Volokh Conspiracy: Second Amendment and people who had been committed to a mental institution 28 years ago

Under federal law, people who have been involuntarily committed to a mental institution however long ago are barred from possessing guns. Congress agreed that people with long-past mental problems might now be sane, and thus not especially dangerous, and provided for a means to apply for restoration of gun rights. But then in 1992 Congress ordered ATF not to spend any money applying the restoration program. And while it provided, in 2007, that people could get their rights restored by applying to a state that has a qualifying program for evaluating applicants mental fitness, many states have no such program.

This case was brought by a resident of one such state that lacks a relief-from-disabilities program, Michigan. From the courts opinion, Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriffs Dept (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 2014):

This case presents an important issue of first impression in the federal courts: whether a prohibition on the possession of firearms by a person who has been committed to a mental institution, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4), violates the Second Amendment. Twenty-eight years ago, Clifford Charles Tyler was involuntarily committed for less than one month after allegedly undergoing an emotionally devastating divorce. Consequently, he can never possess a firearm. Tyler filed suit in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court dismissed Tylers suit for failure to state a claim. Because Tylers complaint validly states a violation of the Second Amendment, we reverse and remand.

Tyler is a seventy-three-year-old resident of Hillsdale County, Michigan. On January 2, 1986, a state probate court committed Tyler to a mental institution. Tyler alleges that he underwent an emotionally devastating divorce in 1985 and that he was involuntarily committed because of a risk that he might be suicidal.

Tyler submitted a 2012 substance-abuse evaluation containing additional information about his 1985 depression. In 1985, when Tyler was forty-five years old, Tylers wife of twenty-three years served him divorce papers. Prior to filing for divorce, Tylers ex-wife allegedly ran away with another man and depleted Tylers finances. Tyler felt overwhelmed and sat in the middle of the floor at home pounding his head. According to a mental-health evaluation submitted by Tyler, Tyler was crying non-stop, not sleeping, depressed, and suicidal at this time. Tylers daughters became scared and contacted the police. [Tyler was then involuntarily committed. -EV]

In 2012, Tyler underwent a psychological evaluation. Tyler informed the psychologist that he had never experienced a depressive episode other than his 1985 incident. The psychologists report indicated that Tyler has no criminal history. The psychologist contacted Tylers physician who also reported that she had not detected evidence of mental illness in Tyler. The psychologist determined that Tylers prior involuntary commitment appeared to be a brief reactive depressive episode in response to his wife divorcing him. The psychologist determined that there was no evidence of mental illness.

The court concluded quite rightly, I think that Hellers endorsement of restrictions on gun ownership by the mentally ill doesnt dispose of the case:

The Courts assurance that Heller does not cast doubt on prohibitions on the possession of firearms by the mentally ill does not resolve this case. For 922(g)(4) prohibits firearm possession not just by the mentally ill but by anyone who has been committed to a mental institution. Hellers assurance that the state may prohibit the mentally ill from possessing firearms may provide solid constitutional ground for 922(g)(4)s restriction as to an individual adjudicated as a mental defective, but it is insufficient by itself to support the restriction as to individuals who have been involuntarily committed at some time in the past.

The court then concluded that strict scrutiny (not intermediate scrutiny) was generally the proper test to apply to gun restrictions, outside those categories excluded from Second Amendment scrutiny by Heller. The court, however, predict[ed] that the application of strict scrutiny over intermediate scrutiny will not generally affect how circuits decide various challenges to federal firearm regulations; this might seem surprising, but the courts explanation of this prediction on pp. 26-27 strikes me as quite plausible. And the court then applied strict scrutiny here are some excerpts from the analysis, which focuses largely on the fact that Congress (1) chose to create a system for people with past mental commitments to regain their Second Amendment rights, but (2) then defunded the federal system and decided to rely on state choices whether to set up their own state systems:

At issue here is only 922(g)(4)s prohibition on possession by persons previously committed to a mental institution. Not all previously institutionalized persons are mentally ill at a later time, so the law is, at least somewhat, overbroad. But is it impermissibly so? Congress, in its efforts to keep firearms away from the mentally ill, may cast a wider net than is necessary to perfectly remove the harm. A prophylactic approach thus obviate[s] the necessity for large numbers of individualized determinations. But is 922(g)(4)s net too wide? Are previously institutionalized persons sufficiently dangerous, as a class, that it is permissible to deprive permanently all such persons of the Second Amendment right to bear arms?

View original post here:
Volokh Conspiracy: Second Amendment and people who had been committed to a mental institution 28 years ago