Category Archives: Second Amendment

The Supreme Court is expected to soon hear New York State Rifle & Pistol Association (NYSRPA) v. Bruen, challenging a New York law that allows judges and police commissioners to deny licenses, to carry handguns for self-defense away from home, to applicants they deem do not have proper cause.

As a result, applicants who want to exercise the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation, as the Supreme Court put it in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), are routinely turned down. New York is one of eight heavily Democrat states with this sort of law, the others being California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.

In The Right To Bear Arms: A Constitutional Right Of The People Or A Privilege Of The Ruling Class?, Second and Fourteenth Amendment scholar Stephen P. Halbrook shows that in this part of the world, from day one until well after the Second Amendments ratification, carrying handguns and other arms for protection, concealed or openly, away from home (without a license) was lawful, thus within the scope of the right to arms as understood by the Framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

However, in the 1800s, state legislatures began prohibiting the carrying of weapons concealed, state courts mostly let them get away with itan exception being the Kentucky Supreme Court, in Bliss v. Commonwealth, 1822and into the 20th century most states kept those blanket prohibitions or prohibited carrying without a license that officials generally refused to issue.

Most of those states have since switched to shall issue laws, which require that licenses be issued to applicants who meet objective standards concerning their age, lack of a criminal record, and so on. Today, 41 states are shall issue, Vermont has never prohibited or required a license for carrying concealed or openly, and those 42 states account for three-fourths of the nations population.

Twenty of the 41, plus Vermont, have constitutional carry laws, so named because, as during the founding era, they dont prohibit or require a license for carrying a handgun concealed or openly. (The 20 states have licensing systems for people who, during travel, carry in states that require licenses.) Fifteen states require a license to carry concealed, but not openly.

In July, a conservative commentator wrote that we should be happy that the Supreme Court is less bad now than at any time during the last 50 years. Another view is that we live in the present, thus should support the court when it rules correctly and oppose it when it rules incorrectly or refuses to rule out of fear of Democrats court-packing and term-limit threats, or because no one on the court is comfortable with Americans being armed to the extent the Framers intended.

We may find out which view of the court is more insightful in NYSRPA. If there are five justices who care about original intent, New York will lose, because its law is at odds with the Second Amendments text and legislative history, and the history of the right to arms leading to the amendments adoption, and it denies New Yorkers their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law.

But thats a big if. In Heller, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas were part of the majority that rejected original intent to justify banning guns quintessentially within the scope of the right to arms.

They began with the courts confused opinion in U.S. v Miller (1939). Miller correctly recognized that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right not limited to militiamen, but incorrectly suggested the right is limited to arms that have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.

Adding to the confusion, it suggested that examples of such arms include ordinary military equipment (which includes machineguns, federal laws catch-all for machine guns and all other fully automatic firearms), but also any other arms that could contribute to the common defense, which would mean all arms. Miller also noted the obvious, that militiamen commonly owned arms in common use.

Heller came to the court from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where it was known as Parker v. District of Columbia (2007). Parker correctly struck down D.C.s handgun ban, but on the wrong basis, saying that because handguns are Arms referred to in the Second Amendment, it is not open to the District to ban them. It reached that conclusion because handguns were common in the founding era, militia officers were required to have them by the second Militia Act of 1792, and [t]he modern handgun (is) a lineal descendant of that founding-era weapon, and it passes Millers standards.

Parkers error was twofold: First, while handguns were common in the founding era and modern handguns are their lineal descendants, thats not why banning them is unconstitutional. The Framers adopted the Second Amendment to guarantee the right to arms as a means to an endthe security of a free State against tyranny and, it went without saying, common criminals and other threats. The distinction is important because, in the future, guns as we know them will be useless for defense against tyranny, and the only arms that will be useful will have no lineage to arms known during the founding era.

Second, knowing what arms founding-era militiamen possessed may be interesting to Revolutionary War reenactors, antique gun collectors, and historians, but it doesnt limit the right of the people, and to the extent Millers standards suggest otherwise, Parker should have ignored them.

The burden of proof when challenging a gun ban should not be upon plaintiffs to show why they should be allowed to have the gun (e.g., version of a founding-era gun), it should be upon them to show why the government doesnt have the power to ban it, or upon the government to show why it has that power. In June, Judge Roger Benitez ruled the latter in Miller v. Bonta, striking down Californias assault weapon ban, saying [t]he command of the Amendment is that the right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. It . . . is the government that must carry the burden of justifying its restriction of Second Amendment rights.

However, even if the burden is upon plaintiffs, its easy to bear. While the Framers understood that privately kept arms had always been used for defense against common criminals, the amendments political objective was to protect the constitutional order against tyranny.

Thus, the only arms the government may ban are those that would give an individual a degree of power against modern tyrannical enemies significantly greater than the degree of power an individual in the founding era had with his arms against the tyrannical enemies of his dayarms that would give an individual a degree of tyranny-fighting power the Framers intended to be distributed among the people.

In his brief in Heller, then-Solicitor General Paul Clement (now counsel for petitioners in NYSRPA) complained that under Parkers standard, the 1986 ban on new machineguns might be unconstitutional, because M16s (which, though not machine guns, can fire fully automatically) are the most common guns in the organized militia (the National Guard). During oral arguments, Clement added, I think it is more than a little difficult to say that the one arm thats not protected by the Second Amendment is that which is the standard issue armament for the National Guard. In other words, to justify banning M16s, the court would have to get creative.

Heller was about handguns, not machineguns, and the court should have said so. Instead, the majority caved to Clement and, before dealing with the former, went after the latter.

Read in isolation, Millers phrase part of [the] ordinary military equipment could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Firearms Acts restrictions on machineguns . . . might be unconstitutional. . . . Millers ordinary military equipment language must be read in tandem with what comes after: [O]rdinarily when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.

The court was wrong. First, there was no need to read any part of Miller in isolation. Miller endorsed the right to ordinary military equipment, such as machineguns, but also to other arms that could contribute to the common defense.

Second, its not only the National Firearms Acts (1934) registration and tax provisions the constitutionality of which might be threatened. The Gun Control Act (1968) prohibits the same guns importation, the McClure-Volkmer Act (1986) prohibits their domestic manufacture, and about half the states prohibit their possession.

Third, Heller didnt read Millers parts in tandem. It ignored Millers endorsement of the right to military and all other arms that could be used for the common defense, and accepted only its observation that militiamen commonly owned commonly owned guns.

On that basis, it claimed machineguns can be banned because they arent common, despite being the most common guns in the organized militia. And while its true theyre not common among the unorganized militia and the people generally, the court neglected to explain why: the federal and state laws mentioned in the previous paragraph.

Finally, whether to apologize or to add insult to injury, the court admitted it was at odds with the Framers intent:

It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military serviceM-16 (sic) rifles and the likemay be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the (amendments) prefatory clause. . . . But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.

If Justices Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett join Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas in thumbing their noses at the Framers in NYSRPA, like the latter three did in Heller, the court will deserve to go down not as the least bad of the last 50 years, but as one of the most anti-constitutional activist courts in American history.

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Can The Supreme Court Be Trusted On The Second Amendment? - The Federalist

THIS SECOND AMENDMENT TO REVOLVING CREDIT AGREEMENT AMENDS THE REVOLVING CREDIT AGREEMENT DATED AS OF SEPTEMBER 1, 2016.

SECOND AMENDMENT TO

REVOLVING CREDIT AGREEMENT

THIS SECOND AMENDMENT TO REVOLVING CREDIT AGREEMENT (the "Second Amendment"), dated and effective as of this 29th day of September, 2021, by and among WEIS MARKETS, INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, DUTCH VALLEY FOOD COMPANY, LLC, a Pennsylvania limited liability company, WEIS TRANSPORTATION, LLC, a Pennsylvania limited liability company, and WMK FINANCING, INC., a Delaware corporation (the "Borrowers" and each a "Borrower") and WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., a national banking association (the "Lender").

BACKGROUND

A.The Borrowers and the Lender entered into that certain Revolving Credit Agreement dated as of September 1, 2016 (as previously modified by that certain First Amendment to Revolving Credit Agreement dated effective August 21, 2019 (the "First Amendment"), hereinafter, as so modified, the "Agreement"). Unless expressly provided otherwise in this Second Amendment, capitalized terms used in this Second Amendment shall have the meanings given to them in the Agreement.

B.The parties desire to amend the Agreement, as set forth herein, so as to (w) extend the Maturity Date, (x) amend the applicable rate of interest, (y) amend certain covenants and (z) amend certain other provisions of the Agreement.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the covenants herein contained and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties hereto agree as follows:

1.Background. The foregoing Background paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference hereto and the accuracy of the same are hereby acknowledged. The Agreement and all terms thereof are incorporated herein by reference hereto.

2.The definition of "Maturity Date" set forth in Section 1.1 of the Agreement is hereby amended and restated in its entirety as follows:

Maturity Date: September 1, 2024, or such earlier date as the Commitment shall terminate pursuant to the terms hereof.

3.Interest Rate. The Agreement is hereby amended to amend the following provisions relating to the interest rate:

(a)Section 1.1 of the Agreement, entitled "Defined Terms", is hereby amended so as to delete in their entirety each of the following definitions:

Base Rate: shall mean, for any day, the higher of (a) rate of interest publicly announced by the Lender from time to time at its principal office as its prime commercial lending rate (which rate is not necessarily the lowest rate charged by the Lender to its borrowers) or (b) the Federal Funds Rate, plus one-half of one percent (0.50%). Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, if the Base Rate determined as provided above would be less than zero percent (0.00%) then the Base Rate shall be deemed to be zero percent (0.00%).

Federal Funds Rate: for any day, a fluctuating interest rate per annum equal for such day to the weighted average of the rates on overnight Federal funds transactions with members of the Federal Reserve System arranged by Federal funds brokers on such day, as published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the Business Day next succeeding such day, provided that (a) if such day is not a Business Day, the Federal Funds Rate for such day shall be such rate on such transactions on the next Business Day as so published on the next succeeding Business Day, and (b) if such rate is not so published for any day, the Federal Funds Rate for such day shall be the average rate charged to the Lender on such day on such transactions as determined by the Lender.

LIBOR Rate: means the variable rate of interest per annum determined by Lender each day based on the rate for United States dollar deposits for delivery of funds for one (1) month as reported on Reuters Screen LIBOR page (or any successor page) at approximately 11:00 a.m., London time, or, for any day not a London Business Day, the immediately preceding London Business Day (or if not so reported, then as determined by Lender from another recognized source or interBank quotation). Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, if the LIBOR Rate determined as provided above would be less than zero percent (0.00%), then the LIBOR Rate shall be deemed to be zero percent (0.00%).

London Business Day: means any day that is a day for trading by and between Lenders in Dollar deposits in the London interBank market.

(b)Section 1.1 of the Agreement, entitled "Defined Terms", is hereby further amended to add each of the following definitions:

"Benchmark" means, initially, Daily Simple SOFR; provided, however, that if a Benchmark Transition Event or an Early Opt-in Election, as applicable, has occurred with respect to Daily Simple SOFR or the then-current Benchmark, then "Benchmark" means the applicable Benchmark Replacement to the extent that such Benchmark Replacement has become effective pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement.

"Benchmark Administrator" means, initially, the SOFR Administrator, or any successor administrator of the then-current Benchmark or any insolvency or resolution official with authority over such administrator.

"Benchmark Floor" means a rate of interest equal to zero percent (0%).

"Benchmark Replacement" means the sum of: (A) the alternate rate of interest that has been selected by Lender as the replacement for the then-current Benchmark; and (B) the spread adjustment, or method for calculating or determining such spread adjustment, (which may be a positive or negative value or zero) that has been selected by Lender, in each case, giving due consideration to (x) any selection or recommendation by the Relevant Governmental Body at such time for a replacement rate, the mechanism for determining such a rate, the methodology or conventions applicable to such rate, or the spread adjustment, or method for calculating or determining such spread adjustment, for such rate, or (y) any evolving or then-prevailing market convention for determining a rate of interest as a replacement to the then-current Benchmark, the methodology or conventions applicable to such rate, or the spread adjustment, or method for calculating or determining such spread adjustment, for such alternate rate for U.S. dollar-denominated syndicated or bilateral credit facilities at such time; provided, however, that if the Benchmark Replacement as determined as provided above would be less than the Benchmark Floor, then Benchmark Replacement shall be deemed to be the Benchmark Floor, subject to any other applicable floor rate provision.

"Benchmark Replacement Conforming Changes" means any technical, administrative or operational changes (including, without limitation, changes to the timing and frequency of determining rates and making payments of interest, prepayment provisions and other technical, administrative or operational matters) that Lender decides may be appropriate to reflect the adoption and implementation of a Benchmark Replacement and to permit the administration thereof by Lender.

"Benchmark Replacement Date" means the date specified by Lender in a notice to Borrower following a Benchmark Transition Event or Early Opt-in Election.

"Benchmark Transition Event" means the occurrence of one or more of the following events with respect to the then-current Benchmark: a public statement or publication of information by or on behalf of the Benchmark Administrator or a regulatory supervisor for the Benchmark Administrator announcing that (A) the Benchmark Administrator has ceased or will cease to provide the Benchmark permanently or indefinitely or (B) the Benchmark is no longer, or as of a specified future date will no longer be, representative of underlying markets.

"Daily Simple SOFR" means, with respect to any day (a "Reference Day"), a rate per annum equal to SOFR for the date that is (a "SOFR Rate Date") two (2) U.S. Government Securities Business Days prior to, (i) if such Reference Day is a U.S. Government Securities Business Day, such Reference Day, or, (ii) if such Reference Day is not a U.S. Government Securities Business Day, the U.S. Government Securities Business Day immediately preceding such Reference Day, in each case, as such rate appears on the SOFR Administrator's Website at approximately 3:00 p.m. (New York City time) on the U.S. Government Securities Business Day immediately following such SOFR Rate Date; provided,

however, that if Daily Simple SOFR determined as provided above would be less than the Benchmark Floor, then Daily Simple SOFR shall be deemed to be the Benchmark Floor.

"Early Opt-in Election" means the election by Lender to declare that the Benchmark will be replaced prior to the occurrence of a Benchmark Transition Event and the provision by Lender of written notice of such election to Borrower indicating that at least five (5) currently outstanding U.S. dollar-denominated syndicated or bilateral credit facilities at such time contain (as a result of amendment or as originally executed) a new benchmark interest rate to replace the then-current Benchmark.

"Federal Reserve Business Day" means any day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or other day on which the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is closed.

"Prime Rate" means at any time the rate of interest most recently announced within Lender at its principal office as its prime rate, with the understanding that the Prime Rate is one of Lender's base rates and serves as the basis upon which effective rates of interest are calculated for those loans making reference thereto, and is evidenced by the recording thereof after its announcement in such internal publication or publications as Lender may designate; provided, however, that if Prime Rate determined as provided above would be less than zero percent (0%), then Prime Rate shall be deemed to be zero percent (0%).

"Relevant Governmental Body" means the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and/or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or a committee officially endorsed or convened by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and/or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or any successor thereto.

"SOFR" means a rate per annum equal to the secured overnight financing rate published by the SOFR Administrator on the SOFR Administrator's Website.

"SOFR Administrator" means the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (or a successor administrator of the secured overnight financing rate).

"SOFR Administrator's Website" means the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, currently at http://www.newyorkfed.org, or any successor source for the secured overnight financing rate identified as such by the SOFR Administrator from time to time.

"U.S. Government Securities Business Day" means any day except for (i) a Saturday, (ii) a Sunday or (iii) a day on which the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, or any successor thereto, recommends that the fixed income departments of its members be closed for the entire day for purposes of trading in United States government securities.

(c)Section 2.3 of the Agreement, entitled "Interest", is hereby amended and restated in its entirety to as to henceforth read as follows:

2.3Interest.

(a)Interest. The outstanding principal balance of the Loans shall bear interest (computed on the basis of a 360-day year, actual days elapsed) at a fluctuating rate per annum determined by Lender to be seventy-six hundredths percent (0.76%) above Daily Simple SOFR in effect from time to time. Lender is hereby authorized to note the date, principal amount and interest rate applicable to the Loans and any payments made thereon on Lender's books and records (either manually or by electronic entry) and/or on any schedule attached to this Agreement, which notations shall be prima facie evidence of the accuracy of the information noted, absent manifest error. The Lender shall be permitted to estimate the amount of accrued interest that is payable at any time hereunder on the applicable invoice provided by Lender to Borrower in respect thereof, in which case Borrower shall pay such estimated amount and Lender shall to the extent necessary, include on the next invoice an adjustment to correct any difference between the amount on the applicable invoice and the amount of interest that actually accrued pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.

(b)Taxes and Regulatory Costs. Borrower shall pay to Lender immediately upon demand, in addition to any other amounts due or to become due hereunder, any and all (i) withholdings, interest equalization taxes, stamp taxes or other taxes (except income and franchise taxes) imposed by any domestic or foreign governmental authority and related in any manner to SOFR or Daily Simple SOFR, and (ii) costs, expenses and liabilities arising from or in connection with reserve percentages prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (or any successor) for "Eurocurrency Liabilities" (as defined in Regulation D of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, as amended), assessment rates imposed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or similar requirements or costs imposed by any domestic or foreign governmental authority or resulting from compliance by Lender with any request or directive (whether or not having the force of law) from any central bank or other governmental authority and related in any manner to SOFR or Daily Simple SOFR. In determining which of the foregoing are attributable to any SOFR or Daily Simple SOFR option available to Borrower hereunder, any reasonable allocation made by Lender among its operations shall be conclusive and binding upon Borrower.

(c)Default Interest. Lender shall have the option in its sole and absolute discretion to have the outstanding principal balance of the Loans bear interest at an increased rate per annum (computed on the basis of a 360-day year, actual days elapsed) equal to two percent (2%) above the rate of interest from time to time applicable to the Loans (i) from and after the Maturity Date; (ii) from and after the date prior to the Maturity Date when all principal owing hereunder becomes due and payable by acceleration or otherwise; and/or (iii) upon the occurrence and during the continuance of any Event of Default.

(d)Inability to Determine Interest Rates; Illegality. Subject to the Benchmark Replacement Provisions below, if Lender determines (any determination of which shall be conclusive and binding on Borrower) that either (i) Daily Simple SOFR cannot be determined pursuant to the definition thereof other than as a result of a Benchmark Transition Event or an Early Opt-in Election (an "Inability Determination") or (ii) any law has made it unlawful, or that any governmental authority has asserted that it is unlawful, for Lender to make or maintain an advance based on SOFR or Daily Simple SOFR, or to determine or charge interest rates based upon SOFR or Daily Simple SOFR (an "Illegality Determination"), then Lender will so notify Borrower. The outstanding principal balance of the Loans shall bear interest (computed on the basis of a 360-day year, actual days elapsed) at a fluctuating rate per annum determined by Lender to be equal to the Prime Rate in effect from time to time, from the date of an Inability Determination or an Illegality Determination until Lender revokes such Inability Determination or notifies Borrower that the circumstances giving rise to such Illegality Determination no longer exist, as applicable. When interest is determined in relation to the Prime Rate, each change in the rate of interest hereunder shall become effective on the date each Prime Rate change is announced within Lender. Notwithstanding any of the foregoing to the contrary, if a Benchmark Replacement is subsequently determined in accordance with applicable Benchmark Replacement Provisions, that Benchmark Replacement, plus any applicable margin, will become effective on the Benchmark Replacement Date and will then supersede the Prime Rate and margin determined in accordance with this provision.

(e)Benchmark Replacement Provisions. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement or in any related loan document (for the purposes of these Benchmark Replacement Provisions, a swap agreement by and between Borrowers and Lender or its affiliates is not a loan document):

(i)Benchmark Replacement. If a Benchmark Transition Event or an Early Opt-in Election, as applicable, occurs, the applicable Benchmark Replacement will replace the then-current Benchmark for all purposes under this Agreement or under any related loan document. Any Benchmark Replacement will become effective on the applicable Benchmark Replacement Date without any further action or consent of Borrower.

(ii)Benchmark Replacement Conforming Changes. Lender will have the right to make Benchmark Replacement Conforming Changes from time to time and any amendments implementing such Benchmark Replacement Conforming Changes will become effective without any further action or consent of Borrower.

(iii)Notices; Standards for Decisions and Determinations. Lender will promptly notify Borrower of (i) any occurrence of a Benchmark Transition Event or an Early Opt-in Election, as applicable, (ii) the implementation of any Benchmark Replacement, and (iii) the effectiveness of any

Benchmark Replacement Conforming Changes. Any determination, decision or election that may be made by Lender pursuant to these Benchmark Replacement Provisions, including any determination with respect to a tenor, rate or adjustment or of the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event, circumstance or date and any decision to take or refrain from taking any action or any selection, will be conclusive and binding absent manifest error and will be made in its sole discretion and without Borrower consent.

(d)Section 2.4.6 of the Agreement, entitled "Application of Prepayments and Repayments", is amended and restated in its entirety as follows:

2.4.6Application of Prepayments and Repayments. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, repayments and prepayments shall be applied (i) first to costs, indemnities and fees (to the extent then payable), (ii) then to principal, applied first to any Loans outstanding at the Prime Rate and then to any Loans outstanding at Daily Simple SOFR, and (iii) finally to provide cash collateral for Letters of Credit. All mandatory prepayments under Section 2.4.5 shall be applied first to outstanding Loans under the Line of Credit (with a corresponding reduction in the Commitment) in the same order as the previous sentence.

(e)Section 2.6.1 of the Agreement, entitled "Mandatory Suspension of LIBOR Rate", is hereby deleted in its entirety.

4.Amendments to General Negative Covenants. Article 8 of the Agreement, entitled "General Negative Covenants", is amended as follows:

(a)The reference to the sum "$40,000,000" contained in subsection (h) of Section 8.1.1, entitled "Limitations on Indebtedness", shall henceforth be amended to read "$50,000,000";

(b)The reference to the sum "$1,000,000" contained in subsection (m) of Section 8.2.1, entitled "Limitation on Liens", shall henceforth be amended to read "$10,000,000";

(c)The reference to the sum "$1,000,000" contained in subsection (k) of Section 8.3, entitled "Investments and Acquisitions", shall henceforth be amended to read "$25,000,000";

(d)Subsection (c) of Section 8.3, entitled "Investments and Acquisitions", of the Agreement is hereby amended and restated in its entirety so as to henceforth read as follows:

(c)Acquisitions, provided, however, that all Acquisitions by the Borrowers and any of their Subsidiaries (occurring after the date of this Second Amendment and in the aggregate) shall not require payment of total consideration (including debt assumption) in excess of Two Hundred Fifty Million Dollars ($250,000,000.00).

(e)The reference to the sum "$30,000,000" contained in Section 8.11, entitled "Sale and Leaseback", shall henceforth be amended to read "$50,000,000".

5.Deliveries. The agreement of the Lender to modify the terms of the Agreement is and shall be subject to the delivery to the Lender of all of the following (which are hereby included within the meaning of the term "Loan Documents" as defined in the Agreement):

(a)This Second Amendment executed by all necessary parties;

(b)The Second Amended and Restated Promissory Note executed by all necessary parties;

(c)An updated Secretary's Certificate in the form of Exhibit C to the Agreement and complying with the terms of Section 3.1.1 of the Agreement; and

(d)Such other documentation, resolutions and confirmations as the Lender may reasonably require.

6.Additional Representations. As an inducement to the Lender to execute this Second Amendment, the Borrowers make the following representations and warranties and acknowledge the Lender's justifiable reliance thereon:

(a)No Event of Default has occurred under the Agreement and/or First Amendment or any of the Loan Documents;

(b)All representations and warranties previously made by the Borrower pursuant to Article 4 of the Agreement, the First Amendment, or in any of the Loan Documents, remain true, accurate and complete and are fully applicable to this Second Amendment; and

(c)The Agreement, as previously amended by the First Amendment and as modified herein, is a valid and binding obligation of the Borrowers and is fully enforceable in accordance with all of its terms except as such enforceability may be limited by bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, liquidation, moratorium, or other similar laws of general application and equitable principles relating to or affecting creditors' rights.

7.Prior Representations. All of the terms, provisions, conditions, covenants, warranties, representations and agreements set forth in the Agreement except to the extent such representations and warranties relate to an earlier date, in which case they are true and correct in all material respects as of such earlier date and except as and to the extent modified by this Second Amendment, shall remain in full force and effect. The Lender and the Borrowers ratify and confirm each to the other all of the provisions of the Agreement and Loan Documents, as amended by the First Amendment and this Second Amendment, and any Loan Documents to be executed in connection herewith.

8.No Additional Commitments. Nothing contained in this Second Amendment shall be deemed to be an offer, commitment, covenant and/or agreement by the Lender to renew, restate, amend, extend or otherwise modify the terms of the Agreement, except as is expressly stated in this Second Amendment; and no such offer, commitment, covenant and/or agreement exists unless same is expressly stated in this Second Amendment.

9.Costs and Expenses. Borrowers agree to pay all of Lender's legal fees and expenses in connection with the review, preparation, negotiation, documentation and closing of this Second Amendment. Nothing contained in this Second Amendment shall limit in any manner whatsoever Lender's right to reimbursement of costs and expenses under any of the Loan Documents.

10.No Novation. Nothing contained herein and no actions taken pursuant to the terms hereof are intended to constitute a novation of the Agreement or any of the Loan Documents and shall not constitute a release, termination or waiver of any of the liens and security interests (if any), rights or remedies granted to the Lender in the Loan Documents.

11.No Waiver. Except as may be otherwise expressly provided herein, nothing herein contained and no actions taken by Lender in connection herewith shall constitute nor shall they be deemed to be a waiver, release or amendment of or to any rights, remedies, or privileges afforded to the Lender under the Loan Documents or under the UCC. Nothing herein shall constitute a waiver by the Lender of the Borrowers' compliance with the terms of the Loan Documents, nor shall anything contained herein constitute an agreement by the Lender to enter into any further amendments with Borrowers.

12.Inconsistencies. To the extent of any inconsistency between the terms and conditions of this Second Amendment and the terms and conditions of the Agreement (as amended) and the Loan Documents, the terms and conditions of this Second Amendment shall prevail. All terms and conditions of the Agreement and Loan Documents, as previously amended, not inconsistent herewith shall remain in full force and effect.

13.Binding Effect. This Second Amendment shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective successors and assigns.

14.Governing Law; Multiple Counterparts. This Second Amendment shall be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. This Second Amendment may be executed in multiple counterparts.

15.Successors and Assigns. This Second Amendment and all rights and powers granted hereby will bind and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective successors and permitted assigns.

16.No Third Party Beneficiaries. The rights and benefits of this Second Amendment and the Loan Documents shall not inure to the benefit of any third party.

17.Headings. The headings of the sections of this Second Amendment are inserted for convenience only and shall not be deemed to constitute a part of this Second Amendment.

18.Joint and Several Liability. The Borrowers acknowledge and reaffirm the terms of Section 10.19 of the Agreement.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]

[TWO SIGNATURE PAGES FOLLOW]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Borrowers and the Lender have caused this Second Amendment to Revolving Credit Agreement to be duly executed and delivered as of the day and year first above written.

WEIS MARKETS, INC.,

a Pennsylvania corporation

By:/s/ Michael T. Lockard_________ ______

Name: Michael T. Lockard

Title: Senior Vice President and

Chief Financial Officer

DUTCH VALLEY FOOD COMPANY, LLC,

a Pennsylvania limited liability company

By:/s/ Michael T. Lockard _______

Name: Michael T. Lockard

Title: Senior Vice President, Treasurer and Assistant Secretary

WEIS TRANSPORTATION, LLC,

a Pennsylvania limited liability company

By:/s/ Michael T. Lockard _______

Name: Michael T. Lockard

Title: Senior Vice President, Treasurer and Assistant Secretary

WMK FINANCING, INC.,

A Delaware corporation

By:/s/ Lisa M. Oakes______

Name: Lisa M. Oakes

The rest is here:
Weis Markets : THIS SECOND AMENDMENT TO REVOLVING CREDIT AGREEMENT AMENDS THE REVOLVING CREDIT AGREEMENT DATED AS OF SEPTEMBER 1, 2016 (Form 8-K) -...

Sarah Huckabee Sanders runs for the Republican gubernatorial nomination with Donald Trump on her side. She vows to protect Arkansas from those who oppose the great one.

Attorney General Leslie Rutledge is countering with the next best thing, meaning the Lord Almighty. She runs to protect all that God has given Arkansas.

I don't like Rutledge's chances. I know the Lord is omnipotent, but the white rural conservative expanse of Arkansas is what I like to call "Trumpland--starring Sarah Sanders." At least I'm calling it that for an upcoming class I'm leading. I titled it that back in the spring a day after watching the movie "Nomadland."

Yet we must applaud Rutledge's fighting spirit in her new television commercial that aired, like two Sanders commercials before, during Saturday college football programming.

In her new spot, Rutledge invokes God ... well, let me quote the ad in full, since it's only 30 seconds, and you can check my math. I've counted four times.

With a forced smile from a farm field, Rutledge declares: "Arkansas. Some call it a flyover state. We call it God's country. And this is where we do God's work, like ending abortion. That's why I kept Planned Parenthood off the taxpayer dime, making Arkansas the most pro-life state in the nation. For seven years, I've led the fight to protect our God-given freedoms like religious liberty and the Second Amendment. Arkansas is one big small town, and I will use my experience to protect all that God has given us."

Leaving aside the dynamics of the emerging Sanders-Trump versus Rutledge-God primary, Rutledge's ad succeeds on the basic modern Republican requirement of being as full of nonsense as Sanders' one-note campaign about protecting Arkansas from the radical left.

It's entirely debatable whether we do God's work in Arkansas considering that we under-educate our youth, over-burden our poor, ill-serve our health, and divide our races.

It was the governor and legislators who took Planned Parenthood off the taxpayer dime in Arkansas. All Rutledge did was make self-promotional public service announcements with public money for KATV while lawyers on her staff defended the gubernatorial and legislative action.

She has no policy resume. She simply occupies the biggest office and practices the least law at state government's law firm.

Arkansas is hardly the most pro-life state in the nation, considering that Rutledge and Jason Rapert and the rest have managed to let Texas and Mississippi get ahead of us on denying a woman's right to attend to her health and decency by getting an abortion if impregnated through rape or incest.

And religious liberty and the Second Amendment are not God-given rights on Earth, where many inhabitants don't enjoy them.

The Second Amendment is not in the Bible. It's in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights.

As one immersed, figuratively and literally, in the Lord's word early in life, I am unable to recall a biblical instance where anyone in the Scriptures carried a semiautomatic, assault-style weapon, much less with the Lord's sanction.

Finally, Arkansas is not one "big small town." It's an interplanetary experience to go from Dermott to Bentonville. Arkansas is Mississippi on the agricultural east, a Kansas-Oklahoma-Missouri blend in the northwest corner, Missouri across the northern rim, Oklahoma to the due west, Texas to the southwest, Louisiana on the lower extreme and whatever Little Rock is in between.

Nonetheless, the Sanders-Rutledge battle to the bottom proceeds. I sure do dread it.

But I'd pay good money to watch a debate between their running mates, Trump and the Lord.

John Brummett, whose column appears regularly in the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, is a member of the Arkansas Writers' Hall of Fame. Email him at jbrummett@arkansasonline.com. Read his @johnbrummett Twitter feed.

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OPINION | JOHN BRUMMETT: Battle to the bottom - Arkansas Online

This is a guest opinion column

There isnt a person in Alabama that isnt saddened by the recent senseless shooting death of Sgt. Nick Risner. Law enforcement is a noble profession all while being one of the most dangerous. No want wants to see our officers injured or even worse killed.

Alabamas state motto is We Dare Defend our Rights. One of those rights is every Alabama citizens Second Amendment firearm rights. The defense of that Second Amendment right starts with our own Attorney Generals Office. Alabama is a Second Amendment loving State. Truth be told most of America is. According to a 2011 Small Arms Survey the United States boasts the highest number of civilian firearms per capita - 270 million, or 89 guns for every 100 residents.

In the past five years Alabama has lost twenty-four officers. AG Marshall is correct.

Since 2009 the United States endured 258 mass shootings according to Everytownresearch.org. Alabama boasts five of these mass shootings. The victims of these mass shootings were innocent people that were targeted in nightclubs, at schools, and even at their jobs. They werent working jobs where they wear bullet proof vests or carrying firearms of their own. They didnt have any type of advanced training or the chance to call for backup.

Our representatives in Montgomery, in all three branches, have time and again told Alabama citizens that we should not overreact to tragedies when drafting and passing laws. That capitalizing on a tragedy is wrong. The argument we hear is that using the deaths of innocent people particularly children - to advance a gun control agenda is abhorrent.

I couldnt agree more. Using a tragedy to promote your personal politics is about as low rent as it comes. Its good to see our representatives reminding people outside the State of that. It might be a good time to remind our representatives inside the State as well.

The recent prison construction bills passed quickly through the legislatures special session. During the special session Governor Ivey also asked that the Legislature consider two criminal justice reform bills. Each of these bills were sponsored by Republican Representative Jim Hill, himself a former judge that presided over hundreds if not thousands of criminal cases. These reform bills were recently targeted in various interviews and opinion columns by certain Alabama elected representatives including our own Attorney General.

Blount Countys District Attorney went on record stating [e]ssentially, what House Bill 2 is allowing to happen is to allow murderers to get out early. We dont have truth in sentencing in Alabama, so even if theyre sentenced to 30 years, it doesnt mean 30 years. This is not correct. For the sake of argument I will solely address the murder claim for now.

In Alabama murder is a Class A felony. The minimum sentence for murder is 10 years; if a gun was used the minimum sentence is 20 years. HB2 reads in part that If the defendant is sentenced to a period of 10 years or more, he or she shall be released by the [Department of Corrections] to supervision by the Board of Pardons and Paroles no less than 10 months and no more than 12 months prior to the defendants release date. In other words if a Defendant hasnt made parole 10 to 12 months prior to the end of their sentence then the Department of Corrections shall release them to be supervised by the Board of Pardons and Paroles.

When I see the claim that we dont have truth in sentencing I can only assume the Blount County District Attorney is talking about correctional incentive time or what most defense lawyers and prosecutors call good time. Certain defendants are eligible to earn up to 75 days of credit for every 30 days they serve. This is not without its limitations.

To use the murder example above since murder is a Class A felony it is explicitly excluded from any good time consideration. The law in Alabama is that no person may receive the benefits of correctional incentive time if he or she has been convicted of a Class A felony In fact, any defendant sentenced to prison in excess of 15 years isnt entitled to good time no matter what the charge is.

In the example above under HB2 the murder convict sentenced to 30 years would be released within 10 to 12 months of the expiration of his 30-year sentence or more appropriately after serving 29 years. For those playing along at home a 20-year-old kid would walk out of prison, having paid his debt to society, as a 49-year-old man.

Dont be fooled into thinking a murderer is waltzing out of prison after having a cup of coffee. In fact, HB1 the criminal justice reform bill that did not pass during the special session specifically excluded violent offenders from consideration. It is intellectually dishonest and insulting to the people of Alabama to rail on and on about worst-case scenarios that arent even possible under the law.

Our Attorney General took a different approach when utilizing the death of Sgt. Risner to support a political talking point. AG Marshalls problem is not only with HB2 but also with the good time statute itself. As Mr. Marshall points out the man that is accused of shooting Sgt. Risner served three years, two months, and fifteen days of his ten-year sentence. He was released from prison in May of 2016.

The person A.G. Mashall is referring to is of course Brian L. Martin who is accused of shooting and killing Sgt. Risner. Alabama court records show that Martin had no prior felony convictions. As a matter of fact he was offered a plea agreement by the State of Alabama. He accepted the deal offered to him by the State and went to prison. Alabama court records show Brian L. Martin was released from prison in May of 2016. According to Alabama court records for over a half-decade after Brian L. Martins release he had no further charges or even run-ins with law enforcement until the tragic day that allegedly led to Sgt. Risners shooting.

This is a tragedy. There isnt a person in Alabama that thinks otherwise. This is the same type of tragedy our Alabama representatives tell people in California and New York and Washington not to use to support their political talking points.

AG Marshall is currently waging war against Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube. His press release stated, Big Tech is not the Ministry of Truth, it should concern us all when platforms that hold such tremendous power and influence over information wield that power in contradiction of and with undisguised disdain for the foundational American principles of free speech and freedom of the press.

AG Marshall is right that powerful institutions that control access to information and impact Alabama citizens should not be selectively picking winning and losers. They should not tell half-stories, spread fake news, or suppress ideas that might not be popular in todays Overton Window. Similarly those institutions should not be preaching one gospel while practicing another. These institutions come in all shapes and sizes. Some look a lot like our own government representatives.

Originally posted here:
Opinion: Dont be fooled into thinking a murderer is waltzing out of prison after a cup of coffee - AL.com

WASHINGTON U.S. Senators Jerry Moran (R-Kan.) and Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-Kan.) led 34 of their Senate colleagues in requesting clarification on the Biden administrations intention to open U.S. Second Amendment rights to international oversight by rejoining the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), an international agreement that would regulate trade in firearms, infringing on Americans Constitutional rights.

It is unacceptable for the Second Amendment rights of Americans to be infringed on or controlled by foreign nations, said Sen. Moran. I rejected attempts by the Obama administration to subject law-abiding Americans to the United Nations ambiguous arms deals, and under the Biden administration, I will actively oppose an international organization attempting to exert control over the Constitutional rights of private citizens.

The Biden Administrations botched military withdrawal from Afghanistan resulted in tens of millions of dollars of firearms gifted to the Taliban. Yet, instead of focusing on preventing further transfer of firearms to international terrorist groups due to gross negligence, the Administration is voicing its intent to jeopardize Americans right to bear arms by allowing our 2nd Amendment rights to be controlled by foreign nations, said Sen. Marshall. Joining the ATT would be an unacceptable move by an already crisis-ridden Administration, and previous attempts failed the Senate with a bipartisan majority during the Obama era. President Biden must provide Congress clarification on whether or not he plans to subject our Constitutional rights to international intrusion.

Co-signers of the letter include Senators Jim Inhofe, Cindy Hyde-Smith, Roger Wicker, John Thune, John Barrasso, James Risch, Thom Tillis, John Hoeven, Rick Scott, James Lankford, Kevin Cramer, John Cornyn, Deb Fischer, Susan M. Collins, Chuck Grassley, Steve Daines, Mike Crapo, John Boozman, Todd Young, Shelley Capito, Bill Cassidy, Mike Lee, Marco Rubio, Cynthia Lummis, Mike Braun, Marsha Blackburn, M. Michael Rounds, Bill Hagerty, Tom Cotton, Mitch McConnell, Pat Toomey, John Kennedy, Lindsey Graham, Roy Blunt, and Tim Scott.

The full letter can be found here and below.

September 28, 2021

President Joe Biden

1600 Pennsylvania Ave, NW

Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Biden,

We write to you today seeking clarification on your Administrations position on the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Recent remarks by Deputy Director for Conventional Arms Threat Reduction, William Malzahn, seem to indicate your intention to rejoin this misguided and overbearing international treaty.

At the Seventh Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, Deputy Director Malzahn stated The United States has long supported strong and effective national controls on the international transfer of conventional arms, and the Arms Trade Treaty is an important tool for promoting those controls internationally. We find this statement to be most concerning and contrary to the current and historical position of the United States.

When President Obama signed the ATT in 2013 he was met with strong bipartisan opposition and failed to garner the approval of the Senate, to which the Constitution vests the sole power to approve international treaties. As-in 2013, we remain concerned by the many troubling aspects of the ATT and its impact on American sovereignty and constitutional protections. The vague language of the ATT makes American commitments uncertain, the most concerning of which is the lack of protections for lawful gun ownership which threatens the rights afforded to Americans under the Second Amendment. Further, with an amendment process that only requires a vote for approval, more intrusive provisions could be applied in the future; legally obligating the United States to comply with international commitments without consent from the Senate.

Under any circumstance, it is inconceivable that the United States would consider subjecting our constitutional right to bear arms to international oversight and interference. For these reasons, we request clarification on your intentions regarding this international accord. Moreover, we urge you to reject the ATT; however, should you have plans otherwise, please know we will unequivocally oppose its ratification in the Senate.

Thank you for your attention to our concerns and we look forward to hearing your response.

# # #

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Sens. Moran, Marshall Request Clarification Regarding Administration's Intent to Open Second Amendment Rights to International Regulation - Senator...

MASON CITY, Iowa - On Tuesday, the Winnebago County Board of Supervisors unanimously approved a resolution declaring the county a 'Second Amendment Sanctuary,' joining 17 other Iowa counties that have issued such resolutions.

But with the terminology being fairly recent, what does it mean? Hart Brothers owner Kemlin Hart explains what it signifies.

"They're not going to let the federal government come in and say, 'were going to restrict here, this small thing.' They're going to take the Second Amendment at its face value as to how the state or county interprets it, and they're not going to enforce the laws driven down by the federal government."

Hart is a firm believer in Second Amendment rights. However, he feels there's a bit of a slippery slope with the issue, as he notes of some possible ambiguity on certain rules depending on the jurisdiction.

"It makes me wonder how much it is politics instead of real getting things done. Does a magazine restriction on deer hunting, for example, cause someone to say, 'it's a sanctuary county, because we could use whatever we want?' Where is that line drawn? Because it's not written up pretty clear, it makes it tough to say, 'that's what you get if you check on that box for 'I want our county or state to be a sanctuary area.'"

As to when Iowa could be declared a Second Amendment Sanctuary state, Hart feels it's likely due to Iowa's already strong supportive stance on Second Amendment rights.

"Having everybody that's on board with the pro-2A type stuff, I think we have a good amount of pendulum swing in our direction."

In Hancock County, the Board of Supervisors have been discussing the issue of declaring the status in their county.

Almost 2,000 counties in 17 states have sanctuary status, according to SanctuaryCounties.com.

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Winnebago County becomes a 'Second Amendment sanctuary' - KIMT 3

Though medieval English legal theory might seem ill-fitting for contemporary American life, the ACLU argued that restrictions on carrying arms in public are just as important, if not more so, in a modern democracy. Self-government depends on the ability of the people to participate fully in civic, political, and economic life, the ACLU argued in its brief. People need to feel safe to vote, to go to school and work, to walk the streets, and to assemble, associate, and speak freely in public. While these rights have not always been equally available to all, the goal of maintaining the peace to allow all people to participate in public life, including to speak out on political, religious, and other sensitive topics, is critically important to our democracy.

In addition to historical evidence, the ACLU also pointed to more contemporary examples. The group cited reports that some participants in the January 6 attack on Capitol Hill consciously decided to leave their guns at home beforehand because of the District of Columbias strict laws on carrying firearms in public. Other recent instances of armed groups carrying out political activities also brought an undercurrent of urgency to the ACLUs argument. As these examples make vivid, states have a sound basis for determining that liberal public carry may jeopardize the safety vital to a robust civic life, they concluded.

Siding with gun rights groups in a friend-of-the-court brief is a coalition of New Yorkbased public defender groups: Black Attorneys of Legal Aid, the Bronx Defenders, Brooklyn Defender Services, and seven county public defense offices. For our clients, New Yorks licensing regime renders the Second Amendment a legal fiction, they told the court. Worse, virtually all our clients whom New York prosecutes for exercising their Second Amendment right are Black or Hispanic. And that is no accident. New York enacted its firearm licensing requirements to criminalize gun ownership by racial and ethnic minorities. That remains the effect of its enforcement by police and prosecutors today.

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An Upcoming Concealed Carry Case at the Supreme Court Has Liberal Allies in Conflict - The New Republic

29 September 2021

Cooley LLP

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Boston - September 27, 2021 - Cooleyrepresented the League of Women Voters in filing an amicus brief inNew York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, aUS Supreme Court case examining New York laws regulating the rightof individuals to carry guns in public places. Lawyers AdamGershenson, Kathleen Hartnett, Daniel Grooms, Adam Katz and AndrewBarr led the Cooley effort.

"Allowing private citizens tocarry guns inside polling places and at other election-relatedevents poses a threat to the electoral process. Voter intimidationmust not be tolerated," Dr. Deborah Ann Turner, boardpresident of the League of Women Voters of the United States, saidin a news release. "Voters have a right to safe access totheir polling place, and these laws protect that constitutionalright. They must be upheld."

The League's brief supportscurrent New York laws requiring citizens to show proper cause - asopposed to "speculative or specious" grounds - beforeallowing them to carry concealed weapons in certain public spaces,including polling places. Without such restrictions, the threat ofintimidation at polling places, during registration and as votesare counted could imperil the electoral process.

"Cooley is proud to partnerwith the League of Women Voters to ensure that all citizens cansafely participate in the electoral process," Cooley partnerGershenson said. "No citizen should face intimidation or havetheir fundamental right to vote undermined, especially at a timewhen we have seen a disturbing increase in armed intimidation atthe polls and at political activities more broadly."

The case will be heard by the Supreme Court on November 3,2021.

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Washington The Supreme Court on Thursday said it will hear a dispute between Republican Senator Ted Cruz of Texas and the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) over campaign finance rules limiting the repayment of a candidate's personal loans to their campaigns.

The appeal from the FEC of a lower court decision is one of five cases the high court added to its docket as it prepares to begin its new termMonday. The legal battle over the campaign finance restrictions joins high-profile cases involving abortion, the Second Amendment and religious liberty that the justices will weigh this term.

Cruz's dispute with the FEC centers around a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 that sets a $250,000 cap on the amount of money raised after Election Day that a campaign may use to repay debt owed to the candidate. Federal law allows a campaign to borrow money from either a third-party lender or from the candidate himself, but the Texas senator argues the $250,000 repayment limit violates the First Amendment.

Cruz argued the FEC's loan-repayment limit "forces a candidate to think twice before making those loans in the first place."

According tofilings with the Supreme Court, Cruz lent his reelection campaign $260,000 as part of his bid to defeat Democrat Beto O'Rourke in the 2018 midterm elections. While his campaign raised more than $35 million in all, and had roughly $2.38 million in cash-on-hand after the election, Cruz's lawyers told the Supreme Court it was not enough to repay loans from the candidate and satisfy the campaign's other creditors.

In the 20 days after the election, the committee used its cash-on-hand to repay its creditors first. Then, in December 2018, it repaid Cruz $250,000, leaving $10,000 outstanding. Because more than 20 days had lapsed since the election, the remaining $10,000 debt could not be repaid, according to the FEC.

Cruz challenged the loan-repayment limit in April 2019 as a violation of the First Amendment and sued the FEC in the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia. But the commission argued he and his campaign committee did not have the legal standing to sue and moved to dismiss the claims.

The federal district court denied the FEC's request and concluded not only that Cruz had standing to sue, because he had suffered a "$10,000 financial injury," but that the loan-repayment limit violates the First Amendment. The limit, the court said, burdens the exercise of political speech.

The FEC asked the Supreme Court to toss out the lower court's decision and send the case back for further consideration.

In a one-line order, the court said that "further consideration of the question of jurisdiction is postponed to the hearing of the case on the merits."

The justices will likely hear arguments in the dispute between Cruz and the FEC in early 2022.

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U.S. Supreme Court

Every Supreme Court term has important decisions that change the law and affect peoples lives, but some years are blockbusters in the number of high-profile, significant rulings. The October 2021 term, which begins on Monday, Oct. 4, promises to be such a year. It is the first full term with the courts current composition.

The justices set about half the docket before they left for their summer recess, with additional cases to be decided this term to be taken through mid-January. But based on just what already is before the court, this is likely to be a year of dramatic decisions.

In Dobbs v. Jackson Womens Health Organization, to be argued on Dec. 1, the court will consider a Mississippi law that prohibits abortions after the 15th week of pregnancy. In 1973s Roe v. Wade, the court held that states cannot prohibit abortions before viability, the time at which the fetus can survive outside the womb. The court repeatedly has reaffirmed this and referred to it as the essential holding of Roe.

Viability is now regarded as being at the 24th week of pregnancy. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether to overturn Roe and allow states to prohibit abortions before viability. If a state can forbid the procedure at 15 weeks, there is no reason why states cannot outlaw abortions even earlier, such as the Texas law that prohibits abortions after the sixth week of pregnancy, or even the Alabama law that bans nearly all abortions.

The Mississippi law had been declared unconstitutional by the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court choosing to hear it at all is an ominous sign for abortion rights, as was the choice by the Supreme Court on Sept. 1 to not enjoin the Texas law. The reality is that the five conservative justices who voted against an injunction are strongly against abortion rights, and it is just a question of how far the court will go in allowing states to prohibit abortions.

In Heck v. Humphrey, in 1994, the Supreme Court held that a person convicted of a crime cannot bring a civil suit, such as for malicious prosecution, unless the conviction has been overturned. What, though, about someone who was arrested, but the prosecutor dropped all charges? Can the person sue for malicious prosecution?

That is the issue in Thompson v. Clark, to be argued on Oct. 12. Larry Thompson and his wife had a week-old baby. Thompsons sister-in-law, who was staying with them, called 911 and said that she thought the baby was being sexually abused because of red marks on the babys buttocks. Emergency medical technicians came to the apartment, but left thinking it was the wrong address. Later that night, they returned with police officers. Thompson said that the officers could not enter without a warrant. The officers pushed their way in, shoving Thompson to the floor. Thompson was arrested and charged with resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration. The baby was taken to the hospital where an examination revealed that it was diaper rash.

The prosecutor dismissed the charges against Thompson in the interest of justice. Thompson sued for malicious prosecution. Both the federal district court and the New York-based 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Thompson, saying that he had not shown an affirmative indication of actual innocence.

No mechanism exists to have a court find someone innocent when charges are dismissed. Does that mean that prosecutors always can avoid liability for malicious prosecution by bringing charges and then dismissing them?

How must trial judges conduct jury selection in high-profile criminal cases? That is a key issue before the court in United States v. Tsarnaev, to be argued on Oct. 13. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his brother, Tamerlan, were responsible for the bombing at the Boston Marathon in 2013 that killed three people and injured hundreds. Tamerlan was killed by the police, but Dzhokhar was tried for murder and sentenced to death.

Dzhokhars lawyer asked for a change of venue in light of the publicity surrounding the case. The judge refused and said that care would be taken during voir dire to select an unbiased jury. The defense wanted the judge to ask prospective jurors about what they had seen and heard and knew about the case. The judge instead asked prospective jurors whether they had formed an opinion and whether they could be unbiased.

Voir dire took 21 days, during which the defense times moved to change venue four times. Each request was denied. Dzhokhar was convicted and sentenced to death. The Boston-based 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the death sentence on the ground that the judge had not done enough to ensure an unbiased jury. The court of appeals also reversed based on the trial judges failure to allow the jury to hear evidence in the penalty phase as to a murder that Tamerlan had committed previously. That issue, too, is before the Supreme Court.

From 1791, when the Second Amendment was ratified, until 2008, not one federal, state, or local gun regulation was struck down. In the few Supreme Court cases about guns, the court said the Second Amendment means what it says: It is a right to have guns for the purpose of militia service. But in District of Columbia v. Heller, in June 2008, the court, 5-4, declared unconstitutional a D.C. ordinance that prohibited private ownership or possession of handguns. The court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, said the Second Amendment protects a right to have guns in the home for the sake of security.

In New York Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, to be argued on Nov. 3, the court will consider the constitutionality of a New York statute that restricts carrying a concealed weapon outside the home to instances where a person can show a need to do so for self-defense.

All five of the conservative justicesin their opinions on the Supreme Court or as court of appeals judgeshave expressed strong support for protecting gun rights and limiting government regulation of firearms. Again, the real question is how far the court will go in this direction in this case.

For decades, the litigation in the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts addressed the question of when may the government give aid to religious schools without it being an impermissible establishment of religion. There were major cases about whether the government could choose to provide religious schools things like sign language interpreters, buses for field trips, textbooks and audiovisual equipment.

Now, though, the question has shifted to when must the government provide assistance to religious schools or the failure to do so violates the free exercise of religion. In 2017, for example, in Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, the court said that a state violated free exercise of religion when it provided aid for surfacing playgrounds to secular private schools but not religious schools.

Carson v. Makin, to be argued on Dec. 8, involves areas of Maine that are too rural to support public schools. The government, through school administrative units, provides parents funds to send their children to private schools, but it cannot be to religious schools. The issue is whether this refusal violates free exercise of religion.

In 1953, in United States v. Reynolds, the court recognized the state secrets doctrine: a common law privilege that requires exclusion of evidence, and even dismissal of cases, when national security information might be disclosed. There are two cases on the docket this term about the state secrets doctrine.

United States v. Zubaydah, which will be argued on Oct. 6, involves Abu Zubaydah, who has been a prisoner at Guantanamo Bay since 2006. After his capture in Pakistan in 2002, but before being sent to Guantanamo Bay, Abu Zubaydah was subjected to the CIAs enhanced interrogation program at several black sites in foreign countries. That program included, among other things, his being waterboarded 83 times in one month and being deprived of sleep for 11 consecutive days.

There is a criminal investigation in Poland where the torture allegedly occurred. Zubaydah filed suit in federal district court in Washington state to obtain discovery from two CIA contractors who apparently had information about the interrogations. The government asserted the state secrets privilege, and the district court dismissed the case. The 9th Circuit reversed and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether sensitive information could be separated from other information that would not risk national security. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether this remand was justified and appropriate.

In Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fazaga, to be argued on Nov. 8, the issue is whether the state secrets doctrine, which is a common law privilege, is preempted by statute. The case involves Muslim men who said that their conversations were illegally intercepted. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act expressly authorizes money damages for those subjected to electronic surveillance in violation of the act. The 9th Circuit said where there is a statutory right to sue it overrides the state secrets doctrine. Twelve 9th Circuit judges dissented from the denial of en banc review, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

These are just a handful of the cases to be heard and decided this term. It is sure to be a truly extraordinary year in the Supreme Court.

Erwin Chemerinsky is dean of the University of California at Berkeley School of Law. He is an expert in constitutional law, federal practice, civil rights and civil liberties, and appellate litigation. Hes the author of several books, including The Case Against the Supreme Court (Viking, 2014) and The Religion Clauses: The Case for Separating Church and State, written with Howard Gillman (Oxford University Press, 2020). His latest book is Presumed Guilty: How the Supreme Court Empowered the Police and Subverted Civil Rights (Liveright, 2021).

This column reflects the opinions of the author and not the views of the ABA Journalor the American Bar Association.

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