The Russians may be learning from the mistakes of the Ukraine war. But are they adapting fast enough? – ABC News

This week, events in Ukraine continued to demonstrate the fluid nature of war. After their successes in the Battle of Kyiv, and the Battle of Kharkiv, the Ukrainians ceded territory in the east. It is indicative of the Russian military's determination to continue its Ukrainian campaign.

The Russians have made steady, if slow, progress in the conduct of their eastern offensive in the Donbas. These tactical advances are probably part of a wider Russian operational design to envelop the territory that forms the last parts of Luhansk under Ukrainian control.

But the Russian successes in the east are also indicators of another more important trend in this war: the Russians are starting to learn from their earlier failures.

Before exploring this in detail, a short detour is necessary to define a method for exploring where the Russians have learned.

Military organisationsincluding in Russia, the US and Australia use principles of war to instruct their soldiers, develop common tactics, and to organise combat and support formations. These principles are, in effect, maxims that represent essential truths about the practice of successful wars, military campaigns and operations.

In the context of this exploration of Russian learning, three principles of war in particular stand out. These are: selection and maintenance of the aim, concentration of force, and cooperation.

In war, and in any military action, the aim must be simple, widely understood and within the means of the forces available. The initial Russian war aims were broad ranging, and did not count on massive Western military aid to Ukraine.

It quickly became clear that these aims were beyond Russian military capacity. The Russians had allocated an invading military that was smaller than that of the state it was attacking, and failed.

More recently, the Russians as highlighted in briefings by senior Russian officershave consolidated their aims to narrower objectives in the east. And they have shifted their forces to give themselves a better chance at achieving these tighter strategic goals. This leads to the second principle of war where Russia has clearly learned.

Success in war often depends on achieving a concentration of military force at the most effective time and place. This should then be supported by efforts such as information operations and diplomacy to magnify the impact of the concentrated military forces.

Early on, the Russians sought to prosecute their war against Ukraine on four ground fronts in the north, northeast, east and south of the country. Another front was the clearly disconnected air and missile attacks against Ukraine.

As shown by the failures around Kyiv and Kharkiv, the Russians have had to reassess this approach. First, they realigned the deployment of their forces so they had fewer "fronts" to support. Second, the Russians have focused their offensive operations in one part of the country the east while largely defending other parts such as in the south and the northeast.

The preponderance of their combat power is in the east, especially Luhansk. They are using this concentration of combat forces to bludgeon their way through Ukrainian defences, destroy military units and population centres, and capture additional territory.

But in stripping forces from other regions, it has made them vulnerable elsewhere. The Ukrainians have thus launched a counter offensive around Kherson.

A final principle of war is cooperation. This is a principle that aims to ensure resources are employed to best effect through the well-planned and cunning orchestration of operations at every level.

Early in the war, it was clear the Russian Army and the Russian Air Force were poorly aligned. At the same time, the Russian inability to effectively use combined arms operations on the groundto synchronise infantry, tanks, artillery, engineers and logistics was another indication of their lack of adherence to the principle of cooperation.

The operations in the east demonstrate a degree of learning in this regard. The Russian air force sortie rate has improved, and it is concentrating much of its efforts to support ground operations in the east. At the same time, there is coordination of Russian ground forces. They have moved slowly and cautiously, used their advantage in artillery well, and have been careful not to expose their logistics to attack.

And at the higher level, the Russians have appointed a senior Russian general as the overall commander of the Ukrainian campaign. It has been a brutal and destructive approach in the east, but the Russians are likely to see it as successful.

This begs a larger question: What might be the impact of this Russian tactical learning be on the overall conduct of the war? The Russians have generated tactical momentum in the east, but how far they can carry their current advances will depend on their logistics, Ukraine's defensive strategy, and the conduct of Ukrainian offensives elsewhere that might draw away Russian forces.

And despite recent Russian gains, the overall strategic balance still appears to favour Ukraine. They have significant reserves of personnel available. The Ukrainians have also demonstrated better tactical leadership, morale and strategic planning than the Russians.

And finally, the massive inflow of Western arms, including longer range rocket artillery and precision weapons, gives the Ukrainians a significant edge over a Russian Army whose access to such systems is being constrained by Western sanctions.

All wars are ultimately a learning competition; they are in effect an adaptation battle.

Russia has demonstrated some capacity to learn from its mistakes at the tactical level. But its ability as a nation to learn and adapt to the economic, diplomatic, informational and other impacts of its flawed strategy to invade Ukraine remains to be seen.

Mick Ryan is a strategist and recently retired Australian Army major general. He served in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, and as a strategist on the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. His first book, War Transformed, is about 21st century warfare.

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The Russians may be learning from the mistakes of the Ukraine war. But are they adapting fast enough? - ABC News