Category Archives: NATO

New Atlanticist

February 1, 2024

By Jason Davidson

When the leaders of NATO member states gather for the Alliances seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington in July, they will have several high-profile items on the agenda. Russias war on Ukraine and NATO members aid for Ukraine will almost certainly dominate discussions. However, there is another item on the agenda that has not received as much attention in the press as it should: NATO is scheduled to adopt its first ever Southern Flank Strategy at the Washington summit.

Despite the critical importance of the Ukraine War for the Alliance, several NATO members are also concerned about instability on the Alliances Southern Flank, which in the Alliances parlance refers to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the Sahel, and the Mediterranean Sea that links those areas to allies shores.

Allies will, however, face significant challenges in adopting a meaningful Southern Flank Strategy, because allies differ on threat assessments and hold varied views on the Alliances scope. There are also limits to NATOs capacity. NATO leaders may ultimately agree on a consequential Southern Flank Strategy at the Washington summit, but it is not a foregone conclusion.

The underlying problem with the Southern Flank is instability in the region, which is rooted in political, security, economic, and demographic problems that are exacerbated by climate change.

This instability on the Alliances Southern Flank has important consequences for NATO members. The International Organization for Migrations data suggests that 286,122 people migrated to Europe in 2023, a significant increase from the 189,620 who migrated in 2022 and 151,417 in 2021. In recent years, a few terrorist acts in Europe have involved migrants staying illegally on the continent, sparking broader security concerns. Large-scale irregular migration also brings with it concerns over the trafficking of humans and contraband substances, and other illegal activities.

Instability on the Alliances Southern Flank also has economic consequences. Since Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Europe has decreased oil and gas imports from Russia and increased imports from the MENA region. As of the last quarter of 2023, the European Union (EU) imported 21 percent of its oil from three MENA countries: Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. The EU also imported 17.8 percent of its gaseous-state natural gas from Algeria and 24.1 percent of its liquefied natural gas from Libya and Qatar. Instability on NATOs Southern Flank is also a potential threat to the maritime commerce that flows through the Mediterranean Sea, which accounts for 15 percent of the worlds shipping by port calls and 10 percent of the worlds shipping by vessel weight.

Russias behavior in the MENA region and the Sahel is another reason why NATO needs to take the Southern Flank seriously. The Wagner Group, which the United States has labeled a proxy of the Kremlin, has a significant presence in Libya, Mali, and Sudan. Wagner provides thousands of mercenary troops, weapons, and training in these countries and Russia undoubtedly gains significant political influence with the host governments. Recent reporting suggests that Russia may directly take over Wagner activities with an Africa Corps that will man a network of Russian bases on the continent. Russia also has a naval base in Tartus, Syriahome to its Mediterranean Squadron, which includes Kilo-class submarines, a cruiser, and a frigate. In 2023, Spanish and Italian navies reported incidents of the Russian frigate Admiral Kasatonov sailing with a Russian tanker in the Mediterranean. Russias naval presence in the Mediterranean could be used for offensive, defensive, or hybrid operations against members of the Alliance or their interests.

One significant challenge facing the development of a meaningful Southern Flank Strategy is the differing threat perceptions of leading NATO members.

On the one hand, NATO members along the Alliances Southern Flank view instability there as a security concern and a domestic political imperative. Italy and Spain, for example, see instability in the Mediterranean as a direct threat to their security. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, in her press conference after NATOs 2023 Vilnius summit, stressed Italys role in getting allies to agree to develop a Southern Flank Strategy in 2024. Meloni referred to herself as the bearer of the view that problems on the Southern Flank are not just Italys problem, but NATOs as well. She went on to say that the Alliances greater awareness of the Southern Flank was due to Italy.

On the other hand, nearly two years since Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATOs Eastern Flank members continue to focus on the threat that the Kremlin poses to their security. Given the urgency of the Russian threat and the limited resources available, it is understandable for Eastern Flank members to worry that any new significant NATO activities in the south could draw resources away from the defense of the Alliances eastern border.

The second challenge facing the development of a Southern Flank Strategy is a fundamental difference in views on NATOs mission and scope. Some members take an expansive view that NATO should act to help allies address their security concerns without limits to the nature of activities or geographical space. Others, most vocally France, argue NATO should focus primarilyeven exclusivelyon territorial defense. Frances view has grown stronger since Russias 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Policymakers in Paris have come to recognize the urgency of the threat Russia poses and the lack of an alternative to NATO in terms of territorial defense. Frances 2022 National Strategic Review, for example, says that Russia is pursuing a strategy that seeks to undermine European security, of which the war against Ukraine, is the most open and brutal manifestation. It goes on to say that NATO is still the foundation and essential framework for Europes collective security. Frances views on what NATO should do suggest that it will resist any moves to expand NATOs remit on the Southern Flank.

The final challenge has to do with NATOs limits relative to the challenges facing the Southern Flank. Leaving aside debates about what NATO should and should not do, it is fundamentally a military alliance. As such, it lacks certain capabilities that are necessary in improving the conditions on the Alliances Southern Flank. NATO, for example, lacks the capacity to engage in any significant economic development activities. It is also not well equipped to engage in activities to strengthen democracy or the rule of law in the countries along its Southern Flank. Finally, NATO faces limits in terms of its image in the region that would put it at a disadvantage if it were to engage in any high-profile, public-facing activities.

There are two basic possibilities for the Washington summit: an embrace of the status quo or a more ambitious attempt to confront the challenges allies on the Southern Flank face.

Given the challenges, under the most likely scenario, the Alliance might enhance existing intelligence gathering and sharing activities. The Southern Flank Strategy could also commit to a marginal increase in the Alliances maritime security operations under Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean. Finally, the Southern Flank Strategy could entail a commitment to deepen cooperation with regional partners through the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

But what might a more ambitious and consequential Southern Flank Strategy look like? First, NATO could engage in a significant increase in counterterrorism training and assistance with regional partners. Second, NATO could better prepare for future military operations in the region by engaging in additional advanced planning and by establishing a multinational division for the Southern Flank. Third, NATO could agree to significantly enhance the resources for Operation Sea Guardian, allowing for more maritime situational awareness, more maritime counterterrorism, and, especially, more maritime security capacity building with regional partners. Finally, NATO could commit to coordinating its activities with the EU and support and encourage the blocs efforts to address the Southern Flanks economic and political challenges.

While a status quo scenario, perhaps with some additions, is most likely to emerge as the new Southern Flank Strategy at the Washington summit, a more ambitious approach, like the one outlined above, would be a better choice for the Alliance.

First, the more ambitious approach would be more likely to stabilize the Alliances Southern Flanka problem that ultimately matters for all members of the Alliance. Second, by embracing an ambitious Southern Flank Strategy, NATO would demonstrate that it is sensitive to the concerns of all members, not just those most concerned with the threat Russia poses. Such a move would reward those Southern Flank allies, such as Italy, that have sent troops to bolster the Eastern Flank and have borne significant economic costs because of sanctions on Russia. An ambitious approach to the Southern Flank would be politically popular in the Southern Flank countries, as well, allowing governments to tout the benefits of their countrys membership in NATO.

The United States has the outsized leverage in the Alliance to overcome those who might resist an ambitious strategy. It also does not have any obvious reasons to oppose it. What remains to be seen is whether it will recognize the benefits of a bold Southern Flank Strategy and exert its influence accordingly at the upcoming summit.

Jason W. Davidson is a professor of political science at the University of Mary Washington and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Councils Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is the author of Americas Entangling Alliances: 1778 to the Present (Georgetown University Press) and is currently completing a book on NATO after the Ukraine War.

Thu, Aug 3, 2023

Report By Matteo Villa and Alissa Pavia

Irregular migration from North Africa to Europe, especially through the Central Mediterranean route connecting Libya and Tunisia to Italy, is increasing once more. Italy has witnessed a surge in irregular arrivals, with approximately 136,000 migrants disembarking between June 2022 and May 2023, almost comparable to the high arrival period of 2014-2017 when around 155,000 migrants landed each year.

Fri, Dec 15, 2023

Report By Atlantic Council Task Force on Black Sea Security

This report outlines the strategic setting, regional challenges and threats, key planning assumptions, risk and risk mitigation, and finally DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) based recommendations for enhancing security and stability in the Black Sea region.

Image: Ships from multiple NATO nations including Italy, Spain, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom, participate in Exercise Mare Aperto 22-2, a high-end exercise sponsored by the Italian Navy aimed at strengthening and enhancing the combat readiness of participating assets in the conduct of maritime operations. Forrest Sherman (DDG 98) is the flagship for Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2), a multinational integrated task group that projects a constant and visible reminder of the Alliances solidarity and cohesion afloat and provides the Alliance with a continuous maritime capability to perform a wide range of tasks, including exercises and real-world operations in periods of crisis and conflict. (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Ezekiel Duran, October 11, 2022)

Read this article:
NATO should be ambitious with its new Southern Flank Strategy - Atlantic Council

BRUSSELS Americas closest allies in Europe are warning that Russia could initiate a new war on the continent as soon as this decade and that they are chillingly ill-prepared.

British Defense Secretary Grant Shapps, in his inaugural speech on the job, cautioned last month that the country is shifting from a postwar to a prewar world, a view shared increasingly among senior European civilians and military officials.

How unready is Europe to face down Russian President Vladimir Putin should he choose to test the West, perhaps with an attack on the vulnerable smaller nations on NATOs eastern flank, as many believe he might after rapidly rebuilding Russias forces depleted in Ukraine? Lets count the ways.

Britains own army has shrunk to a mini-me version of its former self, with fewer troops than at any point since the Napoleonic wars of the early 19th century. U.S. generals have warned that Britains military is dangerously diminished amid reports that its forces would run short of ammunition days into a ground war.

Germany has left its armed forces to atrophy and lacks adequate supplies of soldiers, equipment and even Band-Aids, as its inspector general warned a year ago.

Funding and munitions in the armed forces of Belgium, the scene of fierce battles in both world wars, are so scarce that its army would have to throw stones to defend itself, according to a retired general.

The antidote to those shortcomings is NATOs bulk and brawn, led by the approximately 100,000 U.S. troops on European soil a bigger active-duty force than the entire British army can muster. Increasingly, though, that U.S. security guarantee looks wobbly.

That is the case not only, or even mainly, because of the prospect of a second term for Donald Trump, whose disdain for NATO I addressed in my column last week. It is also the reality given Chinas rising threat, which has displaced Russia as Washingtons No. 1 concern even as Putin presses his pitiless war in Ukraine.

When U.S. strategists discuss a pivot to Asia, what they also mean is a turn that will leave Europe to plug the gaps. That has given rise to an arms-buying spree on the continent, mainly of U.S.-made weapons.

Notably, U.S. allies in Europe have received or ordered more than 600 U.S.-made F-35 fighter jets, at a combined cost of more than $50 billion. In addition to their military value, thats a European bet on bilateral ties with Washington, no matter who occupies the White House.

Nonetheless, a senior European NATO official told me, Europeans are worried about the prospect of being left to defend themselves. NATO without American leadership is no longer NATO, the official said. The whole point of deterrence is that Putin knows if he attacks Europe, hell be at war with a mighty U.S.

The fact that Europe is increasingly vulnerable is underlined by dramatic announcements that yield little follow-up.

A prime example was Chancellor Olaf Scholzs announcement, days after Putins 2022 invasion of Ukraine, that Germany had arrived at a dramatic turning point. The new world, he said, demanded that Germany shed its pacifist posture and launch a $110 billion fund to overhaul its military and defense industrial capacity.

Two years later, Germany has emerged as Europes leading donor of military and financial aid to Ukraine. But Scholzs government, saddled with an anemic economy and red tape, has been slow to bulk up Germanys armed forces, despite Defense Minister Boris Pistoriuss insistence that it be ready for war by the end of the decade.

A top French official in the European Union, Thierry Breton, is pushing the 27-nation bloc to establish a defense fund of almost $110 billion. His proposal chimes with historical precedent a French-led plan at the Cold Wars outset to create a European army, 100,000 troops strong, funded by a common budget.

That idea died in Frances own legislature, as it became clear that the continents security would be assured by U.S. troops and nuclear weapons through NATO, whose champion, Dwight D. Eisenhower, became president in 1953.

Bretons half-baked initiative it includes no funding source has been shrugged off as the latest French buy European initiative and an attempt to weaken the continents bonds with the United States. Yet it should be the basis for serious conversation.

Theres an old tension between transatlantic and European-only solutions to European security problems, Seth Johnston, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University who has led NATO missions as a U.S. Army officer, told me. The episode in the early 1950s is an early example that European proposals often dont work out, and NATO ends up having to reinvent or adapt itself to the new problem.

For NATOs European members, spending more on defense is a quadruple win: a strategy to ensure Ukraines survival, deter Putin from further aggression, respond to Washingtons pivot to Asia, and convince Trump, should he regain office, that the alliance is a good deal.

The alternative is to maintain the status quo: a soft-bellied Europe shuffling into a menacing new era, inviting disaster.

View original post here:
Opinion | As war risks mount, Europe is sluggish to response - The Washington Post

Enlarging the European Union and NATO after the Cold War raised hopes it would unleash an important advance for freedom in a part of the world that had enjoyed little. Integrating former Eastern Bloc countries into keystone Western institutions and requiring democratic and market-oriented reforms for them to join exclusive clubs of wealthy nations would discourage anti-Western nationalism and intolerance. For the most part, this strategy has worked, with countries that once suffered behind the Iron Curtain now vibrant democracies.

Yet the strategy came with risks, chiefly that countries would regress after joining the Western order and undermine from within the Wests commitment to promoting freedom and democracy. So it is with Hungary, whose nationalist and authoritarian prime minister, Viktor Orban, has built what he calls an illiberal state and has spoiled European efforts to advance democracy in Ukraine. European leaders meet Thursday to discuss what to do; anything but determination to curb Mr. Orban would signal European weakness at a time when strength is essential for global security.

The E.U., which Hungary entered in 2004, is devoted to building societies in which pluralism, nondiscrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. NATO, which Hungary joined in 1999, seeks to create a lasting peace in Europe based on members common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Mr. Orban has sabotaged both.

The latest example is his foot-dragging on Swedens admission to NATO, a proposed enlargement of the alliance spurred by Russias aggression in Ukraine. Mr. Orban has pledged that Hungary will approve but has stood by as the parliament he controls has delayed action. Hungary now is the last holdout in the alliance. On Jan. 23, Mr. Orban invited Swedens prime minister, Ulf Kristersson, to Budapest to negotiate on Swedens ascension, an unseemly extension of his hand for an undeserved reward.

Mr. Orbans behavior in the E.U. is equally as troubling. In December, he abstained from a vote on allowing Ukraine to begin the process of membership, stepping out of the room as the other 26 members of the bloc voted a green light. But at the same summit, Mr. Orban directly blocked a $55 billion E.U. aid package for Ukraine and vowed to fight it well into the future, saying there are about 75 occasions when the Hungarian government can stop this process.

Thus, the E.U.'s consensus-based process enables Mr. Orban to serve Russian President Vladimir Putin, who would like nothing better than to paralyze the European Union as he seeks to destroy Ukraine. It was Ukraines strong desire to join the European club, and not be under Mr. Putins thumb, that led to Mr. Putins invasions of Ukraine, in 2014 and 2022. Should Mr. Orban continue to block Ukraine aid, E.U. members can use bilateral channels to send help, effectively bypassing Hungary, but this could take longer and would be more unwieldy.

When it began, Hungarys Fidesz party was made up of young people committed to progressive values. But under Mr. Orbans leadership in the 1990s it shifted to a conservative right-wing outlook, and after a landslide election victory in 2010, he neutered the constitutional court and drafted a new constitution that reflected a collectivist, nationalist worldview, no longer basing its system of fundamental rights on the individual, according to Zsuzsanna Szelnyi, author of Tainted Democracy, a 2022 book about Mr. Orban. Mr. Orban nationalized much of the economy, undercut free and fair elections and human rights, and enabled allies to take over most of the national media. His rhetoric bristles with hostility to immigrants, LGBTQ+ people and the European Union.

There is no E.U. mechanism to suspend or expel a member, but the bloc can withhold funds and suspend voting rights. Largely out of concern over Mr. Orbans poor rule-of-law record, the European Commission had withheld funds for Hungary; but in December, at the time of the Ukraine discussion, the commission released approximately $11 billion, saying that Hungary had met conditions for judicial independence. The commission continues to lock up about $23 billion. Continued financial pressure is critical to deliver the message that a member cannot corrode the blocs values.

Members of the European Parliament and some others have called for exploring a more severe option: suspending Hungarys voting rights. Doing so risks diminishing the bloc in the future, should populists take power in other E.U. nations. A better option is to make the E.U. less vulnerable to Orban-like manipulation, reforming voting rules so that fewer decisions require unanimity. Majority or supermajority rule would suit a bloc devoted to democracy and curb the likes of Mr. Orban from destroying from within one of the Wests most successful institutions.

Original post:
Opinion | How the E.U. and NATO should respond to Hungarys authoritarian Orban - The Washington Post

State Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Washington D.C. West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming Puerto Rico US Virgin Islands Armed Forces Americas Armed Forces Pacific Armed Forces Europe Northern Mariana Islands Marshall Islands American Samoa Federated States of Micronesia Guam Palau Alberta, Canada British Columbia, Canada Manitoba, Canada New Brunswick, Canada Newfoundland, Canada Nova Scotia, Canada Northwest Territories, Canada Nunavut, Canada Ontario, Canada Prince Edward Island, Canada Quebec, Canada Saskatchewan, Canada Yukon Territory, Canada

Zip Code

Country United States of America US Virgin Islands United States Minor Outlying Islands Canada Mexico, United Mexican States Bahamas, Commonwealth of the Cuba, Republic of Dominican Republic Haiti, Republic of Jamaica Afghanistan Albania, People's Socialist Republic of Algeria, People's Democratic Republic of American Samoa Andorra, Principality of Angola, Republic of Anguilla Antarctica (the territory South of 60 deg S) Antigua and Barbuda Argentina, Argentine Republic Armenia Aruba Australia, Commonwealth of Austria, Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Bahrain, Kingdom of Bangladesh, People's Republic of Barbados Belarus Belgium, Kingdom of Belize Benin, People's Republic of Bermuda Bhutan, Kingdom of Bolivia, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana, Republic of Bouvet Island (Bouvetoya) Brazil, Federative Republic of British Indian Ocean Territory (Chagos Archipelago) British Virgin Islands Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria, People's Republic of Burkina Faso Burundi, Republic of Cambodia, Kingdom of Cameroon, United Republic of Cape Verde, Republic of Cayman Islands Central African Republic Chad, Republic of Chile, Republic of China, People's Republic of Christmas Island Cocos (Keeling) Islands Colombia, Republic of Comoros, Union of the Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, People's Republic of Cook Islands Costa Rica, Republic of Cote D'Ivoire, Ivory Coast, Republic of the Cyprus, Republic of Czech Republic Denmark, Kingdom of Djibouti, Republic of Dominica, Commonwealth of Ecuador, Republic of Egypt, Arab Republic of El Salvador, Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Faeroe Islands Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Fiji, Republic of the Fiji Islands Finland, Republic of France, French Republic French Guiana French Polynesia French Southern Territories Gabon, Gabonese Republic Gambia, Republic of the Georgia Germany Ghana, Republic of Gibraltar Greece, Hellenic Republic Greenland Grenada Guadaloupe Guam Guatemala, Republic of Guinea, Revolutionary People's Rep'c of Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Guyana, Republic of Heard and McDonald Islands Holy See (Vatican City State) Honduras, Republic of Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region of China Hrvatska (Croatia) Hungary, Hungarian People's Republic Iceland, Republic of India, Republic of Indonesia, Republic of Iran, Islamic Republic of Iraq, Republic of Ireland Israel, State of Italy, Italian Republic Japan Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Kuwait, State of Kyrgyz Republic Lao People's Democratic Republic Latvia Lebanon, Lebanese Republic Lesotho, Kingdom of Liberia, Republic of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Liechtenstein, Principality of Lithuania Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of Macao, Special Administrative Region of China Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Republic of Malaysia Maldives, Republic of Mali, Republic of Malta, Republic of Marshall Islands Martinique Mauritania, Islamic Republic of Mauritius Mayotte Micronesia, Federated States of Moldova, Republic of Monaco, Principality of Mongolia, Mongolian People's Republic Montserrat Morocco, Kingdom of Mozambique, People's Republic of Myanmar Namibia Nauru, Republic of Nepal, Kingdom of Netherlands Antilles Netherlands, Kingdom of the New Caledonia New Zealand Nicaragua, Republic of Niger, Republic of the Nigeria, Federal Republic of Niue, Republic of Norfolk Island Northern Mariana Islands Norway, Kingdom of Oman, Sultanate of Pakistan, Islamic Republic of Palau Palestinian Territory, Occupied Panama, Republic of Papua New Guinea Paraguay, Republic of Peru, Republic of Philippines, Republic of the Pitcairn Island Poland, Polish People's Republic Portugal, Portuguese Republic Puerto Rico Qatar, State of Reunion Romania, Socialist Republic of Russian Federation Rwanda, Rwandese Republic Samoa, Independent State of San Marino, Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, Democratic Republic of Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Senegal, Republic of Serbia and Montenegro Seychelles, Republic of Sierra Leone, Republic of Singapore, Republic of Slovakia (Slovak Republic) Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia, Somali Republic South Africa, Republic of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands Spain, Spanish State Sri Lanka, Democratic Socialist Republic of St. Helena St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Pierre and Miquelon St. Vincent and the Grenadines Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Suriname, Republic of Svalbard & Jan Mayen Islands Swaziland, Kingdom of Sweden, Kingdom of Switzerland, Swiss Confederation Syrian Arab Republic Taiwan, Province of China Tajikistan Tanzania, United Republic of Thailand, Kingdom of Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of Togo, Togolese Republic Tokelau (Tokelau Islands) Tonga, Kingdom of Trinidad and Tobago, Republic of Tunisia, Republic of Turkey, Republic of Turkmenistan Turks and Caicos Islands Tuvalu Uganda, Republic of Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland Uruguay, Eastern Republic of Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of Viet Nam, Socialist Republic of Wallis and Futuna Islands Western Sahara Yemen Zambia, Republic of Zimbabwe

View original post here:
ARTHUR CYR: NATO The Enduring Alliance | Opinion | henryherald.com - Henry Herald

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg speaks at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, in Washington D.C., Jan. 31, 2024. (NATO)

NATOs top official mounted a defense of the U.S.-led alliance Wednesday at the headquarters of a conservative Washington think tank known for its ties to NATO skeptic Donald Trump.

Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, who was in Washington this week to galvanize Western support for Ukraine, took the stage at the Heritage Foundation to talk up NATO before a pro-Trump audience.

In these dangerous times, we must stand strong against any regime that seeks to undermine us, Stoltenberg said. Any sign of wavering or weakening on our part will invite challenges from those who wish us harm.

Stoltenberg added that NATO is a vehicle for projecting Americas agenda from Europe to the Pacific. Meanwhile, European militaries are a rich market for U.S. weapons makers, who have reaped some $120 billion in sales to allies over the past two years, generating jobs in America, he said.

NATO is an incredibly powerful idea that advances U.S. interests and multiplies American power China and Russia have nothing like NATO, Stoltenberg said. That is why they are always trying to undermine our unity.

During the Trump administration, Stoltenberg guided the alliance through a tumultuous period that included intense criticism of NATO by the former president.

While Stoltenberg was dubbed by some NATO watchers as the Trump whisperer for his ability to manage that relationship, the former Norwegian prime ministers stint at the helm of NATO is slated to end later this year.

With Trump leading the race for the Republican nomination and polls indicating a toss-up in a 2024 rematch with President Joe Biden, political officials in Europe have been contemplating the implications of a Trump return for NATO.

Trump has reiterated his long-held ambivalence about the alliance, saying during a recent town hall meeting that his support for NATO depends on if they (Europeans) treat us properly.

NATO has taken advantage of our country, Trump said during the Jan. 10 Fox News broadcast. The European countries took advantage.

Heritage President Kevin Roberts, as he introduced Stoltenberg, also called out European allies for falling short on defense spending. He added that the conservative group was unwilling to back more support for Ukraine so long as the U.S. border crisis remained unresolved.

Stoltenberg, however, said allies have turned the corner on defense spending.

Much of Trumps criticism about NATO has centered on how a majority of the alliances 31 members fall short on defense spending benchmarks that call for all allies to dedicate 2% of their gross domestic product to defense.

Allies have improved in that area, with expenditures steadily rising every year since 2014. Still, some of the largest percentage increases have been made by smaller nations, such as the Baltic states, which have ramped up spending over concerns about Russia.

The major European power, Germany, still falls well short of the 2% mark, and its not clear when Berlin will reach the threshold.

U.S. presidents going back decades have had similar criticisms of European defense spending, but stated them in more diplomatic terms and while supporting the idea of the alliance as a critical aspect of global security.

Biden in December signed bipartisan legislation that would prevent a U.S. president from withdrawing from NATO without congressional approval.

The uncertainty about the future course of Washingtons commitment to shared defense comes at a time when concerns about Russian aggression in Europe are growing.

While Russia has suffered extensive casualties in its war in Ukraine, several military leaders in Europe in recent weeks have warned that Moscow could rebuild its forces within the next five years.

Adm. Rob Bauer, the Dutch chairman of the NATO military committee, following a meeting of NATO defense chiefs, said that allies must prepare for the possibility of conflict with Russia.

Im not saying it is going wrong tomorrow, but we have to realize its not a given that we are in peace, Bauer said Jan. 18.

While Biden has emphasized repeatedly that the U.S. is prepared to defend every inch of NATO territory, Trumps more vague position on collective defense could increase the angst in Europe.

During his tenure in office, Trump was more blunt behind closed doors than in public, according to European officials.

You need to understand that if Europe is under attack we will never come to help you and to support you, Trump reportedly told European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in 2020.

That statement was brought to light earlier this month by French European Commissioner Thierry Breton, who was present at a meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, where the encounter was reported to have happened.

By the way, NATO is dead, and we will leave, we will quit NATO, according to Bretons account of what Trump said.

Read more:
NATO chief talks up alliance role in advancing US interests at think tank favored by Trump - Stars and Stripes

A woman casts her ballot at a polling station during presidential election in Helsinki, Finland, Sunday, Jan. 28, 2024. Sergei Grits/AP hide caption

A woman casts her ballot at a polling station during presidential election in Helsinki, Finland, Sunday, Jan. 28, 2024.

HELSINKI Ex-Prime Minister Alexander Stubb was projected to win the first round of Finland's presidential election on Sunday and face runner-up Pekka Haavisto in a runoff next month.

Finnish public broadcaster YLE projected that Stubb won the first round of the presidential election with 27.3% of the votes, while Haavisto, an ex-foreign minister, took second place with 25.8%. Parliamentary Speaker Jussi Halla-aho came in third place with 18.6%

The projected result will push the race into a runoff on Feb. 11 between Stubb and Haavisto as none of the candidates received more than half of the votes.

YLE's prediction, highly accurate in previous elections, is a mathematical model calculated on the basis of advance votes and a certain number of Sunday's votes under official data provided by the Legal Register Centre. Exit polls aren't generally used in Finland.

Stubb, 55, who represents the conservative National Coalition Party and headed the Finnish government in 2014-2015, and Haavisto, 65, who is making his third run for the office, were the main contenders in the election where about 4.5 million eligible voters picked a successor to hugely popular President Sauli Niinist, whose second six-year term expires in March. He wasn't eligible for reelection.

Unlike in most European countries, the president of Finland holds executive power in formulating foreign and security policy, particularly when dealing with countries outside the European Union like the United States, Russia and China.

The president also acts as the supreme commander of the Finnish military, a particularly important duty in Europe's current security environment.

Polls across the country closed at 8 p.m. About 4.5 million citizens were eligible to vote for Finland's new head of state from an array of nine candidates six men and three women.

"I expect strong leadership in the current global situation," said Eve Kinnunen, who voted in a polling station in the center of the capital, Helsinki.

Finland's new head of state will start a six-year term in March in a markedly different geopolitical and security situation in Europe than did incumbent Niinist after the 2018 election.

Abandoning decades of military nonalignment in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Finland became NATO's 31st member in April, much to the annoyance of President Vladimir Putin of Russia, which shares a 832-mile border with the Nordic nation.

NATO membership, which has made Finland the Western military alliance's front-line country toward Russia, and the war raging in Ukraine a mere 600 miles away from Finland's border have boosted the president's status as a security policy leader.

In line with consensus-prone Finnish politics, months of campaigning have proceeded smoothly among the candidates. They all agree on major foreign policy issues like Finland's future policies toward Russia, enhancing security cooperation with the United States and the need to continue helping Ukraine both militarily and with humanitarian assistance.

Membership in the military alliance "also means that NATO should have a new Arctic dimension, because NATO is then stronger in the Arctic area when both Finland and Sweden are members," Haavisto told The Associated Press during his last campaign event at a music bar just outside Helsinki late Saturday.

As foreign minister, Haavisto, a Green League member who is running as an independent candidate, signed Finland's historic accession treaty to NATO last year and played a key role in the membership process.

Western neighbor Sweden is set to join NATO in the near future as the final holdout, Hungary, is expected to ratify Stockholm's bid by the end of February.

More:
NATO newcomer Finland's presidential election is headed for a runoff - NPR

When Mr. Chimp and Mr. Gorilla meet on the jungle path, who yields right-of-way? You got it. Law of the jungle. Sadly, the U.S. and NATO fail to understand that this is the law that Vladimir Putin operates by. Had they, instead of a war in Ukraine, we would have witnessed a bloodless victory for democracy in Europe. Putin (Mr. Chimp) may be a murderous dictator, but he is no fool. The 200-pound chump would never have challenged the 800-pound gorilla (the U.S. and NATO) had Mr. G told the chump that if he invaded Ukraine he would be met by Ukrainian and NATO forces. Mr. G could have offered to negotiate on disputed territories in eastern Ukraine as a face-saving gesture for Putin to further encourage Mr. C to make the right decision.

The best and the brightest have done it again. The U.S. State Department, which carries major sway in NATO decisions, has committed another major foreign policy blunder. By its "politically correct" act of omission, we now witness and are responsible in large part for the needless deaths, destruction, unfathomable human suffering, waste of taxpayer dollars and irreparable environmental degradation that continues to take place in Ukraine. Shame on the U.S. and NATO for standing by and not preventing this easily preventable war, and allowing "never again" to happen again.

Dan Falwell

Albemarle County

Get opinion pieces, letters and editorials sent directly to your inbox weekly!

Read more here:
Letter | The US and NATO let 'never again' happen again in Ukraine - The Daily Progress

This week, Turkeys parliament finally approved Swedens bid for NATO membership, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan swiftly ratified the measure.

Swedens NATO accession has dragged on for more than a year. While every other NATO member aside from Hungary supported Stockholms accession, Turkish leaders accused the Scandinavian country of harboring Kurdish terrorists. They demanded that Sweden tighten its anti-terrorism laws, extradite people accused of terrorist activities in Turkey, and resume arms sales to Turkey. The United States seems to have linked approval of Swedens NATO membership to future U.S. sales of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey.

As Swedens membership process stalled, analysts warned of the alliances decline and offered a range of proposed carrots and sticks to rein in Ankara. Some went so far as to suggest that Turkey be expelled from NATO, despite such an action being nearly impossible under its charter.

These concerns and threats come at a time when it has become common for U.S. experts to describe Turkish foreign policy as transactionalmeaning that Turkish national interests override NATOs common values. Once a reliable, Western-oriented U.S. ally, they argue, Turkey is now pursuing its own interests, which often run counter to those of the United States and European countries.

It is worth looking to history to understand Turkeys posture. The country waited nearly four years before it was finally allowed to join NATO in 1952. The experience convinced Turkish policymakers that relations with the United States, NATO, and Western countries always involve a degree of bargaining. Turkish-NATO relations in the seven decades that followed have often reinforced this view, sometimes in Turkeys favor and sometimes to its detriment.

American NATO official Charles M. Spofford signs the protocol to admit Greece and Turkey into NATO in London in 1952.Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images

Turkeys efforts to join NATO and other U.S.-dominated postwar institutions occurred under conditions of extreme insecurity for the country. Turkish leaders kept their country neutral during World War II, accepting aid from Britain and France without committing themselves as belligerents and selling war materials to Germany. At the conflicts end, Turkey found itself with few friends among the Allied victors. And it was surrounded on several sides by communist-controlled regimes: Bulgaria in the west, and the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani Soviet republics in the northeast.

In neighboring Iran, the Soviet Union and Britain occupied the north and south of the country, respectively. The Soviets supported the autonomy of the regions Azeri and Kurdish ethnic groups; Turkish leaders have long opposed the latter separatist movement. Soviet officials also pressured Turkish leaders to renegotiate treaties regulating transit through the Bosporus and Dardanellesstraits and cede control of several northeastern border provinces. To Ankara, the Soviet threat seemed existential.

Rather than comply with Soviet demands, Turkey turned to Britain and the United States. With London unable to maintain its expansive role in the eastern Mediterranean, Washington increased its commitments to Turkey and Greece, directing aid to both countries via the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.

But U.S. and Western European leaders stopped short of including Turkey in NATO. Ankara first inquired about membership in 1948, when the alliance was taking shape, but it was rebuffed. Turkey tried again in 1950 but was offered only associate status. Western leaders objections to full Turkish membership were not based on the ideals of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law enshrined in the NATO charter; the military alliance included Portugals dictatorship. Rather, their reasoning was strategicnot wanting to extend NATOs political and military commitments so far east.

Turkey did not gain firm U.S. support for its NATO membership until after 1950 and 1951, when Ankara sent thousands of Turkish soldiers to fight alongside the United States in some of the most brutal months of the Korean War. Washington proposed Turkeys accession in May 1951, and support from and the whole NATO Council followed. Turkey was admitted in 1952, along with Greece.

From the beginning, Turkeys relationship with NATO was transactional. By demonstrating their willingness to place Turkish citizens in harms way to contain communist expansion in Korea, Turkish leaders convinced their Western peers that Ankara had strategic value. Turkeys geographic position between Europe and Asiaand on major waterwaysseemed beneficial to the Western alliance in the event of war with the Soviet Union. So did Ankaras large army.

Greek Cypriots participate in a communist-backed demonstration in Nicosia against the plan to enlarge the NATO peace force in Cyprus in 1964. Central Press/Getty Images

Though Turkey was often able to extract benefits from NATO, the country was not always on equal footing with its Western counterparts. Turkish leaders felt their national interests were subordinated to those of the United States and other allies. Washingtons willingness to bargain with the Soviet Union over U.S. nuclear missiles stationed in Turkey during the Cuban missile crisis was one example of this dynamic. But the main source of frustration was Cyprus.

Cyprus won independence from Britain in 1960 with a power-sharing agreement between its Greek majority and Turkish minority. When the deal broke down in 1963, Turkey began preparations to invade the island to protect its Turkish population.

But then-U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson informed the Turkish government that it could not count on NATO support should an invasion lead to Soviet intervention in Cyprus. Johnsons letter to Ankara stoked anti-U.S. sentiment in Turkey, putting Turkish leaders who supported the allianceand its various financial and security benefitsin a tough spot.

A decade later, when Turkey did intervene in Cyprus, NATO membership worked to its advantage. In 1974, Greeces military regimewhich had come to power in 1967supported a coup in Cyprus. Turkey responded by taking control of a third of the island, which remains divided to this day.

Then-U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saw Turkey as more important than Greece and worried that pushing Ankara could result in a left-wing regime taking power. Unconvinced, Democrats in the U.S. Congress voted to halt weapons sales to Turkey. The Ford administration responded to the embargo, which would not fully end until 1978, by convincing West Germany and other NATO allies to increase weapons exports to Ankara.

The government in Ankara responded to the embargo by allowing several additional Soviet aircraft carriers to pass from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean and ending unilateral U.S. access to bases in Turkey. On the eve of NATOs annual summit in May 1978, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit refused to sign on to a joint declaration and told reporters that he saw no threat to Turkey from the USSR. He added that a continued U.S. embargo was likely to reduce Turkeys contribution to NATO.

Two months later, the U.S. Senate voted to lift Turkeys arms embargo. By bargaining with NATO, Turkeys leaders satisfied short-term public anger with the United States without wholly undermining their countrys long-term strategic relationships. Transactional diplomacy had paid off.

Then-Turkish National Security Council chair Kenan Evren walks with other officials a few months after a military coup in Ankara, Turkey, on Nov. 10, 1980. Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

After Turkeys 1980 coup, NATO membership again became useful for the country. Military leaders emphasized their determination to honor NATO commitments. They also made conciliatory moves, offering potential territorial concessions in Cyprus (although they never followed through) and supporting the reintegration of rival Greece into NATOs command structure following its withdrawal during the 1974 crisis.

These gestures came as the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War again placed Turkey at the center stage of U.S. strategyand gave Turkeys military rulers more room to maneuver. The United States increased its aid to Ankara even amid reports of torture, investigated by Amnesty International, which prompted countries such as Denmark and Norway to freeze their financial support. By 1991, only Israel and Egypt received more U.S. military aid than Turkey.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the USSR between 1989 and 1991 threatened to make NATO irrelevantand diminish Turkeys importance to its Western allies. In part to reassert Turkeys centrality to Western interests, then-Turkish President Turgut Ozal gave his support to the U.S.-led campaign against Iraq following its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. He also liberalized Turkeys economy to encourage foreign investment. In return, Ozal hoped to secure concessions from the United States and other allies in Europe, such as increased access for Turkish textiles in the U.S. market.

NATO began to expand its ambitions in ways that suited Turkish interests. The alliance provided Turkey with additional aircraft during the Gulf War to deter Iraqi attacks. It chose to intervene in Bosnia and Kosovo, where Turkey was concerned about Serbian attacks against Muslims. There was even talk of an enhanced partnership between Ankara and Washington. The United States and other NATO allies played crucial roles in the 1999 capture of a key Kurdish separatist leader. That same year, the European Union formally acknowledged Turkeys candidacy for membership.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is surrounded by security on the eve of the NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 10, 2023. Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Getty Images

Despite these developments, Turkey in the 1990s was rocked by economic crises, violence, and political instability. The chaos of these years helped discredit established parties and bring Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in 2003.

Initially, the AKP intensified Turkeys efforts to engage with Western allies. But there were multiple setbacks. Turkeys European Union membership talks stalled following Cypruss admission to the bloc and the elections of European leaders such as Germanys Angela Merkel and Frances Nicolas Sarkozy, both of whom opposed Ankaras EU membership.

As the AKP lost the support of Western-oriented groups in its coalitionincluding liberals and the Gulen religious movementErdogan became reliant on political factions that advocated for a Eurasianist foreign policy that was less Western and more engaged with Russia and Central Asia.

Of all the conflicts between Turkey and its NATO allies in the post-Cold War era, the most central has been over relations with Kurdish nationalist groups. Washington has repeatedly looked to Kurdish groups to act as local partners in military operationsfirst against Saddam Hussein in Iraq and later against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

Meanwhile, anti-Kurdish measures taken by governments in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran have helped create a sizable, politically active Kurdish diaspora in Europe. Sweden is one of the most notable examples. There, a closely divided parliament in 2021 allowed a legislator who had fought with Iranian-Kurdish guerrillas in her youth to cast the deciding vote securing additional support for Kurdish groups in Syria.

But the actions of a single legislator were not at the root of Turkeys unwillingness to grant Sweden a quick NATO accession. In fact, Sweden itself is not the issue. Sweden was the first country after Turkey to designate the PKKthe Kurdistan Workers Partyas a terrorist organization in 1984, and other NATO member countries, such as Germany, also have influential Kurdish diasporas.

Rather, Turkeys leaders decided to pick a fight within NATO because the alliance remains one of the few venues where they can exert pressure on Western peers. Through NATO, Ankara can draw attention to its security concernsand gain importantconcessions along the way.

Visit link:
Why Turkey Waited to Approve Sweden's NATO Membership - Foreign Policy

A leaked German defense ministry paper outlining the start of a full-scale Russian attack on the Baltic states and Poland and thereby NATO is artfully imagined.

The scenario begins with the Putin regime mobilizing as many as 200,000 new conscripts in February. This would aim to raise pressure on Ukraine, while Russias army initiated a quiet build-up on the borders of Poland and Lithuania near the Suwaki Corridor. The German paper suggests this would trigger a NATO buildup, and be followed by a Russian attack at the years end, just as Donald Trump returns to office (US voters allowing.)

How might it go after that? The old military maxim states that if you want to understand your adversary, put yourself in his shoes. So I have followed the scenario to its likely conclusion.

Russian generals would need to start war planning immediately. The Kremlin loves a mighty name on a war plan, much like their American counterparts, who spend a lot of energy and time to come up with the most appealing name.

Given the old Soviet-era war plan Seven days to the Rhine, the proposed operational name will be Plan Red Three Days to Paldiski (a small community on the Baltic Sea just west of the Estonian capital, Tallinn.) This name was adopted the moment it hit the desk of Vladimir Putin, who admired its historical echoes.

First, the assumptions behind the plan must be agreed upon. This would be done under five general headings.

First, most Western European armed forces are in a grave state of unreadiness and have limited abilities. Even significant forces such as Germany, France, and Great Britain talk big, and as their politicians market impressive-sounding rearmament programs. But at the unit level, readiness is the same as it was 10 years ago.

The first significant NATO formation to arrive at the Lithuanian border would be Polish, after about 72 hours, but sizeable German and other European NATO forces will not be seen for at least 10-15 days. This, it goes without saying, is a dire start because the small NATO tripwire forces (which total about 6,000-7,000 personnel) in the Baltics rely on relief arriving fast. A German pledge to send an additional brigade of 4,000 troops has not yet materialized.

West European NATO members are in a state of denial about their readiness and inhabit an imaginary world where recent pledges of rearmament are already in place.

One example is the key Swedish island of Gotland, which commands access to much of the Baltic Sea but is still only defended by one mechanized company (barely a few hundred personnel) and some home guard forces.

This chasm between imagined readiness and actual readiness presents Russia with an excellent opportunity.

Second, since the Cold War the fear and ignorance about nuclear arms in Western Europe has built to such an extent they are no longer discussed. At all. At least in the 1970s and 1980s, there was a conversation, even if it came from nuclear abolitionists.

Added to the silence about nuclear arms is the almost 80-year-old geopolitical equilibrium where nuclear arms are never used and are seen as theatrical instruments solely to demonstrate strategic deterrence.

The Russians have no such difficulties and well know how they can be used for effect. The use of relatively small nuclear arms would send the West into a steep economic nosedive. The shock waves would cause widespread popular panic but would also shake political and military leadership and systems. It would cause utter mayhem in the financial markets.

The 9/11 attacks were not only a deadly event in human terms, they also created market chaos. US markets were closed for five days and lost $1.4 trillion in value in the week they reopened. A nuclear weapon detonation is unquestionably the sort of black swan event that terrifies investors and Western central banks would struggle to restore equilibrium.

Its true that nuclear weapons use is not nice, but Russia doesnt worry about nice. It worries about the effect.

Get the Latest

Sign up to receive regular emails and stay informed about CEPA's work.

Third, as the Russian planner, I would assess that NATO trip wire forces in the Baltics will be essentially passive. They lack sufficient artillery, logistics, and medical support, and have few heavy weapons to engage a Russian spearhead.

So I would circumvent these NATO units and once this is achieved there will be little serious interference in our operations during the first 72 hours. Rather than attack us, the NATO trip wire units will hold the territory where they are stationed.

Finland will not have time to mobilize or push units toward Russia, nor will it cross the Russian border, fully aware of the risk of a nuclear response. Russia can thus keep its military units unchanged in that area. They will not need to be reinforced.

Fourth, we will ensure surprise. Western observers like to say that Russians have proved themselves bone-headed in the failed war on Ukraine. Thats true. We made some terrible mistakes, but we also learned.

So rather than weeks and weeks of build-up (as with Ukraine) we will launch the offensive with what we have on the frontline. Yes, NATO will have noticed some military strengthening but it wont be sure. We will not share our intentions with much of our own government or foreign entities; even China will be unaware.

And we can rely on our friends on Western social media to spread our lies, as they did over Ukraine. Many others will suggest high-level talks. We like high-level talks; they keep everyone busy until its too late.

Meanwhile, Russias other weapons of war, our gray zone units, will continue to work at full pitch. Their messaging machine will be careful not to blow the cover of the operation, indeed they will deny it and sow confusion about our real aims. Practiced propaganda and psychological operations will get underway, including thousands of fake social media accounts under Anglophone names explaining the problem is once again NATO aggression. There will be peace demonstrations across Western cities.

We Russians know the considerable military risks. A small invasion force might repeat our humiliation at Hostomel airport near Kyiv in February-March 2022 when lead units were annihilated by the Ukrainian army. Audacity, we learned, has its price. But we wont make the same mistake twice.

The actual plan is simple.

Plan Red.

Day one, the war begins with an intensive missile barrage on high-value targets. An echelon of armor, attack helicopters, and rocket artillery pushes through Northern Estonia-Narwa and Tallinn to Paldiski. Simultaneously, battalion-size naval infantry landed in Tallinn harbor.

In the south, a second echelon pushes northwestwards from Belarus toward Kaliningrad Oblast through Lithuania and then immediately turns south to confront NATO forces coming from Poland. Rear echelon forces mop up the Lithuanian defenses and resistance in the following days.

Latvia is ignored and sits in the Kurland Kessel, the Courland pocket. Its army lacks the means to attack and is effectively removed from the board.

Now comes the drama. A relatively small, high-altitude nuclear device is exploded over international waters releasing a significant electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to knock out communications and computer systems on Gotland, including the main town of Visby, after which a battalion-sized airborne unit captures the nearby airfield. Day two is taken up with securing day ones targets and reinforcing first-echelon forces.

When the Polish army arrives at the main frontline on day three, the Kremlin informs NATO that any attempt to reoccupy Russias new Baltic oblasts will trigger a nuclear response.

After calling Washington to forewarn it and so avoid triggering a US nuclear response Russias Strategic Rocket Forces launch missiles that explode on its own territory targeting the Russian borderland in Novaya Zemlya, the large island north of Murmansk, and minor islands the East Siberian Sea in the Far East. This will not kill many Russians (most would be indigenous people and the Kremlin is indifferent to their welfare) but it would underline how far Putins regime is willing to go.

Allied intelligence meanwhile warns that its satellites and sensors have detected Russian strategic missile submarines putting to sea in unusual numbers in the previous weeks. Now its clear why.

The Kremlin explains to the West that it is a reasonable partner and wishes to restore fraternal relations. Yes, this has been a historic humiliation for the West and yes it must be painful to see the end of its supposed rules-based global order (which it always considered ridiculous and unfair.)

Russia offers a deal. We take the Baltic states, plus a land corridor across the remains of a partitioned Ukrainian state. Oh and Moldova; well have that too.

After all, youre in no position to negotiate. There is nothing to negotiate about.

And because were reasonable and seek brotherly relations, you can have Gotland back as a sign of goodwill.

What do you say?

Jan Kallberg, Ph.D., LL.M., is a non-resident Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and a George Washington University faculty member. Follow him at cyberdefense.com and @Cyberdefensecom.

Europes Edgeis CEPAs online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or viewsof the institutions they representor the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Europe's Edge

CEPAs online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.

View post:
Code Red: How Russia Conquers the Baltics - Center for European Policy Analysis

(Bloomberg) -- Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban escalated a standoff with Western allies over Swedens NATO accession after a senior US lawmaker called for potential sanctions against the lone holdout.

Most Read from Bloomberg

Orbans lawmakers wont allow a parliamentary vote on ratifying Swedens bid until the Nordic countrys leader visits Budapest to meet with his Hungarian counterpart, ATV television reported, citing the ruling Fidesz party. Theyll also boycott a special session the opposition called for Monday on the accession, ATV said on its website.

Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom declined to comment on the report. Fideszs parliamentary group didnt respond to a phone call or email from Bloomberg.

Orbans invitation for Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson to visit Hungary was extended last month in what was seen as a face-saving step for the nationalist leader after he broke a pledge to ratify Swedens accession before Turkey.

Patience over Orbans obstructionism is wearing thin both inside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. On Thursday, Orban finally dropped his opposition to a 50 billion ($54.4 billion) EU aid package for Ukraine after becoming the only of the blocs 27 leaders to veto it in December.

Hungary is the least reliable NATO member, US Senator Ben Cardin, the Democratic chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement on Thursday. He urged the Biden administration to consider imposing sanctions on Hungary for corruption and also to weigh the possibility of scrapping its participation in a US visa-waiver program.

Kristersson met Orban on Thursday on the sidelines of an EU summit in Brussels, but said he preferred to come to Budapest only after Hungarys parliament ratified Swedens NATO bid.

Hes been keen to avoid any optics of negotiating with Orban over his countrys accession, after Sweden received an invitation last year to join the military alliance. Swedens membership is seen as crucial for bolstering NATOs ability to defend its eastern flank nearly two years after Russias invasion of Ukraine.

Orban has sought to attribute the delay to his own lawmakers, who he said have been hurt by Swedish criticism over the erosion of democracy in Hungary. In fact, Fidesz has a supermajority in the chamber and the party is tightly controlled by the prime minister.

--With assistance from Niclas Rolander.

(Updates with Swedish foreign minister in third paragraph, context throughout.)

Most Read from Bloomberg Businessweek

2024 Bloomberg L.P.

Visit link:
Orban Escalates Standoff Over Sweden's Accession to NATO - Yahoo News