Category Archives: NATO

Sailors man the rails as the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Monterey (CG 61) departs Constanta, Romania, March 23, 2021. Monterey is operating with the IKE Carrier Strike Group on a routine deployment in the U.S. Sixth Fleet area of operations. US Navy photo.

A U.S Navy guided-missile destroyer and guided-missile cruiser left the Black Sea this week following drills with NATO allies.

The Navy announced cruiser USS Monterey (CG-61) and destroyer USSThomas Hudner (DDG-116) moved into the Mediterranean Sea following a multinational drill organized by Romania.

Sea Shield 2021 is an annual Romanian-led multinational naval exercise in the Black Sea focused on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and participating nations, emphasizing anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, anti-air warfare, and mine countermeasures mission sets, U.S. 6th Fleet said in a news release.

Montereyleft the Black Sea and sailed through the Bosphorus into the Mediterranean Sea today, and Thomas Hudnermade the transit on Tuesday.

Our operations in the Black Sea demonstrate our commitment to NATO partners and supported the provision of stability in the maritime environment through reassuring presence of an active naval force to deter destabilizing activity, Capt. Joseph Baggett, Montereys commanding officer, said in the news release. Our operations in this strategic waterway were professional, timely and critical to enabling global operations that serve to counter malign influence.

Both ships arrived in the Black Sea last week to perform drills with NATO allies, USNI News recently reported.

Our trip to the Black Sea was very productive, Cmdr. Bo Mancuso, Thomas Hudners commanding officer, said in a separate news release. We are excited to have been part of a continual integration of air and maritime units operating across the U.S. European Command area of responsibility for establishing air and maritime superiority and to continue enabling freedom of navigation in all international waters and airspace.

Before leaving the Black Sea, Monterey pulled into port in Constanta, Romania, earlier this week to refuel, according to 6th Fleet.

Multiple countries were slated to join for the Sea Shield drill, including [m]aritime forces from Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Standing NATO Maritime Group TWO, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine, 6th Fleet said.

Chief Quartermaster Amy Birkholz, from Kalamazoo, Minnesota, left, looks through binoculars at a bearing indicated by Quartermaster Seaman Aaron Maluffgaray, from Asuncion, Paraguay, aboard the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Monterey (CG 61) while operating in the Black Sea on March 21, 2021. Monterey is operating with the IKE Carrier Strike Group on a routine deployment in the U.S. Sixth Fleet area of operations. US Navy photo.

Monterey and Thomas Hudner deployed last month with the Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group. While it is the second deployment in a year for aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower(CVN-69), escorts Monterey and Thomas Hudner are new to the CSG.

In January, two U.S. destroyers and a fleet oiler operated in the Black Sea. The destroyers USSDonald Cook (DDG-75) and USSPorter (DDG-78) and USNSLaramie (T-AO-203) were drilling with NATO, USNI News reported at the time.

The Montreux Convention limits the presence of non-Black Sea countries navies in the sea, but U.S. Navy leaders have said they prioritize the Black Sea region and aim to be present there for about a third of the year. Other NATO forces also aim to be present in the Black Sea for another third of the year, collectively with the U.S. promoting security in the region and pushing back against any aggression from Russian military forces.

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Navy Destroyer and Cruiser Leave Black Sea After Exercising with NATO Allies - USNI News - USNI News

LAST SUNDAY WAS Census Day in Northern Ireland. It is expected to show the current feeling of national identity in the NI population and could well confirm the reported demographic shift away from a unionist majority.

In the last Census (2011), 40% declared themselves to be British, 25% Irish and 21% Northern Irish. In the meantime, we have had Brexit and the rise of the pro-independence movement in Scotland. This 2021 Census could well be the last Census ever in NI as part of the UK.

If the UK union is really weakening, it is now more than probable that Border referendums on the reunification of the island of Ireland will take place within the next five to ten years.

Sinn Finhas called for referendums to be held much sooner. In the past, referendums have been lost in Ireland because the electorate was not informed nor fully convinced of the proposals being put to them.

The lesson learned is that a full and honest debate should take place before a referendum, not, as in the case of the UKs Brexit Referendum, afterwards.

We should remember the Nice Referendum in 2001 and the Lisbon Referendum in 2008, which were both lost on the neutrality issue.

Defence Policy for a United Ireland needed

In any future referendums on Irish reunification the issue of what defence policy a united Ireland should adopt, needs to be considered. In fact, it should be addressed, in advance, so that voters, North and South, know the full picture before making such a momentous decision on reunification.

Two key questions need to be answered. First, would the people in the South support joining NATO as part of the price of reunification? Conversely, would the people of Northern Ireland accept leaving NATO and supporting military neutrality as part of reunification?

At present, the Northern Ireland taxpayer is paying seven times more on defence (2% of GDP) than his/her Southern counterpart (0.27% of GDP). The EU average is 1.2% while the NATO average is 1.3% of GDP.

There is a third option, to be raised and set aside, which is that both current jurisdictions retain their present defence policies after reunification. However, if unification means that the all-Ireland State will be sovereign and independent, it is hard to see how two different and contradictory defence policies could be in place on one island.

Foreign and defence policies go hand in hand. It might, in theory, work, if Ireland were to become a two-state confederation of separate and independent states, pursuing two separate foreign and defence policies.

Of course, a confederal solution should be an option to be examined, along with a unitary state and a federal state. Nevertheless, even in a confederal situation, it would be doubtful that two separate defence forces, would be what the Irish people might have in mind by reunification.

Back in Dec 1993, the UK agreed, in the Downing Street Declaration, that it had no selfish strategic or economic interest in remaining in NI.

This does not mean that the UK will accept a weakening in its national defence arising from Irish reunification. Such a weakening of its national defence, on its North Atlantic flank, could occur if NI became part of an undefended neutral Ireland and if Scotland were also to become independent.

Ireland, the weak link

Up to recently, the North Atlantic had faded in strategic importance since the end of the Cold War. However, Swedish defence analysts have concluded that Russian military exercises in the Baltic area, along the Arctic Circle and down the North-Eastern Atlantic coastline, including in Irish territorial waters, is about cutting the link between the US and Europe.

The outgoing Officer Commanding Naval Operations Command, Captain (NS) Brian Fitzgerald, has pointed out that a large number of transatlantic cables, linking the two continents, are at their most vulnerable in the shallow waters off the Irish Continental Shelf. Maybe some might think we can manage very well without the Internet. Others would disagree.

The problem for the UK and NATO is not Irish Neutrality, but the long-standing underfunding of our Defence Forces for its primary role of national defence.

Until recently, as a defence analyst, I had hoped that Irish-British mutual defence issues could be addressed ultimately within the context of EU Common Defence. With Brexit, this is no longer possible.

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Alternatively, I had thought that an Irish Government would start to move towards bringing defence spending in line with other nations, which would mean that we would no longer be the weak link in Europes North Atlantic Defence. It seems I am wrong on both counts.

Until we sort out the defence issue, it is probably best to forget about Irish reunification.

Colonel Dorcha Lee (retd) is a former Defence Forces Provost Marshal and Director of Military Police. He is a former Irish Military Advisor in Brussels and a former military representative to the WEU and the EU.

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Retired Colonel Dorcha Lee: Is joining NATO the price for Irish reunification? - TheJournal.ie

Attia al-Juwaili may never know which countrys laser-guided bomb killed his young daughter. It could be a British, French, or American pilot who struck, but until he finds out, his familys hopes for justice are forever on hold.

It has been 10 years since the NATO-led coalition dropped the first bombs targeting Libyan strongman Muammar al-Qaddafis forcesturning the tide in Libyas civil war and playing a critical role in bringing down the dictator. The merits of that intervention have been long debated, with foreign meddlers and local rivals and extremists thriving in the vacuum ever since.

But there was a more direct cost. In a war fought expressly to protect civilians, NATOs airstrikes inadvertently killed dozens. New research by the civilian casualty monitoring watchdog Airwars, where I am the senior investigator, lays out for the first time the estimated number of civilians killed by all parties to the 2011 warincluding both Qaddafi forces and Libyan rebels. Almost none of the families left behind have received compensation or an apology.

While NATO insists it took steps to avoid killing civilians, when there were casualty allegations it had limited mechanisms to assess on the ground, with one former official saying they really had no idea.

And those seeking an apology have instead found themselves trapped in a nightmare in which NATO itself does not make condolence payments but insists accountability must be sought from individual nations. Yet, even a decade on, countries including the United Kingdom, France, and the United States still refuse to accept public responsibility for any harm they caused.

Juwailis family and a few others had sought refuge in the village of Majer in northern Libya a few weeks before the deadly strike, after fleeing the encroaching ground war between Qaddafis forces and NATO-backed rebels.

It was Ramadan, so prayers lasted late into the evening. Afterward, the women and children went inside, while the men sat in the August heat chatting.

Then everything was black, we couldnt see anything. After the smoke subsided it was clear the second floor was destroyed, Juwaili told Foreign Policy.

The men rushed forward, searching through the rubble for survivors. Fifteen minutes later, another strike killed many of the rescuers.

Juwaili hunted frantically for his 2-year-old daughter, Arwa, eventually finding her lifeless under the rubble. Thank God her body was not ripped apart, he said.

The United Nations later concluded 34 civilians died at Majer that night, including Arwa. NATO called the site a command and control node for Qaddafis forces. The residents denied this, and U.N. investigators found no evidence of military activity.

My message to NATO is that yes, mistakes happen, but you need to correct such mistakes, Juwaili said. I feel that we were treated as if we were nothing and they did not look back. I hope when Libya is back on its feet, we get justice.

NATOs seven-month intervention in Libya in 2011 was ostensibly carried out to protect civilians.

Qaddafi had brutally crushed an Arab Spring rebellion against his four-decade rule and was closing in fast on Benghazi, the last bastion of the uprising. The U.N., fearing a new Srebrenica, voted to intervene to protect civilians.

NATO led a subsequent international bombing campaign, with the U.S.-dominated alliance claiming to take significant steps to avoid killing civiliansemploying rigorous target monitoring and delayed-fuse weapons. At the end of the war, its head Anders Fogh Rasmussen boasted of no confirmed civilian casualties caused by NATO.

Human rights groups and U.N. investigators on the ground unearthed a more complicated story. They found multiple cases of civilian harm, with a U.N. commission concluding that while NATO fought a highly precise campaign with a demonstrable determination to avoid civilian casualties, the coalition had killed at least 60 civilians in the 20 events the commission investigated.

New research from Airwars concludes that this number could be higher still. Using hyperlocal open-source material to assess for the first time the entirety of reported civilian harm by all parties during the 2011 war, it found NATO strikes resulted in between 223 and 403 likely civilian deaths in the 212 events of concern reviewed.

View Airwars interactive map of civilian fatalities in 2011 here.

This paled in comparison to the killings by Qaddafis forces; according to local communities, they were responsible for between 869 and 1,999 civilian deaths. And rebel actions resulted in between 50 and 113 fatalities.

The real Qaddafi and rebel numbers are likely higher still; documentation of NATO strikes was more comprehensive at the time, and much online social and local media from 2011 has disappeared.

View Airwars interactive map of strikes by belligerents in 2011 here.

Few of those killed by Qaddafis forces were struck by airstrikes or artillery, likely due to NATO imposing a no-fly zone and taking out the regimes heavy weapons.

Instead, violence had spiked at the beginning of the uprisingwith security forces indiscriminately firing on protestersand again in August as Qaddafis forces lost the capital, Tripoli. They carried out a series of massacres, including reportedly using grenades to kill more than 60 prisoners packed into a warehouse.

Rebels also committed atrocitieskilling at least 24 civilians while forcing all 48,000 residents of Tawergha to flee after accusing them of Qaddafi sympathies. Gabriel Farag, a man from the town, told Foreign Policy more than 100 men detained by rebel forces are still missing, including his brother. A decade later, Tawergha remains largely deserted.

Libyan authorities proved largely incapable or uninterested in pursuing post-conflict justice. The first post-Qaddafi government established a mechanism to compensate victims but shelved it as the country slid further into civil war in 2014, a former Libyan government official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Several of those interviewed for Foreign Policy said they received compensation from the government for damage to their homesbut no official condolences for loved ones killed.

After the U.N. investigation into the 2011 war, NATO carried out its own six-month internal review of alleged cases of civilian harm, retired British Army Maj. Gen. Rob Weighill, the Combined Joint Task Force head of operations during the conflict, said in an interview. On one or two occasions they found misfires, but for the other events, including the Majer attack that killed young Arwa, they concluded that their actions were justified.

We went to ultra lengths, Weighill said. I know for a fact that the targeting pack, the data, everything that went toward striking those targets was sufficiently accurate and timely to warrant a legitimate strike.

He insisted that even the second NATO attack in Majer, which killed many of those rushing to rescue the injured, was justified. Such so-called double-tap strikes are often criticized for killing civilians. It was still operating as a command and control bunker, Weighill said. We wouldnt have hit it if it hadnt been.

Yet with the campaign fought almost exclusively from the air, NATO had no on-the-ground mechanisms for measuring civilian harm post-strike, he acknowledged.

Weighill described a conversation he had with the then-supreme allied commander Europe, U.S. Adm. James Stavridis, after the war. He said, What level of confidence do you have that you didnt kill people? according to Weighills recollection. And I said, Zero level of confidence.

We really had no idea, he adds. If you look me in the eye and say, Were there any missions you undertook that edged outside the targeting directive or were not legal? I would say, No. Now, did we kill civilians? Probably.

Long a military taboo, admitting to killing civilians has become more common in recent years.

The U.S. Department of Defense has led the way, admitting that its forces killed more than 1,300 civilians in the U.S.-led coalition campaign against the Islamic Statethough watchdogs such as Airwars estimate the real number to be far higher.

Other key allies remain in denial. The U.K. has admitted to just one civilian fatality in six years of bombing the Islamic State, and France none.

NATO itself now has a dedicated Civilian Casualty Investigation and Mitigation Team for Afghanistan. Mark Goodwin-Hudsonwho as a lieutenant colonel in the British Army headed that team in 2016 and is now a consultant for the Center for Civilians in Conflictsaid it was not just morally right but made military sense to compensate families.

In terms of winning the war, you have got to admit mistakes, particularly in the case of committing civilian harm and appropriate reparations, he said. Especially in contexts where you are meant to be fighting for hearts and minds.

But victims of NATO strikes in Libya find themselves caught in a bind. To seek an apology, they have to know which individual country carried out the strike, yet states still hide behind the anonymity of the coalition.

Eight NATO nations carried out airstrikes in Libya during 2011: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Airwars submitted Freedom of Information requests and press questions to each regarding individual strikes that reportedly killed civilians, including in Majer. Denmark and Norway provided partial information, while all others either did not respond, or declined to answerciting collective responsibility.

The U.S. military said all questions should be answered by NATO. Current NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu did not respond to requests about specific incidents.

NATO as an organisation does not make condolence or ex-gratia payments, she wrote by email. As a voluntary gesture to ease civilian suffering, NATO Allies have made payments to victims of military operations in Afghanistan, Syria or Iraq, she added. We hold no records of Allies making payments in relation to the Libya operation.

Lungescu insisted that NATO had no mandate to investigate inside Libya after the 2011 conflict ended. At the time, the Libyan authorities indicated that they were establishing their own mechanisms to review incidents which affected civilians. We offered to support that process but the Libyan authorities did not take NATO up on the offer, she wrote.

In theory, international coalitions such as NATO are about collective responsibility. Yet for the civilians they harm it often feels like collective evasion.

When a 2015 Dutch airstrike killed dozens of civilians in Iraq, the Netherlands hid behind the anonymity of the anti-Islamic State coalition for four years, despite knowing within hours that it was culpable. When this was eventually exposed by investigative journalists, it nearly brought down the Dutch government. Crucially for survivors, the country has since agreed to an unprecedented 4 million euro fund (nearly $5 million) to rebuild the town, and it has launched a review to improve military transparency and accountability for civilian harm.

Both NATO and individual member states almost certainly know which countries carried out which strikes that led to civilian harm in Libya. A new NATO Protection of Civilians handbook issued on March 11 notes the need to prevent, identify, investigate, and track incidents of civilian casualties from [our] own actions, while also providing amends and post-harm assistance when civilians are harmed as a result of these operations. Yet a decade of silence on Libya suggests NATO has little real willingness to follow that path.

Some cases should have been simple to apologize for. At around 1 a.m. on June 19, 2011, a bomb hit the Gharari family home in Tripoli, killing five people. NATO immediately announced a weapons system failure that caused the weapon not to hit the intended target, and reportedly resulted in a number of civilian casualties.

But an apology in English a continent away did not translate in the chaos of Libyas 2011 war. Angry neighbors spread rumors that the family had caused the strike by being Qaddafi sympathizers.

Mohammed al-Gharari, whose sister and her two children were among those killed, decided to fight for an apology and clear the family name. But he soon learned there was no clear route to justice.

Without knowing which nation dropped the bomb, he couldnt even ask for reparations or medical support for those injured in the NATO attack.

In desperation, he eventually traveled to Brussels, home to NATO headquarters. He paid a Belgian lawyer thousands of euros in a futile attempt to find out what the alliance knew about his familys tragedyincluding which nation had killed them. The money is long gone, but that information remains classified. Yet as Weighill noted, the nation that conducted the strike which killed Ghararis family had internally admitted, almost immediately, that the operation didnt go well.

Gharari is angry that he may never be allowed to know which nation is responsible, and he says they are hiding behind NATO anonymity. This state has to assist the wounded and compensate them as soon as possible. Their admission will also clear my name, said Gharari, speaking recently from Libya.

If there is any justice I will get my apology.

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NATO Killed Civilians in Libya and Must Face Responsibility - Foreign Policy

NATO Headquarters hosted its first-ever internal conference on LGBTQ+ perspectives in the workplace on Friday (19 March 2021). Organised by the staff-led Proud @ NATO volunteer group, the online event brought together around 130 participants across civilian and military staffs, as well as national delegations, to discuss the experiences and challenges of LGBTQ+ people at work.

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addressed the conference on the importance of inclusive leadership, saying every member of the LGBTQ+ community at NATO is a valued member of our staff and family, because diversity and inclusion is at the heart of who we are and what we do... drawing on all resources and all experiences makes us stronger, and better equipped to face the future. The Secretary General also expanded on the concept of allyship in the workplace, defining allies as people who do not identify as LGBTQ+ themselves, yet want to see a more inclusive world. He added: you will always have an ally in me.

NATO is committed to diversity. Organisation policy strictly forbids discrimination based on sexual orientation, as well as sex, race or ethnic origin, religion, nationality, disability, or age. NATO was also a world leader in recognising same-sex marriage. The organisation extended equal spousal benefits to same-sex couples in July 2002, at a time when only one country in the world the Netherlands recognised same-sex marriage.

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NATO Headquarters hosts first-ever conference on LGBTQ+ perspectives in the workplace - NATO HQ

Today (18 March 2021), NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoan talked about the development of relations between NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina and about the Alliances continued commitment to stability in the Western Balkans, at an international conference on Euro-Atlantic Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina organized by the University of Mostar.

The Deputy Secretary General underscored NATOs firm support to Bosnia and Herzegovinas ongoing efforts to reform their defence and security institutions, through the daily activities of NATO Headquarters Sarajevo. He highlighted other important areas of practical support from NATO, including new technologies, disaster response, explosives detection, cyber defence, countering disinformation and scientific cooperation. Deputy Secretary General Geoan also welcomed Bosnia and Herzegovinas important contributions to euro-atlantic security and restressed that cooperation will continue to be informed by NATOs full respect for the countrys sovereignty and independence.

Read the full transcript here.

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NATO Deputy Secretary General highlights long-standing and mutually beneficial partnership between NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO HQ

FILE PHOTO: Banners displaying the NATO logo are placed at the entrance of new NATO headquarters during the move to the new building, in Brussels, Belgium April 19, 2018. REUTERS/Yves Herman

SARAJEVO (Reuters) - Russia will react if Bosnia takes steps towards joining NATO because Moscow would perceive this as a hostile act, the Russian embassy in Bosnia said in a statement on Thursday.

Bosnia has long proclaimed integration with NATO and the European Union as strategic goals. But the Bosnian Serbs, led by pro-Russian Milorad Dodik who currently chairs the countrys tripartite presidency, want the country to remain neutral and stay out of the U.S.-led military alliance.

In the case of practical rapprochement of Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO, our country will have to react to this hostile act, the embassy said.

It continued that the purpose of NATO was a fight against Russia and joining NATO will force Sarajevo to take a side in the military-political confrontation.

Bosnia and Serbia are the only two Western Balkan countries that remain outside NATO after North Macedonia joined the alliance last year.

On Thursday, the new Russian ambassador to Bosnia Igor Kalabuhov met Zeljko Komsic, the Croat presidency member who advocates Bosnias integration into the alliance.

A statement from Komsics office did not mention NATO integration as a topic of the meeting, but said they discussed reforms that Bosnia needs to make to get closer to EU membership.

Russia has long maintained its opposition to Bosnia joining NATO.

Komsic and Bosniak presidency member Sefik Dzaferovic declined to meet visiting Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov in December, saying he has shown disrespect to their state after his meeting with Dodik outside Sarajevo with no Bosnian national flag on display.

Reporting by Daria Sito-Sucic; Editing by Alexandra Hudson

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Russia warns it will 'have to react' if Bosnia moves to join NATO - Reuters

By Lieutenant Colonel Henry Heren, US Space Force, JAPCC

People see what they want to see and what people want to see never has anything to do with the truth.1

Introduction

On 4 December 2019, the North Atlantic Council announced in London: We have declared space an operational domain for NATO, recognising its importance in keeping us safe and tackling security challenges, while upholding international law.2In the months since that declaration, NATO developed an Initial Implementation Plan for Space, while outside NATO there have been numerous opinion pieces published recommending how NATO should proceed from both policy and strategy perspectives. The goal of each of these efforts has been to normalise Space within NATO, to recognise NATOs reliance on Space-based capabilities and to promote greater understanding and appreciation for safeguarding the use of those capabilities. Questions abound concerning how NATO should integrate Space-based capabilities into existing policy, doctrine, strategy, operations, and exercises.

Germany concluded in its 2010 released Space Strategy that a paradigm shift has occurred within space: once a symbol of the technology race and a contest between opposing systems, it is now, in every sense, a part of our everyday lives and an essential instrument for the achievement of economic, scientific, political and social goals.3In 2019, France released its Space Defence Strategy which outlines the future of our space defence in accordance with a roadmap that looks to 2030 and beyond.4This document marks a turning point for the future of our armed forces and for Frances capacity to act in all domains and maintain its strategic autonomy of assessment and decision.5Most recently, in June 2020, the United States (US) released its Department of Defense (DoD) Space Strategy which states: This strategy identifies how DoD will advance spacepower to enable the Department to compete, deter, and win in a complex security environment characterized by great power competition.6Collectively, these nations and others are experiencing a renewed interest, excitement, and focus on Space-related activities. It is both natural and understandable that this enthusiasm will cross over into NATO organizations and discussions.

Several Alliance Nations have increased promotion of Space within their own militaries. France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the US have moved to establish Space Commands to varying degrees, and the US took the additional step of establishing an independent military service, the US Space Force. The combined national activities, accompanied by growth in the commercial Space sector, have created an excitement surrounding Space endeavours not seen in several decades.

However, the various advancements in the commercial sector, national militaries, and NATO with regards to Space are far from equal. The enthusiasm felt across communities of interest does not mean all nations are at the same stage of development and capacity with regards to Space-based capabilities. This article will discuss the unique challenges facing NATO with regards to Space strategy, exercises, and personnel as compared to other national entities which in some cases possess more mature capabilities. The goal being to allow for discussion on a way ahead for Space in NATO based upon NATO requirements.

Strategy

Even as NATO recognised Space as an operational domain, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized: NATO has no intention to put weapons in space. We are a defensive Alliance.7He further clarified, NATO will continue to by and large draw on national space capabilities in support of its missions and operations.8Currently NATO receives Space-related Data, Products, and Services (DPS) from several member nations, and does not own or operate any Space-based capabilities. This means, currently, when it comes to the legal authority to operate Space-based Capabilities, including command and control, the NATO Command Structure (NCS) does not play an active role.9

However, this does not mean the NCS has no role to play with regards to Space. The NCS recently approved a concept for a NATO Space Centre, which will serve as a hub for Space-related information, expertise, and activities and directly liaise with the several nations providing Space DPS. Once operational and fully staffed, it will provide greater ability for NATO to coordinate requests for Space DPS.

In the meantime, with regards to Space Strategy, the focus must be on how NATO ensures the flow of Space DPS within the NCS. Calls for additional NATO Space Strategies10in parallel to its maritime and airpower plans11to help NATO align members states on key tactics, tools, and procedures12are premature at best as this role is currently fully the purview of the member nations. In the future, if NATO reconsiders its position and seeks to acquire NATO-operated Space-based capabilities, then a strategy on how to utilise those capabilities will not only be prudent but necessary. NATO is currently better served focusing on how it will work with the nations to ensure interoperability and access to Space DPS across the Alliance, and not pursuing strategies that require both capabilities and authorities that it does not currently possess, and is unlikely to in the near future.

Exercises

It has been suggested that NATO develop large-scale Space-focused exercises, akin to the several Air, Land, and Maritime focused exercises. As previously noted, NATO does not own nor operate any Space-based capabilities, and calls for NATO to host large-scale Space exercises ignore the lack of capabilities present to necessitate such an exercise. NATO could benefit from sending personnel in an observer role to Space-focused exercises conducted by the nations, but that is significantly different from what is being suggested.

Recommendations for these exercises cite the ability to systematically develop and refine space contingencies against red cell adversaries13to signal allied resolve.14While laudable, these ideals overlook not only the lack of authorities within NATO regarding Space-based capabilities, but also the fact that NATO forces are reliant on Space DPS which should be the focus of increased Space-participation in exercises.

With only 19 Space Billets spread across the NCS, and some of those filled by other than Space educated, trained, and focused professionals, for the time being NATO would be better served in ensuring its leaders understand the role Space plays in their operations beyond the mere acknowledgement of Spaces role as an operational domain. The Space Professionals who have served in the NCS have done an admirable job conveying that Space is important, to the extent that exercise controllers are not permitted to fully exercise degradation of Space DPS as it affects the exercise too significantly.

Space Professionals participating in exercises need to be given the latitude to meaningfully impact Space DPS so the entire exercise team can not only gain increased appreciation for how reliant they are upon Space-based capabilities, but also so Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) can be developed from valuable lessons learned. Those TTPs will be critical if NATO finds itself in a conflict with not only peer-competitors, but also those competitors who are able to exploit asymmetric seams to reduce NATO Combat Capabilities.

Personnel

The creation of any new policies, strategies, doctrines, and expanded exercises will rely on educated and trained personnel to create and maintain them. Within the NCS, as previously noted, there are currently 19 Space Billets. The validity of that number drops precipitously when considering some of these positions are not filled, while still others are filled with people who are not educated, trained, nor experienced in Space Operations (as conducted by NATO nations). Add in the fact many personnel assigned to those positions are double-billeted, which means they work primarily on other activities and responsibilities, and focus only occasionally on Space-related issues, and the effectiveness of that already limited number of personnel is further reduced. The result is NATO has only a handful of Space-proficient personnel dedicated day-in and day-out to Space-related activities.

A concept calling for the establishment of the NATO Space Centre was recently approved by the Defence Ministers in October 2020. That concept includes an increase in Space personnel billets within the NCS, at the Space Centre and at the Joint Force Commands and subordinate organizations. Space educated and trained professionals are desperately needed to fill these billets if NATO is to increase its interoperability regarding Space.

Several challenges stand in the way of a trained and ready NATO Space cadre. Aside from the obvious funding concerns, the primary nations to which NATO would look to provide these professionals are, as noted earlier, reorganising their Space communities internally to their respective nations. They are therefore currently ill-suited to provide additional personnel to the NCS. This could result in personnel being assigned to the Space Centre without the requisite Space education and experience, requiring an increase in training and additional funding. It also means NATO may have a Space Centre severely lacking in resident Space Operations Expertise.

Conclusion

As Space Professional and policy-makers seek to influence and guide NATOs approach to Space, they must be careful not to project ideas compatible within their national Space approaches onto NATO organizations, in other words to see what they want. This will include understanding that NATOs use of Space is almost completely as a utility to support operations in other domains, not operations in the Space Domain. The Alliance has not placed an emphasis on Space significant enough to generate personnel and capabilities comparable to several of its member nations, and thus requires a different approach. National Space Professionals need to ensure they understand the capabilities and capacity within NATO, before promoting recommendations which NATO might not be prepared to incorporate or execute at this point in its integration of Space-related capabilities and expertise.

1. Bolao, Roberto. 2666, Picador; Reprint edition (1 Sep. 2009).2. NATO London Declaration, 4 Dec. 2019. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm. [accessed 20 Aug. 2020].3. German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Making Germanys Space Sector Fit for the Future: The Space Strategy of the German Federal Government, Nov. 2010, p. 3.4. French Ministry for the Armed Forces, Space Defence Strategy, 2019, p. 8.5. French Ministry for the Armed Forces, Space Defence Strategy, 2019, p. 12.6. US Department of Defense, Defense Space Strategy, June 2020, p. 1.7. Paulauskas, Kestutis, Space: NATOs Latest Frontier, NATO Review, 13 Mar. 2020. Available at: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/03/13/space-natos-latest-frontier/index.html. [accessed 30 July. 2020].8. Paulauskas, Kestutis, Space: NATOs Latest Frontier, NATO Review, 13 Mar. 2020. Available at: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/03/13/space-natos-latest-frontier/index.html. [accessed 30 Jul. 2020].9. The NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), which exists outside of the NATO Command Structure, does operate the payload of some communications satellites. However, the satellites themselves are control by a consortium of nations (France, Italy, and the United Kingdom). Additional information available at: http://www.eu2015lu.eu/en/agenda/2015/11/25-seminaire-SatCom/3_Presentation-Tom-PLACHECKI.pdf. [accessed 26 Aug. 2020].10. In addition to NATOs Overarching Space Policy approved on 27 Jun. 2019.11. Silverstein, Benjamin, NATOs Return to Space, War on the Rocks, 3 Aug. 2020. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/natos-return-to-space/. [accessed on 3 Aug. 2020].12. Silverstein, Benjamin, NATOs Return to Space, War on the Rocks, 3 Aug. 2020. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/natos-return-to-space/. [accessed on 3 Aug. 2020].13. Bowman, Bradley and Andrew Gabel, NATO Declares Space Operational Domain, but More Work Remains, Defense News, 16 Dec. 2019. Available at: https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/12/16/nato-declares-space-operational-domain-but-more-work-remains/. [accessed on 3 Aug. 2020].14. Silverstein, Benjamin, NATOs Return to Space, War on the Rocks, 3 Aug. 2020. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/natos-return-to-space/. [accessed on 3 Aug. 2020].

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#SpaceWatchGL Opinion: NATO Space - Recognition versus Current Reality - SpaceWatch.Global

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg set out the NATO 2030 initiative to future-proof the Alliance as part of the Council on Foreign Relations Morse Lecture series on Thursday (11 March 2021). In a discussion moderated by former NATO Supreme Allied Commander James Stavridis, the Secretary General underlined the importance of Europe and North America standing together in strategic solidarity to face shared challenges.

The Secretary General stressed that NATO must strengthen collective defence, step up transatlantic consultations, and stand up for the international rules based order which he warned is being challenged by authoritarian powers, including China. Mr. Stoltenberg also said he believes this is the time to develop a new Strategic Concept for NATO, as the strategic environment has changed significantly since the last one was agreed in 2010.

Speaking of the need to broaden the security agenda, the Secretary General focused on climate change, arguing that NATO should become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding, adapting and mitigating the impact of climate change on our security. He also said NATO should raise its level of ambition on resilience, and innovation in cutting-edge technology to remain competitive in a more competitive world.

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Secretary General sets out vision on NATO's future with the Council on Foreign Relations - NATO HQ

On Tuesday 16 March 2021, Lieutenant General Hans-Werner Wiermann, Director General of the NATO International Military Staff, hosted a virtual meeting with his EU counterpart, Vice Admiral Herv Bljean to discuss the ongoing EU-NATO cooperation, including in exercises, training, military mobility and medical cooperation. The meeting concluded with the presentation of the COVID-19 lessons-learned programme spearheaded by NATO Allied Command Transformation, with the support of NATO Centres of Excellence.

Todays meeting provided a forum for both directors and their respective staffs to exchange views and hold open discussions on the ongoing cooperation between NATO and the EU. Since 2018, both organisations have been conducting parallel crisis management exercises with related scenarios; these contribute to improving our knowledge of each others working methods and procedures as well as our overall coordination and information sharing. NATO and the EU understand the importance of maintaining and building on their collaborative relationship.

Throughout the ongoing pandemic, both organisations have had to adapt how they exercise and how they provide training. Lockdowns and social distancing measures have reinvigorated the interest for virtual courses and e-learning. Both NATO and the EU are looking into the possibility to open these programmes up to their respective counterparts. We have much to learn from each other so training and exercising together makes sense. By building interoperability between NATO and non-NATO countries part of the EU, we can work to mobilise a broader range of tools and make the most efficient use of resources to address common challenges and enhance the security of all our citizens, highlighted Lieutenant General Wiermann. The Director of the EU Military Staff, Vice Admiral Bljean added that NATO and the EUMS are working towards the same goals and objectives, related training and exercise scenarios significantly increases the lessons that are identified and learned which enhances capability development.

This health crisis has also magnified the need for better cooperation between NATO and the EU in certain fields, such as information exchange, medical cooperation and military mobility. Vice Admiral Bljean observed that this pandemic does not respect boarders or organisations, and a coordinated EUMS/NATO strategy and response is far greater than the sum of the parts. This pandemic has also demonstrated a requirement for NATO to improve military mobility, to ensure that allied forces can cross borders faster and more easily, when needed. In the event of a crisis and the requirement for a swift response, we cannot afford to waste time getting our troops or equipment to the right place. Working together will help us undertake a wide range of measures, including legislative measures and diplomatic clearances to enable rapid crossing of borders, on land, in the air, and at sea; effective command, control and communication; transportation capacity; and infrastructure. Working with the EU during this pandemic makes us all safer, clarified the Director General of the NATO International Military Staff.

As Nations launch their vaccinations programmes, it is an opportunity for NATO to identify the right lessons from this pandemic to increase Allied resilience and crisis management. With the help of its extensive network of NATO Centres of Excellence, Allied Command Transformation aims to collect and analyse lessons-learned from over 45 NATO entities, including 25 CoEs. These centres are recognised for their expertise and experience, and regularly assist NATO in doctrine development, identifying lessons learned, improving interoperability and capabilities, as well as testing and validating concepts through experimentation. Specific CoEs, including those specialised in Military Medicine, Military Police, Communications and Crisis Management and Disaster Response, have agreed to collate these lessons for the Alliance. COVID-19 takes a great toll at the same time itoffers a great opportunity for international organizations like NATO and EU to identify issues and possible best practices. The outcome of this work should ensure that we are better prepared should another health crisis emerge. We learn to be better prepared both in the short and long term. Knowledge is power and forewarned is forearmed, concluded Lieutenant General Wiermann.

In the current strategic environment, facing new challenges and threats, cooperation between the EU and NATO remains essential. With 21 common members, the security of the EU and NATO is clearly inter-connected. Since 2016, NATO and the EU have been strengthening their cooperation by working on 74 military-related work strands, including countering hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capacity building, improving cyber defence, maritime security, military mobility and exercises.

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Directors General of the NATO and EU International Military Staffs meet to access ongoing cooperation - NATO HQ

Mateusz Morawiecki/Facebook

Poland has received an official invitation from NATO to carry out coronavirus vaccinations at the military bloc's headquarters in Brussels, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki announced on Sunday.

In a Facebook post, Morawiecki said that Poland has been officially invited by NATO "to carry out vaccinations in the Alliance's headquarters in Brussels by Polish medical teams."

"It is an important mission, because NATO is an organisation that ensures the security of about a billion people around the world, and of course we will undertake it," he added.

A Polish immediate medical response team will be dispatched to do the job, Morawiecki said. "Its work will in fact ensure operational continuity of NATO Headquarters," he added.

NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg wrote on Twitter on Sunday: "I am grateful to #Poland & PM @MorawieckiM for readiness to support #COVID-19 vaccination at NATO HQ. Solidarity and resilience are at the heart of #NATO. Poland is a strong Ally who has provided support to many other Allies and partners in our joint fight against the pandemic."

Twenty Polish medics will fly to Brussels on Thursday to inoculate some 3,500 NATO headquarters employees with the coronavirus vaccine made by the Anglo-Swedish firm AstraZeneca, Michal Dworczyk, head of the Polish PM's Office, told PAP.

The inoculation process will take three days and the vaccine will be provided by Poland, Dworczyk said.

Poland has so far carried out over 5 million Covid-19 vaccinations domestically.

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NATO invites Poland to vaccinate HQ staff The First News - The First News