Category Archives: NATO

Thirty years ago, on August 1, 1991, former U.S. President George H.W. Bush spoke in Kyiv. It was later dubbed the Chicken Kiev speech. In his speech, Mr. Bush said that, Some people have urged the United States to choose between supporting President Gorbachev and supporting independence-minded leaders throughout the USSR I consider this a false choice. In fairness, President Gorbachev has achieved astonishing things, and his policies of glasnost, perestroika and democratization point toward the goals of freedom, democracy and economic liberty. [] Yet freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.

Twenty-three days later, on August 24, 1991, Ukraine proclaimed its renewed independence. Ukraines renewed independence effectively led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union into 15 independent states. he direct result of Ukraines renewed independence was clearly in the best interests of NATO and its member states.

In any event, despite Mr. Bushs Chicken Kiev speech, all the member states of NATO recognized Ukraines independence. U.S. President Jimmy Carters National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski would later write: It cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.

Unfortunately, NATO has not yet fully grasped that political reality and its unique opportunity to change the course of history and ensure peace, security and stability in this crucial region of the world.

That is why during its 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO balked under Russias pressure and did not offer Ukraine and Georgia NATOs Membership Action Plan. This moment of NATOs indecision would embolden Russia to invade Georgia four months later and then Ukraine six years later.

Despite this bitter Euro-Atlantic disappointment, Ukrainians have continued to build their country and actively engage in the process of Ukraines integration into the European Union, which eventually led to the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, publicly decried that the breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century and tried to recreate it by any means and at any cost by 2015 under the guise of the Customs Union, later the Eurasian Economic Union, which to be meaningful necessarily had to encompass Ukraine.

Ukraine dashed this major endeavour of the Russian president with the phenomenal Euro-Maidan that not only chased the fourth president of Ukraine to Russia, but also enshrined Ukraines will to sever its ties with its Soviet past and to move forward decisively in the direction of Europe.

This tremendously important turn of events was also in the best interests of NATO and its member states.

However, Ukraine had to pay a very high price for its crucial geopolitical decision.Indeed, in response to his embarrassing failure to recreate the Soviet Union, the Russian despot with his huge imperialistic appetite invaded and occupied Crimea and a portion of eastern Ukraine in 2014.

Since then, as a result of Russias military aggression, over 14,000 individuals have been killed and more than 30,000 injured in the occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions alone, and there are currently over 1.5 million internally displaced persons in Ukraine.

Despite this ultimate sacrifice, Ukraine courageously doubled down and on February 7, 2019, the Ukrainian parliament amended Ukraines Constitution to encompass the strategic course of Ukraine toward full membership in the European Union and NATO.

Ukraine also implemented this strategic course by cooperating with NATO regarding security in the Black Sea region and making significant contributions to allied operations, the NATO Response Force and NATO exercises.

This is all unmistakably in the best interests of NATO and its member states.However, it was still not enough for NATO to offer Ukraine NATOs long-awaited Membership Action Plan during NATOs Summit in Brussels on June 14.

Instead, history repeated itself as Mr. Putin warned that NATO membership for Ukraine would be a red line and NATO timidly declared in its Brussels Summit Communiqu that, We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine will become a member of the Alliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the process; we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions, including that each partner will be judged on its own merits.

For Ukrainians who defend Ukraines independence and, by the same token, stop Mr. Putins further westward military advances, NATOs 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqu does not provide Ukraine anything more concrete regarding the NATO Membership Action Plan. Thus, recalling the Chicken Kiev speech, Ukrainians may perceive this communiqu as the Belgian Chicken Waterzooi Communiqu.

Just as Ukraine had boldly proclaimed its renewed independence 23 days after the Chicken Kiev speech, it is now incumbent on Ukraine and its diaspora to steadfastly continue Ukraines Euro-Atlantic course until Ukraine achieves its constitutional goals of full membership in the European Union and NATO.

Eugene Czolij is a former president of the Ukrainian World Congress and the president of Ukraine-2050, a non-profit organization established to help implement within one generation by 2050 strategies for the sustainable development of Ukraine as a fully independent, territorially integral, democratic, reformed and economically competitive European state.

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Ukraine and NATO: what's next? - The Ukrainian Weekly

Primarily concerned with maintaining the balance of power in Eurasia, NATO has finally acknowledged the threat posed by China to the alliance's security and global order. (Photo source: AP)

Dr Yatharth Kachiar,

On June 14, the leaders of the 30-member NATO alliance gathered for an annual summit in Brussels to discuss various security challenges facing the trans-Atlantic alliance, such as Putins Russia, cyber warfare, climate change, artificial intelligence, disinformation, energy security, and human security. In a bid to adapt itself and stay relevant with the changing nature of global security challenges, NATO agreed on an ambitious transatlantic agenda for the future called NATO 2030. However, the key takeaway of the summit was NATOs tough stance vis--vis China. Taking a cue from the G7 meeting where participating countries criticized Beijing over human rights, trade and demanded a transparent enquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, NATO members also adopted an equally strong stance in the Brussels communique. It called out China for its stated ambitions and assertive behaviour that poses systemic challenges to the rules-based international order. In response, Chinas mission to the EU called the NATO statement slandering Chinas peaceful development.

Shifting focus

NATO, a regional defensive Euro-Atlantic alliance, forged during the Cold war against the expansive Soviet threat, had mentioned China for the first time in 2019. Compared to the 2019 statement when NATO released a cautious statement about opportunities and challenges presented by China, the current warning indicates rapidly declining relations between the West and Beijing. NATOs tough stance towards China indicates a landmark shift in its policy vis--vis Beijing and will have significant implications for global peace and security. At present, China does not pose a direct military threat to NATO countries that would require conventional military use or expansion in the Euro-Atlantic alliances area of operation. Nevertheless, there are areas such as economy, cyber, technology, nuclear, space and disinformation where China poses a severe challenge to the alliance.According to NATOs Secretary-General, it is not about moving NATO to Asia. Instead, it is China that is moving closer to us.

China challenge

In recent years, China has invested heavily in critical infrastructure such as telecommunications networks, ports facilities, railways and roads across Europe. Such a massive stake in the European economy by China limits NATOs ability to safeguard the critical infrastructure and secure the vital supply chains. Further, Chinas rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, its investment in counter space weapons, cyberattacks, and its use of disinformation presents a challenge to the alliances security and its democratic value system. China has also expanded its military presence in the Atlantic region. Beijings joint military drills with Russia in 2015 in the Mediterranean Sea raised alarm bells in Europe. With their growing military relationship in the Mediterranean Sea, Baltic Sea, and the Arctic region, Russia and China could have potentially serious security implications for NATO countries.

NATOs China policy?

Primarily concerned with maintaining the balance of power in Eurasia, NATO has finally acknowledged the threat posed by China to the alliances security and global order. Under pressure from the Biden administration, NATO has shown greater unity and political cohesion on the China issue in the Brussels summit. The 30-member trans-Atlantic alliance called on China to uphold its international commitments and to act responsibly in the international system, including in the space, cyber, and maritime domains, in keeping with its role as a major power. However, NATO is still far from developing a coherent policy on China. There is no indication from the trans-Atlantic alliance regarding its Indo-Pacific strategy and whether it is willing to expand its area of operation to the Pacific. At the same time, there is little consensus among the NATO countries in terms of strategy and instruments to be adopted while dealing with China. With more robust economic ties with Beijing, countries like Germany and UK are particularly cautious about adopting an aggressive approach vis--vis China. Even during the recently concluded NATO summit, Germany appealed to maintain a balanced approach while dealing with China.

Avoiding the pitfalls

Perhaps, the biggest challenge for NATO vis--vis China is not a military one, but a lack of unity against Chinese economic coercion and other asymmetric threats. In any case, Beijing is known to use its leverage and bilateral ties with European countries to obstruct any unified position on issues adverse to Chinese interests.Therefore,NATO must deepen political coordination and cooperation among the member countries to forge a consolidated long-term strategy on China. Besides strengthening unity and resilience within the alliance, NATO would be better positioned to deal with China if it builds better coordination with institutions like the EU and the partner countries in Indo-Pacific such as Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia.

Further, NATO should consider extending its partnership to countries like India, which is already confronting various threats from China. By consolidating the alliance from within and synergizing with like-minded states and institutions, NATO would be able to enhance its understanding of Chinas actions that could threaten the security and resilience of the alliance. NATO had already taken an initial step towards confronting China when it emphasized Chinas actions in the Brussels Summit. However, if the trans-Atlantic alliance wants to confront the China challenge successfully, it must avoid the major impediment of appearing divided or going alone.

(The author is an Assistant Professor at Manipal Center for European Studies (MCES), Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), Manipal, Karnataka. She has a Doctorate from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position or policy of Financial Express Online.)

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NATOs tough line on China: Regional alliance going global? - The Financial Express

Memo to Joe Biden: NATO did not help us get al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

The U.S. Navy Seals did it.

Had the 30 member countries of NATO ranging from Slovenia to Slovakia been consulted in tracking down and killing the terrorists leader, Osama bin Laden would still be killing Americans.

Rather than strategizing with NATO members about the perilous plan to take out the architect of the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001, the U.S. went at it alone.

Nineteen Islamic terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners that day. Two of them were flown into the two buildings of the World Trade Center in New York, collapsing both and killing 3,000 people and injuring another 25,000.

A third plane was crashed into the west side of the Pentagon killing 125 there. A fourth, headed for the White House, crashed in Shanksville, Pa., after a struggle between passengers and the hijackers, killing 44 passengers.

It was the deadliest terrorist attack in history.

The U.S. responded by declaring war on terror and proceeded to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan where bin Laden had been given sanctuary. However, Osama bin-Laden escaped into Pakistan before he could be captured.

Despite what a confused President Biden said at a press conference in the U.K. last week, where he praised NATO, the organization had nothing to do with the American operation to find and kill bin Laden.

It took 10 years and a costly war, but the U.S. finally tracked him down hiding out in a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

Under the utmost secrecy, on May 2, 2011, U.S. Seal Team Six helicoptered from Afghanistan into the compound in Pakistan. The Seals raided the facility and gunned bin Laden down. The terrorist leader was later buried at sea.

Biden should have known this. He was vice president under President Barack Obama when U.S. intelligence finally tracked bin Laden down.

Maybe he forgot. However, the reporters asking questions should also have known and questioned him about it.

But just as Biden went off the rails at the G-7 summit when he confused Syria with Libya several times during his press conference, he also botched the killing of the terrorist leader.

In the context of praising Article Five of the NATO pact, which calls an attack on one member an attack on all, Biden lauded NATO for supporting us after the 9/11 attack. He did not explain what, if anything, NATO did.

In a mumble of words, Biden added, NATO was with (us) when we got bin Laden.

That had to come as news to NATO.

It is absurd to think that the U.S. would have shared such secret and sensitive intelligence about a highly charged and controversial assassination plan with NATO or any country.

Obama greenlighted the decision to get bin Laden following a meeting in May 2011 of top officials in the White Houses Situation Room. He asked those attending their views.

While most attending hedged, Biden and then Defense Secretary Robert Gates, according to Gates in his book Duty, expressed skepticism. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was all for it, as was then CIA Director Leon Panetta.

As a matter of fact, Biden, as vice president, did not support Obamas decision to launch the clandestine mission which violated Pakistani airspace to get to Abbottabad.

Another source at the meeting said Biden was concerned about the political fallout, We need greater certainty that bin Laden is there, Biden is quoted saying.

Biden at a 2012 Democrat congressional retreat talked about the Situation Room meeting. He said Obama went around the room asking for opinions. He got to me. He said, Joe, what do you think? Biden said he answered, Mr. President, my suggestion is, dont go, adding that he needed more intelligence.

So when Biden talks about the we in killing bin Laden, and includes NATO in it, he is giving himself and NATO credit they do not deserve. Neither Biden nor NATO had anything do with it.

Peter Lucas is a veteran Massachusetts political reporter and columnist.

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Lucas: In praising NATO, Biden gives credit where it isnt due - Boston Herald

USNI News Illustration

The tracking data of two NATO warships was faked off the coast of a Russian controlled naval base in the Black Sea while the actual ships were moored 180 miles away, USNI News has learned.The U.K. Royal Navys HMS Defender, a Type-45 Daring-class destroyer, and the Royal Netherlands Navys HNLMS Evertsen, a De Zeven Provincin-class frigate, pulled into Odessa in Ukraine on June 18. The group had been monitored by Russian warships while exercising in the Black Sea, according to U.S. Navy photos dated on June 17.

According to an automatic identification system (AIS) signal, which transmits position details to improve maritime safety, the pair left Odessa just before midnight on June 18. The data shows that they sailed directly to Sevastopol, approaching to within two nautical miles of the harbor entrance. The strategic port houses the headquarters of Russias Black Sea fleet.

Despite the AIS track, there is clear evidence that the two warships did not leave Odessa. Live webcam feeds show that they did not leave Odessa, however. This was anyway the known situation in defense circles, and local media.Anyone in Odessa can see that they did not leave. The webcams are broadcast live on YouTube by Odessa Online. Screenshots archived by third party weather sites like Windy.com show the two warships present in Odessa overnight.

Positioning two NATO warships at the entrance at the entrance of a major Russian naval base would be widely seen as a provocative action, based on conflicting claims of sovereignty . Most of the international community, including the U.S, Britain and the Netherlands, do not recognize Crimea as part of Russia.

U.K. Royal Navy destroyer HMS Defender, USS Laboon and Dutch frigate HMNLS Evertsen take station for close proximity sailing as a Russian warship watches from afar (rear of picture) in the Black Sea on June 17, 2021. US Navy Photo

While the motives for the deception are unclear, the move raises questions about the efficacy of open-source intelligence data, such as AIS, which is becoming more common in both defense and by journalists. There is compelling evidence that the AIS tracks were faked. NATO representatives did not immediately respond to requests for comment and the tracks were confirmed as false by Dutch naval warfare news site Marineschepen.nl.

The AIS positions were shared with AIS aggregator MarineTraffic.com by a receiver station in Chornomorsk, close to Odessa. Other AIS aggregators also reported the false positions. HMS Defender was shown under the credentials that she is currently using, IMO 4907878. HNLMS Evertsen was reported as Netherlands Warship, MMSI 244942000. It isunclear how the false AIS data was introduced to the feed.

Both Defender and Evertsen are part of CSG21, the carrier strike group centered around HMS Queen Elizabeth (R08). The main body of CSG21 has remained in the Mediterranean, while the two warships temporarily deployed to the Black Sea, where they have been performing freedom of navigation missions and exercising with allies. They have visited Turkey and Ukraine and will also exercise with Romania and Georgia. They have also met with the U.S. Navys Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Laboon (DDG-58).

Related

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Positions of Two NATO Ships Were Falsified Near Russian Black Sea Naval Base - USNI News - USNI News

In a video keynote address at the Women Political Leaders Summit on 21 June 2021, NATOs Secretary General stressed the importance of gender equality to NATOs mission.

The best way to protect our security and way of life is to stand united and draw on all of the talents that our societies have to offer, he said. Gender equality is not only the right thing to do, but also the smart thing to do.

The online event, entitled Building Forward: Women Political Leaders Determining the New Normal, was co-chaired by Women Political Leaders and Amina J. Mohammed, United Nations Deputy Secretary-General, with advisory support from the United Nations Office for Partnerships. It brought together leaders from around the world to discuss how to support, increase and sustain womens leadership and gender equality in the post-pandemic era.

NATO has long recognized the need for increased womens participation and leadership in defence and security. Since 2018, its revised policy on Women, Peace and Security requires the integration of the gender perspective across all Alliance policies, programmes, missions and operations. It also encourages a more gender-inclusive environment and sets the highest standards of behaviour for NATO personnel.

At the Brussels Summit on 14 June 2021, NATO Leaders took a new significant step with the endorsement of NATOs new policy on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.

Link:
NATO Secretary General: Gender Equality is the smart thing to do - NATO HQ

At the NATO leaders summit inBrussels last week, the defense alliance said it would begin formally studying how climate change impacts security threats, calling climate change, one of the defining challenges of our times.

Officials also pledged to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions from military activities, with a goal of promoting military operations that are more resilient and less polluting.

Related:Young activists are making their mark in the climate debate

The alliance said that climate change makes it harder for militaries to do their jobs.

A greater understanding of the ways that climate change exacerbates conflict can help design peacebuilding missions that work, said Janani Vivekanada, who heads the climate and security program at adelphi, a research institute in Germany.

Vivekanadas group is leading a new initiative called Weathering Risk, that combines the latest climate change data with analysis of social and economic conditions to help decision-makers see the connections between climate and conflict.

Related:Luxembourg takes the lead on climate finance

Its about connecting climate science to policy, to support climate security, risk-informed decisions and evidence-based solutions, said Vivekanada. Its aimed at all actors across the defense, development and diplomacy communities.

Vivekanada spoke to the Worlds Marco Werman about the significance of NATO taking on climate change.

Janani Vivekanada: I think this is a really significant step for essentially three reasons. The first is the symbolic value the diplomatic value of affirming as a military organization that climate change is a threat to international peace and security, not just for the future, but one that's already playing out around the world.

The second reason is more operational. It's clear to military actors around the world that they need to better anticipate and prepare for the resulting crises that climate change is contributing to. Theres also an increasing need for humanitarian responses, one that NATOs historically tried to avoid. But as military actors are faced with more and more climate disasters, they're going to be increasingly called upon as first responders. They need just what this action plan is calling for: a better understanding of the interactions between climate change, peace and stability, so they can ensure that military responses are not climate blind, theyre not inadvertently making things worse because they're going in, not really taking account of these climate risks.

This is a tragic example. Lake Chad of the Sahel, which is made up of Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon home of one of the most intractable conflicts that we're seeing between state security forces and armed groups, such as Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province. The drivers of this conflict are manifold, but climate change is making things a lot worse for these communities; 90%of them have livelihoods that are dependent on climate-related rainfall patterns.

When I was in the field talking to members of armed groups, many of these people were saying they had no ideological interest or affinity with what these armed groups were preaching. They actually cited their decision to join these groups, join Boko Haram, for example, because of the climate-blind responses of military responses, things like slash and burn tactics, things like closing fish markets, banning the cultivation of certain crops or certain livelihoods. As your livelihood is becoming less and less viable, not just because of climate change, but because of these military strategies, the offer of armed groups as an anti-state vengeance mechanism becomes more prominent.

The relationship between climate change and peace and security can be this really negative, vicious circle which can lock in conflict, but it can also be a vehicle for peace building. So, in Israel-Palestine in the Levant, more broadly this is the most water-scarce region in the world. And whilst it's not the driver of conflict, the rising temperatures that the region is seeing, decreasing rainfall and rise in extreme weather events, are all contributing to worsening these very, very fraught relationships between communities.

But, we can see green shoots within this. Water is at the center of the crisis, but it's also been used as a vehicle for peace building, using the environment and shared resources like water as a vehicle to create dialog and discourse, and ultimately, trust between groups who would otherwise just not come together.

It's moving us from the rhetoric to being able to work on a more practical level. I think it really is a sign that NATO is taking this seriously. Where we were is, OK, there's a link between climate security, and I think where this action plan is taking us is, answering the So what? OK, yes, [climate change] is a risk to peace and security, so what do we do about it?

This interview has beenlightlyeditedand condensed for clarity.

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NATO agrees to study how climate change impacts global security threats - The World

Russian President Vladimir Putin praised Russian soldiers who fought in World War II and criticized NATO's expansion in an op-ed published Tuesday by a German weekly.

"We hoped that the end of the Cold War would be a common victory for Europe," Putin wrote in Die Zeit. "But a different approach has prevailed based on the expansion of NATO, a relic of the Cold War. Fourteen new countries, including the former Soviet Union republics, joined the organization, effectively dashing hopes for a continent without dividing lines."

He added that NATO's efforts to embrace former Soviet nations in Central and Eastern Europe were responsible for increasing tensions and degrading security.

"The whole system of European security has now degraded significantly," Putin said. "Tensions are rising, and the risks of a new arms race are becoming real."

For more reporting from the Associated Press, see below:

Moscow saw NATO's expansion as a threat to its security, and Russia-West ties sank to post-Cold War lows after Russia's 2014 annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula that followed the ouster of the Moscow-friendly Ukrainian president.

Putin insisted that prosperity and security in Europe could only be achieved through joint efforts and noted that "Russia is in favour of restoring a comprehensive partnership with Europe."

"We simply cannot afford to carry the burden of past misunderstandings, hard feelings, conflicts, and mistakes," he said. "Our common and indisputable goal is to ensure security on the continent without dividing lines, a common space for equitable cooperation and inclusive development for the prosperity of Europe and the world as a whole."

Putin also marked the 80th anniversary of the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union with a wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow.

The Nazis invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and the country lost a staggering 27 million people in what it calls the Great Patriotic War. The enormous suffering and sacrifice have left a deep scar in the national psyche, and the Victory Day marking the end of World War II in Europe that is celebrated in Russia on May 9 is the nation's most important secular holiday.

"The day of June 22 still evokes anger and sorrow in the hearts of all generations, causing pain for the destroyed lives of millions of people," Putin said in a speech at the Unknown Soldier's Tomb at the Kremlin wall. "Those trials, those terrible years, are literally imprinted into our memory."

The invading Nazi forces quickly overran the western part of the Soviet Union and came as close as 30 kilometers (less than 19 miles) to Moscow. But the Red Army rebounded and routed the Nazis near the capital, dealt them a crushing defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943 and then drove them back across Europe all the way to Berlin.

The Kremlin has been anxious to see international recognition of the nation's wartime sacrifices and its role in defeating the Nazis.

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Vladimir Putin Blasts NATO Expansion as 'Relic of the Cold War' in Op-Ed - Newsweek

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), also called the North Atlantic Alliance, the Atlantic Alliance or the Western Alliance, is an international organisation for collective security established in 1949, in support of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, DC, on 4 April 1949. Its headquarters are located in Brussels, Belgium. Its other official name is the French equivalent, lOrganisation du Trait de lAtlantique Nord (OTAN) (English and French being the two official languages of the organisation).

Background

The Treaty of Brussels, signed on 17 March 1948 by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and the United Kingdom, is considered the precursor to the NATO agreement. This treaty established a military alliance, later to become the Western European Union. However, American participation was thought necessary in order to counter the military power of the Soviet Union, and therefore talks for a new military alliance began almost immediately. These talks resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in Washington, DC on 4 April 1949. It included the five Treaty of Brussels states, United States, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. Three years later, on 18 February 1952, Greece and Turkey also joined. Because of geography, Australia and New Zealand missed out on membership. In place of this, the ANZUS agreement was made by the United States with these nations. The incorporation of West Germany into the organisation on 9 May 1955 was described as a decisive turning point in the history of our continent by Halvard Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway at the time. [5] Indeed, one of its immediate results was the creation of the Warsaw Pact, signed on 14 May 1955 by the Soviet Union and its satellite states as a formal response to this event, firmly establishing the two opposing sides of the Cold War.

Dtente

During most of the duration of the Cold War, NATO maintained a holding pattern with no actual military engagement as an organisation. On 1 July 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty opened for signature: NATO argued that its nuclear weapons sharing arrangements did not breach the treaty as US forces controlled the weapons until a decision was made to go to war, at which point the treaty would no longer be controlling. Few states knew of the NATO nuclear sharing arrangements at that time, and they were not challenged. On 30 May 1978, NATO countries officially defined two complementary aims of the Alliance, to maintain security and pursue dtente. This was supposed to mean matching defences at the level rendered necessary by the Warsaw Pacts offensive capabilities without spurring a further arms race. However, on 12 December 1979, in light of a build-up of Warsaw Pact nuclear capabilities in Europe, ministers approved the deployment of US Cruise and Pershing II theatre nuclear weapons in Europe. The new warheads were also meant to strengthen the western negotiating position in regard to nuclear disarmament. This policy was called the Dual Track policy. Similarly, in 198384, responding to the stationing of Warsaw Pact SS-20 medium-range missiles in Europe, NATO deployed modern Pershing II missiles able to reach Moscow within minutes. This action led to peace movement protests throughout Western Europe. The membership of the organisation in this time period likewise remained largely static, with NATO only gaining one new member in 30 May 1982, when newly democratic Spain joined the alliance, following a referendum. Greece also in 1974 withdrew its forces from NATOs military command structure, as a result of Greco-Turkish tensions following the 1974 Cyprus dispute; Greek forces were however readmitted in 1980. In November 1983, a NATO manoeuvre code-named Able Archer 83, which simulated a NATO nuclear release, caused panic in the Kremlin. Soviet leadership, led by ailing General Secretary Yuri Andropov became concerned that US President Ronald Reagan may have been intending to launch a genuine first strike. In response, Soviet nuclear forces were readied and air units in Eastern Germany and Poland were placed on alert. Though at the time written off by US intelligence as a propaganda effort, many historians now believe Soviet fear of a NATO first strike was genuine.

The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, removed the de facto main adversary of NATO. This caused a strategic reevaluation of NATOs purpose, nature and tasks. In practice, this ended up entailing a gradual (and still ongoing) expansion of NATO to Eastern Europe, as well as the extension of its activities to areas not formerly concerning it. The first post-Cold War expansion of NATO came with the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990, when former East Germany became part of the Federal Republic of Germany and the alliance. This had been agreed in the Two Plus Four Treaty earlier in the year. To secure Soviet approval of a united Germany remaining in NATO, it was agreed that foreign troops and nuclear weapons would not be stationed in the east, and also that NATO would never expand further east. On 28 February 1994, NATO also took its first military action, shooting down four Bosnian Serb aircraft violating a UN no-fly zone over central Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO airstrikes the following year helped bring the war in Bosnia to an end, resulting in the Dayton Agreement. Between 1994 and 1997, wider forums for regional cooperation between NATO and its neighbours were set up, like the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. On 8 July 1997, three former communist countries, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, were invited to join NATO, which finally happened in 1999. On 24 March 1999, NATO saw its first broad-scale military engagement in the Kosovo War, where it waged an 11-week bombing campaign against what was then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The conflict ended on 11 June 1999, when Yugoslavian leader Slobodan Miloevi agreed to NATOs demands by accepting UN resolution 1244. NATO then helped establish the KFOR, a NATO-led force under a United Nations mandate that operates the military mission in Kosovo. Debate concerning NATOs role and the concerns of the wider international community continued throughout its expanded military activities: The United States opposed efforts to require the UN Security Council to approve NATO military strikes, such as the ongoing action against Yugoslavia, while France and other NATO countries claimed the alliance needed UN approval. American officials said that this would undermine the authority of the alliance, and they noted that Russia and China would have exercised their Security Council vetoes to block the strike on Yugoslavia. In April 1999, at the Washington summit, a German proposal that NATO adopt a no-first-use nuclear strategy was rejected.

After the September 11th attacks

The expansion of the activities and geographical reach of NATO grew even further as an outcome of the September 11th attacks. These caused as a response the provisional invocation (on September 12) of the collective security of NATOs charter Article 5 which states that any attack on a member state will be considered an attack against the entire group of members. The invocation was confirmed on 4 October 2001 when NATO determined that the attacks were indeed eligible under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. The eight official actions taken by NATO in response to the attacks included the first two examples of military action taken in response to an invocation of Article 5: Operation Eagle Assist and Operation Active Endeavour. Despite this early show of solidarity, NATO faced a crisis little more than a year later, when on 10 February 2003, France and Belgium vetoed the procedure of silent approval concerning the timing of protective measures for Turkey in case of a possible war with Iraq. Germany did not use its right to break the procedure but said it supported the veto. On the issue of Afghanistan on the other hand, the alliance showed greater unity: On 16 April 2003 NATO agreed to take command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The decision came at the request of Germany and the Netherlands, the two nations leading ISAF at the time of the agreement, and all 19 NATO ambassadors approved it unanimously. The handover of control to NATO took place on 11 August, and marked the first time in NATOs history that it took charge of a mission outside the north Atlantic area. Canada had originally been slated to take over ISAF by itself on that date.

Political Structure

Like any alliance, NATO is ultimately governed by its 26 member states. However, the North Atlantic Treaty, and other agreements, outline how decisions are to be made within NATO. Each of the 26 members sends a delegation or mission to NATOs headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The senior permanent member of each delegation is known as the Permanent Representative and is generally a senior civil servant or an experienced ambassador (and holding that diplomatic rank). Together the Permanent Members form the North Atlantic Council (NAC), a body which meets together at least once a week and has effective political authority and powers of decision in NATO. From time to time the Council also meets at higher levels involving Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers or Heads of Government and it is at these meetings that major decisions regarding NATOs policies are generally taken. However, it is worth noting that the Council has the same authority and powers of decision-making, and its decisions have the same status and validity, at whatever level it meets. The meetings of the North Atlantic Council are chaired by the Secretary-General of NATO and, when decisions have to be made, the action is agreed upon on the basis of unanimity and common accord. There is no voting or decision by majority. Each nation represented at the Council table or on any of its subordinate committees retains complete sovereignty and responsibility for its own decisions. The second pivotal member of each countrys delegation is the Military Representative, a senior officer from each countrys armed forces. Together the Military Representatives from the Military Committee, a body responsible for recommending to NATOs political authorities those measures considered necessary for the common defence of the NATO area. Its principal role is to provide direction and advice on military policy and strategy. It provides guidance on military matters to the NATO Strategic Commanders, whose representatives attend its meetings, and is responsible for the overall conduct of the military affairs of the Alliance under the authority of the Council. Like the council, from time to time the Military Committee also meets at a higher level, namely at the level of Chiefs of defence, the most senior military officer in each nations armed forces. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is made up of legislators from the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance as well as 13 associate members.

Military structure

NATOs military operations are directed by two Strategic Commanders, both senior U.S. officers assisted by a staff drawn from across NATO. The Strategic Commanders are responsible to the Military Committee for the overall direction and conduct of all Alliance military matters within their areas of command. Before 2003 the Strategic Commanders were the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) but the current arrangement is to separate command responsibility between Allied Command Transformation (ACT), responsible for transformation and training of NATO forces, and Allied Command Operations, responsible for NATO operations worldwide. The commander of Allied Command Operations retained the title Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and is based in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) located at Casteau, north of the Belgian city of Mons. This is about 80 km (50 miles) south of NATOs political headquarters in Brussels.

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Why did Russia deploy roughly 100,000 troops to the Ukrainian border earlier this year? The move alarmed Western policymakers from the Baltics to the Beltway about the possibility of an all-out invasion. While Moscow ultimately redeployed some of those troops and the crisis deescalated, the buildup highlights Ukraines vulnerability and the Wests powerlessness to Russian hard power in the region.

Russias foreign ministry spokesperson gave a very specific reason for the countrys moves at the beginning of the military buildup she warned that Ukraines bid for NATO membership could entail irreversible consequences for the Ukrainian statehood. President Vladimir Putin in his subsequent address to the nation cautioned the West against crossing Russias red lines. In short, Russia was flexing its military muscles in no small part to prevent Ukraines attempt to draw closer to NATO membership. Preventing Ukraine along with Georgia from joining NATO is one of Russias key geopolitical objectives, and it is certainly one that it is willing to use military force to achieve.

The election of President Joe Biden and the prospect of a NATO summit in the summer (now scheduled for June 14 in Brussels) seem to have triggered new hopes about NATO enlargement in both Ukraine and Georgia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in a interview earlier in the year that if he had a chance to ask Biden a question, it would be, Mr. President, why are we [Ukraine] still not in NATO? In the midst of the Russian military buildup, Zelensky urged that Ukraine be invited to participate in the Membership Action Plan, which is NATOs fast-track roadmap for enlargement, as a real signal to Russia and the only way to end the war in Donbas. The Ukrainian government reiterated its case that a roadmap for quick membership is a necessary step to confront aggression and autocracy in Europe. Insofar as Georgia is concerned, it remains a longstanding and highly ambitious NATO contributor, in the words of President Salome Zurabishvili earlier in the year, and has shown its dedication to reaching the ultimate objective of integration. Antony Blinken, then in the process of confirmation as secretary of state, said that NATOs door remains open to Georgia if it meets the requirements.

In responding to Russias intimidation, Western countries voiced strong support for Ukraine, while the NATO secretary general declared that only NATO would decide on enlargement. However, the unfortunate truth is that NATO will not offer membership to Ukraine and Georgia any time soon. The reluctance of the alliance to do so is based on sound geopolitical reasoning and a sober evaluation of the two countries limited progress on much-needed reforms. NATO should not officially close its open door to new members, but Ukraine and Georgia remaining outside the alliance is ultimately the best policy for NATO given the circumstances.

The Geopolitical Dimension

The debate on NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia dates back 13 years, when the alliance was split in half on this very issue. At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, NATO agreed that the two countries will become members, without granting membership plans or specifying when and the circumstances under which this would happen. Prior to the Bucharest decision, Putin had warned the alliance and dismissed the claim that enlargements were not against Russia because national security is not based on promises. Russias aggression against Georgia later that year, in August 2008, and subsequently in Ukraine since 2014 has pushed enlargement into the deep unknown. Today, it is necessary to approach the question as honestly as possible to avoid future missteps and renewed escalation.

While NATO deplores Russias bullying behavior against its neighbors, none of the allies are willing to risk a military confrontation with Russia over Ukraine or Georgia. It became clear during Russias short war in Georgia in August 2008 that not even the United States at the height of its post-Cold War power was willing to risk a war with Russia. When Russia attacked the Donbas and annexed Crimea in 2014, NATO was even less willing to intervene on behalf of Ukraine and more worried about Russian intentions again existing allies. Granting the Membership Action Plan expresses an intention to enlarge the alliance in the near future: If NATO wishes to take this step with Ukraine and Georgia, it should go without saying that the alliance must be serious about the defense of the aspiring new members against the military threat from Russia. As NATO membership in itself will not deter Russia, the question is whether allies will be willing and able to invest in the immense effort required to make collective defense credible.

In reaction to Russias aggression in Ukraine, NATO put in place rotating multinational battlegroups in the Baltic states designed as a trip wire to assure those allies about the collective defense guarantees. Moreover, the alliance tripled the size of its NATO response force, including by the creation of a spearhead forceto react at very short notice. A much larger U.S. deterrence initiative involves prepositioned equipment in Poland and large-scale military exercises at an annual cost of between $4.5 and $6.5 billion as a cornerstone of the broader NATO effort to deter Russian aggression in Europe. Nevertheless, Russia continues to have military superiority in the region as demonstrated, inter alia, by wargames conducted by the RAND Corporation that concluded Russia would able to overrun the Baltic states within just a few days unless NATO deployed more substantial forces until reinforcements could arrive.

If Ukraine and Georgia were to join NATO, the alliance would have to ready itself for an adequate assurance of its new members and an unprecedented conventional deterrence of Russia. Defending a country the size of Ukraine or as remote as Georgia puts in doubt NATOs ability to deploy the substantial in-theater and backup forces and equipment this would require. It also puts in doubt Americas willingness to greatly enhance its existing deterrence initiative and not least carry the financial burden. NATO has a hard enough time showing a credible defense its current members in Eastern Europe. Extending a security commitment to Ukraine and Georgia would extend NATO requirements beyond any degree of realism. Moreover, combat troops are neither trained nor structured to assist with the gray zone operations below the threshold of collective defense that Russia may be tempted to test again in eastern Ukraine, similar to the situation in 2014. In sum, the fact that NATO seems unable to make its security commitments credible in Ukraine and Georgia would expose enlargement as a gigantic bluff that would kill NATOs credibility as a defense alliance in any theater.

The Domestic Dimension

The case for Ukraine or Georgia to join NATO is further undercut by the reality that neither country is in control of all of its territory. Russia has annexed Crimea and supports separatist republics in the Donbas in Ukraine, and it has de facto annexed Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Russia is the main perpetrator, but it is nonetheless a power-political reality that cannot be ignored. The key question is: Would NATO be ready to exempt the breakaway regions from its collective defense clause or would Ukraine and Georgia be willing to give them up de jure, if this is the price for entering the alliance? Neither option seems plausible. Moreover, while a steady and overwhelming majority of Georgians support NATO membership, a significant portion of the Ukrainian people concentrated in the countrys southern and eastern parts closer to Russia are against joining the alliance.

Finally, neither Ukraine nor Georgia can demonstrate an impressive reform record that would make them obvious NATO candidates today. Ukrainian civil society argues that a Membership Action Plan could give the country the necessary momentum to kickstart security sector reform. However, Ukraine has missed so many European Union, International Monetary Fund, and U.S. reform encouragements since 2014 that it is doubtful that a membership plan this time around would be a big game changer (and besides, the Membership Action Plan instrument, Annual National Programs, is already in place). Vested interests remain a strong impediment to increased democratic control over the armed forces and to curbing the extensive powers of the security service of Ukraine. Georgia, despite a long history of defense reform since 2003, continues to suffer from politicization, the lack of transparency, and imperfect democratic control. The recent jailing of Georgias opposition leader shows the deficiency of its political system and the rule of law. Although domestic politics are ultimately of secondary concern (NATO in the past tolerated autocracies like Portugal and Turkey), it makes the case for alliance enlargement even less credible.

The Diplomatic Message

Ukraine and Georgia under continued Russian pressure are naturally inclined to draw closer to NATO. However, for good reasons, the alliance remains unwilling to risk a military escalation with Russia over the two countries. Nevertheless, the status quo is preferable to extending Membership Action Plans, which likely would lead Russia to escalate the hostilities in eastern Ukraine and perhaps its pressure against Georgia to prevent this from happening. NATOs open door policy applies to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo (should the alliance recognize it) as well as to Sweden and Finland, even though they are unlikely to join the alliance for domestic political reasons. In Eastern Europe, conversely, the open door would apply only if the geopolitical circumstances there change fundamentally. Specifically, Russia would have to abandon its idea of a privileged sphere of interests that it needs to enforce militarily and such change seems unlikely to happen in the current generation of Russian elites.

Ukraine and Georgia may again call for Membership Action Plans approaching the NATO summit on June 14. While they may realize this is unrealistic, they do so as part of a lobbying game to make NATO offer them additional support. Be that as it may, it puts NATO in an uncomfortable position because Russia constitutes a de facto veto on its post-Cold War mission to unite Europe under one security umbrella. At the same time, NATO has nothing to gain, and may in fact invite further Russian aggression, if it were to officially rescind its Bucharest declaration that Ukraine and Georgia will become members. Instead, NATOs private message to the two countries should be an appeal not to publicly push for a plan for membership since that would force NATO to publicly state the brutal reasons why the alliance will not follow through on offering them membership any time soon.

NATO (and the European Union) members should continue to support Georgia and Ukraine politically, financially, and, to a limited extent, militarily. However, they must also leverage the implementation of defense, rule of law, and economic reform that the countries have formally committed to but which remain long overdue. NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia remains a distant aspiration. In the meantime, Ukraine and Georgia, with NATOs help, need to focus on improving the resilience of their defense forces.

Henrik Larsen, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. He served as political adviser for the European Union in Ukraine from 2014 to 2019. He is the author of NATOs Democratic Retrenchment: Hegemony after the Return of History (2019). He tweets at @HenrikLindbo.

Image: U.S. Army (Photo by Sgt. Anthony Jones)

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Why NATO Should Not Offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans - War on the Rocks

In Catholicism, one commits a sin of omission when failing to do that which is required. The sin of omission hanging over the June 14 summit with NATO Heads of State and Government is a potential failure by allies to recognize the existential threat posed by the global march of autocracy, which is quickening its step by the day. The alliance stands at a critical juncture. As we confront a new global competition of values and systems of governance, our leaders must rededicate the alliance to the democratic foundations of the Washington Treaty and anchor our commitment to democracy within NATO by establishing a Center for Democratic Resilience within NATO headquarters.

The United States can lead the effort and do so with great humility. We know that democracy, while resilient, is also fragile. The armed insurrection at the United States Capitol on Jan. 6 opened the eyes of America and the world to this fact. Democracy prevailed that day, and we must ensure it will do so tomorrow.

President BidenJoe BidenHouse Judiciary Democrats call on DOJ to reverse decision on Trump defense Democratic super PAC targets Youngkin over voting rights Harris dubs first foreign trip a success amid criticism over border MORE is a committed transatlanticist. I know because I worked for him as a staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His commitment to the alliance has never wavered. He is also a president helping our country emerge from a period of substantial political turmoil and direct attacks on our democratic institutions. His response is a bold pro-democracy agenda both here at home and abroad. His mission at NATO should be no different and no less bold.

After World War II, 10 European nations, the United States and Canada came together to save Europe from looming communist aggression and domination. NATOs founding fathers had the foresight to define this alliance not by what it stands against, but what it stands for: a commitment to shared democratic values. Ever since, Europe and North America, through NATO, have sought to safeguard an international rules-based order based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This order has come under fire.

Competition between great powers has returned. Russia, China and others are modernizing their militaries in ways that undermine strategic stability. But we face no mere contest of military might. We are in the middle of a contest of values. Autocrats in Moscow, Beijing and elsewhere are promoting alternative models of governance and targeting the principles and institutions at the heart of our democratic societies.

We must strengthen democracy at home. Democracy unites us. It makes us stronger, and it makes us safer. Citizens, legislatures, governments and international institutions must constantly work to protect it, expand it, and strengthen the ability of our democracies to resist and counter attempts to undermine it both from within and without.

NATO must play its part too. Its commitment to shared democratic values distinguishes NATO from other alliances. Without it, NATO would be just another military bloc.

This understanding has always been at the heart of the NATO Parliamentary Assemblys raison dtre. Institutionally separate from NATO, we bring together legislators from across the Atlantic Alliance determined to protect our citizens and defend our democratic way of life. Defending democracy must be acknowledged as a key pillar of NATOs core mission.

That is why, as NATO leaders prepare to meet in Brussels, we call on them to consider the establishment of a Center for Democratic Resilience within NATO. NATO has a well-oiled machinery to deter adversaries, defend its citizens, manage crises and cooperate with our partners. But it lacks a body which is fully focused on defending democracy. This must change.

Such a center, located within NATO headquarters, would be a resource and clearinghouse for democratic best practices. Operationally, it would provide consulting to those who seek guidance and practical assistance in establishing or enhancing democratic architecture like an independent judiciary, election security, or parliamentary oversight functions. It could monitor and identify challenges to democracy, human rights and the rule of law among member states in addition to facilitating democracy and governance assistance to member and aspirant states when requested.

We were encouraged the independent group of experts supporting the NATO 2030 reflection process also saw the need for a center on democratic resilience when they recommended such urgent action to the NATO secretary general last November.

We must demonstrate our commitment to shared democratic values, in both words and in deeds. This would send a strong signal to our citizens as well as those who want to do us harm: the alliance is equally committed to defending our democratic values as it is to collective security. The importance of shared democratic values can no longer be just a mantra that our leaders trot out regularly in summit communiqus.

Come June 14, we hope our leaders heed the call and make operational the foundational commitment enshrined in the 1949 Washington Treaty: safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

Gerald E. Connolly represents the 11 District of Virginia. He is president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

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