Category Archives: Putin

1. Opinion: Putin is trying to distract us from the blindingly obvious  CNN
2. Opinion | Putin Is Onto Us  The New York Times
3. Opinion | As Winter Nears, the West May Save Putin  The Wall Street Journal
4. The Superstitious Beliefs Sending Vladimir Putin Wild in Russia's War on Ukraine  The Daily Beast
5. Ukraine defiant as Putin's terror bombing plunges cities into darkness  Atlantic Council
6. View Full Coverage on Google News

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Opinion: Putin is trying to distract us from the blindingly obvious - CNN

RUSSIA-UN-IAEA-NUCLEAR-DIPLOMACY

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Rafael Grossi, director of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in Saint Petersburg on October 11, 2022. Credit - Pavel BEDNYAKOV- SPUTNIK/AFP)

Since Russia launched its most recent invasion of Ukraine in February, Moscow has threatenedsometimes subtly, other times explicitlynuclear escalation should the war not go its way. Ukraine and the West have to take such threats seriously. But the Kremlin also needs to take their probable responses seriously and would have to weigh the substantial risks and costs of using a nuclear weapon.

Shortly after Russian forces assaulted Ukraine on Feb. 24, Vladimir Putin ordered a special combat readiness status for Russian nuclear forces. But its unclear what that means since the Pentagon has consistently said it sees no change in Russias nuclear posture. The alert may have amounted to little more than additional command post staffing.

Since then, Russian officials have made implicit nuclear threats, such as Putins reference to using all the forces and resources Russia has to defend the Ukrainian territory he claims to have annexed on Sept. 30. Other Russians have voiced more overt threats. Former president Dmitry Medvedev on Sept. 27 imagined Russia using a nuclear weapon against Ukraine. The rhetoric has increased as the Russian army has suffered setbacks on the battlefield.

The war is clearly not going as the Kremlin hoped. The February Russian attack suggested objectives of quickly taking Kyiv and occupying as much as the eastern two-thirds of Ukraine. The Russian army failed to achieve either goal and quit northern Ukraine at the end of March.

The Russian military then focused on Ukraines east but stalled after making little progress.

In September, the Ukrainians launched counteroffensives in the east and south. The Russians retreated, yielding large tracts of territory to Ukrainian liberation. Putin ordered a mobilization, but an influx of poorly trained and equipped soldiers will hardly help.

Story continues

Russias declining military fortunes have raised the question of whether Putin and the Kremlin might use a nuclear weapon against Ukraine. The goals would be two-fold: get Kyiv to capitulate, and persuade the West to end its military assistance to Ukraine. Such decisions would allow the Kremlin to snatch some kind of victory from what increasingly looks like a debacle.

However, the Russians would have to calculate what the situation might look like after a nuclear detonation.

A nuclear strike would achieve relatively little on the battlefield. The Ukrainian army does not mass forces in a way that would create an inviting target for a nuclear attack.

Moreover, the shock of the first nuclear attack in more than 75 years likely would not secure the capitulation Moscow wants. The Ukrainians understand what Russian victory means: summary executions, mass arrests, torture chambers, filtration camps, and loss of independence. Russian escalationssuch as indiscriminate missile strikes on citieshave only hardened the Ukrainians will to resist. They would almost certainly fight on after a nuclear attack.

The Kremlin would have to consider international reactions. Russia would probably lose India, most likely China, and the rest of the Global South, who thus far have sought to remain neutral. Moscow would face broad international condemnation, Putin would become a global pariah, and other states could join in applying sanctions against Russia.

The Kremlin also has to weigh how the West would react. Western leaders have made clear their response would carry extraordinarily serious consequences for Russia. While officials have avoided specifics, the consequences could include an upsurge in the flow of arms to Ukraine, likely with an end to restrictions barring their use against targets in Russia proper. Consequences could also include military action by NATO members, such as conventional air and missile strikes on Russian forces in Ukraine.

This is the gamble the Kremlin would face. It would hope that public fear in the West would restrain the Western reaction. That mightmightprove a winning bet, but it more likely would prove a loser.

Western leaders have compelling reasons to support Ukraine and have publicly staked out their position in support of Kyiv. They would have to ask themselves: would caving in to Russian nuclear use in Ukraine not invite further nuclear threats and attacks from Russia and elsewhere in the future?

Russia could find itself in a shooting war with NATO, when the bulk of its ground forces can barely cope with Ukraine. Having opened Pandoras box, the Kremlin would confront the unpredictable and catastrophic consequences that nuclear escalation could bring to Russia.

It makes little sense for the Kremlin to run that risk in a conflict that is not existential. Russia can lose this warthat is, the Ukrainian military could drive the Russians outand the Russian state will survive. The Ukrainian army will not march on Moscow.

A rational actor in this case would conclude that the risks and costs of using a nuclear weapon are simply too high. Putin seems a rational actor, though he also seems more emotional today than in the past, which may cloud his calculation of risks and costs. And he has made many miscalculations, beginning with his disastrous decision to invade Ukraine.

Would he miscalculate again? That is the key unknowable. The hope is that rationality would prevail, and that senior political and military leaders in Moscow, who may not be so obsessed with Ukraine, would come down on the side of caution.

The nuclear threat understandably raises a frightening prospect. However, it is important to remember that Putin does not want a nuclear war. He wants Ukraine and the West to think he is prepared for nuclear war, hoping to intimidate them into backing down. Western leaders have to respond carefully but must also bear in mind the risks that ensue should they cave.

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Would Putin Roll the Nuclear Dice? - news.yahoo.com

If Vladimir Putin were to decide to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, would we know ahead of launch? If so, how exactly would we know?

Not since the early days of the war in Ukraine have these questions felt so urgent. As Putin has suffered battlefield setbacks and illegally annexed Russian-occupied territory in eastern Ukraine, he has repeatedly threatened to make use of his countrys nuclear weaponsappearing to implicitly extend the protection of Russias nuclear arsenal over lands that Ukrainian forces could soon seek to retake. U.S. officials have underscored the gravity of the situation as well; President Joe Biden recently traced a direct line from what he deemed the serious risk of Putin going nuclear to Armageddon.

In these circumstances, feeling on edge is only natural. But in reporting on nuclear threats over the years, I have learned the pitfalls of assigning undue weight to rhetorical shiny objects. In 2017, for example, when Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un were calling each other Little Rocket Man and a mentally deranged U.S. dotard and warning of all manner of nuclear apocalypse, experts advised me to peer past the bombast and look for clues of impending war, such as the evacuation of American noncombatants from South Korea. Those clues never materialized. Nor did the apocalypse.

Eliot A. Cohen: What to do about Russias nuclear threats

In a similar spirit, I asked several experts to share the indicators theyre watching most closely to determine whether Russian nuclear use in Ukraine is imminentand to help us all separate the signal from the noise.

I do believe that we are at least several steps away from Russian nuclear use in Ukraine, Pavel Podvig, an expert on Russian nuclear forces, told me.

Below is a breakdown of what those remaining steps could look like.

A shift to more explicit, specific nuclear threats by Putin and other Russian officials

Despite Putin hinting recently that threats to Russian territorial integrity could spur the Kremlin to use nuclear weapons, Podvig maintained that the Russian president and other top officials have nevertheless largely been consistent in articulating a defensive doctrine, in which the Russian government would consider using nuclear weapons only if it were to sustain an attack that threatened the existence of the Russian state.

Podvig is looking out for a shift away from that doctrine, which could involve Russian leaders more explicitly threatening to use nuclear weapons to halt Ukrainian advances on the battlefield. Matthew Kroenig, a nuclear strategist and my colleague at the Atlantic Council, served up a scenario: Imagine that Putin, seeing the lands he recently annexed about to slip from his grasp, declares, I warned the world that these four regions are Russian territory. I warned Ukraine not to attack Russian territory. Theyve not heeded these warnings. They need to evacuate these areas immediately, or else Ill consider nuclear weapons. This isnt a bluff. Thats the kind of more specific statement that would put Kroenig on higher alert.

We will know it when we see that, Podvig said of a possible rhetorical shift. My take is that, so far, we havent seen it.

A definitive rout of Russian forces in Ukraine and corresponding threats to Putins power at home

As a dictator who controls the media, Putin could spin any partial Russian win in Ukraine as a victory, Kroenig reasoned. But if Ukrainians are on the verge of taking back all of their territory, Putin could conceivably turn to nuclear weapons to reverse his military misfortunes and avoid a humiliating defeat.

Kroenig, who served in the Department of Defense and the intelligence community in the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, is relatedly tracking Putins strength at home, because if we saw more Russian elites turning against him or publicly criticizing him, Putin could seek nuclear use as a way to gamble for resurrection, change the conversation, [and] show that hes a strong leader.

This is one of the core conundrums in this confounding war: The United States and its partners are rightly supporting Ukraines campaign to regain all the territory it has lost to Russias illegal and abhorrent aggression. But investing in Ukraines unequivocal success, and thus Putins utter defeat, may come with the greater risk of a desperate Putin unleashing nuclear war.

Movements of Russian tactical nuclear weapons from storage to the field

The general consensus among experts is that if Putin were to reach for his nuclear weapons in the course of his war in Ukraine, he wouldnt select the kind of long-range, city-destroying, strategic nuclear weapons that were so prominent during the Cold War. Instead, hed likely opt for one or several of the countrys roughly 2,000 tactical nuclear weaponsless explosive, shorter-range arms intended for use on a battlefield.

These tactical nuclear weapons are not deployed and ready for immediate use the way that Russias ground- and sea-based strategic nuclear weapons are. Experts believe they are held in an estimated 47 national and base-level storage facilities across Russia. The countrys systems for launching these weapons are stashed away in separate locations.

Podvig has sketched out how a move to tap into this arsenal could play out. In the event of an order to raise Russias state of readiness, the defense ministrys 12th Main Directorate, the custodian of the countrys nuclear arsenal, would remove the selected weapons from storage and put them on specialized trucks, which would bring them to a designated point where they would be taken out of their storage containers and paired with their delivery systems (loading a nuclear bomb onto an aircraft at an air base, for instance, or installing a nuclear warhead on a missile).

Through its satellites, other surveillance capabilities, and various forms of on-the-ground intelligence, the U.S. government would probably (not certainly) be able to spot signs of Russian efforts to move tactical nuclear weapons out of storage facilities.

Private researchers poring over open-source intelligence would, conversely, be less likely to catch this activity. But the broader public might quickly find out about it anyway. Just as it did in novel ways in the lead-up to the war in Ukraine, the Biden administration might disclose classified intelligencethrough either leaks to the media or public statementsto expose Putins plans and marshal international pressure, including from more Russia-friendly nuclear-armed states, such as China and India, as a means of deterrence.

In such circumstances, I think President Biden and other officials wouldpublicly and privatelysignal very aggressively to the Russians to dissuade them from escalating the conflict with nuclear weapons, Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear-nonproliferation expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, told me.

The experts I consulted also agreed that Putin himself would probably want to telegraph to the world in subtle or blatant ways that hes making these movesin part because he could never be fully confident of taking these steps without his adversaries detecting them, but also because, as Lewis put it, he would want to see if he could get what he wants for free.

If Putin can frighten Ukraines allies into standing down without actually using nuclear weapons, thats the best outcome for him, Kroenig said. Kroenig could even envision the Kremlin ostentatiously recording video of Russian troops removing tactical nuclear weapons from storage facilities and Putin deliberately leaking it, with a message to the world like Were moving them to the front lines. Were getting ready to use them. Im serious. Back off now, or else this is coming.

From the July/August 2022 issue: We have no nuclear strategy

Intercepted communications suggesting forthcoming nuclear use and corresponding movements of Russian forces or military assets

If Russia were preparing to use nuclear weapons, Podvig said, it would likely raise the level of readiness of a portion of forces, which generates a certain footprint, such as orders and additional communication through both Russias nuclear command-and-control system and other military channels. Russia has practiced these processes during past military exercises, so the U.S. government has a sense of the patterns to watch for. One recent assessment estimated that tens of thousands of Russian soldiers would ultimately need to be involved in the complex logistical operation of transferring tactical nuclear weapons from storage to the battlefield.

I would expect to see alert levels rise throughout Russias nuclear forces before any nuclear use, no matter how small, Lewis said, particularly because the countrys generals will need to gird those forces for escalation that could result from any U.S. or NATO retaliation following Russian nuclear use. Moving Russian nuclear forces to a higher state of readiness could involve not just activity at storage sites for nuclear warheads, but also submarines going out to sea or mobile missiles leaving their bases.

Although open-source researchers such as Lewis dont yet have the capabilities to monitor Russian communications, here, too, the U.S. government could choose to publicly release any intelligence it gathers on Russian military orders that signal nuclear use is in the offing.

A particular challenge with reading the Kremlins tea leaves is that Russia has nearly two dozen dual use delivery systems, some already being used in the war in Ukraine, which can carry conventional or nuclear warheads. U.S. intelligence could assume they have conventional warheads on them, but actually they dont, because Putin has switched them out somewhere and we didnt detect that, Kroenig noted. So it is possible, I guess, that we just start seeing mushroom clouds in Ukraine, but I think thats less likely than that wed get some kind of warning.

In recent weeks, U.S. and allied officials have repeatedly stated that they have not detected signs of imminent Russian nuclear use. And the experts I consulted mostly concurred, although Kroenig noted that because Putin is beginning to lose the war and sharpen his threats, we are already in the danger zone.

There is always some background level of activity with [Russias] nuclear forces, as there is in any nuclear-armed country, Lewis noted. But so far, he has not seen anything in Russia that he would characterize as unusual.

When I asked Podvig whether hed seen any of his top indicators for looming Russian nuclear use, he hesitated and then replied, Not yet. A message of great reassurance this was not. But Ill take it over the latest runaway speculation on Twitter.

The rest is here:

Will Putin Use Nuclear Weapons? Watch These Indicators.

The upper house of Russias parliament was set to quickly seal Putins decision to impose martial law in the annexed Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions. Draft legislation indicates it may involve restrictions on travel and public gatherings, tighter censorship and broader authority for law enforcement agencies.

Putin also didnt provide details of the extra powers the heads of Russian regions will have under his decree.

In a signal his moves could have broad restrictions for people living in Russia, his decree states that the types of measures envisaged by martial law could be introduced in Russia.

The Russian leader also ordered the establishment of a Coordination Committee to increase interactions between government agencies in dealing with the fighting in Ukraine that he continued to call a special military operation.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Putins order doesnt anticipate the closure of Russias borders, state news agency RIA-Novosti reported.

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Putin declares martial law in illegally annexed regions of Ukraine - POLITICO

KYIV, UKRAINE (AP) Russian President Vladimir Putin said Friday he expects his mobilization of army reservists for combat in Ukraine to be completed in about two weeks, allowing him to end an unpopular and chaotic call-up meant to counter Ukrainian battlefield gains and solidify his illegal annexation of occupied territory.

Putin facing domestic discontent and military setbacks in a neighboring country armed with increasingly advanced Western weapons also told reporters he does not regret starting the conflict and did not set out to destroy Ukraine when he ordered Russian troops to invade nearly eight months ago.

What is happening today is unpleasant, to put it mildly, he said after attending a summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Kazakhstans capital. But we would have had all this a little later, only under worse conditions for us, thats all. So my actions are correct and timely.

Russias difficulties in achieving its war aims have become apparent in one of the four Ukrainian regions Putin illegally claimed as Russian territory last month. Anticipating an advance by Ukrainian forces, Moscow-installed authorities in the Kherson region urged residents to flee Friday.

Even some of Putins own supporters have criticized the Kremlins handling of the war and mobilization, increasing pressure on him to do more to turn the tide in Russias favor.

In his comments on the army mobilization, Putin said the action he ordered last month had registered 222,000 of the 300,000 reservists the Russian Defense Ministry set as an initial goal. A total of 33,000 of them have joined military units, and 16,000 are deployed for combat, he said.

Putin ordered the call-up to bolster the fight along a 1,100-km (684-mile) front line where Ukrainian counteroffensives have inflicted blows to Moscows military prestige. The mobilization was troubled from the start, with confusion about who was eligible for the draft in a country where almost all men under age 65 are registered as reservists.

Opposition to the order was so strong that tens of thousands of men left Russia, and others protested in the streets. Critics were skeptical the draft would end in two weeks. They predicted only a pause to allow enlistment offices to process regular conscripts during Russias annual fall draft for men aged 18-27, which was postponed from Oct. 1 to Nov. 1.

Do not believe Putin about two weeks. Mobilization can only be canceled by his decree. No decree - no cancellation, Vyacheslav Gimadi, an attorney for imprisoned opposition leader Alexei Navalnys Anti-Corruption Foundation, wrote on Facebook.

Asked about the possibility of an expanded mobilization, the Russian president said the Defense Ministry had not asked him to authorize one.

Nothing further is planned, Putin said, adding, In the foreseeable future, I dont see any need.

Putin and other officials stated in September the mobilization would affect some 300,000 people, but his enabling decree did not cite a specific number. Russian media reports have suggested it could be as high as 1.2 million.

Putin had also said only those with combat or service experience would be drafted. He later admitted military officials had made mistakes, such as enlisting reservists without the relevant background. Men who received minimal training decades ago were drafted in droves.

Reports also have surfaced that some recruits were sent to the front lines in Ukraine with little preparation and inadequate equipment. Several mobilized reservists were reported to have died in combat in Ukraine this week, just days after they were drafted.

Putin responded to the criticism Friday, saying all activated recruits should receive adequate training and that he would assign Russias Security Council to conduct an inspection of how mobilized citizens are being trained.

Before launching the invasion on Feb. 24, Putin questioned Ukraines right to exist as a sovereign nation, portraying the country as part of historic Russia. Asked about this on Friday, he repeated his claim that Russia was prepared for peace talks and again accused the Ukrainian government of quitting negotiations after Russian troops withdrew from Kyiv early in the war.

Ukraine rejected any possibility of negotiating with Putin after he illegally annexed Ukraines Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk regions last month based on referendums that Kyiv and the West denounced as a sham.

The battlefield momentum has shifted toward Ukraine as its military recaptures cities, towns and villages that Russia took early in the war. After occupied Khersons worried Kremlin-backed leaders asked civilians to evacuate to ensure their safety and to give Russian troops more maneuverability, Moscow offered free accommodations.

Russia has characterized the movement of Ukrainians to Russia or Russian-controlled territory as voluntary, but in many cases they arent allowed to travel to Ukrainian-held territory, and reports have surfaced that some were forcibly deported to filtration camps with harsh conditions.

An Associated Press investigation found that Russian officials deported thousands of Ukrainian children some orphaned, others living with foster families or in institutions to be raised as Russian.

Ukrainian forces reported retaking 75 populated places in northern Kherson in the last month, according to Ukraines Ministry for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories. A similar campaign in eastern Ukraine resulted in most of the Kharkiv region returning to Ukrainian control, as well as parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the ministry said.

As they retreat, Russian forces are adding to their losses by abandoning weapons and ammunition. In the U.S., the Office of the Director of National Intelligence presented a slide deck Friday stating that at least 6,000 pieces of Russian equipment have been lost since the start of the war. The presentation outlines enormous pressure on Russias defense industry to replace its losses and says that because of export controls and international sanctions, Russia is expending munitions at an unsustainable rate.

Konstantin, a Kherson resident who spoke to the AP only if his last name was withheld for safety reasons, said columns of military trucks had moved around the regions capital and eventually left. Most government offices have reduced working hours, and schools have closed, he said.

The city is now in suspense. Primarily the Russian military from the headquarters and the family of collaborators are leaving, Konstantin said. Everyone is discussing the imminent arrival of the Ukrainian military and preparing for it.

Russian forces on Friday carried out missile strikes on Kharkiv, Ukraines second-largest city, and in the Zaphorizhzhia region, home to Europes biggest nuclear power plant. The U.N.s nuclear watchdog has warned that fighting at or near the Russian-controlled Zaphorizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, now shuttered, could trigger a catastrophic radiation release.

Putin has vowed to retaliate if Ukraine or its allies strike Russian territory, including the annexed regions of Ukraine. Russias Belgorod region on the border with Ukraine came under attack for a second day Friday. According to Gov. Vyacheslav Gladkov, the shelling damaged an electric substation, five houses in the village of Voznesenovka and a power line, leaving several nearby villages temporarily without electricity. No casualties or injuries were reported.

Ukrainian shelling blew up an ammunition depot in the Belgorod region on Thursday, according to Russias Investigative Committee. Unconfirmed media reports said three Russian National Guard officers were killed and more than 10 were wounded.

Vowing to liberate all Russian-occupied areas, Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhny, the commander of Ukraines armed forces, said in a video message Friday, We have buried the myth of the invincibility of the Russian army.

Yuras Karmanau contributed reporting from Tallinn, Estonia.

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Follow APs coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

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Putin calls his actions in Ukraine 'correct and timely' - The Associated Press

Not merely is his cultural range perhaps without equal, the Marxist historian Perry Anderson once wrote of the conservative journalist Christopher Caldwell, but in the cast of his intelligence, he is quite unlike most reporters or commentators. Currently a contributing opinion writer for the Times, and formerly a prominent voice at the Financial Times and the now defunct Weekly Standard, Caldwell has written for many years about European politics. (Andersons comments came in the course of a review of a book by Caldwell about Muslim immigration to Europe.)

More recently, Caldwell has become a contributing editor at the Claremont Review of Books, which has been one of the leading publications supporting Donald Trump and the MAGA movementor what its adherents might call Trumpism. Caldwell is also a harsh critic of American foreign policy toward Russia, as well as a defender of Viktor Orbns far-right government in Hungary; his writing about both Vladimir Putin and Orbn suggests his own disappointment with current American cultural trends. Vladimir Vladimirovich is not the president of a feminist NGO, he once said of Putin. He is not a transgender-rights activist. More directly, he referred to Putin as a symbol of national self-determination. (Caldwell called Orbn brave, shrewd with his enemies and trustworthy with his friends, detail-oriented, hilarious.) Caldwells most recent book, The Age of Entitlement: America Since the Sixties, argues that the 1964 Civil Rights Act had legislative outgrowths that led to the over-empowerment of bureaucracies and courts, and eventually paved the way for a countermovement in the form of Donald Trump.

I recently spoke by phone with Caldwell. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed how the Republican Party should deal with election deniers, why Russia is viewed by certain conservatives through the lens of American domestic issues, and how to judge Putins invasion of Ukraine.

In your most recent Times column, about the January 6th committee, you write that the committee members are pursuing their case in a grandiose and ideological manner, tarring Mr. Trumps voting base as a bunch of authoritarians and election deniers. Is that a false characterization, or do you think that, regardless of whether its true or false, you cant talk to voters that way?

Maybe a mix of those things. The committee is trying to prove a grave constitutional trespass here, and serious constitutional damage. The thing that I object to most in this particular case is that they conflate real constitutional misbehavior, such as violence during a vote count, with just sharing an opinion with the President, or sharing an opinion with those who committed violence during the vote count. I quoted something by Liz Cheney. Theres often a tendency to think that the opinion that the election was poorly managed is constitutionally culpable, and I dont think it is.

Yes, you write, Ms. Cheney recently complained that Ron DeSantis, the Republican governor of Florida, is, right now, campaigning for election deniers. She went on: Either you fundamentally believe in and will support our constitutional structure or you dont. But, of course, it is not unconstitutional to question the integrity of an election, and a person who does so is not necessarily an enemy of democracy.

Right.

We see in polls that sixty or seventy per cent of Republicans believe that Joe Biden was elected illegitimately. Its a complicated question, how political leaders should talk to people who have false beliefs. But a majority of the Republican Party believes the election wasnt fairthats a problem.

It depends on how its done. Its the same thing that Stacey Abrams did with the Georgia governors election four years ago. Its just an opinion. Its an opinion about the working of the system. Like a lot of opinions, if it becomes widespread, it can be the source of great instability. But it is a protected opinion. Whats not protected is acting as if the election were therefore illegitimate, like to say that Joe Biden is not the President, so the laws dont bind me. Thats the line I would draw. I would police any misbehavior that resulted from it, but not the opinion.

I think Cheneys point is that, if people like Ron DeSantis are campaigning for candidates who say that the election was stolen, or who say that they will only accept the election results if they win next time aroundwhich, for example, the Republican candidate for governor of Arizona said in the past week or sothen youre setting up the election to essentially be stolen next time, because youre putting into office people who will not abide by the rules. That seems like a reasonable fear, especially when youre talking about officeholders, where the distinctions between speech and action could become less solid over time.

Yes, I agree. This distinction between speech and action is proving kind of blurry, and you certainly see it in some of the things that Jair Bolsonaro has said in the most recent Brazilian election. In a much milder way, I was uncomfortable with certain things that Biden said in his Philadelphia speech, where he was talking about Republicans campaigning for secretary-of-state positions on the grounds that theyll be able to influence the election counts. Democrats are doing similar things. But I think it lays a predicate that is worrisome.

Wait, which is worrisome: Bidens comments, or the Republicans running for these offices?

Its more Biden saying it. Im not exactly sure what the Republicans and Democrats are doing, but, in an election that has been as hotly contested as this one, I think its totally natural that the parties would want to campaign for the positions that have authority over electoral counts.

Brad Raffensperger, whos campaigning in Georgia, seems pretty committed to upholding election results. I think Biden would probably say that he was more concerned about the ones who say that they would not accept election results.

Yeah.

Candidates are running who say the election was stolen. Its a tricky problem. How do you deal with that?

Yeah, it is really tricky. The problem is right where you say it is.

Go on.

I have sympathy for people who are uneasy about the last election. If the rules of the last election were O.K., then why havent we always had them? The answer is that they were required by the COVID emergency. And the increase in access is accompanied by, probably, a decrease in accountability, which is a perfectly legitimate thing to worry about, whether it happens or not.

Im not saying that Trumps absolutely truculent, dug-in refusal to accept the results was inevitable, but unease on the part of the loser was inevitable. His margin in those four states that wouldve changed the election was something like eighty thousand votes. If those eighty thousand votes had gone the other way, and Trump had pulled it out at the end of Election Night, I think that there probably wouldve been a real examination of the ballots. Maybe Im wrong.

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Vladimir Putins Place in the Culture Wars - The New Yorker

French President Emmanuel Macrons frequent use of en mme temps (at the same time) to argue for and then against a case is a standing joke in France. But when the leader of the EUs mightiest military power talks tough and then soft on Russias Vladimir Putin, Frances allies are not amused.

Roses twirl, chocolates swirl asthe Paris skyline unfurls to a seductive French song in a Ukrainian defence ministry video clip released on Twitter last week to thank France for its weapons deliveries.

Romantic gestures take many forms, declares the video as singers Serge Gainsbourg and Jane Birkin breathlessly croon their 1960s hit tune, Je taime...moi non plus (I Love YouMe Neither). Footage of French Howitzers on the Ukrainian frontline then fill the screen as the video ends with a final plea: Please send us more.

Since the Russian invasion began, the Ukrainian governments crack communications team has released videos thanking countries aiding their war effort. The clips invariably end with a culture-specific appeal for more weapons. The video for Sweden, for instance, was a tongue-in-cheek thanks for Stockholms Carl Gustav rocket launchers, set to the Abba single, Money, Money, Money.

Ukraines social media warriors could not have picked a more fitting audio track for France. Gainsbourgs breathlessly sexy Je taimemoi non plus expresses need-laced thanks with an ambiguous declaration of love, but not quite, while urgently conveying desire for guns, not roses.

The war in Ukraine has seen France on a rollercoaster ride between words and deeds, resolve and seeming appeasement, as Europe confronts one of its biggest security challenges since World War II.

Since the crisis began, President Emmanuel Macrons swings between tough talk against Russian aggression, followed by warnings against humiliating President Vladimir Putin have irked Frances allies. Macrons comments last week on Frances likely response to a tactical Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine was the latest example of confused messaging.

A week after US President Joe Biden warned of Armageddon should Russia use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Macron broke with the official iron-clad vagueness on the nuclear deterrence. In an interview with the France 2 TV station, Macron noted that, France has a nuclear doctrine that is based on the vital interests of the country, and which are clearly defined. These would not be at stake if there was a nuclear ballistic attack in Ukraine or in the region.

Macrons comments sparked a media storm with headlines noting that France would not respond in kind if Russia launched a nuclear attack on Ukraine.

French officials however argue that much of the countrys soft on Russia characterisation is simply a matter of style over substance.

When it comes to Macrons recent comments on a response to a tactical Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine, Samantha de Bendern, associate fellow at Chatham Houses Russia and Eurasia Programme, is willing to give the French leader the benefit of the doubt.

Noting the difference between strategic nuclear weapons which cause large-scale damage and tactical weapons with smaller nuclear warheads and delivery systems for limited strikes, de Bendern believes Macrons comments are not as bad as everyone is making them out to be. France cannot give a nuclear response to a tactical nuclear strike in Ukraine for the simple reason that France only has strategic nuclear weapons, she explained. The only country that could carry a proportional nuclear response is the US, they are the only ones with tactical weapons. The tactical weapons in Europe are under US control.

At 44, Macron lacks the Cold War experience of past European leaders who have publicly navigated the nuclear deterrence discourse. I think it was clumsy. It would have been more politically wise to make no comment, she noted. But theres no way France can have a tactical response to a tactical nuclear strike. Thats the reality.

Following Brexit, France is now the blocs only member with an autonomous nuclear capability and is the EUs mightiest military, according to the 2022 Global Firepower ranking. But Paris has come under fire for its low level of military support to Ukraine.

The Ukraine support tracker by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy places France, with its 0.21 billion military commitments, much lower than the UKs 3.74 billion and Polands 1.82 billion.

In early 2022, Germany faced severe criticism over its Angela Merkel-era cozying to Moscow, particularly its dependence on Russian gas, and its defence frugality under the US security umbrella. But since the Olaf Scholz administration launched its Zeitenwende (dawn of a new era) policy switch, Berlin has made an about-turn at breathtaking speed. Today, Berlins military commitments to Kyiv stand at 1.2 billion, according to the Ukraine support tracker.

French defence experts say that in the battlefield, its not just the quantity of military aid, but also the quality of weapons systems that can turn the tide on the battlefront. Paris has supplied Kyiv top-end Caesar howitzers, prized for their accuracy, that Ukrainian military officers in the eastern frontline have hailed as very manoeuvrable and mobile.

But while US systems, such as the HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems) make headlines as game-changers in the Ukraine war, the French military lags behind its US and UK counterparts in putting out its message.

The French army nicknamed La Grande Muette, or the Big Silent One has a reputation for being secretive about its frontline actions. The Grande Muette moniker stems from deeply held principles of an apolitical army loyal to the Republic. But in the modern age of transparency and accessibility, the French military establishment can appear out-of-touch.

In a bid to address these criticisms, French Defence Minister Sbastien Lecornu over the weekend provided details of Frances military aid to Ukraine. In an interview with the daily, Le Parisien, Lecornu said France has supplied 18 Caesar artillery pieces and is in discussions to furnish six more.

Addressing Ukraines pleas for air defence systems following recent deadly Russian strikes on Kyiv and other cities, the minister said France was also sending Crotale air defence missile batteries. France has 12 Crotale batteries, Lecornu disclosed. While he did not specify how many will go to Ukraine, the defence minister maintained that "it will be significant to enable them [the Ukrainians] to defend their skies."

The relatively small tonnage, compared with US supplies, reflects Frances low stocks after years of budget cuts, a situation confronting several European countries, explained de Bendern. France is doing as much as it can because France does not have the capacity to send more weapons systems without endangering its own domestic and overseas security needs, said de Bendern. Europe needs to scale up its arms spending, which is difficult in a time of recession.

The real problem appears to be not the medium, but the message. While Macron talks tough on Ukraine, his repeated warnings that Russia should not be humiliated infuriates Frances more hawkish NATO allies.

Back home, French voters are familiar with what they call their en mme temps (at the same time) president. Macrons self-confessed verbal tic sees him expounding a position, only to succumb to an at the same time rationale for a contradictory one. Critics say it displays the centrist presidents inability to adopt a position, opting instead for a verbal fudge of saying one thing, then its opposite and ultimately, nothing at all.

But on the international stage, and with Europes security at stake, en mme temps does not play well. Following yet another warning about humiliating Putin, Polish President Andrzej Duda blasted his French counterpart in a June interview with German tabloid, Bild. Did anyone say that Adolf Hitler must save face?...I have not heard such voices, he fumed.

Some foreign policy experts say Macrons attempts to engage in a dialogue with Putin stems from Frances post-war diplomacy of balance or the need to maintain independence to balance US power in Europe. This is the Gaullist tradition of General Charles de Gaulle, very much of France going it alone. Its a longstanding tradition in France. There is a sense that France understands Russia, a European power, and that France is the country with the most cultural affinity with Russia, said de Bendern.

The war in Ukraine has unsettled Frances post-war vision of strategic autonomy as Western allies draw closer to defend a democratic, multilateral order that is being tested on the battlefront.

Frances pro-Russia politicians such as the far-rights Marine Le Pen and the far-lefts Jean-Luc Mlenchon have jumped ideological hoops, ditching cherished positions, to condemn Putins invasion of Ukraine. But their nationalist streaks including Mlnchons anti-US, anti-imperialist discourse run deep in French public opinion and is not restricted to extreme left and right fringes.

The Soviet and Russian secret services have long used France as a soft target for their activities. There were many ingredients for this in France, including a strong Communist Party. Now the far-right has plenty of influencers, Putins useful idiots who dont realise they are being used by Russia to peddle information, said de Bendern.

As France, like the rest of Europe, heads for a tough winter, with high energy prices aggravated by the war in Ukraine, Macron needs to keep his words and deeds on track, analysts warn.

The French presidents enduring patience with Putin, along with dissenting positions on NATO, have damaged France's credibility with eastern and northern Europeans, noted Michel Duclos, a former French ambassador to the UN now with the Paris-based Institut Montaigne. On the intellectual level, Frances leaders must acknowledge that, following its mad venture, Putins Russia will emerge weakened but also even more aggressive in its approach to Europe. It will retain considerable capacities to destabilise both, the countries it previously dominated in Central and, through economic and political pressures, Western Europe, Duclos wrote.

Clearly Macron has to do something about his messaging, said de Bendern. If the war ends in Ukrainian defeat which it will if it loses Western support sanctions wont be lifted and the parts of the French economy that are suffering because of the war wont suddenly recover. You dont reward a nuclear bully.Macron has to explain that even if the war ends, it doesnt mean sanctions against Russia will be lifted, said de Bendern.

Its a tough message that will need to be said without en mme temps hedging.

Read the rest here:

Macrons en mme temps on Putin leaves Frances reputation hanging in the mix - FRANCE 24 English

Ilya Ponomarev has long been a thorn in the side of Russian president Vladimir Putin.

From leading street protests over his re-election in 2012 to being the only MP to oppose Moscow's annexation of Crimea,Ponomarev's position is clear.

Only now it's more extreme, a consequence of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Exiled in Kyiv, the 47-year-old says he is a spokesman for the National Republican Army (NRA), an underground group that wants to violently overthrow the Russian leader.

Among others, the NRA claims to be behind the car bomb that killedDarya Dugina,the daughter of ultra-nationalist Alexander Dugin.

Obviously, the end game is regime change in Russia, Ponomarev told Euronews from the Ukrainian capital Kyiv.You need to destroy the system so it does not repeat itself. That can be done only violently. There is no other way because the people around Putin will fight.

However, experts have cast doubt on the existence of the NRA, saying there is little coordination of protests and attacks in Russia.

Russian-born Ponomarev, once a member of the Communist Party of Russia, served as an MP from 2007 to 2016.

Before being exiled due to his opposition to Russia's land grab of Crimea, he had worked withDmitry Medvedev, president from 2008-2012.

I saw Medvedev as a window of opportunity, and I still think that it was, but when Putin asked him to swap back again, he agreed, said Ponomarev, referring to Putin returning as president in 2012 after standing aside to avoid term-limit rules.I think that it was possible to reverse Russia's path if Medvedev had stayed, but it didnt happen and Russia continued on an irrevocable and irreversible path that we are seeing the consequences of now.

Granted Ukrainian citizenship in 2019,Ponomarevsays it became clearthat working within the Russian system cannot change anything.

After the outbreak of war, he launched a news outlet called February Morning, which aims to give a voice to Putin's critics.

Now he helpsthe NRA -- which he says consists of around 500 to 1,000 people and is diverse and decentralised to avoid infiltration -- with advice and assistance.

He also claims to be helping Ukraine and has connections to other partisan groups operating in Russia.

You know, the people who are criticising me [for not criticising Russia's leaders earlier and his links with Medvedev], they have done nothing radical, and they are doing nothing, saidPonomarev.

They have done nothing but wish. I have at least done everything possible to change the situation with all the tools that the system gave me.

Ponomarev says part of his strategy is to split the Russian elite, arguing Russia's oligarchs are almost only interested in money and being safe. As long as supporting Putin is safer than supporting change, nothing will happen, he adds.

Therefore he wants to make it unsafe for the Russian elite so that they will be ready to switch sides.

"They do not like what is happening with the war, but they are doing nothing because there is no real danger to their position," he said. "That needs to change.

The next step, addsPonomarev, is to make Russians feel they can hit the streets and protest.

After any revolution, he believes there is a need for a transition government, tasked with strengthening the rule of law and implementing reforms.

Corrupt politicians and civil servants in all layers of society will have to be removed and replaced, he adds.

He also thinks leaders of any revolution, such as himself, refrain from running in any democratic elections that may follow.

And I think that the people, like me, who are involved in the transition government should take an obligation, promising not to run after the transition period is over, says Ponomarev. I am definitely ready myself to make such an obligation.

Experts, however, have cast doubt over whether the NRA is a fantasy.

"I am not fully convinced that the National Republican Army exist," saidSergey Radchenko, an expert on Russia from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

"There are protests in Russia and attacks on recruitment offices and infrastructure, but I don't see much organisation to it.

"It makes me think that the National Republican Army is not a reality, but maybe fantasy.

"There are non-state groups operating around the world, but I don't see any evidence yet that it is the case in Russia.

"Everything is, of course, possible, but I haven't seen any evidence and it makes me suspicious.

"In absence of evidence, I am sceptical... I cannot rule out that they exist but it is not just true because Ponomarev says so.

"We have to be cautious and that is the whole point."

Continued here:

Ukraine war: Meet the Russian exile 'trying' to overthrow Vladimir Putin - Euronews

Less than 48 hours after the Kerch Bridge connecting Crimea with Russia proper was damaged by a powerful blast, Vladimir Putin retaliated against Ukraine. Russia fired close to 100 missiles at a variety of Ukrainian cities on October 10 and 11. The rockets hit an array of buildings, including residences and schools, killing at least 19 civilians and injuring more than 100.

On October 17, Russia launched new strikes on Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital, with kamikaze drones low-flying drones that swoop toward their target from the sky and blow up on impact. Early reports said that at least three people were killed and some 18 were wounded in the drone attack.

While the attacks from the past week knocked out power and water to Ukraines largest cities, the military value of the attacks was dubious at best. Civilian infrastructure has been the main target. Ukraines population seems ever more determined to resist Russia. Experts pointed out that Russia retains a scarce number of precision-guided missiles, and it seemed like a waste to use them on these kinds of targets. Looking ahead, the attacks may well have also created a permission structure for NATO to arm Ukraine with better air defenses. Oh, and there is also the whole blatantly violating the laws of war thing. Even India and China are trying to generate some separation from Russia.

So Russias missile attacks may have violated international law, alienated longstanding partners, hardened the determination of Ukraine and its allies, and expended scarce munitions without altering the situation on the battlefield. Why did Russia do it?

Trying to explain current Russian foreign policy behavior is complicated, because rational-actor stories have not proven to be a great guide to analyzing 2022. Many experts and policymakers predicted that Russia would not attack Ukraine because it would prove to be such a costly and risky action to take. Indeed, Putins initial decision to invade Ukraine seems like an example of what not to do in international relations. The fact that he did it, however, means we need alternative explanations for Russian behavior.

With constant often flawed comparisons now being made to the Cuban missile crisis, perhaps it is time to approach this question as Graham Allison, a longtime political scientist and sometime US government advisor now at Harvards Kennedy School of Government, did when he wrote Essence of Decision. That 1971 book provided a Rashomon-style explanation of the crisis, using bureaucratic and organizational approaches as well as the rational actor model the idea that countries can be simplified down to unitary strategic actors pursuing the national interest to explain US and Soviet behavior.

Consider the following an attempt to explain why Russia took this step from three different levels of analysis: the international, the domestic, and the psychological.

The perception of Russian power has been on the wane ever since Moscow failed to execute its initial invasion plan of capturing Kyiv in the first week.

Eight months into the war, Ukraine is now on the offensive. Their forces seem better armed, better trained, and better motivated, and most military analysts are predicting further Ukrainian territorial gains before the onset of winter. Russias partial mobilization looks like a logistical mess. Only four countries voted with Russia in the latest United Nations General Assembly vote condemning its attempted annexation of Ukrainian territory.

An underrated source of power in world politics is a reputation for effectively wielding power. This means Russia is in serious trouble.

What was supposed to be a lightning-fast decapitation of the Zelenskyy government has turned into a costly conflict with an opponent out-fighting and out-thinking Russians on the battlefield. Even before the recent strikes on civilians, Putin was forced to acknowledge that key partners like China and India had started making noises indicating dissatisfaction with the war.

With Russia distracted by its Ukraine quagmire, countries like Azerbaijan appear to be taking the opportunity to advance their interests against Russian allies. Even states more dependent on Russia are starting to show some independence. Kazakhstan has flatly rejected the legality of referenda annexing Ukrainian territory, while Kyrgyzstan canceled at the last minute Russian-led military exercises to be held on its soil. The attack on the Kerch Bridge was simply the latest symbolic blow to Russian power.

Given this context, it is easy to see why Russia felt the need to escalate the use of violence in the most vicious way possible. Russia very much wants to remind friends and foes alike that it still can project destructive power. And while bombing civilians seems to have minimal military value, Russia might believe it to be an effective signal that bolsters its nuclear threats. After all, the logic runs, if Russia demonstrates that it is unconcerned about the norms and laws governing the use of conventional force, that sends a message that it is likewise unconcerned about the norms and laws governing the use of nuclear weapons.

And the more credible Russias nuclear threat is, the more it can rely on that tool as a form of coercive bargaining.

Contrary to popular belief, Putin is not running a one-man regime. Even autocrats need to placate supporters among what political scientists call the selectorate the people or group who, in practice, select a states leader. In a democracy, the electorate is the selectorate; in a more authoritarian regime, the selectorate is smaller and murkier. Regardless of regime type, a ruler needs to command a winning coalition with the selectorate.

Who are the actors in Putins coalition? A recent Institute for the Study of War (ISW) analysis of Russias information space concluded that there were three key pillars of support for Putin: Russian milbloggers and war correspondents, former Russian or proxy officers and veterans, and some of the Russian siloviki people with meaningful power bases and forces of their own. Putin needs to retain the support of all three of these factions.

The reverses on the battlefield in the east and south of Ukraine cost Putin some support among his selectorate. According to the Washington Post, A member of Vladimir Putins inner circle has voiced disagreement directly to the Russian president in recent weeks over his handling of the war in Ukraine. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told the Post that was absolutely not true, even while acknowledging, There is disagreement over such moments. Some think we should act differently. But this is all part of the usual working process.

This jibes with the recent public criticisms by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Evgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization, about the way the war has been prosecuted. ISW reported similar discontent from nationalists and military bloggers.

As ISW writes, this dissension has a feedback effect that erodes Putins standing: Word of fractures within Putins inner circle have reached the hyper-patriotic and nationalist milblogger crowd, however, undermining the impression of strength and control that Putin has sought to portray throughout his reign.

Striking Ukrainian civilians with missiles makes sense for Putin within this domestic context. After the bridge attack, there were calls from Russian nationalists to escalate the conflict. They want the gloves to come off in the fight against Ukraine, advocating for ever more brutality. The rocket attacks against Ukrainian cities will placate Putins nationalist supporters for the time being, and allows his subordinates and surrogates to make the case on television that they are responding to reverses on the battlefield. Putins promotion this week of Gen. Sergei Surovikin, known as General Armageddon for his brutality in Syria, will also bolster his standing with nationalists.

While Putin might not be a dictator without constraints, he is far and away the most powerful decision-maker in Russia. US intelligence suggests that he is even giving orders directly to commanders in the theater of operations. Understanding how Putin thinks would go a long way toward explaining his recent actions in Ukraine.

Daniel Kahneman won a Nobel Prize for his research with Amos Tversky demonstrating that most humans do not make decisions based on rational choice, but rather use a collection of cognitive shortcuts known as prospect theory. A central tenet of prospect theory is that individuals will be risk-averse when they are winning, and risk-tolerant when they are losing. In other words, when someone faces a setback relative to the prior status quo, they are more willing to take risks in an effort to gamble for resurrection.

This seems to describe Putins behavior over the past few months. During the late spring and summer, as Russia was making incremental gains on the battlefield, Putin was content to use a combination of Wagner Group mercenaries and raw recruits from Donetsk and Luhansk, the Russian-held eastern regions of Ukraine, to replenish Russian forces.

After Ukraine started making advances in the east and south, however, Putin finally opted for riskier political actions. He announced a partial mobilization, formally announced the annexation of four Ukrainian regions, and amped up his nuclear threats. This did nothing to stop Ukrainian forces on the ground; in the days after annexation, Russia lost the key logistical city of Lyman, in Donetsk, and then suffered the attack on the Kerch Bridge. In this context, the attacks on Ukrainian cities earlier this month can be viewed as Putins attempt to gamble for resurrection.

Prospect theory applies to all individuals; what about Putins individual psychology? According to Michael Kofman, an analyst of the Russian military at CNA, a research and analysis organization, Putin is a master procrastinator. He delays making big decisions until the last minute, so often paints himself into corners. Or, as Kofman told Pucks Julia Ioffe last month, he procrastinates and procrastinates till the options go from bad to worse.

In all likelihood, Putin did not want to expend scarce ammunition bombarding Ukrainian cities. Faced with a deteriorating military and political situation, however, Putin probably felt as though he had little choice but to lash out.

What can we infer from these three different stories?

Weirdly, they suggest that the West should hope Russias actions are explained by Putins individual psychology. Both the international and domestic explanations suggest that Putin will double down on aggressive actions. At the global level, Russia keeps getting humiliated by UN General Assembly votes. At the domestic level, Putin will need to amp up the barbarism to maintain nationalist support as Russian fortunes in Ukraine continue to deteriorate.

Only Putins reputed procrastinating tendencies suggest a return to Russian lethargy in adapting to Ukrainian military successes. It would be ironic indeed if the greatest gift Russia can give Ukraine is Vladimir Putins torpor.

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics and co-director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

Update, October 17, 11 am: This story was originally published on October 15 and has been updated to include news of the latest strikes on Kyiv.

Read more:

Russias missile attacks on Ukrainian civilians show how Putin is thinking about the war - Vox.com

TERROR, CONSCRIPTS, COLD: As Russia continues to target Ukrainian power plants with Iranian-supplied drones, the outlines of Russian President Vladimir Putins strategy for the coming months become clearer.

After suffering humiliating setbacks on several fronts, Putin is rushing tens of thousands of poorly trained and ill-equipped conscripts into battle in a desperate attempt to blunt Ukraines counteroffensive operations while concentrating aerial attacks, mostly with so-called kamikaze drones, on Ukraines energy infrastructure with the goal of freezing the civilian population over the winter.

Since Oct 10, 30% of Ukraines power stations have been destroyed, causing massive blackouts across the country, tweeted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. No space left for negotiations with Putin's regime.

Zelensky said 10 regions of Ukraine were targeted yesterday, and in a video address, he again called on citizens to conserve electricity. Wherever possible, we are trying to speed up restoration work, he said. But now, just like in the previous days, the overall situation still requires a very conscious consumption of electricity and limiting the use of energy-consuming appliances during peak hours.

RUSSIAN ATTACKS HAVE DESTROYED 30% OF UKRAINIAN POWER STATIONS, ZELENSKY SAYS

A BATTLE OF WILLS: Putins hope is that by inflicting enough misery on Ukraine and sharply increasing energy prices for the rest of Europe he can break the will of the Ukrainian people and erode the support of their European allies.

I think obviously trying to inflict pain on the civilian society as well as try to have an impact on Ukrainian forces, but what we've seen so far is Ukraine being very resilient in their ability to get things like their power grids back up online quickly, said Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder, Pentagon press secretary.

While National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told CNN that this months attacks have been somewhat successful in knocking out power in many areas, he added, I think it's twofold. I think it's, one, truly to impact civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and make it harder for them to subsist, certainly make it harder for the Ukrainian armed forces to communicate and to move around and support themselves, but I also think it's an effort to terrorize the Ukrainian people, to make them fearful, to push them to capitulate.

WILL EUROPE HOLD? The United States has said it will support Ukraine for as long as it takes, but as Europeans face the prospect of having to choose between eating and heating, Putin is banking on their resolve weakening.

I'm not sure the target is Ukrainian morale. I think it's European morale, morale in Germany, morale in France and other countries, said former national security adviser John Bolton on CNN. Winter's coming. It's not at all clear they have enough energy to get through the winter, home heating needs and things like that, but especially their manufacturing and production needs.

We're all going into a recession. It looks like Europe's recession may be deeper. And if their factories aren't functioning, it'll be deeper still. And that will allow Putin to prey on European leaders who just want to turn the page now anyway, said Bolton. So that what he cannot win on the battlefield, he may win by breaking Europe's political results.

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IRON DOME FOR UKRAINE? Russias reliance on Iranian-made Shahed-136 suicide drones has prompted calls to provide Ukraine with more effective defenses against the slow, low-flying aircraft.

Israel has the premier system for countering rocket and artillery fire Iron Dome, which is said to have a 90% kill rate against rockets launched from the Gaza Strip toward Israel.

In an interview with CNN yesterday, former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said Ukraine has reached out to Israel about obtaining Iron Dome batteries to counter Iranian drones.

Definitely, I can confirm that. That was a request from Ukraine armed forces, said Poroshenko. We know that Israel has a special technology, how to fight with the Iranian drones. This technology can save the lives of hundreds of Ukrainians.

The U.S. is also looking at what short-range systems might be effective against the drone threat. We're going to continue to provide them air defense capabilities, said National Security Council spokesman John Kirby on Monday. I don't have anything to announce today or get ahead of the next shipment, but I can tell you that from short to medium range, we have been working closely to try to get them the kinds of capabilities that they need.

LOCKHEED MARTIN RAMPS UP HIMARS PRODUCTION: With the U.S. shipping nearly two dozen of its vaunted HIMARS launchers to Ukraine, the maker of the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System is planning to increase production from 60 to 96 units a year.

The announcement came in an earnings call from CEO Jim Taiclet, who was discussing Lockheed Martins third quarter results. Lockheed reported a profit of $1.8 billion on sales of $16.6 billion compared to $16 billion in the third quarter of 2021.

About six, seven months ago, when we saw what was beginning to happen in Eastern Europe, I went over to visit some of the senior officials in the Pentagon and basically took them to letter and said we're going to start spending on capacity for a few of these systems, Taiclet said on the call. On HIMARS specifically, we've already met with our long lead supply chain to plan for increasing production in 96 of these units a year.

Lockheed spent $65 million to speed up production in anticipation that the Pentagon will be buying more. That was without a contract or any other memo or whatnot, Taiclet said. We just went ahead and did that because we expected it to happen. So those parts are already being manufactured now.

The Pentagon has provided Ukraine with 20 HIMARS launchers as well as thousands of rounds of GPS-guided munitions from its own stocks and has pledged an additional 18 to be procured from Lockheed Martin.

MCCARTHY: NOT GOING TO WRITE A BLANK CHECK: House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) signaled yesterday that if Republicans gain control of Congress, billions in military assistance to Ukraine could be on the chopping block.

In an interview with Punchbowl News, McCarthy said the mood among Republicans is that with the problems facing the country, U.S. aid to Ukraine should not be boundless.

I think people are gonna be sitting in a recession and theyre not going to write a blank check to Ukraine. They just wont do it. Its not a free blank check. And then theres the things [the Biden administration] is not doing domestically, not doing the border, and people begin to weigh that. Ukraine is important, but at the same time, it cant be the only thing they do, and it cant be a blank check.

Punchbowl Newss Jake Sherman speculated, These kinds of comments could prompt the Biden administration to push for a full year of Ukraine aid during the lame duck, should Republicans win control of either chamber on Election Day. McCarthy may privately welcome this, in fact.

RETIRED ADMIRALS AND GENERALS FREE TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT: In response to a Washington Post report that more than 500 retired U.S. military personnel have taken lucrative jobs working for foreign governments, the Pentagon said that doesnt necessarily imply anything improper.

As private U.S. citizens, retired service members are certainly free to seek employment at their discretion, but certain standards do apply, said Pentagon press secretary Pat Ryder. Safeguarding national security and classified information, as well as preventing conflicts of interest, will always remain paramount to the Department of Defense.

The Washington Post report said 15 retired U.S. generals and admirals have worked as paid consultants for the Saudi Defense Ministry since 2016, including retired Marine Gen. James Jones, national security adviser to former President Barack Obama, and retired Army Gen. Keith Alexander, who led the National Security Agency under Obama and former President George W. Bush.

In addition to the limitations on foreign government employment that apply to all military retirees, all former DOD personnel are subject to a variety of post-government employment restrictions within law and regulations, said Ryder. For example, they remain bound by laws governing nondisclosure of any nonpublic government information. This includes classified information or information that they may have obtained through their federal employment or other information that may be protected by the Privacy Act.

FORMER BRITISH MILITARY PILOTS TRAINING PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, AND LONDON AND WASHINGTON MUST RESPOND

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WEDNESDAY | OCTOBER 19

7:45 a.m 11100 Johns Hopkins Rd., Laurel, Maryland National Defense Industrial Association Precision Strike Technology Symposium, with the theme "Integrated Precision Warfare in an Era of Major Power Conflict," with Navy Vice Adm. Carl Chebi, commander, Naval Air Systems Command https://www.ndia.org

10 a.m. Atlantic Council virtual discussion: "How will the U.S. Navy navigate an uncertain security environment?" with Adm. Michael Gilday, chief of naval operations https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/how-will-the-us-navy-navigate

11 a.m. Los Angeles, California Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, Los Angeles, forum: "Space Industry Days: Responsive to the Threat Accelerating Resilient Space Capabilities," with Army Lt. Gen. Daniel Karbler, commanding general of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command https://afcea-la.org/events/space-industry-days-2022/

11 a.m. Heritage Foundation virtual discussion: "The Freedom Agenda and America's Future," with former Vice President Mike Pence https://www.heritage.org/conservatism/event/the-freedom-agenda

11:30 a.m. 1700 Army Navy Dr., Arlington, Virginia Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association discussion: "From The Boardroom to The Battlefield: Operationalizing AI/ML (artificial intelligence/machine learning), with Gregory Little, deputy comptroller for enterprise data and business performance in the Office of the Defense Undersecretary; Patrick McCartney, lead of the Air Force Futures' AI Cross Functional Team; Alexander O'Toole, engineering lead at the Defense Department; Kristin Saling, director Army Human Resources Command's Innovation Cell; Brett Vaughan, chief AI officer at the Navy; and Brandi Vincent, reporter at DefenseScoop https://afceadc.swoogo.com/aiml2022

12:30 p.m. Axios virtual event: Cybersecurity Landscape Ahead of the Midterms, with former Rep. Will Hurd (R-TX); Suzanne Spaulding, senior adviser, homeland security, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Sam Sabin, Axios cybersecurity reporter; Alayna Treene, Axios congressional reporter; and Charley Snyder, head of cybersecurity policy, Google https://cybersecuritylandscape.splashthat.com

THURSDAY | OCTOBER 20

7:45 a.m. 11100 Johns Hopkins Rd., Laurel, Maryland National Defense Industrial Association Precision Strike Technology Symposium, with the theme "Integrated Precision Warfare in an Era of Major Power Conflict," with Brad Cardwell, program manager at the Missile Defense Agency. Register at https://www.ndia.org

10 a.m. Hudson Institute virtual book discussion: "China after Mao: The Rise of a Superpower," with author Frank Dikotter, chair professor of humanities at the University of Hong Kong https://www.hudson.org/events/2151-china-after-mao

12 p.m. Atlantic Council virtual discussion: "How the latest women-led protests in Iran might shape the country's trajectory," with Hadi Ghaemi, executive director of the Center for Human Rights in Iran; Golnaz Esfandiari, senior correspondent at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; Nader Hashemi, director of the University of Denver's Center for Middle East Studies; and Assal Rad, research director at the National Iranian American Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event

FRIDAY | OCTOBER 21

10 a.m. 1616 Rhode Island Ave. N.W. Center for Strategic and International Studies discussion: "Transatlantic Relations," focusing on the war in Ukraine and foreign policy priorities, with French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Catherine Colonna https://www.csis.org/events/discussing-transatlantic-relations

TUESDAY | OCTOBER 25

8:30 a.m. 1700 Army Navy Dr., Arlington, Virginia Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies first annual Spacepower Security Forum with Gen. David Thompson, vice chief of space operations; Lt. Gen. Stephen Whiting, commander, Space Operations Command; Air Commodore John Haly, air and space attache, Australian Defense Staff; Air Commodore Jeremy Attridge, U.K. air and space attache to the U.S., Derek Tournear, director, Space Development Agency; and retired Air Force Gen. Kevin Chilton, former commander, U.S. Strategic Command https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/event

I think people are gonna be sitting in a recession and theyre not going to write a blank check to Ukraine. They just wont do it.

House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-CA), in an interview with Punchbowl News, warning that military aid to Ukraine could be cut in a Republican Congress

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Putin's three-pronged strategy to survive the winter in Ukraine - Washington Examiner