The Pandemic and International Migration: Exploiting the Healthcare Crisis to Reform Mobility Governance – Valdai Discussion Club

Itisremarkable that liberal and authoritarian states around the globe alike turned toultra-radical policy measures and largely outlawed fundamental liberties including the right toleave ones country, city oreven home, atleast temporarily, not seen since the exceptional times ofmartial law, the Chinese Hukou system orthe Soviet era, writes Franck Dvell, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies, Osnabrck University.

Early 2020, Earth was struck byapandemic, not for the first time though but this time itcaused aglobal moral panic. The initial response tofight the spread ofthe virus was tofight mobility and international migration, internal mobility, commuting towork and even short trips for shopping orvisiting family and friends were largely banned. Basically, the engine that drives much oftodays economy and social life mobility came toagrinding halt; only digital industries, the transportation and delivery sectors and certain key industries were spared and partly even thrived. Still, working-hours equivalent to100 million full-time jobs were lostand the global economy has dropped by3.2 to4.5%, aloss of4 or even 8trillionUS dollar. Asaside-effect, many fundamental rights and civil liberties such asthe right totravel, work, education orfamily life ortogather for political purposes were defacto suspended.

Crises often highlight orexacerbate issues that had already been looming but were often concealed ofanotherwise healthy-looking situation. For example, the arrival oflarge numbers ofrefugees frequently reveals pre-existing latent nationalism and xenophobia. History also shows that crises can and have been exploited topush through policies that had already been inthe drawers but were considered too controversial tobeput into practice. For example, the dismantling ofworkers and welfare rights from the 1970s inEurope and theUS only became possible inthe wake ofthe economic crisis. And this year,warningshave been issued not tomisuse public health issues for other political purposes; though mycontributions suggests that these have not been acknowledged everywhere.

The pandemic struck atatime ofand thus overlaps with several other crises, the protracted Syrian crisis, theglobal refugee crisisnumbers have reached record level, the crisis oftheEU partly triggered byBrexit aswell asthe rise ofilliberal and/or Eurosceptic forces and political turmoil intheUS and elsewhere, and now the Afghanistan crisis. Itthus occurred attimes ofafundamental transformation ofthe global socio-economic and political order all causing uncertainties and tensions.

Notably, mobility had already been widely looked atwith increasing anxiety. Inmany countries, anti-migration sentiments and xenophobia had for long been onthe rise. This spurred asecuritisation ofmigration and the pandemic added concerns over health security tothis already strong trend. Migration and migrants are now widely perceived asrisks. This isfuelled bythe climate crisis which has already been raising doubts over the future ofextensive driving, flying and traveling asissotypical for our hyper-mobile era; the pandemic further accelerated this trend. Also the rise ofauthoritarian ruling had been noticed inmany parts ofthe world and the pandemic only spurred this trend. Itisvery likely that atleast some ofthe new features, notably new lines ofmigration and border controls such ashealth controls and traveller tracking and tracing apps will exist beyond the end ofthe pandemic just asmany ofthe measures introduced after 9/11 are still operational.

The recentreportbyDmitri Poletaev and Andrei Korobkov onInternational Migration inPandemic Times published bythe Valdai Club isnot only sorelevant because itadds tointernational scholarship the cases ofRussia and Central Asia, cases which are sooften and annoyingly neglected bywestern academia. The report also reveals some important similarities and differences between Russia, theUS and other countries.

Onthe one hand, itshows that inRussia, aswell asinGermany, theUK orDubai the pandemic exposes the vulnerability ofmigrants, notably their often precarious immigration status aswell astheir precarious employment situation. Italso illustrates how close many ofthem and their families are onthe brink ofpoverty: many lost their job but are not eligible tobenefits and have thus become destitute. This, wecould clearly see, isaglobal phenomenon affecting migrants inRussia, Germany and elsewhere alike.

Onthe other hand, the report implies, for example, that reverse migration ofmigrant workers seems more dramatic inRussia but also intheUK (partly driven byBrexit) orthe Gulf countries than, for example, inGermany. Itcan beassumed that this isbecause immigrants inGermany often have apermanent status and thus access towelfare rights sothat they are affected less severe than those migrants with atemporary and thus precarious status; hence, incountries with more settled immigrants fewer people are severely affected bythe economic consequences ofthe pandemic sothat the pressure toreturn isless strong.

Further tothis, Poletaev and Korobkov imply that also the different countries oforigin inthe different regional migration systems are affected quite differently bythis great reverse migration and the subsequent collapse ofremittances ofmigrants. Whereas intheEU migrants intheir majority come from other member states they did not immediately plunge into severe poverty upon return; incontrast, inthe already poor Central Asian republics the return ofthe now unemployed migrants and the breakdown ofthe all-important remittances pushed many families into despair, asinUzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Apotential side-effect ofthe increase ofglobal poverty due tothe loss ofincome from migrant work wemight only see inthe future: rising poverty could potentially fuel social discontent which inturn may lead tothe destabilisation ofentire regions and countries. This would cause more future forced migration which would affect the still affluent countries, also the international relations between the different countries would bedistorted.

The surprising decline ofxenophobia inRussia, asopposed, for example, toGermanyis, however, deceptive, asthe authors show asithas been only retreating due tothe now limited contacts between Russians and migrants; xenophobia israther sleeping than diminishing asthey argue convincingly.

Only implicitly the report also highlights acouple ofother important differences between Russia, theUS and someEU countries and between specific groups ofmigrants. For instance, migrants toRussia are more likely tobelow-skilled filling gaps atthe bottom ofthe labour market and whilst intheUS and theEU wefind similar patterns there isnevertheless astrong focus onskilled migration.

Also, inwestern countries the proportion ofrefugees who since 2020 find iteven more difficult tomigrate issignificantly higher than inRussia; therefore, the decline ofinternational refugee migration toOECD countries isfelt more pronounced inthe West than inthe East. Indeed, weprobably need tocome toterms with the fact that inthe wake ofthe pandemic the west has been silently accelerating the demolition ofthe international refugee system. Notably, the Afghanistan crisis suggests that large-scale forced migration will becombatted byall means necessary whilst being replaced byaregime ofcomparably small-scale evacuations and resettlements. This suggests, that the pandemic has been used toreverse animportant element ofthe post-war western liberal and human rights-based system; anelement that Russia and other countries inthe Global East never (fully) implemented anyway.

Generally, generic references tomigration tend toobscure differences between and discrimination ofspecific group, notably women, specific nationalities orethnicities, families and children orirregular immigrants. But many reports demonstrate that the pandemic exacerbated structural inequality and thus the vulnerability ofmany people. For example, becausemigrant womenare disproportionally employed ininformal services they have been more likely tolose their jobs due tolockdowns whilst simultaneously excluded from benefits. The same goes for irregular immigrants. Also, transnational families, astypical inmigration, have been separated for long periods oftime; notablychildrenhave been affected the worst.

Toconclude, itisremarkable that liberal and authoritarian states around the globe alike turned toultra-radical policy measures and largely outlawed fundamental liberties including the right toleave ones country, city oreven home, atleast temporarily, not seen since the exceptional times ofmartial law, the Chinese Hukou system orthe Soviet era. States, the pandemic has shown, still have the power toalmost fully control migration; infact, nationalism and national interests once more trump rights-based, multilateral orsupranational arrangements. This disprovesprevious claimsthat under conditions ofglobalisation states have lost control over their borders; rather the opposite isthe case, border controls have been modernised and intensified and are more effective than ever before. Some ofthe new migration selection criteria and new control lines are very likely tostay. The pandemic thus accelerates the trend tofacilitating migration ofskilled workers into key industries whilst preventing undesirable migration; italso drives replacing migration and mobility with remote working. Itremains tobeseen whether and towhat extent the pandemic spurs aparadigmatic shiftinsocio-political and economic policies, the often-mentionednew normal.

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The Pandemic and International Migration: Exploiting the Healthcare Crisis to Reform Mobility Governance - Valdai Discussion Club