Chinese Censorship Under the Microscope

The cadres in charge of controlling the media in Chinaand importantly over the last several years, influencing the media outside of Chinahave a crucial job to perform, necessitated by the internal logic of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule: On the one hand, they must show that the Party is the rightful and successful ruler of China; on the other, they must deal with those who would say otherwise.

As Sarah Cook, a researcher for Freedom House, puts it in her recent report: For the partys narrative to be convincing to audiences inside and outside China, reportingespecially investigative reportingabout the darker sides of CCP rule at home and Chinese activities abroad must be suppressed.

According to two new reports published on Oct. 22, Chinese communist propaganda and censorship officers have over the last few years developed a rich and nuanced set of practices and tactics aimed at affecting these outcomes.

Anne Nelson, another researcher, published a report on the international expansion of China Central Television, the broadcast mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, on the same day. Both reports were sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy, a U.S.-funded agency that supports democracy around the world.

Cooks report methodically peels back the layers of the Partys censorship apparatus, examining each to see how it functions, who it targets, and what effect it has: there is direct action by Chinese diplomats, officials, and security personnel, who simply obstruct reporters and punish recalcitrant media outlets; there are economic inducements and punishments; there is indirect diplomatic, political, and economic pressure, transmitted through advertisers or governments; and then simply cyberespionage or even physical attacks.

There was, for example, the time that the chief editor of Bloomberg was approached by a top Chinese diplomat, who attempted to have him kill a story about the finances of the family of Xi Jinping, at the time the incoming general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. The story ran, but Bloombergs English website was blocked soon afterward.

That did not have a significant impact on Bloombergs business because its English-language readership in China is limited. The New York Times, however, was hit somewhat harder. After it ran an investigation that sought to show how the family of Wen Jiabao had gained vast wealth, the Chinese authorities shut down its Chinese-language website, which had just opened. The stock dropped 20 percent overnight, Cooks report says. Reprisals of this kind are meant as a warning to others who would transgress against the Partys reporting preferences.

Journalists on the ground in China can find that the face of censorship is a little more sharp-toothed. In February of this year, thugs believed to be dispatched by the local government of a village near Beijing intercepted the vehicle of a German film crew and smashed their windshield in with baseball bats.

The former chief technical officer of Epoch Times in 2006 was also a recipient of the kinetic approach: a group of men made their way into his home in Atlanta, tied him up, and beat him about the head with a gun handle. There is no direct evidence that the men were associated with the Chinese Communist Party, but Mr. Yuan believed it to be the case. Two of my file cabinets were pried open. Two of my laptop computers were taken away, but the more expensive items, such as cameras, were not.

More subtle forms of influence are almost ubiquitous. Eutelsat, a French satellite company, was one of the more disturbing examples of undue influence, Cook said at an Oct. 22 National Endowment for Democracy forum in Washington, D.C.

Read more:
Chinese Censorship Under the Microscope