Category Archives: Socio-economic Collapse

Scotland is in the grip of a poverty crisis.

In the period from 2017 to 2020 just over a million people a fifth of the population were living in relative poverty, according to Scottish Government statistics, with close to half of those (40 per cent) living in households that had no certainty over being able to put food on the table. Though levels of pensioner poverty had levelled out in the years since the recession, child poverty rates had continued to rise, going from just over a fifth (21 per cent) in 2010-13 to just under a quarter (24 per cent) last year.

The figures may appear stark, but Neil Cowan, policy and campaigns manager at the Poverty Alliance, warns the true picture is likely to be a whole lot worse.

That one million figure doesnt include the impact of the pandemic it doesnt cover from March 2020, he says. Next years figures will reflect that and Id expect those to be higher. Before the pandemic we had a million people living in the grip of poverty. For people already living in poverty the grip has really tightened but a lot of folk have also been tipped in for the first time.

There are a number of reasons why so many people were living such financially precarious lives in the lead-up to the pandemic, but Cowan says that by far the biggest driver was the UK Governments austerity programme, which began in the aftermath of the financial crash. When the global economy was brought to its knees by the collapse of large financial institutions, then chancellor George Osbornes solution was to make large-scale cuts to public spending that resulted in libraries being closed, public sector pay being frozen and benefits being slashed.

His mantra was that were all in this together, but Cowan says in reality the highest price has been paid by those at the bottom of the socio-economic scale, many of whom have seen their incomes plummet after being moved from a multi-layered system of benefits that helped poverty fall sharply in the pre-crash years onto the single and controversial Universal Credit payment.

The social security system is supposed to protect people from poverty but actually it drags them into it

Over the last decade the key thing really has been the social security system at the UK level, Cowan says. From 2010 we have seen a profusion of policies from the UK Government that have driven people into poverty. Theres the benefit cap, the two-child limit, the benefit freeze which lasted for several years and things like the five week wait for Universal Credit, which drives people to foodbanks.

"More recently there has been the 20 a week cut to Universal Credit the government increased it by 20 in response to the pandemic, which was recognition that it wasnt adequate and thats having a big impact. The social security system is supposed to protect people from poverty but actually it drags them into it.

For Morag Treanor, deputy chair of the Poverty and Inequality Commission, an independent body that provides advice and scrutiny to Scottish ministers, the problem goes further than that. She says that subtle changes to the benefits system such as using the consumer price index rather than the higher retail price index when linking increases to inflation mean payments have reduced in real terms over and above any nominal cuts, while problems in the labour market and high levels of debt are pushing more and more people further into poverty.

Employment and earnings also impact hugely on poverty, she says. Since the recession of 2008 the UK hasmanaged to keep a relatively high level of employment so it looks good on paper, but the nature of those jobs has changed with zero-hours contracts and other insecure contracts. In the decade up to 2008 wages increased by around 17per cent in the UK; in the decade since they have increased by about 0.4 per cent. People in work are earning relatively less while costs are rising hugely.

When it comes to debt, Treanor says the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) is now the largest creditor of individuals, with everything from rent arrears, council tax arrears and school meal arrears meaning public debt is huge, way bigger than any commercial debt. These so-called zombie debts never get taken off the DWP's books and, because they get taken off people's benefits at source, collecting them pushes already vulnerable people further into poverty.

The fact the UK Government is not doing anything to alleviatethe situation is, saysElaine Downie, co-ordinator of Faith in Community Scotlands Poverty Truth Community,making extremes of poverty even worse. While the statistics show that, proportionally, there are more people living in poverty than a decade ago, she notes that the numbers do not reveal how that poverty is impacting on an individual level.

In the last 10 years Ive seen it get harder for people and Ive found that really distressing, she says. Ive seen people really, really desperate. Were not a support agency and we dont give out food or clothes, but we have people coming to us who are really desperate. We are signposting and we do what we can, but thats something that wasnt happening 10 years ago.

The UK Government has reserved powers and reserved responsibility so its perfectly legitimate to point out their failings, but the Scottish Government and local government have massive powers as well

In its annual report on poverty in Scotland, social change organisation the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) said that families all over Scotland need [the Scottish Government] to do more and do better to help them out of the poverty trap. Yet Chris Birt, associate director for Scotland at the JRF, says that because the benefits system is largely reserved, too often the response from Holyrood is to point the finger at Westminster while Westminsters response is to say that if the Scottish Government was that bothered it could use the welfare powers it has had at its disposal since 2016.

The UK Government has reserved powers and reserved responsibility so its perfectly legitimate to point out their failings, but the Scottish Government and local government have massive powers as well, he says.

Noting that Scottish social security powers should not be used simply to mitigate against cuts made at Westminster, Birt says the introduction of a minimum income guarantee, which the Scottish Government is playing around with, would be one key way to reduce poverty levels. Setting a floor below which no one will drop is crucial because then youre using social security as a public policy tool, he says.

Targeted policy changes can make a considerable impact. Mubin Haq, chief executive of abrdn Financial Fairness Trust (formerly the Standard Life Foundation), a charitable organisation focused on promoting financial wellbeing, says that pensioner poverty, which was sitting at 31 per cent in the 1990s, has stabilised at a much lower level in recent years thanks to the introduction of the so-called triple lock by the coalition government in 2010. Though poverty levels among Scottish pensioners have risen slightly since then, Haq says the measure, which guarantees the state pension will increase annually in line with the higher of inflation, average wage rises or 2.5 per cent, has provided a welcome safety net.

Pensioner poverty in Scotland is 14 per cent, Haq says. Thats five percentage points lower than everyone else and thats a success story.

The Scottish Government has already made some similar moves of its own, doubling this months instalment of the Carers Allowance Supplement a twice-yearly Scottish top-up to a UK-wide benefit to 462.80 and last month announcing that the Scottish Child Payment, which is currently paid to low-income families with children under the age of six, will double to 20 a week from April next year.

But while the increase to the child payment in particular has been welcomed, Birt notes that, as the Scottish Government has set itself a target of reducing child poverty levels to 18 per cent by 2024 and 10 per cent by 2030, it does not go nearly far enough. Increasing it to 40 would possibly enable the government to hit the interim target, but Birt stresses that no legislature should be relying on social security measures alone to reduce poverty rates.

The government needs to join the dots. Housing, transport, childcare, and other costs of living need to be made easier, cheaper and seamless

Action needs to be taken in other areas so that people on benefits can afford the laptop and broadband that will enable them to complete the college course that will improve their employment prospects; public transport needs to be cheap enough and connected enough for them to be able to attend job interviews; and childcare needs to be affordable and accessible enough to be of benefit to them when they secure a job. All these areas need to be tackled alongside the social security issue, Birt says, if Scotland is ever to stand a chance of reducing its poverty rates.

Treanor agrees. We need to sort housing, she says. We need more affordable housing. There needs to be more done to make things more affordable for tenants in the private rental sector too.

"Employment is key. Its not good enough to say the UK Government controls employment law - which it does when the Scottish Government has some levers at their disposal. There is currently discussion on how to use public contracts to put in conditions and requirements saying those biddinghave to pay the living wage.

"Transport is key. Often where people live, especially in peripheral, poorer areas, is not well served by transport or it doesnt take them to the centres where the jobs are. The government needs to join the dots. Housing, transport, childcare, and other costs of living need to be made easier, cheaper and seamless.

Haq adds that if the Scottish Government really wanted to be radical, it could introduce legislation aimed at better sharing the rewards generated within the companies that are based here.

Are those rewards being fairly shared?, he asks. We did some work with the High Pay Centre on pay ratios and found really large differences between what was being given to those at the very bottom and those at the very top, but a very small change could make a really big difference to what those at the bottom get. If you take three per cent from the pay of those in the upper quartile of FTSE350 companies you could give a 2,500 pay increase to those in the bottom quartile. Its quite substantial. It couldnt be done overnight, but how we share rewards really needs to be addressed.

In its poverty report the Joseph Rowntree Foundation likened the poverty crisis in Scotland to the climate emergency, in as much as it is something that needs to be dealt with at speed to avoid serious repercussions further down the line. Though the Scottish Governments 2030 child poverty target looks just as ambitious and just as likely to be missed as its net-zero one, Birt says the fact it has pledged to meet them in tandem shows just how committed to positive change it is. The challenge now is to bring it all to fruition.

Its good that its aligned with the climate change targets, he says. If all the parties are signed up to that and they are all signed up to the child poverty targets thats a vision for a radically different Scotland. We can get there but we need to make some difficult decisions along the way and we need to loosen the grip of people on the highest incomes, with the highest wealth and the most power. If we can share the income, wealth and power we will have that low-poverty society and it will be a better society than it is today.

Continued here:

Poverty in Scotland: Time to share - Holyrood

The European Commission initiative on carbon farming due today is expected to rely on a market in sequestration.

Climate change is already causing droughts, heatwaves and floods. Two-thirds of soils in the European Union are degraded, costing around 50 billion a year, partly due to yield losses. The collapse of biodiversity on farmland is affecting crucial ecosystem services, such as pollination and natural pest control.

These crises affect farmers but agriculture is also a major contributor to these problems. Farmers can become a central part of the solution but it will not easy: the sector needs to undertake a complex transition towards sustainability and resilience.

How does carbon farming fit into this? This is about land-management practices which reduce greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions and remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. It is best done by restoring degraded peatlands, maintaining and restoring high-nature-value grasslands, deploying agroforestry (trees on agricultural land), restoring and maintaining healthy forests, afforesting or reforesting sustainably and sequestering carbon in soils through agroecological or regenerative farming practices.

Debates mainly centre however on this last approachhow farmers can sequester carbon in their soils and especially how this should be incentivised. There is strong scientific evidence that agroecological practices, such as constant soil cover, diverse crop rotations with deep-rooting and nitrogen-fixing crops, organic fertilisation (especially with compost) and reduced soil disturbance, are the most important practices for healthy soils and carbon sequestration.

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Some of these practices are however at odds with the mainstream, intensive farming system, based on growing a small variety of (cash) crops with high use of synthetic fertilisers and pesticides. Many economic actors are therefore pushing for more business as usual approaches to carbon farming, with only minimal changes to intensive practices. Going down this route would be to miss a huge opportunity.

Carbon farming seems to be attracting the attention of many farmers. For some it is perhaps only the lure of more cash but for many it is rather the chance to do their bit and be part of a good-news story. This makes carbon farming a crucial opportunity to start a conversationacross the usual dividing lines of environment versus farmingabout a different model for agriculture in the EU. This would be based not on intensive and extractive land use but on restoring healthy soils and agro-ecosystemsfarming with nature, not against it.

Unfortunately, instead of harnessing this opportunity, the European Commission seems set to take the dangerous path of narrowing carbon farming down to carbon credits, or carbon removal certificates, seeing this as an opportunity to inject (private) cash into more sustainable farming practices. It is a slippery slope which could lead to short-sighted techno-fixes, greenwashing and, at worst, perverse incentives.

Currently, the economic signals guiding farmers decisions are stacked against soil protection, biodiversity conservation and climate mitigation. So the right incentives are needed. But voluntary incentives are not enough: under the Common Agricultural Policy, they have so far had barely any impact.

The urgency of the climate and environmental crises requires bold action to restore healthy soils this decade. This will require a much more comprehensive policy mix, combining voluntary and mandatory instruments, including legally-binding targets, safeguards and basic soil-protection measures.

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The commissions recent commitment to develop a Soil Health Law and its long-awaited Nature Restoration Law are crucial pieces of this puzzle. A proposed application of the polluter-pays principle to emissions from agricultural activities (contained in a draft of the commissions communication on carbon cycles) would also be a step in the right direction. The commission needs to clarify how these separate initiatives fit into a coherent picture.

The biggest concern with the commissions stress on carbon credits is the narrow focus on counting how much carbon gets sequestered. Organic matter is the fuel of soil life, which in turn delivers crucial ecosystem services: plant nutrition and protection, water regulation and purification, climate regulation and nutrient cycling.

But soil carbon does not tell the whole story about the health of soil. Its structure, concentrations of contaminants and the abundance and diversity of soil life are other crucial parameters. If the EU sets up a whole incentive scheme focused solely on the amount of carbon in soil, things could go very wrong.

First, we could see significant trade-offs on biodiversity, soil health or other environmental dimensions. A frequently mentioned approach to carbon sequestration is no-till and cover crops. Its easy to apply in intensive farming but often farmers adopting no-till end up substituting the plough with herbicides to kill off the cover crop before the new growing season. Will carbon farming lead to an explosion in glyphosate use?

Biochar (coal-like pyrolysed biomass) is another techno-fix promoted by some. But serious concerns remain around possible contamination of soils with carcinogenic compounds. Unless carbon farming is strongly framed around holistic approaches with strict safeguards, and other quantitative and qualitative indicatorssuch as soil health or agrobiodiversityit could do more harm than good for the environment.

Secondly, there could also be negative socio-economic impacts. Those farmers who will benefit most are those with large farms who have depleted their soils of carbon through decades of intensive farming. Small farmers and those already caring for their soils will struggle to secure access to finance.

This could worsen the already-skewed distribution of CAP funding driving many smaller farmers out of business. It could also drive up land prices, exacerbating the concentration of ownership and barriers to access for young and new farmers, again already evident as a consequence of CAP subsidies.

Thirdly, will this deliver genuine climate benefits? Soils dont only sequester carbon: they are constantly cycling carbon and nitrogen and releasing gases from this process, including GHGs such as CO2 and nitrous oxide. Significant emissions are also linked to the manufacture of fertilisers and pesticides and machinery use. Focusing on counting soil carbon could thus miss a big part of the GHG balance sheet. Soil carbon might increase at the cost of increased emissions of N2O from soils or CO2 from increased machinery or input use.

Whats more, soil carbon exists in different forms and measuring it is extremely complex. Scientists have warned that existing models lack accuracy, so even just counting carbon will be highly challenging.

Finally, carbon markets rely on polluters purchasing carbon offsets. The availability of cheap offsets would however disincentivise prior emissions reductions. And soil carbon sequestration is not permanent, so the climate-mitigation benefits could be very short-lived, while the emissions offset would remain in the atmosphere for hundreds of years.

Even if these issues are properly addressed by the commissions framework for the certification of carbon removals, it remains questionable whether polluters should be allowed to buy the right to claim climate neutrality. This could send confusing signals to consumers, slowing the shift to more sustainable lifestyles.

For all these reasons, non-governmental organisations and organic farmers wrote to the commission on December 3rd, calling for the EUs carbon-farming initiative to drive a just, holistic and ambitious agenda for ecosystem restoration, climate mitigation and adaptation in European agriculturenot reliant on carbon markets. The indications are that this is not however what the commission intends, which would be a great shame.

Clia Nyssens is policy officer for agriculture at the European Environmental Bureau.

Originally posted here:

Burying the problem: carbon markets and sustainable agriculture - Social Europe

OPINION

Over the past few weeks after the 2021 local government elections, I have had an opportunity to read 11 articles giving various perspectives on the electoral performance of the African National Congress (ANC) and possible causes thereof. The writers of these articles are very diverse; three are currently serving in the leadership structures of the ANC, four are ordinary members and four are academics who have penned incisive articles and have unquestionable credentials on the subject matter. Three of these writers are from Gauteng Province, two are from the Northern Cape, four from the Western Cape, one from the Eastern Cape and two from KwaZulu-Natal.

The three ANC leaders and four members, understandably, perceive the gut-wrenching erosion of the ANC electoral fortunes as a vicissitude in the evolution of democracy in South Africa. The academics, on the other hand, see this as bittersweet. It is sweet because dominant parties in a democracy tend to impede the growth of democracy, erode accountability and may tend towards rent-seeking and corruption. It is bitter because the weakening of the ANC introduces an era of coalitions, which in most cases tend to be unstable and often unpredictable. The academics are thus of the view that such instability is something that South Africa can ill-afford as our democracy is still in its formative stages.

All 11 writers undertook an unrestrained journey to diagnose the reasons for the decline. Please note that the word decline is used consciously rather than the word demise, because even the recent electoral performance of the ANC indicates that it is far from a demise. Even though these election outcomes are disappointing, the ANC still remains the dominant political force in the country, where, of the 226 local municipalities, the ANC outright won 167 with more than 4,500 council seats. The second biggest party, the Democratic Alliance (DA) won only 22 municipalities outright. In 67 municipalities there are hung councils and in more than half of these hung councils, the ANC obtained a greater share of votes and council seats.

I partly agree with seven of these writers who observe that the 2021 elections could be a bellwether of might happen to the ANC in 2024. I use the term "partly" because I do not agree with the narrative that the ANC will obtain less than 50% of the votes in 2024. In 2024 the expectation is that the ANC will win the general elections, albeit with a reduced majority if its electoral base continues to abstain from voting.

In the past few years, the ANC has been in an unenviable position organisationally, divided at the core, unable to pay its employees for months, with the secretary-general on suspension, internal battles fuelled by manipulation of the list process, as well as the COVID-19 pandemic and its related socio-economic challenges of increased unemployment and poverty. This enervated state of the organisation was compounded by the visibly poor service delivery capacity of ANC municipalities.

The combined impact of all these factors was a demoralised support base of the ANC. Despite these challenges, the two biggest opposition parties were unable to deal the ANC a substantive blow and instead their electoral support consolidated, the DA at around 20% and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) at around 10%. The inability of the two largest opposition parties to make any major inroads is due to the fact that for now there is no credible opposition to the ANC in the country. What this suggests is that it is not only the ANC that suffers from a credibility crisis.

The credibility challenge of opposition parties can be demonstrated in the fact that the decline in the electoral support of the ANC is mainly because of electoral abstention by ANC supporters. This saw a voter turnout below 40% in most ANC urban strongholds. This suggests that the majority of disenchanted ANC supporters decided to withhold their votes than to vote for any other party.

The abstention by ANC urban voters suggests a serious shift in the spatial dimension of the party support, or what many call the ruralisation of the party. This is because the ANC used to enjoy popularity in both urban and rural areas, but in recent years this popularity has been substantively moving to rural areas, leaving the ANC with a narrow urban base. However, the high level of urbanisation in the country renders reliance on rural support unsustainable.

Eight of the writers argue that leadership paralysis in the ANC is the primary cause for its decline, and furthermore that weak leadership reinforces factional battles. Factional battles in turn reinforce lack of accountability which then reinforces widespread corruption. They argue that the collective impact of the four reinforcing pathologies; weak leadership, factionalism, lack of accountability and corruption led to the political disengagement of the ANC electoral support base. Any of these can be selected as they are related and reinforcing; the festering of one giving birth to and incubating the other.

These reinforcing pathologies led to significant abstention on the part of ANC supporters. Similar developments took place in 2004, when the opposition was in disarray, and their supporters abstained, catapulting the ANC to a record 70% electoral victory with roughly the same number of votes as in 1999.

Since the 2009 elections, each election in the country was punctuated by a major breakaway in the ANC. With national elections, these breakaway groups assume a national dimension, and with the recent local government elections the breakaways assumed a local dimension that resulted in a record number of independent candidates and service delivery forums contesting the elections. Most of the independent candidates and service delivery forums are the offshoots of the ANC and so in their contestation of elections they subtract from the ANC numbers. Whilst it is accepted that the four reinforcing pathologies are the drivers of poor electoral performance by the ANC, at the substantive level our failure to progressively and properly manage internal party dynamics and tensions is at the heart of the hemorrhage. The failure to manage internal party dynamics leads to breakaways that demoralise our supporters and thereby corrode the ANCs social base. A demoralised support base will abstain from voting and thereby undercut the electoral support. It is recognised that political parties with continuous internal party squabbles do not win elections.

Breakaways do indeed weaken the main political party. The establishment of the National Freedom Party (NFP) in 2011 as a breakaway from the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) cost the IFP its status as the official opposition in the Provincial Legislature and lost a number of municipalities in KwaZulu-Natal. The recent breakaway in the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) with the establishment of the Azanian Peoples Convention wiped out the party in the political landscape of the country. Breakaways are inevitably corrosive.

I am of the firm view that the longevity of the ANC incumbency might come to an end with the advent of any new breakaway or the collapse of the tripartite alliance. In its current organisational state, the ANC does not have the necessary capacity to absorb the impact of any further splits. Rescuing the ANC now is about reaching out to each other because an all-out war and a zero-sum game between the different factions might cost the ANC its political hegemony. This reaching out also includes proper management of the Alliance relations.

The management of internal party dynamics reminds me of a political training session organised by the South African Student Congress (SASCO) for new members at the university. During those years we were deeply infatuated with Marxism. The facilitator was Mashapa Nale, who took us through a gruelling lesson on student struggles and where SASCO fits into the whole equation, took us through the ideological leanings of SASCO as a Marxist-Leninist student movement and also the scientific revolutionary analysis. In his brief exposition of Marxism, Nale emphasised the importance of understanding how society evolves and works and its inherent contradictions and furthermore emphasised the point that all human progress is the product of contradictions in society. His categorisation of contradiction is what most of us as Marxist-Leninist aspirants were absorbed by, specifically the antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. Antagonistic contradiction is the notion that compromise between different social classes is impossible, and their relations must be characterised by external conflict. Non-antagonistic contradiction lies within the same class with the same interests and may be resolved through mere debate.

Nale further explained that SASCO is a student movement with members that approximately have the same interests but different views on almost everything, including policy or leadership preferences. Those differences generate contradictions in SASCO, but such contradictions are non-antagonistic because we are all in the same organisation, and we all pursue the same objectives. Such contradictions, even though they may sometimes be very intense, must be resolved through debates. It is now almost 30 years since that political lesson was shared, but I vividly remember him calling this the art of managing internal organisational squabbles.

This art requires a tolerance of differing views, the need to be understanding and to be organisational when dealing with matters affecting the organisation. We need tolerance because on many occasions it takes time to resolve such contradictions. We need understanding, because some of the contradictions are very deep, nuanced and complex, and cannot be taken at face value. We need to be organisational, which requires putting the organisation and its interests first when dealing with matters affecting the organisation. The art of management of internal contradictions is thus central to internal cohesion of the organisation.

Like many other political parties, the ANC has been struggling to consolidate its internal cohesion post-1994. This could be largely attributed to the failure to properly deploy the art of management of internal disagreements.

The failure to properly manage the challenge of internal disagreements and tensions has contributed to breakaways that corrode the social base and electoral support of the ANC. The 2021 local government elections are a clear demonstration thereof, where many of the major parties, civic movements and independent candidates that contested these local government elections are direct offshoots of the ANC. The continued failure to properly manage internal tensions weakens the ANC and is the main cause of the terminal decline in its electoral support.

From being the single dominant party in South Africa to its dismal electoral showing in the recent local government elections, the ANC has been on a steady decline. It also marked a sixth election where the ANC experienced a persistent decline in its electoral support. The seeds of this terminal decline were sown in the 2009 general election where the ANC lost about 4% of its national share of the votes and continued to the 2014 general election when the ANC lost more than 5% of its electoral support. With the 2016 local government election the trend of shedding votes became a full-blown challenge with the ANC for the first time getting below the 60% threshold. The 46% attained in the recent local government election indicates that the ANC continues to experience an overbearing challenge that could lead to its demise. This is due to the fact that the reasons for the decline that were identified during the 2009, 2014, 2016 and 2019 elections were not addressed, but fermented and led to successive electoral backlashes. Unlike the other election outcomes, the 2021 elections marked a tectonic shift in the political equilibrium of the country as 66 municipalities are without a decisive winner that has resulted in hung councils. The ANC could not regain majority in the 4 metros that were lost in 2016, and furthermore lost a majority of seats in the eThekwini metro. By the ANCs own standards, this latest electoral performance was a bloodbath. The over-enthusiastic political observers and writers are of the view that this terminal decline, if not soon arrested, will turn full cycle with the ANC losing incumbency in either the 2024 or 2029 elections.

This article examines the ANC trajectory post-independence and especially in the aftermath of the 2021 Local Government Elections. At the heart of the terminal decline in the electoral support of the ANC is its lack of leadership capabilities to organisationally deal with internal contestation for leadership positions and policy preferences. As mentioned above, these contestations largely contributed to breakaways that are accentuated by a decline in the subsequent electoral performance. In most cases these breakaway parties managed to enthuse a significant support to emerge as major opposition parties. The first breakaway post-1994 led to the establishment of the United Democratic Movement (UDM) after the expulsion of General Bantu Holomisa. The impact of the establishment of the UDM was felt by the ANC in the Eastern Cape. What followed was the breakaway post-Polokwane Conference in 2007 that led to the establishment of the Congress of the People (COPE) by some prominent figures. This split was driven by the failure to manage the internal organisational dynamics generated by the groups aligned to the leadership contestation of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. After the 2009 elections COPE emerged as a significant opposition party, having eroded a sizeable portion of the ANC vote. The establishment of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) coincided with the 2014 general election and the newly formed Economic Freedom Fighters party was able to obtain 6.35% of the votes, mainly from the ANC. It continues to show signs of modest electoral growth in subsequent elections and now consolidates around 10%.

The ANC attaining less than 50% of the national vote is a rude awakening and Fikile Mbalula correctly characterises these outcomes as a warning shot. What does this characterisation mean? In a military and police context a warning shot is an intentionally harmless gunshot with the intention being to ensure direct compliance or to signal impending danger. In Mbalulas view this disappointing electoral outcome was an intentional harmless warning by ANC supporters to ensure compliance with their collective aspirations to avert an impending danger. If the ANC does not improve on its capacity to manage internal dynamics in a non-antagonist manner, the impending danger might become full-blown as soon as 2024. If the ANC continues to manage internal dynamics through external conflicts rather than via internal debates then unending internal battles can be expected in 2022. 2022 will be a single most challenging year that will test the skill of ANC leaders in managing internal dynamics through compromise and reaching out. Among the issues that this leadership will have to deal with is implementation of the step-aside rule that led to the suspension of the secretary-general, more than 30 regional conferences, eight provincial conferences, and the national policy conference that will culminate in the 55th National Conference. The year 2022 could thus be a decisive year in seeking to reverse the bleeding or to accelerate the loss of power. All of this depends on the partys capacity to manage its internal dynamics. For all the role players, there is no alternative to reaching out to each other and building a platform for cooperation as the alternative of an all-out war will be catastrophic and destroy what is left of the ANC. This conciliatory approach should be bolstered by the ANC developing organisational capacity to seize the moment, create strategic initiatives and leverage opportunities.

There are many opportunities for the ANC to recover lost ground and this includes the following:

Dr Zamani Saul is the ANC's provincial chairperson in Northern Cape.

See the original post here:

ZAMANI SAUL: 2022 is a year to reach out and rebuild the ANC - Eyewitness News

MOSCOW, December 8. /TASS/. The Soviet economic pattern had reached its limits by the end of the 1970s, experts polled by TASS believe. They found it difficult to separate among the reasons for the Soviet Union collapse only political or economic ones, saying that a systemic crisis led to a collapse of the Soviet state, whereas economists and political analysts have not so far arrived at a consensus.

Thirty years ago, on December 8, 1991, an agreement dissolving the Soviet Union was signed in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha (a national park in Belarus). The agreement stipulated that the Soviet Union as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality ceased to exist, and the Commonwealth of Independent States was established. The document was signed by the leaders of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Belarusian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics Boris Yeltsin, Stanislav Shushkevich and Leonid Kravchuk.

"Some scientists share the view that the system of totalitarian communism has started to destroy itself due to the low level of peoples standard of living, the general crisis of the economic pattern, the suppression of the economic initiative, the centralized management system and red tape. Others suggest that it was all the fault of the differences in the ruling elite. Some say that the socio-economic crisis was artificially triggered by an arms race, naming the defeat in the Cold War as the reason for the collapse of the Union. The truth is somewhere in the middle, as usual, with a logjam of systemic problems leading to the fall," President of the Free Economic Society of Russia, President of the International Union of Economists SergeyBodrunov said.

The absoluteness of "the end of the USSR" was not innated in its DNA, its reasons were not an incurable pathology, Bodrunov said.

"Many experts and even western economists and politicians share this view. Particularly, Margaret Thatcher who served as British Prime Minister in 1990, when addressing American oil producers in 1991 acknowledged that the percentage of the Soviet Unions national gross product growth was twice as high compared with the west, and considering its huge natural resources, the country had real opportunities to squeeze western countries from the global markets if it used rational economic management," he explained.

Even in the last years of the existence of the USSR, the Soviet economy was the worlds second-biggest in terms of gross value after the US, accounting for roughly 50% of the US economy, the expert added.

Rector of the European University Vadim Volkov thinks that it was possible to avoid the economic collapse with the help of reforms at the end of the 1960s - the beginning of the 1970s. "Probably, through the introduction of elements of the market economy, another motivation system, another management system, certain decentralization, probably, it was possible to avoid it. And maybe it was possible to avoid it if there was no boosting of defense expenditures at such scale, meaning the arms race also killed the Soviet Union," he noted.

It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the Soviet economy of the 1970s-1980s was much stronger than that of the 1920s, though it did not save it from degradation, Associate professor of the Department of History at the Moscow State University Andrei Shadrin said. Consequently, the expert believes that the reason was not only the economy, but the policy pursued by the authorities as well.

"Clearly, the Soviet economy of the 1970s was several-fold stronger, more capable of existing than in the 1920s. Nevertheless, the country did not dissolve in the 1920s, it did not degrade, whereas in the 1970s the opposite occurred. This means that the issue was not the economy, but in the politics it pursued," he said.

According to Shadrin, the Soviet economy no longer met the demands of the society and the state, including the military. As a result, the level of peoples confidence in the authorities fell.

Bodrunov suggests it was possible to avoid both a sharp drop in the quality of life in the country and the collapse of production, particularly considering the fairly high level of the USSRs technological development and its huge potential. "One of the alternatives, and both foreign and Russian experts write a lot about it, was to move the way China did, which managed to transform the economy into a market controlled by the state," the economist explained.

Yuri Andropov came to power in 1982 and tried to cope with the situation through setting the task of increasing labor efficiency.

Andropov drafted reforms, mainly aimed at recovery of centralized planning, the way it used to be with Stalin, coupled with financial incentives, the development of individual labor activities, more differentiated payment for labor, with even such issues as attracting foreign capital set," Shadrin said.

Andropov failed to implement those plans, concurrently China started developing such reforms as well.

"Chinas position at the time could be compared with some African countries. Can you imagine what those reforms transformed China into? This fantastic transformation base on the pattern that we started talking about, could have also occurred in the Soviet Union. But it never happened," Shadrin noted.

Even after 30 years have passed, some Russians and CIS citizens still feel nostalgia for the Soviet Union due to the demand for the restoration of social fairness.

"The thing is that in an attempt to withdraw from the Soviet system we have come to a society of deep social heterogeneity as the so-called excessive inequality emerged in Russia. Interestingly, the Russians refer to the recovery of social fairness as one of the most relevant problems as it is one of the main demands of the society, which is proved by numerous sociological researches," Bodrunov said.

"But I think that the collective memory on belonging to a huge state in the past, to a strong power that had force in the world, unites many, both in Russia and in former Soviet republics," the economist added.

"Because they felt very good about themselves there. Basically, all the problems of the Soviet Union boil down to the deficit. If there had been no deficit, it would have been, in principle, fine," Shadrin concluded.

Continued here:

Systemic problems led to economic collapse of USSR, say experts - TASS

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I am very happy to welcome you in Brussels, Minister Mahmood Qureshi. Thank you for coming, warm welcome, to this building of the European Union.

Your visit is a very timely visit. We have a lot to discuss, both on our bilateral relations as well as with regard to Afghanistan and other regional developments, which are concerning for both of us.

We will talk about our ongoing cooperation based on the implementation of the Strategic Engagement Plan, and how we can enhance our joint work, especially on security issues.

We will, certainly, also discuss human rights - as every time we meet -, and related international conventions and legislations. These are integral parts of our GSP+ preferential trade regime - which is a key component of our bilateral relations.

But, certainly, Afghanistan will be very much at the centre of our talks. I am looking forward very much to discuss with you, Minister, the humanitarian situation, which is really dire - you know it better than I do, because you are a close neighbour - and the country is on the brink of socio-economic collapse. We have to look at how we can avoid this collapse that would jeopardise all of us, especially and first of all, the neighbouring countries.

Finally, we need to work together to avoid that the socio-economic situation worsens any further, to support regional stability and guarantee the protection and respect of the Afghan people, their rights and dignity.

So, we are going to have a busy agenda, but, once again, it is a pleasure to meet you here, Minister. Thank you for your visit.

Q&A

Q. Pakistan has been advocating Taliban regime recognition for the sake of stability in Afghanistan, but you have always put forward you 5 benchmarks. You should be knowing by now that the Taliban will not comply with your benchmarks. Is there any possibility to reach? consensus between Pakistan and the European Union?

The five benchmarks that the [EU] Foreign Affairs Ministers agreed in September - just after the fall of Kabul - was a way of calibrating our engagement with the [de facto] Taliban government.

When we say that we are going to engage more or less, depending on what? Depending on the way these five benchmarks are going to be fulfilled. We knew from the beginning that they were not going to be fulfilled, all of them, immediately. But this constitutes, and will constitute, our way of calibrating how much we engage with the Taliban.

We will engage more according with the fulfilment of these conditions. If these conditions are not fulfilled, we will engage less, which does not mean that we are not going to support the Afghan people through humanitarian assistance. We are doing it, we will continue doing it, and increasingly. The President of the Commission [Ursula von der Leyen] announced 1 billion to support Afghan people through our humanitarian+ aid, which means that we are going to do something more than the pure humanitarian help, but without recognition of the Afghanistan government, the Taliban government. It will depend on the way they evolve on these five axes of behaviour in order to see how do we engage with them.

Q. The federalism system, they say this is the main solution in Afghanistan. Are you going to support this idea? The people of Afghanistan want that, because Pakistan is also a federal government and federal state, the people think that the solution is to change the system. Are you going to support the idea of the people of Afghanistan?

I think that I have to agree with the Minister. There are some priorities. The federal structure of the country is important, but in any case this is an internal issue. For us, what is important is to support the Afghan people, to provide them with humanitarian assistance, bring them food, medicines, support to the schools, support to the hospitals and, later, we will see.

Link to the video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-215232

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EU-Pakistan: Press remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell upon arrival to the 6th round of the Strategic Dialogue -...

International Relations December 8, 2021 Venkatesh Athreya

This article deals with the impact of the neoliberal policies pursued since 1991, on the working people of India, and in particular on poor peasants and wage labourers. It is now three decades since neoliberal policies popularly known as LPG (Liberalization, Privatization, and Globalization) policies have been in place, pursued vigorously by both the Congress Party-led governments and the BJP-led coalitions, at the Centre and in most of the States.

The regional parties, of whom several had earlier opposed LPG policies, gradually came around to accepting and implementing these policies as they sought to retain power in their respective states through a process of political collaboration with either the Congress or the BJP. The Left-ruled states and Left Parties have been more or less alone in opposing the LPG policies both theoretically and on the ground.

LPG policies involve deregulation of the economy, opening it up as widely as possible to private capital, and opening up the nation as widely as possible to foreign capital. Specifically, deregulation (also called liberalization) means the removal of regulations governing the operations of private companies, especially the large ones. In other words, it frees these companies from the constraints of social accountability. They are to be left free to make profits in any manner they wish and to any extent possible.

This naturally implies that the State will no longer defend even the minimal rights of working people. It also implies that large companies are free to gobble up smaller companies and become powerful monopolies, ironically in the name of promoting competition! Privatization relates not only to the government selling some of its shares in State-owned companies to private capital and gradually dismantling the public sector, but also opening up all economic and social activity, including those related to education, health, infrastructure, and so on, to private players and allowing them to convert all these activities into profit-making opportunities rather than activities governed by the need to promote social well-being. This has obvious implications in terms of denying the poor access to education and health beyond minimal levels, and to raising the costs to the people of infrastructure services, including those relating to energy and power, water, and transport.

Globalization, the third element of LPG, means liberalizing imports, lowering import tariffs, and removing all quantitative restrictions on imports. Even more importantly, it means removing all restrictions on the free movement of capital as finance into and out of India, as a strategy to attract foreign capital flows into the country. This is the single most important aspect of LPG reforms and the one with the most serious consequences. The moment restrictions on bringing money into India and taking it out of India in foreign currency are removed, the government can no longer be independent in its economic policymaking. It will have to worry about whether foreign finance capital brought into India may be taken out if any government measure is not to the liking of foreign finance capitalists. Finance capital always demands minimal government regulation and minimal government expenditure. It does not like to be taxed, and it wants complete freedom to speculate, in the name of financial innovation. This has serious consequences for the governments welfare and investment policies. Since 1991, successive governments in India have, on a relative basis, cut back welfare programmes and public investments to keep foreign finance capital happy, in violation of democratic verdicts against the consequences of these policies in successive elections to the Parliament.

How have the Indian economy and the working people of India fared during the period of neoliberal reforms?

First, the annual rate of growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the economy was already close to 6 percent per year from the mid-1980s. Between 1991 when the reforms were accelerated, widened, and deepened, and 2003, the average annual growth rate of GDP was no higher than in the period from 1985 to 1990. However, from 2003-04 to 2007-08, the GDP grew more rapidly at between 7 and 9 percent. Following the global economic crisis that erupted in 2008, the annual GDP growth rate fell to 6.7% in 2008-09. The government responded to the global economic crisis by announcing considerable concessions to capitalists and the well-to-do in respect of excise duties, customs duties, and corporate and personal income taxes. The growth rate of the GDP rose in response between 2009 and 2011. But with the stimulus wearing off, the GDP growth rate in 2011-12 was 6.2 %, that in 2012-13 just 5 %, and that for 2013-14 did not even reach 5%. Over the period 2014 2021, during the BJP led regime, the official growth statistics have become less and less credible, but the consensus is that GDP growth rates, on a comparable basis, were modest till the twin shocks of demonetization in 2016 and GST in 2017, but have plunged since. By 2019-20, even the official GDP growth rate fell below 4%. The downturn evident by 2018-20 was made much worse by the COVID-19 pandemic and the disastrous policies of the Union government in tackling it.

One can argue that even an average GDP growth rate of 6.1 percent between 1980-81 and 2013-14 claimed by the UPA regime in 2014 is impressive when many countries, including the developed capitalist countries, are growing at much lower rates and only China grew at between 9 and 10 percent per year for over three decades from the late 1970s. The issue, however, is not just the rate of growth, but the nature and composition of growth and its implications for different socio-economic classes.

There are major concerns about the nature of economic growth in India in the period of neoliberal reforms.

First, it is the service sector that has accounted for most of the reported growth. The share of the service sector in Indias GDP is now close to 60 percent. The secondary sector which includes manufacturing, gas, electricity, and water supply has grown at much lower rates than the service sector and has also shown instability. Its share in GDP is only around 25 percent, much lower than in China. The share of the manufacturing sector in GDP has been stagnating at about 16%. The share of the primary sector agriculture and allied activities, forestry and fishing has declined to somewhere around 16 17 percent.

Second, while the decline in the share of the primary sector in GDP is to be expected as an economy modernizes and industrializes, the point to be noted with concern is that the share of the labour force in the primary sector, at nearly 50 %, is much higher than its share in GDP. By contrast, the services sector contributes 60% of GDP, but its share of employment is less than 30%.

Third, the last three decades have seen a huge and continuing agrarian crisis, with more than 300,000 farmers committing suicide in just a period from 1997 to 2017. Growth in agriculture and in food grains has been the lowest since independence during the neoliberal period, with the annual growth rate being just 0.6 percent between 1994-95 and 2004-05.

Agriculture and the rural economy have been devastated by neoliberal policies that have:

Fourth, the growth in employment during the neoliberal period has been smaller than in the decade preceding the reforms. Moreover, practically all the increase in employment over the last three decades has been in informal jobs that are not only often at very low wages, but carry no welfare benefits, are completely insecure with no protection for workers, involve long working hours, and deny workers the right to form unions and fight for better wages and working conditions. An ever-rising share of value-added in manufacturing goes to the big capitalists as profit while large productivity increases are accompanied by increased unemployment and lower real wages on average.

Fifth, the reforms have led to much greater integration of the Indian economy with the world capitalist economy. For instance, the combined share of exports and imports in the Indian economy in Indias GDP was only one-seventh in 1991. It is now around one-half of GDP. In addition, because the reforms allowed free entry and exit of foreign finance capital, there is a much greater degree of instability in the economy, with foreign institutional investors bringing money into the country to make quick profits through speculation in Indian financial and other markets and taking them out as quickly. While foreign capital makes sizeable profits in this manner, there is no benefit to the Indian economy as no wealth is created. But the unregulated entry and exit of foreign finance capital cause great instability in the financial and currency markets and the integration of Indias economy through trade and capital flows make us far more vulnerable to external shocks emanating from any part of the world capitalist economy.

Evidence, from the national sample surveys, the national family health surveys, and various other surveys are done across the country, shows that the reforms have not made a significant impact on the depth and severity as well as the widespread of poverty, even though the government often claims the contrary. Research has shown that per capita income in fact decreased between1993-94 and 2004-05 in regions located more than 5 kilometers from urban settlements, and these regions account for over half the population of India. With the global economic crisis impacting the Indian economy, growth falling, little increase in employment between 2004-05 and 2011-12, and sharp cuts in subsidies, the twin Modi disasters demonetization and the ill-designed GST-weakening and harassing the unorganized sector, especially the micro and small enterprises and informal retail trade, the extent of poverty is likely to have gone up significantly even prior to the COVID pandemic. The slowdown of the economy in 2019 and the collapse of livelihoods induced by the pandemic and lockdown have led, in the absence of adequate relief measures by the Union government, to increase in hunger and malnutrition across the country, especially among the rural poor and the working people in the unorganized sector. With global economic growth rates remaining persistently low and with no significant revival of the global economy anticipated for some years to come, the recovery of the Indian economy faces serious challenges.

The BJP/RSS regime has been in office for over seven years now. This has been, by far, the worst period for the working people of India, especially the rural masses. Besides pursuing ultra-neoliberal economic policies including wholesale privatization of valuable public sector assets at garage sale prices, this regime has also carried out demonetization and implemented in great haste a very poorly designed goods-and-services tax (GST) scheme. These two measures had destroyed peoples livelihoods, increased unemployment sharply, and driven the economy toward recession. As a result, the Indian economy was already experiencing declining growth in the year before the arrival of the pandemic. Big business spokespersons had then spoken of the collapse in demand not only for automobiles but even fast-moving consumer goods like biscuits. The government was in denial, but nevertheless announced several concessions for big business between August 2019 and January 2020, to boost the economy. These resulted in severe revenue losses for the government, totalling Rs 2.25 lakh crores even before the budget of 2020 February. Rs 10,000 crores went to pacify speculative foreign finance capital operating in stock markets; Rs 50,000 crores went to exporters; Rs 20,000 crores to housing and real estate players; and a whopping Rs 1,45,000 crores to the corporate sector through a drastic reduction of the corporate income tax rate to just 22%.

The budget of February 2020 provided further concessions to the extent of Rs 65,000 crores in direct taxes to the rich. Having thus given away nearly 3 lakh crores to big business, the Budget tried to manage the deficit through the sale of Rs 2.10 lakh crore worth of government shares in public sector enterprises. But there was nothing for migrant workers, informal sector workers, rural manual labourers, farmers, small businesses and others.

Three key problems were the features of the Indian economy when COVID-19 arrived. One was the continuing agrarian crisis, with no let-up in farmers suicides and negative returns from crop cultivation for a large proportion of small and marginal farmers. The second was the crisis of unemployment. The unemployment rate had risen sharply between 2011-12 and 2017-18, from 2% to 6%. The rates were close to 17 18% among the youth and the educated. The third feature was the decline of household incomes. Between 2011-12 and 2017-18, when the GDP growth rate was officially claimed to be between 7 and 8% per year, the average per capita monthly consumer expenditure of rural households fell by 8.8% signifying the collapse of rural demand. Both neoliberal policies pursued by successive governments at the Centre and the ill-advised measure of demonetisation, poorly designed and implemented GST, relentless increase in fuel prices and cutting down of welfare and investment expenditures lie behind these dismal outcomes. It is on this already weak economy that the shock of COVID-19 landed.

The first recorded case of coronavirus was in Kerala on January 30 of 2020. The government of Kerala moved swiftly to face the challenge. It mobilized the entire people of Kerala in its efforts, the local bodies, the organizations of farmers, of workers and of other sections such as women and youth, various civil society organizations, the entire medical and para medical personnel and support staff. Till date, the Kerala government has been the best performer by far in India in meeting the COVID-19 challenge, and has also won global acclaim.

The government of India did not respond seriously for nearly two months, from January 30 till the last week of March, till after President Trumps visit and a change of government in Madhya Pradesh had taken place. It finally responded on March 24 in a most drastic manner by imposing an undifferentiated national lockdown, giving less than four hours notice. This had a devastating impact on millions of migrant workers, leaving them stranded in various cities, far from their families, with no place to stay and no income. It destroyed access to livelihoods and incomes for nearly 80% of our households, as business establishments closed down across the country. Despite the prolonged lockdown and associated, severe restrictions on freedom of movement of people, the government found itself unable to control the spread of the pandemic as well as its economic consequences.

The lockdown imposed from March 24, 2020 was not a solution to the pandemic, but only a means of slowing its spread and buying time to equip our health infrastructure to manage the surge in the number of COVID patients when the pandemic spread. But the Union government did precious little to improve or help the state governments to strengthen health infrastructure. The lockdown destroyed peoples livelihoods and incomes, but the government offered paltry relief. The first stimulus package, announced March 26th, claimed to be worth Rs 1.7 lakh crores, but this included existing budgetary allocations. The net new spending for relief amounted to Rs 93,000 crores, hardly 0.5% of Indias GDP. On May 12th, the prime minister announced a stimulus of Rs 20 lakh crore. This too was a very misleading figure, consisting as it did mainly of credit-related measures and not real fiscal spending by government.

It became clear from the finance ministers announcements that the actual spending that the government would undertake as COVID relief would hardly amount to 1% of GDP. About Rs 18 lakh crores out of the announced 20 lakh crores are in the nature of increasing liquidity and credit availability in the economy through banks and other financial institutions. This is of little help to workers, petty producers, small and medium industries and entrepreneurs (MSME), peasants and other working people. Not only did government offer little relief to people, it announced economic reforms pushing the LPG agenda. It raised the FDI limit in defence manufacturing via the automatic route from 49% to 74% and opened up the coal industry to private capital. It declared that it would limit the role of the public sector to a few specified strategic activities while all activities will be open to the private sector. Several new concessions and policies favouring private big business, both Indian and foreign, have been announced.

Through three Acts, passed under controversial circumstances especially in the Rajya Sabha, the government opened up the agricultural sector to foreign and Indian big business, began the process of abandoning procurement and price support for farmers, removed stock limits on essential commodities enabling big traders to hoard and sell them at artificially high prices, and liberalized rules for land acquisition by corporate entities even in tribal areas. It is pursuing anti-labour measures both directly and via several state governments. Critics of the government have argued that the draconian lockdown regime, under which protests and mobilization are difficult to carry out, is being used to push through anti-people reforms. They have questioned the logic of selling the countrys mineral wealth and industrial assets to foreign capital while talking of self-reliance. The brazenness of the regime is apparent in its scheme of National asset monetization pipeline which envisages selling valuable public sector assets at throw away prices.

Meanwhile, the Indian economy is sinking deeper into severe recession. GDP in 2020-2021 is estimated to be nearly 10% less than in 2019-20. In April 2020 alone, 14 crore persons lost employment. Even with the resumption of economic activities across the country, the unemployment rate which touched 25% in April-May, remained high in mid-July 2020 at 11%. Though agricultural activities picked up with the arrival of the monsoon, the peasants facing a mountain of debt have been hit hard by sharp rise in input prices, with the government increasing petrol and diesel prices through huge additional taxes. Retail inflation has risen sharply. The limited increase in employment has been accompanied by poor wages and low incomes from self-employment.

A particularly obnoxious feature of the governments handling of the pandemic challenge has been the manner in which it has put numerous obstacles in the path of state governments which are dealing with the pandemic on the ground. It has centralized decision making on lockdown strategies, on ensuring supplies of masks and other personal protective equipment (PPEs), on testing kits, indeed on practically all matters. In addition, it has given little financial assistance to states, and in fact owes the states large sums of money by way of GST compensation and tax devolution. It made a complete mess of handling the so-called second wave which resulted in a large number of deaths.

What emerges from our account of the neoliberal regime is that ruling class policies have largely served the interests of the capitalist and landlord classes. Big business has been the biggest beneficiary. Taking into account the politics of the ruling dispensation, it would be correct to call it a Corporate-Hindutva regime.

The fact that land monopoly has not been seriously eroded, despite a great deal of rhetoric on land reforms and a large number of legislations, reflects the exercise of state power by the landlord class. While Prof Mahalanobis estimated in 1960 that roughly 63 million acres of land would be surplus under prevailing ceiling norms, hardly one-tenth of this figure has even been identified as surplus and even less has been distributed. Likewise, while the green revolution had enabled a significant increase in agricultural output through increase in yields per acre, the agrarian policies of the Indian state including the green revolution have largely benefited the landlords and big capitalist farmers as well as sections of the rich peasantry. Even in the neoliberal reforms period, which has seen a deep and persistent agrarian crisis, the process of peasant differentiation has continued and a small section of rural exploiters consisting of landlords and big capitalist farmers have benefited from the neoliberal reforms and strengthened their control of land and other productive assets. On the other hand, data from the Census and from the national sample surveys including the latest survey of agrarian households carried out by the National Statistical Organization in 2019(Reference Year July 2018 to June 2019) show that the vast majority of the peasantry and agricultural labour remain poor, with average monthly household incomes abysmally low.

One may sum up the current agrarian crisis under the neoliberal regime in the following terms:

Overall, in class terms, the big bourgeoisie has benefited the most in the political economy of Indian development. Landlords, big capitalist farmers, and a section of the rich peasantry have also substantially benefited from neoliberal policies, though they are also facing increased volatility on account of opening up and exposure to international economic shocks. A section of the middle class professionals, for instance has also benefited to some extent. But the rural poor consisting of rural manual workers, poor peasants, and traditional artisans as well as sections of the middle peasantry have largely been victims of neoliberal policies and have seen a worsening of their livelihood prospects.

The world has changed remarkably since India gained independence. The relatively greater autonomy that India had in implementing its strategy of development at that time has been eroded both by dramatic global developments and by the logic of the capitalist path of development itself which has entailed an increasing collaboration with foreign finance capital.

Three major developments of the period since 1990 have to be noted. One is the economic crisis of 1991 that resulted from the path of capitalist development pursued since independence. The second is the changed balance of class forces in the international arena following the collapse of socialist regimes in USSR and Eastern Europe in the period 1989 to1991. The third is the rise of Hindutva forces and the resultant rightward shift in Indian politics as well as in economic policies. It is remarkable that despite these adverse developments, the progressive movements and forces in India were able to slow the juggernaut of neoliberal reforms with mass action on both political and economic planes. For a short period from 2004 to 2007, it even proved possible to get important progressive legislations passed. These include the Tribal and Forest Rights Act (TFRA), the Right to Information Act (RTI) and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). However, the balance of forces in the country has remained strongly in favour of the parties of the ruling classes, and the three decades from 1991 to 2021 have seen an intensification of neoliberal economic policies as well as the emergence of the aggressive communal politics of Hindutva. The economic policies of the Hindutva led government have been even more neoliberal than those of the regime it replaced.

It is clear that a huge challenge lies ahead for progressive forces in India who wish to see pro-people economic policies implemented. But experience also suggests that the challenge can be met only through sustained class and mass struggles. The important initial victory of the year-long struggle of the peasantry, carried on with active support from the working class of India signified by the Union governments decision to repeal the hated farm laws passed in July 2020, suggests once again that the people united cannot be defeated in the long run.

This article first published on the Indian Researcher website.

Professor Venkatesh Athreya is an eminent Marxist Political Economist. His works on Agrarian Relations, on the political economy of Reforms in India, has shaped the discussion around these issues for decades. Professor Athreya is currently retired from his position at Bharati Dasan university.

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Neoliberalism's Toll: Impacts on India's Peasants and Workers - The Bullet - Socialist Project

The rivalry between Argentina and Brazil dates back to the 1800s, when Argentina and Brazil established disputes over territorial boundaries. The two giant economies have gone through multiple integration periods; yet, it seems like the two countries fail to find a middle ground on political, social, and economic issues. For example, in 1960, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) proposed creating the Latin American Free Trade Agreement (LAFTA). However, the brewing rivalry between Argentina and Brazil destabilized this integration attempt. Fast forward to the 1990s, after countless attempts of economically integrating the region, Brazil and Argentina create the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), which comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In practice, MERCOSUR never came to fruition because Brazil only aimed to establish an economic hegemony in the region, and Argentina maintained many of its nationalist economic policies. These actions undermined economic integration and fueled rivalry and tensions. Argentina and Brazil have threatened MERCOSURs peace at several points.

In 1999, the Federative Republic of Brazil devalued its currency without giving Argentina advance notice, thereby deterring some of the critical trade processes between the two countries. The unilateral decision by Brazil had a significant impact on MERCOSUR since Brazil was, at the time, the most considerable economic power of South America. Brazil, however, has not been the only unilateral player in the region. In 2003, President Kirchner in Argentina developed a series of protectionist policies, which obstructed Brazilian refrigerators and cars inflows to Argentina. The ban on Brazilian steel manufactured products in Argentina struck Brazils economy by halting the processing of steel products and ultimately increasing unemployment and contracting the economy. Moreover, in 2016, Argentina imposed the same ban on Brazilian products; during this occasion, Brazil was going through a recession with its gross domestic product (GDP) shrinking by an estimated 3.6% the second consecutive year of a fall greater than 3.5%.

As of today, the relationship between the two countries is unlikely to recover. Firstly, Argentina elected a new president, Alberto Fernandez, a Peronist and ideological rival of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. The political tensions between the two dignitaries are reflected through the nation-states new economic and trade policies. While Brazil is trying to promote a series of Neoliberal ideas such as trade liberalization and attracting foreign investment domestically, Argentina, under Fernandez, is seeking to have a more cautious and gradual approach to keep trading within and outside the region. President Fernandez promised to establish a more protectionist strategy that focuses on promoting domestic manufacturing over exporting goods. Additionally, the Argentinian President intends to renegotiate parts of MERCOSURs trade deal with the EU, including an increase in tariffs, the imposition of new trade barriers to protect the Argentinian economy, and the delayed ratification of the EU-MERCOSUR Trade Agreements. Fernandezs new position on trade is not beneficial for Bolsonaros economic plan, as the Brazilian leader began negotiations between MERCOSUR and other financial entities like the EU, the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, with Argentinas return to a protectionist economic model, the trade negotiations have changed drastically. Although it is unlikely that the two nations will dissolve MERCOSUR, the organization may suffer a downgrade from a customs union to a free trade area (i.e., without a standard external tariff).

Another pivotal aspect of Argentinas new economic policy is the rise of the Peoples Republic of China (China). With Fernandez in charge, Argentina has signalled its desire to deepen economic ties with China, making it more challenging to achieve the U.S. governments goal of deterring Chinas influence in Latin America. In turn, this will make it more likely for the U.S. to put more pressure on Bolsonaro to take an anti-Beijing stance and ban Chinese products from the region. This position will result in a severe economic hit to Brazils current production model, which depends heavily on China. Suppose Argentina adopts China as its leading trading partner, then this could mean animosity from the United States, the collapse of several agreements between Europe and MERCOSUR, and an increased Chinese presence in South America.

Lastly, the disputes between Brazil and Argentina regarding the crisis in Venezuela are translating into an economic battle. If Fernandez and Bolsonaro continue to have opposite stances on Venezuela, then MERCOSUR will suffer from more disruption in its operations. Despite being a MERCOSUR member, Venezuela has not had a significant amount of power when it comes to decision-making since, in previous years, Brazil and Argentina have had a similar political stance. However, given that Argentina and Uruguay do not recognize the government of Juan Guaid, which gives legitimacy to Nicols Maduro Moros, Brazil and Paraguay may be on the minority side during MERCOSUR voting processes. If MERCOSUR tips the balance towards Venezuela, it may lose millions of dollars in trade deals, given the countrys unpopular position in the eyes of the world. Unless Brazil and Argentina establish a dialogue to find a middle ground and overcome their socio-economic and political rivalry, the future of MERCOSUR, and therefore regional trade, cooperation, and integration is in serious jeopardy.

The best course of action is for the current leaders of both nations, to establish a plan of cooperation based on the mutual understanding that regional trade needs to be a consensual system of policies that would maximize each nations productivity. These sets of policies must be drafted under the supervision of a cohort of economists experienced on trade relations from each country to ensure bilarity. Most importantly, other MERCOSUR members should be invited to the negotiation process to delineate the future of regional power and trade cooperation in South America. Additionally, MERCOSUR needs to establish a system of checks and balances that observes abrupt changes in trade policies of all country members. By creating a system of cooperation where the two rivals do not try to impose superiority over one another, we can ensure that we carry beneficial negotiations that will ultimately benefit trade and overall South American cooperation. The history of rivalry between these two giants may spell doom for this region of Latin America. Whether South America will thrive or perish, is, in part, in the hands of the leaders of Argentina and Brazil. They ought to move past this rivalry that has dominated the countries relationship for decades and think of the future of cooperation in South America.

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The Fragile Future of MERCOSUR as a Result of the Argentinian-Brazilian Rivalry THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW - International Affairs Review

Jutting out from the second-largest continent, the Horn of Africa is one of the worlds regions most vulnerable to climate change. The four countries on the peninsulaDjibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somaliaare warming more quickly than the global average, with dangerous implications for unrest and conflict within and across their borders. Weather in the Horn is also confounding forecasters. Torrential rains give way to torrid dry spells, triggering catastrophic droughts, record-breaking floods, and biblical swarms of desert locusts.

More than climate anomalies, these gathering menaces have become what some experts call threat multipliersroiling politics, upending markets, and menacing social stability in what is already one of the most fragile patches on earth. Sudden hot spells and intense rainfalls can paralyze agricultural and livestock production, disrupt fishing ecosystems, and deepen tensions between rival communities already on the precipice of collapse. According to some researchers, a 0.5 degrees Celsius increase in local temperatures is associated with a 10 to 20 percent increase in the risk of conflict. With around 80 percent of the regions population depending on subsistence farming and herding to survive, minor setbacks can push villages headlong into hunger and malnutrition.

Climate change is already disrupting the livelihoods of millions of people who farm and herd in the Horn, especially the poorest and most vulnerable. It is driving people from their homes, with rebels including the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front in Ethiopia and predatory armed groups such as al-Shabab in Somalia profiting from instability to expand their power and influence. The cascading risks of food insecurity, forced migration, and organized violence are growing more urgent, putting relief agencies and development organizations on high alert. Although they fall below the threshold of armed conflict, these tensions are generating severe humanitarian need. Rapid urbanization, competition over dwindling pasture and arable land, and the absence of government services are adding to the burden.

Jutting out from the second-largest continent, the Horn of Africa is one of the worlds regions most vulnerable to climate change. The four countries on the peninsulaDjibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somaliaare warming more quickly than the global average, with dangerous implications for unrest and conflict within and across their borders. Weather in the Horn is also confounding forecasters. Torrential rains give way to torrid dry spells, triggering catastrophic droughts, record-breaking floods, and biblical swarms of desert locusts.

More than climate anomalies, these gathering menaces have become what some experts call threat multipliersroiling politics, upending markets, and menacing social stability in what is already one of the most fragile patches on earth. Sudden hot spells and intense rainfalls can paralyze agricultural and livestock production, disrupt fishing ecosystems, and deepen tensions between rival communities already on the precipice of collapse. According to some researchers, a 0.5 degrees Celsius increase in local temperatures is associated with a 10 to 20 percent increase in the risk of conflict. With around 80 percent of the regions population depending on subsistence farming and herding to survive, minor setbacks can push villages headlong into hunger and malnutrition.

Climate change is already disrupting the livelihoods of millions of people who farm and herd in the Horn, especially the poorest and most vulnerable. It is driving people from their homes, with rebels including the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front in Ethiopia and predatory armed groups such as al-Shabab in Somalia profiting from instability to expand their power and influence. The cascading risks of food insecurity, forced migration, and organized violence are growing more urgent, putting relief agencies and development organizations on high alert. Although they fall below the threshold of armed conflict, these tensions are generating severe humanitarian need. Rapid urbanization, competition over dwindling pasture and arable land, and the absence of government services are adding to the burden.

A major part of the problem is that countries in the Horn are already starting from a low human development baseline. Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia are among the worlds poorest nations. Other nations in the region likewise face sharp social and economic deprivations, with burgeoning urban slums and vast, neglected rural hinterlands. The Horn also suffers from rudimentary agricultural productivity and scant trade in value-added agricultural products. With sky-high population growth averaging 3 percent per year and an outsized youth bulge, the region is struggling to meet the growing demand for basic resources, especially food and energy.

Another big challenge is that the region is riddled with armed conflicts, extremist violence, and myriad security crises. Ethiopias military confrontation in Tigray has left thousands dead and displaced over two million people since 2020. With the Tigrayan rebels marching toward Addis Ababa and the country on high alert, the worsening conflagration could spark a wider crisis tearing apart Africas second most populous country. Meanwhile, Somalias political crisis between its president and opposing factions is compounded by a long-running conflict with al-Shabab militants linked to al Qaeda. At the same time, protracted negotiations over sharing the Niles waters among Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt are becoming increasingly fraught. When Ethiopia began construction on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in 2011, it threatened Egypts water and food security. Tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Juba and Shabelle rivers are also simmering.

Climate change will only exacerbate these and other security risks. The influence of warming temperatures and erratic rainfall on migration and displacement is particularly worrisome. In 2019 alone, roughly 40 percent of the internal displacement of Sub-Saharan Africans was due to natural disasters, which are expected to increase in frequency. This year, the African Unions Peace and Security Council explicitly recognized the relationships between climate change, socio-economic underdevelopment, peace, security, and stability. And while the issue still divides the United Nations Security Council, several council resolutions nevertheless acknowledge these same links in Somalia and South Sudan.

Somalia, in particular, is a country on the edge. Daily temperatures there already average 27 degrees Celsius and are expected to climb by another 3 degrees Celsius by the end of the century. Escalating water stress depletes irrigation, agricultural yields, grazing routes, and livestock production. Even the most subtle shifts in seasons and weather patterns can therefore have dire implications. Somalia has suffered more than 30 climate-related shocks since 1990, including 12 droughts and 19 floods. These crises are exacerbated by chronic political instability and weak central government. Recurring bouts of organized violence between farmers and herders, the obstruction of aid, and spiralingfood prices have left millions of already ill-fed people hungrier. These miseries were compounded in 2020 by the arrival of billions of desert locusts that further ravaged farmland.

The complex relationships between climate and security have climbed the agendas of diplomats, including in the U.N. Security Council. Ireland and Niger, with support from a raft of European, African, and small island states, may lead the passage of the first ever Security Council resolution on climate and security this week. Among other things, they are urgingU.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres to appoint a special envoy for climate security and deliver a major report on climate security with recommendations on how to tackle the issue. The resolution also recommends that U.N. field missions provide more regular reporting on climate-linked concerns.

Not all Security Council members are convinced. A similar proposal was circulated by Germany last year but abandoned when U.S. support could not be assured. China and India have expressed reservations about the current text, and Russia is sharply opposed to expanding the definition of peace and security to include climate issues. It argues that the Security Council should not take on issues that are, in its view, the responsibility of entities such as the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Encouragingly, there are signs, if admittedly still weak, of an organized response to the climate and security crisis in the Horn itself. The African Unions Continental Early Warning System and the International Authority on Developments Conflict Early Warning and Response Network are ramping up monitoring of the situation. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (a bloc of eight African countries) and the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization have also initiated community development projects to strengthen food security for small scale farmers and pastoralists in regional hotspots such as the Mandera triangle, the conflicted area whereSomalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya meet. The East African Community has likewise launched a transborder initiative to support shared management of common freshwater ecosystems spanning hundreds of thousands of acres.

Among the most ambitious environmental initiatives in Africa is the Great Green Wall. The $8 billion plan sets out to reforest 247 million acres of degraded land and improve climate resilience with an almost 5,000-mile rampart of trees stretching across the continent from Senegal to Djibouti. Launched in 2007 by the African Union and supported by the European Union, U.N., and World Bank, the wall is supposed to be completed by 2030. Once completed, it is expected to absorb nearly 250 million metric tons of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere while also cooling down the climate in one of the hottest places on earth.

But the project is way behind schedule: Just 4 percent of the envisioned area has been planted as of 2020. As impressive as the mega-project is, the Horn needs far more than a wall of trees to curb its underlying climate-related risks and bring peace to this chronically conflicted stretch of the continent.

With mitigation efforts unlikely to ease short-term distress, the situation in the Horn underlines the urgent need to address growing security concerns through climate adaptation. Greater support for safety net systems, water storage and efficiency, redoubled investment in resilient crops such as sorghum and millet, and the development of drought-tolerant crop strains including maize and wheat are essential strategies to foster food security in an era of runaway climate change. At the top of the to-do list is financingit is vital to ensure that multilateral and bilateral climate funds are allocated to the most fragile ecosystems in the Horn.

Too often, regions such as the Horn are consigned as investment risks and management liabilities to be avoided. Yet that is shortsighted. More than anything, the Horn needs redoubled investment in job creation and other opportunities for young people, to keep them out of harms way and prevent them from taking up arms to resolve conflicts that extreme weather and escalating climate disruption will only worsen.

Mac Margolis and Peter Schmidt contributed to this article.

Link:

Climate Threats in the Horn of Africa Are Multiplying - Foreign Policy

INTRODUCTION

Covid-19 is presently raising the threat to the financial sustainability of private tertiary institutions (PTIs).

They are limited to the accomplishment of their missions and their ability to provide top-of-the-line educational programmes and resources to learners in different disciplines. Problems of financial sustainability of educational institutions typically have a repercussion that continues to grow dramatically, given the decrease of government funding and the decline inenrollment(Marginson 2017; Wu 2017). Based on the financial sustainability problems, over 104 private tertiary institutes closed in the USA between 2004 and 2012 on average (Greenwell, 2017).

In Africa, there are various financial difficulties for PTIs. Ahmed (2015 ) states in Nigeria that PTIs lack the resources they are supposed to seek in their attempts to achieve their objectives. Mugo and Ngahu (2015) observethat many PTIs in Kenya have completely folded because they cannot help themselves financially.

A lot of PTIs in Ghana are onlife support (Addo, 2018). Even before COVID-19, some PTIs had already laidoff some of their workers to stay afloat in Ghana. Currently, PTIs are considering all forms of cost reduction control measures.It is the opinion of the authors of this article to test the income diversification approach of PTIs to stay afloat during the COVID-19 era, and after based on the institutional ownership type, that is denominational versus non-denominational profile.

The traditional source of revenue (tuition fees) of PTIs is decreasing due to severe competitions from public educational institutions. Almost all the heads of private educational institutions are expressing worries on the current trend of enrolment competition because they require significant effort to admit, at most, 1,000 students in a given academic year (Nsowah-Nuamah, 2017; Donkor, 2017; Siaw, 2018; Bediako, 2019).

More recently, the emergence of the COVID-19has also highlighted the issue of excess dependence on the conventional revenue source by PTIs. Education is one of the most affected industries in the Ghanaian economy. To avoid the spread of the virus, the government ordered the suspension of numerous operations, including schooling (Dogbey, 2020). The pandemic exacerbated the financial burden of the PTIs, which needed to pay its employees despite the pause in tuition payments. The institutions needhelp from the government, as most of them cannot pay their employees salaries (Quartey, 2020; Dogbey, 2020).

Many educational experts expect that PTIs will be closing before 2028 (Alhassan, 2017; Eide, 2018). These forecasts call for joint efforts to tackle the PTIs financial sustainability challenges because these institutions make significant impacts on the socio-economic growth of the global economy by the access to higher quality training (Yanka, 2017).

Ekpoh and Okpa (2017) looked at diversifying sources of sustainability funding for university education, its challenges, and development strategies. The study sampled 480 respondents from four federal universities across Nigerias south-south region. Findings indicated that diversifying university income to include consulting services, marketing of physical facilities, part-time degree programs, proper financial management, and eliminating poor employee attitude increased enrolment with its resulting positive impact on the financial sustainability of universities in Nigerias South-South region.

Amos and Koda (2018) analyzed the contribution that the Catholic Diocese of Moshi in Tanzania is making from school-based income-generating activities in providing quality education in secondary schools. The research was interviewed 252 respondents from 12 Catholic Church-operated secondary schools. The study concluded that institutional projects are important alternative ways of generating additional income as they enable financial problems to be solved by second-cycle institutions. The study identified grain, vegetable, and poultry cultivation as the schools significant ventures.

Nyamwega (2016) assessed income-generating projects at Nairobi Countys public secondary schools. The researcher analyzed public institutions. The study revealed that the schools received annually from ventures between KShs 680,000and KShs 6,000,000 ($6,559 and $57,876 respectively, an indication that school-based ventures are profitable. The study concluded that to remain financially viable; institutional managers should be more creative in launching more institutional projects.

Adan and Keiyoro (2018) did a study in Kenya on factors affecting the implementation of income-generating projects at public secondary schools in Isiolo. The study found that institutional initiatives improve financial sustainability as it enables educational institutions to cope with the financial dynamics without necessarily shifting budget overruns to parents and guardians. Therefore, the researchers called on management to equip those in charge of ensuring the viability of income-generating activities in secondary schools in Isiolo North Sub- County, Kenya.

Sakawa and Watanabel (2020) found that the strategic and monitoring positions of the institutional owners improve institutional resilience for higher growth opportunities. The researchers looked at shareholder ownership and firm performance under stakeholder-oriented corporate governance in Japan using 2924 company-year observation of large listed Japanese companies.

Institutional profile, used in this analysis as a moderator, defines institutional ownership, classified under both denominational and non-denominational. Institutional variations are increasing in this sample, and each institutions expertise becomes crucial as the schools can vary in ownership. Studies also found institutional profile affecting institutional financial sustainability (Kisengo & Kombo, 2014; Hossain & Khan, 2016; Lambinicio, 2016; Ibrahim, 2019).

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

METHODOLOGY

The researchers sought to address the research questions of finding the correlation between income diversification and financial sustainability among PTIs and going to investigate further the moderation of institutional type on their economic sustainability approach related to income diversification. This study adopted a causal research design to study the correlation between income diversification and financial sustainability among PTIs. Among the institutions used in the Greater Accra Region, 14 (35%) were denominational, and 26 (65%) were non-denominational. The study utilized parametric inferential statistics by relying on regression Process v3.2 by Andrew F. Hayes model 1. The study was carried out in PTIs in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. Forty out of the sixty PTIs in the region were randomly sampled to answer the self-constructed questionnaires with the Cronbach Alpha of .863 for income diversification and .852 for financial sustainability.

RESULTS AND DICUSSSION

The research explored the relationship between the diversification of income and financial sustainability. The analysis showed a moderately positive significant association between income diversification and financial sustainability (R=0.4195, p=0.024). This indicates that a rise in the diversification of income allows the PTIs to be financially sustained. The study showed that the determination coefficient was 17.6% (R2=0.1760), which means that the diversification of income would predict financial sustainability by 17.60%. The consequence of this outcome is that achieving the financial sustainability of PTIsis moderately dependent on diversification of income. This result confirms Amos and Koda (2018) research in Tanzania among second cycle institutions, Ekpoh and Okpa (2017 ) study in Nigerias South-South Region, and Nyamwega (2016) study in Kenya among public secondary schools that diversification of income contributes reasonably to the financial sustainability of PTIs.

Table 1. Model Summary

S=Significant, NS= Not Significant

The final investigation for this research was to find out the moderating impact of institutional profile on the relationship between PTI s incomediversification and financial sustainability. By following the model of Jose (2013), Haye (2009), and Hayes and Matthes (2009) the study of the impact of moderation is described and submitted. The power of moderation, that is, an effect of interaction, is seen either as enhancing or as antagonistic (Hayes & Matthes, 2009). An improved effect of moderation is when an increase in moderator quantity (institutional profile) causes an increase in the influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable. An antagonistic effect is when a moderator increase has an opposite effect on the independent variable.

In the model, 1 represented the denominational institutions, and 2 represented the non-denominational institutions. The initial overview model showed a considerable variance value of R2 = 0.1760, F=2.562, p=.0240 financial sustainability. It then implemented the relationship between financial sustainability and institutional profile. With an interaction model, the moderating variable induced a significant change in the process R2 = 0.0566, F= 2.4742, p= 0.0450 as shown in Table 1. When analyzing the interaction plot of the institutional profile, Figure 2 illustrates the effect of moderation on financial sustainability and the consequences of income diversification. It is noted that it is also enhanced, and statistically important, an enhancing impact of income diversification on financial sustainability because of the positive relationship with the implementation of the interaction of institutional forms.

Figure 2. Enhancing the effect of institutional profile on the relationship between income

Diversification and financial sustainability of PTIs

A detailed analysis, as shown in figure 2 on substantial moderation, also showed that most denominational PTIs ( blue line 1) rely on income diversification in achieving financial sustainability compared with non-denominational PTIs (Green line 2). The outcome of this research is a Sakawa (2020) report confirmation that institutional ownership has an enhanced impact on financial sustainability. Although denominational institutions rely on diversification of income in order to maintain financial sustainability, non-denominational institutions rely less on this. This suggests that income diversification strategies would differ between denominational and non-denominational tertiary institutions for the financial survival of PTIs.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The relationship between incomediversification and financial sustainability has been moderately positive. This means an increase in PTIs financial sustainability as the management puts considerable effort into strategies for diversifying income. Diversification of income could predict financial sustainability by 17.60%. A private tertiary institution with a 17.60% income diversification venture will sustain financially during the COVID-19 pandemic era. This study alsohas shown thatdenominationalPTIs are currently relaying on incomediversificationventures stay afloat during this COVID- 19 era more than non-denominational PTIs. Furthermore, PTIs institutional profiles are enhancingthe impact of income diversification on financial sustainability. The study concludes that PTIs financial sustainability is based on strategies to diversify incomes during the COVID-19 era. Therefore the research suggests that the PTIs invest in profitable projects to diversify revenue.

REFERENCE LIST

Adan, S.M., & Keiyoro, P. (2017). Factors influencing the implementation of income generating projects in public secondary schools in Isiolo North Sub County, Kenya. International Academic Journal of Information Sciences and Project Management, 2(1), 558-573.

Addo, C. (2018, March 12). Central running on life support-Registrar. Retrieved from https://www.yen.com.gh/ 107277-central-university-running-life-support-registrar.html#107277

Ahmed, S. (2015). Public and private higher education financing in Nigeria. European Scientific Journal, 11(7), 92-109.

Alhassah, I. (2018, March 29). Revise programmes to avoid collapse NAB to Private Unis. Retrieved from https://starrfmonline.com/2018/03/revise-programmes-avoid-collapse-nab-private-unis/

Amos, O., & Koda, G.M. (2018). Contribution of school-based income generating activities in quality education provision in secondary schools managed by the Catholic Diocese of Moshi, Tanzania. British Journal of Education, 6(4), 49-69.

Bediako, K.D. (2019). 25th Congregation and 40th Anniverasry Celebration (Vice-Chancellors Report). Valley View University

Dogbey, S.A. (2020, April 28). Ghana National Association of Private Schools pursue financial aid to pay salaries of teachers.Retrieved from https://www.myjoyonline.com

Donkor, E.A. (2017, December 14). Private universities facing financial challenges despite rebate University President. Retrieved from https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/ 2017/ December-

Eide, S. (2018, Fall). Private colleges in peril. Retrieved from https://www.educationnext.org/ private-colleges-peril-financial-pressures-declining-enrollment-closures/

Ekpoh, U.I., & Okpa, O.E. ( 2017). Diversification of sources of funding university education for sustainability: Challenges and strategies for improvement. Journal of Education, Society and Behavioural Science, 21(2), 1-8. doi: 10.9734/JESBS/ 2017/ 34494

Greenwill, B. (2017). Business strategies to increase the financial stability of private universities. Retrieved fromhttp://www.scholarworks. waldenu.edu/dissertations

Hayes, A.F. (2009). Beyond Baron and Kelly: Statistical mediation analysis in the new millennium. Communication Monograph, 76, 408-420. Doi: 10.1080/03637750903310361.

Hayes, A.F., &Matthes, J. (2009). Computational procedures for probing interactions in OLS and logistic regression: SPSS and SAS implementations. Behavior Research Methods, 41, 924-936.

Hossan, M.S., & Khan, M.A. (2016). Financial sustainability of microfinance institutions (MFIs) of Bangladesh. Developing Country Studies, 6(6), 69-78. Retrieved from https://www.pdfs. semanticscholar.org/e967/ 4a43bd2b51be263bbeb85e9281e46ad890ac.pdf

Ibrahim Y., Ahmed, I., & Minai, M.S. (2018).The influence of institutional characteristics on financial performance of microfinance institutions in the OIC countries.Economics and Sociology, 11(2), 19-35. doi:10.14254/2071-789X.2018/112/2.

Kisengo, Z.M., & Kombo, H. (2014). Effect of firm characteristics on performance of the microfinance sector in Nakuru, Kenya.International Journal of Science and Research, 3(10), 1791-1799. Retrieved from https://www.ijsr.net

Lambinicio, J.S. (2016). Organizational Performance of Higher Education Institutions in Pangasinan. Paper presented at the Third Asia Pacific Conference on Applied Research, Melbourne. Retrieved from https://www.apiar.org.au/journal-paper-/organizational-performance-of-higher-education-institutions-in-pangasinan/

Marginson, S. (2017). Global Trends in Higher Education Financing: The United Kingdom. International Journal of Educational Development. Retrieved from https://www. sciencedirect.com/science/ article/pii/S0738059 317301748

Mugo, A.N., & Ngahu, S.T. (2015). Assessment of financial challenges affecting operations of private tertiary colleges in Nakuru town, Kenya. International Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management, 3(5), 1476-1486.

Nsowah-Nuamah (2017, November 12). Private universities face imminent collapse-Prof. Nsowah-Nuamah. Retrieved from https://www.myjoyonline. com/news/2017/ November-12th/private-universities-face-imminent-collapse-prof-nsowah-nuamah.php

Nyamwega, H.N. (2016). An evaluation of income generating projects in public secondary schools in Nairobi County. International Journal of African and Asian Studies, 21, 6-16.

Quartey, P. (2020). COVID-19 and the plight of private school teachers in Ghana. Statistical, Social and Economic Research.

Sakawa, H., & Watanabel, N. (2020). Institutional ownership and firm performance under stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. Sustainability Journal, 12(3), pp 1-21.Retrieved from https://www.doi.org/10.3390/su12031021

Siaw, E.K. (2018, November 17). Public universities crippling private universities. Retrieved from https://www.modernghana.com/news/897917/public-universities-crippling-private-universities.html

Wu, F.H. (2017). The crisis of American higher education. Retrieved from https://www.tah. oah.org/february-2017/the-crisis-of-american-higher-education/

Yanka, K. (2017). Leadership for a changing public-private higher education landscape. A paper presentation at 2017 International Association of Universities Conference, Accra, Ghana. Retrieved from https://www.ug.edu.gh/sites/default/files/images/Address%20 by%20 Professor%20Kwesi%20 Yankah %20%20-%20IAU%202017%20 INTERNATIONAL%20 CONFERENCE.pdf

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Post NUM extended NEC media statement

7 December 2021

The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) convened its Extended National Executive Committee (NEC) meeting at the Double Tree by Hilton Hotel in Cape Town from 1 to 3 December 2021. This Extended NEC meeting for 2021 had numerous challenges to mull over in charting the way forward. In this regard, several critical points were discussed and the NEC pronounced as follows:

1. The deepening crisis in South Africa

The NUM NEC is deeply concerned by the deepening crisis in South Africa. The gains of the 1994 democratic breakthrough are fast withering away under the weight of deepening inequality and mass unemployment.

While it did not need COVID-19 to lay bare the depth of the social, economic and political crisis facing South Africa, the pandemic has certainly made everything more stark. No country or state can sustain a society where almost 50% eligible people to work are unemployed. Nor is it possible to talk of a united single nation where just 10% of the super-rich own 90% of the wealth. And no society can develop where a woman is raped on average, every 25 seconds or is killed on average every 8 hours by an intimate partner.

A spiral of economic decline is underway and might well precipitate social collapse on an unprecedented scale.The July unrest indicates just how dire the situation is.

Moreover, billions of Rands are lost to corruption and other forms of profit shifting, including the central role of western civilized transnational corporations. This is some of the money that the state should be investing in social renewal, creating decent work and reindustrialising the economy for a wage-led low carbon development path.

2. Economy

The NUM has noted that the crisis of mass unemployment gets worse each and every quarter. This is a result of a stagnant economy caused by an investment strike undertaken by big business and systematic disinvestment from the South African economy. Government austerity, the favouring of privatisation through Public Private Partnerships and conservative monetary policies imposed by both the South African Reserve Bank and the Treasury have significantly contributed to the widening of inequality, where the poor are becoming poorer and a tiny elite masses extreme levels of concentrated wealth.

The decision to close mines in Mpumalanga and Power Stations will not assist the situation at all. We can't have a country where the majority of our people are relying on social grants. The closure of mines and power stations will have devastating consequences; the NUM will not allow an imperialist agenda to be imposed on our people. The view of the NUM is that the agenda of closing these mines is an agenda that seeks to collapse the economy of our country. The NUM will undertake a programme of mass action to fight against the closure of mines and power stations.

3. ESKOM Challenges

The NUM NEC has noted with dismay the ongoing crisis at ESKOM. While corruption, state capture and mismanagement have contributed to the crisis, its origins lie in the corporatization of ESKOM and a set of neoliberal policies, which have under-funded the utility and prevented it from investing in building new power plants to meet growing demand. Consequently, the country and the economy are faced with constant load-shedding and the death-spiral of a utility, which was the envy of the world.

The attitude that is portrayed by the ESKOM management, the Board and the shareholders in uncritically implementing capitals agenda of unbundling ESKOM, without consulting the NUM and other unions that organise at ESKOM, represents an attack on our members and the labour movement, more generally.

Unbundling and the privatisation of ESKOM will not address ESKOMs functional and financial crisis but simply accelerate its death spiral, with serious consequences for ESKOM workers and the working class more broadly. Moreover, the privatized renewable energy programme will not be able to meet the challenges of ensuring a secure and cheap supply of electricity. The introduction of an electricity market will only contribute to making electricity more expensive.

The NUM has decided to march to ESKOM Head Office Megawatt Park on the 11thof December 2021 as part of a rolling programme of mass action directed to stopping the unbundling and privatization of ESKOM. The NUM is calling on all trade unions, trade union federations and the broader society to join the march to Megawatt Park. We are going to demand the disbandment of the ESKOM board; the resignation of the CEO, the resignation of the COO and the conditions of service of our members must be immediately reinstated.

4. NUM Rejects the R131 billion so-called Just Energy Transition (JET)

We note the so-called just energy transition agreement signed in Glasgow at COP26, by which ESKOM will obtain concessional financing to accelerate the decommissioning of its coal fired power plants. We have noted the complete lack of transparency regarding this agreement and we are certain that part of the reason is that the loans are attached to conditionalities, which will further undermine our energy and economic sovereignty.

The closure of the power stations in Mpumalanga must never be unnecessarily rushed to JET as it has a devastating socio-economic impact. South Africa must continue following the Integrated Resource Plan based on an energy mix appropriate to the development needs of the country. The NUM is not opposed to renewable energy and believes ESKOM should be involved in its development, which can give rise to a low carbon industrial path where the inputs are produced locally.

Developed countries have been using fossil fuels over the years to build their economies. They are responsible for the climate change crisis that we are now facing. It cannot be the responsibility of South Africa to sacrifice our economic development so they can continue to pollute.

South Africa has an abundance of coal reserves. It will be very irresponsible for South Africa to stop the use of coal, unless and until we are fully compensated by the rich industrialised countries.

The NUM in its policy conference agreed to the continued use of coal in a responsible way. We need to start building environmentally friendly power stations and investigate all technologies, which can reduce the pollution of greenhouse gas emissions, including carbon capture and storage.

5. Petrol Price

The NEC is deeply concerned about South Africas high fuel prices. The pump prices are piling on the pressure for working class households that are already struggling financially.

Fuel costs have skyrocketed making it difficult for workers to move from the mines to see their families. Rate hikes make life unbearable for ordinary poor workers driving thousands into shack life as they can no longer afford their houses while the price of basic food is unaffordable, sending millions into starvation. We call on the government to subsidize public transport in ways that recognize the costs workers and the poor bear for being forced to stay in townships on the peripheries of our economy.

6. Gender-Based Violence (GBV)

The NEC has called on all citizens of this country to put a STOP to all forms of GBV by observing and monitoring 16 Days of Activism against women and children abuse daily. The day should not only be commemorated in November and December but is an all-year programme designed to completely transform the consciousness of those men who are entrenched in sexism and misogyny. The NEC further called upon all men in the country to respect women and support all efforts intended at fighting the abuse of women and children.

In South Africa, the abuse culminates in a woman being killed every 4 hours.Most women killed in South Africa are killed by their partners or ex-partners and many of them suffer months or years of domestic abuse before their death.

7. Mandatory COVID-19 Vaccination

The NUM continues to support the vaccination drive by our government; however, we are against mandatory vaccination of workers. We will defend this right with all the means we have to ensure our members are not discriminated against because of their constitutional right to exercise their beliefs. The NEC is deeply worried that some mining companies have been forcing workers to vaccinate for Covid-19 and enforcing proof of vaccination when entering their premises.

The NEC is strongly opposed to the decision taken by Sibanye Stillwater to introduce a mandatory vaccine from February 2022. From the start of February 2022, any person entering Sibanye workplaces in South Africa will require proof of vaccination or a valid test showing they are negative for Covid-19. Given the costs of such tests, it is effectively a mandatory policy.

Further, non-vaccinated employees must submit negative PCR test results and the costs associated with such PCR tests will be for the employees own accounts.This NUM rejects with contempt.

8. Local Government Elections

The NEC noted that the ANC fared very badly in the last Local Government Elections. This is a call for the ANC to do self-introspection and deal decisively with the causes of the decline of the standing of the ANC amongst voters.

The NEC of the NUM noted that our glorious movement, the ANC, encountered a decline during local government elections; some of the factors have to do with internal political squabbles fueled by competition to be the preferred ward councilors.

However, we are of the view that the poor election results for our movement is rooted in the failure to implement the Freedom Charter and play the leading role in ensuring the redistribution of wealth to ensure a better life for poor and working people. The implementation of neoliberal policies and promotion of black elite has created social distance between the political elites and the mass of our people.

Furthermore, the low turnout contributed to the poor showing of the ANC. It is urgent that if the ANC is going to regain its standing among our people it must go back to basics and drive policies for transformation as the leader of the society.

The ANC must now focus on service delivery; this will help the movement to gain trust and confidence from the masses of our people.

9. Fatalities in the mining industry

The NUM NEC has noted with anger the ever-increasing fatalities on the mines including the death of mineworkers at Impala Platinum and Sibanye Stillwater's Beatrix operation. The NUM strongly believes that drastic action is needed to compel the mining industry to comply with safety standards and procedures.

We hope the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) comrade Gwede Mantashe and his inspectors will hold the industry fully accountable for its failures and adopt a no-nonsense approach when it comes to mine deaths. The NUM would like to convey its deepest and heartfelt condolences to the families, colleagues, and friends of the deceased during this difficult time.

The NUM is of the view that one death in the industry is just one death too many, production should not and must not be at the expense of mineworkers' lives.

8. World AIDS Day

World AIDS Day is highlighting the need to end the inequalities that drive AIDS and other pandemics around the world. Without bold action against inequalities, the world risks AIDS continuing to devastate working class communities for many decades to come as well as contributing to a prolonged COVID-19 pandemic with spiraling social and economic consequences.

UNAIDS issued a stark warning that if leaders fail to tackle inequalities the world could face 7.7 million AIDS-related deaths over the next 10 years. UNAIDS further warns that if the transformative measures needed to end AIDS are not taken, the world will also stay trapped in the COVID-19 crisis and remain dangerously unprepared for the pandemics to come. The warning comes in anew report by UNAIDSentitledUnequal, unprepared, under threat: why bold action against inequalities is needed to end AIDS, stop COVID-19 and prepare for future pandemics.

9. Sibanye Stillwater

The NUM has observed with disappointment the attitude of Sibanye Stillwater on the wage negotiations for the poor offer tabled for more than five months and NUM resolved to seek for legal opinions on the basis that if Sibanye indeed they dont have money, they must agree with labour to put their company under Business Rescue to assist them to better manage the company. NUM will take a view of applying for Business Rescue after our three legal opinions sorted can advise us to do so.

Issued by Livhuwani Mammburu, NUM National Spokesperson, 7 December 2021

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