Category Archives: NATO

Even as the Kremlin once again massed troops on Ukraines borders last month, Europe has still not addressed the glaring capability gaps exposed by Russias annexation of Crimea and its proxy war of aggression in Donbas. Having been rudely awakened from their dreams of the end of history by the return of geopolitics, Europeans are concerned but seem unable to devise a common, realistic response, instead resorting to debates over what to do, including calls for strategic autonomy. In a recently published study, we and our colleagues looked under the hood of the military forces in Europe north of the Alps and were unimpressed. Based on granular, country-by-country analysis, combined with a review of NATOs preparations for collective defense and a war game simulating a war in the Baltics, it is painfully clear that NATO and many European armies to this day remain ill-prepared to confront a peer adversary in a high intensity conflict. In fact, even with two weeks of preparations and support from U.S. troops stationed in Europe, NATO and its partners could currently probably not repel a swift Russian ground invasion into the Baltic states. Hence, while European efforts to assume a greater responsibility for their own security are absolutely necessary, largely symbolic initiatives or gestures should be avoided in favor of rebuilding the hard military capabilities that are still severely lacking, and of striking a balance between dealing with threats from the east and from the south. Europe can dramatically improve its own defense, but it will be costly and slow, and European efforts alone cannot replace the critical role of the U.S. military in deterring Russia for the foreseeable future.

The Twilight of Eternal Peace

Following the end of the Cold War, many Europeans embraced the idea that history had ended and that globalization would turn all countries into liberal democracies, thus bringing eternal peace. Accordingly, most European countries enjoyed the peace dividend and radically reduced their armed forces, configuring what remained primarily for stability operations overseas. But since 2014, Europe has been hit by a quadruple whammy: From the east it was rattled by a revisionist and revanchist Russia, from the south it was struck by mass migration and terrorism, from the west it was threatened with abandonment by America under President Donald Trump, and on the domestic scene the ruling elites were challenged by new forces of populism and nationalism. This has led to at least two lively debates, one on just how deficient NATOs defenses against Russia are, and the other on how to respond to the threat of American withdrawal. In the latter debate, which at times has been acrimonious, French President Emmanuel Macron and other voices from Europes south have called for a reduced dependence on the Unites States and for more European strategic autonomy, whereas Atlanticist voices (often from the east and north) instead have argued for revitalizing NATO and improving burden-sharing by rebuilding European military capabilities, while a third group of allies seems to hope that the whole thing will pass and things will go back to normal.

Given Trumps tirades against Europe and NATO while in the White House, and given the very real risk that he would have taken America out of NATO had he been re-elected, it is eminently understandable that Europeans started looking for the lifeboats in case the captain decided to scuttle the ship. In many ways, the Trump presidency was a near-death experience for NATO and the transatlantic link, and to judge from a recent survey it seems to have resulted in a widespread distrust of America as a security partner among European publics. Thus, given that an isolationist may return to the White House in four or eight years, appealing to a need for greater national or European self-reliance may be necessary in order to build the political support needed for greater defense efforts. However, moving from a strategic sabbatical straight to strategic autonomy in one go would seem like a very long jump. In fact, the kind of European strategic autonomy advocated by Macron could not replace the transatlantic link, since autonomy would effectively be limited to political matters, industrial policy, and intervening in Africa and the Middle East. Hence, Europe would still need America to balance out Russia militarily and politically, and to act as a backstop against the return of inter-European rivalry. True European strategic autonomy i.e. the ability to hold its own against major powers, including Russia will remain out of reach as long as Europe consists of separate and independent countries rather than of a single superstate. Indeed, there is a palpable risk that efforts to achieve strategic autonomy will instead result in strategic cacophony, given the widely diverging threat perceptions on the continent.

That said, greater European defense capabilities are an absolute necessity to improve deterrence against Russia and shoulder a greater share of the burden for defense of the continent, and for necessary interventions elsewhere. But, while a measure of signaling of reduced dependence on the United States may be both healthy and politically necessary, too much rhetoric about autonomy could undermine NATO reforms and provide ammunition to U.S. isolationists. Hence, instead of talking loudly but carrying a small twig, Europeans should focus on rebuilding their own military capabilities, with a focus on the near term. Here there is much work to do.

Quick to React, Yet Slow to Act

While Russia came back as a threat in 2014, many European armies to this day remain ill-prepared to confront a peer adversary in a high intensity conflict. With serious gaps in the existing organizations, European defense capabilities are less than meets the eye, and increases in defense budgets have tended to plug holes rather than create new capabilities. Progress has been made, for example, in readiness, planning, logistics, and training, but NATO would probably still come up short in case the Russians attacked the eastern allies.

On paper, NATO, or even NATO Europe alone, clearly outspends and outguns Russia when seen over the entire European theatre. However, funding does not equal fighting power, and troops at home in their garrisons cannot win battles. For political reasons, NATO has refrained from building a robust forward presence on the eastern flank, instead relying on tripwire forces and sending reinforcements rapidly if needed. However, many of the units on NATOs roster have low availability and readiness and are based far away in Western Europe, making demanding movements of troops and equipment necessary. For example, the distance from the port of Bremerhaven in northern Germany to the Suwalki corridor in eastern Poland is almost as great as that between Omaha beach and Berlin. Thus, on the eastern flank Russia has a time-distance advantage and can easily achieve a favorable force ratio. Moreover, as the aggressor chooses a time and place of its liking for an attack while the defenders have to cover a broader area, the local balance of forces at the point of attack will be even worse for the defenders. Adding to that, as many European ground units are either light or have obsolete equipment, they are ill-suited for high-intensity maneuver warfare in open terrain. Light units may be great for deterrence, as they can rapidly be deployed, and can also be useful in defending close or urban terrain, but they are of limited utility once a war turns hot and if the enemy choses another axis of advance, making it necessary to regroup or to counterattack.

Alarmingly, we estimate that given a weeks notice, NATO and partner countries in Northern Europe could only stand up half the number of mechanized battalions in their peacetime garrisons compared with what Russia could west of the Urals. The availability of forces is surprisingly low even for such large and potentially powerful allies as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and such forces that can be mobilised often have deficiencies in critical combat support elements artillery, engineering, air defence, not to mention logistic support. Importantly, since many of these battalions are garrisoned in Western Europe, the only units that would face Russian forces in a short-notice attack on the eastern flank would be the units already there, or those that could be brought there quickly. Moreover, most of the units from the Baltic states, the Nordic countries, and Poland are unsuitable for mobile warfare or incapable of counteroffensives, which would be necessary once the locus of the main Russian attack had been determined.

Hence, in a short, sharp conflict in Northern Europe, the balance of forces clearly favors Russia with respect to ground units with offensive capabilities, and also attack helicopter units. The reverse is true for naval and air forces, but this would only really matter if Russia could be denied a quick win on the ground and if airpower could be quickly brought to bear, which requires planning and preparations in advance, as well as American air reinforcements to Europe ahead of the onset of hostilities.

Fighting for a Draw?

As part of the study, we also conducted a war game covering the initial stages of a Russian attack against all three Baltic states from Russia proper and through Belarus into Lithuania simulating the military balance as of 2020. Compared with 2014, the United States and the countries in the region (Poland, the Baltics and Finland) have started to improve their capabilities for defense against an invasion. For instance, Finland has significantly enhanced the readiness of its conscript army and has improved its long-range precision fire capabilities, the Baltics are mechanizing their armies and are taking deliveries of self-propelled artillery and anti-armor missiles, while Poland has embarked on an ambitious program of upgrading and modernizing its armed forces. All of these front-line states have defense budgets north of 2 percent of GDP.

Furthermore, what would have been a nightmarish contingency in 2014 a swift Russian attack against any or all of the Baltic states is now such a well-known scenario as to almost have become clich. Plans and preparations are being adjusted accordingly, with large-scale, international exercises having increased considerably since 2014, and battalion-sized enhanced forward presence battlegroups are in place in the Baltic states and Poland as multinational tripwires to enhance deterrence.

The downside is that currently, given Russias continuously improved military capabilities, NATO could still probably not repel a swift Russian ground invasion into the Baltic states even with support from American troops stationed in Europe and with two weeks of preparations. In a previous study, we have sought to dispel some of the exaggerations surrounding Russian anti-access/area denial capabilities in the region, particularly its ground-based air defenses. While suppressing Russias air defenses in the region will probably not be as difficult, costly, or time-consuming as previously thought, it would still have to be done before Western airpower could be effectively employed against the attacking Russian tank columns. Crucially, this means that NATOs ground forces would need to delay the Russian advance sufficiently for NATO airpower to come into play, and that NATO must be able to generate a substantial number of suppression of enemy air defenses sorties and ground attack sorties from day one. Thus, the initial duel between NATO airpower and Russian ground-based air defenses could very well prove decisive. With substantial air support early on in a confrontation, NATO ground forces in the Baltics might inflict very substantial damage to any attacking force and possibly even stop it. However, if NATOs air forces are late coming out of the starting blocks, or if Russian ground-based air defenses and other assets deter, delay or, sufficiently degrade NATO airpower, NATOs ground troops would in all likelihood be overrun. In such an air operation, the American contribution would be key in providing planning, striking power, and scarce high-end capabilities such as suppression of enemy air defences, offensive electronic warfare, stealth capabilities, remote sensing, and advanced munitions.

However, we contend that given the Russian aversion to a drawn-out conventional war of attrition which it would probably lose unless it escalated to nuclear weapons NATO and its partners would not have to win in a conflict over the Baltic states; they simply must not lose. This should be within the realm of the possible, if not immediately achievable. For instance, in our assessment, an addition of a handful of mechanized brigades suitable for offensive operations in the Suwalki corridor area, improved combat support especially artillery, air defense, and engineering and particularly improved capabilities for suppressing Russian air defenses, would shift the likely outcome of this scenario considerably. None of this is easily or cheaply achievable, but neither should it be insurmountable.

Building Capability and Cohesion, but Not Pursuing Full Autonomy

In a nutshell, Europes dependence on American military support to balance out Russia remains for the foreseeable future, regardless of debates over strategic autonomy. And even with support from the Unites States, it currently seems difficult for Europe to defend the eastern allies against a short-notice offensive by Russia, especially if this remains limited in geographical scope and ends quickly. Moreover, as Russia seems prone to play the nuclear card in conflicts, having America on board becomes a sine qua non in a confrontation. Nevertheless, a reduced European dependence on America should be within reach, as Russia is not the Soviet Union and has finite resources, while Europe has untapped economic and manpower reserves. A key measure would be to improve the readiness of existing European units and to ensure that they are given the necessary combat support units rather than creating new units or acquiring exotic new technologies. Given the balance of forces and the geography of the eastern flank, improving suppression of enemy air defenses capabilities could be a key force multiplier.

Furthermore, improving operational planning and properly organizing the chain of command for defense is extremely important, relatively cheap and would have good optics; i.e. this would be noticed as a signal of seriousness and determination in Moscow without necessarily causing major political protests in the West.

Improving European defense capabilities is already a work in progress, but this is mainly true for countries bordering Russia or Belarus, while the big three Germany, France, and the United Kingdom still do not seem fully committed and could and should do more. While improvements are underway, they are not happening at a speed that add up to a credible NATO Europe deterrence anytime soon, and France seems to be the only of the majors determined to rebuild a capability for waging high-intensity war. Military capabilities can quickly be abolished but often take a decade or more to reconstruct. That said, as seven years have already passed since the annexation of Crimea, and as the time of maximum danger may lie only a few years ahead as illustrated by Russian sabre-rattling on Ukraines borders it is crucial to identify and exploit any opportunities to plug existing capability gaps as quickly as possible. Instead of pursuing largely symbolic autonomy without credible military substance, Europe should focus on the nuts and bolts of rebuilding its military capability and nurture its strategic cohesion, the key source of its strength.

In doing so, America and the northern European allies and partners would be wise to accept and adapt to the fact that many allies situated farther from Russia consider the threat from the south and the Levant as more urgent and serious. Russias power and reach is, after all, much reduced as compared with the Soviet Unions, and it aims primarily to divide and dominate, not conquer, the European continent. This means that it should be much less demanding to deter Russia militarily than it was to contain the Soviet Union. Russia constantly tests and probes the boundaries constraining its return to great power status, looking for weaknesses while carefully watching Western reactions. In responding to this, Europe needs credible capabilities, not grand slogans or lofty long-term plans.

A continued tug-of-war between NATOs southern and eastern perspectives or over strategic autonomy could be as needlessly divisive as it is barren, and it would be better for both camps to mutually accept and support each others underlying concerns. If NATO is to have a new lease on life, and if the southern members are to feel motivated to really engage and contribute, the alliance needs to address both these perspectives and to add substance to the slogan NATO 360. For Europe north of the Alps and the eastern Balkans, this would mean taking a major role in deterring Russia, with especially Germany needing to play a more assertive role. At the same time, the European allies need to adapt to the long-term shift in Americas attention from Europe to Asia and shoulder more of the burdens, while America needs to realize that transatlantic trust has been dented, accept and encourage a greater role for Europe, and not be so instinctively suspicious of all European initiatives.

Robert Dalsj, Ph.D., is a research director in the Department for Strategy and Policy at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), specializing in politico-military matters in the Euro-Atlantic region. Robert has also served at the Ministry of Defense and on the Swedish NATO delegation and he is an active reserve officer in the Armed Forces.

Michael Jonsson, Ph.D., is a deputy research director in the Department for Strategy and Policy and the head of the Defence Policy Studies program at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Michael holds a doctoral degree from Uppsala University, has previously served at the Swedish Defence Headquarters and is the co-editor of Conflict, Crime, and the State in Postcommunist Eurasia (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

The opinions expressed in this article reflects the assessments of its authors alone, and do not represent any formal position of FOI as a government agency.

Image: Defense Department (Photo by Sgt. Maj. Marco Dorow, German Army)

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Autonomy, Cacophony, or Coherence? The Future of European Defense - War on the Rocks

The special F-16 of the Portuguese Air Force. (All images: David Parody)

NATO Tiger Meet (NTM) is one of Europes most famous and loved among the aviation enthusiasts community, multinational exercise attended by squadrons sporting Tiger (or feline) emblems. As often explained, although it usually includes Spotters/Media Day and, sometimes, an Open Day for general public, NTM is not an air show: all types of air-to-air and air-to-ground and a wide variety of support missions are part of each Tiger Meeting, whose goals are the creation of a high-level tactical exercise, where participants can train realistically; practice day and night operations in a multi-domain environment, against air, land and sea threats; maximize integration and interoperability with NATO members & Partnership for Peace Members, and share learning points; creation of an environment promoting the well-known Tiger Spirit, which respects the NATO Tiger Association Traditions and Customs.

However, the main difference between NTM and many other traditional exercises is that many aircraft taking part in the maneuvers, at least one (but usually more than one) per participating unit, sport Tiger markings, Special Tails or flamboyant tiger-themed paint schemes.

This years edition, NTM 21, organized by the Portuguese Air Force, is underway from May 2 to May 14, 2021, at Air Base No. 11 (BA11), in Beja. The Portuguese airbase was planned to host the NTM in 2020, but the exercise last year was cancelled because of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

NTM21 host unit is the Squadron 301 Jaguares of the Portuguese Air Force. At NTM 2019, which took place in Mont-de-Marsan, France, the Portuguese unit, flying the F-16 was awarded both the Silver trophy Tiger and the Tiger Spirit award.

Nine Tiger squadrons from 8 allied nations for a total of more than 50 aircraft and around 1,000 military personnel are scheduled to take part in this years Tiger Meet that, as usual, will also be supported by several external units, including Esquadra 751, performing troop insertion with its EH-101 Merlin helicopters; and the civilian Cobham Aviation with its Special Mission Falcon 20 jet.

The NTMs program is basically always the same: two waves are flown, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. The first ones are usually the most complex COMAO (Composite Air Operations) and the second ones are the so-called Shadow/Panther missions (the first are performed during the day the second are night missions), smaller scale events which usually involve junior pilots. There are also some night operations, this year planned on May 4, 5 and 6, 2021.

COMAO missions cover the entire spectrum of air operations with broad force involvement as part of the same package: from the air defense of a specific area to the offensive operations against all types of targets (both maritime and land), all the missions require the participants to cooperate and face threats to ingress and egress a simulated contested airspace.

Shadow and Panther missions are smaller scale missions, where specific operations will be trained. Some examples are: CAS (Close Air Support), in coordination with ground troops; Vehicle Interdiction or Hostage Rescue, where a helicopter will command the operation with the support of fighters; Basic Fighter Maneuvers (BFM) and DACT (Dissimilar Air Combat Training).

Tiger Meetings also offer some nice exchange opportunity for aircrew to fly orientation missions aboard allied aircraft.

On May 3, 2021, our contributor David Parody had the opportunity to attend the Media Day at Beja and shoot the photographs you can find in this article.

Among the most interesting, eye-catching liveries of NTM 21, we cant but mention the one of the Italian Air Force Eurofighter Typhoon with the 12 Gruppo (Squadron) with the Siberian/White Tiger as well as the host nations F-16 MLU jets: the full Tiger special color of the Esq 301 along with the other F-16 Viper sporting the 50th anniversary tail.

David Cenciotti is a freelance journalist based in Rome, Italy. He is the Founder and Editor of The Aviationist, one of the worlds most famous and read military aviation blogs. Since 1996, he has written for major worldwide magazines, including Air Forces Monthly, Combat Aircraft, and many others, covering aviation, defense, war, industry, intelligence, crime and cyberwar. He has reported from the U.S., Europe, Australia and Syria, and flown several combat planes with different air forces. He is a former 2nd Lt. of the Italian Air Force, a private pilot and a graduate in Computer Engineering. He has written four books.

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We Have Been To NATO Tiger Meet 2021 And Here Are The Most Interesting Aircraft We Found There. - The Aviationist

Two NATO warships have been spotted off the coast of North Wales ahead of a major two-week exercise.

One of the ships has stopped close to the Gwynt y Mr wind farm, while the second is close to the Conwy Platform, according to data from website marinetraffic.com.

Officials were unable to confirm the reason for the ships' appearance off the coast, but it is understood it is linked to a major exercise getting underway this month.

Exercise Strike Warrior, which takes place off Scotland, will involve more than 20 warships, three submarines and 150 aircraft from 11 nations.

It will be the UK Carrier Strike Group's "largest and most demanding exercise" so far before it heads out on operational deployment to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific, according to the Royal Navy.

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This exercise will also take place in conjunction with Exercise Joint Warrior, a NATO exercise which happens twice a year.

Aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth has already left Portsmouth as it prepares for the exercise, and will be joined by warships HMS Defender, HMS Diamond, HMS Kent and HMS Richmond.

The Royal Navy said: "The exercise, which will run for two weeks, will see the task group pitted against warships from NATOs Standing Maritime Group 1 in waters off north-west Scotland to prove it is capable of undertaking high intensity operations against the most demanding adversaries.

"The culmination of Strike Warrior will see the Carrier Strike Group certified ready for deployment, at which point operational command will pass from the Royal Navys Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Jerry Kyd, to the Chief of Joint Operations, Vice Admiral Sir Ben Key."

Commodore Steve Moorhouse, commander of the UK Carrier Strike Group, said: The advent of the UK Carrier Strike Group represents a substantial new injection of fifth generation combat power into the defence of the Euro-Atlantic region.

It is therefore fitting that our final and most demanding test prior to deployment involves so many of Britains allies.

As the ships and aircraft of the Carrier Strike Group assemble over the coming days, Exercise Strike Warrior is an opportunity prove to ourselves, and to the world, that we have what it takes to act as cohesive and potent fighting force at sea, under the water, in the air and over the land.

Strike Warrior is the third and last in a series of pre-deployment exercises undertaken by the Carrier Strike Group over the past year.

It takes place concurrently with NATOs largest biannual maritime exercise, Joint Warrior, predominantly in the north west of Scotland, which sees the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and British Army joined by forces from NATO and Australia for a series of realistic operational scenarios spanning sea, air, land and cyber and space.

The participating NATO nations will be the UK, USA, Denmark, France, Germany, Latvia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland.

Australia is the non-NATO participant.

Read more from the original source:
Huge NATO warships spotted off the coast of North Wales - North Wales Live

RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, Germany --

U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa hosted the first Command and Control Commanders Conference with the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence Center of Excellence at the NATO Missile Firing Installation conference center April 20-21, in Crete, Greece.

The C2CC was created to provide a venue for commanders across the area of operations to collaborate, bringing their ideas, experiences and discussions to the table to get a big picture of what to expect during the upcoming USAFE-AFAFRICA-led exercise Astral Knight 2021.

The purpose of the conference was to bring the AK21 exercise participants unit commanders together to discuss air and missile defense topics of interest and concern, said Bryan Vaughn, USAFE-AFAFRICA 603rd Air Operations Center air and missile defense planner. And also to better prepare them for the execution of the exercise event.

NATO allies that participated in the conference include Greece, Italy, Albania, Croatia, Turkey and the U.S. The partners discussed C2 strategies and collaboration, specifically IAMD coordination in the southern European region, in preparation for AK 21.

Vaughn planned the C2CC to make sure that coalition unit commanders, and their staff, were prepared for the exercise after its expansion and involvement with several different participants.

The group conferred on three different vignettes, specific to AK21 scenarios, affording each partner the opportunity to hear perspectives and discuss lessons learned from prior experiences.

The conference brought the partners, the commanders and critical nodes of the exercise together so that we could talk through some challenges that well see next month and some of the scenarios, said Maj. Gen. Greg Semmel, Air National Guard assistant to the commander, USAFE-AFAFRICA and AK21 exercise director. As a partnership and a coalition, this ensures were all on the same sheet of music when we go into the exerciseits critical.

Having been the first ever C2CC in which leaders came together prior to the multinational exercise, the two-day conference allowed partners to learn and understand why C2 is important and how each nation takes ownership in the success of the exercise.

We felt it was a good idea to do some mission rehearsal and some preparatory discussions with them to build their confidence and ensure smoother execution of the exercise itself, Vaughn said.

The staff of the newly-formed IAMD COE plan to take information from the discussions and the experiences of their counterparts as tools to ensure their success in the business.

The conference broadened our horizon in knowledge and expertise through great discussions about IAMD, said Hellenic Air Force Col. Evangelos Tzikas, IAMD COE director. We were able to receive the knowledge and experience from the IAMD spectrum to use in the future and we now have a better understanding of where we have to focus as a multinational COE.

During their closing remarks, all of the commanders gave remarks of gratitude.

This happened because of USAFEs team, my IAMD COE team, and the NAMFI team that put all these things together Tzikas said. and of course with the permission of the Hellenic National General Staff allowing us to be together.

Having this conference was critical, Semmel said.

Sometimes we go into an exercise cold; this allows us to go into the exercise a little warmer and even better prepared. It was hugely beneficial.

AK21, scheduled to take place at the end of May, is U.S. European Commands capstone IAMD and Joint All-Domain Command and Control exercise, and the only one led by USAFE-AFAFRICA. The joint, multinational exercise is intended to focus on defending key terrain through communications infrastructures.

See more here:
NATO partners discuss command and control leading up to AK21 - Air Force Link

With Russia actively undermining the interests of NATO and its partners in the Black Sea, the Alliance must adopt a formidable strategy to enhance its presence in the region.

Russias recent military buildup along its border with Ukraine and in occupied Crimea put a spotlight back onto the importance of the Black Sea.

Social media was filled with countless videos of trains carrying Russian military equipment towards Ukraine. However, Russias build up was limited to land. Recently, at least fifteen vessels from the Caspian flotilla including amphibious landing ships have arrived in the Sea of Azov. Four more Russian warships from the Baltic fleet are also now in the Black Sea. This brings a total of at least 50 Russian warships now operating in the waters around Ukraine.

The Black Sea sits at an important crossroads between Europe, Asia, and the Caucasus. Many important oil and gas pipelines, as well as fibre optic cables, crisscross the sea. Throughout the history of the region, the Black Sea has proven to be geopolitically and economically important.

The Black Seas strategic importance for NATO is primarily derived from two issues.

The first is the fact that three of six Black Sea countries (Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania) are in NATO and fall under the alliances security guarantee. Another two countries (Ukraine and Georgia) participate in NATOs Partnership for Peace program and aspire to join the Alliance someday.

Secondly, one of the Alliances biggest geopolitical competitors and adversaries, Russia, is very active in undermining the interests of NATO and its partners in the region. Also, Russia uses its military presence as a springboard to launch military operations further afield like in Libya or Syria.

For Russia, domination of the Black Sea region has always been considered a matter of national survival. Russian Black Sea ports, being Russias only warm water ports, have always served its economic interests.

For example, on the eve of World War I, 50 percent of all Russian exports, and 90 percent of Russian agriculture exports, passed through the Bosphorus via the Black Sea. Today, an oil tanker passes through the Bosphorus out of the Black Sea every fifteen minutes carrying Russian oil or Kazakh oil (the latter, of course, transits Russia so that Moscow can collect transit fees).

A proactive strategy

Inside NATO circles there has been a lot of talk, and some action, regarding the Black Sea region. However, NATO could do four things to enhance its presence in the region.

Firstly, NATO needs to develop a regional strategy that includes both the Black Sea and Sea of Azov regions. Often overlooked in the debate about the Black Sea is the situation in the Sea of Azov this small, shallow body of water, connected to the Black Sea by a narrow strait, has been important for centuries.

Since Russias annexation of Crimea, the Sea of Azov has essentially become a Russian lake. With the Black Sea being contested like never before in modern history, it's a direct threat to US, NATO, Ukrainian, and Georgian security interests.

Secondly, NATO should not neglect the land and air component of Black Sea security. With much of the focus on the maritime realm, policymakers cannot ignore the important air and land component in the region. NATO should consider the feasibility of a Black Sea Air Policing Mission, for example.

Thirdly, NATO should establish a Black Sea Maritime Patrol mission modeled on the Baltic Air Policing mission. NATOs interest in Black Sea security is increasing, but the overall presence of nonBlack Sea NATO warships is decreasing. A Black Sea Maritime Patrol mission would maintain a robust NATO presence in the Black Sea in line with the 1936 Montreux Convention. This would require nonBlack Sea NATO countries to commit in advance to a regular and rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea.

Finally NATOs door must remain open for Georgia and Ukraine. These are two Black Sea countries that know what it is like to suffer from Russian aggression. They also aspire to join the Alliance someday. Without close cooperation and relations with both, NATO cannot have an effective Black Sea strategy.

Any proposals to increase the Alliances presence in the Black Sea should include Turkey's involvement and consultation. Turkey has the most capable Black Sea navy inside NATO, and is a member with sovereign control of the straits entering the Black Sea. It should be explained to Ankara that nothing the US or NATO will do in the Black Sea is meant to undermine this control.

Russias annexation of Crimea in 2014 was an unprecedented act of foreign-state aggression in the 21st century. It was the first time that borders in Europe had been changed using military force since 1945. The annexation has de facto cut Ukraines coastline in half.

Also, Russia has since claimed rights to underwater resources off the Crimean Peninsula previously belonging to Ukraine. With the recent Russian military buildupon both land and seait is clear that Moscow has even bigger plans for Ukraine in the future.

The economic, security, and political significance of the Black Sea and the broader region is only becoming more important. Not only for NATOs southern flank, but also to keep the door open for future NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia.

With Russia using the Black Sea as a springboard for operations in places like Syria and Libya, and with continued Russian aggression against Ukraine and Georgia, the Alliance cannot afford to ignore the region.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of TRT World.

We welcome all pitches and submissions to TRT World Opinion please send them via email, to opinion.editorial@trtworld.com

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NATO cannot afford to ignore the geopolitics of the Black Sea - TRT World

COLOGNE, Germany NATO officials are kicking around a new set of questions for member states on artificial intelligence in defense applications, as the alliance seeks common ground ahead of a strategy document planned for this summer.

The move comes amid a grand effort to sharpen NATOs edge in what officials call emerging and disruptive technologies, or EDT. Autonomous and artificial intelligence-enabled weaponry is a key element in that push, aimed at ensuring tech leadership on a global scale.

Exactly where the alliance falls on the spectrum between permitting AI-powered defense technology in some applications and disavowing it in others is expected to be a hotly debated topic in the run-up to the June 14 NATO summit.

We have agreed that we need principles of responsible use, but were also in the process of delineating specific technologies, David van Weel, the alliances assistant secretary-general for emerging security challenges, said at a web event earlier this month organized by the Estonian Defence Ministry.

Different rules could apply to different systems depending on their intended use and the level of autonomy involved, he said. For example, an algorithm sifting through data as part of a back-office operation at NATO headquarters in Brussels would be subjected to a different level of scrutiny than an autonomous weapon.

In addition, rules are in the works for industry to understand the requirements involved in making systems adhere to a future NATO policy on artificial intelligence. The idea is to present a menu of quantifiable principles for companies to determine what their products can live up to, van Weel said.

For now, alliance officials are teeing up questions to guide the upcoming discussion, he added.

Those range from basic introspections about whether AI-enabled systems fall under NATOs legal mandates, van Weel explained, to whether a given system is free of bias, meaning if its decision-making tilts in a particular direction.

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Accountability and transparency are two more buzzwords expected to loom large in the debate. Accidents with autonomous vehicles, for example, will the raise the question of who is responsible manufacturers or operators.

The level of visibility into of how systems make decisions also will be crucial, according to van Weel. Can you explain to me as an operator what your autonomous vehicle does, and why it does certain things? And if it does things that we didnt expect, can we then turn it off? he asked.

NATOs effort to hammer out common ground on artificial intelligence follows a push by the European Union to do the same, albeit without considering military applications. In addition, the United Nations has long been a forum for discussing the implications of weaponizing AI.

Some of those organizations have essentially reinvented the wheel every time, according to Frank Sauer, a researcher at the Bundeswehr University in Munich.

Regulators tend to focus too much on slicing and dicing through various definitions of autonomy and pairing them with potential use cases, he said.

You have to think about this in a technology-agnostic way, Sauer argued, suggesting that officials place greater emphasis on the precise mechanics of human control. Lets just assume the machine can do everything it wants what role are humans supposed to play?

See more here:
NATO tees up negotiations on artificial intelligence in weapons - C4ISRNet

The NATO Building Integrity (BI) toolkit has a new effective learning tool ''Glossary of Human Resource Management in the Public Sector''. Developed by the Norwegian Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector (CIDS), this new, quick and reliable reference material is designed for civil servants and public sector managers as well as individuals from civil society organisations and media.

Human resource (HR) management is critical for building integrity. It is one of the main functional areas of the institutional framework of the public service. A robust and well-functioning system of HR management is indispensable for embedding the principles of integrity and professionalism in the defence and related security sector, reducing corruption risk and ensuring that corporate ethical leadership culture is well mainstreamed.

The development of effective and transparent personnel structures and practices in the defence forces is one of the main principles of defence institution building as elaborated in NATOs 2004 Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building. It is an inseparable part of integrity-building and anti-corruption efforts and is one of the areas of analysis in the NATO BI Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process.

This glossary has been designed as a practical tool to guide NATO BI efforts in strengthening the focus on human resource management. It provides an easy reference for the broad range of terms and concepts used in this area. It is also a living document, given the dynamic nature of HR management as a growing field of research and practice. As such, the glossary can benefit from first-hand expertise of researchers and practitioners and is expected to advance knowledge within the NATO BI community of practice.

This glossary, like other NATO BI key reference documents, will be made available in the two official NATO languages (English and French), as well as other languages in which NATO BI is implemented.

Read more:
NATO Building Integrity: New Glossary of Human Resource Management in the Public Sector - NATO HQ

In a written statement delivered at the UN Security Councils Open Debate on Sexual Violence in Conflict on 14 April 2021, the NATO Secretary Generals Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, Clare Hutchinson, warned against the use of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence as a weapon of war against women and girls and increasingly against men and boys.

Sexual violence perpetuates conflict and instability she said, despite the adoption of resolutions, policies and guidelines, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence is not only a persistent problem, it is evolving and growing. And as we have seen, it is increasingly used as a tactic of terrorism.

NATO currently has military guidelines on preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence. The Alliance is in the process of developing a formal policy on the topic.

This will support NATOs ongoing efforts to contribute to the international communitys work to counter sexual violence in conflict. As Ms. Hutchinson outlined, developing and maintaining high standards for ourselves is crucial, and encouraging high standards in other militaries around the world is also essential. We have worked with many of our partner countries, strengthening our training on human rights and the protection of civilians, including against Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.

Ms. Hutchinson concluded by underscoring the fundamental importance of this work. We recognise that understanding and responding to the grievous, systematic sexual abuse of women and girls in and around conflict is mission critical and essential to our operational effectiveness. We understand that sexual violence does not have to be an inevitable consequence of conflict. And we understand that we can help to drive change.

Click here to read the address by the NATO Secretary Generals Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security.

Read the original post:
NATO stands with the international community to address sexual violence in conflict - NATO HQ

The Mahindra driver started second on the grid at the Spanish venue following a penalty for Porsches Andre Lotterer and was biding his time behind the pole-sitting BMW Andretti of Jake Dennis, saving as much as one percent energy over his rival on a track that is known to be very high on power consumption.

The 27-year-old was planning to attack rookie Dennis for the lead right at the death of the race, but he was nudged into the gravel trap at the exit of Turn 9 by Nato on lap 18, initially dropping to fifth before slipping further to ninth as drivers armed with attack mode slipped past him.

Lynn managed to regain some of the lost ground when he armed his own attack mode, before also passing Nissans Oliver Rowland and the Audi of Rene Rast to finish fourth on road, and a five-second penalty for Nato for their incident promoted him to the final spot on the podium.

This result marked his first podium finish in FE, the British driver having never finished higher than fifth in 33 race starts despite claiming pole position on his debut back in 2017 as a substitute for Jose Maria Lopez at the DS Virgin team.

Lynn admitted that he had the speed to score Mahindras first FE win since the 2019 Marrakesh E-Prix but felt there was always a risk of being caught up in incidents when running in a train of cars as they all ran nose-to-nail in the early part of the race.

Its a shame, to be honest, Lynn told Autosport. Norman has apologised to be fair.

Its just a miscalculation from him, it seems. I need to look at it, I havent watched it back. Its Formula E, isnt it.

You run the risk of sitting in the train and trying to be clever and one moment it can bite you in the arse. And it did.

But thats part of the game that was part of our strategy because we took the risk.

"Its a shame because I think we had enough energy and the car to win. But we salvaged what we could and that was third.

Photo by: Sam Bagnall / Motorsport Images

Lynn, however, said he was not gutted to miss out on a chance to battle Dennis for victory, having finally ended his podium drought in his first full season with the Mahindra team.

Asked if he felt missed emotions in the press conference, Lynn said: Its actually not because Ive never had a Formula E podium and its quite crazy really because I felt so close so many times, so from that side it feels super sweet.

But [credit] to Jake, in the end he led from the front.

Nato dropped from second on the road to fifth after the penalty was taken into account, ahead of Rast who was forced into a massive power-saving exercise in the final few laps of the race.

The Venturi driver apologised for the incident and said it was a direct consequence of drivers running too close to each other while saving energy.

This race was really about energy management so from the beginning, especially through the corners, we were all trying to save as much energy as possible," Nato told Autosport.

"Sometimes, it closes up massively and you touch the guy in front.

Its not like you do it on purpose. So many drivers did the same on me as well but this time I was a bit surprised how much they slowed down in front.

"I was just couldnt really avoid him. I touched him. I was not even trying to overtake.

Thats why I went to apologise because if I was him I would have been angry as well.

"But we know in Formula E this kind of thing can happen. A small mistake will cost a lot. Im still learning.

Read more here:
Lynn: Nato shunt shows FE "can bite you in the arse" - Autosport

The Russian military is doing an unfortunate amount of posturing in Central Europe, with more than 100,000 troops amassed on its border with Ukraine. The crisis will serve as a litmus test of President Joe Bidens ability to get our NATO allies to pull together. They need to blunt any Russian threat to invade Ukraine by raising their own military preparedness and giving arms to Ukraine. Also, they must speak with one voice on the financial risks Russia will face if it continues its aggressive behavior.

The Russian effort to intimidate Ukraine follows years of actions in defiance of peaceful relations with its neighbors and the United States, ranging from assassinations on foreign soil to physical and cyber sabotage and online interference with elections in Europe and the United States. The latest example of cyber crime involves the exploitation of Solar Winds software last fall to compromise U.S. government agencies and many private corporations.

President Biden has responded to Russias actions in an appropriately measured way so far. In an April 13 call to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Mr. Biden offered to meet him this summer in Europe to discuss relations. In an April 15 speech on relations with Russia, he reiterated this offer but also issued new economic sanctions for the Solar Winds attack and Russias interference in the U.S. elections last year. He also ordered the expulsion of 10 Russian diplomats. Earlier, he had applied sanctions for Russias treatment of dissident Alexis Navalny, who was poisoned, then arrested on orders from Putin, and who now appears close to dying in jail.

Mr. Biden has tried to strike a balance between raising the cost to Russia of its harmful foreign actions and keeping lines of communication open on subjects of mutual interest, such as nuclear arms control and Iran.

But he may have to get tougher. Indeed, his April 15 remarks promised just that.

In an angry response to these new sanctions, the Kremlin expelled 10 U.S. diplomats, sanctioned eight other U.S. officials and called Mr. Bidens actions an obstacle to a meeting between the two presidents. Russia also stepped up military maneuvers on Ukraines border.

The most powerful sanction Mr. Biden has issued since the early April flare-up forbids U.S. banks and financial institutions from participating in the market for Russias official debt, a move likely to raise Russias cost of financing its debt.

A solid front by Americans main allies on this matter would have a devastating effect, and Mr. Biden should push for their cooperation.

But there are even more powerful financial weapons available to Mr. Biden if he decides he has to raise the cost to Russia even more. Banning Russia from participating in the international financial clearing house known as SWIFT could bring the countrys export and import economy to a halt. It is considered the nuclear option of trade sanctions, and one that Russia has reason to fear.

Mr. Putin has been cooperating more with China on a range of foreign issues as a hedge against deteriorating relations with Europe and the United States.

But his threatening moves on Ukraines border will backfire if as they should they raise the alarm in European capitals and prompt European leaders to cooperate more with the United States. In fact, Russias ill-considered threats may have done more to strengthen NATO than anything in more than a decade.

Read more here:
Editorial: A test of the Biden administration's ability to work with NATO - Charleston Post Courier