Category Archives: Socio-economic Collapse

The Supreme Courts ruling last week on cooperatives restricts the operation of the 97th Amendment to the Constitution, passed by Parliament in 2011, to multi-State cooperative societies. This Amendment had sought to spell out a set of governance norms to be enforced by the Centre on cooperatives, the running of which is a State subject. The apex court has observed that for the amendment to hold, at least half the State assemblies should have passed it. Therefore, the newly formed Cooperation Ministry at the Centre can oversee the running of multi-State cooperatives (which form a fraction of the over 8.5 lakh such bodies in India). The Reserve Bank of India oversees the functioning of urban cooperative banks, following an amendment to the Banking Regulation Act last September. However, cooperatives that do not call themselves banks, do not issue cheques, and are restricted in their operations to a single State, will continue to be governed by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies (RoCS). Cooperative societies are set up either as quasi-banks (receiving term deposits and disbursing credit) or producing or marketing entities, such as in sugar, dairy and fertiliser sectors. A collapse of a credit cooperative can cause a serious contagion effect. The trouble here is that the district and State cooperative banks are under RBI and NABARD oversight, while primary agriculture credit societies (PACS) that accept lay deposits are under the RoCS. The unfolding of a cooperative bank scam in Kerala, where the primary agriculture credit societies (PACS) actually call themselves banks, underscores the need for cohesive regulation which the States should appreciate. The RoCS has failed to ensure professional governance. For PACS an independent body that comprises the RoCC and other professionals should be set up in the States.

Producer cooperatives have achieved impressive socio-economic gains in Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. However, their structure and access to resources financial, physical and human opens them to political misuse and patronage. Revenues from cooperatives finance elections, while jockeying for political control of cooperatives is commonplace in these States. As for credit cooperatives, it is true that some PACS have produced remarkable outcomes but are deprived of necessary funding from district cooperative banks for political reasons. The challenge is to improve transparency in the running of all cooperatives.

There can be no denying that the States, while fiercely defending their turf here, need to set cooperatives right and not merely blame the Centre for interference. Successes in Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala should be replicated in the rest of the country. An independent oversight system for cooperatives could show the way forward. The Centre should operate with a light touch, recognising that decentralised governance works best.

More here:

Co-operative solution - BusinessLine

Former president Thabo Mbeki.

Former president Thabo Mbeki says the current state of the ANC is of concern and South Africans' confidence in the party is dwindling.

Mbeki was delivering the Walter Sisulu Memorial Lecture on Saturday afternoon.

"The survival of the ANC threatens our country and all 60 million citizens, which is virtually in a general political and socio-economic crisis. It cannot, and must not, be that we, the ANC leadership, are trapped in an organisational death wish".

He said the renewal of the ANC was imperative.

"Our democracy means more than just a vote. The ANC should make an honest assessment on how the quality of life of citizens has changed."

READ |Thabo Mbeki: Without an ANC 'renewal', major problems of our country will not be solved

Mbeki spoke on the Covid-19 pandemic and how the government handled it.

"The measures introduced to stop the spread of the virus led to a sharp decline of economic activity. And it has a direct effect on the livelihoods of South Africans, their prospects for finding work, recovery of their businesses and our collective future. Our economy is facing the worst crisis since 2008."

He said the state was running out of options.

Eskom is a ticking time bomb, threatening the collapse of the economy. Tax revenue is declining, and other state-owned entities are at various stages of collapse.

Mbeki reflected on the Freedom Charter, which was endorsed in Kliptown, Soweto, 66 years ago. In 1955, the ANC sent 50 000 volunteers into various parts of the country, to collect "freedom demands" from South Africans. The charter was officially adopted on 26 June.

READ ALSO|ANC stalwarts welcome the return to the values of Luthuli, Tambo and Mandela

Mbeki said South Africans were getting poorer, while private and public investments were declining.

"The hard reality is that economic recovery cannot be achieved, except through an implementable plan, with all social partners committed."

Continue reading here:

Thabo Mbeki on why South Africans are losing confidence in the ANC - News24

Among all the sectors suffering the brunt of COVID-19, the retail sector has suffered the most. The first wave of the pandemic enforced a nationwide lockdown which led to a massive downfall of the economy and the retail sector witnessed huge turmoil.

The retail industry has been swarmed with very tough choices, either downsizing to shutting down completely. In the process, a lot of retail companies could not find their feet on the ground and have been forced to quit the business.

The crisis has engulfed the organised and the unorganised sector under its effects. Organised sector companies still have better balance sheets and access to finance to manage for relatively more time but the unorganised segment which is bigger in size was holed badly.

A large percentage of the migrated workforce which moved back to their hometowns are often engaged in these small retail shops. Things had started coming back to usual during the last quarter of 2020 and early 2021, but the Second Wave hit again and this time in a more severe form. The lockdown and lockdown-like restrictions across the country have made a difficult case for the retail industry to survive owing to real estate costs, human resources and other overheads.

As the restrictions are being eased and markets have been allowed to open conditionally, there is still some life left in the retail to fight and recover even though slowly. But if the Third Wave of the same magnitude hits the country with below-average preparedness, we may witness a collapse of Indian retail leading to huge socio-economic disturbance. Those who were banking on their savings to survive till now or have managed to borrow from money lenders to get the game going would not find a way to escape the vicious circle which we better know as the debt trap. There will be a cascading effect of the same and many sectors including manufacturing, logistics, auto etc. would have a bearing of retail sector fallout.

Retail is one such thread that keeps the entire economy connected and moving. If we recall the 2008 financial crisis, it was the unorganised sector that provided a gateway for the country to bounce back. The consumption-led economy still had huge demand, no lockdowns and circulation of funds kept things under control and the heat of the global crisis was felt in limited magnitude. But the COVID-induced situation has not been the same. On the contrary, the last 15 months has posed a big question of survival for the retail sector.

According to the Confederation of All India Traders, around 8 crore traders in India have suffered a cumulative business loss to the tune of Rs 6.25 lakh crore during April. Of this, the retail businesses suffered an estimated business loss of about Rs 4.25 lakh crore. Although subsequent lockdowns and similar restrictions can be attributed for the loss, per capita spending has also taken a backseat.

Retail outlets selling non-essential goods have already seen a temporary closure. The spike in COVID cases during each wave has infused a sense of fear among customers, which will now keep them away from the market for a longer duration, therefore, hampering the demand further.

Companies are working on the revised blueprints to remain in the markets while most of the small scale businessmen and retailers are in a helpless situation. When a significant component of the economy malfunctions, the implications can be seen across all retail categories, be it apparel, auto, lifestyle, etc. The dots can easily be connected and the latest unemployment data further adds insult to the injury.

The lockdown has led to rise in digital sales channels and has made life tough for existing offline retailers. This has impacted commercial real estate with a lack of buyers.

As far as spending is concerned, the priorities of the customers have changed. As of now, health and safety of the family have become a priority and shopping has taken a backseat. The online and e-commerce sales which helped in the survival of the sector during the First Wave also couldnt sustain those levels during the deadly Second wave, majorly because the consumer sentiment is at an all-time decline. Till the customers have a sense of health security, this priority is unlikely to change.

The two Waves have already hit the country badly and taken us backwards and there is no actual prediction as to how many more Waves may come. The bigger question is of what magnitude will be the next Wave that will hit the nation. The dent of the first two Waves would take a significant amount of time to fade and the retail backbone is not ready to take up a similar economic shock. Therefore, the need of the hour is to prepare a backup plan for the sectors which are reeling under the crisis.

The pace of vaccination needs to be further expedited so that even if there is a recurrence of COVID, a lockdown can be avoided and economic activities can go on. Also, there is a dire need for some kind of policy change that would allow retailers to cope up with the crisis. Apart from this, the government must also mull over providing a relief package for the retail sector so that it can sustain the Third Wave, else there will be a huge impact on the sector and consequently, a major impact on the overall economic development of the country.

More:

Retail sector won't be able to survive COVID Third Wave; policy change required if there is one - Free Press Journal

Hunger and malnutrition in the Arab region stand in the way of achieving Zero Hunger by 2030, UN report warns

Transforming food systems in the Arab region is crucial to ending hunger and malnutrition in the region

A United Nations study indicates that hunger in the Arab region continues to rise, threatening the regions efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including the Zero Hunger goal.

The latest edition of the Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition in the Near East and North Africa, published today, estimates that more than 51 million people in the region are suffering from hunger.

According to the report, the "triple burden of malnutrition" consisting of undernutrition, overweight and obesity, and micronutrient deficiencies (often linked to poor diets) continue to increase at an alarming speed in the Arab region, particularly among school-age children and adults.

The report highlights that 22.5 percent of children under 5 years of age were stunted, 9.2 percent wasted and 9.9 percent were overweight. The Arab region also ranked second for adult obesity in the world in 2019, with 27 percent of the adult population obese.

Vulnerable food systems is a serious concern in the Arab region

Conflicts and protracted crises continue to be the main drivers behind the degrading hunger situation, but the regions food systems as a whole are failing to deliver the affordable, diverse, safe and nutritious food to all is exacerbating the situation, said Abdulhakim El Waer, FAOs Assistant Director-General and Regional Representative for the Near East and North Africa while commenting on the latest report.

Population growth and migration, increasing dependency on food imports, water scarcity and the threat of climate change are also putting a heavy toll on the regions food systems and increase its vulnerability, Elwaer added.

Healthy diets for ending hunger and malnutrition

This year, the report focuses its attention on the resilience of the food systems. Resilience is critical to improve food security and nutrition situation in the region, and to ensure that the regions food systems are able to resist and recover from shocks and stresses, like the COVID-19 pandemic. It also includes an in depth analysis of current dietary patterns, and the costs of diets for individuals, society, and the planet.

COVID-19 undermined the already fragile food systems in the Arab region. It is time for urgent action to transform our socio-economic policies, food system strategies and modes of economic and technological governance, to achieve their sustainability and inclusiveness, and ensure food accessibility and healthy diets for all, Ms. Rola Dashti, ESCWA Executive Secretary said.

According to the report, growing urbanization, liberalization of markets and demographic, social, economic, and political changes have been contributing to a progressive shift in the way population of the Arab region eat.

Volatile exchange rates and high prices affect many countries in the region, it is now all the more important to help the most vulnerable to grow their food, generate incomes and become more resilient in the face of these multiple shocks. The past years have shown us how economic collapse and conflict threaten to keep even bread out of peoples hands, says Corinne Fleischer, WFP Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa. Peoples ability to put food on the table is key to the stability of societies. Hunger and uncertainty about the next meal breeds conflict and political instability.

New consumption patterns include shifting away from healthy diets, the traditional, seasonal, and more diverse diets rich in whole grains, fruits, and vegetables. They are greatly influencing the nature, scope and magnitude of nutrition problems in the region as well as the burden of diseases and risk factors associated with them.

"Despite the importance of dietary diversity for both the physical and cognitive development of children, diverse and nutritious foods are currently not accessible to all. Conflicts and political instability have contributed to inequities in access to healthy diets within and between countries of the region, said Ted Chaiban, UNICEF Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa. Many countries in the region still show high levels of stunting or overweight in children. This underlines the need for food systems that protect, promote and support diets, services and practices that prevent child malnutrition in all its forms, he added.

Enhancing the resilience and transforming the regions food system for a better future of food

Sustainable, resilient food systems are fundamental to ensuring that people in the region and future generations eat healthy food, the Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition for the Near East and North Africa highlights.

The report calls on countries to transform their food systems to increase their capacity in delivering healthy diets for all, while ensuring that food production and consumption contribute to environmental sustainability.

ENDs-

####

Notes to Editors:

About the report

The Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition for the Near East and North Africa sheds the light on the progress towards the targets of Sustainable Development Goal 2 aims at ending hunger and all forms of malnutrition in the region. It also provides projections of the number of undernourished people in the region by 2030 under a continuation of trends.

The annual report jointly produced by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

Contact

WFP

Reem Nada, WFP/ Cairo,Mob. +20 106 6663 4522reem.nada@wfp.org

FAO

Regional Communication Office for the Near East and North Africa

RNE-Communications@fao.org(+2) 02 33 316 000, extension 2777Mohamed AlaidaroosMohamed.Alaidaroos@fao.org(+971) 50 699 6411

FAO | Regional Office for the Near East and North Africa

11, AL Islah El Zerai, Dokki-Cairo, Cairo, Egypt(+2) 02 333 16000www.fao.org/neareast

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Near East and North Africa Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition 2020: Enhancing Resilience of Food Systems in the Arab States - World -...

The actual complexities of reality are difficult to put into structured, cohesive arguments, leading public debate toward simpler and generally binary discussions. When confronting a level of extreme complexity such as the Venezuelan crisis, Argentinas political actors tend to align themselves ideologically: to different degrees those close to the ruling Frente de Todos coalition defend the regime of Nicols Maduro, while supporters of the opposing Juntos por el Cambio coalition consider it Venezuelas government to be a dictatorship that must be toppled by any means possible. Hardliners in the opposition close to former president Mauricio Macri continue to use the electoral slogan that Kirchnerism will take us down the road to Venezuela, while their counterparts in the pan-Peronist coalition led by Alberto Fernndez and Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner deny evident human rights violations perpetrated by the Maduro regime, continuing to describe it as democratic.

In Venezuela, both Maduro and main opposition leader Juan Guaid appear to have noted the changing winds of the times, recently expressing pragmatic positions based on dialogue with each other. In his interview with Perfils Jorge Fontevecchia (published in English in this issue), Guaid repeats time and time again that its time to put all options on the table in order to ensure free and fair elections as soon as possible. He calls it his salvation plan for Venezuela. And while he continues to denounce Maduro and his henchmen as human rights violators and dictators, he makes it clear that he would be happy to see them board a plane to Cuba and be done with them, even if judicial processes are still underway at the International Criminal Court.

For his part, Maduro chatted with Bloomberg Television and, despite lambasting the Yankee imperialists, he made a thinly veiled plea to US President Joe Biden to lift crippling economic sanctions in exchange for concessions. Indeed, in the interview (also re-produced in this issue), Maduro asks for the country to be allowed to export oil, gold and other commodities in order to be able to pay bondholders, while inviting US investors to sink capital into the embattled South American nation. Over the past two years the Maduro regime has cut subsidies on everything from gasoline to credit, eliminated price controls, dropped restrictions on imports, and allowed for an ad hoc dollarisation of the economy, writes Bloombergs Erik Schatzker (who conducted the interview). The mandarins of capitalism at the International Monetary Fund couldnt have scripted it better, he adds, noting the reforms are pushed by Vice-President Delcy Rodrguezs adviser Patricio Rivera, Ecuadors former economy minister.

Whether it was Bidens electoral victory over Donald Trump in the United States or the impact of the global coronavirus pandemic on an already imploded economy, both sides of the Venezuelan grieta have publicly stated their intention to sit at the negotiating table. This is a massive step forward after years of deadlock, during which the balance of power has swayed but eventually remained in Maduros court. After several botched popular uprisings, Guaids carefully planned strategy nearly worked in toppling the Chavista regime in 2019. With Trump in the White House, the US had Venezuela in its crosshairs, while throughout Latin America a series of rightist presidents aligned themselves to form a regional block that extended over to Europe. Macri here in Argentina, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Ivn Duqu in Colombia practically threw their support behind an aggressive strategy by the US that involved recognising Guaid as interim president and nearly calling for a military invasion. It almost worked, but Maduro held on.

There can be no doubts that the Boliviarian regime put in place by Hugo Chvez in 1999 has been the worst thing to happen to Venezuela in its entire history. Venezuela ranks near the very bottom of the global rankings for nearly every socio-economic indicator. Once the country with the worlds largest oil reserves and once South Americas richest nation, it has become the poorest with salaries of US$3 per month, inflation rates of 2,300 percent, and an estimated economic contraction of around 80 percent in nine years. More than five million people have fled the embattled nation looking for opportunities abroad, the second worst refugee crisis in the world after Syria.

Both Chvez and Maduro have abused the countrys democratic institutions and put in place one of the worst autocratic regimes in the world. As United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet put in her recent landmark report on abuses in Venezuela, extrajudicial killings, politically motivated detention and torture, protest-related violations and a compromised judiciary have become the norm the markings of a failed state.

Thus, it is extremely troubling when Alberto Fernndez says that the human rights issue in Venezuela has progressively disappeared. Or when his administration expresses abjectly contradictory positions before multilateral organisations including the United Nations and the Organisation of American States (OAS). Alberto, of course, is playing a dual game: trying to keep an internal balance in the governing coalition that spans from Boliviarian all the way to the hard right, and playing the regional geopolitical game. Its clear that in leaving the Lima Group and aligning Argentina with Mexico and Uruguay before Luis Lacalle Pou took the presidency Alberto Fernndez was looking for a negotiated de-escalation between the Maduro regime and the opposition that could lead to elections. Now, some suggest he could even act as a mediator between the opposing sides, with the backing of Pope Francis. He needs to start being a lot more careful with what he says if he aspires to play such a part.

If indeed Maduro and Guaid are ready to play ball, the final piece of the puzzle is Biden. The US has kept its cards close to the vest, indicating it would not pursue the Trumpian agenda of all-out aggression and even easing just barely certain sanctions. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has called Maduro a brutal dictator though, and the Biden administration will be keen to keep the pressure on Venezuela if it serves its domestic political goals.

Venezuelas collapse into one of the worlds most troubled countries is an extremely complex phenomenon, and theres many questions as to whether the process can actually be reversed. If the different actors engage and incentives are aligned, the beginning of a solution could be in the works, and Argentina could play an important role, if it figures out its own internal contradictions first.

related news

Excerpt from:

Maduro, Guaid and Alberto: the beginning of a new phase in Venezuela? - Buenos Aires Times

Authors: Maxim Sigachev and Elena Elena*

Tolerance remains a complicated issue in the West and Russia alike. The challenge, though, remains in the need to account for the connection between the notions of tolerance, social security, and the development of the society. The West tends to adopt a broader perspective on tolerance when compared to Russian practices. In Europe, the notions of tolerance is informed by active cooperation rather than merely patience, as is the case in Russia.

There are at least four dimensions to this issue in Europe:

This article is devoted to the problem of the social and political crises in Italy, which have been caused by pan-European problems (i.e., migration, anti-EU attitudes of the public) and strengthened by the national Italian conflicts (the gap between the Northern and the Southern regions, debates between the Left and the Right opposition, the rise of the populist parties etc.).

Social and political discrepancies in Italy

As a part of the EU, Italy has to get through the complex processes of adaptation to a life in a supranational union, which includes profound transformations in socio-economic, cultural, and even religious spheres. If we analyze the election agenda used by the Italian populist parties in the European elections 2019 campaign, we will notice the strong anti-EU discourse and a deep disappointment in the EU politics. Being part of the EU is conceived as a loss of independence. Further, we can notice the increasing deficit of tolerance in many spheres: religious, sociocultural, ethnic, ideological.

Research on the contemporary European political parties notes that Eurosceptical spirit is strong in developing economies and advanced economies (as is the case with Germany and the UK) alike[1]. Thus, Italys crises are not necessarily unique but can be found across the Western world as well.

The crisis of Western world order manifests itself on, at least, three levels:

The European societies are characterized by a growing alienation between the rich and the poor, the elites and the people, the establishment and the middle class.

The idea of social and political divisions was first proposed by Stein Rokkan, who studied the existing divisions between political parties that are caused by cleavages between the center and the periphery, the city and the village, etc.

Rokkans theory was developed by Paul Lazarsfeld, who studied electoral behavior and stated that people vote not only for their own social group but also in favor of it[2].

According to S. Rokkan, the European party system was developed on the foundation of existing social conflicts. Rokkan also formulated the basic lines of conflicts such as centerperiphery, statechurch, employeeemployer, citycountry. The social discrepancies of the Lipset-Rokkan theory were built on by French political scientist D.-L. Seiler in the work Whether it is possible to apply the clivages of Rokkan to Central Europe?

We can use this theory to explain the stability of the European political systems in the second half of the 20th century and electoral behavior of the Europeans.

Among the notable works on the cleavage theory are R. Rose and D. Urwin Persistence and Change in Western party systems since 1945 [3] S. Wolinetz The Transformation of Western European Party System Revisited [4]M. Abrams, R. Rose and R. Hinden[5], G. Evans and S. Whitefield The Evolution of Left and Right in Post-Soviet Russia [6].

Russian scientists rarely study the Italian political system and electoral behavior in the frameworks of the cleavage theory, as they usually study the different aspects of the political life in their research papers. There are some fundamental works that attempt to analyze facts and knowledge of Italian political thought from the perspective of the communist ideology. Cecilia Kin divided the liberal political thought into purely liberal and catholic in her work Italy at the turn of the century. From the history of social political thought, K.G. Kholodkovsky and I.B. Levin compared the Italian Socialist and Communist parties.[7]

The basic factors of social political crisis in contemporary Italy

The basic factors of the social political crisis in modern Italy can be divided into two groups. The first group includes socio-political divisions of a more historical, traditional character, whereas the second group consists of relatively new, contemporary collisions.

The North-South Divide

The contemporary socio-political crisis in Italy originates from the long-term and unfinished division between the North and the South, which has not been overcome since the Italian Risorgemento (unification) in 1861. Historically less developed Southern Italy has always faced serious difficulties. The process of modernization in Southern Italy is ongoing, the standard of living still pales in comparison to wealthy Northern regions. According to the Soviet-Russian researcher K.G. Kholodkovsky, Italy still suffers from the fact that different parts of the country existed as separate states for centuries. The most important consequence of this Italian historic disunity is economic and cultural gaps between the North and the South[8].

Polarization between the Left and the Right

The ideological conflict between the Right-wing and the Left-wing political forces also has historically contingent roots and goes back to the period of Risorgimento. In 19th century, the two leading political movementsrepublicans and monarchistsvied for leadership of a newly unified Italy.

One group of politicians led by Giuseppe Mazini tried to establish a Republican Republic, which was supported by the socialist-utopist Carlo Pisacane. Their ideas became the ideological basement for the Italian republicanism. The second group advocated for a monarchy and was led by Camillo Cavour who would later become Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Italy. Those advocating for monarchy provided a base for conservative right-wing sentiments/ideology.

In the 20th century, there was a divide between fascists and anti-fascists. Those who supported Mussolini espoused conservative views. The anti-fascist coalition united a broad spectrum of political movements including democrats, socialists, and communists.

Today it is impossible to claim that the contemporary Italian Left and Right are descendants of that original opposition, but ideological divides are still a prominent feature of Italian politics.

It would be more correct to divide the Italian parties not only along their preferences of political system but along their attitude toward traditional values as well. Today, political parties on the Right tend to be more nationally oriented and Eurosceptic. They typically advocate for traditional values and greater autonomy from EU Commission directives. They are also staunch opponents of high levels of migration from outside the EU.

The Left is more loyal to the EU and the benefits provided to Italy by its institutions. They also support more progressive economic and family policies. A key difference between left and right in Italy is migration. The left tends to be more tolerant of migrants and refugees and advocate for the integration of migrants into Italian society.

Thus, while the division between the Left and the Right has weakened, it certainly still remains intact. Due to the particularities of the national election law, it is difficult to get the majority of the vote needed and enough seats in the Italian Parliament to form the Cabinet of Ministers. Subsequently, this problem forces the Italian parties to create different coalitions to secure seats in the Parliament. These coalitions are often characterized by the ideology of party members (center-right, right-wing, etc.). This changed in 2013 when a new political party, the 5 Stars Movement, uprooted the traditional political spectrum. Now, there is no pure center-right or center-left coalition. Coalitions have become more volatile as ideological divides become deeper as compared to the situation of ten years ago. For example, the right-wing coalition which included Forza Italia! (S. Berlusconi), Fratelli dItalia (G. Meloni) and the Northern League (M. Salvini) won the parliamentary elections of 2018. Despite this result, the far-right League abandoned its ideological partners to form a Coalition Cabinet with the Five Stars Movement which cannot be defined as entirely Left or Right-wing.

New collisions

Recently (in the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century), new collisions emerged: Eurosceptics vs. Eurooptimists, populists vs. traditional political parties, the supporters of migrants vs. opponents of mass immigration (as well as the division between migrants and local communities).

Eurosceptics vs. Eurooptimists

The growth of Euroscepticism in Italy can be attributed to a crisis in relations between the European Union and Italy as well as disappointment from the Italian society in the EU.

Since 1957, Italy has been a strong advocate for greater European integration, however, recently Italy has begun to transform into one of the Euroscepticism centers. According to the sociological data of Eurobarometer, about 50 per cent of the Italian society is disappointed with the European Union.

The question about the relation between Euroscepticism and populism is an intellectual challenge. On the one hand, Eurosceptics are mainly populist movements: not only the anti-immigrant League but also The Five Star Movement. On the other hand, Euroscepticism has been typical for classical Italian communiststhe heirs of the Communist party of Italy. Besides, old populism of Berlusconi is more euro-optimistic than the new populism of Salvini.

Particularities of the relations between Italy and the European Union are based on a disagreement in two key issues: immigration policy and the social economic policy.

Populists vs. Traditional Political Parties

One of the results of this political crisis is the growth of social and political populism. Weinstein noted that there are a few approaches to the phenomenon of populism. According to these approaches, a hybrid phenomenon seems to exist in different dimensions: as an ideology, as a specific style of politics, and as a specific form of political organization.[9] The Italian populism started with Silvio Berlusconi coming to power in 1994. Berlusconi is perceived as the founding father of Italian populism, who managed to unite center-right forces. K.G. Kholodkovsky underlines that populism has in new conditions become a complex of sense and values, uniting many Italians in being connected with the illusion of personalistic overcoming of the gap between authorities and citizens. The breaking of the barriers between the authorities and the people has found its personification in the figure of the uniter of the center-right forces Sylvio Berlusconi[10] As noted previously, the rise of Berlusconi came against the background of the collapse of Christian Democratic and the Communist parties. This fact reflects an important feature of populism:

Pro-migrants vs. Anti-migrants

The migrant crisis manifested itself most significantly in Southern Italy, since the coast of the Italian South is the closest to the North Africa. From a geographical perspective, this fact has turned the Southern part of Italy (especially the island of Lampedusa) into a gate from Africa to Europe for immigration. The immigration issue is not a new one for Italy. There were several waves of internal migration from the Southern to the more economically developed Northern regions. This process fostered resentment between citizens from different parts of the country. However, the European immigration crises as well as burgeoning crowds transformed this internal cleavage into an external one.

The intensification of the migrant crisis in Italy and in the European Union has been reflected in public opinion. According to Eurobarometer, about half of Italians consider immigration as the most important problem for the European Union, whereas another half of the Italian society cites terrorism as the most important dilemma. This fact also demonstrates that Italians are anxious about the consequences of the immigration crisis, because illegal immigration is one of the factors of the growing terrorist threat. According to the Eurobarometer spring 2016 data, 44% of Italians pointed immigration as the most important problem of the European Union. By autumn 2016, this number rose to 49,1%, by spring 2017fell to 40%, then in autumn 2017fell again to 38%, by autumn 2018rose to 41%.

The growth of anti-immigrant sentiments in the Italian society has led to the emergence of the new nationalism, which is typical not only for the poorer regions but also for the richer ones. The figurehead of new nationalism in Italian politics is the League, formerly the League of the North, which has changed its name to appeal to broader segments of Italian society.

Thus, the migrant crisis has added a new collision between migrants and Italians. The problem of illegal migration became an accelerator of the existing Italian conflicts rather than an entirely new phenomenon. Illegal immigration has essentially accelerated these already-existing Italian conflicts.

Conclusion

Economy and culture are the two principal ingredients of the Italian mindset and are sources of intense socio-political divisions, as economic reasons lead to a rise of new divisions, as well as feeding traditional ones.

Economic crises lead to social and political crises. Nowadays, Italian voters are disillusioned with the existing political order giving way to new and less ideologically driven parties. Yet, these parties first years in power have demonstrated their weakness in taking action to overcome the existing crisis.

For example, under Giuseppe Contes First Cabinet, known as yellow-green government of change (due to the colors of the League and the Five Star Movement), inter-coalition conflict between Salvini and Di Maio led to a significant political crisis, creating a weaker position for the Five Star Movement and the ambitions of the Leagues leader Matteo Salvini for domination. On September 5, 2019, Contes Second Cabinet was formed, usually referred to as the yellow-red government, because it was supported by the yellow M5S and the center-left red Democratic party.

The internal political situation in Italy remains unstable, which also results in instability of its foreign policy. Irrefutably, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has contributed significantly to the Italian political crisis. On February 13, 2021, the dilemma peaked when Prime Minister Guiseppe Conte stated he would resign from office. Pro-European technocrat Mario Draghi became the newest Prime Minister of Italy in the wake of Contes resignation. Draghi leads a unity government consisting of mainstream political parties and populist parties such as the League and M5S. This government only failed to garner support of the far-right Brothers of Italy.

Although Draghi has enjoyed widespread support throughout the coronavirus crisis, in the post-covid world there are long-term prospects for conflict between Italy and the EU and between Italys internally divided political system.

*Elena Elena, PhD student at the Institute of Socio-Political Research under the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISPR RAS)

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Fostering Tolerance in Europe: Issues of Migration and Populism in Italy - Modern Diplomacy

With the World Bank identifying Bangladesh as one of only three big economies, along with Pakistan and Mexico, with increased remittance inflow in 2020, and with remittances making up a substantial share of the country's income for long, it is not surprising that a recent study found an unexpected resilience in the rural economy through remittance inflow during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic. The study, supported by the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), shows that according to Bangladesh Bank's monthly remittance data, after reaching a low in March to May 2020, inward remittances quickly recovered in June and peaked in July last year, when remittances reached a record USD 2.6 billion.

Collaborating with Socioconsult Ltd, a well-known survey company in Dhaka, the study was conducted throughout 2020 to develop a more panoramic view of what is happening in rural areas and offer answers to the quick recovery of the Bangladesh economy, which the Asian Development Bank, other multilateral development partners, and the government are working towards. The study is based on a three-round survey (June and September 2020, and January 2021) on the widely used Mahabub Hossain Panel Data (MHPD) samples of more than 2,200 householdscreating nationally representative rural samples that followed multistage random sampling to capture short- to medium-term impacts of the first wave of the pandemic.

The MHPD samples are a unique dataset created and maintained by the late Mahabub Hossain (1945-2016), a respected agricultural economist, and former leader of Brac, IRRI's social science division, Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies (BIDS), and the Asian Society of Agricultural Economists (ASAE). The MHPD has been tracking rural households for around three decades in five different rounds (1988, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2014). It has been used significantly in academic research and in formulating numerous policies of a number of government, nongovernmental, and international development organisations.

Repeating the surveys for the same samples every three to four months throughout 2020 allowed us to observe changes in the rural economy, offering evidence of the quick recovery of consumption and economic conditions of rural households and associated factors. The first-round survey targeted all 2,846 respondents of the survey in 2014 and used detailed contacts provided by those households at that time. In the next rounds, the survey only targeted those who gave full complete answers in the previous round.

The first round of surveys, conducted in June 2020, documented several adverse impacts of the containment measures, such as delayed Boro harvest, difficulty in selling farm produce, labour and material input disruptions and cost increases, and reduced remittance receipts and non-farm business sales. Rural households had to reduce food consumption and required food support from the government and cash support from the private sector. However, when we combine all three rounds of data, our preliminary results revealed a more positive picture in rural areas, with a quick recovery of farm and non-farm businesses, and recovered remittance income and household consumption. The number of farmers reporting labour disruption for different crops and non-crop farm products dropped from 20-53.6 percent to 9-24 percent; the proportion of non-farm/cottage businesses with more than 75 percent decline in sales dropped by 10 percent. We observed both the quantity and quality of food consumption improving substantially over the rest of 2020.

In response to a question asked during the third survey round (in January 2021) on whether households' economic condition improved, was stable or worsened due to the pandemic, around 44 percent reported that their economic condition worsened compared to the pre-Covid-19 situation. However, when asked about their relative socio-economic position (rich, higher middle income, lower middle income, poor and ultra-poor) compared to other households in the village currently (January 2021) and before the pandemic (February 2020), we did not find significantly different opinions, especially among poor and ultra-poor households.

We also found a considerable share of rural households receiving remittance from an absentee member who works overseas or within Bangladesh. While the share of overseas remittance recipients quickly recovered from around six percent during MarchMay 2020 to over 11 percent in SeptemberDecember, the average amount of overseas remittance increased from around Tk 2,000 to more than Tk 7,500. The same trend was observed in domestic remittance as well, with the domestic economy undergoing a quick recovery last year. Around 30 percent of households reported getting money or food support from the government, NGOs, and friends or neighboursmostly received in the first survey round period after lockdown measures were imposed across the country.

After deeper analyses from collected data, two major findings can be summarised. First, there was a more optimistic picture of food consumption equity in contrast with the widening food gap warned by scholars and international organisationssuch evidence is more profound among remittance recipient households compared to non-recipient counterparts. There were also rapid changes in spending of different quantile groups of real food distribution. In MarchMay 2020, real food consumption spending of the top consumers was more than four times higher than those at the bottom, but the bottom group quickly caught up and the gap dropped to less than two times higher in SeptemberDecember 2020. Second, in contrast with several studies that predicted that females would suffer more during the pandemic, we found that female-headed households actually had higher real food consumption expenses and better perceptive changes in economic conditions.

Together with descriptive evidence, regression analyses show robust evidence of a significantly positive relationship between food consumption expenses, consumption experiences and changes of economic condition, and both remittance recipient dummy and amount of remittance (a dummy variable is a numerical variable used in regression analysis to represent subgroups of the sample, which is often used to distinguish different treatment groups). However, when we take support (received from different sources, including government safety nets) dummy and amount of support, we did not find any significant positive association between them with food consumption expenses, consumption experiences and changes of economic condition. Aligning with previous studies, it was also found that poorer and larger households and those with less educated household heads are more vulnerable. Geographical location is also significantly associated with household consumption and economic conditionthose located further from Dhaka, the economic centre, or in regions where lockdown measures were imposed last year, were more vulnerable.

Although our study does not claim a causal relationship between remittance inflow and rural recovery, it gives a more positive impression about the multiplier effect of remittance inflow within the rural economy rather than the multiplier effect of new spending, especially government spending such as safety nets. Thus, our results help reinforce the claim made by the Asian Development Bank and other development partners on the crucial role of remittance in domestic demand and consumption, amid a pandemic that fuelled the collapse of other foreign currency sources, foreign direct investment and exports.

Dr Mohammad Abdul Malek is an Associate Professor at the University of Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan. Dr Hoa T. Truong is a Research Associate at the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo, Japan. Dr Tetsushi Sonobe is Dean of ADBI, Tokyo, Japan. The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the organisations they are affiliated with.

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Remittances have helped villages bounce back - The Daily Star

On 16-17 June 2021, the 52nd Informal Meeting of the Ministers of the member countries of the OECD Development Assistance Committee took place. The meeting bears the name Tidewater, which is the name of the town in the USA where the first meeting of the development cooperation ministers took place in 1968. This year's meeting was convened jointly by the Irish Overseas Development Cooperation Minister Colm Brophy, and the Committee Chair Susanna Moorehead. The Slovak Republic was represented at the meeting by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Ingrid Brockov.

The theme of this year's Tidewater meeting was a green and fair recovery in the developing world after the ongoing crisis. The meeting addressed two key current framework challenges in international development: socio-economic recovery through development cooperation and the fight against the undesirable causes and consequences of climate change in order to protect the environment and biodiversity. The participants also recalled that with regard to modern international development cooperation, which is coordinated by the OECD Development Assistance Committee, we are commemorating the 60th anniversary of the organisation during this period.

As Ingrid Brockov stated: 'We are aware that the pandemic crisis in the world is not yet over and our developing partner countries are at risk of economic, social and health care collapse. From the viewpoint of development aid providers, it is crucial to give serious weight to all opportunities for international political, health and economic solidarity.' State Secretary Brockov also provided information about the scale of humanitarian aid which the Slovak Republic has provided during the COVID-19 pandemic.

State Secretary Brockov also expressed her appreciation for the importance of joint donor efforts at the European Union level in the framework of the Team Europe initiatives, as well as the importance of strong multilateral development organizations for otherwise remote regions of the world, especially in Africa. She also highlighted the key role of non-governmental development organizations and other civil society organizations not only in managing the COVID-19 pandemic but especially in building sustainable development: 'The private sector is, primarily, a key source of innovations, investments and economic sustainability in development cooperation.'

The second part of the event focused on the use of development cooperation to improve the climate and environmental sustainability in developing countries. The COVID-19 pandemic clearly demonstrates that the prosperity and security of nations is to a large extent also conditioned by foreign influences. Despite its small share in public finances, development diplomacy plays an important role in mitigating the consequences of crisis situations.

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Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic published this content on 17 June 2021 and is solely responsible for the information contained therein. Distributed by Public, unedited and unaltered, on 19 June 2021 19:48:02 UTC.

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Ingrid Brockov at the Tidewater Meeting of Ministers for International Cooperation: The private sector is a key source of innovations, investments and...

Binghamton is a sleepy place at 3 a.m. Diren Valayden is usually among the folks catching zs at that hour. But occasionally, the assistant professor of human development is awake, in front of his computer screen at home and plugged into a conference in India, where its early afternoon.

Diren Valayden, assistant professor of human development, attends virtual conferences. Image Credit: Jonathan Cohen.

Conferences have gone virtual and are happening all over the world, Valayden says. With the global time difference, you might be at a conference in the middle of the night. Its unfortunate that we dont have the whole range of interactions we used to have. A lot of research ideas come from conferences and networking in person.

Its one of the many adjustments College of Community and Public Affairs (CCPA) faculty have made since the emergence of COVID-19. Research and teaching have been upended, requiring a positive outlook, flexibility and creative solutions to getting work done. In March 2020, when the University announced the suspension of in-person classes and a transition to fully remote instruction, the change was abrupt. Yet Valayden didnt find it difficult from a technical standpoint. Im an immigrant so Ive used Skype for a long time to communicate with family and friends, Valayden says. I was accustomed to using video technology to interact with people, but not for teaching.

The tough part, for Valayden, was missing the thrill of performing on the figurative stage and feeding off the energy of the students in his human development capstone class and his courses on theorizing social change and human rights. When youre physically present, there is eye contact and you know if people are paying attention or not, Valayden says. On the screen, its hard to know whats landing and gauge the response to what you are delivering. Valaydens colleague in human development, Ren Rojas, feels the same. Rojas says the end of spring semester 2020 wasnt hard because he was teaching a masters level course that was moving into student-led workshops. The struggle was real though when he tried teaching a graduate course in the fall using a hybrid model with some students in the classroom and others simultaneously online. Rojas found that excelling as a teacher in person and online were mutually exclusive so by mid-October, he decided going full remote focusing on one modality would be best for everyone. Im the kind of instructor who moves around a lot, the assistant professor says. I had to be careful under COVID-19 conditions that I wasnt moving close to the students, but I had the full front of the seminar room to myself. That gets my energy going. But, I was moving in and out of the camera shot, so students at home couldnt see me or hear my voice as clearly.

Ren Rojas, assistant professor of human development, shifted his research focus. Image Credit: Jonathan Cohen.

As the mode of instruction changed, content had to be adjusted as well. Instead of group presentations, Valayden had students do more individual work and leveraged online discussion boards to increase interaction. Rojas used Zoom tools such as polls and breakout rooms to keep students in his Oppression, Dignity and Social Change course engaged with the material and each other.

We had just come off a summer of mass mobilization and protests on the streets, Rojas says. The election took place in the midst of the semester, and I knew most of my students were following it, so I constantly drew on what was happening in the country to make sure engagement stayed high.

Just being able to participate in coursework at all wasnt something to take for granted. Socio-economic gaps between students became more obvious during the pandemic. Many students who used the Universitys computers and internet didnt have these resources at home and struggled to have the same experiences as students with easy access to laptops, Wi-Fi and webcams.

The pandemic had a differential impact in terms of online learning, Valayden says. People have always had different levels of access to digital tools, and now were seeing new forms of inequalities that might not be readily grasped through a more traditional way of seeing things. When we design coursework, [we should] think about access to online learning.

As is true for other areas of life, the pandemic hasnt been all negative. Sometimes, you give up Plan A only to find a Plan B can satisfy. Rojas was disappointed when he couldnt travel to continue his research into coordinated labor markets in post-collapse Argentina; this was the basis for his dissertation at New York University, which he completed in 2017. Obtaining material for a book manuscript wouldve required lengthy face-to-face interviews and Zoom isnt a viable solution the richness of the in-person interaction is lost so that project is on hold.

In its place, he worked with secondary sources to produce papers on the impact of neo-liberal changes and market reforms on labor and social movements in Latin America. Hes also studying determinants of far-right attitudes in local American populations.

This is such a fascinating time in the U.S., Rojas says. There is so much social change and so many developments politically. My thinking is that Id turn this difficult circumstance into an opportunity. [The pandemic] is not a total loss. Ive managed to keep my research going in my primary vein of scholarship and open another area as well.

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Rethinking teaching and research | Binghamton News - Binghamton University

Addis Abeba, June 16, 2021 It is an established historical fact that contemporary Ethiopia is the result of a forceful annexation of nations and nationalities in the late 19th century. Ever since the conquest of Oromia and the greater South by the Abyssinian forces, the country has been undergoing an unfinished project of state building. The overriding expression of this project is the recurrent endeavor to build a unitary nation-state against the demands of nations and nationalities for self-determination. With a varying level of atrocities, Ethiopia has long been under authoritarian rules and a perpetual political culture of denial. The political culture of denial is characterized by denial of histories of atrocities, state violence and demands and rights of nations and nationalities, while reversely subscribing to a unitarist and selective history of the state. The consistent resistance of the nations and nationalities challenged the central Ethiopian regime. The recent popular Oromo youth uprising that had culminated in the dictatorial regime of EPRDF in 2018 has been a continuation of a century old resistance.

The hoped-for transition to democracy and the prospect for peace and development that glimmered in 2018, following the social movement ignited by the Oromo youth dubbed the #OromoProtests, is stalled and an authoritarian rule has taken hold. Since the advent of the current leadership, contradictory political and economic aspirations have increasingly become evident. Rooted in contradictory historical representations and future aspirations, contestation is underway on the possibilities and implications of constitutional reform pertaining to the existing federal dispensation. Nations and nationalities of the country, who fought for their collective rights for over half a century to gain a semblance of structural recognition, are following the ongoing situation with a sense of imminent danger and existential threat.

Currently, Ethiopia is facing multidimensional and intersectional crises of geo-political, security, and socio-economic characteristics. Gross violations of human rights are perpetrated by government forces and persistent demands for accountability have fallen on deaf ears. Impunity is so rampant that it has become the rule of the Ethiopian state. These crises are rooted in the political history of the country and are reflections of contradictory visions for the future of the country. The country is facing a heightened contradiction on state structure. The prospect of the countrys continuity hinges on whether and how this contradiction gets settled. The question is whether they will be settled in a way that rectifies historical injustices and usher in the prospect of peaceful co-existence, or will they culminate in disintegration of the country? The alliance of forces and the continued struggle for justice, freedom, and democracy is informed by the critical situation of the country. The situation calls for unprecedented determination to end these crises devastating the country and greatly endangering the stability of the Horn of Africa. In this paper, we attempt to address the current situation in Ethiopia, with a focus on the prevailing contradictions on state structure and associated crises. We will take a brief retrospective look into the past and reimagine the prospect of the Oromo struggle in the context that is unfolding.

Ethiopia is a country of many contradictions and contestations. From the birth of the modern empire in the late 19th century, continuation of historically asymmetric relations and ruptures that sustained the empire have cemented deep-rooted antagonism between diverse nations and nationalities. The empire that was forged through brutal war of conquest during the European colonial aggression in other parts of Africa perpetuated a form of internal colonialism manifested in terms of economic exploitation, political oppression, cultural marginalization, and imposition of the language, religion and culture of one ethnic group over others.

Since the 1960s, resistance against the assimilationist, exploitative, and oppressive imperial system has given birth to national liberation movements notably with nationalities question as a defining feature of the movements. Questions of land to the tillers, political representation, cultural rights and, broadly speaking, the right to self-determination became the mobilizing factors for national liberation movements and other political parties and brought the demise of the feudal system in 1974. Nevertheless, despite its radical measures on land policy that responded to popular demands, the military regime (1974-1991) continued the homogenizing narrative of state-building project that suppressed the autonomy and identity of nations and nationalities and their rights to self-administration.

The fall of the military junta in 1991 through a coordinated force of TPLF (EPRDF), EPLF, OLF and ONLF opened the way for institutionalization of a multinational federal system that ushered in a new rupture in Ethiopias political order. Precisely, the adoption of the 1995 FDRE Constitution marked a breakaway from Ethiopias imperialist past and signaled the birth of a state structure that recognizes the autonomy, and socio-economic, civil, and political rights of groups as well as individuals. However, TPLF (EPRDF) controlled the government and pushed away all other organizations that helped to establish the federal system. Rather than harnessing the multinational federal order for economic empowerment and political representation of nations and nationalities, the TPLF dominated EPRDF regime consolidated its power through democratic centralism and continued land appropriation under the vague developmental state political economy. Despite the TPLF/EPRDF governments misappropriation of the system in establishing economic oligarchies and authoritarian political systems, the multinational federal system has at least laid an architecture for a system of shared rule and self-rule through which a democratic system could be strengthened.

From 2014-2018, massive youth protests, first ignited by the Oromo youth and later joined by other groups have prompted the regime to undertake some reforms leading to the coming to power of Abiy Ahmed. Abiys ascendance to power was followed by the restructuring of the incumbent party towards a unitary-like party, named Prosperity Party, in which every structure (branch) of the party is accountable to the Prime Minister. As the establishing documents and public statements of officials suggest, the newly reorganized party aspires towards building a unitary state through a constitutional amendment. In doing so, the party seeks to achieve at least three things: a state in which individual rights are given primacy over group rights, led by presidential government system, and reversal of the ethno-lingual multinational federal structure to geography-based state structure. These aspirations were among the major factors that resulted in the exit of the TPLF party from the coalition and growing suspicion of pro multinational forces against Abiys government. This marks a moment in Ethiopias history where the contradiction in Ethiopias state formation and structure became crystal clear. Furthermore, the contradiction continues translating into and getting manifestations in the form of unfolding contemporary socio-economic, political, and security crises in Ethiopia and the region. We present a highlight of these crises as follows.

Political crisis:

The deep-seated contradiction on Ethiopias state formation and state structure inform and underlay the current political divide between political parties. The incumbent Prosperity Party and some other unitarist political parties that are in control of the economy, bureaucracy, and military power are exploiting their leverage that went to an extent of pushing out widely accepted federalist political parties such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). This is evident from the data on electoral candidates recently published by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) in which 2432 are from the Prosperity Party, 1385 candidates from Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (also known as EZEMA) and 491 candidates from NAMA and the less known Enat Party prepares 573 candidates while Oromia the populous and largest region appears to be represented by one barely known opposition political party Oromo Liberation Movement, which is represented only by 4 candidates. Moreover, the upcoming election will be undertaken with the exclusion of one of the constituting members of the federation Tigray regional state. This squarely points to the problem of election without representation, which has a considerable potential of resulting in pre-and post-election crises. Furthermore, as its multiple procedural and substantive practices suggest, the institutional integrity and independence of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) itself is questionable.

Security crisis:

Contradiction over state structure, which is directly tied to the right to self-determination and shared rule, underlies the power struggle that culminated with devastating war between the federal government and the Tigray regional state. With varying magnitude, limited media reporting, and involvement of external powers, a prolonged conflict between government forces and rebel groups in different parts of Oromia has been ongoing since 2018. This too is directly linked with the question of the Oromo peoples right to self-determination over their own resources and region. Security crisis is taking hold in different parts of the country. There is credible evidence that the Amhara regional government has been deploying its special forces to bolster conflicts in different areas, such as the Benishangul-Gumuz region and western Oromia. The increasing security crisis exhibits features of scramble for resource and political power, and it is mostly perpetrated by the centralizing tendency of the state and reactionary forces.

Socio-economic crises:

The political and security crises that emanate from deep contradictions on state structure have implications on socio-economic conditions and prospects. Economically, Ethiopia is experiencing one of the highest inflation rates in its recent history; irregular sectors and black market are increasingly in use; foreign currency shortage is crippling the already declining economy of the country; the rising gap in living standard is a testament for expansive irregular sectors, lack of good governance, and corruption. The economic crisis in turn translates into social crises such as a climbing unemployment rate that exposes most youth to irregular migration and human trafficking that risks their lives. Moreover, internal displacements, raising rural-urban mobility, and increasing risks of organized robbery and theft are manifestations of socio-economic crises.

Augmented by the deep-seated contradiction on state structure and mismanaged transition, Ethiopia is currently facing both internal and external threats of unprecedented scale. Among the most pressing internal and external threats are the following.

Internal threats

Given the growing tension in many regions of the country, notably in Oromia, Tigray, Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, Somali, and Amhara regions, the likelihood of pre-election and post-election violence is very high. This is compounded by systematic and violent exclusion of contending political parties promoting pluralistic vision of state structure and policy alternatives. Among others, the exclusion of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), the Oromo people are left without representation in this election. This seems to be related to Abiys government intention and effort to consolidate power by winning the election without meaningful competition.

The political parties currently campaigning for the election, including the ruling Prosperity Party (PP), largely represent similar political views that could be classified as anti-multinational federal arrangement, while those excluded are largely in favor of democratizing and perfecting the multinational federation. Thus, the election will likely result in reversal of existing federal system, and to the promulgation of policies that enhance the return to imperial Ethiopia and its unitarist visions.

The necessary conditions for free, fair, and competitive election are not in place. If the election takes place as scheduled, there will be an illegitimate government that must deal with its own illegitimacy and face the consequences of conducting a sham election, the outcome of which was known well before the election. The government to be formed will be in no position or shape to solve prevailing crises; it will rather exacerbate the already fragile condition. Instead of solving longstanding problems and contradictions that left the country wanting for democracy, peace, and development, the election will complicate and heighten existing contradictions.

After the election, we anticipate that the government that will be formed will embark on reversing the gains of nations and nationalities that have been struggling for a democratic multinational federation. The composition of political parties participating in the election and the tone of their campaign in relation to the rights of nations and nationalities signifies this likely trend. It is highly likely that the excluded mass will launch strong resistance to the reversal of the multinational federal dispensation and other fledgling signs of cultural recognition and political representation by the forthcoming government. As the imperial ambitions meet formidable resistance, it will not take too long before Ethiopia is engulfed by protracted wars. The country is already on the verge of a full-scale civil war.

External threats

Geo-political manifestations of emerging threats will likely aggravate regional instability far beyond the borders of Ethiopia. The new development following the War on Tigray has already unraveled geopolitical tensions. There is a fast deterioration of relations and border dispute with Sudan, which may escalate to full-scale war. The Ethiopia-Egypt relation, which is tied to the longstanding Nile politics, is facing a deadlock with regards to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Even the Ethiopia-Kenya relations are not as smooth as before. The involvement of the Eritrean forces in the wars in Tigray and Oromia has severely complicated matters and worsened internal tensions.

While the immediate effect will be felt in the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa more broadly, the implications of potential mass displacement and refugee crises will be far-reaching. The Western world, including Europe and North America, will certainly feel the heat.

Potential consequences

The emerging threats further reinforce existing crises, including social, economic, and security crises. Humanitarian catastrophe and population displacement of unprecedented scale may be unfolding if the current path persists. We believe that the cumulative impact of all these is an impending state collapse that will unravel not only the Ethiopian state but also the entire Horn of Africa and beyond.

Existing pockets of peace will dissipate and there will likely be a nightmare where people will face difficulty in engaging in productive activities. In a country where over 80 percent of the population are farmers, farming will become impossible under current security crises, and so will livelihood activities. As supply shrinks to an unprecedented level, the existing inflation will worsen even further. It should be underlined that international organizations are warning of large-scale famine in Tigray, where over 90 percent of the population needs emergency aid. We fear that this will spill over to other regions, further complicating the situation.

We anticipate that law-enforcement institutions will collapse and give way to informal and armed groups, leading to further deterioration of security. Armed and unarmed groups may engage in informal economic activities which may fuel further violence. Existing investments are likely to be stalled and new investments will become unthinkable under growing conditions of security crises and precarity. This will lead to the worsening of the already unstable foreign currency flow and reinforce economic stagnation that is experiencing near-zero growth.

It is highly appreciated that the international community, particularly the UN, USA, EU, and NATO have given attention to the deteriorating humanitarian and political crises in Ethiopia. However, Abiys government and its unitarist allies are neither willing for peaceful resolution of ongoing conflicts nor are they ready for inclusive dialogue on the future of the country. Unilateral framing of problems and an exclusive approach to seeking solutions has long been the tradition of consecutive regimes of the Ethiopian state. The country must seek internal reconciliation over the past and consensus for the future. If genuinely implemented before it is too late, a solution of great potential is an all-inclusive dialogue. For successful dialogue, all stakeholders shall be included and welcomed to contribute with due commitment. The ruling party and the governments share of responsibility are very high in making the dialogue a success.

All-inclusive dialogue is a dialogue that involves political organizations, civic organizations, religious leaders, indigenous institutions, and notable individuals and elders from all corners of the country. If there is political will for an all-inclusive dialogue, the procedural and technical matters can be handled by an independent commission constituted with the consensus of all stakeholders. Such a dialogue should be understood as a means of making sure all voices are heard and demands addressed to the satisfaction of the majority. Ultimately, it should be up to the Ethiopian people to decide the countrys future.

While a detailed and comprehensive way forward must be set based on the consensus of all stakeholders, issues for the dialogue should include the nature of the state structure going forward and a collective agreement on how to seek solutions for the crises engulfing the country. The international community should put pressure on all parties, especially the government, as a matter of urgency. There are many preconditions to be undertaken for a meaningful dialogue. These include:

Editors Note: The above viewpoint was submitted to Addis Standard by Oromo Action Council (OAC). The Oromo Action Council (OAC) is a non-partisan, pan-Oromo organization established in 2020 to serve as a voice for the Oromo people and other marginalized groups in Ethiopia. OAC can be reached through oromoactioncouncil@gmail.com or Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/oromoactioncouncil

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Viewpoint: The Current Crises in Ethiopia, Security Threats in the Horn and the way out - addisstandard.com