Category Archives: Populism

But as one character says to another: Why are you so afraid of the word fascism? Might not be so bad, with all of the lazy bums we got panhandling relief nowadays and living on my income tax and yours. Not so worse to have a real Strong Man, like Hitler or Mussolini and have em really run the country and make it efficient and prosperous again.

All of which might or might not be echoed in todays politics. Again, you can decide for yourself.

Yet while we think about such questions, we also should ponder how we arrived at this place, and why Trump still holds sway over the Republican Party. In truth, such de-evolution does not happen in a vacuum. It takes decades to develop, and the Despotism film offers a suggestion: If a communitys economic distribution becomes slanted, its middle-income groups grow smaller and despotism stands a better chance to gain a foothold.

Last year, I asked a former professor of mine, Peter Hayes, about why fascism is often being excused as populism, not only in this country but in other democracies. Its a globalizing world with complicated problems that can only be handled, if at all, by collective, international responses, which are hard to devise and understand, Hayes wrote in an email. Retreating into a fortress mentality is simply easier, and hating complexity and the people who seem to cause it feels good to many people.

Which helps explain why the United States is where it is now. Which helps explain why many Republicans have avoided the opportunity to move beyond Trump as their partys standard bearer.

That is fine; that is their choice. But we were warned about the dangers many years ago.

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Jayne: Yes, it can happen here - The Columbian

William Shakespeare once famously described the world as a stage, where men and women are merely players, each having "their exits and their entrances". It's the perfect analogy for Philippine politics today, particularly as business-as-usual drama is about to reach its crescendo ahead of next year's presidential election.

Throughout its centuries-long existence, the Philippines has been tossed among rapacious empires and self-serving elites. But it has not seen a leader quite like Rodrigo Duterte. For the past five years, the president has run the country like a personal fiefdom, dictating the course of politics and public discourse.

However, the Covid-19 pandemic, which triggered five quarters of recession and the deepest economic crisis in the country's modern history, has left the government exposed. As a result, a growing number of Filipinos are looking for alternatives, seeking competent leadership and a clear map for post-pandemic recovery.

Mr Duterte is entering his twilight months in power with rapidly declining approval ratings. Populist politics, nevertheless, continues to be a major force in the Philippines. Thus, almost all of his potential successors are presenting themselves as amalgams of technocratic competence and anti-establishment populism. Chief among them is the young and charismatic mayor of Manila, Francisco "Isko" Moreno, who is positioning himself as a kind of "Macron of the Philippines" referring to French President Emmanuel Macron wrapping proactive governance in populist rhetoric inside a broadly centrist political agenda.

More from Richard Javad Heydarian

This formulation is an outcome Mr Duterte's impact on the political landscape. A consummate politician with inscrutable charisma, the incumbent leader has faced a number of crises without losing his grip on the imagination of millions of Filipinos.

His political success is underpinned by a phenomenon called "performative populism", which involves mobilising a range of evocative symbols, powerful images and emotionally driven rhetoric, which collectively create an impression of decisive and sincere leadership. A public relations machinery powered by an engaging disinformation campaign and a set of pro-Duterte social media influencers and bloggers with immense reach has proven helpful.

It's precisely Mr Duterte's flair for the dramatic that explains the rollercoaster drama ahead of the 2022 presidential election.

In early November, the Davao City mayor and presidential daughter, Sara Duterte, toyed with the idea of running for the presidency, which would have placed her on a collision course with former senator Ferdinand Marcos Jr, the namesake son of the former Filipino strongman. Ms Sara eventually settled for a vice-presidential run in tandem with the ascendant Mr Marcos. Unwilling to cede initiative, Mr Duterte threatened to run for the vice-presidency against his own daughter, only to drop the idea days later.

But while the dramatic turn of events captured public imagination, it's unlikely to indefinitely distract voters from the pandemic-led impoverishment throughout the country. All the key global rankings, from Nikkei Asia's Covid-19 Recovery Index to Bloombergs Resilience Index, have shown that, under Mr Duterte, the Philippines is among the world's laggards in pandemic management.

The Philippines has seen few leaders like President Rodrigo Duterte. AP Photo

Be that as it may, both Ms Sara and Mr Marcos have consistently topped surveys of potential contenders for the presidency, while relishing a nationwide network of supporters and massive electoral machines.

Yet, the heirs of two of the most influential Filipino political families are far from invincible. If anything, both "establishment candidates" are vulnerable to public backlash amid a prolonged economic crisis, which has wiped out a decade of developmental gains and driven millions of Filipinos into precarious employment conditions for years to come.

And yet, there is little indication that the public wants a reversion to a liberal-reformist past. Throughout the past decade, surveys have consistently shown a preference for decisive leaders, who can swiftly and effectively deliver public services. Surveys show that only about 15 per cent of Filipinos are committed to liberal democratic politics, meaning that the vast majority is possibly open to more populist, if not authoritarian, leaders.

This should come as no surprise. As the leading political scientist Cas Mudde explains, populism represents "an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism", and in the Philippines, the liberal elite broadly failed to bring about inclusive development after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship in the mid-1980s.

To be fair, there is no consensus on the exact definition of populism, which is often conflated with authoritarian rule. In simplest terms, populism can be defined as a distinct style of politics and electoral mobilisation strategy, whereby the leader claims to be the true representative of the masses against a self-serving elite. This is why scholars such as Jan-Werner Muller insist that populism is inherently authoritarian, since it is "an exclusionary form of identity politics" that portrays all critics as public enemies.

The political scientist Chantal Mouffe has, however, argued that populism can also be channelled in a more progressive direction, especially when it's narrowly employed as a tactic to "mobilise progressive passions towards promotion of democratic designs".

Ferdinand Marcos Jr, left, the son of late Philippines dictator Ferdinand Marcos, and Sara Duterte, right, the daughter of Rodrigo Duterte, are a formidable tandem but they are also dynasts. Reuters

Like Isko Moreno, Manny Pacquiao, too, has tried to balance his image in his presidential campaign. AFP

Thus, enter alternative candidates in next year's presidential race.

Take the example of Vice President Leni Robredo, de facto opposition leader. On the one hand, she emphasises her humble roots to offset her affiliation with the largely discredited Liberal Party, while on the other, trumpets her technocratic background, including her training as an economist in one of the country's most prestigious universities.

Boxer-turned-senator Manny Pacquiao, with his rags-to-riches life story, is also presenting himself as the man of the people who will fight against corruption and oversee economic recovery by tapping into his global network of billionaire investors.

But it is Mr Isko, the capital city's mayor, who could represent the most potent version of technocratic populism.

There is little indication that the Filipino public wants a reversion to a liberal-reformist past

Raised in Manila's slums amid crushing poverty, the former movie actor is a natural populist who appears to have sensed the pulse of the people. He has shown remarkable ease in the company of entrepreneurs and tycoons, while being relatable with the public. This explains why he has consistently ranked among the top three candidates.

Stints at the Harvard and Oxford universities have given Mr Isko a good understanding of modern governance, too. Under his watch, Manila has become one of the country's best-performing local governments. He has also drawn international praise for his pandemic management, including setting up mass vaccination centres and makeshift hospitals. He is, meanwhile, attracting big businesses to the capital.

In recent weeks, he has also sought to showcase his nationalism by taking an increasingly populist stance vis-a-vis the Philippines' territorial disputes with China and other neighbouring countries in the South China Sea.

Similar to Mr Macron, who rose to power on the back of a technocratic-centrist campaign, Mr Isko is presenting himself as post-partisan figure who will serve as a "healing president" by prioritising technocratic solutions over ideological debates and partisan mudslinging.

A self-made man, Mr Isko has publicly chastised Ms Sara and Mr Marcos, characterising them as privileged dynasts, while actively courting the support of Mr Duterte, who has lately expressed his dislike for the Marcoses. For critics, Mr Isko is effectively becoming a "Duterte lite", a more gentle and youthful version of the incumbent populist.

The reality is that he and other candidates are trying to beat the Dutertes and the Marcoses at their own game by giving a new and increasingly resonant twist to populism. Whether this will be a winning strategy in five months' time, it is too soon to say.

Published: December 9th 2021, 4:00 AM

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Can the 'Macron of the Philippines' succeed Duterte? - The National

ON BOARD THE PAPAL PLANE Pope Francis on his way back to Rome on Monday criticized the rise of western populism, advocated on behalf of migrants, and stressed the need to continue working for unity with the Orthodox.

Speaking to journalists on board his flight from Athens to Rome at the end of a Dec. 2-6 visit to Cyprus and Greece, the pope also touched on the fall from grace of French Archbishop Michel Aupetit, the former archbishop of Paris.

Aupetits resignation was accepted on Thursday after a report was published last week in Le Point magazine saying he had a consensual, intimate relationship with a woman.

Aupetit responded to the report saying he didnt have sexual relations with the woman. However, in an interview with Catholic radio Notre Dame last week, the French archbishop admitted that he poorly handled the situation with a person who was in contact many times with me.

Francis challenged allegations against Aupetit, saying, what did Aupetit do that was so bad in order to give his resignation?

Answer me, he asked the journalists on the papal plane, and handed the microphone to the journalist who asked the question. When there was no answer, the pope insisted that if we dont know the accusation, we cant condemn him.

When there are allegations, an investigation must be made, but it should not be the public that condemns, Francis said.

Pope Francis admitted that while there was perhaps a violation of the sixth commandment not to commit adultery, it was not totally a violation in Aupetits case.

There were small caresses, massagesThis is the accusation, he said, saying This is a sin, but its not among the most serious, no?

Everyone is a sinner, including Aupetit and himself, the pope said, noting that even Peter sinned by rejecting Jesus before his passion.

We must all always feel that we are sinners, and we must be humble, he said.

When gossip grows and grows and grows and takes the good name from someoneThis is an injustice, he said, saying he accepted Aupetits resignation not on the altar of truth, but on the altar of hypocrisy.

In Aupetits case, Pope Francis appeared to deviate from his previous approach to similar situations, having refused to accept the resignation of German Cardinal Reinhard Marx earlier this year over failure to properly handle the clerical abuse crisis.

Pope Francis also reiterated criticisms he made during his opening speech in Greece to civil authorities, when he said that democracy throughout Europe and the West is being weakened by a wave of nationalism.

The pope told the reporters on the plane that democracy is a treasure of civilization. A treasure that countries need to defend with themselves but also elsewhere.

Francis said he sees two current threats to democracy, the first of which is populism, which he said is starting to show its nails.

I am thinking of the populism from last century: Nazism. Nazism was a populism that defended national values. Or so it said. But it managed to annihilate democratic life, it became a dictatorship, he said, cautioning governments on both the right and left to be careful not to slip on the road of populism.

Populism, he said, has nothing to do with popularism, which is the expression of a nations identity, folklore, value, but is rather a system in which national values are sacrificed and watered-down in favor of a government that goes beyond national interests.

We shouldnt water down our identity for national gain, he said, pointing to the 1907 end times novel The Lord of the World, written by English convert Father Robert Hugh Benson, who foresaw the rise of an international government that ruled all other nations.

This is what happens when a superpower dictates the economic, cultural and social value, he said.

Pope Francis also touched again on the issue of migration, which was a primary theme of his visit to both Cyprus and Greece, telling journalists that those who build walls forget history.

He also spoke of relations with the Orthodox churches, saying they can walk together toward unity through prayer and acts of charity, while theological disputes are worked out over time. He also said a potential second meeting with Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill of Moscow is being planned, but offered no other details.

Follow Elise Ann Allen on Twitter:@eliseannallen

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Pope on resignation of French archbishop: What did he do that was so bad? - Crux Now

In the public-health world, the rise of Omicron prompted a great, big I told you so. Since the new variant was detected in South Africa, advocacy groups, the WHO, and global-health experts have said the new variant was a predictable consequence of vaccine inequity. Rich countries are hoarding vaccine doses, they said, leaving much of the developing world under-vaccinated. But in reality, countries with low vaccination rates are suffering from more than just inequity.

South Africa, the country where the variant was first reported, did receive vaccines far too late, partly because wealthy countries did not donate enough doses and pharmaceutical companies refused to share their technology. At one point, South Africa had to export doses of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine that it had manufactured in-country in order to comply with a contract it had signed with the company. The COVID-19 vaccines must be kept cold, and because not everywhere in South Africa has reliable roads and refrigeration, the country has struggled to store and transport vaccine doses to far-flung areas.

Today, though, South Africa has about 150 days worth of vaccine supply. Its now facing the same problem thats bedeviling countries the world over: Lots of people dont want to get their shots. South Africa recently paused deliveries of the J&J and Pfizer vaccines because it has more stock than it can use. We have plenty [of] vaccine and capacity but hesitancy is a challenge, Nicholas Crisp, the deputy director-general of the countrys health department, told Bloomberg recently.

The South African experience is an example of how anti-vaccine sentiment has become a global phenomenon at precisely the worst time. Nearly a quarter of Russians, 18 percent of Americans, and about 10 percent of Germans, Canadians, and French are unwilling to get vaccinated, according to a November Morning Consult poll of 15 countries. South Africa wasnt part of the Morning Consult sample, but a study from this past summer found that it had a high level of vaccine hesitancy when compared globally. It falls roughly in the middle of African countries in terms of vaccine hesitancy: About a third of South Africans have been vaccinated, a higher percentage than most other African countries, but 22 percent of South Africans werent willing to accept a COVID-19 vaccine, according to a study from this past spring, compared with just 4 percent of people in Ethiopia and 38 percent of people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Malawi and South Sudan recently destroyed thousands of vaccine doses because the countries werent going to be able to administer them before they expired.

The U.S. should not blame South Africaor any other nationfor vaccine hesitancy, or stop sending vaccines to places that need them. Vaccine access is crucial. But vaccine hesitancy is an urgent problem, and a global one. New variants can emerge wherever populations remain unvaccinated. (Indeed, its possible that Omicron emerged elsewhere and was merely detected in South Africa, which has an advanced genomic-sequencing operation.) If we had had everybody immunized in the world who is over the age of 18 with at least one dose of COVID vaccine, Omicron might not have happened, Noni MacDonald, a vaccinologist at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, told me. Some surveys suggest that vaccine hesitancy is actually higher in rich countries than in poor ones, so the virus is just as likely to evolve into some dreadful new form in an unvaccinated Americans body as in a Congolese or Russian persons.

Read: Inside the mind of an anti-vaxxer

If policy makers want to limit the damage that Omicron and future variants do, theyll have to better understand why people reject vaccines. Something as complex as vaccine hesitancy is bound to have many causes, but research suggests that one fundamental instinct drives it: A lack of trust. Getting people to overcome their hesitancy will require restoring their trust in science, their leaders, and, quite possibly, one another. The crisis of vaccine hesitancy and the crisis of cratering trust in institutions are one and the same.

The world over, people feel lied to, unheard, and pushed aside. They no longer have any faith in their leaders. Theyre lashing out against their governments and health officials, in some cases by rejecting the COVID-19 vaccine.

Populism, a political expression of this mistrust, is correlated with vaccine hesitancy. In a 2019 study, Jonathan Kennedy, a sociologist at Queen Mary University of London, found a significant association between the percentage of people who voted for populist parties within a country and the percent who believe vaccines are not important or effective. Past research has similarly found that populists around the world are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories about issues such as vaccination and global warming. Vaccine hesitancy and political populism are driven by similar dynamics: a profound distrust in elites and experts, Kennedy writes. In politics, populism manifests as supporting parties and figures outside the mainstream, like Donald Trump or UKIP. But populism can be expressed differently in other spheres. In public health, theres this growing distrust and anger towards doctors, also towards pharmaceutical companies. Medical populism is skepticism that's uninformed, Kennedy told me.

Medical literature reveals a strong connection between vaccine hesitancy and distrust of pharmaceutical companies, government officials, and health-care workers, even among health-care workers themselves. Studies and polls from various countries over the past two years show that people who are reluctant to get a COVID-19 vaccine are more likely to vote for politically extreme parties and to distrust the government, and to cite their distrust as a reason for not getting the shot. In a recent German poll, half of the unvaccinated respondents had voted for the far-right populist party, Alternative fr Deutschland, in the recent election. Anti-vaccine sentiments are also most common in the populist areas of Austria, France, and Italy.

In South Africa, vaccine hesitancy is higher among white South Africans than among Blacks, though whites are more likely to have been vaccinated, possibly because of better access, an August survey found. Some white South Africans mistrust the countrys government, which is led by politicians from the Black majority. South Africans circulate American anti-vaccine material on WhatsApp and Facebook, including videos by Tucker Carlson and memes about Tony Fauci, says Eve Fairbanks, a Johannesburg-based journalist at work on The Inheritors, a book about South Africa. A group representing the Afrikaans-speaking white minority, AfriForum, recently came out against vaccine mandates. I feel like theres a little bit of a posturing and a sort of feeling of being marginalized among white South Africans, Fairbanks said. One of the biggest losses that white South Africans suffered after the end of racial segregation was not material, but it was status. Among Black South Africans, skepticism toward doctors might arise from the fact that pro-apartheid arguments were often rooted in wrong, but supposedly scientific, beliefs about differences between races.

Though many factors contributed to the erosion of trust in government and science, Kennedy highlighted one in particular: As the postwar narrative of optimism and progress failed to pan out for some people, they became suspicious and angry. Theres large amounts of the population that havent benefited economically from globalization, he said. Theres lots of people who feel increasingly disenfranchised by politics; they feel like mainstream politicians are aloof and arent interested in them. Populism and anti-vax sentiment, then, seems to be a kind of rejection of this narrative of civilizational progress ... Its kind of like a scream of helplessness.

Perhaps no country better exemplifies the role of trust in vaccine uptake than Russia, one of the most vaccine-hesitant countries on Earth. Despite the fact that its vaccine, Sputnik V, was one of the first developed, only 40 percent of Russians have been vaccinated. Russian anti-vaxxers are numerous and include opposition activists, Communists, and some Orthodox figures.

Russia, and Eastern Europe in general, has an extremely low level of trust in institutions: One in three Eastern Europeans doesnt trust the health-care system, compared to one in five residents of the European Union on average. Romania and Bulgaria have also vaccinated only small fractions of their populations, despite an abundance of vaccines, in part because trust in health care is much lower in these formerly communist countries. One of the legacies of the Soviet health-care system is the high level of bureaucracy, says Elizabeth King, a professor of health behavior at the University of Michigan who has studied Russia. The multilevels of bureaucracy also work to erode trust in the medical-care system, including vaccination efforts.

Russia also spreads vaccine hesitancy beyond its borders with the help of government-funded news sites and trolls. Russian state news agencies have gleefully amplified every complication and casualty from vaccines produced by BioNTech-Pfizer, Moderna, and AstraZeneca and gloated over every development hiccup. Meanwhile, the Russian foreign broadcaster RT has been feeding Western audiences anti-vaxxer conspiracy theories, comparing lockdowns and other restrictions to the Nazi occupation and apartheid, the Russian journalist Alexey Kovalev wrote in Foreign Policy. Russian trolls have, for years, posted anti-vaccine content to social media, hoping to sow division in the U.S. During the pandemic, Russia Todays German-language channels have promoted skeptical views of vaccines, masks, and lockdowns. At one point, the Russian government used fake news sites to undermine trust in the Pfizer vaccine, The Wall Street Journal reported.

Read: Vaccinated America has had enough

Russia-specific factors contribute to this distrust in vaccines: Russia has a tradition of folk medicine, perhaps allowing skeptical Russians to believe that there are alternatives to vaccination. Sputnik V was released quickly and with little public data, making it hard to trust, and Russian President Vladimir Putins government has issued conflicting and confusing statements about the true scope of the pandemic. After centuries of government mistreatment, fatalism pervades Russia, and some Russians have come to the conclusion that it doesnt matter whether they get COVID or not. Judy Twigg, a global-health professor at Virginia Commonwealth University who focuses on Russia, told me she hears arguments from Russians like, This is just another in a long series of ongoing catastrophes affecting our country, or Whats going to happen is going to happen, and everything is always terrible. More and more, people outside Russia seem to feel the same way about their own countries.

Restoring trust in institutions will be hard. The simplest step governments can take immediately is making it easier to get the vaccine and to learn about it. Developing countries havent, for the most part, had the money to invest in flashy pro-vaccine ad campaigns. How easy I make it for you to get information about the vaccines thats of good quality, and how easy I make it for you to be able to access that vaccine, makes a huge difference on vaccine acceptance, MacDonald said.

Though some low-income countries might have adequate doses right now, being forced to wait for doses while the rest of the world swam in them might have increased vaccine skepticism. If you cant have what you should have, sometimes you rationalize it by saying you dont need it, says Saad Omer, director of the Yale Institute for Global Health.

But mostly, restoring trust in medicine and vaccines comes down to the extremely boring and extremely necessary task of properly funding public health, even when theres not a pandemic raging. African countries have struggled to vaccinate willing people with the doses they have, because clinics are few and the health workforce is strapped. Sometimes even political populism can be overcome if the public-health system is strong: Brazil, where trust in the public-health Sistema nico de Sade is high, has an excellent immunization track record despite having a populist leader. Brazilians trust the SUS with their lives, so they trust it for their shots.

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Whats Really Behind Global Vaccine Hesitancy - The Atlantic

Mandatory vaccination these words could well be two of the most controversial of 2021. But so contentious that they could divide German society?

At the moment, it certainly feels that way.The fact thatvaccination against COVID-19 could well become compulsory next year in Germanyhas prompted much heated debate.

But before we start making things worse by banging on about polarization in a knee-jerk reaction, it is worthwhile to pause for a bitand listen.

Listening, for example, to what the new German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said about the day that he was elected about the vaccination causing the much-cited rift in society. "I don't think much of that view of things," he said, pointing out that most citizens have been vaccinated.

And he is right. As of December 10, almost 70% have received the full dose of the vaccine."And many more think that this is right or at least not wrong in principle," Scholz added. That is also true.

But he really hit the markwith this sentence: "We must not assume that the whole of society is split just because a vocal minority is being extremely radical in its behavior." Well said, Mr.Chancellor! If anybody doubts his words, they should take a closer look at studies on polarization and populism. There are many of these, and their findings are clear: Social cohesion is much greater than many people would assume.

DW's Marcel Frstenau

In a study conducted for Germany's Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Jochen Roose, who researches elections and society, wrote: "At the beginning of 2019, two-thirds of the population believed that there was little or no cohesion in society. This perception of polarization has declined during the COVID-19 pandemic. Agreement with the statement 'In our society, people are irreconcilably opposed to each other' decreased from 41% before the pandemic to 31% in the pandemic."

It should be notedthat this is how people in Germany themselvesassess the situation.

The Bertelsmann Populism Barometer also contains reassuring statements:"Currently, only about two in 10 eligible voters in Germany (20.9%) remain populist in their views. That's 11.8 percentage points, or a little more than a third, less than in November 2018 (32.8%)."

This also contradicts the widespread perception of an increasingly divided society.

Why then is there so much talk of division, polarization and conspiracy theories? One explanation is that we live in a so-called media democracy. What is positive about the digital age is that anyone can, in theory, express themselves about anything at any time, thanks to social media.But the negative side of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and the like is their unbridled buzz potential. And that's where age-old reflexes kick in: The louder and more agitated someone appears, the more attention they attract.

According to a study by public broadcasters, only a minority of people use social media in Germany. In 2020, 26% were active on Facebook, 20% on Instagram and only 5% on Twitter. However, there are people in certain sectorswho are particularly active: politicians,activists of all stripesand journalists.

All of them want and have to put their messages out in front of the public, and it is unthinkable to do so today without social media platforms since those who disregard these platforms are no longer heard or seen. Tweets and other posts on social mediahave become the fastest way of broadcasting an opinion without being asked for one. Such opinion-giverswould mostly remain among themselves if not for theother people and channelsthat spread their views. As it is, however,they can sometimes reach millions through more traditional media platforms, especiallyTV talk shows.

In the never-ending competition for audiences, ratings and clicks, sensational headlines and exaggerationare part of the trade. A debate about the pros and cons of mandatory vaccination can thus quickly give the impression of a divided society.

But here, too, Olaf Scholz had something sensible to say: "Of course, this can be debated fiercely. And that is not a problem at all. That's what democracy is about."

To conclude, let us look at an award-winning essay entitled "Anger and Worldview" by Paula Khler of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. The author argues that Germany is not so much experiencing a polarization of society as a whole but a debate that it is increasingly personalized.

"A small part of the population (political elites and opinion-makers)[is] bombarded with hatred and slanderby an equally unrepresentative small part of the population (angry online trolls)," she writes. And this, in turn, she says, impacts the broader debate culture.

Unfortunately, she is right there.

This article has been translated from German.

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Opinion: The myth of a divided German society - DW (English)

Succession9pm, Sky Atlantic

As Shiv stirred the pot around his predilection for sending nude pics to Gerri, it seemed that Roman was having the worst week of all the Roy siblings. Kendall wasnt faring too well either, with Logan having reneged on his earlier offer to end their civil war and let him cash out. Then came the end of episode eight, and the moment of tragedy viewers had been both dreading and anticipating all season (and could it really be?). With all the bickering, backstabbing and Lukas Matssons tech bro twaddle suddenly rendered utterly trivial, prepare yourself for a devastating, revelatory end to this masterful third series. Hannah J Davies

Part polemic, part appeal for common sense, this documentary sees Twitter addict Baddiel explore the grim synergy between new communications technology and dysfunctional movements ranging from rightwing populism to cancel culture. Its understandably light on plausible solutions but, at the very least, its a thoughtful acknowledgment that, collectively, we have a big problem that isnt going away any time soon. Phil Harrison

More mechanical tinkering from Guy Martin in this episode, prepare for the slowest and least glamorous race of his career. Underpowered, functional and basic in every sense, the Trabant was a symbol of pre-glasnost East Germany. Guy prepares for a race at Brands Hatch in which these dowdy vehicles are pushed to their limits. PH

Romesh Ranganathan is in charge of the banter-fuelled panel shows festive fun this year and hes dragging Freddie Flintoff and Jamie Redknapp to Center Parcs for physical challenges with a variety of special guests. Ranganathan also likes to get his mum involved tonight, shes helping him serve a Sri Lankan Christmas meal. PH

All flu-ridden Beth (Arabella Weir) wants is a hot water bottle, so every neighbour in town is popping in to give advice, soup and anecdotes about legendary colds theyve had. The action reaches a climax when tact vacuum Cathy (the fabulous Doon Mackichan) turns up to bring her unique brand of entertainment and tough love. Hannah Verdier

Christmas with the Cockfields rings in festive drama. Simon has made time out from his busy work schedule to visit his mother two days after the 25th only to find friction with his stepfather. Tensions rise but can a trip to the pub bring peace? HV

Championship football: Sheffield United v Queens Park Rangers Mon, 7pm, Sky Sports Main Event. From Bramall Lane.

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TV tonight: Successions devastating finale - The Guardian

The stunning end to the twenty-year war in Afghanistan with an unambiguous defeat has had little consequences in American domestic politics. To be sure, the final rout may have contributed to President Bidens decline in public opinion polls, but there are plenty of other reasons for that. The end of the Afghanistan War, surely a matter of historical import, just disappeared into the news cycle. After the lives lost, the resources wasted, and the ideals betrayed, one might expect the political class to pay attention and to demand accountability. Yet no one seems to notice.

Such an accounting could take the form, for example, of congressional hearingsbut instead Congress prefers to rehash the sad political circus of the January6 riot. It has no time for the two decades in Afghanistan, telling evidence of our legislators priorities. Instead of congressional hearings, a special commission might be convened, serious and bipartisan, such as the one that followed on 9/11. No one is taking this road either. Enormous expenditure of resources and a defeat clearer even than the exit from Vietnam, and Washington doesnt care. The impassioned call by Lt. Col. Stuart Scheller has not been heeded; on the contrary, he was punished for making the suggestion. It is as if the war were already well on the way to being forgotten by an amnesiac political culture at large. At least the veterans, their families, and the families of soldiers who lost their lives will remember.

The congressional avoidance is the most salient piece of evidence of a general cultural repression that deserves closer scrutiny. It involves more than the standard marginality of foreign policy for the domestic public. Member of Parliament Tom Tugendhat has addressed the problem in terms of a lack of patience, a mindset that helps us understand the eagerness to end the so-called endless war. But there is another, perhaps deeper connection between the Afghanistan defeat and contemporary American politics. The impatience with the duration of the commitment in Afghanistan and the perplexed relationship to the distinct features of its culture are indicators of aspects of contradictions in American society and in Western modernity more broadly. Two commentaries by French geographical thinkers, Fabrice Balanche and Christophe Guilluy, have been translated and juxtaposed on this site. Taken together, their focus on space and culture sheds important light on these matters.

Balanche proceeds from the material priority of the geographical terrain in Afghanistan, a country defined by its steep mountains and valleys that have produced a society of compartmentalized ethnicities and tribes, while also posing genuine physical challenges to any invading force. It is this physical and existential reality of Afghanistan that, he argues, was largely ignored by American and Western military planners, as well as by the Soviet occupation effort before them. The aspiration for any homogenizing polity of equal rights, the core ideal of modernity, turned out to be a bad fit for the conservatism and regionalism of the Afghan condition. One might wish that it would be otherwise; one might wish that that the effort to establish a regime of democracy and liberty had succeeded. That emancipation project is what the mission in Afghanistan grew into, after it expanded by mission creep beyond the initial goal to defeat al-Qaeda. The ideals of that modernization and democratization are hard to dismiss. They evidently were not achieved.

Balanche attributes this defeat to a structural ignorance on the part of the planners, who remained separated from the material and cultural reality of the place. They had little appreciation for the facts of life on the ground, for the difficulties of the terrain and the recalcitrance of the culture. Instead they engaged in an abstract projection of Western ideals onto a very foreign arena, both physically and culturally. Given their training and mindset, the planners operateso Balanche argueswith the assumption of a global uniformity of space, devoid of particularity, and they therefore do not take into account the radically heterogeneous conditions of the distinct situation in which they hope to operate. For Balanche this is not only a problem with regard to the Wests inability to understand Afghanistan, but one that is symptomatic of the Western approach to a much wider swath of the Middle East and Central Asia, where the lifeworlds of the population are rooted in diversities that the universalism of modernity discounts. Instead that modernizing perspective treats local culture exclusively as an obstacle to be excised in order to establish a universal regime of liberalism, regardless of the local will.

Guilluy in contrast takes us to one of the paradigmatic sites of contemporary modernity, analyzing socio-economic transformations in France and their geographic expression. His approach overlaps with Balanches account in bringing a spatial-geographic perspective to bear. He describes the metropolitan centers, foremost among them Paris of course, but the other major cities as well, as real estate from which the middle and working classes have largely been expelled, a long-term process of systematic gentrification. After the exile of the popular classes, the inhabitants who remain are the well-salaried bourgeoisie, some slightly to the left, some to the right, in either case well off. These are, for Guilluy, the core base of the political support for Emmanuel Macron. Nearby but safely separated from them live the large populations of immigrants who find their livelihoods in service positions for the wealthy. The traditional French middle and working classes have had to migrate to the peripheries of the country, outside of the French metropoles but also away from those regions that the wealthy have selected for their second homes, especially along the coast. An extensive deracination has taken place. This displacement fed into the populist revolt of the Yellow Vest movement and continues to motivate the far-right electorate. It is often the traditional working class or its children that has migrated from the left to the right, as globalization pushed employment opportunities overseas. They voted for LePen in 2017, and Guilluy predicts that they will vote similarly in 2022, as we still await the selection of candidates.

Against this background, Guilluy details the geographical tension between metropolitan center and the French periphery. To be precise, for Guilluy it is not only genuine location that counts, i.e., measurable distance from a metropolitan center, but rather the distance from integration into the neoliberal model of economic globalization, which has its winners and its losers. And the winners in globalization cannot help but rub salt in the wounds of the losers, declaring them deplorable.

Balanche and Guilluy approach two very different contexts, and there are important differences in their methodologies, but they agree in their central account of a binary structure of spacethe showcase city of Kabul versus the deep Afghanistan valleys, the opulence of the center of Paris in contrast to the degraded periphery with its decaying regions. This is not only a matter of parallel bifurcations; these are genealogically the same bifurcation, to the extent that the abstract universalism that the West attempted to impose on Afghanistan is cut from the same cloth as the liberal globalism of the metropolitan economic model that Guilluy associates with Macronism. (To be sure, the features of cultural conservatism associated with the French periphery are hardly identical to the conservatism of the Afghan countryside, although both stand in important proximity to the category of tradition: the spatial divide maps onto the difference between abstraction and particularity, or between progress and tradition.)

The similarity of these parallel analyses points us back to our initial question: the connection between the disinterest in the Afghanistan defeat and the politics of contemporary American society. The familiar opposition of the American coasts and flyover country is effectively identical to Guilluys contrast of cities and periphery in France. Metropolitan universalism is based on an abstract liberalism that is impervious to the lived experience of a countrys population, held in disdain because it clings to traditions, or at least is treated as if it does. Power, wealth, and what is valued as intelligence are concentrated in enclaves, and what lies beyond is left to decay. The same abstraction that, according to Balanche, could not grasp the geographical particularity of Afghanistan recurs in the metropolitan disdain of the domestic hinterland. This is where the connection to the American situation becomes clear. The political choice to forget Afghanistan is the same as the disregard for the expanses between the coasts. The politics that holds deplorables in contempt is the same politics that does not want to examine its own culpability in the war. This refusal to face up to the war and its lessons will further embitter the domestic conflict between liberalism of the metropoles and the populism of the periphery.

Originally posted here:

Geographies of Populism and the End of the Afghanistan War - Telos Press

In The Great Recoil: Politics after Populism and Pandemic,Paolo Gerbaudo explores how the crises of populism and the COVID-19 pandemic are giving rise to a great recoil from neoliberal globalisation, leading to the return of the state and notions of sovereignty, protection and control. While Gerbaudo outlines how the left can seize this moment to build a society of care committed to overlapping visions of equality and security, Marco Bitschnau remains unconvinced by the books interpretation of the long-term impact of populism and the pandemic.

The Great Recoil: Politics after Populism and Pandemic. Paolo Gerbaudo. Verso. 2021.

The futures uncertain and the end is always near

The Doors, Roadhouse Blues (1970)

Times of crisis are times of change but also times to contemplate the nature of this change, to discuss it and put ones thoughts to paper. Paolo Gerbaudo is one of those seizing such an opportunity in The Great Recoil, addressing the question of systemic transformation against the backdrop of two major crises: populism the rise of populist actors and increasing demands for policies based around people-centrism and the COVID-19 pandemic. How will they shape the world of tomorrow, he asks, providing an answer in the nine chapters of this 288-page book. Or, in more concrete and politically charged terms: what comes after neoliberalism?

This question is central to Gerbaudo, who follows many other thinkers on the left in identifying neoliberalism as the dominant ideological structure of the present, a political and economic doctrine that has held sway over the world since the end of the Cold War (18). But now, he argues, it is crumbling. As the aforementioned crises show, its playbook of free competition seems unfit to address present dilemmas (19) and a systemic change in ideological space (38) that converges around the return of state power (neo-statism) is about to replace it. With each social certainty succumbing to crisis pressure, with each iteration of market forces failing to mitigate its impact, with each instance of the political centre ceding ground to demands from the populist periphery, this change becomes more conspicuous. Ultimately, it is merely a matter of time until the neoliberal signifier that is freedom gives way to the neo-statist master-signifiers (40) of sovereignty, protection and control. Gerbaudo devotes a single chapter to each of these, tracing their history and mapping their meaning.

Yet, there is more that unites than separates these signifiers, first and foremost their joint root in experiences of powerlessness and alienation. The craving for sovereignty, for instance, is described as a reaction to democratic preferences being subjected to the primacy of the market: it is a revolt against neoliberals who conceive of the term as a steel encasement suffocating the ability of individuals to determine (80) their own fate and have no hesitation to hollow out the promise of democracy. The same pertains to protection, a concept that may appear alien to those who have spent most of their adult lives before the great crises (99) of the past decade but has now become a necessity to fend off the threat posed by laissez-faire capitalism. Control, the third signifier, is basically a more practical form of protection, revolving around the perception that political control [] has been lost, resulting in the demand to return to order and stability amid a world caught in chaos (141).

In practice, Gerbaudo admits, all three concepts are strongly interlinked and may be best imagined as different aspects of a shift from exopolitics to endopolitics, from politics oriented towards the outside to those primarily concerned with the collective self. Debates that used to centre around future possibilities are increasingly dominated by a desire to preserve and protect, with more and more people responding to the precariousness of modern life by calling for the intervention of a potent state. In this moment, Gerbaudo claims, lies a historic chance for those advocating radical social change. After all, what could be a better way out of this misery than a socialism that protects (252) and provides a real alternative to the masses? The ground has already been prepared now the left must overcome its internal divisions to spark change and build a society of care, in which the commitment to equality and the pursuit of security seamlessly complement each other.

Photo byTamanna RumeeonUnsplash

While this may sound impressive at first, one cannot help but recall the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008. Back then, almost everybody on the left seemed similarly convinced that this was the beginning of a new era; that from the ashes of casino capitalism, a different society was bound to arise, a more egalitarian society in which the savage beast of financial markets would finally be tamed. But despite these prophecies, it did not take long for the global economy to recover, the bankers to return to their offices and the Occupy Wall Street protesters to fold up their tents in New Yorks Zuccotti Park. Not the faintest sign of revolutionary change, not even a fierce outcry of the mythical 99%, but plenty of disappointment for those who were premature in their judgment and sought salvation from a future that never came into being.

Gerbaudo is no soothsayer, and his analysis is more astute than the utopian dreams of the Occupy crowd. And yet, there are striking similarities, especially his conviction that we are witnessing a real paradigm shift rather than a straw fire. A bold claim, given that his argument rests on a quite exaggerated interpretation of both crises. Populism, if ever that relevant, has clearly entered a phase of stagnation or even retreat. Since the Trump peak in 2016, populist challengers have lost high-profile elections in France, the UK and the Netherlands, populist parties were ousted from power in Austria and Norway and populist positions have lost much of the forbidden fruit status that contributed to their appeal. No longer do they represent serious challenges to a sclerotic status quo but rather corruption and incompetence, from Donald Trumps obscene narcissism to Heinz-Christian Straches Ibiza adventures.

At the same time, the perception of COVID-19 is also shifting in some countries from that of an unprecedented health crisis into that of an everyday nuisance. With mass vaccination campaigns being rolled out, mask mandates lifted and Freedom Days proclaimed, the pandemic is increasingly loosening its tight grip on many societies and is beginning to fade from the centre of public attention. There is no doubt that it is leaving lasting scars, but there is little reason to agree that we are likely to see a phase of outright deglobalisation and an existential challenge (52) to global capitalism as Gerbaudo argues. Not only is this the most robust (albeit uneven) economic recovery in 80 years, but there is very little empirical evidence in support of the deglobalisation thesis. In fact, prominent economists such as Pol Antrs have called such predications hyperbolic and the pandemic not likely to constitute a significant de-globalization force (2021: 2). Are all of these experts simply propagandists of the neoliberal cause or could it rather be that Gerbaudo is a prisoner of his own argument?

Apart from this macro-critique, there are more points to be highlighted. For instance, it remains unclear to what extent populism and neoliberalism are actually in opposition to each other. Gerbaudo constructs such an opposition when he casts populism as a negative counterpart of neoliberal elitism (21), but the truth is that populist parties form no monolithic bloc and some of them are even more pro-market than the average centre-right party.

Similarly, one could question the view that COVID-19 has sparked a pro-statist consensus. It is certainly correct that most governments were riding on a wave of support during the early phase of the pandemic, but it is likewise correct that this support has waned since, with lockdowns and mandatory vaccinations giving rise to anti-state sentiment and mistrust towards political institutions. And even if we were to assume that there is a real return of the state, would this necessarily be tantamount to the end of neoliberalism? Even leftist thinkers such as Milo umonja have their doubts, suspecting that the corona crisis might, in retrospect, appear as just another capitalist crisis, an integral part of its life cycle (2021: 220).

What is more, Gerbaudos argument is in places built around vague notions. He writes extensively about sovereignty, protection and control, but the relationship between them remains opaque and many details appear superfluous. Jean Bodins Six Livres sur la Rpublique are always worth a read but is it really necessary to go back to the sixteenth century to grasp the meaning of sovereignty, a term that is ultimately little more than a signifier [that] is filled by a variety of signifieds (93)? In addition, the analysis of speeches, public declarations, policy documents and campaign messages (39) is sparse and the tone polemical at times. Evidently, Gerbaudo is no friend of markets but contending that they can only be efficient when shielded by active patronage of the state (199) or that free trade is subservience to the rapacious logic of international capitalism (214) does not exactly help to advance his argument. It merely conveys a reductionist account of economic matters.

Still, The Great Recoil is not without merit. It draws on a depth of theoretical resources, provides elements that are stimulating for example, the concept of long ideological waves and does not cloak its argument in incomprehensible jargon. One would also do Gerbaudo wrong to consider him an apologist for unrestricted state power; he even warns not to fall in the opposite trap [and worship] the state as an infallible actor (201). It would only have been beneficial if he had extended the same caution to the rest of this book. Perhaps he is right, and we will hear the roaring of the Leviathan for many years to come it just does not seem very likely.

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Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP American Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.

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Marco Bitschnau University of NeuchtelMarco Bitschnau holds a B.A. in Sociology, Politics & Economics from Zeppelin University and an MPhil in Sociology from the University of Cambridge. He is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Neuchtel and a doctoral fellow at the National Center of Competence in Research (NCCR) on the move.

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Book Review: The Great Recoil: Politics after Populism and Pandemic by Paolo Gerbaudo - USAPP American Politics and Policy (blog)

Populism is for lazy politicians. It relies on dreaming up some sort of common enemy immigrants, elites, experts, business, the French and claiming that you speak for the people by blaming these groups for societys ills. Populist politicians trumpet easy solutions to the pressing issues of the day, but their ideas are simplistic, not simple, and rarely go to the root of the problem.

Unfortunately, the UK is suffering an entire generation of economically and historically illiterate populists in government and opposition. On the left, the Corbyn years are a surreal cheese-dream of madcap spending plans that might easily have led the UK back to the doorstep of the International Monetary Fund, begging for rescue. The Labour Party still has not found its footing after that sorry episode, with lots of Angela Rayner types trying to keep the hard socialist dream alive.

On the right, the madness of Brexit is wreaking havoc with the economy and international relations, while the red-trousered Spartans who dragged the Conservative Party down this historical cul-de-sac swan about gaslighting the entire population by claiming that this mess is exactly what the 52 per cent voted for. Flailing about for ways to boost his popularity, the Prime Minister has alighted on a big spending, big government, muscularly intervening in the market left, right and centre to appeal to the people.

This is a big topic in itself, worth coming back to another day. Im quite enjoying the manifest horror among the self-same Spartans as they troop through the lobbies voting for an economic programme that would have been considered too lefty even for Red Ed a few years ago.

As much as I dislike them, I do share some common economic ground with the hard nuts. But just some. Socialism (with its various related-isms) and capitalism share the goal of creating prosperity for all. But despite its flaws, only capitalism has consistently delivered. The invisible hand of the market ensures the most efficient allocation of resources possible and this efficiency delivers high living standards. The miraculous mechanism of price underpins it all.

The price of everything, from goods to investment capital, is the point at which supply and demand balance out. If prices rise too high, buyers go on strike and competitors rush in until prices fall back. Go too low and suppliers turn off the taps until scarcity pushes prices higher.

Nave left-wing thinking often imagines that simply setting low prices by law means goods for everyone. It does not. Fixing prices by diktat never works. Ever. Venezualas socialists have finally lifted the price controls on basic consumer goods that delivered empty shelves for years, just as Argentinas Peronists have nailed down the price of 1,432 everyday items by law. Expect the same result there.

But surely that doesnt happen in the UK? Unfortunately it does, and the outcome is the same. Theresa May was the most hapless UK prime minister since the 1970s, so its no surprise the wheels have fallen off her policy to control the price of gas to consumers, designed to win votes and stolen from the Labour Party. Simple. Appealing. Populist. Foolish.

Of course, the wholesale gas market is global, the price set by billions of consumers and millions of businesses the world over. It is entirely indifferent to the hubris of British politicians. So what happens if you force companies to sell gas at a loss? Bankruptcies and loss of competition.

I dont have a lot of sympathy for the shonkier small fry that have gone bust. They knew the rules and most of them cheered the price cap when it came in because they imagined it would undermine the Big Six energy companies.

My point is that ultimately we still all bear the cost. The Government has been forced effectively to nationalise Bulb, as no other supplier wanted six million loss-making customers thank you very much. So whether we fork out as customers or taxpayers, we cant escape the inevitable. Ofgem, slowly, will get around to adjusting the price cap, but the damage has already been done.

I am not a pure free marketeer; I believe in regulated capitalism. Governments must make rules, for example on environmental standards, and then just step back and let the market get on with it. And there should be fierce, immediate and expensive penalties for bad behaviour like dumping sewage into rivers and onto beaches.

But cack-handed interventions to chase votes always end in tears. For the energy market regulating the profit margin on gas, the mark-up, rather than legislating a price, would have avoided this latest debacle and would prevent profiteering. At times of extreme high prices, welfare provides a route to support the vulnerable.

Price controls have broken the energy market. But the economic consequences of other populist policies are mounting too. The immigration clampdown has broken the haulage market, the pork industry, hospitality, seasonal agriculture and much more. The post-Brexit trading arrangements are delivering red tape and shortages, damaging the prospects of our vital financial services industry and splintering the Northern Ireland Protocol. All of this ends up as a cost to us as taxpayers and consumers.

Lamentably, there seems no end in sight to Britains populist convulsions. Instead of wisdom and experience leading public opinion, we have empty slogans in search of workable policy. If Peppa Pig is the apotheosis of Global Britain we are in serious trouble.

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Cack-handed policies to chase votes always end in tears just look at the energy market - iNews

Perhaps the language of populism lying around the corner when once the linguistic turn has been made shows nothing more than that. Some political scientists labelled as ' neopopulism ' the newer variant of populism in the context of globalisation and widespread acceptance of neoliberal policies. The result was first ' caudillismo ', then - in the twentieth century - populism, revolution, or breakdown. He seems to envisage a better future emerging from subaltern populism, untainted by the impositions of the modern bureaucratic state. But the new media coverage also signalled a new populism. If neopopulism cannot claim a similar set of accomplishments, then it can hardly be assigned the same degree of importance as classical populism. In fact, one of the most striking elements of the book is how very infrequently the terms populism and neopopulism appear on its pages. If the populism of his earlier labor radicalism was gone, his suspicion of capitalist power in alliance with a centralized state remained. Unfortunately the case studies' treatment of the more contemporary cases of populism (or neopopulism) is rather meagre. Thus, a key question for a book on populism is whether it contributes to a better understanding of the term. Populism and egaliterianism had become rhetorical pillars of the post-independence state. As the executive tried to buy support in congress and the politicians tried to buy a new electorate, populism was reborn and corruption spread unimpeded. Not very surprisingly, perhaps, the means by which this revival of populism is to be effected remain somewhat unclear. There are, however, two reasons why populism is such a problematic concept. Both plans may have represented a welcome break with the previous culture of inflation, but they also contained a significant element of economic populism.

These examples are from corpora and from sources on the web. Any opinions in the examples do not represent the opinion of the Cambridge Dictionary editors or of Cambridge University Press or its licensors.

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POPULISM | meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary