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After six months of war in Ukraine, President Vladimir Putins military offensive has stalled. Now, as winter looms, Putin is aggressively playing the energy card. Russia is deliberately deepening Europes energy crisis to the gravest level since the Arab oil shock of 1973.

Half a century ago, the OPEC oil crisis was staged partly for political reasons, partly for economic ones. Led by Saudi Arabia, OPEC sought to help Egypt and Syria destroy Israel in the Yom Kippur war. The six-month oil embargo quadrupled world oil prices.

Today, Putin seeks to destroy Ukraine as an independent nation. He already is reaping the benefits of high prices for gas, oil and coal. As in 1973, lagging American oil production is tightening world markets.

On the nuclear front, Russias Defense Ministry threatened to close the largest nuclear power plant in Europe. Russian soldiers occupy the plant at Zaporizhzhya and use it as a base from which to fire on nearby Ukrainian territory.

At best, a shutdown would cut off Ukraine from the source of 20% percent of its electricity. Nuclear experts warn that the delicate process of shutting down the reactors could cause an accident. Putin warned President Emmanuel Macron of the danger of a large-scale catastrophe that could lead to radiation contamination of vast territories.

In addition to nuclear blackmail, Putin is using natural gas to put the European Union in an energy hammerlock. Over the last decade, a succession of European politicians most notably Angela Merkel ignored clear warnings from Washington about the dangers over reliance on cheap Russian gas.

Now, Putin is turning off the tap. Politicians worry that Putin will eventually shut off all gas exports.

To fill the gap, the EU has started a crash program to cut natural gas usage by 15% before winter. Air conditioning is cut off in hallways. Heat is turned off in swimming pools. Germany is restarting several coal-fired electricity plants and is debating decommissioning its last three nuclear power plants. World coal prices have increased six-fold over the last year.

Over the last five years, European natural gas prices have averaged about twice as highas those in America. Currently, they are eight times as high.

Now, to some degree, America is coming to the rescue. The Paris-based International Energy Agency reportedlast month that this summer, for the first time in history, America exported more gas to the EU than Russia. LNG, though, is too expensive to revive German factories built to run on cheap, pipeline gas. While the LNG imports will keep the lights on, the costs of LNG will likely sink the German and many other European economies into deep recession.

Putin can afford to pinch the natural-gas hose to the EU, because he makes his real money selling oil. Western sanctions have backfired. In a tight oil market, Russia is making more money selling less oil. Despite President Joe Bidens visit to Saudi Arabia last month, OPEC did not increase oil production.

The oil-market victory means Putin can afford to forego revenue by restricting natural-gas sales to Europe, putting pressure on Berlin, Paris and London, which are bracing for massive retail energy-price increases and potential shortages that may lead to rationing this winter, Javier Blas wrote this month. Moscow is making so much money selling oil it can afford to restrict crude supply to Eastern European nations, too.

In a world of tight energy markets, a tight oil market is pushing up oil prices. But, with world demand high, Bloomberg reports that distillate inventories in the US mid-Atlantic are at a 30-year low.

To counteract American concerns, Americas energy secretary, Jennifer Granholm predicted in an interviewthat America will see record oil production starting next year.

In Europe, gas prices this winter are expected to go so high that markets will break down, industries will close and governments will impose rationing. In advance, some Europeans are chopping wood.

In Belgium and the Netherlands, firewood prices have doubled. In Germany, Google searches for firewood have spiked. In Hungary, logging restrictions have been loosened. Last week, Bulgaria banned wood exports outside the EU.

The winter is coming, and we dont know how cold it will be, the Czech Republics minister of industry and trade, Jozef Sikela, said last month. But what we know for sure is that Putin will continue to play his dirty games.

James Brooke is fellow for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Alonger version of this columnoriginally appeared in The New York Sun.

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Putin's squeeze on European energy is threatening disaster across the continent - New York Post

The sanctions did have an impact when Putin nonetheless invaded Ukraine. Putin hasnt gone away, though. He has also successfully countered Russias counter-sanctions. Who is winning the sanctions war now that it has been going on for almost six months and is in its third phase: first deterrence, then compilation, and now attrition? Sanctions as a key component of deterrence in the first phase failed. Putin may have been impenetrable because of his Greater Russia vision and conviction that triumph was imminent; he recalled that Russian soldiers carried dress parade outfits in their bags.

However, even if he were not yet prepared to invade, we know from other incidents that, while sanctions have occasionally been effective in achieving modest goals of policy change, they have never been able to stop a determined aggressor from starting a war. Not the Soviet Union, not former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, not former Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, who invaded Ethiopia-Abyssinia in 1935, or former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who invaded Kuwait in 1990.

Phase two, the broad sanctions put in place when Russia invaded, aimed to cause enough hardships, along with NATO assistance for the Ukrainian resistance, to force Putin to back down. Financial sanctions shut off Russia from a large portion of the global financial system, blocking about half of the $640 billion in foreign hard currency reserves.

Technologies like semiconductors, which are essential for both commercial and military items like telephones and automobiles, were restricted. More than 1,000 global corporations stopped doing business in or with Russia, as opposed to the end-around used in many other sanctions situations.

Putin and his family are among the almost 600 Russian billionaires and siloviki elites who have received personal sanctions. Although oil and natural gas play a crucial role in the Russian economy, accounting for one-third of the GDP and roughly half of the federal budget before the war, sanctions have been slower to take effect and have a smaller impact due to the energy dependence of those who are issuing them.

Overall, the sanctions program did have a significant economic effect. The greatest reductions in Russian GDP estimates since the disorganized 1990s have been seen. The value of the ruble decreased by about 50% in March, going from 84 to 154 rubles per dollar. Moscows mayor issued a warning that 200,000 jobs were in jeopardy in mid-April.

Inflation throughout the entire economy was close to 18 percent, and it was significantly higher in the industries most dependent on global supply networks. As a result of the Ukrainian opposition destroying so much fighting gear and sanctions preventing resupply operations, Russian front-line soldiers were experiencing shortages.

However, Russia has turned to three key sanctions defense strategies: alternative trade partners; sanctions breaching; and internal offsets, as sanctioned nations so frequently do to control those costs. Although many nations participated in the sanctions, some significant ones did not.

Although it hasnt been as totally supportive as the Russia-China no boundaries cooperation suggested before the invasion, China has boosted its imports of Russian oil, contributed some military equipment, and offered encouraging words. As a result of price breaks and close military relations, India raised its imports of Russian oil from 1% to 20%.

Although Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates refused to considerably raise output, earnings were, by some estimates, greater than the previous year because of global price increases that more than compensated for Russias use of discounts.

The tripled number of oil tankers that are going dark to escape detection and the concealment of Russian oil mixed in with other types of oil by shippers and refiners are not even factored into those figures for oil revenues. The grain from Ukraine, worth hundreds of thousands of metric tonnes, was stolen and sent to Russian friends.

There have been several more instances of sanctions-busting, such as billionaires and Putin allies locating safe harbors for their super yachts and offshore tax and banking havens. The Kremlin has used a combination of economic corrective measures and political repression to offset the expenses that are currently being incurred.

The ruble recovered from its early severe depreciation and reached a seven-year high in late June thanks to increases in central bank interest rates and capital controls. The typical Russian has been given some relief by increases in retiree pensions and corporate bailouts. The initial wave of domestic demonstrations was put down by arrests and other forms of political repression. A price has been paid by the few billionaires who have dared to speak out.

Russian counter sanctions are beginning to strike back, most notably by shutting off natural gas supplies to the European Union. Pipeline volumes, which were above 400 million cubic meters per day (mcm/day) a year earlier, were only about 100 mcm/day as of July 31. Between January and June, the price of electricity in Germany quadrupled, from 140 to 260 euros per megawatt-hour. Major sectors are already reducing production as a result of gas constraints. Measures to reduce consumption and change suppliers and fuel sources have made modest progress.

The latest gas-sharing agreement between the EU and member states still contains enough flaws to raise the possibility of winter rationing. Rationing has already begun in certain areas. In Spain, commercial air conditioning must be set no lower than 27 degrees Celsius (or 80 degrees Fahrenheit), the Netherlands encourages 5-minute shower limitations, and urban insurgents are turning off storefront lights in France amid one of the hottest summers on record.

Then there are the repercussions on a larger, global scale. Climate change is once more being compromised. Domestic oil and gas drilling restrictions are being loosened in the US, and coal is once again being used in Europe. The current estimate for global GDP growth is 2.9 percent, down from the January prediction of no more than 4.1 percent and 5.7 percent for 2021.

Even though oil prices have recently decreased, there are still worries that they might reach $200 per barrel as Russian oil sanctions tighten. At least 40 million people have been forced into poverty as a result of all of this, which has been extremely hard on emerging and poor countries. Even while Russian military tactics are mostly to blame for the food shortages that affect over half of the worlds population, Western sanctions are also held accountable in a large portion of the global south.

According to several evaluations, including those in this magazine, sanctions are causing the Russian economy more serious structural harm. Despite being supported, the rubles decline may be seen in black market exchange rates. Gazprom failed to provide a dividend, causing its shares to decline for the first time since 1998. In one industry after another, import substitution has fallen short.

Its telling that Elvira Nabiullina, the head of the Russian Central Bank, cautioned that the economy cannot survive on reserves forever. An estimated 500,000 people, many of whom are highly educated, have expertise in the computer industry, and are essential components of any economys talent base, have left the nation.

Sanctions are requiring jerry-riggged resupply operations, such as stealing semiconductors from refrigerators and dishwashers, as Russian forces are claimed to have lost 2,600 armored vehicles and fired close to 70% of their precision-guided missiles.

The economic-military pincer may get much tighter if Western sanctions weariness doesnt set in and the NATO-backed Ukrainian opposition keeps causing significant harm on the ground. Putin shouldnt be expected, though. The claims that sanctions are Putins military machine and are sending Russia into economic ruin are not accurate.

Also, this goes beyond Putinology. The history of sanctions is replete with instances when significant economic damage did not result in a policy change: For instance, sanctions against Cuba have been in place for more than 60 years, but the regime is still in place; sanctions against North Korea have been in place for decades, but leader Kim Jong Un keeps building up his nuclear arsenal; and the former U.S.

President Donald Trumps maximum pressure campaign against Iran reduced GDP by 10%, increased inflation to 40%, and decreased youth unemployment to nearly 30%, but there were no protests from Tehran either. Two variables have been crucial in cases where sanctions have changed the economic impact of policy compliance. Two variables have been crucial in cases where sanctions have changed the economic impact of policy compliance.

One is whether domestic elites and other important political players behave as circuit breakers or transmission belts, obstructing or advancing sanctions pressure against the regime depending on whether compliance or resistance serves their interests. Because they applied economic pressure without engaging in political hostility, previous U.S. President Barack Obamas Iran sanctions succeeded in their policy goal, unlike Trumps, which failed to do so.

In 2003, when sanctions imposed by the United States, Europe, and the United Nations had caused Libyas oil industry to deteriorate due to a lack of foreign technology and investments, pragmatist technocrats surrounding Muammar al-Qaddafi, the former leader of Libya, were better able to argue that concessions on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction programs would be in their and his best interests.

Reports of growing internal resistance from Russian families and dissidents shouldnt be overemphasized, but they also shouldnt be discounted either given that estimates of Russian troops dead or injured range from 70,000 to 80,000, significantly more than in their eight-year war in Afghanistan.

The same goes for situations where certain important power broker elites exert pressure to find a workable solution for their nationalist reasons; pride being injured by having to turn to North Korean volunteers or shielding the military from further harm.

The diplomatic approach that uses sanctions to strengthen its position in exchange for advantageous but still somewhat reciprocal conditions is the second important component. Despite certain contrasts, the instances of Iran and Libya are instructive here as well.

When an agreement with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was achieved, many of the sanctions were withdrawn because Obamas Iran sanctions caused Iran enough economic hardship to have them genuinely engage in nuclear nonproliferation negotiations. Any legitimate foundations for reciprocity were eliminated by Trumps rejection of anything like a meaningful diplomatic procedure.

Similar to the agreement reached with Libya, the agreement reached by American and British negotiators (led by William Burns, then-assistant secretary of state of the United States and current director of the CIA) offered sanctions relief in exchange for terrorism concessions and the destruction of WMD; the significance of this agreement has become increasingly clear in the wake of the chaos and instability that followed the 2011 Arab Spring.

With Russia, it will be much more difficult to reach substantively relevant and politically feasible agreements than it was with Iran and Libya. Which sanctions are eased, and in exchange for what? Do some remain in place permanently? The key will be to be sufficiently harsh to have support from the United States, Europe, and Ukraine while also establishing a foundation for Putin or any future Russian leader to agree on these and other issues.

edited and proofread by nikita sharma

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The Russian Economy Has Suffered From The West, But Putin Has So Far Kept The Expenses Under Control. - Inventiva

'The weapons have to fall silent, the left wing of Germanys ruling Social Democratic party suggested this week, in their latest public appeal for peace in Ukraine. The authors argued that it is time to find a way of living with the Russian government, putting pressure on the Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

The intervention could well be a watershed moment for the Chancellor, whose own support for Ukraine during the conflict has been mixed to say the least. Now Scholz has been presented with a choice: either he faces down the appeasers in his own party, or signals once again that Germany is an unreliable ally to Ukraine.

The left-wing SPD appeal itself demands a ceasefire in Ukraine even if that means accepting realities one may not like. There is little mention of the fact that the realities of war in Ukraine means rape, torture and summary executions. The reports authors forget that Russia is holding the world hostage with the seizure of nuclear power plants and threats of nuclear war. And that Russia launched a war of aggression in order to wipe an entire country off the map of Europe. Instead, the SPD appeal talks of Ukraine and Russia as war parties that have to find a way to come to terms as if both sides share equal blame and responsibility for the prolonged conflict.

In fact it doesnt appear to matter at all how much destruction Russian troops wreak in Ukraine. The clamour to reward Putin for the war never seems to cease among elements of the German political establishment, and especially Scholzs party. No matter that Moscow marked the six month anniversary of its war of aggression with a rocket strike on a railway station that killed 25 people, including two children.

The blind pacifism of the SPDs left wing is as naive as it is callous. The signatories hope that third countries can step in as mediators. China is named directly due to its comparatively amicable relations with Russia. The signatories envision a role for China as a neutral country and want to draw it in to end the war just as Beijing ramps up its own aggression against Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Indo-Pacific region as a whole.

This is not only morally wrong but also runs contrary to Germanys current foreign policy. Evidence of detention centres and other human rights abuses in China, combined with Beijings aggressive economic expansion, have made the German government and industry wary of their immense dependence on China. Scholzs coalition is in the process of formulating a new China policy which will be better aligned with Natos, and the German airforce is this year taking part in Australias Pitch Black military exercise for the first time to underline the change. A plea for diplomatic aid from China would undermine efforts of deterrence and peacekeeping elsewhere in the world.

Given how at odds the appeal is with government policy, its tempting to brush this it off as the work of a fringe group. After all, even the Ukrainian ambassador in Berlin is cautiously optimistic that Germany is on the right track in increasing its aid to Kyiv. The German public also still supports Ukraines war effort. In a recent survey 71 per cent said they would want this to continue even if it means higher energy prices. Among SPD voters, the figure was even higher.

Nonetheless Scholz should confront the pacifist faction in his party head-on. Among the signatories were parliamentarians, the mayor of Dortmund and the former mayor of Bremen. With his muddled messaging Scholz gives their voices resonance. It is never entirely clear how committed he is to upholding security and the rule of law again Russian aggression.

After a lot of dithering in the build-up to the invasion, Scholz surprised many, including the majority of his fellow SPD members with his declaration of the war as a Zeitenwende a watershed era. Party colleagues reluctantly joined the standing ovations in parliament as their Chancellor declared that Germany would invest 100 billion into its military to keep warmongers like Putin in check.

But since then the ongoing war in Ukraine has sorely tested the unity of the SPD. The partys co-leader Lars Klingbeil made headlines in June when he called on Germany to take its place as a leading power in the world. After nearly 80 years of restraint, he argued, Germany must learn to accept military force as a legitimate means of politics. He was immediately criticised by the Young Socialists, the partys youth wing, whose leader said Klingbeil was completely wrong and the SPD should work towards perspectives of disarmament.

Scholz has done little to resolve the tension that is tearing his party apart and there seems to be no attempt to take ownership of the SPDs ideological direction. As a result, voters are beginning to turn away from last years election winner. A new survey puts Scholz as their third choice for chancellor with only 18 per cent rooting for him. The SPD too have fallen into third place with only 19 per cent saying they would still vote for them.

If Scholz ignores the latest attempt of those on the left of his party to undermine his credibility as a principled leader, it will not only cost him dearly but Germany, Ukraine and Europe too. This war is not a conflict between two aggrieved parties but an attempt to restore Russian overlordship in Eastern Europe. Putin could end it tomorrow, but at the moment there is not enough conviction behind Scholzs words and deeds to suggest he can steer his country through a tough winter while continuing to support Ukraine.

Neither Berlin nor Beijing can coax Putin to the negotiating table. The key to peace in Europe lies not in misguided pacifism but in bullish determination to do the right thing.

ENDS

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Olaf Scholz needs to deal with the Putin appeasers in his party - The Spectator

Russian President Vladimir Putin recently reinstated a Soviet-era award, giving women who have ten or more children a single payment of a million rubles (worth $16,747 USD, as of publishing).

The honorary title and certification of "Mother Heroine" are given to the mother once their tenth living child turns 1 year old.

According to Putin's decree, mothers will still be eligible for the award if their child dies as a result of war or from an act of terrorism, or in an emergency situation.

The Mother Heroine award was initially established by Josef Stalin in 1944 to encourage repopulation in wake of the country's high casualty count from World War II. At the time, the award was described as a "badge of special distinction" but was stopped in 1991 alongside the fall of the Soviet Union.

A woman walks with a child, Aug. 20, 2022, in St. Petersburg, Russia.

Russian Look via ZUMA Press

With an average household size of 3.2 people, Russia's population has been declining at a rapid rate over the past 30 years, as reported by Statistica.

Recent estimates state that between January and May of 2022, the population of the Russian Federation fell by over 430,000 people, 20% being those who have left the country, according to the Russian statistics agency Rosstat.

Though Russian authorities do not provide an official toll for the number of citizens who have been killed in the war in Ukraine, 5,256 deaths are estimated, according to independent news outlet, istories.

According to the data department of the Russian Database on Fertility and Mortality, the death rate of young people in Russia has increased by 18% due to war.

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Putin revives Soviet-era title of 'Mothers Heroine' - ABC News

Retired U.S. General Barry McCaffrey said Monday that Russian President Vladimir Putin is "out of ideas," and will see things get worse for himself rapidly in his ongoing war in Ukraine.

McCaffrey tweeted that Putin's military is "operationally in a box," while Russia as a whole is "showing signs of severe strain from growing military losses and economic isolation."

Ukraine has been reporting a series of successful strikes on Russian targets and groups in recent weeks using U.S.-supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), which have been described as a "game changer" last month by retired U.S. Army General Mark Hertling. While Ukraine records these purported victories, Moscow is allegedly carrying out forced conscriptions to bolster its ranks while also offering cash incentives to its existing troops to motivate them to fight.

Putin has also had to contend with the economic fallout of the invasion that saw unprecedented Western sanctions take aim at Russian oil, oligarchs, and other entities.

Still, Russia has continued to express confidence in its ability to succeed in the conflict. Ivan Nechayev, the deputy director of Russia's Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department, asserted during a press briefing last Thursday that the country's goals of "demilitarizing and de-Nazifying Ukraine" will come to fruition.

"Only when [Russia's goals] are achieved, will it be possible to guarantee peace, stability and security in the region," he said.

However, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is a native Russian speaker and is Jewish, who had family members die during the Holocaust that was perpetuated by the Nazis during World War II. He was elected with about three-quarters of the vote in 2019, when Ukraine's prime minister was also Jewish, which would counter Russia's claims that Ukrainians have adopted a "Nazi" ideology.

McCaffrey's Monday tweet also linked to an appearance he made on MSNBC in which he discussed the implications of a car explosion in Moscow on Saturday night that killed 29-year-old Daria Dugina, the daughter of one of Putin's allies, Alexander Dugin.

Russia's Federal Security Service has accused the Ukrainian secret services of organizing the attack, and alleged that a female Ukrainian citizen traveled to Moscow in July to carry it out. Ukraine's government has denied any involvement in the bombing.

"Ukraine definitely has nothing to do with this, because we are not a criminal state, which the Russian Federation is," Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Zelensky, said during a telethon on Sunday. "And even more so, we are not a terrorist state."

McCaffrey said on MSNBC that it seems "impossible" to believe that Ukrainians were behind Dugina's death, and wondered whether the deadly explosion could indicate that a rebellious faction is mounting against Putin. He added that he thinks the incident might represent a "growing desperation" among Russians as Ukraine continues to counter Putin's army.

Newsweek reached out to the Kremlin for comment.

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Putin Is 'Out of Ideas,' Things in Ukraine Will Get Worse Rapidly: General - Newsweek

Russian President Vladimir Putins confidence appears to have grown as the war in Ukraine drags on for a sixth month. What could be some reasons for this change after the initial military failures of Russias invasion of Ukraine?

Russian military forces, after retreating from the north and consolidating in the eastern part of Ukraine, have made incremental gains in the Donbass region. In addition, through the use of the Wagner Group - Putins mercenary army Moscow was able to bolster its troops with experienced and ruthless soldiers who have left atrocities in their wake in Syria, Africa, and now in Ukraine. In the southern Russian occupied region of Kherson, Putin is planning to hold illegal annexation referendums to solidify his gains.

Putin has been able to get around his countrys isolation by the West through his counter diplomacy, increasing economic ties with the leaders of Turkey and Iran and participating in the BRICS summit. Many countries in the Global South are non-committal toward the conflict, seeing it more as a regional crisis. Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, recently conducted a whirlwind tour of Africa to garner opposition towards Western sanctions. China is still standing by its friendship agreement without limits signed with Russia.

The Russian leader also calculates that divisions within NATO will eventually deepen. High global energy prices, inflation, and expected fuel shortages will, he believes, increase tensions between Western allies. High energy prices are also helping to fund Putins war. Countries, such as India, are buying Russian oil for favorable prices. In addition, Russia is able to raise revenue through the Wagner Groups financial dealings in various countries, allowing Moscow to access critical funding while evading sanctions.

Putin also appears to have completely suppressed domestic opposition to the "special military operation by using terror, imprisonment, and eliminating any free press in Russia. The oligarchs and other elites who have benefited financially by their association with Putin continue to toe the line.

But Putin should not necessarily be so confident as the situation may not be as favorable as he might think. The Ukrainians have continued to fight with limited resources despite Russias military advantages and gains in the east. The arrival of HIMARS have enabled Ukrainian soldiers to launch strikes further into Russian-held territory, targeting command posts, ammunition depots and disrupting supply lines. Kiev is also believed to be close to launching an offensive to reclaim Kherson. That has forced Russia to redeploy some of its troops from the east to protect its gains in the south.

Russia has also suffered significant casualties in the conflict, with British intelligence estimating the number at 80,000. Moscow is running low on troops and is recruiting more underqualified, underaged men, including prison inmates. Putin is resisting declaring a national mobilization because it would signify that the special military operation is not going well. In addition, export controls have impacted Russian arms manufacturers, forcing them to slow down production on advanced munitions. These manpower and equipment problems could stall Russian advances and offer Ukraine a better opportunity for a counteroffensive.

Putins efforts to sow division within NATO and its allies have not been successful. Suspected war crimes, bombing of civilian targets, kidnapping of Ukrainians into Russian territory, and using a nuclear power plant as a military base have actually galvanized Western unity. The European Union has made preparations for the expected energy shortages which Russia is likely to trigger. Sanctions have only been increasing on Russia, its elites, and Putins family members. While Putin claimed his invasion was to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, he most likely did not imagine that it would prompt Sweden and Finland to join the alliance.

One of Putins primary goals of the invasion was to depose President Volodymyr Zelensky and his government. Not only did his attempt fail, but it actually strengthened the Ukrainian leaders domestic position and increased his standing in the global community. His recent approval rating is 97 percent, higher than what Putin reportedly enjoys at home. While Putin has cracked down on domestic opposition and the media within Russia, and as body bags of dead soldiers continue to arrive, public support might begin to fade much like it did during the Soviet war in Afghanistan.

Although the China-Russia alliance appears strong, Beijing has likely had some misgivings about its total allegiance, particularly in light of Russias poor performance in Ukraine. In addition, Putins invasion has inadvertently made Russia a junior partner by increasing its economic dependence on China. For now, China is abiding by the sanctions, understanding the importance of its trade with its Western partners.

Putin, therefore, has quite a bit to worry about. The Western allies must continue supporting Ukraine with weaponry, intelligence, financial assistance, while increasing sanctions on Russia. A victory for Putin would only encourage him to pursue further imperial dreams. Ukraine needs these tools to defend its sovereignty and push back on Russias territorial gains, making the price for continued military actions too costly for Putin. It would also put Kiev in a stronger position for eventual diplomatic negotiations. That would really give Putin something to worry about.

Dr. Joanna M. Gwozdziowski is senior program adviser at Network 20/20. She resides in Stamford.

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Opinion: What Putin should be worried about - CT Insider

Nearly six months after Russias invasion of Ukraine, there is still widespread disagreement in the west on Vladimir Putins motives.

This is of more than academic interest. If we do not agree why Putin decided to invade Ukraine and what he wants to achieve, we cannot define what would constitute victory or defeat for either of the warring sides and the contours of a possible endgame.

At some point, like all wars, the present conflict will end. Geography condemns Ukraine and Russia to live beside each other and that is not going to change. They will eventually have to find a modus vivendi. That also applies to Europe and Russia, although it may take decades before the damage is repaired.

Why, then, did Putin stake so much on a high-risk enterprise that will at best bring him a tenuous grip on a ruined land?

At first it was said that he was unhinged a lunatic, in the words of the defence secretary, Ben Wallace. Putin was pictured lecturing his defence chiefs, cowering at the other end of a 6-metre long table. But not long afterwards, the same officials were shown sitting at his side. The long table turned out to be theatrics Putins version of Nixons madman theory, to make him appear so irrational that anything was possible, even nuclear war.

Then western officials argued that Putin was terrified at the prospect of a democratic Ukraine on Russias border, which would threaten the basis of his power by showing Russians that they too could live differently. On the face of it, that seemed plausible. Putin hated the colour revolutions that, from 2003 onwards, brought regime change to former Soviet bloc states. But Ukraines attractions as a model are limited. It is deeply corrupt, the rule of law is nonexistent and its billionaire oligarchs wield disproportionate power. Should that change, the Russian intelligentsia may take note but the majority of Russians those fed on state propaganda who make up Putins political base would not give two hoots.

The invasion has also been portrayed as a straightforward imperialist land grab. A passing reference to Peter the Great earlier in the summer was taken as confirmation that Putin wanted to restore the Russian empire or, failing that, the USSR. Otherwise sensible people, mainly in eastern Europe but not only, held that Ukraine was just a first step. I wouldnt be surprised, a former Swedish minister told me last week, if, in a few years, Estonia and Latvia are next in line.

Given that Putin once called the collapse of the Soviet Union the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, that may seem to make sense. But he also said: Anyone who does not regret [its] destruction has no heart; anyone who wants to see it recreated has no brain. Leaving aside the fact that the Russian military is already hard-pressed to achieve even modest successes in Ukraine, an attack on the Baltic states or Poland would bring them into direct conflict with Nato, which is the last thing that Moscow (or the west) wants.

In fact, Putins invasion is being driven by other considerations.

He has been fixated on Ukraine since long before he came to power. As early as 1994, when he was the deputy mayor of St Petersburg, he expressed outrage that Crimea had been joined to Ukraine. Russia won Crimea from the Turks! he told a French diplomat that year, referring to Russias defeat of the Ottoman empire in the 18th century.

But it was the possibility, raised at a Nato summit in 2008, that Ukraine should become a fully-fledged member of the western alliance that turned his attitude toxic.

Bill Burns, now the head of the CIA, who was then the US ambassador to Moscow, wrote at the time in a secret cable to the White House: Ukrainian entry into Nato is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In my more than two-and-a-half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putins sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in Nato as anything other than a direct challenge to Russias interests Todays Russia will respond.

Successive American administrations ignored Burnss warning and Putin did respond. In 2014, he annexed Crimea; then he fomented a separatist revolt in the Donbas; finally, in February of this year, he launched a brutal, undeclared war to bring Ukraine to heel.

Nato enlargement was merely the tip of the iceberg. Many other grievances against the west had accumulated in the two decades Putin had been in power. By the end of 2020, when planning began for a renewed push against Kyiv, the wheel had come full circle. The young Russian leader who had so impressed Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, who had backed George W Bush to the hilt after 9/11 and who had insisted that Russias place was with Europe and the western world, had slowly morphed into an implacable adversary, convinced that the US and its allies were determined to bring Russia to its knees.

Western politicians dismiss that as paranoid. But the problem is not western intentions, it is how the Kremlin interprets them.

Putins goal is not only to neutralise the regime in Kyiv but, more importantly, to show that Nato is powerless to stop him. If in the process he extirpates Ukrainian culture in the areas Russia occupies, that is not collateral damage: it is a bonus.

Whether he succeeds will depend on the situation on the battlefield, which in turn will depend on the extent of western support over the autumn and winter, when energy shortages and a soaring cost of living risk putting Ukraines western partners under intense strain.

Moscow does not have to achieve a great deal for Putin to be able to claim victory. It would be enough for Russia to control all of the Donbas and the land bridge to Crimea. He would certainly like more. If Russian troops take Odesa and the contiguous Black Sea coast, it would reduce Ukraine to vassalage. But even more modest gains would show the limits of US power. It is possible that Ukraine, with solid western backing, will be able to prevent that. But it is far from certain.

The war in Ukraine is not happening in isolation. While Russia is contesting the US-led security order in Europe, China is challenging it in Asia. A geopolitical transition has begun whose results may not be fully apparent for decades. But the post-cold war order that has governed the world for the past 30 years is drawing to a close. From its demise, a new balance of power will emerge.

Philip Short has written authoritative biographies including Putin: His Life and Times, Mao: A Life and Pol Pot: History of a Nightmare, following a long career as a foreign correspondent for the BBC in Moscow, Washington and other world capitals

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After six months of bloody and terrible war, what exactly does Putin want from Ukraine? - The Guardian

A unit of pro-Russian militias from the the self-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) issued a video in which they said they refused to fight in the Donetsk region. The fighters said they had fulfilled their duty in securing the LPR's control over all of Luhansk, which was taken in July 2022. In its daily bulletin on the war, the UK's Ministry of Defence wrote: "On 15 August 22, Ukrainian social media channels circulated a video which reportedly showed elements from a military unit of the self-proclaimed Luhansk Peoples Republic (LPR) delivering a declaration outlining their refusal to be deployed as part of offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast.

"The fighters claimed they had fulfilled their duty in securing the LPRs control over all of Luhansk Oblast, which was secured in July 2022, and were unwilling to fight in Donetsk Oblast despite threats and intimidation by senior commanders."

The MOD's analysts said that the Russian army was struggling to bolster its forces with new recruits in the Donbas.

They claimed that Russian commanders were resorting to direct financial incentives in order to attract new volunteers.

The researchers added: "A consistent contributing factor to these problems is Russias classification of the war as a special military operation which limits the states powers of legal coercion."

Russian commanders have seen their frontline forces seriously depleted after almost six months of heavy fighting.

Putin's army has sustained massive casualties as they come up against determined and courageous resistance from their Ukrainian opponents.

Ukraine's army estimates that around 45,000 Russian soldiers have been killed since the beginning of the invasion on February 24th.

US sources, however, say that between 75,000 and 80,000 Russians have been killed and injured during the course of the war.

The Kremlin has sought to keep a tight lid on the number of casualties.

However, anecdotal evidence continues to emerge of the heavy losses suffered by their troops.

The Russian army has started to hand out funeral notices for its fallen soldiers that were printed during the Soviet era.

READ MORE:Putin's Soviet reunion dream 'will never happen'

Dmitry Kolezev, an editor for the Russian independent media outlet Republic.ru, wrote on his Twitter page: "Funerals printed in 1974 are brought to the families of Russian military personnel.

"Firstly, this may mean that they were not ready for such losses and modern forms quickly ran out.

"Secondly, this is a terrible symbol - young men were sent to fight for the return of the USSR, and funerals for them come straight from there, from the Soviet Union."

The Kremlin has been scrambling to recruit more people into the army, despite its current refusal to implement a national mobilisation.

Reports have emerged of the formation of volunteer battalions in Russia's regions.

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Moreover, adverts have started to appear on utility bills received by millions of Russians.

The adverts promise significant financial rewards for those willing to sign up and fight in Ukraine.

Ukraine's military warned on Monday that the country should brace for an intensification of Russian missile attacks to coincide with its independence day on Wednesday.

Commanders warned that Russia had put five cruise missile-bearing warships and submarines in the Black Sea

They also said that Moscow was positioning air defence systems in Belarus.

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Russia mutiny: Troops refuse to fight- desperate Putin forced to give financial incentives - Express

The Russian army has seen a devastating depletion of its military forces during the current campaign. Fierce resistance by Ukraine's defenders have resulted in massive losses and casualties for the Kremlin. Kyiv estimates that around 45,000 Russians have died since hostilities broke out on February 24.

The Pentagon believes somewhere between 75,000 and 80,000 of Putin's army have been killed or injured.

Despite the mounting casualties, the Russian president has refused to introduce a nationwide mobilisation.

Instead, he has relied on covert conscription carried out by state officials in both remote Russian regions and in occupied parts of Ukraine.

Evidence has now emerged of the desperate measures being used by Russia's army to meet its recruitment needs.

Anecdotal reports suggest that officials are raiding hospitals to round up patients receiving treatment and sending them to enlistment camps.

A woman recounted how her husband was collared by recruitment officials, while receiving treatment in a hospital in the the city of Alchevsk.

The industrial city is located in Luhansk province in the Donbas, which was captured by Russia's army at the end of July.

She wrote: "Today, they rounded up my husband and sent him to the front.

"He was receiving treatment at the hospital in Alchevsk. After being given a drip, he was discharged by the hospital and told he could go home.

"He was detained on the street (by enlistment officials) and despite his protests was sent to Beloe.

"They also nabbed a young lad with a broken foot, who has to use crutches to get around!

READ MORE:Cannon fodder! Desperate Putin seeks new recruits

The militia has also issued adverts in which they say people from the Commonwealth of Independent States, (former Soviet republics), between the ages of 24-52 can apply to join the group.

Adverts for the army have been placed on utility bills that millions of Russian receive every month.

The Russian president seems to be afraid of provoking a significant social backlash if he introduces a general call up to the army.

A national mobilisation would make a mockery of the Kremlin's claim that it is not fighting a war in Ukraine.

Putin and his acolytes have insisted that their forces are only engaged in a "special military operation".

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Putin desperation: Army sends men in 'plaster casts' with 'flip flops and shorts' to front - Express

Every nation has its founding myths and narratives, usually starring historical figures we know almost nothing about; absurd stories even to the schoolchildren to whom they are usually peddled. Think Alfred and the cakes or Robert the Bruce and his study of spiders. For Russia, it has long been Grand Prince Vladimir, who had 800 concubines and wives before choosing Christ over Muhammad at the end of the first millennium for the very Russian reason that Islam did not permit alcohol. In truth, Vladimir (or Volodymyr to the Ukrainians) is a classic founding figure, now a saint, about whom almost nothing is known. Yet according to President Putin, unveiling a monstrous statue to him in 2016, he gathered and defended Russias lands by founding a strong, united and centralised state.

As Orlando Figess new history methodically lays bare, this is both myth-making of the first order and of profound importance to understanding Russia today. From Ivan to Peter, Catherine to Nicholas, Russias rulers have reforged these myths to suit their own purposes, sometimes as a defensive standard for the people to rally round, sometimes as a badge of celestial honour to cement Moscows place as the saviour of the west. Often both at once.

In July 2021, Vladimir Putin published his own story of Russia, a 5,000-word essay On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, which can now be read as his justification for the invasion he launched seven months later to bring his brother little Russians back into the arms of big brother Rus. Reaching back into the mists of myth, he sees the idea of Ukraine as a Trojan horse, an anti-Russian project since the 17th century and that the present state is on historically Russian lands. As Figes makes clear, anyone with the most elementary grasp of the shape of Europe, from Berlin to the Urals, would know that borders are determined by raw power, not some mystical racial bond. Flip through any historical atlas of the past 1,000 years and states appear, disappear and move around with astonishing but telling regularity. Empress Catherine, a German, may have founded Odessa (Figes interestingly uses Russian spellings for Ukrainian cities) to capture the worlds grain trade in 1794. But just years before that, the Black Sea coast had been part of the Polish Lithuanian commonwealth.

This historical primer has only traces of the original thinking that Figess other important works on Russia have displayed, but it does effectively lay out with important clarity the structural continuities of power, how the state and the ruler, be that a tsar or Stalin, are united in the body of a single being... the sacralisation of the tsars authority. He takes us on a chronological journey, in the process highlighting the way Putin and his propagandists have filled the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union with what Figes calls the debris of Russian history. Pride, fear and resentment, aggression and defensiveness have coalesced into the toxic present, which offers a retreat into a conservative celebration of communal sacrifice, with little vision of any constructive future.

In his brief post-invasion update, Figes points out the significance of the speech given by Patriarch Kirill on the day of forgiveness, in which he labelled the war in the Ukraine a crusade for human salvation, reminding the people that Moscow and the Orthodox church are the saviours of Christianity, the last bastions of true morality. Russias soldiers, it emerged, are giving their lives to hold back the onslaught of gay pride parades, a Kremlin obsession of the past 20 years. The church yet again has nailed its colours to the authoritarian mast, turning away from European concepts of government and thought and undermining any serious development of a civil society able to challenge central government.

Figes notes the irony that it was the choice of Christianity that opened the gateway to Europe for Muscovy in the first place, which makes Putins pivot from all things western so ultimately destructive. For while geopolitics make an alliance with Beijing an immediate strategic imperative, page after page of the Russian story has been defined by continuous, often highly creative friction between western ideas and Russian Slav exceptionalism. The term Eurasian is bandied around as if the balance of cultural influences were equal, but in truth, after the Mongols had helped establish Muscovy as the primary statelet in the 15th and 16th centuries, what is striking is how marginal the influence of Asia and its culture has been on Russia. However abhorrent the word empire is to Soviets and Russians, Moscow became and remains an imperial power, driving at different times into Europe, into Siberia and later into central Asia.

The present Ukrainian horror is the post-imperial catastrophe of a Russia that is struggling to accept what happened with the collapse of the Soviet Union and that empire in 1991. As always with Russia, the costs on all sides will be huge. 1812. 1917. 1945. These dates point to the astonishing impact Russia always has, twice claiming the role of saviour of civilisation after being invaded itself, as well as being the lodestar of world revolution for over a generation. Add 2022 to that list, as I suspect we will have to, and the long-term reverberations of Putins present destruction of Ukrainian cities and confrontation with the west become clear. Is it any wonder that Russians, both leaders and the people, have struggled to accept a humbler status in the world?

Figes quotes the extraordinary findings of the respected Levada Centre, whose polling suggested that Homo Sovieticus has not died, with his low material expectations, social conformism, intolerance of ethnic and sexual minorities, acceptance of authority. Indeed, reading the catalogue of oppression Russians have put up with, head lowered before their rulers, Homo Rus is not that different from Homo Sovieticus, both before and after the Soviet era. Despite knowing that between 10 and 30 million of their own people were repressed unjustly under Stalin, more than three-quarters polled believe that his policies were a terrible necessity. Figes records how in 2021 Putin directly attacked history by closing Memorial, an organisation deliberately set up to collect information about the past. Who knows now what the people truly feel about their new tsars attempt to re-establish the empire at such cost not just to Ukrainians but to themselves? Reading The Story of Russia you would be betting against history to suggest that Putin and his present boyars are not reflecting something deep in the Russian story. Yet in Kyiv, Putin is now creating another myth that will not easily be forgotten, for a country he does not believe exists: Ukraine.

Film-maker Angus Macqueen has helped create a platform of award-winning documentaries, Russia on Film

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The Story of Russia by Orlando Figes review Vladimir Putin and the power of myth-making - The Guardian