Category Archives: Populism

Did you see the love hearts that the Bidens set out on the Whitehouse lawn for Valentines day, filled with messages to the American nation like Unity, Hope and Love? You donthave to be a master in semiotics to spot that these were designed to put some distance between the current and previous First Families.

Many in adland are also pretty happy to see the back of Trumps famously populist presidency. And theres a group with a particular reason to be cheerful those of us who believe in creative (not political) populism: that the most effective creativity speaks to the many rather than the few.

Thankfully for this school of creative thought, Biden is now being hailed as a populist, too (a progressive populist). And as the stigma around the P-word diminishes we can be loudly and proudly creatively populist without sounding like we want to Make America Great Again. Phew.

So what lessons can anyone looking to speak to mass audiences learn from these two strands of populism from Trump and Biden?

Their policy differences are less relevant to the daily life of brands. More revealing are their strategies for creating emotional engagement with their audiences.

Trump may have avoided impeachment this month, but it was clear from his rhetoric that were going to see a continuation of his signature strategy: the use of friction and division as the source of emotional engagement with his supporters.

Biden, meanwhile, is clearly adopting a different approach. From Amanda Gormans striking calls for unity in her inauguration poem The Hill We Climb, to the First Ladys folksy love letters on the lawn, he is aiming to move people through an appeal for togetherness.

But are these two opposing approaches, of friction and unity, both fair game for brands?

The 2021 Edelman Trust Barometer shows that business leaders, for the first time, enjoy greater levels of public trust than politicians do. And as we know from another American icon, Spider-Man, with great power, comes great responsibility. So, in a world struggling with polarisation, do businesses need to be firmly on the side of unity?

Some of the challenges of championing unity can be seen in Jeeps Super Bowl ad, The middle, starring blue-collar hero Bruce Springsteen. In its call for togetherness, the ad managed to inadvertently pull off the feat of being one of the most divisive of the night.

But can brands justify going the other way and actively playing to division and friction?

Abrasive creative is nothing new. From the ShakenVac song to the Go Compare singer, advertisers have long used friction to drive salience. But this approach, while unleashing unwelcome earworms and reducing brand likeability, is unlikely to endanger the fabric of society.

Others recognise their products themselves are divisive, from the sublime (step up Marmite) to the ridiculous (Andrexs Scrunch vs Fold, anyone?). But, if treated with a deft lightness of touch, this can be a playful way to engage both lovers and haters.

Some look to take on the category establishment. Theres an echo of Trumps swamp-draining bravado in BrewDogs self-styled punkish campaigns. But the worst one can say is that such strategies are at some point likely to prove growth-limiting. Its easier to play the scrappy outsider when you have sales of $300m per year than it is when you enjoy Carlsbergs $10bn.

Others directly enter the political fray. But no matter how satisfying it might be to tell a president to f**k off as Rebel Kitchen did, this is clearly a case of stooping to someone elses level, rather than following Michelle Obamas famous mantra When they go low, we go high.

Then we come to those who take a social stand, notably Nike in its Colin Kapaernick campaign. It bravely supported the right of black NFL players to take a knee in the face of Trumps condemnation of the practice. It was unapologetically provocative and political was it also irresponsibly divisive?

In a word, no. Theres an important distinction to make here. Campaigns like Nikes are not deliberately sowing differences. They dont suggest, as Trump so often does, that if you are different you are an inferior, second-class citizen. They are actually defending the right to be different. They dont demonise difference, they celebrate it.

And there are those that put this celebration of difference not just at the heart of a campaign, but at the heart of their brand. From Skodas celebration of those that are Driven by something different, to Apples iconic Think different and its current challenger Androids platform of Together, not the same.

This shows how brands can best treat the potentially toxic area of difference today. Not by glossing over it, like Bruce and Jeep. Not by resorting to name calling, like Rebel Kitchen. But by accepting and celebrating our differences whether playfully or powerfully.

We are all different. Its the one thing we all share. Difference unites us. And perhaps thats what the Bidens should have written in a love heart on the White House lawn this weekend.

Josh Bullmore is chief strategy officer at Leo Burnett

Photo: Alex Wong/Getty Images

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Brands have things to learn from both Trump and Biden's approach to populism - CampaignLive

Last Wednesday night, all three primetime Fox News shows began their shows with tributes to Rush Limbaugh, who had died earlier in the day. And well they should. Limbaugh, more than anyone, coarsened American political discourse, paved the way for the rise of conservative populism, and fed the rawness of the culture wars, which are the nightly fare offered by Tucker Carlson, Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham. EWTN host Raymond Arroyo made an appearance on Ingraham's show to praise the fallen icon.

Jonathan Chait, writing at New York magazine, captured the repugnant essence of Limbaugh's appeal:

Limbaugh oozed bile. He did not merely characterize his targets as misguided, or stupid, or even selfish. He rendered them for his audience as dehumanized targets of rage. He had special rage for feminist women, who were castrating harpies, and Black people, who were lazy, intellectually unqualified, and inherently criminal. The message he pounded home day after day was that minorities and women were seizing status and resources from white people and men, and that politics was a zero-sum struggle and the victory would go to whichever side fought more viciously.

The content and the style vied with each other for vulgarity, none of it bounded by a concern for truth and almost always with a view toward stoking the basest of human emotions.

When Ingraham speculated, as she did on the afternoon of Jan. 6, that the mob attacking the Capitol had turned violent because it had been infiltrated by Antifa, she was walking down a path that Limbaugh had marked. When Arroyo traffics in anti-immigrant rhetoric, as he did last Thursday night, he is singing from the Limbaugh hymnal. When the entire EWTN and Fox networks explain away former President Donald Trump's serial misogyny, their script was perfected by Limbaugh.

One of the grimmest ironies of these conservative populists is that they advocate the very economic policies that sustain the economic insecurities without which their paranoid politics would collapse. I always wonder if they know they are duping their followers.

There is no denying that Limbaugh had a certain genius, but originality was not a part of that genius. He publicized conspiracy theories about the Clintons the way Oliver Stone publicized conspiracy theories about the assassination of JFK. He demeaned Blacks the way Fr. Charles Coughlin demeaned Jews. He advocated for states' rights the way George Wallace and John Calhoun had advocated for states' rights. Limbaugh liked to bemoan others as thugs, but he and his pedigree damn near cornered the market on thuggery.

No one need have cared about Limbaugh's influence if that influence had been confined to the media. But Limbaugh's style and ideas were consequential, as he shifted the Republican Party away from traditional conservatism toward movement conservatism. Chait's observation about politics becoming a zero-sum game is spot-on: Limbaugh brought back a paranoid and Manichaean element that has manifested itself in American politics through the years.

In previous times, however, it had faltered: Joseph McCarthy wreaked great harm on our society and our polity, but his reign of terror was short and his misdeeds were balanced by traditional Republicans who still believed that politics was the art of the possible.

Why was Limbaugh successful where Coughlin and McCarthy had failed? In part, because his rise in shock jock radio coincided largely with the rise of the religious right in politics. In this great free country of ours, people can believe and worship as they wish. But bringing millions of voters who think dinosaurs walked the earth a few thousand years ago (until they failed to get a ticket on Noah's Ark and were wiped out by the great flood) into the political mainstream introduced a capacity for credulity without which it is hard to imagine Trump getting away with his lies about building a border wall and making Mexico pay for it. Or Sen. Mitch McConnell's backflip on confirming Supreme Court justices in an election year. Or the Texas Republican lies about the loss of power in their state being the result of windmills freezing.

The Enlightenment has its limits and its excesses to be sure. Still, if you spend an hour on YouTube listening to what is being said in many white evangelical pulpits, you will find yourself thinking H.L. Mencken's reporting on "The Monkey Trial" was not blinded by his undoubted anti-religious bigotry. Maybe he nailed it. Listen for another hour to some of those sermons, and you find yourself harboring Voltairean thoughts: "crasez l'infme!" (""Crush the infernal thing!")

Regrettably, the same can be said about far too many Catholic pulpits these days. Here's looking at you, Tyler, Texas?

Newt Gingrich, who led the Republican takeover of the House in 1994, acknowledged the party's debt to Limbaugh, naming him an honorary member of the caucus and inviting him to address the new GOP majority. As historian Heather Cox Richardson explained in one of her Letters from an American:

Limbaugh told them that, under House Speaker Newt Gingrich, the Republicans must "begin an emergency dismantling of the welfare system, which is shredding the social fabric," bankrupting the country, and "gutting the work ethic, educational performance, and moral discipline of the poor." Next, Congress should cut capital gains taxes, which would drive economic growth, create hundreds of thousands of jobs, and generate billions in federal revenue.

The conservative fascination with the "moral discipline of the poor" evidences their rank hypocrisy: Limbaugh had four wives and Gingrich is on his third, as is Trump. Rules for thee but not for me.

As for the capital gains tax cut, it did not actually create millions of jobs nor bring in new revenue; it furthered the income inequality that actually harmed the working-class men and women Limbaugh claimed to champion.

When Winston Churchill was asked to send a note to his predecessor, Stanley Baldwin, on the occasion of the latter's 80th birthday, the normally magnanimous Churchill declined, saying, "I wish Stanley Baldwin no ill, but it would have been much better had he never lived." I am not prepared to go that far about Limbaugh nor any man or woman. That said, it is a close call.

Limbaugh threw gasoline on the flames of the culture wars for 40 years, giving permission to millions of Americans to indulge the baser racist and misogynistic tendencies. Trumpism might not have existed without the Rev. Jerry Falwell and his Moral Majority's anti-feminist and anti-gay diatribes. It might not have existed without Pat Buchanan and his appeals to nativism and anti-Semitism. It might not have existed without Mitch McConnell's obstructionism, leading millions of Americans to believe government was broken and needed some kind of savior.

Limbaugh developed and exploited all these themes and more. He was the indispensable man in the creation of conservative populism, and the country is very much the worse for it.

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Limbaugh: The indispensable man in the forging of Trumpism - National Catholic Reporter

During the visit, Francis told Edith Bruck: 'I came to thank you for your witness and to pay homage to the people martyred by the craziness of Nazi populism.'

ROME, Italy Pope Francis on Saturday visited with a Holocaust survivor in her Rome apartment to pay tribute to all those who suffered from what he called the craziness of Nazi populism.

Francis surprised Romans strolling Saturday afternoon on a Rome street not far from the Spanish Steps when a Vatican sedan dropped him off outside the apartment building that is home to Edith Bruck, a Hungarian-born writer and poet.

Bruck, who is 88, survived life in Nazi-run death camps during World War II and later settled in Italy.

The Vatican said that during the hour-long visit, Francis told her: I came to thank you for your witness and to pay homage to the people martyred by the craziness of Nazi populism."

And with sincerity I repeat the words I pronounced from my heart at Yad Vashem, and that I repeat in front of every person who, like you, suffered so much because of this: Forgive, Lord, in the name of humanity,'" the pontiff told Bruck, according to the Vatican's account of the private meeting.

Francis was referring to his 2014 visit to the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial in Israel where he prayed and also kissed the hands of several survivors in a gesture of humility.

Vatican spokesman Matteo Bruni said the conversation between Francis and Bruck evoked the fears and the hopes for the times that we are living through, stressing the value of memory and the role of the elderly in cultivating it and transmitting it to the youngest."

Italian RAI state TV said the pope had wanted to meet with Bruck after reading an interview with her recently in the Vatican newspaper.

A day earlier, Italy's interior minister condemned attacks on social media leveled against another Holocaust survivor, Italian senator-for-life Liliana Segre. Prosecutors are investigating the invective and racist comments which followed the 90-year-old Segre's urging other older adults in Italy to follow her example and receive the COVID-19 vaccine.

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Pope Francis visits Holocaust survivor's home in Rome to thank her - KHOU.com

Rached Ghannouchi, Opinion contributor Published 6:00 a.m. ET Feb. 20, 2021

Speaker of Tunisias Parliament: Tunisia is still a democracy in the making, and after the economic damage of COVID, we need help.

Ten years ago, Tunisia made history when Tunisian youth decided to take their fate into their hands and ignited the revolution of freedom and dignity. Tunisia began a pioneering but challenging transition from authoritarian regime to democracy. Since then, Tunisia has become a beacon of hope for those who believe in Arab democracy, holding successive peaceful elections, establishing democratic institutions and enacting progressive social change.

Yet, despite this progress, we are witnessing the rise of regressive movements that invoke nostalgia for the old regime and seek to return to an authoritarian past of one-man rule rather than the pluralism and compromise of a democratic system. The reasons for this are manifold. First, much of our world, including the United States, is grappling with the rise of populism. Populists have a tendency to thrive in moments of economic crisis and social turmoil, both of which are plentiful in the current climate. Their dangerous narratives are built around an opposition between a virtuous homogenous group of people against a vilified "other" whether it be elites, minorities or any alternative viewpoint. In Tunisia it takes the form of attacking democratic institutions, elected officials and political parties, disrupting their work, and feeding the notion that complex and deep-rooted social and economic challenges can be addressed by returning to a more efficient strong man rule, or installing a benevolent dictator. Secondly, any revolution is followed by counter-revolutionary movements and discourses that seek to block and undo any progress achieved and preserve their own privileges and interests.

Tunisian democracy is still in the making. The riots in some Tunisian cities in recent weeks have highlighted just how much there is that is still to be done. The Tunisian people are frustrated at the slow progress of economic reform since 2011 and have yet to see the jobs and better living standards they rightly expect. Our progress has not kept up with peoples expectations. The revolution inspired huge expectations among us all, with little awareness of how complex change would be. Looking back to other modern transitions not so long ago, like those in Eastern Europe, we can see that it takes several decades to see benefits from difficult reforms. This explains how nostalgia for the past order is a common feature of all transitions.

Nevertheless, we can be proud of Tunisias remarkable achievements in the last 10 years. We have established new democratic institutions, resolved conflicts peacefully, set a culture of political inclusion, introduced protections for human rights, gender equality, rule of law and set new standards for state accountability and transparency. Tunisia has made unprecedented progress, placing it among the fastest democratic transitions in history. This is even more remarkable given that past transitions, such as Eastern Europes, took place in a more favourable regional and global climate for democracy and economic growth than Tunisia has faced.

Protesters on Jan. 26, 2021, in Tunis, Tunisia.(Photo: Hedi Ayari/AP)

However, the feelings of disenchantment are understandable and Tunisians continued demands for dignity and prosperity promised are entirely legitimate. Due to the COVID-19 crisis, unemployment has increased from 15% to18%in 2020. Over a third of small businesses are threatened with closure. The tourism sector, which represents 10% of Tunisian GDP and employs almost half a million people,is among the sectors most affected. The government has provided support to those affected by the repercussions of the pandemic and continues to strive to achieve a fine balance between protecting the lives of Tunisians and preserving their livelihoods.

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After decades of dictatorship, inequality and corruption, Tunisias economy is in need of deep-rooted reforms. We believe a stable government that has the support of the largest possible number of political parties and social partners has the best chance to to enact delayed but necessary reforms. What is urgently needed is to embrace once again the values that won Tunisia a Nobel Peace Prize in 2015 compromise and dialogue between political parties, trade unions, business leaders and civil society around a shared economic vision for the country. The coronavirus crisis creates even greater urgency for undertaking these reforms. In addition, agreement must be reached on reforming the electoral system to enable the emergence of majorities that can provide stable and accountable government for the people.

Tunisia cannot do this on its own. It needs support from its international partners who believe in democracy. The difficulties of our democratic transition must not engender a loss of faith in Tunisias democracy. We have crossed uncharted territory in our region, in the face of regional challenges and an unfavourable and volatile global environment. Tunisia needs to be supported as its success will send a message to all nations that democracy can prevail and is, as we believe, the best system of government for delivering freedom and dignity for all. The alternative to democracy in our region is not stability under dictatorship but rather chaos and intensified repression.

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Continued support for and belief in Tunisias transition to a strong and stable democracy is not just in the interest of Tunisians but for all our neighbors and partners. Despite all challenges, our democratic system has stood firm and, with the necessary commitment and support, will deliver the fruits of democracy that Tunisians have been awaiting.

Rached Ghannouchi is the speaker of Tunisias parliament, the Assembly of Peoples Representatives.

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After decades of dictatorship and corruption, Tunisia cannot thrive as a democracy on its own - USA TODAY

Populism, political program or movement that champions, or claims to champion, the common person, usually by favourable contrast with a real or perceived elite or establishment. Populism usually combines elements of the left and the right, opposing large business and financial interests but also frequently being hostile to established socialist and labour parties.

Campaign poster from the 1896 U.S. presidential election with the text of William Jennings Bryan's Cross of Gold speech, colour lithograph.

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history of Latin America: The advent of populism

The amorphous phenomenon of populism was another feature of the mid-20th-century political scene. Its consummate practitioner was Juan Pern...

The term populism can designate either democratic or authoritarian movements. Populism is typically critical of political representation and anything that mediates the relation between the people and their leader or government. In its most democratic form, populism seeks to defend the interests and maximize the power of ordinary citizens, through reform rather than revolution. In the United States the term was applied to the program of the Populist Movement, which gave rise to the Populist, or Peoples, Party in 1892. Many of the partys demands were later adopted as laws or constitutional amendments (e.g., a progressive tax system). The populist demand for direct democracy through popular initiatives and referenda also become a reality in a number of U.S. states.

In its contemporary understanding, however, populism is most often associated with an authoritarian form of politics. Populist politics, following this definition, revolves around a charismatic leader who appeals to and claims to embody the will of the people in order to consolidate his own power. In this personalized form of politics, political parties lose their importance, and elections serve to confirm the leaders authority rather than to reflect the different allegiances of the people. Some forms of authoritarian populism have been characterized by extreme nationalism, racism, conspiracy mongering, and scapegoating of marginalized groups, each of which served to consolidate the leaders power, to distract public attention from the leaders failures, or to conceal from the people the nature of the leaders rule or the real causes of economic or social problems. In the second half of the 20th century, populism came to be identified with the political style and program of Latin American leaders such as Juan Pern, Getlio Vargas, and Hugo Chvez. In the early 21st century, populist authoritarian regimes arose in Turkey, Poland, and Hungary, among other countries.

Juan Pern and his wife Eva in Buenos Aires on inauguration day (June 9, 1952) of his second term as president of Argentina.

The term populist is often used pejoratively to criticize a politician for pandering to a peoples fear and enthusiasm. Depending on ones view of populism, a populist economic program can therefore signify either a platform that promotes the interests of common citizens and the country as a whole or a platform that seeks to redistribute wealth to gain popularity, without regard to the consequences for the country such as inflation or debt.

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populism | History, Facts, & Examples | Britannica

Political philosophy that supports needs and desires of "the people" over those of "the powerful."

Populism refers to a range of political stances that emphasise the idea of "the people" and often juxtapose this group against "the elite". The term developed in the 19th century and has been applied to various politicians, parties, and movements since that time, although it has rarely been chosen as a self-description. Within political science and other social sciences, several different definitions of populism have been employed, with some scholars[by whom?] proposing that the term be rejected altogether.

A common framework for interpreting populism is known as the ideational approach: this defines populism as an ideology which presents "the people" as a morally good force and contrasts them against "the elite", who are portrayed as corrupt and self-serving. Populists differ in how "the people" are defined, but it can be based along class, ethnic, or national lines. Populists typically present "the elite" as comprising the political, economic, cultural, and media establishment, depicted as a homogeneous entity and accused of placing their own interests, and often the interests of other groupssuch as large corporations, foreign countries, or immigrantsabove the interests of "the people". Populist parties and social movements are often led by charismatic or dominant figures who present themselves as the "voice of the people". According to the ideational approach, populism is often combined with other ideologies, such as nationalism, liberalism, or socialism. Thus, populists can be found at different locations along the leftright political spectrum, and there exist both left-wing populism and right-wing populism.

Other scholars of the social sciences have defined the term populism differently. According to the popular agency definition used by some historians of United States history, populism refers to popular engagement of the population in political decision making. An approach associated with the political scientist Ernesto Laclau presents populism as an emancipatory social force through which marginalised groups challenge dominant power structures. Some economists have used the term in reference to governments which engage in substantial public spending financed by foreign loans, resulting in hyperinflation and emergency measures. In popular discoursewhere the term has often been used pejorativelyit has sometimes been used synonymously with demagogy, to describe politicians who present overly simplistic answers to complex questions in a highly emotional manner, or with opportunism, to characterise politicians who seek to please voters without rational consideration as to the best course of action.

The term populism came into use in the late 19th century alongside the promotion of democracy. In the United States, it was closely associated with the People's Party, while in the Russian Empire it was linked to the agrarian socialist Narodnik movement. In the 1960s the term became increasingly popular among social scientists in Western countries, and later in the 20th century it was applied to various political parties active in liberal democracies. In the 21st century, the term became increasingly common in political discourse, particularly in the Americas and Europe, to describe a range of left-wing, right-wing, and centrist groups that challenged the established parties.

Although frequently used by historians, social scientists, and political commentators, the term [populism] is exceptionally vague and refers in different contexts to a bewildering variety of phenomena.

Margaret Canovan on how the term populism was used, 1981

The word populism has become a contested term that has been used in reference to a diverse variety of movements and beliefs. The political scientist Will Brett characterised it as "a classic example of a stretched concept, pulled out of shape by overuse and misuse", while the political scientist Paul Taggart has said of populism that it is "one of the most widely used but poorly understood political concepts of our time".

The term originated as a form of self-designation, being used by members of the People's Party active in the United States during the late 19th century. In the Russian Empire during the same period, a group referred to itself as the narodniki, which has often been translated into English as populists. The Russian and American movements differed in various respects, and the fact that they shared a name was coincidental. In the 1920s, the term entered the French language, where it was used to describe a group of writers expressing sympathy for ordinary people. Following 2016, the year which saw the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States and the United Kingdom's vote to leave the European Unionboth events linked to populismthe word populism became one of the most widely used terms by international political commentators. In 2017, the Cambridge Dictionary declared it the Word of the Year.[10]

Although the term began as a self-designation, part of the confusion surrounding it stems from the fact that it has rarely been used in this way, with few political figures openly describing themselves as "populists". As noted by the political scientist Margaret Canovan, "there has been no self-conscious international populist movement which might have attempted to control or limit the term's reference, and as a result those who have used it have been able to attach it a wide variety of meanings." In this it differs from other political terms, like "socialism" or "conservatism", which have been widely used as self-designations by individuals who have then presented their own, internal definitions of the word. Instead it shares similarities with terms such as "far left", "far right", or "extremist", which are often used in political discourse but rarely as self-designations.

In popular discourse, the term "populism" has often been conflated with other concepts like demagoguery, and generally presented as something to be "feared and discredited". It has often been applied to movements that are considered to be outside the political mainstream or a threat to democracy. The political scientists Yves Mny and Yves Surel noted that "populism" had become "a catchword, particularly in the media, to designate the newborn political or social movements which challenge the entrenched values, rules and institutions of democratic orthodoxy." Typically, the term is usually used against others, often in a pejorative sense to discredit opponents. Some of those who have repeatedly been referred to as "populists" in a pejorative sense have subsequently embraced the term while seeking to shed it of negative connotations. The French far-right politician Jean-Marie Le Pen for instance was often accused of populism and eventually responded by stating that "Populism precisely is taking into account the people's opinion. Have people the right, in a democracy, to hold an opinion? If that is the case, then yes, I am a populist." Similarly, on being founded in 2003, the centre-left Lithuanian Labour Party declared: "we are and will be called populists."

Until the 1950s, use of the term populism remained restricted largely to historians studying the People's Party, but in 1954 the U.S. sociologist Edward Shils published an article proposing populism as a term to describe anti-elite trends in U.S. society more broadly. Following on from Shils' article, during the 1960s the term "populism" became increasingly popular among sociologists and other academics in the social sciences. In 1967 a Conference on Populism was held at the London School of Economics, the participants of which failed to agree on a clear, single definition. As a result of this scholarly interest, an academic field known as "populism studies" emerged. Interest in the subject grew rapidly: between 1950 and 1960 about 160 publications on populism appeared, while between 1990 and 2000 that number was over 1500. From 20002015, about 95 papers and books including the term "populism" were catalogued each year by Web of Science. In 2016, it grew to 266; in 2017, it was 488, and in 2018, it was 615.[25] Taggart argued that this academic interest was not consistent but appeared in "bursts" of research that reflected the political conditions of the time.

Canovan noted that "if the notion of populism did not exist, no social scientist would deliberately invent it; the term is far too ambiguous for that". From examining how the term "populism" had been used, she proposed that seven different types of populism could be discerned. Three of these were forms of "agrarian populism"; these included farmers' radicalism, peasant movements, and intellectual agrarian socialism. The other four were forms of "political populism", representing populist dictatorship, populist democracy, reactionary populism, and politicians' populism. She noted that these were "analytical constructs" and that "real-life examples may well overlap several categories", adding that no single political movement fitted into all seven categories. In this way, Canovan conceived of populism as a family of related concepts rather than as a single concept in itself.

The confusion surrounding the term has led some scholars to suggest that it should be abandoned by scholarship. In contrast to this view, the political scientists Cas Mudde and Cristbal Rovira Kaltwasser stated that "while the frustration is understandable, the term populism is too central to debates about politics from Europe to the Americas to simply do away with." Similarly, Canovan noted that the term "does have comparatively clear and definite meanings in a number of specialist areas" and that it "provides a pointer, however shaky, to an interesting and largely unexplored area of political and social experience". The political scientists Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell thought that "if carefully defined, the term 'populism' can be used profitably to help us understand and explain a wide array of political actors". The political scientist Ben Stanley noted that "although the meaning of the term has proven controversial in the literature, the persistence with which it has recurred suggests the existence at least of an ineliminable core: that is, that it refers to a distinct pattern of ideas.". Political scientist David Art argues that the concept of populism brings together disparate phenomena in an unhelpful manner, and ultimately obscures and legitimizes figures who are more comprehensively defined as nativists and authoritarians.[35]

Although academic definitions of populism have differed, most of them have focused on the idea that it should reference some form of relationship between "the people" and "the elite", and that it entailed taking an anti-establishment stance. Beyond that, different scholars have emphasised different features that they wish to use to define populism. These differences have occurred both within specific scholarly disciplines and among different disciplines, varying for instance among scholars focusing on different regions and different historical periods.

The ideational definition of populism used by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser

A common approach to defining populism is known as the ideational approach. This emphasises the notion that populism should be defined according to specific ideas which underlie it, as opposed to certain economic policies or leadership styles which populist politicians may display. In this definition, the term populism is applied to political groups and individuals who make appeals to "the people" and then contrast this group against "the elite".

Adopting this approach, Albertazzi and McDonnell define populism as an ideology that "pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous 'others' who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice". Similarly, the political scientist Carlos de la Torre defined populism as "a Manichean discourse that divides politics and society as the struggle between two irreconcilable and antagonistic camps: the people and the oligarchy or the power block."

In this understanding, note Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, "populism always involves a critique of the establishment and an adulation of the common people", and according to Ben Stanley, populism itself is a product of "an antagonistic relationship" between "the people" and "the elite", and is "latent wherever the possibility occurs for the emergence of such a dichotomy". The political scientist Manuel Anselmi proposed that populism be defined as featuring a "homogenous community-people" which "perceives itself as the absolute holder of popular sovereignty" and "expresses an anti-establishment attitude." This understanding conceives of populism as a discourse, ideology, or worldview. These definitions were initially employed largely in Western Europe, although later became increasingly popular in Eastern Europe and the Americas.

According to this approach, populism is viewed as a "thin ideology" or "thin-centred ideology" which on its own is seen as too insubstantial to provide a blueprint for societal change. It thus differs from the "thick-centred" or "full" ideologies such as fascism, liberalism, and socialism, which provide more far-reaching ideas about social transformation. As a thin-centred ideology, populism is therefore attached to a thick-ideology by populist politicians. Thus, populism can be found merged with forms of nationalism, liberalism, socialism, federalism, or conservatism. According to Stanley, "the thinness of populism ensures that in practice it is a complementary ideology: it does not so much overlap with as diffuse itself throughout full ideologies."

Populism is, according to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, "a kind of mental map through which individuals analyse and comprehend political reality".Mudde noted that populism is "moralistic rather than programmatic". It encourages a binary world-view in which everyone is divided into "friends and foes", with the latter being regarded not just as people who have "different priorities and values" but as being fundamentally "evil". In emphasising one's purity against the corruption and immorality of "the elite", from which "the people" must remain pure and untouched, populism prevents compromise between different groups.

As a result of the various different ideologies with which populism can be paired, the forms that populism can take vary widely. Populism itself cannot be positioned on the leftright political spectrum, and both right and left-wing populisms exist. Populist movements can also mix divisions between left and right, for instance by combining xenophobic attitudes commonly associated with the far-right with redistributive economic policies closer to those of the left.

The ideational definition of populism used by Ben Stanley

The ideologies with which populism can be paired can be contradictory, resulting in different forms of populism that can oppose each other. For instance, in Latin America during the 1990s, populism was often associated with politicians like Peru's Alberto Fujimori who promoted neoliberal economics, while in the 2000s it was instead associated with those like Venezuela's Hugo Chvez who promoted socialist programs. As well as populists of the left and right, populist figures like Italy's Beppe Grillo have been characterised as centrist and liberals, while groups like Turkey's Justice and Development Party have been described as combining populism with Islamism, and India's Bharatiya Janata Party has been seen as mixing populism with Hindu nationalism. Although populists of different ideological traditions can oppose each other, they can also form coalitions, as was seen in the Greek coalition government which brought together the left-wing populist Syriza and the right-wing populist Independent Greeks in 2015.

Adherents of the ideational definition have also drawn a distinction between left and right-wing populists. The latter are presented as juxtaposing "the people" against both "the elite" and an additional group who are also regarded as being separate from "the people" and whom "the elite" is seen to favour, such as immigrants, homosexuals, travellers, or communists.Populist leaders thus "come in many different shades and sizes" but, according to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, share one common element: "a carefully crafted image of the vox populi". Stanley expressed the view that although there are "certain family resemblances" that can be seen between populist groups and individuals, there was "no coherent tradition" unifying all of them.While many left-wing parties in the early 20th century presented themselves as the vanguard of the proletariat, by the early 21st century left-wing populists were presenting themselves as the "voice of the people" more widely. On the political right, populism is often combined with nationalism, with "the people" and "the nation" becoming fairly interchangeable categories in their discourse.Some political scientists have also argued that populism can be divided into "inclusionary" and "exclusionary" forms.

Populists (claim to) speak in the name of the 'oppressed people', and they want to emancipate them by making them aware of their oppression. However, they do not want to change their values or their 'way of life.' This is fundamentally different from, for example, the (early) socialists, who want(ed) to 'uplift the workers' by re-educating them, thereby liberating them from their 'false consciousness'. For populists, on the other hand, the consciousness of the people, generally referred to as common sense, is the basis of all good (politics).

Political scientist Cas Mudde

For populists, "the people" are presented as being homogeneous, and also virtuous. In simplifying the complexities of reality, the concept of "the people" is vague and flexible, with this plasticity benefitting populists who are thus able to "expand or contract" the concept "to suit the chosen criteria of inclusion or exclusion" at any given time. In employing the concept of "the people", populists can encourage a sense of shared identity among different groups within a society and facilitate their mobilisation toward a common cause. One of the ways that populists employ the understanding of "the people" is in the idea that "the people are sovereign", that in a democratic state governmental decisions should rest with the population and that if they are ignored then they might mobilise or revolt. This is the sense of "the people" employed in the late 19th century United States by the People's Party and which has also been used by later populist movements in that country.

A second way in which "the people" is conceived by populists combines a socioeconomic or class based category with one that refers to certain cultural traditions and popular values. The concept seeks to vindicate the dignity of a social group who regard themselves as being oppressed by a dominant "elite" who are accused of treating "the people's" values, judgements, and tastes with suspicion or contempt. A third use of "the people" by populists employs it as a synonym for "the nation", whether that national community be conceived in either ethnic or civic terms. In such a framework, all individuals regarded as being "native" to a particular state, either by birth or by ethnicity, could be considered part of "the people".

Left and right populists[] both regard representative democracy as being captivated by political elites and powerful interest groups. However, populists of the right tend to express envy for those low on the social ladder, identifying 'special interests' with ethnic or other minorities. Progressive populists, on the other hand, envy those high on the social ladder, identifying 'special interests' with powerful groups such as large corporations.

Political scientist Tjitske Akkerman

Populism typically entails "celebrating them as the people", in Stanley's words.The political scientist Paul Taggart proposed the term "the heartland" to better reflect what populists often mean in their rhetoric. According to Taggart, "the heartland" was the place "in which, in the populist imagination, a virtuous and unified population resides". Who this "heartland" is can vary between populists, even within the same country. For instance, in Britain, the centre-right Conservative Party conceived of "Middle England" as its heartland, while the far-right British National Party conceived of the "native British people" as its heartland.Mudde noted that for populists, "the people" "are neither real nor all-inclusive, but are in fact a mythical and constructed sub-set of the whole population". They are an imagined community, much like the imagined communities embraced and promoted by nationalists.

Populism often entails presenting "the people" as the underdog. Populists typically seek to reveal to "the people" how they are oppressed. In doing so, they do not seek to change "the people", but rather seek to preserve the latter's "way of life" as it presently exists, regarding it as a source of good. For populists, the way of life of "the people" is presented as being rooted in history and tradition and regarded as being conducive to public good. Although populist leaders often present themselves as representatives of "the people", they often come from elite strata in society; examples like Berlusconi, Fortuyn, and Haider were all well-connected to their country's political and economic elites.

Populism can also be subdivided into "inclusionary" and "exclusionary" forms, which differ in their conceptions of who "the people" are. Inclusionary populism tends to define "the people" more broadly, accepting and advocating for minority and marginalised groups, while exclusionary populism defines "the people" in a much stricter sense, generally being focused on a particular sociocultural group and antagonistic against minority groups. However, this is not exactly a pure dichotomy exclusive populists can still give voice to those who feel marginalised by the political status quo and include minorities if it is advantageous, while inclusive populists can vary significantly in how inclusive they actually are. In addition, all populisms are implicitly exclusionary, since they define "the people" against "the elite", thus some scholars argue that the difference between populisms is not whether a particular populism excludes but whom it excludes from its conception of "the people".[83][84][85]

Anti-elitism is widely considered the central characteristic feature of populism, although Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser argued that anti-elitism alone was not evidence of populism. Rather, according to Stanley, in populist discourse the "fundamental distinguishing feature" of "the elite" is that it is in an "adversarial relationship" with "the people". In defining "the elite", populists often condemn not only the political establishment, but also the economic elite, cultural elite, academic elite, and the media elite, which they present as one homogeneous, corrupt group. In early 21st century India, the populist Bharatiya Janata Party for instance accused the dominant Indian National Congress party, the Communist Party of India, NGOs, academia, and the English-language media of all being part of "the elite".

When operating in liberal democracies, populists often condemn dominant political parties as part of "the elite" but at the same time do not reject the party political system altogether, instead either calling for or claiming to be a new kind of party different from the others. Although condemning almost all those in positions of power within a given society, populists often exclude both themselves and those sympathetic to their cause even when they too are in positions of power. For instance, the Freedom Party of Austria (FP), a right-wing populist group, regularly condemned "the media" in Austria for defending "the elite", but excluded from that the Kronen Zeitung, a widely read tabloid that supported the FP and its leader Jrg Haider.

When populists take governmental power, they are faced with a challenge in that they now represent a new elite. In such caseslike Chvez in Venezuela and Vladimr Meiar in Slovakiapopulists retain their anti-establishment rhetoric by making changes to their concept of "the elite" to suit their new circumstances, alleging that real power is not held by the government but other powerful forces who continue to undermine the populist government and the will of "the people" itself. In these instances, populist governments often conceptualise "the elite" as those holding economic power. In Venezuela, for example, Chvez blamed the economic elite for frustrating his reforms, while in Greece, the left-wing populist Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras accused "the lobbyists and oligarchs of Greece" of undermining his administration. In populist instances like these, the claims made have some basis in reality, as business interests seek to undermine leftist-oriented economic reform.

Although left-wing populists who combine populist ideas with forms of socialism most commonly present "the elite" in economic terms, the same strategy is also employed by some right-wing populists. In the United States during the late 2000s, the Tea Party movementwhich presented itself as a defender of the capitalist free marketargued that big business, and its allies in Congress, seeks to undermine the free market and kill competition by stifling small business. Among some 21st century right-wing populists, "the elite" are presented as being political progressives committed to political correctness. The Dutch right-wing populist leader Pim Fortuyn referred to this as the "Church of the Left".

In some instances, particularly in Latin America and Africa, "the elites" are conceived not just in economic but also in ethnic terms, representing what political scientists have termed ethnopopulism. In Bolivia, for example, the left-wing populist leader Evo Morales juxtaposed the mestizo and indigenous "people" against an overwhelmingly European "elite", declaring that "We Indians [i.e. indigenous people] are Latin America's moral reserve". In the Bolivian case, this was not accompanied by a racially exclusionary approach, but with an attempt to build a pan-ethnic coalition which included European Bolivians against the largely European Bolivian elite. In South Africa, the populist Julius Malema has presented black South Africans as the "people" whom he claims to represent, calling for the expropriation of land owned by the white minority without compensation. In areas like Europe where nation-states are more ethnically homogenous, this ethnopopulist approach is rare given that the "people" and "elite" are typically of the same ethnicity.

For some populist leaders and movements, the term "the elite" also refers to an academic or intellectual establishment and, as such, entails scholars, intellectuals, experts, or organized science as a whole.[99] Such leaders and movements may criticise scientific knowledge as abstract, useless, and ideologically biased, and instead demand common sense, experiential knowledge, and practical solutions to be "true knowledge".[100] Examples of such a "science-related populism"[101] are British Conservative Party politician Michael Gove suggesting that the British people "have had enough of experts"[102] or US entrepreneur Peter Thiel praising common sense as an "incredible indictment of our elites".[103]

In various instances, populists claim that "the elite" is working against the interests of the country. In the European Union (EU), for instance, various populist groups allege that their national political elites put the interests of the EU itself over those of their own nation-states. Similarly, in Latin America populists often charge political elites with championing the interests of the United States over those of their own countries.

Another common tactic among populists, particularly in Europe, is the accusation that "the elites" place the interests of immigrants above those of the native population. The Zambian populist Michael Sata for instance adopted a xenophobic stance during his campaigns by focusing his criticism on the country's Asian minority, decrying Chinese and Indian ownership of businesses and mines. In India, the right-wing populist leader Narendra Modi rallied supporters against Muslim Bangladeshi migrants, promising to deport them. In instances where populists are also antisemitic (such as Jobbik in Hungary and Attack in Bulgaria) the elites are accused of favouring Israeli and wider Jewish interests above those of the national group. Antisemitic populists often accuse "the elite" of being made up of many Jews as well. When populists emphasise ethnicity as part of their discourse, "the elite" can sometimes be presented as "ethnic traitors".

A third component of the ideational approach to populism is the idea of the general will, or volont gnrale. An example of this populist understanding of the general will can be seen in Chvez's 2007 inaugural address, when he stated that "All individuals are subject to error and seduction, but not the people, which possesses to an eminent degree of consciousness of its own good and the measure of its independence. Because of that its judgement is pure, its will is strong, and none can corrupt or even threaten it." For populists, the general will of "the people" is something that should take precedence over the preferences of "the elite".

As noted by Stanley, the populist idea of the general will is connected to ideas of majoritarianism and authenticity. Highlighting how populists appeal to the ideals of "authenticity and ordinariness", he noted that what was most important to populists was "to appeal to the idea of an authentic people" and to cultivate the idea that they are the "genuine" representatives of "the people". In doing so they often emphasise their physical proximity to "the people" and their distance from "the elites".

In emphasising the general will, many populists share the critique of representative democratic government previously espoused by the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This approach regards representative governance as an aristocratic and elitist system in which a country's citizens are regarded as passive entities. Rather than choosing laws for themselves, these citizens are only mobilised for elections in which their only option is to select their representatives rather than taking a more direct role in legislation and governance. Populists often favour the use of direct democratic measures such as referendums and plebiscites. For this reason, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser suggested that "it can be argued that an elective affinity exists between populism and direct democracy", although Stanley cautioned that "support for direct democracy is not an essential attribute of populism."Populist notions of the "general will" and its links with populist leaders are usually based on the idea of "common sense".

Stanley noted that rather than being restricted purely to populists, appeals to "the people" had become "an unavoidable aspect of modern political practice", with elections and referendums predicated on the notion that "the people" decide the outcome. Thus, a critique of the ideational definition of populism is that it becomes too broad and can potentially apply to all political actors and movements. Responding to this critique, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser argued that the ideational definition did allow for a "non-populism" in the form of both elitism and pluralism.

Elitists share the populist binary division but reverse the associations. Whereas populists regard the elites as bad and the common people as good, elitists view "the people" as being vulgar, immoral, and dangerous and "the elites" as being morally, culturally, and intellectually superior. Elitists want politics to be largely or entirely an elite affair; somesuch as Spain's Francisco Franco and Chile's Augusto Pinochetreject democracy altogether, while otherslike Spain's Jos Ortega y Gasset and Austria's Joseph Schumpetersupport a limited model of democracy.

Pluralism differs from both elitism and populism by rejecting any dualist framework, instead viewing society as a broad array of overlapping social groups, each with their own ideas and interests. Pluralists argue that political power should not be held by any single groupwhether defined by their gender, ethnicity, economic status, or political party membershipand should instead be distributed. Pluralists encourage governance through compromise and consensus in order to reflect the interests of as many of these groups as possible. Unlike populists, pluralists do not believe that such a thing as a "general will" exists. Some politicians do not seek to demonise a social elite; for many conservatives for example, the social elite are regarded as the bulwark of the traditional social order, while for some liberals, the social elite are perceived as an enlightened legislative and administrative cadre.

The popular agency definition to populism uses the term in reference to a democratic way of life that is built on the popular engagement of the population in political activity. In this understanding, populism is usually perceived as a positive factor in the mobilisation of the populace to develop a communitarian form of democracy. This approach to the term is common among historians in the United States and those who have studied the late 19th century People's Party.

The Laclauan definition of populism, so called after the Argentinian political theorist Ernesto Laclau who developed it, uses the term in reference to what proponents regard as an emancipatory force that is the essence of politics. In this concept of populism, it is believed to mobilise excluded sectors of society against dominant elites and changing the status quo. Laclau's initial emphasis was on class antagonisms arising between different classes, although he later altered his perspective to claim that populist discourses could arise from any part of the socio-institutional structure. For Laclau, socialism was "the highest form of populism". His understandings of the topic derived in large part from his focus on politics in Latin America. This definition is popular among critics of liberal democracy and is widely used in critical studies and in studies of West European and Latin American politics. Harry C. Boyte for example defined populism as "a politics of civic agency" which "develops the power of 'the people' to shape their destiny", as examples citing both the Russian narodniks and the South African Black Consciousness Movement.

The socioeconomic definition of populism applies the term to what it regards as an irresponsible form of economic policy by which a government engages in a period of massive public spending financed by foreign loans, after which the country falls into hyperinflation and harsh economic adjustments are then imposed. This use of the term was used by economists like Rudiger Dornbusch and Jeffrey Sachs and was particularly popular among scholars of Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. Since that time, this definition continued to be used by some economists and journalists, particularly in the US, but was uncommon among other social sciences. This definition relies on focusing on socialist and other left-wing forms of populism; it does not apply to other groups commonly understood as populist which adopted right-wing stances on economic issues.

An additional framework has been described as the "political-strategic" approach. This applies the term populism to a political strategy in which a charismatic leader seeks to govern based on direct and unmediated connection with their followers. Kurt Weyland defined this conception of populism as "a political strategy through which a personalist leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers". This is a definition of the term that is popular among scholars of non-Western societies. By focusing on leadership, this concept of populism does not allow for the existence of populist parties or populist social movements; under this definition, for instance, the U.S. People's Party which first invented the term populism could not be considered populist. Mudde suggested that although the idea of a leader having direct access to "the people" was a common element among populists, it is best regarded as a feature which facilitates rather than defines populism.

In popular discourse, populism is sometimes used in a negative sense in reference to politics which involves promoting extremely simple solutions to complex problems in a highly emotional manner. Mudde suggested that this definition "seems to have instinctive value" but was difficult to employ empirically because almost all political groups engage in sloganeering and because it can be difficult to differentiate an argument made emotionally from one made rationally. Mudde thought that this phenomenon was better termed demagogy rather than populism. Another use of the term in popular discourse is to describe opportunistic policies designed to quickly please voters rather than deciding a more rational course of action. Examples of this would include a governing political party lowering taxes before an election or promising to provide things to the electorate which the state cannot afford to pay for. Mudde suggested that this phenomenon is better described as opportunism rather than populism.

The factors which make it more likely for individuals to support populist ideas are referred to as the demand-side of populism.[133] Various factors have been claimed to increase the demand for populism:

The modernisation losers thesis argues that certain aspects of transition to modernity has caused demand for populism.[134] Some arguments rely on the belief that the anomie which has followed industrialisation has resulting in a "dissolution, fragmentation and differentiation", weakening the traditional ties of civil society, and increasing individualization.[135] Populism offers a broad identity which gives sovereignty to the previously marginalized masses as 'the people'.[136]

The economic grievance thesis argues that economic factors, such as deindustrialisation, economic liberalisation, and deregulation, are causing the formation of a 'left-behind' precariat with low job security, high inequality, and wage stagnation who then support populism.[137] Some populist parties have offered welfare chauvinism in response to this.[137] However, the evidence is for this claim is mixed.[137] Some theories only focus on the effect of economic crises.[138]

The cultural backlash thesis argues that right-wing populism is reaction to the rise of postmaterialism in many developed countries, including the spread of feminism, multiculturalism, and environmentalism.[139] As such ideas and values have spread through societies, they have reached a 'tipping point' which has caused a reaction in the form of right-wing populism.[140] Some theories limit this argument to being a reaction to just the increase of ethnic diversity from immigration.[141] However, the empiric studies testing this theory have produced highly contradicting results.[142]

The length of time since a country has been democratized has also been linked to its potential for populist success. This is claimed to be because younger democracies have less established political parties and weaker liberal democratic norms.[143] For example, populist success in Eastern Europe has been linked to the legacy of communism.[144] However, this explanation suffers from the lack of success of populism in most post-communist countries.[145]

There are three forms of political mobilisation which populists have adopted: that of the populist leader, the populist political party, and the populist social movement. The reasons why voters are attracted to populists differ, but common catalysts for the rise of populists include dramatic economic decline or a systematic corruption scandal that damages established political parties. For instance, the Great Recession of 2007 and its impact on the economies of southern Europe was a catalyst for the rise of Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain, while the Mani pulite corruption scandal of the early 1990s played a significant part in the rise of the Italian populist Silvio Berlusconi. Another catalyst for the growth of populism is a widespread perception among voters that the political system is unresponsive to them. This can arise when elected governments introduce policies that are unpopular with their voters but which are implemented because they are considered to be "responsible" or imposed by supranational organisations; in Latin America, for example, many countries passed unpopular economic reforms under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank while in Europe, many countries in the European Union were pushed to implement unpopular economic austerity measures by the union's authorities. Decentralisation of political power is a very useful tool for populists to use to their benefit, this is because it allows them to speak more directly to the people which they seek to gain the attention and votes of.[150]

Populism is often associated with charismatic and dominant leaders, and the populist leader is, according to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, "the quintessential form of populist mobilization". These individuals campaign and attract support on the basis of their own personal appeal. Their supporters then develop a perceived personal connection with the leader. For these leaders, populist rhetoric allows them to claim that they have a direct relationship with "the people", and in many cases they claim to be a personification of "the people" themselves, presenting themselves as the vox populi or "voice of the people". Chavez for instance stated: "I demand absolute loyalty to me. I am not an individual, I am the people." Populist leaders can also present themselves as the saviour of the people because of their perceived unique talents and vision, and in doing so can claim to be making personal sacrifices for the good of the people. Because loyalty to the populist leader is thus seen as representing loyalty to the people, those who oppose the leader can be branded "enemies of the people".

The overwhelming majority of populist leaders have been men, although there have been various females occupying this role. Most of these female populist leaders gained positions of seniority through their connections to previously dominant men; Eva Pern was the wife of Juan Pern, Marine Le Pen the daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen, Keiko Fujimori the daughter of Alberto Fujimori, and Yingluck Shinawatra the sister of Thaksin Shinawatra.

Canovan noted that populists often used "colourful and undiplomatic language" to distinguish themselves from the governing elite. In Africa, several populist leaders have distinguished themselves by speaking in indigenous languages rather than either French or English. Populist leaders often present themselves as men of action rather than men of words, talking of the need for "bold action" and "common sense solutions" to issues which they call "crises". Male populist leaders often express themselves using simple and sometimes vulgar language in an attempt to present themselves as "the common man" or "one of the boys" to add to their populist appeal.

An example of this is Umberto Bossi, the leader of the right-wing populist Italian Lega Nord, who at rallies would state "the League has a hard-on" while putting his middle-finger up as a sign of disrespect to the government in Rome. Another recurring feature of male populist leaders is the emphasis that they place on their own virility. An example of this is the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who bragged about his bunga bunga sex parties and his ability to seduce young women. Among female populist leaders, it is more common for them to emphasise their role as a wife and mother. The US right-wing populist Sarah Palin for instance referred to herself as a "hockey mom" and a "mama grizzly", while Australian right-wing populist Pauline Hanson stated that "I care so passionately about this country, it's like I'm its mother. Australia is my home and the Australian people are my children."

Populist leaders typically portray themselves as outsiders who are separate from the "elite". Female populist leaders sometimes reference their gender as setting them apart from the dominant "old boys' club", while in Latin America a number of populists, such as Evo Morales and Alberto Fujimori, emphasised their non-white ethnic background to set them apart from the white-dominated elite. Other populists have used clothing to set them apart. In South Africa, the populist Julius Malema and members of his Economic Freedom Fighters attended parliament dressed as miners and workers to distinguish themselves from the other politicians wearing suits. In instances where wealthy business figures promote populist sentiments, such as Ross Perot, Thaksin Shinawatra, or Berlusconi, it can be difficult to present themselves as being outside the elite, however this is achieved by portraying themselves as being apart from the political, if not the economic elite, and portraying themselves as reluctant politicians.Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser noted that "in reality, most populist leaders are very much part of the national elite", typically being highly educated, upper-middle class, middle-aged males from the majority ethnicity.

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser suggested that "true outsiders" to the political system are rare, although cited instances like Venezuela's Chvez and Peru's Fujimori. More common is that they are "insider-outsiders", strongly connected to the inner circles of government but not having ever been part of it. The Dutch right-wing populist Geert Wilders had for example been a prominent back-bench MP for many years before launching his populist Party for Freedom, while in South Africa, Malema had been leader of the governing African National Congress (ANC) youth league until he was expelled, at which he launched his own populist movement. Only a few populist leaders are "insiders", individuals who have held leading roles in government prior to portraying themselves as populists. One example is Thaksin Shinawatra, who was twice deputy prime minister of Thailand before launching his own populist political party; another is Rafael Correa, who served as the Ecuadorean finance minister before launching a left-wing populist challenge.

Populist leaders are sometimes also characterised as strongmen orin Latin American countriesas caudillos. In a number of cases, such as Argentina's Pern or Venezuela's Chvez, these leaders have military backgrounds which contribute to their strongman image.Other populist leaders have also evoked the strongman image without having a military background; these include Italy's Berlusconi, Slovakia's Meiar, and Thailand's Thaksin Shinawatra.Populism and strongmen are not intrinsically connected, however; as stressed by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, "only a minority of strongmen are populists and only a minority of populists is a strongman". Rather than being populists, many strongmensuch as Spain's Francisco Francowere elitists who led authoritarian administrations.

In most cases, these populist leaders built a political organisation around themselves, typically a political party, although in many instances these remain dominated by the leader. These individuals often give a populist movement its political identity, as is seen with movements like Fortuynism in the Netherlands, Peronism in Argentina, Berlusconism in Italy and Chavismo in Venezuela. Populist mobilisation is not however always linked to a charismatic leadership. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser suggested that populist personalist leadership was more common in countries with a presidential system rather than a parliamentary one because these allow for the election of a single individual to the role of head of government without the need for an accompanying party. Examples where a populist leader has been elected to the presidency without an accompanying political party have included Peron in Argentina, Fujimori in Peru, and Correa in Ecuador.

A subset of populism which deals with the use of media by politicians is called "media populism".[178][179][180]

Populist leaders often use the media in order to mobilize their support.[181] In Latin America, there is a long tradition of using mass media as a way for charismatic leaders to directly communicate with the poorly educated masses, first by radio and then by television.[182] The former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had a weekly show called Al Presidente, which according to historian Enrique Krauze gave some Venezuelans "at least the appearance of contact with power, through his verbal and visual presence, which may be welcomed by people who have spent most of their lives being ignored."[183]

The media has also been argued to have helped populists in countries of other regions by giving exposure to the most controversial politicians for commercial reasons.[184] Donald Trump was claimed to have received $5 billion worth of free coverage during his 2016 campaign.[185] Tabloids are often stereotyped as presenting a platform for populist politics due to their tendency toward melodrama, infotainment, and conflict, and thus provide support for populist parties. Examples of this have been the support given by Kronen Zeitung to the Austrian Freedom Party and the Berlusconi-owned presses' support for Italy's National Alliance in the mid-1990s. Based on his analysis of Dutch and British media, Tjitske Akkerman however argued that tabloids were no more prone to populism than the quality press.

In the 21st century, populists have increasingly used social media to bypass the mainstream media and directly approach their target audiences. It has been claimed that while traditional media, acting as so-called gatekeepers, filter the messages that they broadcast through journalistic norms, social media permits a direct linkage from political actors to potential audiences.[189] It has been claimed that the use of Twitter helped Donald Trump win the US presidency,[190] while the same has been claimed regarding the use of YouTube by the Jair Bolsonaro presidential campaign.[191]

Populist leaders have been claimed to be more successful in presidential systems. This is because such systems give advantage to charismatic populist leaders, especially when institutionalized parties are weak.[192] This is especially the case in two-round systems, because outsiders who might not win most votes in the first round of voting might be able to so when faced against a mainstream candidate in the second round.[193] This has been claimed to be evident in the 1990 Peruvian general election won by Alberto Fujimori, who lost on the first round.[193] Furthermore, Juan Jos Linz has argued that the direct relationship between the president and the electorate fosters a populist perception of the president as representing the whole people and their opponents as resisting the popular will.[194]

Another form of mobilisation is through populist political parties.Populists are not generally opposed to political representation, but merely want their own representatives, those of "the people", in power. In various cases, non-populist political parties have transitioned into populist ones; the elitist Socialist Unity Party of Germany, a Marxist-Leninist group which governed East Germany, later transitioned after German re-unification into a populist party, The Left. In other instances, such as the Austrian FP and Swiss SVP, a non-populist party can have a populist faction which later takes control of the whole party.

In some examples where a political party has been dominated by a single charismatic leader, the latter's death has served to unite and strengthen the party, as with Argentina's Justicialist Party after Juan Pern's death in 1974, or the United Socialist Party of Venezuela after Chvez's death in 2013. In other cases, a populist party has seen one strong centralising leader replace another, as when Marine Le Pen replaced her father Jean-Marie as the leader of the National Front in 2011, or when Heinz-Christian Strache took over from Haider as chair of the Freedom Party of Austria in 2005.

Many populist parties achieve an electoral breakthrough but then fail to gain electoral persistence, with their success fading away at subsequent elections. In various cases, they are able to secure regional strongholds of support but with little support elsewhere in the country; the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZ) for instance gained national representation in the Austrian parliament solely because of its strong support in Carinthia. Similarly, the Belgian Vlaams Belang party has its stronghold in Antwerp, while the Swiss People's Party has its stronghold in Zurich.

An additional form is that of the populist social movement. Populist social movements are comparatively rare, as most social movements focus on a more restricted social identity or issue rather than identifying with "the people" more broadly. However, after the Great Recession of 2007 a number of populist social movements emerged, expressing public frustrations with national and international economic systems. These included the Occupy movement, which originated in the US and used the slogan "We are the 99%", and the Spanish Indignados movement, which employed the motto: "real democracy now we are not goods in the hands of politicians and bankers".

Few populist social movements survive for more than a few years, with most examples, like the Occupy movement, petering out after their initial growth. In some cases, the social movement fades away as a strong leader emerges from within it and moves into electoral politics. An example of this can be seen with the India Against Corruption social movement, from which emerged Arvind Kejriwal, who founded the Aam Aadmi Party ("Common Man Party"). Another is the Spanish Indignados movement which appeared in 2011 before spawning the Podemos party led by Pablo Iglesias Turrin. These populist social movements can exert a broader societal impact which results in populist politicians emerging to prominence; the Tea Party and Occupy movements that appeared in the U.S. during the late 2000s and early 2010s have been seen as an influence on the rise of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders as prominent figures in the mid-2010s.

Some populist leaders have sought to broaden their support by creating supporter groups within the country. Chavez, for instance, ordered the formation of Bolivarian Circles, Communal Councils, Urban Land Committees, and Technical Water Roundtables across Venezuela. These could improve political participation among poorer sectors of Venezuelan society, although also served as networks through which the state transferred resources to those neighbourhoods which produced high rates of support for Chavez government.

Populism is a flexible term as it can be seen to exist in both democracies as well as authoritarian regimes.[207] There have been intense debates about the relationship between populism and democracy. Some regard populism as being an intrinsic danger to democracy; others regard it as the only "true" form of democracy. Populists often present themselves as "true democrats". It could be argued that populism is democratic as it allows voters to remove governments they dont approve via the ballot box because voting is an essential value for a state to be considered a democracy.[210] Albertazzi and McDonnell stated that populism and democracy were "inextricably linked", the political scientist Manuel Anselmi described populism as being "deeply connected with democracy", and March suggested that populism represented a "critique of democracy, not an alternative to it". Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser write that "In a world that is dominated by democracy and liberalism, populism has essentially become an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism."

Populism can serve as a democratic corrective by contributing to the mobilisation of social groups who feel excluded from political decision making. It can also raise awareness among the socio-political elites of popular concerns in society, even if it makes the former uncomfortable. When some populists have taken powermost notably, Chvez in Venezuelathey have enhanced the use of direct democracy through the regular application of referendums. For this reason, some democratic politicians have argued that they need to become more populist: Ren Cuperus of the Dutch Labour Party for instance called for social democracy to become "more 'populist' in a leftist way" in order to engage with voters who felt left behind by cultural and technological change.

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser argued that "populism is essentially democratic, but at odds with liberal democracy," since populism is based on putting into effect "the will of the people". It is therefore majoritarian in nature, and opposed to the safeguarding of minority rights, which is a defining feature of liberal democracy. Populism also undermines the tenets of liberal democracy by rejecting notions of pluralism and the idea that anything, including constitutional limits, should constrain the "general will" of "the people". In this, populist governance can lead to what the liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill described as the "tyranny of the majority".

Populists tend to view democratic institutions as alienating, and in practice, populists operating in liberal democracies have often criticised the independent institutions designed to protect the fundamental rights of minorities, particularly the judiciary and the media. Berlusconi for instance criticised the Italian judiciary for defending the rights of communists. In countries like Hungary, Ecuador, and Venezuela, populist governments have curtailed the independent media. Minorities have often suffered as a result; in Europe in particular, ethnic minorities have had their rights undermined by populism, while in Latin America it is political opposition groups who have been undermined by populist governments. In several instancessuch as Orban in Hungarythe populist leader has set the country on a path of de-democratisation by changing the constitution to centralise increasing levels of power in the head of government. A December 2018 study of 46 populist leaders argued that populists, regardless of their position on the political spectrum, were more likely to damage democratic institutions, erode checks and balances on the executive branch, cause democratic backsliding and attack individual rights than non-populists.[225]

Even when not elected into office, populist parties can have an impact in shaping the national political agenda; in Western Europe, parties like the French National Front and Danish People's Party did not generally get more than 10 or 20% of the national vote, but mainstream parties shifted their own policies to meet the populist challenge.

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser suggested that to deflate the appeal of populism, those government figures found guilty of corruption need to be seen to face adequate punishment. They also argued that stronger rule of law and the elimination of systemic corruption were also important facets in preventing populist growth. They believed that mainstream politicians wishing to reduce the populist challenge should be more open about the restrictions of their power, noting that those who backed populist movements were often frustrated with the dishonesty of established politicians who "claim full agency when things go well and almost full lack of agency when things go wrong". They also suggested that the appeal of populism could be reduced by wider civic education in the values of liberal democracy and the relevance of pluralism. What Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser believed was ineffective was a full-frontal attack on the populists which presented "them" as "evil" or "foolish", for this strategy plays into the binary division that populists themselves employ. In their view, "the best way to deal with populism is to engageas difficult as it isin an open dialogue with populist actors and supporters" in order to "better understand the claims and grievances of the populist elites and masses and to develop liberal democratic responses to them".

In trying to win over populist supporters, and perhaps even some elites, liberal democrats should avoid both simplistic solutions that pander to "the people" and elitist discourses that dismiss the moral and intellectual competence of ordinary citizens both will only strengthen the populists. Most importantly, given that populism often asks the right questions but provides the wrong answers, the ultimate goal should be not just the destruction of populist supply, but also the weakening of populist demand. Only the latter will actually strengthen liberal democracy.

Political scientists Mudde and Rovira Kaltwaasser

Mainstream politicians have sometimes sought to co-operate or build alliances with populists. In the United States, for example, various Republican Party figures aligned themselves with the Tea Party movement, while in countries such as Finland and Austria populist parties have taken part in governing coalitions. In other instances, mainstream politicians have adopted elements of a populist political style while competing against populist opponents.[232] Various mainstream centrist figures, such as Hillary Clinton and Tony Blair, have argued that governments needed to restrict migration to hinder the appeal of right-wing populists utilising anti-immigrant sentiment in elections.[233][234]

A more common approach has been for mainstream parties to openly attack the populists and construct a cordon sanitaire to prevent them from gaining political office Once populists are in political office in liberal democracies, the judiciary can play a key role in blocking some of their more illiberal policies, as has been the case in Slovakia and Poland. The mainstream media can play an important role in blocking populist growth; in a country like Germany, the mainstream media is for instant resolutely anti-populist, opposing populist groups whether left or right.Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser noted that there was an "odd love-hate relationship between populist media and politicians, sharing a discourse but not a struggle". In certain countries, certain mainstream media outlets have supported populist groups; in Austria, the Kronen Zeitung played a prominent role in endorsing Haider, in the United Kingdom the Daily Express supported the UK Independence Party, while in the United States, Fox News gave much positive coverage and encouragement to the Tea Party movement. In some cases, when the populists have taken power, their political rivals have sought to violently overthrow them; this was seen in the 2002 Venezuelan coup d'tat attempt, when mainstream groups worked with sectors of the military to unseat Hugo Chvez's government.

Scholars have argued that populist elements have sometimes appeared in authoritarian movements.[237][238][239][240][241][242] The scholar Luke March argued that the populist Narodnik movement of late 19th-century Russia influenced the radical rejection on the constitutional limits of the state found in MarxismLeninism. Although the MarxistLeninist movement often used populist rhetoricin the 1960s, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union called itself the "party of the Soviet people"in practice its emphasis on an elite vanguard is anti-populist in basis.

The historian Roger Eatwell noted that although fascism and populism "differ notably ideologically", fascist politicians have "borrowed aspects of populist discourse and style". Some fascists have for instance used the terms "people" and "nation" synonymously. However, fascism generally distinguishes itself from populism by not recognising the democratic rights of the people or believing that they are capable of governing, instead maintaining that a vanguard should take charge. According to Eatwell, "major ideological differences [...] lie at the core" of fascism and populism, the former being anti-democratic and latter being rooted in democracy, "albeit not liberal democracy". The historian Peter Fritzsche nevertheless argued that populist movements active in Weimar Germany helped to facilitate the environment in which the fascist Nazi Party could rise to power. Fritzsche also noted that the Nazis utilised, "at least rhetorically", the "populist ideal of the people's community.

At the turn of the 21st century, the pink tide spreading over Latin America was "prone to populism and authoritarianism".[249] Chavez's Venezuela and Correa's Ecuador have both been characterised as having moved toward authoritarianism. Steven Levitsky and James Loxton,[250] as well as Ral Madrid,[251] stated that Venezuelan president Hugo Chvez and his regional allies used populism to achieve their dominance and later established authoritarian regimes when they were empowered. Such actions, Weyland argues, proves that "Populism, understood as a strategy for winning and exerting state power, inherently stands in tension with democracy and the value that it places upon pluralism, open debate, and fair competition".[252]

Although the term "populist" can be traced back to populares (courting the people) Senators in Ancient Rome, the first political movements emerged during the late nineteenth century. However, some of the movements that have been portrayed as progenitors of modern populism did not develop a truly populist ideology. It was only with the coming of Boulangism in France and the American People's Party, which was also known as the Populist Party, that the foundational forms of populism can fully be discerned. In particular, it was during this era that terms such as "people" and "popular sovereignty" became a major part of the vocabulary of insurgent political movements that courted mass support among an expanding electorate by claiming that they uniquely embodied their interests[.]

Political historian Roger Eatwell

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser argue that populism is a modern phenomenon. Eatwell noted that although the actual term populism parallels that of the Populares who were active in the Roman Republic, these and other pre-modern groups "did not develop a truly populist ideology." The origins of populism are often traced to the late nineteenth century, when movements calling themselves populist arose in both the United States and the Russian Empire. Populism has often been linked to the spread of democracy, both as an idea and as a framework for governance.

Conversely, the historian Barry S. Strauss argued that populism could also be seen in the ancient world, citing the examples of the fifth-century B.C. Athens and Populares, a political faction active in the Roman Republic from the second century BCE.[257] The historian Rachel Foxley argued that the Levellers of 17th-century England could also be labelled "populists", meaning that they believed "equal natural rights [...] must shape political life"[clarification needed] while the historian Peter Blickle linked populism to the Protestant Reformation.[259][260]

In the Russian Empire during the late 19th century, the narodnichestvo movement emerged, championing the cause of the empire's peasantry against the governing elites. The movement was unable to secure its objectives; however, it inspired other agrarian movements across eastern Europe in the early 20th century. Although the Russian movement was primarily a movement of the middle class and intellectuals "going to the people", in some respects their agrarian populism was similar to that of the U.S. People's Party, with both presenting small farmers (the peasantry in Europe) as the foundation of society and main source of societal morality. According to Eatwell, the narodniks "are often seen as the first populist movement".

In German-speaking Europe, the vlkisch movement has often been characterised as populist, with its exultation of the German people and its anti-elitist attacks on capitalism and Jews. In France, the Boulangist movement also utilised populist rhetoric and themes. In the early 20th century, adherents of both Marxism and Fascism flirted with populism, but both movements remained ultimately elitist, emphasising the idea of a small elite who should guide and govern society. Among Marxists, the emphasis on class struggle and the idea that the working classes are affected by false consciousness are also antithetical to populist ideas.

In the years following the Second World War, populism was largely absent from Europe, in part due to the domination of elitist Marxism-Leninism in Eastern Europe and a desire to emphasise moderation among many West European political parties. However, over the coming decades, a number of right-wing populist parties emerged throughout the continent. These were largely isolated and mostly reflected a conservative agricultural backlash against the centralisation and politicisation of the agricultural sector then occurring. These included Guglielmo Giannini's Common Man's Front in 1940s Italy, Pierre Poujade's Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans in late 1950s France, Hendrik Koekoek's Farmers' Party of the 1960s Netherlands, and Mogens Glistrup's Progress Party of 1970s Denmark. Between the late 1960s and the early 1980s there also came a concerted populist critique of society from Europe's New Left, including from the new social movements and from the early Green parties. However it was only in the late 1990s, according to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, that populism became "a relevant political force in Europe", one which could have a significant impact on mainstream politics.

Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc of the early 1990s, there was a rise in populism across much of Central and Eastern Europe. In the first multiparty elections in many of these countries, various parties portrayed themselves as representatives of "the people" against the "elite", representing the old governing Marxist-Leninist parties. The Czech Civic Forum party for instance campaigned on the slogan "Parties are for party members, Civic Forum is for everybody". Many populists in this region claimed that a "real" revolution had not occurred during the transition from Marxist-Leninist to liberal democratic governance in the early 1990s and that it was they who were campaigning for such a change. The collapse of Marxism-Leninism as a central force in socialist politics also led to a broader growth of left-wing populism across Europe, reflected in groups like the Dutch Socialist Party, Scottish Socialist Party, and German's The Left party. Since the late 1980s, populist experiences emerged in Spain around the figures of Jos Mara Ruiz Mateos, Jess Gil and Mario Conde, businessmen who entered politics chiefly to defend their personal economic interests, but by the turn of the millennium their proposals had proved to meet a limited support at the ballots at the national level.[272]

At the turn of the 21st century, populist rhetoric and movements became increasingly apparent in Western Europe. Populist rhetoric was often used by opposition parties. For example, in the 2001 electoral campaign, the Conservative Party leader William Hague accused Tony Blair's governing Labour Party government of representing "the condescending liberal elite". Hague repeatedly referring to it as "metropolitan", implying that it was out of touch with "the people", who in Conservative discourse are represented by "Middle England". Blair's government also employed populist rhetoric; in outlining legislation to curtail fox hunting on animal welfare grounds, it presented itself as championing the desires of the majority against the upper-classes who engaged in the sport. Blair's rhetoric has been characterised as the adoption of a populist style rather than the expression of an underlying populist ideology.

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Populism - Wikipedia

I. Definition

Populism is a kind of political philosophy, unusual in that it may (arguably) describe many more specific philosophies, right-wing, left-wing, and neither, including democracy, socialism, labor parties, libertarianism, and even some forms of fascism!

At its simplest, populism is the belief that government policies should be determined by the will of the masses, rather than any elite. Democracy is, arguably the closest philosophy to pure populism. However, populism has come to mean opposition, often revolutionary opposition, to the elite minority of citizens in any nation who have most of the economic or political power in a nation. Populist rhetoric normally casts the elite who rule as abusing the masses, trampling on their rights, and ignoring their voices. Populism is clearly opposed to aristocracy, plutocracy, and elitism.

While left-wing populists generally oppose the power of the wealthy, big business, capitalism, and religious authority, right-wing populists also claim to represent the common man in their opposition to what they see as a left-wing intellectual elite.

The word populism is derived from the Latin populus, meaning people.

Since populism is a label adopted by many political causes with different agendas, there may be many more kinds of populism than listed here; these are the main types recognized by current political theorists:

Agrarian populism: This refers to populist movements led by farmers and their allies, often labor unions, such as the earlier discussed populist party of 1890s America which opposed laws and policies seen as exploiting the labor of farmers and other workers to profit those in power.

Populist democracy: This refers to efforts to engage a higher proportion of the population more actively in the democratic process, such as through public referenda, and registering voters.

Reactionary populism: This describes extreme right-wing populism and is practically synonymous with the radical right. It is most associated with anti-immigration policies and extreme nationalism; Donald Trumps campaign was a perfect example. These sort of parties also have very strong followings in many European nations today.

Populist Socialism: Left-wing populism has often been associated with opposition to capitalism and support for communism or socialism. But this label is used mainly to refer to the socialist rebellions and revolutions of Latin America.

You might think nobody would admit to being anti-populist. However, there are compelling arguments against populism. The Chinese Communist Party, who are not the only anti-populists in the world, can serve to represent that position here. The CCP and its supporters today argue that the best people to make governmental policy decisions are the most intelligent, ambitious, well-trained, and dedicated to the chosen ideology of their nation (in this case Communism with Chinese characteristics as they call it). They point to Americas problem with not being able to accomplish reforms due to inter-party deadlocks. Supporters of the Chinese system argue that if populist democracyor even freedom of speechwere instituted in a nation like China, the results would be disastrous due the potential for demagogues to mobilize the population in dangerous directions. Most of Chinas educated population consider the Chinese masses too ignorant and gullible to be allowed to contribute to political decisions. China considers itself a democracy, just one in which only party members may vote, choosing among several candidates from the same party (the CCP). They believe that this method assures quality of leadership.

The idea that the common people are too ignorant, stupid, gullible, or small-minded to be granted political influence is hardly new or specific to China; some of the American founding fathers expressed similar beliefs. In a broader sense, it was usually part of the justification for the aristocracies of old; the aristocratic rulers of the past usually believed that they were better suited to wield power than common folk due to better breeding and education.

Other common arguments against populism are specific to right- versus left- wing varieties of populism. Each side may claim that the other does not truly represent the interests of the masses but are rather using the idea of populism to mobilize ignorant voters in favor candidates who really represent other interests, such as the affluent intellectual elite or the wealthy business elite.

Do you know what causes low voter turnout in America? Its the result of having the fate of our nation at stake. This began with the bitter presidential election of 1828, which pitted the education, cultivation, and puritan constraint of John Quincy Adams against the yahoo populism of Andrew Jackson, thereby deciding permanently whether America would become a shining city upon a hill or an overlighted strip mall along a highway.

Ozzy Ozbourne

This provocative quotation about populism comes from the infamous lead singer of the heavy metal band Black Sabbath. Osbourne argues that American democracy has always been ham-strung by an opposition between politicians representing the educated elite and those claiming to represent the uneducated masses, resulting in frustration among voters and low voter turn-out. He also implies that the populism is ultimately responsible for the low-brow culture of commercial materialism symbolized by American strip-malls.

As with fascism, the rise of Islamic totalitarianism has partly to do with its populist appeal to the class resentments of an economically oppressed population and to anger at political subordination and humiliation. Ellen Willis

Ellen Willis presents us with a cogent explanation for how very un-democratic movements can succeed through populist appeals. Willis description of how Islamic totalitarians have appealed to the masses could almost equally well describe the way the Russian and Chinese communist revolutions won the loyalty of the masses.

There have been populist movements throughout history, with the first populists in name being an unofficial faction of the Roman senate who believed in mobilizing the masses and used public referenda to bypass the Senateincluding Julius Caesar and Caesar Augustus.

Following Rome, the next upsurge in populism was the Reformation in Europe; enabling the common man to read the Bible and have a relationship with God were ideas populist in spirit; and some groups, such as the Anabaptists even proposed the foundation of populist theocratic societies. There were several populist rebellions or attempted revolutions based on protestant ideals in Germany and England during the 16th and 17th centuries.

The 18th century brought the well-known French and American revolutions, both presenting themselves as populist movements, although both were led by elite groups of affluent intellectuals. In fact, the first Populist Party in the United States, in the 1890s, consisted mainly of farmers, and labor groups, who felt that American capitalism was favoring a small affluent elite who were benefitting disproportionately from the labors of the common people. They were especially upset about the power of banks and railroad companies.

During the twentieth century, populism has been used to describe many very different movements and leaders, including Teddy Roosevelts Progressive Party, the McCarthyism of the 1950s, the populist socialist revolutions of Latin America, Huey P. Long, the Tea Party, Ralph Nader, Ross Perot, Bernie Sanders, and Donald Trump. Basically, populism has come to mean opposition to the elite and sticking up for the common man, and so is claimed by numerous politicians of diverse parties!

Populism is most directly opposed to elitism, the belief that some small group of people, usually the wealthiest or most educated, should have most of the power in a nation or organization. Populism promotes the power of the masses, who are never, of course, wealthy, and usually do not have equal access to the same degree of certified education as the elite. Elitists believe that the elite are the most capable of ruling well, while populists believe that the elite rule not for the good of the people, but merely for their own benefit, at great cost to everyone else.

Pop music has frequently been a vehicle for populist sentiments, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. Bob Marley has been one of the best loved musical spokesmen for empowerment of the common people, with lyrics like Get up, stand up for your rights! and One love, one people.

An extremely anti-populist philosophy is Ayn Rands objectivismone which seems to appeal to many young people. In this creative song by Rush, the forest is used as an analogy to society in order to argue against populist ideals.

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Populism: Examples and Definition | Philosophy Terms

byBILL WILSON|| The Republican partyis struggling to define itself, and the elephant in the room is populism. With corporate Democrats in the White House and an establishment GOP eager to return to defending corporations and policing the globe, is there a place for conservative populists?

One theory posits that conservative populism was a fleeting fad, championed by the charismatic larger than-life Donald Trump, and that it will fizzle without him. The theory is that the almost 75 million Americans who voted for Trump adopted his populist ideas on immigration, trade policy, and scaling down U.S. military operations overseas, more because they liked Trumps rhetoric and less because they held populist beliefs.

Now with Trump defeated, at least until the 2024 election cycle when he is cleared to run again, Democrats are speaking about unity and offering to work with Republicans who distance themselves from Trump. Corporate Republicans like Lindsey Graham, Mitt Romney, and John Kasich are promising Trump was a fluke who does not represent the party and distancing themselves rapidly from populism.

This narrative concludes that without Trump in the spotlight, conservative populists will lose interest, and make their way back to the corporate GOP, or perhaps back into political nonparticipation.

A related theory is that populism always belonged to the left, most notably to big-name progressives like Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders, and AOC. This theory posits that populism is relegated to the realm of Wall Street regulation, transfer payments, and infrastructure spending. It asserts that the natural manifestation of anti-elitist sentiment is progressive left-wing populism and the right has no real business drumming up populist sentiment.

Proponents of this narrative can point to the fact that it has historically been progressives who have been hammering away about the wealth gap and inequality for years. Now, with Biden-Harris in the White House and progressive voices like Warren and Sanders dragging the party leftward on economic issues, the GOP should stay in its place.

These topical arguments are extremely compelling to both parties, who are understandably looking forward to returning to their status-quo roles and activities.

DEMOCRATS WOULD LIKE TO RECOUP THE PRO-WORKING CLASS POPULIST IDENTITY (AND SEVERAL MIDWESTERN STATES), AND CORPORATIST REPUBLICANS SEEM ALL TOO HAPPY TO HAND POPULISM BACK TO THE LEFT AND RETURN TO FIGHTING DOMESTIC SPENDING AND EXPANDING THE MILITARY.

New York Timescolumnist Ross Douthats recent op-ed How Trump ate Populism sums up both arguments perfectly. Douthat argues that populism was a movement defined entirely by Trump, and that Trump,was defining, in his own selfish and demagogic way, what a conservative populism meant.

Reducing populism to its economic core Douthat argues that the right has never been successful at integrating working-class populist policies into its platform: the American right doesnt usually move leftward on economics in a thoughtful, coherent and sustainable way that the move is usually ad hoc, undercooked and cheerfully unprincipled, which makes it more likely to be abandoned once the party is out of power, treated as rubble instead of a foundation.

Douthat concludes that,over the next few years, this will have two likely implications for the rights sincere economic populists. First, they will watch the Biden administration poach issues that they once hoped to own, from big tax breaks for families to big spending on domestic infrastructure. Second, they will watch their party nominate self-proclaimed populists, in states like Ohio, Pennsylvania and Arkansas that should be the base for a working-class conservatism, who are just acolytes for the cult of Trumpwith a policy agenda condensed to owning the libs and dog whistling to the QAnoners.

There is a possibility, or perhaps a risk, that Douthats predictions for right-wing populism are correct. It is certainly a neat and tidy narrative: populism can be reduced to traditionally left-wing economic policies, and with a Democrat president and Democrat-controlled House and Senate, Democrats can easily charter a path as the real economic populists. Republicans, to remain relevant, will revert back to opposing Democrats, and the cycle will spin on.

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Where does this leave the working-class coalition of conservative populists who were Trumps strongest supporters?

The working-class blue-collar coalition that elected Trump based on his America first platform is not just going to disappear. Assuming these voters will quietly rejoin the corporatist GOP is optimistic, to say the least. Significant numbers of Trumps white-no college supporters in both 2016 and 2020 were political newcomers, disenfranchised Americans who chose to vote for Trump because he spoke directly to their needs. Trump remains extremely popular in polling withwhite no college, with men, with Midwesterners, and with middle income Americans.

The latest YouGov survey shows 37 percent of Americans think Trump should run again, and that number climbs to 44 percent among men and53 percent among white men without a college degree, though a substantial 49 percent of white menwitha college degree also support him running again. As with previous polling, middle-income Americans support Trumps next bid at the highest rate. Forty-seven percent of those making between $50K and $100K annually support Trump running again, compared to 31 percent of those making under $50K and 35 percent of those making over $100K.

Trumps support remains highest in the Midwest and South where 43 percent and 41 percent support him running again, compared to 32 percent in the West and 30 percent in the Northeast. What is more, 38 percent of Independents want Trump to run again, as do 27 percent of moderates. Thirty-six percent of Americans overall maintain that Biden did not legitimately win the election, and that climbs to 39 percent of men and 49 percent of white men without a degree, though 43 percent of white men with a degree feel this way too.

Of course, these numbers tell only the story of Trumps popularity, but do white working-class Americans lean populist on real issues? The answer appears to be, a lot do. The same YouGov survey shows widespread support among equal or larger shares of core Trump supporter groups for proposals including the $1.9 trillion COVID-19 aid package, and the $1400 stimulus checks. Sixty-four percent of Americans somewhat or strongly support the aid package, including 60 percent of men, 56 percent of white men without a degree, and 51 percent of white men with a degree. Note the breakdown there white menwithouta degree (core Trump supporters) support the stimulus bill at a higher rate than white menwitha degree. Not a surprise from an economic perspective, but somewhat of a shift from a political one.

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Support for the aid package is highest among the lowest income groups, with 73 percent of those making under $50K a year supporting it, compared to 57 percent of middle-income groups and 56% of higher income groups. It is supported by 32 percent of Republicans, 32 percent of conservatives, and 59 percent of Independents. The stimulus checks are supported by 79 percent of Americans, including 76 percent of men, and 73 percent of white men without a degree compared to 71 percent of white men with a degree. Strong support for the stimulus checks is highest in the Midwest, with 43 percent strongly approving of them and 80 percent net approving of them.

Most notably, 61 percent of Trump voters support the stimulus checks, as do 63 percent of Republicans, and 59 percent of conservatives.

Now, these are unprecedented economic times, with states shutting down entire sectors of the economy in response to the coronavirus, and rising Republican and conservative acceptance of increased government spending and aid could be more a sign of desperation than it is an ideological shift. However, the numbers are clear: increasing shares of Trumps core supporters are open to, and in fact supportive of, government solutions.

However, what analysts on both the left and right seem to miss is this

ECONOMICS IS ONLY ONE PIECE OF A MUCH MORE NUANCED SET OF PRIORITIES FOR CONSERVATIVE POPULISTS.

While populism has a core economic imperative, it also has a cultural one. Populists on the right are staunchly pro-American and anti-globalism. They dont want to merely benefit from wealth redistribution schemes or up infrastructure spending, although they are not as opposed to these ideas as the vigilant libertarian wing of the GOP.

What populists seek is for political leaders to put American citizens first and that is something the Biden administration, the Democrat Party, and the Establishment GOP, are not doing.

IF THERE IS A PLACE ON THE RIGHT FOR POPULISM IT IS IN THAT PRECISE AREA: OPPOSING GLOBALISM AND EMBRACING AN AMERICA FIRST SET OF PRIORITIES.

Populists want to reestablish a robust American manufacturing sector, and incentivize corporations to keep jobs inside the United States instead of offshoring, they want to cut foreign aid, reduce foreign intervention andbring American troops home.

Populists want to see politicians follow in Trumps footsteps and continue to restructure trade deals in the U.S.s favor. In 2020 Trump signed a new trade dealthat forced China to commit to buying an additional $200 billion worth of American goodsand services by 2021, while maintaining most of the tariffs he placed on $360 billion worth of Chinese goods. Populists want more of that kind of thinking.

Populists want to pull out of dubious international agreements like the Paris Climate Accord that punishes the U.S. while forcing taxpayers tosubsidize polluting countries like China and Indiajust to get them to participate.

Populists want to deport illegal aliens whose first act on American soil was to break the law, and they want to ensure a strong border and a legal immigration system. Populists want a robust police force, and they want to ensure the fundamental rights to life and property are protected.

Sure, maybe populists want to up teacher pay or weigh the pros of domestic spending projects now and again. But what many populists are looking for long-term is not necessarily a handout, but the removal of the vast number of anti-American policies stacked against the average citizen.

The core of conservative populism is putting America first, rejecting globalism, and restoring a nation where politicians work for the people. It is about much more than transfer payments or tax cuts.

WHAT LEFTWING POPULISTS FAIL TO UNDERSTAND IS THAT THEIR GLOBALIST PRIORITIES ARE ACTUALLY HURTING THE POPULISTS WHO SUPPORT THEM, AND THIS IS WHERE THE RIGHT CAN DIFFERENTIATE ITSELF WITH AN AMERICA-FIRST AGENDA.

If there is a place on the right for conservative populists, it is a place where they successfully differentiate themselves from the globalists and corporatists on the left and the right and demand a domestic agenda that puts the American people first.

(Via: Provided)

Bill Wilsonis the President of the Market Research Foundation and a former board member and former president of Americans for Limited Government. His column, reprinted with permission,originally appearedon the Market Research Foundation website.

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Guest Column: Is There A Place For Conservative Populism In America? - FITSNews

No doubt thanks to Donald Trump, Brexit, and a string of anti-establishment leaders and parties in Europe, Latin America and Asia, everyone seems to be talking about populism.

But populism is nothing new. Its long accompanied democratic politics, and its activity and success has experienced peaks and troughs. Right now were in a bit of a heyday for populism, and this is impacting the nature of politics in general. So its important we know what it means and how to recognise it.

Even among academics, populism has been difficult to define. This is partly because it has manifested in different ways during different times. While currently its most well-known cases are right-wing parties, leaders and movements, it can also be left-wing.

Theres academic debate on how to categorise the concept: is it an ideology, a style, a discourse, or a strategy? But across these debates, researchers tend to agree populism has two core principles:

it must claim to speak on behalf of ordinary people

these ordinary people must stand in opposition to an elite establishment which stops them from fulfilling their political preferences.

These two core principles are combined in different ways with different populist parties, leaders and movements. For example, left-wing populists conceptions of the people and the elite generally coalesce around socioeconomic grievances, whereas right-wing populists conceptions of those groups generally tend to focus on socio-cultural issues such as immigration.

The ambiguity of the terms the people and the elite mean the core principles of people-centrism and anti-elitism can be used for very different ends.

Read more: Populism's problems can be fixed by getting the public better-informed. And that's actually possible

Populism gets a bad name for a couple of reasons.

First, because many of the most prominent cases of populism have recently appeared on the radical right, it has often been conflated with authoritarianism and anti-immigration ideas. But these features are more to do with the ideology of the radical right than they are to do with populism itself.

Second, populists are disruptive. They position themselves as outsiders who are radically different and separate from the existing order. So they frequently advocate for a change to the status quo and may champion the need for urgent structural change, whether that is economic or cultural. They often do this by promoting a sense of crisis (whether true or not), and presenting themselves as having the solution to the crisis.

A current example of this process is Trumps southern border wall, where hes characterised the issue of illegal crossings on the southern border as a national emergency, despite, for example, more terrorist-related border crossings occurring on the northern, Canadian border and by air.

The fact populists often want to transform the status quo, ostensibly in the name of the people, means they can appear threatening to the democratic norms and societal customs many people value.

And the very construction of the people plays a large part in populists being perceived as bad, because it ostracises portions of society that dont fit in with this group.

Read more: Perspectives on migrants distorted by politics of prejudice

The most famous contemporary example of a populist leader is the president of the United States, Donald Trump, and the renewed interest in populism is partly due to his 2016 electoral success. One way researchers measure populism, and consequently determine whether a leader or party is populist, is through measuring language.

Research has found Trumps rhetoric during the campaign was highly populist. He targeted political elites, drawing on the core populist feature of anti-elitism and frequently used people-centric language, with a strong use of collective pronouns of our and we.

He combined this populist language with his radical right ideology, putting forward policies such as America First foreign policy, his proposed wall between the US and Mexico, and protectionist and anti-globalisation economic policies.

The combination of populism and such policies allowed him to draw a distinction between the people and those outside that group (Muslims, Mexicans), emphasising the superiority of the former.

These policies also allow for the critiquing of the elite establishments preference for globalisation, free trade and more liberal immigration policies. His use of the drain the swamp slogan - where hes claiming hell rid Washington of elites who are out of touch with regular Americans - also reflects this.

Along with Trump, Brexit has also come to exemplify contemporary populism, because of its European Union-centred anti-elitism and the very nature of the referendum acting as an expression of the peoples will.

In South America, populism has been most associated with the left. The late Hugo Chavez, former president of Venezuela, was also highly populist in his rhetoric, and is perhaps the most famous example of a left-wing populist leader.

Chavezs populism was centred around socioeconomic issues. Even while governing, he positioned himself as an anti-establishment politician, channelling the countrys oil revenues into social programs with the aim of distributing wealth among the Venezuelan people, relieving poverty and promoting food security.

Read more: Venezuela is fast becoming a 'mafia state': here's what you need to know

The current Mexican president, Andrs Manuel Lpez Obrador, and the Bolivian president, Evo Morales are also considered left-wing populist leaders.

But left-wing populism is not just confined to South America. In Europe, contemporary examples of left-wing populist parties include the Spanish Podemos and the Greek Syriza. These parties enjoyed success in the aftermath of the Great Recession. They questioned the legitimacy of unregulated capitalism and advocated structural economic changes to alleviate the consequences of the recession on their people.

It doesnt look like populism is going anywhere. So its important to know how to recognise it, and to understand how its presence can shape our democracies, for better or worse.

See more here:

What actually is populism? And why does it have a bad ...

The governors of New York and California the most populous states led by Democrats now symbolize the fact that slick liberal images are no substitute for genuinely progressive priorities.

After 10 years as New York's governor, Andrew Cuomo is facing an uproar over revelations that his administration intentionally and drastically undercounted the deaths from COVID in nursing homes. Meanwhile, in California, the once-bright political glow of Gavin Newsom has dimmed, in large part because of personally hypocriticalelitismand a zig-zag "middle ground" approach to public-health safeguards during the pandemic, unduly deferring to business interests.

The political circumstances differ: Cuomo has beenin conflictwith New York progressivesfor many yearsover key policy matters, whereas Newsom was somewhat of a golden boy for Golden State progressives if they didn't look too closely at his corporate-friendly policies. But some underlying patterns are similar.

Both Cuomo and Newsom know how to talk progressive, but they're corporate Democrats to the core. On many issues in the state legislature, Cuomo has ended up aligning himself with Republican lawmakersto thwart progressive initiatives. In California, where a right-wing petition drive islikelyto force Newsom into a recall election, the governor's moderate record is hardly cause for the state's huge number of left-leaning voters to be enthusiastic about him.

Anyone who thinks that the current Cuomo scandal about nursing-home deaths is a recent one-off problem, rather than reflecting a deep-seated corporate orientation, should take a look at investigative reporting by David Sirota that appeared nine months ago under the headline "Cuomo Gave Immunity to Nursing Home Execs After Big Donations Now People Are Dying." Sirota wrote:

As Gov. Andrew Cuomo faced a spirited challenge in his bid to win New York's 2018 Democratic primary, his political apparatus got a last-minute boost: a powerful health care industry group suddenly poured more than $1 million into a Democratic committeebackinghis campaign. Less than two years after that flood of cash from the Greater New York Hospital Association, Cuomo signed legislation last month quietly shielding hospital and nursing-home executives from the threat of lawsuits stemming from the coronavirus outbreak. The provision, inserted into an annual budget bill by Cuomo's aides, created one of the nation's most explicit immunity protections for health care industry officials, according to legal experts.

On the other side of the continent, Newsom is second to none in sounding the alarm about climate change and the need to move away from fossil fuels. ButNewsweekreportsthat during his first two years as governor, Newsom's administration "approved more than8,000 oil and gas permitson state lands." Hecontinuesto issuemany fracking permits. (As theWall Street Journalnoteddays ago, fracking is now "the source of most oil and gas produced in the U.S.")

Newsom's immediate predecessor in Sacramento, Jerry Brown, became fond of crowing that he governed the way a person would steer a canoe, paddling sometimes on the left and sometimes on the right. The metaphor did not answer the question of where the boat was headed.

It may be relevant that Cuomo and Newsom grew up in the nurturing shadow of extraordinary privilege, making them ill-positioned to see much beyond the comfortable bubbles surrounding them.

Andrew Cuomo's father Mario was New York's governor for three terms. At age 35, the younger Cuomo was appointed to be assistant secretary of Housing and Urban Development by President Bill Clinton, who promoted him to HUD secretary four years later. Such powerful backers propelled him toward the governor's mansion in Albany.

From the outset, Newsom has been enmeshed with power. As longtime California journalist Dan Walters recentlypointed out, "Gov. Gavin Newsom wasn't born to wealth and privilege but as a youngster he was enveloped in it as the surrogate son of billionaire Gordon Getty. Later, Getty's personal trust fund managed by Newsom's father provided initial financing for business ventures that made Newsom wealthy enough to segue into a political career as a protg of San Francisco's fabled political mastermind, Willie Brown."

It's possible to transcend such pampered upbringings Franklin Delano Roosevelt certainly did but failures to show credible concern for the working class and serve their interests have put both Cuomo and Newsom in today's political pickles.

Like all politicians, Cuomo and Newsom are expendable as far as the corporate system is concerned. If their individual brands lose appeal, plenty of other corporate-power servants are eagerly available.

When elected officials like those twofade, the solution is not to find like-minded replacements with unsullied images. The problem isn't the brand, it's the quality of the political product.

But it doesn't have to be this way. And some trends are encouraging.

Genuine progressive populism insisting that government should strive to meet widespread social needs rather than serve the special interests of the wealthy and corporate elites is threatening to disrupt the complacency of mainline Democratic leaders who have long coasted on merely being better than Republicans.

More than ever, many entrenched Democrats are worried aboutprimary challengesfrom the left. Such fears areall to the good. Progressive activism and shifts in public opinion have strengthened movements that are recruiting, supporting and sometimes electing candidates who offer far better alternatives.

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Cuomo and Newsom symbolize corporate Democrat rot and the need for progressive populism - Salon