Category Archives: NSA

Source: Adobe/afxhome

The most popular cryptocurrency, Bitcoin (BTC), is filled with conspiracy theories, ranging from the plausible to the downright absurd.

Lets take a quick look at the most common Bitcoin conspiracy theories for a good laugh or - if you choose to believe them - a peek down the rabbit hole.

On Wednesday, June 20, 2018, a new block was mined on the Bitcoin blockchain. It was a typical block, except that its hash was 00000000000000000021e800c1e8df51b22c1588e5a624bea17e9faa34b2dc4a.

It caused a massive uproar among the community, with Twitter and Reddit awash with speculations concerning the origins and meaning of the number.

The reason for the excitement around this particular block hash, something many within the community are already familiar with, is a number. First, upon a cursory glance, the number of zeros at the beginning of the block hash was similar to the ones in the block hash of the Genesis Block, or the first block of Bitcoin ever mined.

Given the lengths supposedly undertaken by the pseudonymous creator of BTC, Satoshi Nakamoto, to achieve that hash in the Genesis Block, some believe it to be meaningful. Additionally, it was pointed out that it is highly improbable for the June 2018 hash to be generated at random.

Secondly, the number that came after the first zeros was 21e8. This number is an important one in physics because it refers to the E8 Theory, which is an attempt to describe all known fundamental interactions in physics and to stand as a possible theory of everything.

Possible explanations for the event ranged from a simple chance to AI or Nakamotos resurgence and even time travel.

Possibly, the biggest mystery (together with when moon?) in the Bitcoin world is its creator Satoshi Nakamoto. It is assumed this was either a person or a group of people working in concert to create the worlds first decentralized digital currency. The people listed as possible Nakamoto candidates reads like the whos who of the cypherpunk movement, such as Hal Finney, Adam Back, and Nick Szabo, computer scientist, legal scholar, and cryptographer known for his research in cryptocurrency.

Meanwhile, Finey, who died in 2014, was the first-ever recipient of a BTC transaction sent from Satoshi. Also, he was identified as a possible Nakamoto ghostwriter by Newsweek and the New Yorker. In fact, shortly before his death, Forbes wrote about the fact that Finney, a cryptography pioneer, had a neighbor named Nakamoto.

Also, Adam Back, CEO of major blockchain technology firm Blockstream, was one of the first two people to receive an email from Satoshi, and he was also cited in the Bitcoin white paper.

Another computer scientist, Craig S. Wright has infamously claimed to be Nakamoto but has never been able to prove it.

Given the complexity of Bitcoin and the deep understanding of economics showcased by Nakamoto, many are of the opinion that Nakamoto was actually a group of people. Many contend that it is improbable that one person could be so well versed in many different areas of scholarship to create a technological tool so robust that it continues to stand the test of time today.

The etymology of Satoshi Nakamoto corresponds to knowledge or enlightenment and the middle or center. The vague nature of the words can mean one of two things, either awoken by being at the source or central intelligence. The latter is a much-speculated theory, that the US National Security Agency (NSA) (or some other government intelligence operation) created the cryptocurrency.

The most quoted evidence backing this theory is the fact that Bitcoin employs a common cryptography tool to create its public and private keys. The theory is that this in itself could provide the NSA with a back door to the Bitcoin blockchain.

Another reason cited by pundits of this theory is the fact that social media threads, on sites like Reddit, which question the NSA/Bitcoin connection are deleted. Finally, even Ethereum (ETH) co-founder Vitalik Buterin (before his ETH career even started) reportedly said that he wouldnt be surprised if [Nakamoto] is actually an American working for the NSA specializing in cryptography. Then he got sick of the governments monetary policies and decided to create Bitcoin. He also added: Or the NSA itself decided to create Bitcoin.

However, several years later, Buterin clarified that his opinions have changed a lot since his NSA-related statements in 2011.

Blockstream is a blockchain technology company staffed by well-known and well-regarded developers. It is led by aforementioned Adam Back, a cryptographer aligned with the cypherpunk movement. It is through these endeavors where he interacted with Satoshi Nakamoto, corresponding with him, which led to him being cited in the Bitcoin whitepaper.

Blockstream describes itself as the global leader in Bitcoin and blockchain technology. Founded in 2014, the company aims to create a range of products and services which should ease the use and adoption of bitcoin and other blockchain-based digital currencies. Blockstream has raised large amounts in its funding rounds since its inception.

To the onlooker, Blockstream should be a well-regarded institution within the space. Meanwhile, for a number within the space, Blockstream seems to be hell-bent on destroying the original intent of Bitcoin with its driving motivations being profit.

However, these accusations can be heard from the Bitcoin Cash (BCH), which is a hard fork of Bitcoin, camp mostly. They claim that Blockstream is against any changes that may scale Bitcoin because they want users to use their proprietary sidechains, such as the Liquid Network.

Given that many of the Bitcoin Core developers also work at Blockstream, this is an "interesting" accusation, to say the least. While it is an old conspiracy theory, it keeps morphing with time.

In 2018, a Danish firm called BiChip (which, ironically, seems to be spreading vaccines-related conspiracy theories by itself) released an update to their subdermal chip, allowing people to store the XRP token inside themselves. By writing the chip, users could transact with their XRP holdings. The chip has since expanded its abilities and can now be used by BTC users too.

Conservative and religious circles were quick to point out the similarities between the emerging tech and the mark of the beast.

The mark of the beast references a theme in the Book of Revelations where people in the end times will be unable to trade without having the mark of the beast, either in their hand or on their forehead. Given the subdermal nature of the chip, speculation was rife and the theory took hold quickly.

That speculation inspired even more end-time related theories, with people claiming that Bitcoin was intended to usher in the New World Order where artificial intelligence would be lord to all. The theory is that AI created Bitcoin, using the prospect of profit as a lure to trap humanity into worshipping it.

___

In either case, despite all these conspiracists, Bitcoin is about to turn 12 on January 3, the anniversary of the first block in the Bitcoin blockchain mined, and it looks ready to ignore even more and even crazier conspiracy theories going forward.

___

Learn more: Bitcoin Wheel Cannot Be StoppedCrypto in 2021: Bitcoin To Ride The Same Wave Of Macroeconomic ProblemsCrypto Adoption in 2021: Bitcoin Rules, Ethereum Grows & Faces RivalsCrypto in 2021: Institutions Prefer Bitcoin, Retail Open to Altcoins

See the original post here:
Satoshi Nakamoto from NSA, AntiChrist and Other Bitcoin Conspiracy Theories - Cryptonews

Colombo, Jan 1 (PTI) The Sri Lankan has appointed 25 senior officers to coordinate the COVID-19 control operations in each district amid a surge in the number of coronavirus cases.

General Shavendra Silva, the Army chief, appointed the coordinating officers for all 25 districts, each of the units headed by a Major General, the Army said.

The new Army coordinating officers at each district would facilitate smooth conduct of quarantine centres, transportation of individuals for quarantine and treatment, the supply of medicines, equipment and dry rations, the Army statement said.

Silva, who was promoted to the rank of a 4 star General last week, was appointed the head of COVID-19 prevention task force at the outset of the pandemic mid-March.

Since early October the island has seen a massive surge in confirmed coronavirus cases and deaths. The death toll from the pandemic in the country crossed the 200-mark by Thursday.

The surge was due to two new clusters reported from a garment exporting factory and at the Colombos biggest wholesale fish market.

Out of the total of 43,249 identified cases since mid-March, 39,570 had come from the two clusters. PTI CORR NSA

Disclaimer :- This story has not been edited by Outlook staff and is auto-generated from news agency feeds. Source: PTI

Read the original here:
Sri Lankan Army to play bigger role in COVID-19 prevention - Outlook India

Sheep producers are invited to find out more about post-Brexit trade and future agricultural policy at a series of virtual events starting next month.

The events, organised by the National Sheep Association (NSA), will take place each Wednesday morning at 8.30am for four weeks from January 20.

With so much still to be announced on how the UKs departure from the EU will shape our future sheep industry, combined with changes to agricultural legislation and support payments, there will no doubt be many sheep farmers out there seeking some support and guidance as we start the new year, said NSA chief executive Phil Stocker.

NSA is excited to launch this new series of short webinars to help the nations sheep farmers keep up to date on the latest announcements affecting them.

We will be welcoming industry leaders from across the UK as well as NSA office holders and some of our corporate supporters to present what we hope will be engaging and useful short sessions that can be enjoyed over breakfast before the days jobs really begin.

Farmers and crofters interested in finding out more about the events are asked to register their interest online here.

Original post:
Trade and policy in spotlight at webinars for sheep producers - Press and Journal

Trump talking about trying to split up the cyber command from the national security agency, in the midst of a crisis to be talking about that type of disruption makes us vulnerable again, House Armed Services Chair Adam Smith (D-Wash.) said Saturday night during an interview with CNN.

On Friday, Smith sent letters to acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, warning them against severing the leadership of NSA and Cyber Command. The two agencies have shared leadership under a so-called dual-hat arrangement since the Pentagon stood up Cyber Command in 2009.

Nakasone has led the militarys top digital warfighting unit and the federal governments largest intelligence agency for roughly two and a half years. He has re-imagined how both organizations can deploy their own hackers and analysts against foreign adversaries via a doctrine of persistent engagement putting U.S. forces in constant contact against adversaries in cyberspace, including tracking them and taking offensive action.

The four-star is beloved by both Democrats and Republicans, especially after defending the 2018 and 2020 election from foreign interference. Some lawmakers even joke they wish they could put Nakasone in charge of more parts of the federal government.

Trump, meanwhile, has churned through the leadership of several federal agencies since losing the presidential election last month, including the Pentagon and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. The president fired the agencys widely-respected chief, Chris Krebs, last month via Twitter.

Breaking up Cyber Command and NSA is now prohibited under a previous defense policy bill. The measure says the two cannot be split unless the Defense secretary and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff jointly certify that such a move wont hinder the effectiveness of Cyber Command, which is co-located with NSA at Fort Meade, Md.

A Democratic congressional staffer said there is concern on Capitol Hill that Miller and other DoD leaders might simply state that the assessment is complete in order to ram the split through without going through the required steps.

A defense official cautioned that even if the leadership change should go through, President-elect Joe Biden and his defense team could simply reverse the decision and rejoin the offensive digital unit and the intelligence gathering organization.

Read the original:
Democrats cry alarm over proposal to split up NSA, Cyber Command amid hacking crisis - POLITICO

The lack of conclusive upstream intelligence about Russias long-running, recently discovered digital espionage effort suggests a need to rethink how the U.S. is organized to meet cyber threats and in particular, the dual-hat leadership of the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command.

To be sure, the United States has worked to improve its national security focus on cybersecurity in recent years, spurred by Russian efforts to interfere in the 2016 election and recognition that more adversaries can and will want to use offensive cyber methods and tools. These efforts include strategy documents, executive orders, and legislation yet more work remains to be done. Insights about the SolarWinds attack underscore a number of cybersecurity gaps and vulnerabilities that were exploited. These include shortcomings in virtual supply chains from the private sector to the government, incomplete information-sharing between and within both these sectors, and the limitations of federal cyber threat detection measures like the Department of Homeland Securitys Einstein program.

The next step should be acting on a long-debated proposal to split the job of leading the NSA and CYBERCOM. On Dec. 19, officials with the lame-duck Trump administration sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a plan to do so. The plan would need the defense secretary and Joint Chiefs Chairman to certify that it meets Congressional requirements; it is not clear whether they will do so before the next administration begins.

Critics of splitting the job note that the two agencies enjoy a very close relationship, sharing people, expertise, resources, and even a physical campus. Separate organizations with different chains of command would develop this level of integration and collaboration slowly, if ever.

But from our vantage point as former professionals with significant experience and insights on how national security reforms have unfolded since 9/11, we believe the nation could be served by the split. Such a move would have a rough precedent in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and created the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position. The law allowed the Central Intelligence Agency to retain its authorities and responsibilities, but its director was no longer forced to lead both an operational agency and the entire U.S. intelligence community.

Splitting up the leadership of NSA and CYBERCOM could allow the latter commander to fully focus on the organizations attention on training, equipping, and organizing military forces to conduct the full spectrum of operations to support national security priorities. It could also eliminate potential conflicts of interest in which the CYBERCOM would advocate conducting warfare against a cyber target (i.e., taking it down) while the NSA would be more interested in collecting intelligence from it (i.e., leaving it up but subverting it). Such decisions would be elevated to an interagency forum such as the National Security Council, where competing equities could be debated in a rigorous manner.

We would also advocate for moving the NSA from its organizational home in the Defense Department. It should be led by a Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed civilian who reports to the DNI. Such a move would improve NSAs existing authorities and capabilities, place it under the intelligence umbrella for which its best suited, and improve its ability to serve national-level and military-specific intelligence requirements.

Javed Ali is a Towsley Policymaker in Residence at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan. He previously had over 20 years professional experience in Washington, DC on national security issues, to include senior roles at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and National Security Council.

Adam Maruyama is a national security professional with more than 15 years of experience in cyber operations, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism. He served in numerous warzones and co-led the drafting of the 2018 National Strategy to Counterterrorism. Adam currently manages cybersecurity softwaredeployments for a number of federal customers.

Read more:
Split Up NSA and CYBERCOM - Defense One

NSA warns hackers are forging cloud authentication information | 2020-12-22 | Security Magazine This website requires certain cookies to work and uses other cookies to help you have the best experience. By visiting this website, certain cookies have already been set, which you may delete and block. By closing this message or continuing to use our site, you agree to the use of cookies. Visit our updated privacy and cookie policy to learn more. This Website Uses CookiesBy closing this message or continuing to use our site, you agree to our cookie policy. Learn MoreThis website requires certain cookies to work and uses other cookies to help you have the best experience. By visiting this website, certain cookies have already been set, which you may delete and block. By closing this message or continuing to use our site, you agree to the use of cookies. Visit our updated privacy and cookie policy to learn more.

Read the original here:
NSA warns hackers are forging cloud authentication information - Security Magazine

The most surprising thing about the failure of U.S. intelligence to discover for nearly nine months the SolarWinds penetration of U.S. government agencies, reportedly including the State, Energy, and Homeland Security Departments as well as private contractors, is that anyone is surprised. After all, the National Security Agency, responsible for protecting the communications of the U.S. government, had such a massive hole punched in its capabilities by a breach in 2013 that Michael McConnell, the former director of first the NSA and then the Office of National Intelligence, assessed This [breach] will have an impact on our ability to do our mission for the next 20 to 30 years.

The proximate cause of the damage was Edward Snowdens theft of NSA files in June 2013. He was never apprehended because he fled first to Hong Kong, where he met with journalists, and then Russia, where he received sanctuary from Putin. How could such a loss of intelligence not do immense damage to the NSAs counterintelligence for many years?

According to the unanimous report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Snowden removed from the NSA digital copies of 1.5 million files, including 900,000 Department of Defense documents concerning, among other things, the newly created joint Cyber Command. Other stolen files contained documents from GCHQthe British signal intelligence service to which Snowden had access. One NSA file, a 31,000-page database, included requests to the NSA made by the 16 other agencies in the Intelligence Community for coverage of foreign targets.

NSA Deputy Director Rick Ledgett, who headed the NSAs damage assessment, warned that this database reveals the gaps in our knowledge of Russia, thus provides our adversaries with a roadmap of what we know, what we dont know, and gives themimplicitlya way to protect their information from the U.S. intelligence communitys view.

Snowdens theft dealt a savage blow to U.S. intelligence. Whenever sensitive compartmentalized information (SCI) is removed without authorization from the NSAs secure facilities, as it was by Snowden, it is, by definition, compromised, regardless of what is done with it. Whether Snowden gave these files to journalists, Russians, or Chinese intelligence, or whether he erased them or threw them in the Pacific Ocean, all the sources in them had to be considered compromisedand shut down. So did the methods they revealed.

The Pentagon did a more extensive damage assessment than the NSA, assigning hundreds of intelligence officers, in round-the-clock shifts, to go through each of the 1.5 million files to identify all the fatally compromised sources and methods they contained, and shut them down. This purge reduced the capabilities of the NSA, the Cyber Command, the British GCHQ, and other allied intelligence services to see inside Russia and China.

The damage was deepened by Snowdens defection to Russia. In a televised press conference on September 2, 2013, Vladimir Putin gloated, I am going to tell you something I have never said before, revealing that, while in Hong Kong, Snowden had been in contact with Russian diplomats. While Snowden denies giving any stolen secrets to Russia, U.S. intelligence further determined, according to the bipartisan House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee, that he was in contact with the Russian intelligence services after he arrived in Moscow and continued to be so for three years. Both Mike Rogers, the committees chair, and Adam Schiff, its ranking minority member, confirmed this finding to me. Fiona Hill, an intelligence analyst in both the Obama and Trump administrations, told the The New Yorker in 2017 that The Russians, partly because they have Edward Snowden in Moscow, possess a good idea of what the U.S. is capable of knowing. They got all of his information. You can be damn well sure that [Snowdens] information is theirs.

After the NSA, CIA, and the Cyber Command shut down the sources and methods Snowden had compromised, McConnell pointed out that entire generations of information had been lost. The resulting blind spots in our surveillance of Russia gave Moscows intelligence services full latitude to carry out mischief. Russian intelligence services have no shortage of operatives and tools to carry out long-term operations in cyberspace and elsewhere.

In the 2020 SolarWinds penetration, which Secretary of State Mike Pompeo attributes to Russian intelligence, the gaps allowed Russian spies to masquerade as authorized system administrators and other IT workers. The spies could use their forged credentials to copy any material of interest, plant hidden programs to alter the future operations of thousands of workstations in networks inside and outside the government, cover their tracks, and plant hidden backdoors for future access. Though it may take years to find and unravel all the malicious code implanted in these systems, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has already determined that this threat poses a grave risk to the Federal Government and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as well as critical infrastructure entities and other private sector organizations.

This immense compromise of government networks is the inevitable price for allowing a large part of our counterintelligence capability to be compromised in 2013. The perverse irony here is that while Vladimir Putin rewarded Snowden for his contributions with permanent residency, Donald Trump says that he is looking into pardoning Snowden for his intrusion into NSA files and betrayal of American secrets.

Edward Jay Epsteins most recent book was How America Lost Its Secrets: Edward Snowden, the Man and the Theft.

Photo by Rosdiana Ciaravolo/Getty Images

See the article here:
Edward Snowden Pardon and the SolarWinds Hack - City Journal

3rd Party Risk Management , Critical Infrastructure Security , Cyberwarfare / Nation-State Attacks

The U.S. National Security Agency has issued a warning about two hacking techniques that could allow threat actors to access cloud resources by bypassing authentication mechanisms.

See Also: The SASE Model: A New Approach to Security

The warning comes after a week's worth of revelations over the SolarWinds breach that has affected government agencies as well as corporations, including Microsoft, FireEye, Intel and Nvida (see: SolarWinds Hack: Lawmakers Demand Answers).

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, commenting on the breach, said in a Friday evening radio interview that "the Russians engaged in this activity."

"I can't say much more as we're still unpacking precisely what it is, and I'm sure some of it will remain classified," Pompeo said, according to a transcript provided by the State Department. "But suffice it to say there was a significant effort to use a piece of third-party software to essentially embed code inside of U.S. government systems, and it now appears systems of private companies and companies and governments across the world as well. This was a very significant effort, and I think it's the case that now we can say pretty clearly that it was the Russians that engaged in this activity."

In a pair of tweets on Saturday, President Donald Trump appeared to question whether Russia was involved in the hacking operation and opened up the possibility that China may have played a role (see: President Trump Downplays Impact of SolarWinds Breach).

"The Cyber Hack is far greater in the Fake News Media than in actuality," Trump tweeted. "Russia, Russia, Russia is the priority chant when anything happens because Lamestream is, for mostly financial reasons, petrified of discussing the possibility that it may be China (it may!)."

The NSA advisory does not specify whether the nation-state hackers behind the SolarWinds breach used these same tactics, techniques and procedures to compromise various networks and gain additional privileges, but the advisory notes threat actors could use these methods to steal credentials and maintain persistent access.

"Initial access can be established through a number of means, including known and unknown vulnerabilities," according to the NSA alert. "The recent SolarWinds Orion code compromise is one serious example of how on-premises systems can be compromised, leading to abuse of federated authentication and malicious cloud access."

The NSA adds these particular tactics and methods described in the alert are not new and have been used by threat actors since 2017.

The two techniques described by NSA involve hacking of cloud resources using either compromised authentication tokens or through compromised system administration accounts in the Microsoft Azure platform. The agency adds, however, that these techniques can be replicated in other cloud platforms as well.

The NSA notes that its latest alert builds on a previous warning about techniques that Russian-linked hackers were using to exploit a vulnerability in several VMware products. The company has since issued a fix for this bug, and users are encouraged to apply it as soon as possible (see: NSA: Russian Hackers Exploiting VMware Vulnerability).

This alert describes two scenarios where the attackers have already compromised the local network and have gained access to the authentication mechanisms that are used to access cloud resources.

In the first scenario, the threat actors begin by compromising on-premises components of federated single sign-on authentication systems that use a single identification and password to log into several systems, the advisory notes.

The attackers then steal credentials or private keys that are used to sign Security Assertion Markup Language, or SAML, tokens used for authentication and authorization between cloud service providers and its tenants or users, the NSA notes.

"Using the private keys, the actors then forge trusted authentication tokens to access cloud resources," according to the NSA alert. "If the malicious cyber actors are unable to obtain an on-premises signing key, they would attempt to gain sufficient administrative privileges within the cloud tenant to add a malicious certificate trust relationship for forging SAML tokens."

In the second scenario, the threat actors use compromised administrator accounts to assign credentials to cloud application services. The actors then call for the applications' credentials to gain automated access to cloud resources, the advisory adds.

The NSA adds that attacks against the cloud infrastructure do not use vulnerabilities in the cloud components, but instead manipulate the "trust" needed for performing authentication, assigned privileges and the SAML tokens.

"If any of these components is compromised, then the trust in the federated identity system can be abused for unauthorized access," the advisory notes.

Brendan O'Connor, CEO and co-founder of security firm AppOmni, notes the tactics described by NSA particularly make third-party apps that connect to cloud services more susceptible to attacks, especially with more organizations now working remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

"It's not that our premise tools have failed, but the data has moved to where they can't see it," O'Connor tells Information Security Media Group. "Getting visibility into what third-party applications are already connected to your cloud applications should be one of the top priorities for security teams."

Because the attacks mainly take advantage of Security Assertion Markup Language in cloud platforms, the NSA recommends several steps that cloud service providers and users can adopt to prevent breaches using the scenarios described in the alert. These mitigation methods include:

The NSA also recommends auditing of the tokens to identify any disparities in their activities. This can be done by either auditing the creation and use of service principal credentials or by auditing the assignment of credentials to applications that allow for non-interactive sign-in by the application.

While the mitigation strategies described by the NSA are meant to provide guidance for the National Security System, Department of Defense, and Defense Industrial Base network administrators, these methods can be applied to any network.

Managing Editor Scott Ferguson contributed to this report.

Continued here:
NSA Warns of Hacking Tactics That Target Cloud Resources - BankInfoSecurity.com

The pandemic affected everyone this year, but our mission didnt slow down. As our Director, GEN Paul Nakasone said, we are one team, and each of us contributes our unique expertise to a mission that is all the more critical in times of crisis.

Throughout 2020, our workforce contributed our expertise in many ways:

NSA worked to secure our elections

The security of the2020 Presidential electionwas NSAs top priority in 2020. We were part of the Whole-of-Government effort to identify and counter foreign interference and malign influence threats to the 2020 U.S. elections. NSA generated vital insights and shared them with partner agencies like U.S. Cyber Command, the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.Our efforts strived to assure all audiences, and most importantly, the American public, that NSA, USCYBERCOM, and other U.S. government partners together protected the U.S. elections from foreign interference and influence campaigns.

NSA shared cybersecurity guidance and advisories

MarylandGovernor Hoganrecognized our cybersecurity expertise to keepCOVID-19 research protectedas part of the U.S. Government-wide Operation Warp Speed (OWS). In addition to our support to OWS, as the pandemic shifted the workplace to home, NSA helped teleworkerswork from home safely,secure their home office, and evenlimit their mobile device exposurethanks to guidance developed by our Cybersecurity mission.

NSA continued our steady provision ofcybersecurity advicefor the Department of Defense, National Security Systems and the Defense Industrial Base. These specificadvisories and guidancealso helped system administrators and other cyber specialists across the cybersecurity field by providing information that was timely, relevant, and actionable throughout the year.

NSA drove innovative solutions

While the world faced new challenges this year, we didnt stop creating solutions. We contributed to the evolution of5G, were involved in how to keep theInternet of Thingssecure, planned for the future of national security when applyingquantumcomputing, we developed aQuBIT Collaboratory, and stood up theCenter for Cybersecurity Standards.

NSA invested in our nations future

We look forward to starting the New Year and the future looks bright, thanks to our investments in the future. TheOnRamp II programprovides the scholarships for students who will be developing the newest solutions to keep our nation safe. NSA worked in partnership with the DoD Office of Small Business Programs and created theCybersecurity Education Diversity Initiativeto assist minority serving institutions. This allows Historically Black Colleges and Universities with no existing cybersecurity program to obtain access to and educational resources from designated National Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity Institutions. We were pleased to announce that theU.S. Naval Academyreceived its designation as an NSA Center of Academic Excellence in Cyber Operations to develop new cyber warriors.

NSA personnel recognized for excellence

While many NSA personnel serve in silence, several of our staff and former personnel were publicly recognized this year for their dedication to our nations security. Former NSA Executive DirectorHarry Cokerwas recognized by the Intelligence Community for his commitment to improving diversity, equality, and inclusion.MSgt Frances Dupris,Dr. Ahmad Ridley,LaNaia JonesandJanelle Romanowere recognized for showing the importance of STEM education and career development. OurTech Transfer Teamwas recognized by the DoD for creating an efficient process for releasing NSA-developed capabilities to the open-source software community.

For more details on our efforts to protect our nation and secure our future, check out our Twitter,@NSAGov, throughout the month.

Read more at NSA

(Visited 71 times, 1 visits today)

Continued here:
NSA Year in Review: Election Security, Cybersecurity, and More - HSToday

In the wake of the SolarWinds incident, critics have pointed to budget and personnel imbalances between offensive and defensive missions. As Alex Stamos pointed out in the Washington Post, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) at the Department of Homeland Security has only 2,200 employees for a mission that includes protecting all sixteen critical infrastructure sectors and all federal agencies while the National Security Agency (NSA) alone has more than 40,000 employees. The Department of Defenses (DOD) Cyber Command has over 12,000 personnel, including 6,000 military members.

While total spending on cyber missions at NSA is classified, what is known about federal spending suggests priorities skewed toward offense. As Jason Healey pointed out last spring, the DODs cybersecurity budget is significantly larger than the cybersecurity budgets of all civilian components combined. The federal government spends more than half a billion dollars per year on the headquarters elements of Cyber Command alone and only $400 million on cyber diplomacy at the State department. All of CISAs budget adds up to about half of what DOD spends on just offensive cyber operations.

More on:

Cybersecurity

U.S. Department of Defense

Homeland Security

Defense and Security

The SolarWinds disaster clearly indicates that CISA and federal agencies will need more money in order to develop the capabilities necessary to detect and contain adversaries as capable as Russias Foreign Intelligence Service. Additional funds are also badly needed to scale out efforts to coordinate with the private sector, fund research that the market will not support, and bolster the security of critical infrastructure. That funding, however, should not come out of the current budgets or future budget growth on the offensive side of the equation.

Net Politics

CFR experts investigate the impact of information and communication technologies on security, privacy, and international affairs.2-4 times weekly.

Since cybersecurity first became an issue of national import, cyber policy has been predicated on the idea of a public-private partnership, a term that is now nauseating to much of the community. Yet the phrase captures the reality that the federal government, unlike in other domains, does not assume ultimate responsibility for the security of systems it does not own or operate, including critical infrastructure. In terms of dollars and cents, what this means is that total spending on U.S. cybersecurity is actually heavily skewed toward defense not offense because all the cybersecurity spending in the private sector goes in the defense column.

Alongside DHSs 2,200 employees at CISA, the 6,000 cyber warriors in the Defense Department suggest an imbalance towards offense over defense until you recognize that only about 2,000 of these 6,000 are in units that carry out offensive cyber missions and these 2,000 people are the only people in the United States that are authorized to carry out offensive cyber operations. Even the NSAs 40,000 employees, only a fraction of which are focused on intelligence collection against adversary cyber operators, pale alongside the total cybersecurity workforce estimated at 750,000.

While estimates of total private sector spending in the United States range from $40 billion to $120 billion, even the lower end of that range is more than ten times the Pentagons budget for cyber operations and four times what data leaked from the Snowden disclosures suggested was the NSA's budget. Microsoft alone says that it spends $1 billion a year on cybersecurity, and JP Morgan also spends close to that amount.

No doubt CISA needs to grow several times over to carry out its mission, and other civilian agencies will need a large influx of funds to secure themselves, but relative percentages between defense and offense in the federal budget could look largely the same.

More on:

Cybersecurity

U.S. Department of Defense

Homeland Security

Defense and Security

Digital and Cyberspace Update

Digital and Cyberspace Policy program updates on cybersecurity, digital trade, internet governance, and online privacy.Bimonthly.

While the defense clearly failed, it is becoming increasingly clear that the intelligence community either failed to detect this campaign or lacked the ability to understand and communicate what they saw. Its also possible that the NSA supplied indications and warnings of the campaign to Cyber Command but offensive operators were spread too thin to engage and disrupt the activity. Either way, more spending, not less on offense, could be in the cards.

Read more here:
No, the United States Does Not Spend Too Much on Cyber Offense - Council on Foreign Relations