Category Archives: NATO

Italian submarine ITS Salvatore Todaro (S 526) and Canadian frigate HMCS Fredericton (FFH 337) sail in the Ionian Sea during an anti-submarine warfare demonstration for media on Feb. 24, 2020, during the kickoff of NATOs Dynamic Manta exercise. USNI News photo.

ABOARD ITS CARABINIERE, IN THE IONIAN SEA All across the Mediterranean Sea, more non-NATO countries are fielding submarines while NATO allies are increasing the size of their own undersea fleets. Those submarines are also becoming harder to find.

All told, the ability for NATO to find, track and identify submarines is not just a matter of defense against Russia, but a matter of basic traffic safety on and under the Mediterranean.

Set against the backdrop of the increasingly crowded Med, NATO is hosting the Dynamic Manta 2020 anti-submarine warfare exercise, bringing together nine nations to combine ASW capabilities from ships, maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters and submarines, and improve their ability to work together to keep these southern European waters safe.

Dynamic Manta was designed to train, to prepare, to test our ability in a very particular domain, that is the anti-submarine warfare, Italian Navy Rear Admiral Paolo Fantoni, who commands Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, said ahead of the kickoff of the exercise.All this to facilitate the integration of forces. That is the goal and the strength of NATO: the capability for the alliance to operate with different forces from different nations using the same standards and procedures, and to be able to react properly to any type of emergency.

SNMG-2 commands the surface forces in the exercises and is one of four very high readiness surface forces that NATO maintains under its Maritime Command (MARCOM).

Canadian frigate HMCS Fredericton (FFH 337) and a helicopter participate in an anti-submarine warfare demonstration for media on Feb. 24, 2020, at the kickoff of the NATO Dynamic Manta 2020 exercise. USNI News photo.

Fantoni told USNI News during an interview aboard SNMG-2 flagship ITS Carabiniere (F 593) that ASW is tough enough for one nation to do, but combining ships and aircraft from multiple countries is a challenge. Each bring different kinds of sensors onboard ships and aircraft of different ages and sophistication. For example, under his command is Italian frigate Carabiniere, an ASW-variant FREMM frigate that delivered to the fleet in 2015. Also in the task group is Hellenic Navy frigate HS Aegean (F 460), which was commissioned into the Royal Netherlands Navy in 1980, sold to Greece in 1993 and modernized in 2010. Fantoni said all the ships are trained to certain NATO standards before they are assigned to a NATO group like SNMG-2, but his job is to figure out how to make the most of the differing capabilities each ship brings.

We need to operate as a force not Carabiniere acting on her own and (Canadian frigate) Fredericton and the others on their own the ships are a part of the scenario for the interactions: they have to achieve some goals, to detect the submarines, to take some actions against the submarines, and vice versa to defend themselves, to defend a nearby unit from a submarine attack, he said, calling it a force-multiplier when they can share information and hunt a sub collectively rather than operating in proximity but independently.

Everyone involved in the exercise can perform some ASW, but some assets bring especially advanced capabilities: Carabiniere has a variable-depth sonar, some helos have a dipping sonar to supplement their airborne sensors, the fixed-wing planes have great endurance and range.

Its like an orchestra. I feel like, really, a director of an orchestra to use different instruments as much as they can contribute to my mission, Fantoni said.

In the complex undersea environment in the Mediterranean, squeezing out the most capability from SNMG-2 and the ships and aircraft it partners with during exercises like Dynamic Manta is key.

This August, Russia did Exercise Ocean Shield, which was the largest post end of the Cold War exercise conducted by Russia. And one of the components of [NATOs Supreme Allied Commander Europe]s guidance is that we conduct deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area. The point of Dynamic Manta is to show a credible defense, that we have the ability to act interoperably within the ASW realm, Rear Adm. Andy Burcher, commander of NATO submarines at MARCOM, said during a press conference aboard Carabiniere on Feb. 24 the first day of the exercise.In addition to that, I would say that all of the large number of nations that surround the Mediterranean are increasing the number of submarines that are operating in the Mediterranean: Algeria, Egypt, Russia and Israel are now all operating submarines in the Mediterranean. And a large number of our NATO alliance countries are increasing their submarine footprint in the area: Spain, Italy, Turkey, I believe Greece, are all conducting expansion programs within the submarine realm. So from a submarine perspective, the number of submarines that are operating in the Mediterranean is increasing, so its important that we understand how the Mediterranean operates, and in particular, all of these submarines that are coming in have advanced capabilities in comparison to the past. So we have to stay both proficient and capable in the ASW realm. So those are the factors that I see in the Mediterranean that make this exercise important.

On Russia specifically, Fantoni said that, they are military vessels, they dont belong to the alliance, they are present so we could consider them as a threat, but I dont see a threat, an immediate threat to the forces. We respect their potential capability but also confident that we are as well prepared for any type of emergency.

A helicopter from Italian frigate ITS Carabiniere (F 593) lowers its dipping sonar into the Ionian Sea on Feb. 24, 2020, during an anti-warfare demonstration for media at the kickoff of NATO exercise Dynamic Manta. USNI News photo.

If the purpose of NATOs four standing maritime groups is to ensure theres always a task group integrated and ready to respond to an emergency, the purpose of exercises like Dynamic Manta and its sister exercise in the North Atlantic, Dynamic Mongoose, is to allow those task groups to prove their proficiency in specialized warfare areas.

Burcher said during the press conference that, if a war were to break out, NATO countries could bring a great number of submarines to the fight: 12 NATO countries have a combined 69 submarines, and though the U.S. Navy typically doesnt lend its submarines to NATO for tasking, it could bring about 30 Atlantic-based subs to the fight if the need arose. Those 100 subs, plus the frigates and destroyers and helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft that would supplement them in a hypothetical fight against the Russian submarine fleet, are all capable assets but integration only comes through practice. By rotating which nations are involved in the standing groups and which participate in exercises like Dynamic Manta, all nations are exposed to some amount of integrated theater ASW operations through NATO and are able to develop some sort of institutional knowledge.

In Dynamic Manta 2020, a series of CASEXs increase in complexity, from familiarization efforts up through a graduating event of coordinated theater ASW with air, surface and subsurface assets contributing to finding an enemy submarine, Burcher explained. Early on, a ship might be told that the target is in its operating box and be given its course and speed to see if it can positively find and identify the submarine with its systems; by the end, the ship might be told a target is within its operating box but it wont have any clues as to its location or course.

Four submarines are participating, with subs serving as targets as well as ASW assets. Nine countries total are involved, as well as NATOs Center for Maritime Research and Experimentation, which is bringing unmanned undersea vehicles and gliders to contribute to sub-hunting operations while also testing out the new gear and new tactics, which Burcher said brings in an extra added tool to the undersea fight.

A helicopter tracks Italian submarine ITS Salvatore Todaro (S 526) in the Ionian Sea on Feb. 24, 2020, during an anti-submarine warfare demonstration for media at the kickoff of the NATO Dynamic Manta 2020 exercise. USNI News photo.

Fantoni said MARCOM is constantly identifying gaps, noting lessons learned, testing out new concepts to fix those gaps, and then ultimately updating doctrine so NATO forces will train to the best and most relevant capabilities. Much of this is driven by ever-changing capabilities both in NATO assets as well as potential target submarines.

Technology is evolving very very quick, and of course we adapt our doctrine to the new capabilities. One basic example: if in the past your sensors were able to detect a submarine at 10 kilometers, and now your sensor allows you to detect beyond that limit, you need to adjust to how you intend to use the tactics that goes behind it, Fantoni told USNI News.But also the submarines are getting new technology, so we change on a yearly basis from exercise to exercise.

Dynamic Manta takes place in the Ionian Sea, in the Central Mediterranean in waters with relatively less commercial shipping traffic. Dynamic Mongoose takes place in Northern Europe, typically rotating between the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean to allow northern NATO navies to practice in shallower waters and in the deep ocean.

Fantoni called Dynamic Manta and Mongoose two of the most interesting and viable activities and represent today the highest level of integration of forces in anti-submarine warfare. Very beneficial to surface vessels, for maritime patrol aircraft, and indeed for the submarines.

Submarines are constantly improving their stealth, their quietness. They are improving in their tactics and the sensors that they have, and so these types of exercises allow us to really put theory to practice and make sure that we understand what were doing in a highly complex environment, Burcher said.Because anti-submarine warfare requires both air, surface and submarine assets to detect the other submarines, its important that we learn how to and we practice in a combined environment.

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NATO Trains For Submarine Warfare As More Attack Boats Prowl the Med - USNI News

Russian submarines are deploying farther, in greater numbers, than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The undersea surge has prompted NATO to initiate a surge of its own, launching large numbers of maritime patrol planes to find, track and practice sinking the Russian boats.

But theres evidence Russia is doing the same thing, sending its own patrol planes farther south than they normally fly.

The escalating deployments point to growing readiness for war on both sides.

British and Norwegian Typhoon and F-16 fighter jets scrambled two times in late February 2020 to intercept pairs of Tu-142 patrol planes belonging to Russias Northern Fleet after the Tu-142s flew farther south than normal and approaches Norwegian air space.

These Russian aircraft operate relatively routinely over the seas north of Norway, Maj. Brynjar Stordal, a spokesperson for the Norwegian armed forces, told The Barents Observer. It is not common that they fly as far south as they did this week.

The Russian planes flew over the Barents Sea north of the Kola Peninsula before turning south into the so-called Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap, a maritime chokepoint in the North Atlantic.

Breaking through the GIUK gap in a potential conflict would be important for the Russian navy when establishing the bastion defense concept, protecting the ballistic missile submarines patrolling in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean, The Barents Observer explained.

The Tu-142 flights coincided with the beginning of a major NATO exercise in Norway. Exercise Cold Response involved 15,000 alliance troops from nine countries.

We have experienced in the past that allied exercise activities in out neighborhoods has led to some increased activity from Russian surveillance capacities like this, Stordal said.

NATO isnt alone in staging large-scale war games. The Russian navy in mid-October 2019 sortied eight subs in the countrys biggest undersea exercise since the Cold War.

The eight submarines, including six nuclear-powered ships, sailed from their bases in northern Russia into the cold waters of the Barents and Norwegian Seas. At the same time, an additional two boats -- the nuclear-powered Sierra-class attack submarines Pskov and Nizhny Novgorod -- sailed into roughly the same waters for tests and training.

The 10 vessels represent around 20 percent of the Russian submarine force. For comparison, the U.S. Pacific Fleet with its roughly 30 subs as recently as 2013 reliably could deploy eight boats on short notice.

More than a dozen NATO patrol planes flew back-to-back missions in order to find and track Moscows submarines. Amatuer plane-spotters using commercial software kept tabs on the planes transponders.

Its unclear how many NATO submarines also joined the hunt for the Russian boats.

Between Oct. 25 and Nov. 7, 2019, the NATO planes flew more than 40 missions. Six Norwegian air force P-3s, four U.S. Navy P-8s and a Canadian air force CP-140 flew from Andoya in Norway. At least one additional P-8 flew from Keflavik in Iceland. A French navy Atlantic 2 patroller staged from Prestwick airport in Scotland.

Russian submarines also have extended their patrols across the Atlantic to the U.S. East Coast. In response, the U.S. fleet in March 2020 is doing something it hasnt done in decades. Practicing to protect convoys.

The Navy is exercising a contested cross-Atlantic convoy operation for the first time since the end of the Cold War, using a carrier strike group to pave the way for sealift ships with a cruiser escort to bring the Army ground equipment for the Defender-20 exercise, USNI News reported.

The nuclear-powered supercarrier USS Eisenhower is leading the current convoy exercise. The Ike, along with an unidentified submarine sweeping the depths of the ocean for unexpected Russian guests, is participating in an exercise that will throw simulated attacks at the convoy to stress test how prepared the Navy is to punch its way across the Atlantic, Breaking Defense explained.

But NATO isnt the only one preparing for undersea warfare, as the spike in Russian aerial patrols indicate.

David Axe serves as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is theauthor of the graphic novelsWar Fix,War Is BoringandMachete Squad.

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Putin Is Pushing: NATO Jets Are Scrambling to Intercept Russian Patrol Planes - The National Interest Online

Temperatures were dropping to below minus 20 degrees celsius in parts of northern Norway as up to 16,000 troops from ten countries on 2nd March started the Cold Response 2020.

It is Norways biggest allied exercise and the countrys Armed Forces have been preparing intensively for months.

For sixteen days military men and women backed by heavy hardware will fight their way across deep snow and harsh climate conditions. For Norway, cold weather fighting is considered field of top expertise and the country has made Arctic operations its special contribution to NATO.

According to the Norwegian military, the main purpose of the Cold Response 2020 is to conduct multinational joint exercises with a high-intensity combat scenario in demanding winter conditions.

Of big importance is also joint training with large amphibious capacities, the countrys Armed Forces inform.

The training ground covers major parts of northern Norway, except areas close to the Russian border. A key role in the drills are given to the newly formed Finnmark Land Defense, a unit based in Porsanger.

These forces, along with supporting troops from the Sr-Varanger border guards, as well as units from the Finnish, Swedish and British armed forces, will play the role as attacking enemy in the exercise scenario.

The attacking forces will advance on theBrigade North, the more south-based troops that subsequently will request support from NATO units.

This is a milestone in the build-up and development of the Finnmark Land Defense, says Jan Marius Nilsen, Head of the countrys Border Guards.

The Finnmark Land Defense has been a key priority in the development of Norways Arctic capacities. By year 2022, a full-fledged cavalry battalion with about 400 soldiers will be based in Porsanger, the military base located near the town of Lakselv in northern Norway.

Included in the military buildup is also a new 200 soldiers strong Ranger Company at the Garrison of Sr-Varanger, based on the border to Russia.

Included in the drills are heavy military hardware, including ships, aircraft and armored vehicles and tanks.

The exercise was originally to include a bigger number of American troops. However, up to 3,000 U.S. soldiers were ultimately instead sent to engagements in the Middle East.

The Cold Response 2020 still includes a significant number of Americans that will engage alongside Norwegians, British, Dutch, German, French, Danish, as well as Swedish and Finnish troops.

The number of foreign forces will total about 6,000.

Military observers from neighboring Russia are invited to attend parts of the exercise along with observers from a number of more countries.

Russia has on repeated occasions expressed dislike with the bi-annual NATO exercise and has explicitly displayedits presence in the region ahead of the drills.

On February 26th and 27th, two Tu-142 planes from the Russian Northern Fleet flew far south along the Norwegian coast.

The planes came out over the Barents Sea north of the Kola Peninsula, continued to west of the North Cape before heading south deep into the so-called GIUK gap (Greenland-Iceland-UK), the area in the northern Atlantic that forms a naval choke point.

Russia has also carefully planned its own exercise activity to match with the NATO training.

In the last days of February, the Northern Fleet conducted combat training at the Shary shooting range just few kilometers from the border to Norway

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Freezing cold as 16000 NATO soldiers kickstart Arctic war game - The Independent Barents Observer

With an election coming up in November, Trump is keen to make good on pledge to end America's longest war, but observers say it appears the Taliban have yet to be convinced to come to the negotiating table with Kabul.

Western forces will only leave Afghanistan if the Taliban make good on their commitment to reduce bloodshed, the head of NATO warned Wednesday, as attacks surge.

The militants have ramped up violence against Afghan forces since signing a deal with Washington at the weekend, casting doubt over peace talks between Kabul and the Taliban, due to begin on March 10.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told AFP that a "long and hard" road to peace lay ahead but warned the Taliban that if they reneged on the agreement, foreign forces would not leave.

"It is a very difficult situation and Taliban must honour their commitment. We need to see reduction in violence," Stoltenberg told AFP in an interview in Zagreb, where he attended a meeting of EU defence ministers.

"We can only deliver our side of the deal if Taliban deliver their side of the deal."

US President Donald Trump has touted the deal, signed in Doha, as a way to end the bloody 18-year US military presence in Afghanistan.

But overnight, Taliban militants killed at least 20 Afghan soldiers and policemen in a string of attacks in the latest breach of the partial truce.

Under the terms of the deal, US and other foreign forces will quit Afghanistan within 14 months, subject to Taliban security guarantees and a pledge by the insurgents to hold talks with the government of President Ashraf Ghani.

'No alternative'

NATO, which has a 16,000-strong training and support mission in Afghanistan, has long insisted it would only leave when conditions were right in particular that terrorists could not use the country as a springboard for attacks abroad.

"The agreement that was signed on Saturday was an important first step, but it's only a first step," said Stoltenberg, who as prime minister of Norway sent troops to Afghanistan following the US-led invasion that overthrew the Taliban in 2001.

"The road towards peace will be long and hard and we have to be prepared for disappointments."

"At the same time there is no alternative. The only way to have a peaceful solution is a negotiated agreement and to talk to Taliban."

With an election coming up in November, Trump is keen to make good on pledge to end America's longest war, but observers say it appears the Taliban have yet to be convinced to come to the negotiating table with Kabul.

Barely three days after signing the partial truce deal, the Taliban announced they were resuming their offensive against Afghan government forces.

In a sign of their intent, the militants have mounted 30 attacks in 15 of the country's 34 provinces in the space of 24 hours, according to the Afghan interior ministry.

Source: AFP

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NATO chief warns of hard road to Afghan peace as violence soars - TRT World

CRISIS POINT: Ambassadors from all 29 NATO nations met in emergency session in Brussels this morning, after Turkey invoked Article 4 of the alliance treaty. Under Article 4 of the Treaty, any ally can request consultations whenever, in the opinion of any of them, their territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened, NATO said in a statement.

Turkey is calling on world powers to impose a no-fly zone over northern Syria after regime airstrikes in the Idlib region killed 33 Turkish troops Thursday, and worsened a humanitarian crisis that has displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Its the highest death toll for Turkish forces since they first moved into Syria in 2016.

Turkey has been trying to block the Russian-backed Syrian government offensive which is aimed at capturing the last major rebel stronghold. The brutal military campaign has targeted hospitals and schools, and has worsened the misery of thousands of civilians fleeing the fighting.

NO-FLY, NO GO: When NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emerged from the meeting shortly after 6 a.m. Washington time, he made no mention of any no-fly zone, but said the NATO allies expressed their full solidarity and condemned the continued indiscriminate airstrikes by the Syrian regime and Russia in Idlib province.

I call on them to stop their offensive, to respect international law and to back U.N. efforts for a peaceful solution, he said.

REFUGEES ON THE MOVE: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has ordered his border forces to stand down and allow refugees to cross into Turkey, and a senior Turkish official says Ankara would no longer stop Syrian refugees from reaching Europe, according to Reuters.

The move was applauded by Refugees International, which advocates on behalf of displaced people. If true, the move could provide a lifeline for the hundreds of thousands of desperate Syrians fleeing a brutal and condemnable Syrian and Russian offensive in Idlib, said the groups president, Eric Schwartz. And we would urge Turkey not to impose an arbitrary deadline on those seeking to escape the Russian-Syrian kill box.

Turkey has already taken in more than 3.6 million Syrian refugees, and says it will not stop the new arrivals from moving on to Europe and other destinations.

All refugees should enjoy freedom of movement, but we are also deeply concerned that those leaving Turkey will face a perilous journey across the sea to Greece a journey that has claimed so many lives, said Schwartz The Greek government will need to move quickly to rescue and receive refugees that make the crossing.

THE WORLD IS SITTING ON ITS HANDS: South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham, a stalwart defender of President Trump, yesterday supported Turkeys no-fly zone request, and called on Trump to act quickly.

Mr. President: it is in our national security interest to stop the slaughter and get ahead of a humanitarian crisis that could see millions of additional refugees flow out of Syria, creating further chaos, Graham said in a statement.

The world is sitting on its hands and watching the destruction of Idlib by Assad, Iran, and the Russians. This is one of the greatest humanitarian disasters in decades and the brutal aggression of Assad supported by Iran and Russia needs to come to an end, Graham said.

I very much appreciate Turkeys intervention in Idlib. It is now time for the international community to establish a no-fly zone to save thousands of innocent men, women, and children from a horrible death.

ESPER ENGAGED: At the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Mark Esper consulted with his Turkish counterpart, Hulusi Akar, by phone.

The two leaders discussed the Assad regime's brutal aggression in Idlib, which is backed by Russia and Iran; the resulting humanitarian crisis in Northwest Syria; and Libya, said a Pentagon read-out of the call. As President Trump said on Tuesday, and as discussed in today's call, we are exploring ways the United States can work together with Turkey and the international community.

RUSSIA DENIES ROLE: The Russian Defence Ministry claimed Turkish troops were hit by artillery fire, not airstrikes, and said the Turkish forces were collocated with rebel fighters and shouldnt have been there.

The Russian news agency RIA said Turkey had failed to notify Moscow of the presence of Turkish troops in the area despite being in regular communication with the Russian military.

MESSAGE TO ERDOGAN: As the news was breaking yesterday, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison was briefing reporters at the State Department. As she waited for details of the attack she said one thing was clear: The U.S. not Russia is Turkeys true friend.

This is a big development, and our alliance is with Turkey. It is not with Russia; it is with Turkey. We want Turkey to understand that we are the one that theyve been allied with. Theyre in all of the missions that we have.

Good Friday morning and welcome to Jamie McIntyres Daily on Defense, written and compiled by Washington Examiner National Security Senior Writer Jamie McIntyre (@jamiejmcintyre) and edited by Susan Katz Keating (@SKatzKeating). Email here with tips, suggestions, calendar items, and anything else. Sign up or read current and back issues at DailyonDefense.com. If signing up doesnt work, shoot us an email and well add you to our list. And be sure to follow us on Twitter: @dailyondefense.

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HAPPENING TODAY: Acting Navy Secretary Thomas Modly discusses "How a Modernized Navy will Compete with China and Russia, with Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, at 9 a.m. See calendar below.

355 SHIPS IN 10 YEARS: At yesterdays House Armed Services Committee hearing, Modly insisted that despite proposed cuts in the Navys shipbuilding budget for FY 2021, he anticipated meeting the goal of 355 ship fleet in 10 years.

While this budget does slow our trajectory to a force of 355 ships or more, it does not arrest it, Modly testified. You have my personal assurance that we are still deeply committed to building that larger, more capable, more distributed naval force within what I consider a strategic relevant timeframe of no more than 10 years.

Committee chairman, Democrat Rep. Adam Smith was highly skeptical of the pledge. It's almost meaningless at this point, since it's like 20, 30 years out, he said. It's great to have goals, I suppose, and we can aspire towards that number. But at the point -- at this point, it seems like just that, an aspiration.

LOSING A SUB: Modly was quizzed by Smith about the decision of the Pentagon to move money that would have paid for a second Virginia-class attack submarine to boost funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration.

Well, to be frank, it's not helpful because it takes a ship out of a plan that we're driving towards, said Modley. It particularly is harmful in the sense that it takes a ship out of a category of ship for which we're going to have a hard time getting to anyway.

The need for new attack submarines is considered a critical component of the Navys future strategy, and Modly admitted the current plan doesnt quite get where the Navy wants to be. We feel like we need to have at least 66 attack submarines. Even on the 10-year trajectory, based on industrial base capacity, we think we can get to about 49 or 50, he said So it takes out one. If we can get to 48 instead of 49, that impacts that number.

NOT IN THE ROOM WHERE IT HAPPENED: Pressed by California Democrat Rep. Susan Davis, Chief of Naval Operation Adm. Michael Gilday admitted he was not consulted about the decision to forgo a submarine for more nuclear funding.

I was not directly involved in those discussions, he testified. It happened at budget endgame very quickly and we were informed after the decision was made.

IRANS TORTURE TV: The Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies is out with a new report that documents the Iranian regimes use of torture and forced confessions on its state-run media network.

To coerce political prisoners into appearing on camera and falsely admitting to contrived crimes, interrogators often beat prisoners with cables, sometimes to the point of paralysis; hold prisoners in solitary confinement for years; or threaten forced injections of hallucinogenic drugs, write authors Toby Dershowitz and Talia Katz. In using forced confessions, Iranian state media violate human rights of the innocent, demonize minority groups, delegitimize dissidents, and frame dual-nationals for contrived crimes.

The report calls for sanctions to be placed on the state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting network, noting IRIB reporters are actually the interrogators who extracted the forced confessions.

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Washington Examiner: Pompeo on anniversary of Russia's 'unprovoked invasion': Crimea belongs to Ukraine

Washington Examiner: Adam Schiff asks acting spy chief Richard Grenell to declassify documents related to Khashoggi killing

USNI News: Coronavirus Concerns Prompt PACFLEET To Impose 14-Day Gap Between Port Visits

Military.com: CENTCOM Limits Troop Travel In Middle East Due To Coronavirus Fears

Breaking Defense: Navy & Marines Caught By Surprise By Espers Budget Cuts

Military.com: More Marine Corps Personnel Cuts Are Coming, Commandant Says

Defense News: Expect Congress To Block Africa Troop Cuts, Says Defense Panel Chairman

AP: Afghans view US-Taliban deal with well-earned skepticism

Washington Post: Recent calm lets Afghans envisage a peaceful life Amid respite from fighting, Afghans glimpse peace

McClatchy: Congressman who also served at toxic black goo base reveals his own cancer fight

Washington Examiner: 'Our Agent Orange': Veterans who served at toxic Uzbekistan base want help from Congress

New York Times: U.S. Maintains Pressure On Iran, Stalling Diplomacy While Expecting Attacks

Stars and Stripes: U.S. Military Gives South Korean Employees One Month Notice On Unpaid Leave

Washington Post: Inspector general to probe whether VA chief Wilkie tried to discredit Democratic aide who reported sexual assault

AP: Grandfather, Navy vet among 5 victims of Wisconsin shooting

FRIDAY | FEBRUARY 28

8 a.m. Orlando, Fl. Day three of the Air Force Association 2020 Air Warfare Symposium, with, Will Roper, assistant secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology And Logistics; Air Force Secretary Barbara Barrett; Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein; and Elon Musk, SpaceX Chief Engineer and Lt. Gen. John Thompson, commander, Space and Missile Systems Center. Agenda at https://www.afa.org/events/airwarfare/agenda

9 a.m. 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W. Brookings Institution discussion: "How a Modernized Navy will Compete with China and Russia, with acting Navy Secretary Thomas Modly, and Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellow at Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/events

9 a.m. 201 Waterfront St., National Harbor, Md. The American Conservative Union holds its annual Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC). Agenda: http://cpac.conservative.org/agenda

5 p.m. 1521 16th St. N.W. Institute of World Politics book discussion on "To Catch a Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence," with author Jim Olson, former chief of CIA counterintelligence. https://www.iwp.edu/events

MONDAY | MARCH 2

10 a.m. 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W. Brookings Institution discussion: Congress and defense policy: A conversation with Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas. https://www.brookings.edu/events

10 a.m. 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W. Brookings Institution discussion: Defending NATOs eastern flank: A conversation on Russia with Estonias minister of defense, with Jri Luik Estonian MoD. https://www.brookings.edu/events

TUESDAY | MARCH 3

10:30 a.m. 2118 Rayburn House Armed Services Committee hearing: The Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Budget Request for the Department of the Army, with testimony from Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy and Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville. https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings

2 p.m. 2118 Rayburn House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness hearing: The Fiscal Year 2021 Air Force and Space Force Readiness Posture, with testimony from Shon Manasco, acting undersecretary of the Air Force; Gen. Stephen Wilson, Air Force vice chief of staff; and Lt. Gen. David Thompson, vice commander, U.S. Space Force. https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings

2:30 p.m. 2212 Rayburn House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces hearing: The Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request for Nuclear Forces and Atomic Energy Defense Activities, with testimony from Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; Victorino Mercado, performing the duties of assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and capabilities; Vice Adm. Johnny Wolfe, Navy director, Strategic Systems Programs; Air Force Lt. Gen. Richard Clark, deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration; and Allison Bawden, director, natural resources and environment team, Government Accountability Office. https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings

WEDNESDAY | MARCH 4

9 a.m. 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. McAleese Defense Programs Conference, with national security adviser Robert OBrien; Ellen Lord, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment; Michael Griffin, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering; Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy, and more than a dozen others. https://www.mcaleese.com/events

10 a.m. 2118 Rayburn House Armed Services Committee hearing: The Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Budget Request for the Department of the Air Force, with testimony from Air Force Secretary Barbara Barrett; Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein; Gen. John Raymond, chief of space operations, U.S. Space Force. https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings

2:30 p.m. 2212 Rayburn House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and Capabilities hearing: The Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request for U.S. Cyber Command and Operations in Cyberspace, with testimony from Kenneth Rapuano, assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and global security; and U.S. Cyber Commander and National Security Agency Director Army Gen. Paul Nakasone. https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings

2:30 p.m. 1030 15th St. N.W. Center for the National Interest and the Eurasia Center debate: Why should the US care about Ukraine? with Will Ruger, vice president for research and policy at the Charles Koch Institute; and Alina Polyakova, president & CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis. The moderators are Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of The National Interest; and Melinda Haring, deputy director of the Eurasia Center. Register at : https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event

9:30 p.m. ET Hoover Institution, Stanford, Ca. Intelligence Squared U.S. debates "The Maximum Pressure Campaign Against Iran Is Working, with former national security adviser retired Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster and Military Historian Victor Davis Hanson arguing for the proposition and Martha Crenshaw, terrorism studies expert and Abbas Milani of the Iran Democracy Project arguing against. Streamed live at https://www.intelligencesquaredus.org/debates

THURSDAY | MARCH 5

9:30 a.m. 2212 Rayburn House Armed Services Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces Hearing: The Fiscal Year 2021 Army and Marine Corps Ground Modernization Programs, with testimony from Bruce Jette, assistant secretary of the army for acquisition, logistics and technology; Gen. John Murray, commanding general, Army Futures Command; Lt. Gen. Eric Smith, commanding general, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and James Geurts, assistant secretary of the navy for research, development, and acquisition https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings

This dangerous situation must be deescalated to avoid further worsening of the horrendous humanitarian situation in the region, and to allow urgent humanitarian access for those trapped in Idlib. We urge an immediate return to the 2018 ceasefire.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, after an urgent meeting called by Turkey to discuss the escalating crisis in Syria

Read more here:
NATO convenes urgent session as Turkey calls for no-fly zone over northern Syria after airstrikes kill 33 Turkish troops - Washington Examiner

B61 in an underground Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3) vault at Volkel Air Base, Netherlands (Source: US Air Force/Wiki Commons)

Various NATO member-states have long contributed to the Cold War-era alliance by playing host to US nuclear weapons, as part of a special arrangement in which nuclear sharing is a core principle of the collective defence and deterrence with conversation about developing Australias deterrence, is it time to follow suit?

Australia's earliest strategic relationship with the British Empire established a foundation of dependence that would characterise all of the nation's future defence and national security relationships both in the Indo-Pacific and the wider world.

As British power slowly declined following the First World War and the US emerged as the pre-eminent economic, political and strategic power during the Second World War Australia became dependent on 'Pax Americana', or the American Peace.

Recognising this, Australia's strategic and defence planning has been intrinsically defined and impacted by a number of different, yet interconnected and increasingly complex factors, namely:

These factors have formed the basis of Australia's deterrence doctrine, depending upon larger, "great and powerful" friends to provide the real strategic deterrence to Australia's ad hoc tactical deterrence capabilities.

While conventional power projection capabilities alongside economic and soft power deterrence plays a role in this balancing act, the nuclear umbrella provided by theUS and, to a smaller degree, theUK has provided Australia with a greater degree of security in the face of potentialregional adversaries.

Despite thecollapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War cementing America's position as the pre-eminent world power this period was relatively short lived as costly engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, peace-keeping interventions in southern Europe and enduring global security responsibilities have drained American 'blood' and 'treasure'.

In doing so, these expeditions have served to erode the domestic political, economic and strategic resolve and capacity of the US to unilaterally counter the rise of totalitarian regimes and peer competitors in both China and Russia.

NATO's nuclear sharing paradigm

While Australia has long been recognised as a global middle power, straddling the line between lower tier and global power, nuclear weapons and nuclear energy have remained highly contentious. Looking more broadly, many of Australia's NATO contemporaries seem to have fewer compunctions about both nuclear energy and, critically, nuclear ordnance.

As part of the NATO agreement, theUS has provided European NATO allies with a successive series of nuclear ordnance options across bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy and, up until recently, Turkey as a means of providing a tactical and strategic deterrence to potential Soviet aggression.

Looking further abroad, but still within the confines of the NATO alliance structure, Australia's Commonwealth 'cousin' Canada has a history of sharing nuclear ordnance with both theUS and the UK, largely through the auspice of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD).

Canadian military units deployed to Europe throughout the Cold War frequently hosted a range of American and British nuclear ordnance, ranging from the B57 tactical nuclear weapon, which was deployed with the Canadian Air Force's CF-104s in Germany, through to the MGR-1 Honest John with a 1-kiloton W31 nuclear warhead.

Additionally, Belgium, Italy andGermany all continue to partake in the NATO nuclear weapons sharing program, with the modern B61 nuclear weapons divided between a range of facilities, for deployment upon existing tactical strike aircraft including the Belgian Air Force's F-16s and future F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, the German and Italian Eurofighter and the Panavia Tornado aircraft.

The rollout of the next-generation of the B61 weapons system, the Mod 12, will also see the platform integrated with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter fleet to be deployed across US and NATO-allies in Europe.

NATO's distributed nuclear deterrence strategy is based on what Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp and US Air Force Major General (Ret'd)Robertus Remkesdescribe as, "The logic of nuclear deterrence is to change the risk calculation of a potential aggressor by threatening unacceptable damage through nuclear retaliation.

"In that sense, a nuclear posture sends the political message to an opponent or potential attacker that they cannot expect any gain or benefit from their aggression beingsufficient to justify the nuclear devastation they will suffer on their own territory."

This stratagem fits in line with recent conversations launched byMarcus Hellyer, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's (ASPI) senior analyst for defence economics and capability, beginning with'Deterrence and long-range strike capability for Australia',in which he begins to debate the options available to Australia.

It is pivotal to identify that Hellyer does not in anyway articulate the development and introduction of an independent Australian nuclear arsenal (at least not yet anyway).

However,Hellyer's core driving force behind the radical shift in thinking regarding the introduction of an Australian long-range deterrent is based on the fact that "we could no longer take American military primacy for granted".

Crossing the "nuclear Rubicon"

Enter widely respected Australian strategic and defence policy analyst Hugh White, who recently kicked the hornets nest of debate with his new book,How to Defend Australia, and a series of supportingopinion pieces.

White set the scene for the Australian public, presenting perhaps one of the most asinine questions of recent strategic debate:

"Should Australia defend itself? Our choice is not an easy one. Just because we probably can build the forces to defend ourselves does not mean we necessarily should. As we have seen, the costs would be very high, and it is not a foregone conclusion that the benefits outweigh those costs."

While this represents a quick summary of White's proposal, it broadly encapsulates his modus operandi that is the path of least resistance and a belief that Australia is incapable of affecting its own future.

However, his most controversial option, the possibility of Australia developing or acquiring a domestic nuclear capability, remains an interesting conundrum for Australia's political and strategic leaders and public to consider as the region we are increasingly dependent upon continues to evolve and challenge our preconceptions of how we think the world should work.

While floating the idea,White specifically states he "neither predicts nor advocates" for the development of a domestic nuclear arsenal, yet it has been met with increasing debate and dialogue, with many taking to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute to discuss the options and the very idea of Australia's own nuclear arsenal, and the supporting doctrine required.

A key component of this discussion is reshaping the debate, ASPI senior fellow Rod Lyon clearly articulates this in what he describes as"crossing the nuclear Rubicon":

Lyon also goes on to expand onWhite's central premise for considering an Australian nuclear option, what White calls "nuclear blackmail", defined more simply as nuclear coercion by a nuclear armed and conventionally well-equipped great power, providing examples of Chinese, Indian, Pakistani and, most relevant for Australia, French concepts of 'minimum deterrence'.

Lyon states the French Cold War nuclear doctrine, which "called for an arsenal that could rip the arm off a superpower, leaving it an amputee among its more able-bodied peers", fits in well with Australia's existing conventional doctrine, which is focused on controlling the sea-air gap and limiting a hostile nation's attempts to coerce the otherwise isolated nation.

Building on this, Lyonarticulates: "So, should Australia build its own nuclear arsenal? I think the answer is, Yes, if it needs to. Thats a big if indeed, a series of big ifs: if the regional strategic environment becomes appreciably darker; if US extended nuclear deterrence is no longer available, or patently incredible; and, perhaps just as importantly, if theres bipartisan Australian acceptance of the need for an indigenous arsenal."

Leased nuclear weapons or a model based on France or Israel? Or a little from column A and a little from column B?

Lyon's French option is one that requires closer consideration and study as France's nuclear doctrine is dependent upon large, nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarines that serve as a continuous-at-sea-deterrence doctrine similar to the model used by the British Royal Navy and its own nuclear deterrence strategy.

Shifting to the Middle East, Israel, while not a 'declared' nuclear weapons state (NWS), received early support from France and has an estimated arsenal of between 80 and 400 warheads spread across free-fall nuclear bombs, submarine-launched cruise missiles stationed onboard their fleet of five, modified, German designed and built Dolphin Class conventional submarines and the Jericho series of intermediate to intercontinental range ballistic missiles.

Both the French and Israeli models provide interesting concepts for Australian consideration, should the nation seek to pursue a domestic nuclear arsenal particularly the submarine leg of their respective nuclear deterrence forces could be extrapolated for implementation on Australia's existing Collins Class and future Attack Class vessels to serve as an Australian force multiplier and strategic leveller in the face of a rapidly evolving regional order.

It is important to recognise that any decision to acquire or develop nuclear weapons is not an easy decision to make and should not be taken lightly and should be done in full view of the Australian public following the presentation of the facts for the public's consideration.

Your thoughts

Long-range tactical and strategic deterrence capabilities combined with the qualitative edge of Australian personnel and technological advantages of these platforms, ensured Australia unrestrictedregional dominance against all but the largest peer competitors.

The rapidly evolving regional environment requires a renewed focus on developing a credible, future-proofed long-range strike capability for theRAAF and RAN to serve as critical components in the development of atruly 'joint force' Australian Defence Force capable of supporting and enhancing the nation's strategic engagement and relationships in the region.

For Australia, a nation defined bythis relationship with traditionally larger, yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build-up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geopolitical, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century's 'great game'.

Enhancing Australias capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australias sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia's future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms ofshaking up the nation's approach to our regional partners.

We would also like to hear your thoughts on the avenues Australia should pursue to support long-term economic growth and development in support of national security in the comments section below, or get in touch withThis email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.or atThis email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

Following the NATO precedent? The nuclear-weapon sharing option

Originally posted here:
Following the NATO precedent? The nuclear-weapon sharing option - Defence Connect

Last year, when French president Emmanuel Macron declared in an interview with the Economist that NATO was brain dead, he caused a stir throughout Europe. Official European reactions came quickly, and they were negative across the continent. NATOs Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said, any attempt to distance Europe from North America will not only weaken the trans-Atlantic alliance, it is also risking dividing Europe itself. European unity cannot replace trans-Atlantic unity. German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that she could not support Macron, and Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki went as far as to qualify Macrons statements as dangerous. Rather than hearing the French wake-up call, the rest of Europe rallied around the NATO flag. Instead of advancing the European debate and generating support for greater European defense efforts as Macron probably hoped to do, his statements apparently had the opposite effect. Allies eventually decided to bury the controversy in a reflection-group process, following a German proposal. Macron recently repeated his call for a stronger Europe at the Munich Security Conference, causing less irritated reactions yet this event should not be seen as representative of the European debate. A large number of Europeans remain skeptical of Macrons vision of a less dependent Europe.

In times of increasing European doubts about the transatlantic link and in light of the massive problems European defense is facing, this can seem surprising. Three years into the administration of President Donald Trump, and with a good chance that Trump might be reelected in 2020, most Europeans understand very well that the transatlantic relationship is in a bad state. Westlessness, a sense of loss of purpose for the West, was the main theme of this years Munich Security Conference. Europeans are also increasingly aware that the rise of China will have a long-term impact on Euro-Atlantic security relations. For example, Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commissions new president, announced that she wants her commission to be geopolitical in light of a world characterized by great-power competition. Yet openly saying that Europeans must stop relying almost exclusively on the United States for their defense remains something of a taboo. Breaking it triggers the reactions Macron experienced. Another reason for the pushback against Macrons comments is that in many Europeans eyes, France, its military strength notwithstanding, is probably the least credible leader on the issue of European defense unity given its own Gaullist legacy.

The key point to understand about the European defense debate is therefore that it is all about the United States at least indirectly. For the vast majority of Europeans, their attitude toward the United States and thus NATO determines their attitude toward European defense cooperation, not the other way around. Likewise, in times of growing transatlantic uncertainties, expectations about what the United States will do are what determines Europeans willingness to even think about a possible plan B.

The Link Between Attitudes on the United States and European Cooperation

That European attitudes toward the United States determine attitudes toward European defense cooperation is linked to threat perception. Threat perception varies widely across Europe, in both the nature and the intensity of threats perceived. In a nutshell, the debate is about threats from the south (failed states, terrorism) and threats from the east (Russia). Historical legacies obviously matter in countries threat perceptions, as does geography. A countrys defense priorities then inform its perceived and actual dependence on the United States. For the Atlanticists among the Europeans, this is thus not simply about blind followership no matter what Washington does or says. It is ultimately about ensuring the nations survival. Hence the United States as the independent variable and the fear to engage in any kind of activity that might alienate Washington.

That attitudes vis--vis the United States are the determining factor thus applies to the United Kingdom and Germany as well as other traditional Atlanticists such as the Netherlands. The rule of thumb holds even more true for the so-called Eastern flank countries, that is the Baltic states, the Nordic states, Poland, or Romania. The equation is simple: Without the Americans, they are helpless in facing their main threat, Russia. The greater the fear of Moscow, the stronger the respective capital clings to the United States. What Atlanticist countries are interested in today is effective deterrence against Russia. In their certainly accurate view, nobody else can provide credible deterrence but the Americans. Therefore, the transatlantic security link remains the only game in town: this means NATO, as well as all the bilateral U.S. engagement in European security, including with non-NATO countries Finland and Sweden. Any European type of defense cooperation, such as the European Unions Common Security and Defense Policy, is consequently relegated to second place: a nice-to-have, which must not negatively affect NATO. Real defense is about Russia, together with the United States, as there is simply no viable alternative to Washington.

French Exceptionalism

The major exception to that rule is France. Frances attitude vis--vis the United States traditionally derives from Paris own priorities. With its own (exclusively national) nuclear deterrent and a self-image as a capable military actor with global reach, France just does not consider its own survival to be linked to U.S. engagement in European security. In terms of defense, the French key priority is fighting terrorism in the global south, in particular in Africa. In these endeavors, France cooperates very closely with the United States and has tried hard to convince the United States to not abandon it in West Africa. (With some success: In late January, U.S. Defense Secretary Marc Esper announced that the United States would not completely withdraw forces from the region.) Yet, close transatlantic security ties are simply not as vital for France as they are for other European countries. Replacing the United States as a partner in the Sahel is obviously hard to do, but not impossible in particular if Europeans join forces. The traditional Russian threat to European security is, in turn, not very high on Frances agenda, nor is conventional deterrence against Moscow and that is the Eastern flanks key preoccupation. Thus Frances engagement in NATOs Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics is in reality better understood as Paris securing, for instance, Estonias support for expeditionary operations in the Sahel. For France, that is what real defense is about.

Replacing the United States is not on Frances agenda. Yet, Paris apparently fails to understand the fears that lead many Europeans to bet so heavily on the United States. As seen from Paris, and given French defense priorities, the United States is less difficult to replace than as seen from Warsaw. Moreover, France simply does not seem to understand that anything emanating from Paris is seen against the backdrop of several decades of Gaullist legacies, of which Macrons Economist interview is the latest example. That many perceive Macron as pursuing a Gaullist agenda certainly does not help Paris cause precisely because it is viewed as Frances cause rather than Europes.

Whats the Right Dose of U.S. Engagement?

That Europes defense debate is all about America is nothing new. How much America is the right amount? This argument goes back to the creation of NATO. Among the stranger aspects of this debate is that many Europeans approached it as if the degree of U.S. engagement were decided in Paris or London rather than in Washington. It was in any case fears of weakening NATO that made Britain oppose defense becoming an area of European integration, an attitude that only evolved to some degree during the late 1990s. An early illustration of Americas centrality is also the preamble the Germans added to the 1963 Franco-German Elyse Treaty. This preamble, which stressed Germanys interest in a larger European community including the United Kingdom and close ties with the United States, infuriated de Gaulle, and to this day, France and Germany are not on the same page when it comes to their Atlantic preferences.

After the Cold War, the debate continued to pit the proponents of a Europe of Defense (that is: France) against the Atlanticists with the latter camp growing with each round of E.U. and NATO enlargement. Europeans continued to debate how much of America they wanted in their defense. One explanation for Frances return to NATO in 2009 is thus Paris realization that such a Europe of Defense is unlikely to see the light of day, as former French foreign minister Hubert Vdrine writes in his 2012 official assessment. In sum, in all these debates, France traditionally stood, and continues to stand, on the other side of the European mainstream. At least in its modern version, this has yet little to do with anti-Americanism, but rather with the divergent priorities outlined above.

Does Europe Need a Plan B?

The European debates of the 1990s, such as on the European Security and Defense Identity or the traditional French take on lEurope de la defense, were mainly academic in nature. After the demise of the Soviet Union, or so many Europeans thought, defense had become a sort of nice to have. Many European countries preferred to take advantage of the peace dividend, notably those in Western Europe. This changed with Russias 2014 annexation of Crimea. NATO found a new raison dtre and is again considered the security linchpin in the vast majority of European capitals. But the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president led to questions of whether the United States would still be the partner the Europeans needed. After all, Trump had inter alia claimed the Atlantic alliance was obsolete, and NATO summits are nowadays considered diplomatic nightmares in numerous European capitals. Europeans seem to finally understood that the degree of U.S. implication will be decided in Washington, rather than in Paris or Warsaw. Thinking about a plan B consequently would appear a sensible thing to do.

The result is essentially the debate on European strategic autonomy. In this current version of the European defense debate, fault lines once again run exactly along the lines described above. Threat perception determines the degree of dependence on the United States, which in turn determines attitudes toward European defense efforts. France is thus the self-proclaimed leader on European strategic autonomy. The Atlanticists on the Eastern flank, in turn, are most skeptical of any attempt at building a European defense. Then-Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydo for instance declared that the so-called strategic autonomy of the EU [must] not lead to weakening of [the] European contribution to [the] deterrence and defence potential of NATO. Some even went as far as to argue long before the French presidents Economist interview that Macrons visions are suicidal for Poland. More nuanced academic assessments also come to the conclusion that the United States is simply irreplaceable in European security, identifying a strategic autonomy dilemma based on the need to preserve Washingtons engagement.

In short: yet again, this is all about America. Really strengthening European defense efforts indeed is plan B to many, and only of interest if plan A NATO backed by the United States is not available. Whether plan A is really off the table is hotly debated. The lack of a European consensus on the need for a plan B stems from divergent analyses of the transatlantic links future trajectory. In the French discourse and debate, the progressive and unavoidable disengagement of the United States from Europe is considered a given. Mounting frustration about not getting the message across may thus partly explain Macrons harsh words on NATO. In Germany, despite Merkels statement that Europe needs to take its fate in its own hands, hopes still seem high that transatlantic relations will go back to normal after Trump. In many Eastern flank countries, the standard argument is that Trump actually increased funding for the European Deterrence Initiative and that there consequently is no need to worry. Other items regularly mentioned by Poles or Swedes (as well as Americans meaning to reassure the Europeans) as proof of the United States commitment to European security are various polls and references to support for NATO in the U.S. Congress. Psychology certainly plays into it: On all sides, the analysis seems to magically yield the preferred result.

Answering the Key Question

In light of these divergent assessments, it is no wonder there is no consensus on the conclusions to draw for European defense and the need for a plan B. The main reason why Macrons wake-up call is unlikely to work is indeed that the key question remains unanswered: What will be the United States future engagement in European security? With America being the independent variable for a majority of European capitals and European defense cooperation the dependent one Paris ultimately lacks influence on their positions. A European debate based on what France wants (and its subsequent rejection by the Atlanticist camp) will lead nowhere. All Paris can do is find partners for projects even Atlanticist capitals consider nice-to-haves (and that do no harm to NATO), such as the French European Intervention Initiative. At the end of the day, this is the reality of European defense cooperation as of 2020. Macrons offer to start a strategic dialogue on the role of nuclear deterrence in European security made during his long-expected speech on nuclear deterrence on February 7 is unlikely to fundamentally change any of this. Europes key defense problems cannot be solved by nuclear means. Europes main defense challenge is conventional, boiling down to the question What if the tripwire in the Baltics fails?

Ultimately, only the answer to the question of future U.S. engagement in European security can provide the necessary impetus for European defense cooperation to really become an alternative to NATO and provide most Europeans with a reason to strive for that objective. Absent a unified European analysis, nobody but Washington can provide that answer either together with the Europeans or through unilateral acts and faits accomplis.

In an ideal world, Europeans would therefore engage in a constructive dialogue with Washington on the United States future engagement in European security. As Ronja Kempin and I have argued earlier in these pages, it is in Americas interest to have a Europe with strategic autonomy. A stronger European defense would lead to better burden-sharing, thereby strengthening the transatlantic link rather than weakening it, as its detractors would have it. This would in essence mean leaving the zero-sum logic that more Europe means less NATO behind. Unfortunately, this again seems to be the predominant view in Washington, most recently expressed in an official letter sent to the European Union.

Yet if the United States wants capable European partners in a 21st century that will be characterized by multipolarity and great-power competition, it must change its mind on Europes strategic autonomy. Attaining that autonomy is of course a matter for the Europeans, which requires European leadership. Germany has a key role to play in that respect. Yet the fear of alienating Washington many Europeans hold constitutes the major roadblock in attaining that objective, or even starting to think about operationalizing it. Answering the question that is, implicitly or explicitly, underlying the entire European defense debate is perhaps the greatest service the United States can do their European allies in the multipolar and potentially post-Atlantic era.

Dr. Barbara Kunz is a senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. She specializes in European and transatlantic security, with a special focus on Franco-German cooperation and the Nordics.

Image: The Kremlin

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Europe's Defense Debate Is All About America - War on the Rocks

Picture it. Youre at an awesome party, making the rounds, and someone starts asking you what you know about NATO.

FRIEND: Hey, what do you know about NATO?

And maybe you know a lot. But maybe you dont. Maybe youve seen it in the news a bit. Maybe youve heard an argument over who pays for it. Maybe you have it confused with NAFTA.

Okay, lets be honest, this doesnt usually come up at parties... but lets pretend that it did.

In this episode, my friend and I are gonna have a drink, listen to some experts and try to figure out what NATO is.

Im Gabrielle Sierra and this is Why It Matters. Today, what do you know about NATO?

KUPCHAN: If you drive today from Washington, where we are, up to Toronto or Quebec, youll have to stop at the Canadian border. Youll show a passport. But you wont see any tanks. The U.S.-Canadian border is largely undefended.

My name is Charles Kupchan, Im a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Professor at Georgetown University.

If you drive today from France to Germany you may see a few sheep, but you wont see a border guard, you wont change money, and you will see no tanks and soldiers. That border is undefended. That border is the site of untold bloodshed. Its today undefended because NATO and the European Union and processes of integration have made those borders geopolitically inconsequential.

FRIEND: Huh, you know what? Ive never actually thought about it that way.

SIERRA: You know how last summer I was on that train from Paris to Berlin? I didnt even know when I left France and entered Germany, no soldiers in sight.

FRIEND: Yeah okay wait, can we just start with what NATO stands for?

KUPCHAN: NATO stands for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

CLIP MONTAGE OF OFFICIALS SAYING NATO.

KUPCHAN: And it is a body formed in 1949 to commit the members of the alliance to collective defensei.e., an attack on one is an attack on all, we are in this together. It is an institution that keeps us safe. We dont lie awake at night worrying that somebody is going to invade, that we got to look out the window and see tanks and troops coming. And thats in part because starting in 1949 the United States reached out to Canada, reached across the Atlantic to its democratic partners in Europe and said were going to hang together, were going to unite against threats to the peace. That alliance has been around ever since 1949 and it has succeeded in keeping this community of Atlantic democracies safe.

NATO: 0:00: On April 4th, 1949, The North Atlantic Treaty was signed by Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Iceland, Canada and the United States. This union of 12 nations became known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or more simply NATO.

SIERRA: So lets go back to the beginning a bit. How did this all start? How did NATO form?

KUPCHAN: Well, you have to go back to the 1930s, when the United States basically became a passive bystander and was staunchly isolationist as fascism began to spread all over the world, mainly in Europe and Asia but also began to spread its tentacles further. And the United States tried to stay out of it. That strategy didnt work. Pearl Harbor, we all know the story. The U.S. enters World War II.

FOOTAGEARCHIVE: 0:14: December 7th, 1941, a date that will live in infamy, the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

KUPCHAN: At the end of World War II, we go into this big debate about, well, what do we do now? Do we go back to being a hemispheric power? Do we bring back all the troops and pull out of Asia and Europe, or do we stay put? And that question was answered by the Cold War; by the fact that the Soviet Union, which was our ally in World War II, became our chief adversary by the late 1940s.

PERISCOPE FILM: 2:58: When peace returned and the Western allies demobilized, the Soviet Union maintained an overwhelming military superiority on the European continent. Both during and immediately after the war the Soviet Union forcibly brought under its control a whole series of countries in Eastern Europe.

KUPCHAN: And it was because of fear that if the United States did withdraw from Europe that the Soviets would overrun Germany, France, Britain, and the industrialized powers of the West that we basically said were staying put and we are going to form an alliance with our key partners in Europe to prevent the Soviet Union and communism from spreading.

POLYAKOVA: So I think we have to remember one really key aspect to the founding of NATO, mainly where the world was and specifically where Europe was at the end of the second world war.

Im Alina Polyakova, and Im President and CEO of the Center of European Policy Analysis, a think tank in Washington.

We had just had the most devastating global conflict in the history of humanity,[it] killed millions of people in Europe. And it was really on the ashes of that horrible, terrifying set of years and really a century of fighting between European countries that we have the founding of NATO.

SIERRA: So what do you think the world would have looked like without it?

POLYAKOVA: Just a decade basically after World War I, we start having the beginnings of another global conflict. And really Europe for a very long time was just rife with fighting between all the different countries. And there was never really hugely long periods of prosperity and growth and peace, because as soon as you had a moment of peace, that would be usually followed by war.

SIERRA: Hey, are you listening? Why are you on your phone right now?

FRIEND: I was just checking and basically, European countries have been fighting each other for the last thousand years.

SIERRA: Right, and they havent fought a war with each other since NATO came into being. Which if you take a second to think about it is actually...pretty huge!

FRIEND: Huh.

SIERRA: Alright, phone down, lets keep going.

POLYAKOVA: If we had not had NATO, and then we could not have the European Union after NATO, we would have had a world that would have continued to be rife with conflict. And I think certainly in the United States, would have found itself embroiled in far more conflicts in Europe, which is now unimaginable to us.

SIERRA: Can you tell me a little bit about NATOs role in the Cold War?

KUPCHAN: Well, surprisingly, NATO never fired a shot. NATO never went to war. And in some ways, it is the best testament to its success because NATO was as much about deterrence as it was defense, saying to the Soviet Union do not come across this line because if you do you will be met with the collective force of the Western democracies.

POLYAKOVA: So during the Cold War, NATO became the core of the military alliance to serve as a deterrent and a container of Soviet expansionism. European countries were very nervous that there would be a Soviet invasion at any moment at any day. And NATO was really the only thing that protected them from that kind of invasion, because from the Soviet perspective, of course, if you started to make military incursions into a NATO country, well then you would face not just that single country, but the might of all the countries that are part of NATO, most notably the United States.

KUPCHAN: And we did things to make the Soviets realize that we meant business. Why were American troops in West Berlin? They were there because they served as what we call a tripwire, which was that if the Red Armythe Soviet armycame across and they invaded and they went into West Berlin, they would have to kill Americans. And if they killed Americans, they knew that Uncle Sam would jump into the fray. And it was because of that deterrent effect, because of nuclear weapons, because the inter-German boundary line was NATOs frontier, that we never saw a war. And then over time, we know the story of internal rot of the Soviet Union, of Gorbachev, of his effort to reform the Soviet Union from inside fell apart and the Soviet Union imploded. Cold War over; NATO successfully stood the test of time.

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN: 1:58: Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.

PETER JENNINGS: 0:21: Thousands and thousands of West Germans come to make the point that the wall has suddenly become irrelevant. Something as you can see almost a party on, how do you measure such an astonishing moment in history?

SIERRA: So whats NATOs story since the end of the Cold War?

KUPCHAN: Well, the end of the Cold War raised questions about NATOs future, and thats because most alliances die when the threat that brought them to life disappears. NATO didnt die. In fact, it thrived. It went on to become the go-to vehicle for organizing security at the end of the Cold War. It began to expand eastward and take in Europes new democracies. And it became a vehicle for locking in democracy and capitalism in countries that had long been part of the Soviet Bloc.

FRIEND: Okay, so, its not a closed club.

SIERRA: Yeah new countries have been joining all along. Were up to 29.

FRIEND: Whos on their phone now?

SIERRA: Alright alright, one more second, I promise. But, did you know Montenegro joined in 2017?

FRIEND: Gabrielle! Focus! Were almost caught up here.

KUPCHAN: NATO began to look outside the territory of its members to defend common interests more broadly. So NATO got involved in the Balkans to prevent the bloodshed associated with the unraveling of Yugoslavia. And then for the first time in its history, when the United States was attacked on September 11, NATO invoked Article 5...

NATO SEC GEN LORD ROBERTSON: 0:15: In response to the appalling attacks perpetrated yesterday against the United States of America, the Council agreed if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5

KUPCHAN: ...which is the provision that says...

NATO SEC GEN LORD ROBERTSON: 0:37: ...that an armed attack against one or more of the allies in Europe or in North America shall be considered an attack against them all.

KUPCHAN: An attack on one is an attack on all, the provision of collective defense, and eventually undertook a substantial mission in Afghanistan to backstop the U.S. effort to take down al-Qaida and the Taliban. That mission has been a long and arduous one, partly because Afghanistan is a mess.

SIERRA: How realistic is that clause across the board with NATO?

KUPCHAN: If the Russians invaded Estonia, would all NATO members rush to Estonias defense?

SIERRA: Right.

KUPCHAN: You know, its the 6 million dollar question. If they didnt do so, NATO would come apart because it rests at its core on the sense that were in this together. My best guess is that if Estonia were attacked, yes, NATO would come running. The United States would lead the effort. And thats because if we dont do it for Estonia, were not going to do it for anyone else, and the emperor has no clothes. This issue of Article 5 and collective defense has come back to life, partly because of the threat of terrorism but in a more traditional sense because the Russians in 2014 annexed Crimea and moved into eastern Ukraine.

ABC NEWS: 0:23: Good morning, Dan, the pressure from Russia is growing, large groups of pro-Russia troops surrounding Ukranian bases ordering their forces off of them so they can occupy them. The international warning to Russia to end its invasion is being ignored.

KUPCHAN: And this raised the prospect of Russia again becoming an expansionist power that would grab territory from its neighbors. And that led to an effort by the United States and its allies to begin to bolster defense on the eastern flank. It led to increases in defense expenditure that started during the Obama administration and increased into the Trump administration. More than $100 billion dollars increased in allied defense expenditure since 2016. And so this issue, which for a long time was kind of off-centerpeople really werent worried about an attack on NATO territoryis now front and center.

POLYAKOVA: The world today is just much more complex than it was during the Cold War so what is NATO's mission now- when you don't have the Soviet Union anymore, when you don't have the Warsaw Pact anymore, but now you have these far more complex problems that are threatening democracies and democratic institutions in various ways. And I think that kind of reckoning is happening right now.

FRIEND: Alright so I get NATOs history. But how does it work?

SIERRA: Right, like, if NATO troops get sent somewhere, whose troops are they?

FRIEND: Yup. And if its a mix of troops from Germany and the US and Italy and Turkey, whos telling them what to do?

SIERRA: So theres an actual NATO army?

KUPCHAN: There isnt a NATO army. There is a NATO command where individuals from all of the different members sit together and plan together. And then if NATO were called upon to act, the different countries would then contribute forces to that command. Those forces would be operating under the command of the supreme allied commander, who is always an American. And then they would be put into action.

SIERRA: And who pays for it?

KUPCHAN: There is a fairly small common budget that essentially covers things like the main office in Brussels, the command structure that I was talking about, and some joint infrastructure. That pales in comparison to the money that individual countries spend to have the forces ready to go into action if they were called upon.

SIERRA: We still hear a lot of criticism of NATO here in the U.S and you know, namely that it's been like a free ride for allies at our expense.

POLYAKOVA: The U.S does contribute the most to NATO, but that was by design. Because that allowed Europeans to take the funds and the money they would have normally invested in rebuilding their militaries, which had been the pattern up to that point. And they were able to invest all of that into their economies, and into rebuilding their countries, after they were, destroyed, during the second world war.

And so the reason why we've had prosperity in Europe throughout most of the 20th century is because the United States was there to provide that military umbrella and as a result, the U.S was safer because we completely took out any threats that could have emanated from Europe. If you want to use business-speak, you know, our return on investment was very high.

SIERRA: So it sounds like it's a little more of an intangible type of answer for people who are like, well, what does this mean to me today? It's a little more looking to history and also realizing that freedoms aren't necessarily free and we have them because of this.

POLYAKOVA: You know, I grew up, for the first 10 years of my life in Ukraine, which was part of the Soviet Union at the time. And my family was a family of political refugees. And what that meant was that we wanted to get out, like many people did. It felt like if we stayed in the Soviet Union, that felt like death, it could have been, you know, intellectual, emotional death because that was the reality. You know, in my family, during the Stalinist years, people disappeared, right? And we didn't know where they went. So to me, these experiences of deep, profound loss and tragedy and conflict were very personal. And I think it's hard to explain how to young people who grow up in the United States or other democracies, what it's like to live in an authoritarian state. It felt like we had to get into the United States, Europe, anywhere where we could finally just be free. And so to my mind, it is those alliances that make those kinds of institutions and values and principles live in reality. You know, we can talk about our belief in democracy. We can all agree that we want to live in a society that gives us freedom of speech and expression and, you know, the pursuit of happiness. But we have to also work to make them real. These are principles worth dying for, many people did. And I think we have to continue to remember that.

It can be easy to forget about something that was created long ago and far away. NATO is even harder to understand because its all about things that haven't happened. Wars, conflicts and divisions that the alliance has prevented. We dont talk about it at parties. But maybe we should, because with every new generation, we lose more of our direct connection to the past. Plus, who doesnt love to learn something new?

FRIEND: You know, I love learning something new.

SIERRA: Me too. I had no idea we would spend this entire party talking about NATO, but I actually enjoyed it.

FRIEND: Uh yeah.. and...in the spirit of old friends who stick together, should we keep this party going and grab a nightcap?

SIERRA: Lets do it.

MERRILL: Awesome! Okay, so how much do you know about the World Health Organization? And, like, what about the International Monetary Fund? And...

Theres a lot more to learn about NATO. So you can head on over to CFR.org/Whyitmatters and take a look at the show notes for this episode. And while youre there, check out the Councils other podcasts, The World Next Week, and The Presidents Inbox. Theyre pretty great!

Interested in saying hi to the team? Send us an email at whyitmatters@cfr.org. Be sure to subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or wherever you get your audio. And if you like the show, leave us a review! Why It Matters is a production of the Council on Foreign Relations. The show is created and produced by Jeremy Sherlick, Asher Ross, and me, Gabrielle Sierra. Our sound designer is Markus Zakaria. Robert McMahon is our Managing Editor, and Doug Halsey is our Chief Digital Officer. Original music is composed by Ceiri Torjussen. Special thanks go to Richard Haass and Jeff Reinke. And to our awesome guest for this episode, Cayla Merrill. Big thank you!

Hey and by the way, this episode was our tenth, and the last for the first season. Stay tuned in the coming weeks for a preview of our second season! Theres a lot of good stuff coming up. For Why It Matters, this is Gabrielle Sierra, signing off. See you soon!

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The One Where We Talk About NATO at a Party - Council on Foreign Relations

On Feb. 18, Turkey marked the 68th anniversary of its NATO membership with enthusiastic messages of commitment to the alliance and a series of laudatory events, which could have drawn little attention were they not in sharp contrast to the dismissive atmosphere of last years anniversary.

Neither Ankara nor the media seemed to care about the 67th anniversary of the countrys NATO membership last year. The occasion was passed over with a mundane statement by the Foreign Ministry, while the year 2019 in general was abuzz with debates, mostly in the pro-government media, on whether Turkey should leave the alliance.

Indeed, a long list of issues marred Turkey-NATO relations in 2019, including:

A persisting crisis mode in Ankaras ties with Washington and frequent disputes with European countries;

Turkeys Operation Peace Spring in northeastern Syria against the Peoples Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey sees as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the armed group that has fought Ankara since 1984 and is considered a terrorist organization by most of the international community;

Ankaras refusal to back a NATO defense plan for the Baltics and Poland in a bid to extract political support for its military campaign against the PKK-affiliated YPG forces in Syria;

Ankaras gunboat diplomacy in the eastern Mediterranean amid growing tensions over gas exploration;

Ankaras acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense systems, followed by preparatory tests and, most recently, the arrival of the systems missiles in December;

Ankaras signing of a maritime demarcation deal with Libyas Tripoli-based government in November and the ensuing criticism of Western governments;

Ankaras threats to review the NATO-mission status of key military facilities in Turkey such as the Incirlik air base and the Kurecik radar station;

Turkish accusations that NATO has protected Turkish officers with alleged links to the Gulenist network, which Ankara blames for the 2016 coup attempt, and that fugitive Turkish officers have been granted political asylum in some NATO member states through exclusive and expedited procedures;

The exclusion of Turkish officials from some critical NATO meetings.

In light of all those tensions, Turkeys pro-government media came to depict NATO as a top security threat. NATO became a hate object, accused of myriad misdeeds, from having a hand in orchestrating the coup attempt to plotting to divide Turkey.

On this years anniversary, however, things looked diametrically different. Ankara and the pro-government media seemed to have rediscovered NATO. The anniversary was celebrated with high-pitched gatherings, conferences and a government-backed social media campaign under the motto Turkey is NATO, we are NATO, which became a top trending topic on Twitter. In short, last years prevailing discourse that portrayed NATO as a shackle that keeps Turkey from acting independently to advance its national interests gave way to a narrative about NATO being an anchor bonding Turkey to the Western security bloc.

And what aroused this NATO fervor in a country where arguing in favor of NATO required much courage around this time last year? What happened in a couple of months to make Ankara remember NATOs importance as a security partner?

NATO itself did nothing special to win Ankaras affection. Yet, Turkeys relationship with Russia nosedived into a fresh chapter of chill as tensions shot up in Syrias rebel-held province of Idlib and Russias position in Libya shifted from impartial mediation to favoring Gen. Khalifa Hifter, the adversary of the Turkey-backed Tripoli government. As a result, Turkey and Russia have come to the brink of a military faceoff akin to the crisis of November 2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian jet at the border with Syria.

A quick survey of the pro-government medias coverage of Idlib and Libya would reveal a fast U-turn in sentiment since the Russian-brokered meeting between the Turkish and Syrian intelligence chiefs in Moscow on Jan. 13, when the Turkish-Russian partnership apparently began to crack.

Yet, judging by both Ankaras rhetoric on the importance of the Western security bloc and the publications of media outlets and think tanks close to the government, Ankaras outreach to NATO is a result of Turkeys predicament in Idlib and its need to counterbalance Russia rather than a sign of a structural, long-term reorientation.

For instance, in an article titled NATOs support of Turkey, a member of SETA, a staunchly pro-government think tank, asks the following questions: Can Turkey rely on NATO against Russia, [Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad and Iran in the problem it is experiencing in Idlib? Is NATO supposed to give Turkey practical support against those actors in Idlib? What does the Idlib crisis mean for NATO and its members? The author then proceeds to a cautiously optimistic conclusion on NATO backing.

And does Ankaras abrupt U-turn stem from conjunctural necessity or a new realization of its structural dependency on NATO?

The outlook suggests the change of heart is driven entirely by the dead ends that Turkey has hit in Idlib and Libya. To extricate itself from those dead ends, Turkey is attempting to counterbalance Russia and shift its bilateral relationship with Russia, which has spiraled out of balance and become a one-sided dependency, to a multilateral ground.

Ankara is obviously trying to draw NATO, the United States and European heavyweights into greater involvement in Idlib to readjust the balance, whileAssad's forces are expected to forge ahead until they assert control over the strategic M4 highway.

And is NATO capable of deterring Russia in Idlib at all?

Recalling the case of Ukraine might be enough to answer the question. Looking like a giant that cannot bite in the Ukraine crisis, NATO appears unlikely to take the risk of armed confrontation with Russia over Idlib, which it sees as an out-of-area conflict and outside the scope of the NATO treatys Article 5 on collective defense. The most tangible sign of NATOs reluctance on Syria is its foot-dragging on taking some operational responsibilities in the fight against the Islamic State in the 2014-2019 period.

NATO is likely to swiftly return to its hate-object status in Turkey if NATO fails to meet Ankaras request for urgent assistance. Ankara is in constant need for enemies real or imaginary to be able to sell to the Turkish public its rapid U-turns in its foreign policy and the consequences of its political and strategic miscalculations. NATO tops the nominee list of outside foes because it remains a common enemy on which pro-government quarters and the still influential anti-Western and Euroasianist lobbies in Ankara can agree and cooperate.

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Turkey Can Ankara's sudden change of heart on NATO save the day in Idlib? -

]]> Allied defence ministers recently agreed to enhance Nato training mission in Iraq. Credit: NATO.

The survey found that of 5,208 respondents 62% think that while NATO is still relevant to the defence of its member states, the organisation needs an overhaul to be more effective. 20% of readers said that the organisation was relevant in its current form, whereas 18% disagreed.

NATO has been the subject of a number of statements from world leaders questioning its effectiveness, with French President Emmanuel Macron claiming the organisation was brain-dead and US President Donald Trump criticising European contributions to the organisations.

Relations within the organisation have also been strained by Turkeys growing closeness to Russia and its decision to buy the Russian S-400 Air Defence system, resulting in the countrys expulsion from the F-35 programme.

Our poll asked Is NATO still relevant for the defence of member states?; 1,067 responded Yes in the current format, 3,214 responded Yes, but it is in need of an overhaul to be more effective and, 927 responded No.

At last Decembers NATO Engages event, leaders from across the alliance accepted that the organisation needs to adapt to new threats and develop a response to emerging threats of hypersonic missiles and cyberwarfare.

Speaking at the event, UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said: Today we face new challenges, and in keeping with our best traditions we must continue to adapt. Traditional warfare has changed. The threats are no longer only conventional, no longer only overt. Our adversaries are striking from the shadows.

They are pursuing new tactics to divide and destabilise, exploiting new technologies to exacerbate the uncertainties of an uncertain world, and undermine our way of life.

Despite the event taking place shortly after Macrons criticism, Wallace said that the organisation was the still most effective tool for the defence of its members adding that a collective response to modern challenges would assert NATOs power.

Wallace said: We must stand together, no side deals, no separate voices. Our adversaries strive for that division; they fund that division and target that division. We will not let them succeed.

In recent years, European NATO allies have sought to step up their contributions to the organisations in the face of US pressure to share more of the burden. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) report The Military Balance 2020, around two-thirds of allies are aiming to reach the recommended 2% of GDP by 2024.

NATO is also funnelling money into research and development to maintain its edge and adapt to new threats, with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in the past saying that the organisation was pushing for 20% of budgets to be spent on research and development.

While NATO has responded to new challenges internal debates continue to be discussed on what the biggest threats to the alliance are. In the past Macron has claimed it is terrorism, while members in Eastern Europe say it is the increasing activity of Russia and the annexation of areas of Georgia and Ukraine.

In response to Russia, NATO has stepped up its presence in Eastern European states to maintain a strong deterrent force.

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NATO needs an overhaul - Army Technology