Category Archives: NATO

At long last: Americas military is leaving Afghanistan in September. Thats the big news we learned Tuesday, and expect to hear more about this afternoon when President Joe Biden addresses the topic in remarks planned for about 2 p.m. ET from the White Houses Treaty Room.

Also today: We could get a better sense of what Americas NATO allies think of Bidens decision. His Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin and top diplomat Secretary of State Antony Blinken are in Brussels to meet with Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, as well as foreign and defense ministers from across the alliance and Afghanistan is just one of a few interrelated matters the officials are discussing today. Others include NATO support to Ukraine and the immediate need for Russia to cease its aggressive military buildup along Ukraines borders and in occupied Crimea, according to a statement today from Blinkens spokesman Ned Price.

But about Afghanistan: [T]he NATO Alliance went into Afghanistan together, adjusted to changing circumstances together, and will leave together, Price said.

According to the White House: We will begin an orderly drawdown of the remaining forces before May 1 and plan to have all U.S. troops out of the country before the 20th anniversary of 9/11, a senior administration official told reporters Tuesday.

NATO troops will also depart; but exactly how many is unclear. We have discussed the drawdown with our NATO allies and operational partners, that administration official said. We will remain in lockstep with them as we undergo this operation. We went in together, adjusted together, and now we will prepare to leave together.

Worth noting: At the moment, of the 9,600 NATO troops officially in Afghanistan, about 2,500 of them are American, though that number can be as many as 1,000 higher, the New York Times reports today from Brussels. The second-largest contingent is from Germany, with some 1,300 troops.

ICYMI: 500 more U.S. troops will be headed to Germanys Wiesbaden area possibly as early as this fall, Austin announced Tuesday from Berlin. The new troops would bring the total U.S. forces in Germany to about 35,500; and it sends a notably different message to NATO than the one from Bidens predecessor, who sought to reduce troop levels in Germany and add to troop levels in Poland.

[T]his move will also create more space capabilities, more cyber, and more electronic warfare capabilities in Europe, and it will greatly improve our ability to surge forces at a moment's notice to defend our allies, Austin said Tuesday. Some 35 local national positions and 750 family members will also be coming to the Wiesbaden areas, U.S. Army-Europe officials said in a separate announcement Tuesday.

Germanys reax: It is great news that not only has the withdrawal of troops...from Germany been halted, but, quite the contrary; we will be able to welcome an additional 500 U.S. troops, Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said while standing beside Austin in Berlin.

US, NATO Troops to Withdraw from Afghanistan by 9/11, US Official Says // Tara Copp: Decision for a September pullout follows rigorous policy review.

Afghanistans Situation Didnt Change. American Politics Did // Kevin Baron: The Biden administration says it can fight terrorism in a way that its predecessors called impossible. Can it?

HASC Chair: White House Is Slow-Rolling Defense Budget Details // Marcus Weisgerber: Get us the numbers before May 10, Rep. Adam Smith said Tuesday.

New ODNI Report Sees Growing Cyber Threats, COVID-Related Instability // Patrick Tucker, Government Executive: Intelligence heads will brief lawmakers on Wednesday about threats from China, Russia, others.

'I Felt Hate More Than Anything': How an Active Duty Airman Tried to Start a Civil War // Gisela Prez de Acha, Ellie Lightfoot, and Kathryn Hurd, ProPublica: Steven Carrillos path to the Boogaloo Bois shows the hate group is far more organized and dangerous than previously known.

Welcome to this Wednesday edition of The D Brief from Ben Watson with Bradley Peniston. And if youre not already subscribed to The D Brief, you can do that here. On this day in 1865, President Abraham Lincoln was assassinated at Ford's Theatre in Washington, D.C., on the same night that a deserter in the Confederacy attacked Lincolns Secretary of State William Seward while he was being treated by an Army nurse in his home. Confederate Gen. Robert Lee had surrendered to the Union Army just four days earlier, but Lincoln and Sewards attackers thought there was still a chance the South could win the war. Seward somehow survived his attack; Lincoln passed away the following day. The South officially lost the war on May 9.

For the first time in two years, Americas top intelligence officials will testify on global threats to the U.S. That includes CIA Director William Burns; FBI Director Chris Wray; Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines; Army Gen. Paul Nakasone of the National Security Agency; and Defense Intelligence Agency's Army Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier. That started at 10 a.m. ET. Catch the livestream here.Some things theyre apt to bring up today: The worldwide effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is prompting shifts in security priorities for countries around the world, Defense Ones Patrick Tucker reports off the new worldwide threat assessment (PDF) from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which was released this week.In addition to COVID-19, A large section on cyber this year highlights the risk of supply-chain disruptions from China and particularly Russia. Read on, here.What does the future of U.S. cybersecurity look like? Thats what the Senate Armed Services Committee is looking into today during an afternoon hearing with NSA Cybersecurity Director Robert Joyce; the Defense Department's David McKeown and and Navy Rear Adm. William Chase III. That gets underway at 2:30 p.m. ET.

NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM leaders are headed before the House Armed Services Committee today. The ostensible focus of that hearing: National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in North and South America. Thats scheduled for 11 a.m., and comes an hour after the House Foreign Affairs Committee began its hearing digging into Root Causes of Migration from Central America.

Biden talked with Putin on Tuesday. During the leaders second phone call, the U.S. president emphasized the United States unwavering commitment to Ukraines sovereignty and territorial integrity," according to a White House readout of the call. The Hill has a bit more.Russia vows two more weeks of military maneuvers near Ukraine as U.S. warships plan Black Sea sortie, AP reported Tuesday.Heres a roundup of Russias recent military moves in the region, from Defense Ones Patrick Tucker.

The U.S. has also dispatched an unofficial delegation to Taiwan, according to Reuters: Former U.S. Senator Chris Dodd and former Deputy Secretaries of State Richard Armitage and James Steinberg headed to Taiwan on Tuesday at President Joe Bidens request, in what a White House official called a personal signal of the presidents commitment to the Chinese-claimed island and its democracy. Read on, here.ICYMI: Chinese and U.S. naval forces have been particularly active in the Western Pacific and South China Sea in the past few weeks. More at CNN.

And finally today: A company in Australia knows how to break into encrypted iPhones. Thats why the FBI asked them to help in the case of the San Bernardino shooters back in December 2015 and its also why Apple is suing the company, the Washington Posts Ellen Nakashima and Reed Albergotti report after some respectable sleuthing.Who are these guys? Azimuth Security, which the Post describes as a publicity-shy company that says it sells its cyber wares only to democratic governments.Where this story gets interesting: Even Apple didnt know which vendor the FBI used, Nakashima and Albergotti write. But without realizing it, Apples attorneys came close last year to learning of Azimuths role through a different court case, one that has nothing to do with unlocking a terrorists device. Continue reading here.

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Today's D Brief: US, NATO to pull out of Afghanistan; IC's threat assessment; Biden diplomacy; Extremist airman; And a bit more. - Defense One

Any suggestion that India should engage the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is usually met with a cold stare in Delhi. India in recent years has broken many presumed political taboos in its foreign policy, but talking to NATO is not one of them. Why are regular consultations with NATO, the post-War military alliance between the US and Europe, so unimaginable in Delhi?

During the Cold War, Indias refusal was premised on its non-alignment. That argument had little justification once the Cold War ended during 1989-91. Since then, NATO has built partnerships with many neutral and non-aligned states. NATO has regular consultations with both Russia and China, despite the gathering tensions with them in recent years.

An India-NATO dialogue would simply mean having regular contact with a military alliance, most of whose members are well-established partners of India. If Delhi is eager to draw a reluctant Russia into discussions on the Indo-Pacific, it makes little sense in avoiding engagement with NATO, which is now debating a role in Asias waters.

India has military exchanges with many members of NATO including the US, Britain, and France in bilateral and minilateral formats. Why, then, is a collective engagement with NATO problematic? If Delhi does military exercises with two countries with which it has serious security problems China and Pakistan under the rubric of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), why should talking to NATO be anathema?

Indias real problem is not with NATO, but with Delhis difficulty in thinking strategically about Europe. This inhibition has deep roots. Through the colonial era, Calcutta and Delhi viewed Europe through British eyes. After Independence, Delhi tended to see Europe through the Russian lens. In the last few years, Delhi has begun to develop an independent European framework, but has some distance to go in consolidating it. Talking to NATO ought to be one important part of Indias European strategy.

British Rule in India involved a continuous struggle against rival European powers. First it had to prevail over the Portuguese, Dutch and the French. Then it had to constantly keep an eye on the plans of other European powers to undermine British hegemony in the Subcontinent. In this so-called Great Game with France, Germany and Russia at different stages suspicion of Europe was written into the Indian establishments DNA. In the great reversal after Independence, driven by multiple considerations that we need not go into here, Delhi came to rely on the Soviet Union for its security in the Cold War, amidst Indias widening political divide with the West.

To be sure, there were countervailing trends over the last three centuries. As the East India Company expanded its reach, many princes sought cooperation from other Europeans in their (losing) battles to preserve their sovereignty vis a vis the British.

As nationalist forces gained ground at the dawn of the 20th century, they sought alliances with European powers to overthrow the British empire. Wilhelmine Germany helped set up the first provisional government of India in Kabul headed by Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh and Maulana Barkatullah in 1915. The newly established Soviet Union became an attractive partner for Indian revolutionaries for the overthrow of the British Raj. In the Second World War, Subhas Bose looked for German support to oust Britain from India.

As the Cold War enveloped the world, nuancing Europe became harder in Delhi. India began to see West Europe as an extension of the US and Eastern Europe as a collection of Soviet satellites. Europes many internal contradictions did not disappear in the Cold War; but Delhis rigid ideological framing of the world in East-West and North-South axes left little room for a creative engagement with Europe.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union demanded a fresh approach to Europe. But Delhi could not devote the kind of strategic attention that Europe demanded. The bureaucratisation of the engagement between Delhi and Brussels and the lack of high-level political interest prevented India from taking full advantage of a re-emerging Europe.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has certainly sought to end this prolonged political neglect. The deepening maritime partnership with France since 2018 is an example. Joining the Franco-German Alliance for Multilateralism in 2019 is another. Modis first summit with Nordic nations in 2018 was a recognition that Europe is not a monolith but a continent of sub-regions. So was the engagement with Central Europes Visegrad Four.

Delhi appears to be poised for a vigorous new push into Europe this year. A pragmatic engagement with NATO must be an important part of Indias new European orientation especially amidst the continents search for a new role in the Indo-Pacific.

While NATO is an impressive military alliance, it is not ten feet tall. It is riven with divisions on how to share the military burden and strike the right balance between NATO and the EUs quest for an independent military role. NATO members disagree on Russia, the Middle East and China. Meanwhile, conflicts among NATO members for example, Greece and Turkey have sharpened. NATOs recent adventures out of Europe in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya have not inspired awe.

NATO is not offering membership to India; nor is Delhi interested. At issue is the question of exploring potential common ground. To play any role in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and NATO need partners like India, Australia and Japan. Delhi, in turn, knows that no single power can produce stability and security in the Indo-Pacific. Indias enthusiasm for the Quad is a recognition of the need to build coalitions.

A sustained dialogue between India and NATO could facilitate productive exchanges in a range of areas, including terrorism, changing geopolitics; the evolving nature of military conflict, the role of emerging military technologies, and new military doctrines. More broadly, an institutionalised engagement with NATO should make it easier for Delhi to deal with the military establishments of its 30 member states. On a bilateral front, each of the members has much to offer in strengthening Indias national capabilities.

Would Russia be upset with Indias engagement with NATO? Russia has not made a secret of its allergy to the Quad and Delhis dalliance with Washington. Putting NATO into that mix is unlikely to make much difference. Delhi, in turn, cant be happy with the deepening ties between Moscow and Beijing. As mature states, India and Russia know they have to insulate their bilateral relationship from the larger structural trends buffeting the world today.

Meanwhile, both Russia and China have intensive bilateral engagement with Europe. Even as hostilities between Moscow and Brussels have intensified, multiple European voices call for a dialogue with Russia. After all, Europe cant wish away Russia from its geography. Meanwhile, China has long understood Europes salience and invested massively in cultivating it. Delhis continued reluctance to engage a major European institution like NATO will be a stunning case of strategic self-denial.

This column first appeared in the print edition on April 6, 2021 under the title Why Delhi must talk to NATO. The writer is director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express

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Why India must not say no to NATO - The Indian Express

Another member of the mighty NATO alliance is armed with the world's most powerful fighter jet. The Danish Defence Command has taken delivery of its first historicF-35 Lightning II joint strike jet fighter.

Danish and U.S. officials gathered at Air Force Plant 4 in Fort Worth, Texas, earlier this week to celebrate the rollout of the Royal Danish Air Forces (RDAF) first state-of-the-artF-35 fifth-generation stealth fighter.

The Danish side was represented by officials including Chief of Defense General Flemming Lentfer, New Fighter Program Director Henrik Lundstein, Commander of the Danish Ministry of Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organisation General Kim Jrgensen, and Chief of the Air Command Maj. General Anders Rex.

Also present at the event were representatives of Danish industry and the Danish embassy in the United States. The celebration was likewise joined by Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet, Fort Worth Mayor Betsy Price, Texas Representative Marc Veasey, Performing the Duties of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Gregory Kausner, Defense Security Cooperation Agency Director Heidi Grant, and Program Executive Officer for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Program Office Lt. General Eric Fick.

There is no defense platform in the 21st century that can better support our allies and friends and ensure the security and safety of all Danish citizens, said Taiclet during his remarks. The F-35 provides allied nations with unrivaled capabilities to deter far-reaching and complex threats. With its combination of advanced stealth, speed, agility, and connectivity, the F-35 will strengthen the effectiveness of every branch of the Armed Forces of Denmark, he added. Alluding to the latest round of great-power competition in the Arctic, Taiclet added the F-35 will be the cornerstone for joint operations with NATO and its allies in order to protect and secure Northern Europe, and more importantly now than ever, the Arctic region as well.

Representative Veasy spoke next, reiterating the F-35 acquisition as a symbol U.S.-Danish friendship while also stressing the importance of the F-35 program as a driver of economic activity. The F-35 is the largest defense contract in the state of Texas, in the United States, and the world, Veasy noted. In Texas, we have over 110 suppliers working on the F-35, resulting in over 55,000 direct and indirect jobs worth over 10 billion dollars to our states economy.

Veasys remarks were followed by a promotional video highlighting the cooperation between Lockheed Martin, Danish defense companies, and the Danish government that led to the projects success, as well as a brief remote appearance by Danish Defence Minister Trine Bramsen.

General and the commander of United States Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa Jeffrey Harrigian took the stage next. As senior leaders, our sacred duty is to ensure that if we send our daughters and sons into combat, they will have nothing but the best. He said. And this, he added, turning to the static F-35 displayed behind him, is the best. Another promotional clip followed Harrigians address, showing footage of Denmarks first F-35. General Kim Jrgensen then described the history leading up to Denmarks decision to acquire the F-35. In 2016, we did choose the F-35 and Lockheed Martin, and today I am proud to be the commander of the Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organisation which delivers this unique and powerful jet to the Danish Armed Forces, he stated. Several other high-placed Danish officials took to the stage to reiterate Jrgensens remarks, as the ceremony drew to a close with a final clip highlighting the F-35s capabilities and the ways in which the fighter will bolster Danish air power.

Denmark plans to procure twenty-seven F-35A jet fighters between 2021 and 2026.

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the national interest.

Image: Reuters.

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The F-35 Alliance: Another NATO Member Is Now Flying the F-35 - The National Interest

NATO, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was established in 1949 as a way to ensure the safety of its member countries. Article 5 is a cornerstone of the alliance; it is used to deter attacks on NATO member countries. The original members of NATO include the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Iceland, and Belgium. As of 2020, there are 30 members of the organization. But what is NATO? and why was it formed? Read on below to find out more.

NATO is a multi-country military alliance founded after World War II and established in 1949. There are currently 30 countries that are a part of NATO and the membership is open to any European state to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." In order to join, countries must prepare for membership by following the advice of the Membership Action Plan. Bosnia and Herzegovina are currently participating, and the newest member to join was North Macedonia on March 27, 2020.

NATOs mission objective is to protect the freedom of its members and to stop weapons of mass destruction, cyber-attacks, and terrorism. Article 5 of the Treaty states that an attack on one member state is an attack on all states; members of the organization pledge to aid any member state that has come under attack. Despite its importance, Article 5 has only been invoked once. This was in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

NATO was formed as a defense against the threat of the Soviet Union dismantling democracy in Europe and spreading communism to the United States. President Harry Truman signed the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949. 12 countries joined NATO in 1949, including Canada and the United Kingdom. In 1954, the Soviet Union made requests to join but they were rejected and have been ever since. One of the conditions of being a part of NATO is to spend two percent of their countrys wealth on defense. In 2018, President Trump had expressed desires to withdraw the United States from NATO, this led to the passing of the NATO Support Act which prohibits the appropriation or use of funds to withdraw the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Trump was criticized by officials who said the United States withdrawal would destroy relationships and undo the hard work carried out by the organization over the last 70-plus years.

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What Is NATO? - WorldAtlas

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg took part in a virtual meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS on Tuesday (30 March 2021), co-hosted by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sophie Wilms.

NATO remains committed to the lasting defeat of ISIS, said the Secretary General. For several years now, we have been supporting the Global Coalition directly with AWACS surveillance flights and with NATOs mission in Iraq. He recalled that following Iraqs request, Allies agreed in February to expand NATOs non-combat advisory and training mission. He stressed that the expansion will continue to be demand-driven, conditions-based, and incremental with the consent of the Government of Iraq and in full respect for Iraqs sovereignty and territorial integrity. Mr. Stoltenberg said that NATO will also continue to consult with key partners including the United Nations and European Union, and to coordinate closely with the Global Coalition going forward.

Secretary General Stoltenberg commended Iraqs remarkable progress in fighting Daesh and praised the reform efforts of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimis government. We look forward to continuing the excellent cooperation with the Government of Iraq as we expand our mission, he said.

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NATO Secretary General joins meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS - NATO HQ

In his Annual Report, the NATO Secretary General spoke in his foreword of the need to maintain our technological edge, to remain competitive in a more competitive world. Three publications show how NATO researchers are pursuing this task.

Despite the pandemic that marked 2020 and will continue to challenge us in 2021, the NATO Science & Technology Organization (STO) and its network of over national 6,000 scientists, engineers and analysts delivered a tremendous programme of work (PoW). This programme demonstrates, once again, that the STO stays at the forefront of science & technology and remains committed to sustaining the Alliances technological advantage.

In March 2021, the STO issued three reports to introduce the general public to a selection of the impressive results achieved over the last year and to offer an overview of its future projects.

As the NATO Chief Scientist, Dr Bryan Wells highlighted: Supporting National and NATO priorities on delivering innovation for the Alliance has been a particular focus of the work of the STO in 2020.

While the threats that existed before the pandemic have not diminished, the STO remains committed to supporting, advising and preparing Nations and NATO for the emerging technological environment and future challenges.

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Maintaining NATO's Technological Edge - A Snapshot of the work of NATO Researchers - NATO HQ

When NATO suspended its training and advisory mission in Iraq following the killing of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, the alliance experienced its first reality check on its new enterprise in the country. Iraq was and remains a tragic playground for domestic, regional, and international competition. Now NATO member states have agreed to expand the alliances Iraqi mission. What has changed in the last year? And how will the alliance fare?

COVID-19 may have temporarily constrained the behavior of some regional actors, particularly Iran, but the situation remains as challenging as ever and the distance between the level of ambition in Brussels and the reality on the ground in Baghdad remains significant. Despite renewed support for the alliance, the new U.S. administration appears still eager to continue with progressive disengagement from Iraq. The mission will therefore test NATOs well-known burden-sharing problems. European allies will be called to a greater role in the mission as the United States draws down, a factor that will necessarily bring about significant operational challenges to overcome.

The expanded mission will present NATO with the opportunity to evaluate its limited role in the Middle East, as well as its ability to deliver effective results in security-sector reform in such a polarizing political and security environment. The mission will only succeed if it is properly resourced by the alliance nations and rooted in serious and meaningful engagement with the Iraqis. In its search for relevance beyond Europe, including by articulating its approach to China and to the wider southern flank, NATO needs to decide whether it wants to invest in building effective political influence in the Middle East or be confined to the role of providing technical capacity-building.

A Greater European Role

In February 2021, NATO defense ministers agreed to enlarge the alliances mission in Iraq. The expanded mission will work with a broader range of ministries beyond just the Ministry of Defense, and will possibly operate outside the Baghdad area. There will be a significant rise in personnel too: Up to 4,000 civilian and military staff are set to join the mission, up from a maximum of 500. The expansion will be incremental, conditions-based, and negotiated step by step with the Iraqi authorities.

Established in 2018, NATO Mission Iraq has thus far focused on professionalizing the Iraqi security forces, advising national security institutions the Ministry of Defense and the Office of the National Security Advisor and training the trainers, including the Iraqi Army Bomb Disposal School, the School of Administration and Logistics, and the Military Medical School. These activities have complemented the work of the American-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL, the United Nations, and the European Union Advisory Mission in Iraq, the last of which is small and confined to strategic-level advising at Iraqs Ministry of Interior. Over the last year, however, many of these activities have stalled due to a double whammy of factors the killing of Soleimani in January 2020 and the global COVID-19 pandemic that have together contributed to halting progress and led to a departure of NATO personnel from Iraq.

With the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL reducing its footprint and activities in Iraq, the upgraded NATO mission is set to expand its scope. For instance, it is expected that the mission will initially broaden its role within the Ministry of Defense to include advising on leadership development, good governance, and policy and planning. In the future, and subject to Iraqi requests, NATO may also undertake the advising of the federal police, which sits under the Ministry of Interior and has up until recently been trained and advised by the Italian Carabinieri.

Italy will take the command of NATO Mission Iraq from Denmark in 2022, reflecting the sustained willingness of European countries to play their role in NATOs burden-sharing. Spain, which is a leading European contributor to the anti-ISIL coalition and already plays a prominent role in NATO Mission Iraqs training activities, is also well-placed to undertake a future leadership role. In a departure from President Donald Trump, the Joe Biden administration has been quick to praise and reinforce the role of NATO allies and the value of multilateral frameworks, including in Iraq. With the U.S. presence in Iraq drawing down, European nations willingness to step in to fill the likely operational gaps will therefore be crucial to the sustainability of NATOs mission in Iraq.

Operational Challenges

The drawdown of the anti-ISIL coalition will have some significant implications for NATO in Iraq, but the upgraded NATO mission should not be simply considered as a transition of activities from the coalition to NATO. The two missions mandates are different unlike the coalition, the NATO operation remains a non-combat mission with NATO personnel not involved in the training or accompanying of military units at the tactical level. But NATO will build upon the coalitions gains and will be likely to put more emphasis on strategic-level advisory efforts once the main coalition-supported military operations end. While the coalition is in the last phase of its military campaign, we do not yet have an announced end-date for its operations.

In light of a greater European role within the NATO mission in Iraq, there are likely to be teething problems. Moving from the agile and flexible coalition framework to the highly standardized, bureaucratic, and consensus-based NATO mechanisms will bring operational challenges. NATOs force-generation process, the formal and often lengthy procedure through which alliance nations provide the necessary personnel and equipment for missions and operations, will take time to reach the required operational capability. Any significant expansion of the mission will therefore have to deal with a protracted process before it is properly equipped.

The NATO mission in Iraq is the first such mission with a strong civilian component, which mainly provides strategic-level advice to the Ministry of Defense. The expanded NATO mission will likely see an increase in these civilian elements. Success will therefore rest on NATO allies providing high-quality civilian personnel capable of navigating the complex bureaucracies of the Ministry of Defense and possibly the Ministry of Interior. The NATO mission aims to become more self-sufficient but currently relies on the anti-ISIL coalitions enablers mainly American-provided intelligence, infrastructure, basing, and logistics. Some countries may decide to reflag their military personnel under the NATO umbrella, but the mission will require its own enablers, as briefly alluded to by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg during a recent press conference. If European allies are serious about burden-sharing, this is an area where they could do more.

It is not yet clear whether and how the NATO mission will go beyond the Baghdad area. It is not unimaginable that NATO could move to providing some level of strategic advising to the Kurdish Peshmerga in the north of Iraq in the future. Any such expansion, however, will have to be requested by the Iraqi government and approved by NATO countries, to include Turkey. Given the difficult triangle of relations between Iraqi Kurdish factions, Baghdad, and Ankara, this will be tricky to negotiate.

Expectations for NATO in Iraq and in the Middle East

The upgraded NATO Mission in Iraq will be demand-driven, and the relevant question is: What does the Iraqi government want or need? The Iraqi government has definitely requested support in the professionalization of their security institutions. However, NATO should not overlook the political, security, and socio-economic context in which the mission will operate in order to link strategic ambitions with realistic expectations.

Iraq is still experiencing a delicate transition process from a military campaign to recovery, reconstruction, and wider stability. There are myriad issues to consider an ambitious economic reform program, looming parliamentary elections, the unresolved future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, resurgent jihadist activity, and the uncertain prospect of American-Iranian relations. In opening up to the expansion of the NATO mission in Iraq, with a demand-driven approach and more of a European face than an American one, Iraqs Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi has attempted to reach the dual objective of an assertion of Iraqi sovereignty coupled with a U.S. drawdown. He has also tried to seriously engage with neighboring countries, including Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, to secure political and economic support and navigate the regions dangerous and delicate competitions.

In this context, the NATO mission will play a role in wider security-sector reforms an important domain, but one that cannot deliver quick wins and is highly polarizing in Iraq. And such reforms are not a panacea for wider structural problems.

NATO can provide technical capacity-building to Iraq in the form of training or advisory activities. However, this will be futile if not streamlined in a coherent strategy developed by the Iraqi government and supported by NATO, which is a highly politically sensitive process. NATO therefore should be more politically savvy with regards to what is happening in Iraq and its power relations, rather than just limiting itself to technical capacity-building. Iraq will continue to be at the crossroads of several regional and international issues relations between the United States and Iran and between Iran and the Gulf monarchies, as well as Turkeys regional ambitions. The expanded NATO mission cannot ignore this political context by staying in its comfort zone of capacity-building it needs to be more proactive if it wants to earn relevance. Bridging this political versus technical gap will contribute to NATO attaining a more significant and positive influence in achieving its stated objective of projecting stability in neighboring and partner countries in order to ensure the alliances own security. This will provide NATO with more robust political reach and relevance in the Middle East limited thus far and give much-needed coherence to the multitude of military partnerships established in the region.

Paolo Napolitano, Ph.D., is an independent international consultant with over 10 years of professional experience working in conflict analysis and crisis management for International Organizations and prominent research centers. He was the lead political and security analyst responsible for the Middle East at NATOs Strategic Military Headquarters until October 2020 and deployed to Iraq as a part of the NATO mission from July to October 2019. The opinions expressed here are his own.

Image: NATO

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What to Expect When You're Expecting NATO in Iraq - War on the Rocks

Since joining the alliance in 1952, Turkey has been a staunch NATO member that has decisively contributed to the materialization of the alliances interests. Both NATO and Turkey have been reaping benefits from this cooperation.

Even though in recent years tensions have increased between Turkey and some NATO allies, this should not be interpreted as a crisis between Turkey and NATO.

Changing security priorities and the geopolitical imaginations of members have caused serious spats within the alliance and Turkey is not the only ally that has done some soul-searching during this process.

NATO members now find it difficult, if not impossible, to be on the same page when it comes to certain key issues, such as the revival of Russian assertiveness in wider Europe, China's growing clout in international politics, enlargement of the alliance and American commitment to the liberal international order.

Since NATO adopted its latest security strategy in 2010, many things have changed in international politics. We are now fast moving to a post-liberal international order where not only the possibility of great power competition has increased, but also the rise of illiberal authoritarian powers in global politics have incrementally chipped away at the core principles of the rules-based order, of which NATO has acted as the chief custodian.

NATO now seems to be having a moment of reflection. Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has already commissioned a group of wise men to prepare a blueprint for the alliance to chart its way through the next decade.

The goal is to come up with a new strategic concept that better reflects the current realities of global politics and helps the allies maintain cohesion in the years ahead.

We are now living in a new world and this requires a serious recalibration of the benefits of NATO membership. Whether NATO serves as a force multiplier for Turkey or seriously constrains its quest for strategic autonomy deserves closer attention.

With the process of readapting the alliance to the emerging realities of the new world order now fully underway, Turkey and its NATO allies would do well if they focused on the points of mutual commonalities rather than lashing out at each other on conjectural points of friction.

Even though some allies deem Turkeys recent international outlook as diverging from the West and accordingly treat Turkey as a potential geopolitical challenge to be managed, the big picture is that Turkeys membership in NATO is beneficial for both Ankara and the Western capitals.

Lets leave aside the points of friction for a while and focus on what Turkey and its allies could gain from closer cooperation within NATO.

Turkey benefits from its NATO membership. First, it is in Turkey's interest to be in NATO since the country's ability to deal with traditional threats to its territorial security certainly increases under NATO's nuclear umbrella and the "one for all, all for one" principle of NATO solidarity.

Second, NATO is the most important international organization in today's world tying Turkey to the West. Assuming that Turkey still defines itself as a western country, membership in NATO would offer the strongest confirmation in this regard.

The prospects of Turkey's membership in the EU are not so high and the westernization process Turkey has been pursuing for centuries indeed began as a security strategy. It was to ensure Turkey's territorial security by bringing Ankara closer to western capitals and securing western support against non-western security threats.

Third, Turkey's bargaining power vis-a-vis Russia, China and other non-western powers would certainly decrease should Turkey leave the alliance or experience acrimonious relations with its allies within NATO.

This point needs to be well understood by Turkey's rulers because neither Russia nor China is willing to admit Turkey into their geopolitical clubs. Both countries view Turkey from an instrumental perspective in that the more Turkey becomes part of intra-alliance crises and weakens NATO from within, the better for them.

Fourth, membership offers Turkey an immense opportunity to negotiate its priorities with allies within NATO's multilateral institutional setting. It is much better and cost-effective to talk to allies within NATO than to engage with them bilaterally.

No matter the issue, whether it be the Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean Sea, Cyprus, Libya, Syria, or the S-400s, NATO's mechanisms and platforms provide Turkey with credibility and the ability to make its voice heard more loudly.

The consensus-based decisionmaking process within the alliance enables Turkey to prevent some member states from pressuring it through NATO. Inside the alliance, Turkey could also play a role in shaping NATO's transformation agenda in its national interests.

From Turkey's perspective, the emerging world order should not be built on rigid ideological polarizations between rival blocks.

As a middle power, Turkey needs to maintain its ability to develop cordial economic and political relations with non-western global and regional powers.

Despite its shortcomings, Turkey is a liberal democratic country, yet it does not want a rigid ideological perspective to inform NATO's transformation agenda.

Fifth, Turkey's membership in NATO, alongside the EU accession process, does not only contribute to Turkey's hard power but also decisively shores up its soft power credentials. This is particularly valid in the wider Middle East and North Africa regions where many Muslim-majority states could potentially look to Turkey as a role model in their attempts to bring together religion and tradition with the requirements for sustainable modernization.

Just as Turkey derives immense benefits from NATO membership, the alliance in general, and the United States in particular, also benefit from Turkey's membership.

First, since it entered into the alliance, Turkey has played a key role in European security by shielding the continent from the east and the south.

Turkey does not only act as a buffer zone insulating Kantian Europe from the Hobbesian Middle East but also as a spearhead enabling NATO allies to reach out to the Caucasus, the Black Sea, Central Asia and the wider Middle East.

During the Cold War, Turkey acted as a bulwark against Soviet penetration into the wider Middle East and helped lessen Soviet military pressure on central Europe by tying up a sizable amount of Soviet troops. Turkey's role as an unsinkable aircraft carrier has been well noted.

Second, Turkey is the only ally within NATO that has a Muslim-majority population. Turkey's membership serves as an antidote to the claims that NATO is an alliance of Christian nations.

This has become more and more important in the post-9/11 era, as civilizational and identity-related considerations have increasingly colored international politics.

For NATO's military operations across the globe not to be seen as biased against Islamic nations, Turkey's presence within the alliance has been of vital importance.

Third, if the Biden administration in the U.S. is sincere about reviving rules-based international order and is committed to strengthening NATO as a bulwark against Russia and China, securing Turkeys cooperation within NATO would be key. Turkey is too important an ally to lose to the Russian-Chinese axis.

Fourth, as Stoltenberg has underlined many times, Turkey's cooperation within NATO has been vital to the defeat of radical religious terrorism in the wider Middle East.

Besides, Turkey is home to millions of refugees who would otherwise go on to European countries.

Fifth, having the second-largest army within the alliance and having participated in almost all NATO military operations to date, Turkey has decisively contributed to NATO's overall military capabilities.

Turkey's participation in multinational NATO operations in Afghanistan, taking command numerous times, speaks volumes. Turkey hosting the upcoming negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban could potentially facilitate the peace process.

Sixth, Turkey's NATO membership provides western countries with important opportunities to influence the orientation of Turkey's international and internal policies. Why lose this by pushing Turkey further away from the alliance?

All in all, both Turkey and NATO allies benefit from Turkeys membership. Unless NATO reveals itself to be an ideological weapon deployed by the liberal hawkish cabals in the West, Turkey will feel quite comfortable in the alliance.

*Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Antalya Bilim University

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Turkeys NATO seat: Win-win situation for both sides | Daily Sabah - Daily Sabah

The NATO Secretary-General shakes hands with Japan's Prime Minister April 15, 2013. REUTERS/Toru Hanai

NATOs Asia-Pacific partner countriesAustralia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Koreaare easily among the Alliances most undervalued assets. All four are established democracies that share NATOs values and have contributed to NATO initiatives. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia are also US treaty partners and boast some of the worlds most sophisticated militariesoutmatching those of the vast majority of NATO alliesaccording to global military rankings. Although NATO and these partners have developed their relations over the past two decades, various constraints have limited the ambition and potential of these relationships. A recent report from a group of experts, charged by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with identifying ways to strengthen the Alliance for the future, could lead to a change in this status quo.

The report calls on NATO to devote increased attention and resources to the security challenges posed by Chinaa relatively new focus for the Alliancein part through deepened consultation and cooperation with its Asia-Pacific partner countries. Engagement between NATO and these partners on China is certainly important, but the increased attention paid in this context toward the Asia-Pacific partners also serves as an opportunity for both NATO and these countries to assessand where possible addressthe constraints that have thus far limited their relations. Doing so would enable NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners to maximize the potential of these partnerships going forwardboth in regard to China and more broadly.

The constraints from NATOs side include its partnership program, which poses particular challenges for the Asia-Pacific partners. These partners belong to a catch-all Global Partners designation created for countries falling outside of NATOs formalized, regionally based partnership categories: Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. NATO has not made space for meaningfully engaging Global Partners in the partnership activities that it offers, which are geared toward the needs and interests of the countries in these formalized partnership categories. Most partnership activities are also held in Europe, limiting their accessibility to countries in the Asia-Pacific. Increasing resources for NATOs partnership program, as recommended in the expert-group report, could help with these problems, but first the problems must be recognized and solutions to address them prioritized.

NATO military exercises present a similar issue; although many are open to Global Partners, they are also largely held in Europe. Expanding formal NATO military exercises to other geographic areas more readily accessible to Asia-Pacific partnerslike the Indian Oceanwould require endorsement by the NATO Military Committee and approval by the North Atlantic Council. Such hurdles have thus far been too high for an organization whose decisions are made on the basis of consensus among thirty countries. A less formal option, such as a smaller, ally-led exercise under a NATO flag, would still require Military Committee approval but presents a somewhat lower bar to entry. More feasible still may be sending NATO observers to exercises held by Asia-Pacific partners. Such an option may provide a useful starting point from which to build momentum for addressing the accessibility aspect of military exercises more thoroughly.

The hurdle of consensus for military exercises highlights a deeper problem for relations between NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners. Despite NATOs outreach to and articulated support for these partners, and despite general acknowledgement of the significance of the broader region in which they are located, there has been no agreement among allies on the priority of the Asia-Pacific Global Partners for NATO. Thats the case even though these countries make up the largest regional group within the Global Partners category. NATO allies have been split on their level of ambition vis--vis the Global Partners writ large since the category emerged, with divisions breaking along intra-Alliance fault lines between more globally oriented allies, like the United States, and those favoring NATOs traditional transatlantic character, like France. Russias 2014 invasion of Ukraine, which underscored the continued importance of European territorial defense, added to the divisions among allies regarding Global Partners. If the emphasis on Asia-Pacific partner countries in the expert-group report is to find fertile ground rather than bumping up against these obstacles, it may be necessary to lay additional political groundwork within NATO.

The lack of consensus within NATO on the Asia-Pacific partners has also hampered the Alliances ability to craft a strategic approach to these partnerships, resulting in a largely tactical one instead. NATO has established the administrative and political frameworks necessary to formalize its bilateral relationship with each of the Asia-Pacific partners, including by finalizing Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme agreements, approving national staff contributions to NATO headquarters and satellite installations, and facilitating exchanges of visits between high-level officials. The Alliance and its Asia-Pacific partners have also undertaken operational cooperation on issues like piracy and the war in Afghanistan. NATO has made uneven progress, however, in deepening and further developing the potential of its individual relationships with these countries, which have progressed largely on an ad-hoc basis. The Alliance has also lacked a strategy for harnessing the potential of the Asia-Pacific partners as a group, instead favoring a hub-and-spokes approach.

NATO is not alone in these shortcomings; the Asia-Pacific partners all have various individual constraints on their relations with NATO. In a recent paper for the Japan Institute of International Affairs, I discuss examples from Japan-NATO relations. Although further research on the other partners is warranted, some of the basic issues facing Japanpersonnel shortages, competing priorities, and only a nascent strategic vision for relations with NATOare mirrored in other Asia-Pacific partner countries. The Asia-Pacific partners have also failed to take adequate advantage of coordination with one another as a tool for advocacy with NATO. Such coordination could amplify a regional voice in NATO and be a more effective method of championing issues and activities relevant to the region than the efforts of any single country. The partners, however, would first need to determine jointly any shared goals and interests regarding NATO, as well as potential areas of contention.

If NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners do undertake dialogue and consultation on China, as recommended in the expert-group report, they should pair this move with the broader strategic thinking about their relations that has so far been missing. NATO should determine what it wants going forward from its relations with these partnersboth the individual countries and the regional groupincluding an order of priority and a timeline for action. Even if NATOs resulting approach is relatively modest, reflecting the differing preferences of key allies, it will still provide the greater clarity needed to focus NATO efforts and resources. The Asia-Pacific partners should individually make similar determinations regarding NATO and should also consult with each other as a group. Such actions by NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners will not only help them identify how they can best work together to address the security challenges associated with Chinas rise, but also improve the overall health of their relations.

There is, moreover, an important benefit to such actions in terms of the message they would send to China and others in the region. A more holistic and strategic approach to relations between NATO and the Asia-Pacific partners would substantiate the view that NATOs increased engagement on China is part of a natural evolution of its relationships in the Asia-Pacific, rather than just a thumb in Chinas eye. China may still bristle at NATOs moves, but it will have a harder time seizing the narrative.

A concerted effort from both sides will be necessary if NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners are to address the constraints between them and maximize the potential of their relations. Fortunately, there is still time to undertake such an effort. Along with the expert-group report, Stoltenberg is continuing to gather other input on planning for NATOs future that he will distill at a summit later this year. The recommendations made at this summit will likely be in broad strokes and the subsequent process of implementation, during which NATO will need to work out the details, will provide a longer timeframe for planning and action. The Asia-Pacific partners and advocates of NATOs engagement with these countries should take full advantage of this period.

Mirna Galic is a nonresident senior fellow at the Asia Security Initiative and the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Councils Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Wed, Mar 24, 2021

Policymakers in Brussels should recognize that the EU has significant security interests in the Taiwan Strait, push for dialogue over the issues at stake there, andif this failswork with the United States to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan.

New AtlanticistbyPhilip Anstrn

Continued here:
Opportunity knocks for NATO and its partners in the Asia-Pacific - Atlantic Council

During the March 23-24 meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) council, Anthony Blinken, the U.S. Secretary of State, encouraged NATO members to join the U.S. in viewing China as an economic and security threat to the U.S. as well as to NATO countries, thereby expanding NATOs areas of focus to include the Pacific. This is a dangerous move that must be challenged.

To gain insight into what transpired at the March NATO meeting, we can look to a roadmap for NATOs future, which was released last fall. The report, entitled NATO 2030: United for a New Era, is intended to be a guide for the military alliance in meeting the challenges it will face in the next decade. In the report, released in November, the independent group of five advisers from 10 NATO countries identified 13 challenges and threats to NATO in the next decade.

This new proposed roadmap for NATO reflects an alarming expansion: It is as much about China and the Asia/Pacific region as it is about NATOs traditional area of operations and concern, Europe and Russia.

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Although the group identified the number one threat to NATO as Russia, China was named as threat number 2.

The document brings the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into the Pacific and attempts to provide a justification to expand and strengthen partnerships in the Asia/Pacific region. NATO already has four partners in the Pacific through bilateral agreements with Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. As NATO partners, Australia and New Zealand have deployed many troops under the NATO banner in Afghanistan, while Japan and South Korea have had reconstruction and development projects in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the United States, NATOs mega-member, has military bases all over the Pacific, including in Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, Guam, Singapore and Hawaii that are used by NATO partners during regional war drills.

U.S. Secretary of State Blinken, in his address on March 24 to NATO members, strongly rebuked China and urged NATO allies to join with the U.S. in this adversarial position.

Blinken said the U.S. wouldnt force its European allies into an us-or-them choice, but he then implied the opposite, emphasizing that Washington views China as an economic and security threat, particularly in technology, to NATO allies in Europe.

When one of us is coerced we should respond as allies and work together to reduce our vulnerability by insuring our economies are more integrated with each other, Blinken said.

Blinken cited Chinas militarization of the South China Sea, use of predatory economics, intellectual property theft and human rights abuses.

In his March 24 press conference after the meetings of the North Atlantic Council and after U.S. Secretary of State Blinkens statement, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg focused on primarily on Russia but echoed Blinkens oppositional rhetoric regarding China. While saying We dont regard China as an adversary, Stoltenberg nevertheless continued to spell out specific reasons NATO agrees with the U.S.: The rise of China has direct consequences to our security. So, one of the challenges we face as we now have this forward looking process with NATO 2030 is how to strengthen and how to work more closely together as allies, responding to the rise of China.

NATOs concerns about Chinese military expansion include the construction of nine naval bases on atolls in the South China Sea and an increasing number of ships: China now has the largest navy in the world, with 350 ships and submarines, including over 130 ships. In comparison, the U.S. Navy has 293 ships as of early 2020, but U.S. naval ships have substantially more firepower than Chinese Navy ships.

While Chinas military budget has increased dramatically in the past decade, it still amounts to only one-third of the military budget of the U.S. and is very small compared to the combined military budgets of NATO members and partners.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institutes 2019 estimates show the U.S. military budget of $732 billion is 38 percent of global military expenditures, while Chinas $ 261 billion is 14 percent and Russias military budget of $61 billion is 3.4 percent. Six of the 15 highest military global spenders are members of NATO: the U.S., France, Germany, the U.K., Italy and Canada. Together, these six accounted for 48 percent ($929 billion) of global military expenditure. Total spending by all 29 NATO members was $1035 billion in 2019.

At the March meeting, NATO members spoke frequently about Chinas increasingly global military footprint, including the development of an overseas base in Djibouti, which now hosts military bases of the United States, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Japan and China. China also has several smaller bases around the world, including in the province of Neuqun, Patagonia, Argentina, on land loaned to the Chinese government during Cristina Fernndez de Kirchners presidency. China claims the land is for space exploration and intelligence services. The Chinese government also has a naval electronic intelligence facility on the Great Coco Island of Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal and a small military post in south-eastern Tajikistan.

China has a total of 13 military bases worldwide, including the 9 on atolls in the South China Sea. For perspective, the United States has over 800 military bases around the world.

Meanwhile, NATO is also raising alarm about Chinas economic Belt and Road Initiative, which includes a belt of overland road and rail corridors and a maritime road of shipping lanes and ports.

The groundwork has already been laid for NATOs expansion into Asia: The dominant and continued presence of the United States in the Pacific has given NATO a permanent foothold in the region. The Obama administrations Pivot to Asia was a NATO stepping-stone for increased military actions in the region.

For many years, NATO countries have participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), the worlds largest naval exercise held every two years in Hawaii. In 2020, the COVID-modified RIMPAC had ships from 25 countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, South Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, United Kingdom, United States and Vietnam. China participated in the 2014 RIMPAC with four ships and in 2016, but was disinvited in 2018 due to its military activities in the South China Sea.

The United Kingdom and France have increased their presence in the Indo-Pacific. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, French and British defense ministers announced they would sail warships through the South China Sea to challenge Chinas military expansion. The Shangri-La Dialogue is a security forum attended by defense ministers and military chiefs of 28 Asia-Pacific states and is named for the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore where it has been held since 2002.

Subsequently, the United Kingdom deployed the HMS Albion to conduct freedom of navigation exercises near the Paracel Islands in August 2018 and conducted its first joint exercise with the United States in the South China Sea in 2019. NATO member France has exclusive economic zones in the Pacific around its overseas territories and in February 2021, France conducted a patrol through the South China Sea with a nuclear attack submarine and two other navy ships as a part of its freedom of navigation exercises.

Additionally, the U.S. military is already reorienting much of its military equipment and war maneuvers to the Pacific. The U.S. Armys longstanding massive land maneuvers Defender exercises in Europe will be in the Pacific in 2021. Meanwhile, the U.S. Marine Corps is reorganizing its forces in the Pacific to be fast moving counterweights to Chinas growing navy fleet.

NATOs new strategy in the Pacific is for Marines, as well as small Army units, to operate in littoral operations or operations around shorelines from the islands around the Western Pacific in small units with ship-killing missiles. The Corps is testing missiles fired from these smaller vehicles, which according to the Marine Corps, will make it incredibly hard for the enemy to find us. We will have dozens and dozens and dozens of these platoons and vehicles placed strategically throughout the region.

In 2021, Hawaii will become the home of the Marine Corpss first Marine Littoral Regiment, with initial operating capability in 2023. The Hawaii-based 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment will be composed of 1,800- 2,000 Marines from the 3rd Marine Regiment at Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, which has about 3,400 Marines.

Currently, the Marines have two regiments on Okinawa and one in Hawaii. In the next two years, the new strategy calls for one littoral regiment each on Okinawa, Hawaii and Guam.

The new strategy not only redesigns units but is also redesigning the sea transportation to move the forces around the Pacific. According to the Congressional Research Service, the Light Amphibious Warship, a proposed new class of Navy vessel, will be between 200 and 400 feet long and cost $100 million. The Navy wants to have 28 to 30 of these amphibious ships, which will have the capability to pull up onto beaches. How many ships would be based in Hawaii, Guam and Okinawa remains unclear, as is where they would practice beach landings in the islands, which will be watched closely by local environmental activists.

The U.S. Marines are also adding weaponized drones to their war-fighting equipment. Beginning in 2023, 18 Predator drones will come into the Pacific region, 6 in Hawaii and the others going to Guam and Okinawa.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military is building new bases in the Pacific. In 2020, the president of Palau, a small Pacific island nation of a population of only 17,000, offered his country as a new base of operations for the U.S. military in the Pacific. The U.S. has already constructed a runway and has increased the number of U.S. Navy ships using Palaus ports. The Trump administration quickly sent the secretary of defense and secretary of the navy to consolidate the agreement. Palau already receives extensive funding from the U.S. through an economic and defense agreement called the Compact of Free Association.

U.S. military operations from other Pacific islands have increased in recent years. U.S. nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers and their accompanying escorts of 10 ships and B-2 nuclear-equipped bombers operate daily from the U.S. territory of Guam on freedom of navigation sea drills and overflights of Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan and South Korea.

The Chinese military has responded with its own naval drills in the South China Sea and air armadas of 18 aircraft flying to the edge of Taiwans air defense zone during the Trump administrations increased diplomatic engagement and military sales to Taiwan, an island the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) considers as a renegade province of the PRC.

The level of air and sea confrontation in the Western Pacific between the U.S. and NATO forces and China has increased dangerously over the past two years, and its only a matter of time until an accident or purposeful incident presents a potential war incident that can lead to horrific consequences.

As NATO advisors name China as the number two threat to the organization after Russia, the U.S. top diplomat echoes their rallying call as the U.S. military ramps up its forces in the Pacific region. These worrisome developments suggest the U.S. will continue to play a leading role in pushing NATO to train its sights on China, which will heighten the dangerous confrontation in the Western Pacific.

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In Alarmist Turn, NATO Is Increasingly Positioning Itself in Opposition to... - Truthout