Serbia: Media and government

U.S. expert on the Balkans Daniel Serwer recently published an analysis of the media scene in Serbia, regarding claims of censorship and stifling of media freedoms.

Serwer, senior research professor and senior fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, wrote that he "asked a knowledgeable friend about media freedom in Serbia."

Noting that he was "prepared to publish other well-reasoned perspectives on this issue," Serwer posted the reply he received on is blog:

"Here is my theory on the Serbian media scene.

Media freedom activists (MFA) who claim there is censorship imposed directly by the Serbian government or even Prime Minister Vui himself and who consist of both journalists and nongovernmental organization representatives constitute a small fraction of people working in the media sector overall. Most journalists do not complain about censorship and perform their jobs normally.

Of course, being a minority does not mean being wrong. But in the case of the MFA, the problem is the argumentation they use in their attempts to prove that there is censorship. What they emphasize as their ultimate proof is that a vast majority of mainstream media never, or at most rarely, criticize Vui.

It is true that most media treat Vui in a positive way, but that does not necessarily have to be due to censorship by him or the government as a whole. The media do not operate in a vacuum; they are an integral part of broader society. As such, they reflect the general mood of the public. If Vui enjoys huge support from people, it is not surprising that most media might be reluctant to write or speak against him, even if they have grounds. They do not want to risk alienating their readers and followers, both actual and potential.

Even though Vui is today far more popular than Tadi ever was during his presidency (and certainly holds more power than Tadi did), when you compare the number and percentage of mainstream media that are currently pro-Vui with the number of those that were pro-Tadi when he was in power, youll see that, strangely, more media then favored Tadi than now favor Vui.

Another two factors that I believe contribute a great deal to sycophantic behavior of some media toward those in power (at any given time, not just at present) are opportunism and cowardice. An example of cowardice is when a journalist refrains from criticizing a politician in power not because someone influential warned them not to, but because of perceived fear of getting into trouble if they did. An example of opportunism is when a journalist (or editor) flatters powerful figures in hopes of earning privileges in return. Albeit different, both can be regarded as cases of self-censorship.

In terms of their attitude toward the ruling elite, Serbian mass media can be roughly classified into three basic categories.

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Serbia: Media and government