Category Archives: NATO

By Daniel S. Hamilton*

NATOs current Strategic Concept, the Alliances guiding document, was adopted in 2010. It is woefully out of date. Its message is emblematic of a bygone age of relative stability, in which the prevailing assumption across the North Atlantic was that the continents divisions would be overcome by a magnetic, largely unchallenged and gradually expanding Western-led order. In that order, eastern Europe and eventually Russia could potentially find a place, the US would continue as an affirmative European power, and China far from NATO planners minds would continue to develop as a regional power and responsible stakeholder in the international system. Military tensions and military forces would be reduced, and growing interdependencies would lower conflict and generate greater security and prosperity. The Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low, the document declares. Challenges to transatlantic security appeared to emanate far from European shores, particularly terrorism and tensions across the Broader Middle East.

That age of stability is a paradigm lost. Today,NATOand other European and Euro-Atlantic institutions must be repositioned to address a more volatile age of disruption. Critical societal functions of our democracies are increasingly susceptible to disturbances, interruptions, and shutdowns. New and emerging technologies are changing the nature of competition and conflict. The speed of innovation makes pace as important as space to Euro-Atlantic security. Digital transformations are upending the foundations of diplomacy and defence. Policy makers accustomed to protecting territory must consider how to protect our connectedness. Climate change and energy transitions pose security dilemmas for which the Alliance remains unprepared. Europes periphery has turned from a ring of friends to a ring of fire.

Through Russias annexation of Ukraines Crimean Peninsula, its military intervention in eastern Ukraine, and its use of energy, cyber and other instruments as political tools, Vladimir Putin has delivered a clear three-fold message: (1) hard power matters; (2) borders in Europe can still be changed by force; and (3) Russia is intent on expanding the arena of competition to disturb and damage the critical functions of other societies.Chinas economic reach, its rapid technological progress and growing military capabilities, its global diplomacy geared to very different norms, and its vast resource needs render it a world-class challenger. Its investments in strategic industries and ports, its challenges to the global commons, and its entente with Russia, which includes arms cooperation and maritime exercises in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas, has made it a power in Europe itself.

On top of these challenges, after years of turbulence Europeans wonder about the US commitment to the Alliance. TheBiden Administrationhas an opportunity to use the current Strategic Concept review to reassure Americas allies about US staying power, generate new unity and update NATOs tasks and tools for the age of disruption.

As of the time of writing the Biden Administrations approach to a new Strategic Concept continues to evolve. There is a general sense that the Alliances three core tasks of collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security, which featured in the 2010 Concept, remain important and should be preserved. But Administration officials are keenly aware that each of the three core tasks needs to evolve to meet disruptive threats and a range of new challenges to the Alliance. There is also a recognition that the Alliance must be able to perform each of these core tasks by incorporating military tools into a broader array of diplomatic, political and economic instruments.

NATOs own internal debates thus far reflect this basic framing. There seems to be broad consensus already on the threats and challenges posed by Russia, and on ways the Alliances multi-domain defense and deterrence posture must be adapted. On a number of other issues, however, individual Allied views diverge in certain respects. Five areas in particular could prove more challenging to achieve consensus: (1) how to address issues of democratic resilience; (2) how to address the China challenge; (3) the appropriate relationship between NATO and the EU; (4) what lessons for crisis management can be drawn NATOs 20-year mission in Afghanistan; and (5) the future of arms control, including nuclear issues but also the impact of emerging disruptive technologies.

With this in mind, I argue that the approach taken by the US and its NATO allies should be guided by what one might call One Plus Four: affirming the singular importance of Alliance cohesion; bolstering NATOs ability to perform its three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security; and adding a fourth core task focused on the Alliances role in strengthening resilience against disruptions to critical societal functions.

NATOs role as a defensive alliance of democracies has been weakened by assaults on democratic institutions and values in a number of allied countries, including the US. Reaffirming our common commitment to this foundational purpose as the basis upon which NATO must conduct its activities will be the most important element of a new Strategic Concept.

The preamble to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty that established NATOstatesthat the signatories are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. Article II declares, The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions. Nonetheless, today our democracies are under assault from within and without. NATO allies themselves are manipulating information and distorting data, engaging in direct cyberattacks on their opponents, undermining democratic processes and the rule of law, even threatening each other. In this new world of dangers, not only are fragile democratic allies more vulnerable to subversion through corruption, information warfare and blackmail, malign influence within such states could mean that Russia or other non-NATO allies could, in effect, enter into the NATO decision-loop.

Because the Alliance operates by consensus, it does not currently have provisions for sanctioning or suspending wayward members. Efforts to expel them would probably prove counter-productive. The Strategic Concept review offers a process through which allies can assess mechanisms to uphold their mutual commitment to strengthen their free institutions. Proposals range from some version of qualified majority voting and monitoring powers for the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs to barring errant members from common NATO projects or common funding, or even establishing oversight procedures by an independent NATO Inspector General. Regular review of allied commitments to democratic principles enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty preamble could be an important outcome of an updated Strategic Concept. We should be clear-eyed, however, that achieving consensus on these elements will be difficult.

Collective defence and deterrence remain central to NATOs purpose. The Administration supports two key initiatives stemming from theNATO 2030 programmelaunched at NATOs Brussels Summit. The first is the Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA). The second is NATOs Warfighting Capstone Concept. Both are opportunities to set forth NATOs military priorities and its approach to current and future threats. As they develop further, they will provide a guide to commanders for future security requirements and resources.

The US is particularly keen on ensuring that the Alliance can bridge current and future gaps in its ability to maintain its military and technological edge in an all domain battlespace. Allies must enhance deterrence, including through new military technologies, greater readiness, improved military mobility, more effective and rapid decision-making, and the continued need for arms control and incident management.

That includes ensuring the Alliance is prepared to counter an aggressive Russia. In addition to its military interventions in neighbouring countries and its conventional and nuclear buildups, in recent years Moscow has been steadily constructing a set of anti-access/area denial outposts, from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Mediterranean, that can offer Moscow a cheaper version of strategic depth than was provided by the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War.

Advancing the Alliances ability to deter and defend also means prioritising ways to deal with unconventional conflicts that might hover just below the Alliances Article 5 mutual defence threshold for instance, some types of cyberattacks, energy intimidation, election interference and disinformation campaigns. Such dynamics will have to take account of the immediate concerns of exposed allies, and broader global concerns that affect all allies, such as Chinas growing influence.

Enhanced measures of deterrence and defense should be reinforced by NATOs readiness to engage with Moscow not as a favor to Putin, but in our own interests. Those include counter-terrorism and avoiding incidents at sea, on land, in the air and in space. NATO must also consider its coordinating role in broader strategy relative to Russian influence operations, including Moscows own second strike options on sanctions (such as stopping energy flows to key NATO allies), which can create non-military pressures that could freeze NATO from acting in a crisis.

The Alliance must continue to be able to reduce threats, prevent and respond to crises in its immediate neighborhood, and help address crises outside its area of responsibility that could affect Alliance interests. This core task has dominated the business of the Alliance for most of the past two decades. It has included NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya, training missions in Iraq, operations against ISIS, counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, naval operations to deal with the continuing refugee flows coming to Europe from the south and counter-terrorism operations in the Mediterranean Sea.

In many of these areas the EU and individual European allies play important roles, and have the potential to do even more. The US and Canada have a real interest in a more capable Europe that can address such challenges. In two statements together with French President Emmanuel Macron, US President Joe Biden has affirmed US support for a stronger and more capable European defense that contributes positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, for European Allies and Partners growing investments in the military capabilities that enable our shared defense, for strengthening the NATO-EU strategic partnership, which is unique and essential for the security and prosperity of our nations and of the Euro-Atlantic area, and for a US-EU dialogue on security and defense.2

With this in mind, European allies should define a European Level of Ambition within NATO and align NATO and EU capabilities so that Europe can be the first responder when it comes to crisis management operations in and along its periphery. NATO would continue to engage as needed, but Europe should take the lead.

The Alliance has defined cooperative security primarily in terms of working on common security challenges together with other partners. This task remains important. NATO has more partners than members. Partners provide significant political support to the Alliance and can also contribute substantial military forces. NATOs partners are a significant asset that can enhance the capabilities of the Alliance at low cost. Key partnerships with Sweden and Finland can evolve further.

As of the time of writing, Administration thinking on cooperative security has yet to mature, beyond a sense that such partnerships should be interest-driven in terms of what added value they might bring to the Alliance. There is still opportunity for creative thinking in this space.

With this in mind, NATO should consider supplementing its Enhanced Operational Partnership with Australia with similar arrangements with Japan and South Korea. Partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia are in flux, with each partner seeking NATO membership, but without allied consensus to take such a step. The Alliance should consider deeper deterrent and resilience initiatives that make those partnerships more operationally meaningful.

A new Strategic Concept has the potential to anchor an operational partnership with the EU that will leverage additional resources for the Alliance, help it deal with a range of civil-military and unconventional challenges, shore up democratic standards and shared resilience, and perhaps even lead to a military Schengen, easing cross-border movements, mirroring the EUs own civilian Schengen zone.

Today, however, cooperative security must evolve beyond earlier understanding to encompass challenges to the global commons. The Alliance is an important actor in at least four dimensions of the global commons: (1) protecting freedom of the seas; (2) upholding the global information commons; (3) ensuring security and norms of peaceful behaviour in space; and (4) protecting Alliance equities in Arctic security. Chinas activities pose challenges in all four areas. Such challenges can only be addressed cooperatively with a range of non-NATO state and non-state actors. In some areas, NATO will not be the lead institution, but it can offer specialised capabilities. In other areas, for instance protecting freedom of navigation, it needs to be equipped to play a leading role.

Joe Biden has called on the US to lead its democratic allies and partners in increasing theirresilience. The growing need to implement operationally the concept of resilience the ability to anticipate, prevent and, if necessary, protect against and bounce forward from disruptions to critical functions of our societies has become a challenge on par with NATOs other core tasks, and is in fact essential to the other three, yet it has not been adequately integrated into allied planning or operational activities beyond country-by-country baseline requirements. NATOs efforts thus far betray a static understanding of resilience, which encompasses a wide range of dynamic interconnections. The Administration is keen on developing the concept further; here, too, there is opportunity for new thinking.

In this context, I contend that NATO needs to adopt comprehensive resilience as a fourth core task. The Alliance must move from a static, country-by-country approach to resilience and operationalise two more dynamic concepts. The first is shared resilience. Given Europes deep interconnections, it does not matter how resilient one ally is if its neighbour is not. The second concept is forward resilience. Allies have an interest in projecting resilience capabilities forward to weak neighbouring partner countries, such as Ukraine, Western Balkan countries and states along NATOs southern flank.

Corrosive cyber operations, disruptions to defence-relevant supply chains and the COVID-19 pandemic have each underscored the need for the Alliance to address more effectively unconventional challenges to human security. Comprehensive resilience would also include efforts to withstand hybrid attacks on NATO societies and political will. NATO will also be impacted by global warming and efforts to deal with it may eventually require the capabilities of NATO militaries for things like emergency rescue and logistics support. This is also an area in which a more effective NATO-EU partnership can contribute.Resilienceis a job for NATO, but it need not be a job for NATO alone. Enhanced NATO-EU cooperation offers a means to leverage the combined resources of both organisations in common cause.

One Plus Four: a NATO that is more cohesive, capable, balanced and resilient an Alliance prepared for the Age of Disruption.

*About the author: Daniel S. Hamilton, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for NATO and European security affairs; former Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff for two US Secretaries of State; and former Global Europe Director, Woodrow Wilson Center and Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment. @DanSHamilton

Source: This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute

Disclaimer: The Elcano Royal Institute is launching a series of publications with the aim of feeding into the emerging debate around NATOs Strategic Concept by providing a collective and national approach to the future of NATO. Selected national experts from different NATO allies (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy and Portugal) have contributed to the series by portraying the current debate in their home countries around the Strategic Concept and the future of the Alliance. Thus, the Elcano Royal Institute seeks to highlight the importance of the renewal of the Concept and its adoption at the Madrid Summit, to be held in Madrid in June 2022.

1Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for NATO and European security affairs; former Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff for two US Secretaries of State; and former Global Europe Director, Woodrow Wilson Center and Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment. Recent relevant publications includeOpen Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War;Europe Whole and Free: Vision and Reality;Forward Resilience: Protecting Society in an Interconnected World; andAlliance Revitalized: NATO for a New Era. This is a shortened version of an article appearing inOrbis.

2See the US-France Joint Statements of 22 September and 29 October 2021 athttps://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/29/united-states-france-joint-statement/.

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One Plus Four: What NATO's New Strategic Concept Should Say, And How To Achieve It Analysis - Eurasia Review

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most successful military alliance in modern history. For 40 years, NATO protected Western Europe from the hostile might of the Soviet Union until that ideologically driven empire collapsed in 1990. Victory in the Cold War, however, would be the beginning of the end for NATO, an alliance that has outlived its time and today is an expanded membership group of disparate nation-states unable to agree on its current purposes.

The 72-year-old alliance has become the victim of its own success and the simple passage of time. In NATOs heyday, the glue that held it together was a very realistic fear of Soviet Russia and its immense military establishment. Now most members of NATO do not feel threatened by todays post-communist Russia and worse, feel little inclination to militarily support the few frontline states (e.g., Poland, the three Baltic nations) that do feel threatened.

Polls in recent years confirm this new reality. In 2015, a Pew Research Center poll found that, among NATO members, only in the United States and Canada did a majority support military force to aid a NATO member that was invaded. Earlier this year, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) polled 60,000 people in its 11-member states and found that, by margins well over 2 to1, public opinion believes that their countries should remain neutral in conflicts between the U.S. and Russia or China.

These sentiments flatly contradict the core tenet of the NATO Treaty Article5, which obligates all members to militarily support a member who is under attack. If European NATO members prefer to remain neutral in any Russia-America conflict, what is the point of the alliance from the United Statess perspective? Add to this the fact that almost all European NATO members long have been defaulting on the financial obligations required by the treaty, and American skepticism about NATO in recent years is entirely understandable.

The seeds of NATOs decline were sown at the moment of the alliances greatest triumph, and the context was the issue of NATO expansion into the former Soviet satellites. The not unreasonable view of former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and later former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, was that with the Cold War over, the Soviet-sponsored Warsaw Pact dissolved, and with an economically prostrate Russia struggling to become a democracy, there was no justification for expanding a Western military alliance hundreds of miles closer to the Russian border.

Initially, Presidents Bush and Clinton seemed to agree. Then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker assured Gorbachev in February 1990 that NATO wouldnt move one inch eastward. In October 1993, Clintons Secretary of State Warren Christopher assured Yeltsin that there would be no NATO expansion, but instead a new organization, Partnership for Peace, that would include all of the former satellite states and Russia as well. Yeltsin enthusiastically embraced this concept. However, his fury knew no bounds a year later when Clinton reversed course, expanded NATO to include the satellites and excluded Russia. Yeltsin insisted that what was agreed upon was Partnership for all, not NATO for some and he spoke of betrayal and the purposeful humiliation of a weakened Russia. From the sidelines, Gorbachev lamented the rejection of his concept of a common European home.

This toxic issue has haunted relations between Russia and the West ever since, and became particularly dangerous when President George W. Bush said in April 2008 that he strongly supported NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine and wouldnt accept any Russian attempt to veto this. Bushs proposal, however, was strongly rebuffed by six NATO members led by Germanys Angela Merkel, who called such NATO expansion needlessly provocative. An outraged Russian President Vladimir PutinVladimir Vladimirovich PutinOvernight Defense & National Security New rules try to tackle extremism in the ranks Sullivan urges Russia to de-escalate Russia says US response to security demands needs to be 'urgent' MORE declared that NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine was a direct threat to Russias national security and he viewed it as a red line that could not be crossed.

Putin further countered by becoming involved in the savage ethnic politics of Georgia by supporting dissident separatist groups in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and ultimately recognizing them as independent republics backed economically and militarily by Russia. In 2014, when Western-backed mass protests led to the overthrow of a pro-Russian president of Ukraine, Putin acted swiftly to intervene militarily in those areas of Eastern Ukraine whose inhabitants were largely Russian ethnically (Crimea 65 percent) or Russian-speaking (Donbas 70 percent).

It is ironic that, with all its internal problems, NATO should be pursuing high-risk policies on behalf of countries that are not NATO members; are not allies; and assuredly would bring far more burdens to the alliance than assets. As for the United States, which has seriously damaged itself through long wars in distant places, why would we be risking more of the same in places so little-connected to our true national interests?

Clearly it is time for NATO to re-examine the reasons for its existence so far beyond its prime.

William Moloney, Ph.D., is a Fellow in Conservative Thought at Colorado Christian Universitys Centennial institute who studied at Oxford and the University of London and received his doctorate from Harvard University. He is a former Colorado Commissioner of Education.

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NATO today: The sad decline of a grand alliance | TheHill - The Hill

Holiday greetings to all NATO servicemen and -women around the world.

Hello and warm greetings to all our service men and women.

As this year draws to a close, I want thank all those who serve, and who have served, under the NATO flag, for the sacrifices you and your families make, every day.For our freedom and our security.

Meeting our men and women in uniform is one of the greatest privileges of my role.And I was delighted to see many of you again in person this year.In our peace-keeping mission in Kosovo.On board the HMS Queen Elizabeth during our Steadfast Defender exercise.And most recently, in our multinational battlegroup at Camp dai in Latvia.

I also want to take this opportunity to thank our veterans.Especially those who served in Afghanistan.For over twenty years, there have been no terrorist attacks on our countries organised from Afghanistan.We owe this to you.And I pay tribute to all those who made the ultimate sacrifice for our freedom.

As we look to the New Year and our Summit in Madrid, we are adapting our Alliance, to face a more dangerous and competitive world.We are stepping up to address any threats and any challenges.On land, at sea, in the air, in space, and in cyber space.

This starts with strong and capable armed forces.It starts with you.You represent the spirit and the strength of our Alliance.All for one and one for all.

So I wish you and your families all the best for the holidays.And thank you for everything you do.To keep NATO strong.And to keep us all safe.

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Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's end of year message to NATO troops and veterans - NATO HQ

Russian President Vladimir Putin has blamed the West for increasing tensions in Eastern Europe and suggested a military-technical response if his request for security guarantees is not met while a media mouthpiece for the Kremlin warned that Russia will hold a gun to Americas head if Ukraine is allowed to join NATO.

In a speech Tuesday to Russian defense ministry officials, Putin said Moscow needs long-term, legally binding guarantees from the West that the US and NATO will not deploy missilesystems in Ukraine, rather than verbal assurances.

Russia has massed as many as 175,000 troops as well as heavy military equipment on its western border with Ukraine, a move that many fear is a prelude to an invasion as early as next month.

Putin said NATO has continued to expand its footprint in Europe since the end of the Cold Wardespite assurances from the West that Moscows fears of encroachment are groundless.

What is happening now, tensions that are building up in Europe, is their [the US and NATOs] fault every step of the way, Putin said.

Russia has been forced to respond at every step, he added. The situation kept worsening and worsening, deteriorating and deteriorating. And here we are today, in a situation when were forced to resolve it somehow.

Putin vowed if the US and its allies continue their obviously aggressive stance, Russia would take appropriate retaliatory military-technical measures, adding that it has every right to do so.

At the same time, the Russian leader said he hopes that constructive, meaningful talks will lead to a resolutionthat all sides can be on board with.

Armed conflicts, bloodshed is not our choice, and we dont want such developments. We want to resolve issues by political and diplomatic means, Putin said.

President Biden, who held a virtual summit with Putin earlier this month, has warned that the US would impose substantial economic sanctions on Russia if it invades Ukraine.

Dmitry Kiselev, a Putinconfidant and the head of state-controlled media outlet Rossiya Segodnya, took a more militant approach in an interview with the BBC.

He said if the West fails to deliver the security guarantees, Russia will deploy missiles.

But this is your choice. We dont want this,Kiselev said in the interview published on Monday.

If Ukraine ever joins NATO or if NATO develops military infrastructure there, we will hold a gun to Americas head. We have the military capability, he said.

Russia has the best weapons in the world hypersonic ones. Theyd reach America as fast as US or British weapons could reach Moscow from Ukraine. It would be the Cuban Missile Crisis all over again, but with a shorter flight time for the missiles, he threatened.

Kiselevadded Moscow was prepared to defend the red linesPutin laid down last month against the deployment of missiles in Ukraine.

One hundred percent, because for Russia this is a question of life or death, he said.

US Assistant Secretary of State Karen Donfried, the top US diplomat in Europe, said the administration isprepared to discuss those proposals that Russia put on the table.

There are some things were prepared to work on, and we do believe there is merit in having discussion, Donfried told reporters after a visit to Kiev, Moscow and Brussels.

There are other things in those documents that the Russians know will be unacceptable, she said, without specifying which ones.

Talks could begin in January, Donfried added.

With Post wires

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Putin flunky warns Russia will put 'gun to America's head' as tensions grow - New York Post

In December 2021, President Joe Biden reportedly offered to convene a meeting between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members and Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the future of Russias concerns relative to NATO writ large.REF In particular, the Kremlin is unhappy with the close relationship between NATO and Kyiv, and the possibility of Ukraine someday becoming a member of the Alliance.

This offer of a meeting comes on the heels of a large-scale Russian military mobilization on Ukraines borders, a Kremlin-backed and Kremlin-manufactured migrant crisis along Polands, Latvias, and Lithuanias borders with Belarus, a Moscow-inspired natural-gas shortage in Eastern Europe, and regular Russian-sponsored cyberattacks against the U.S. and its allies. Proposing a meeting between NATO and Russia under the current circumstances is a diplomatic blunder by the Biden Administration.

Rather than offering to meet without preconditions, the U.S. should support a meeting only once Russia meets certain conditions. Furthermore, if Russia meets the conditions and this meeting comes to fruition, it should take place only through the NATORussia Council (NRC) that includes all 30 members of the Alliance. A discussion that leaves a majority of members out, especially those from Central and Eastern Europe, would only embolden Putin to make more aggressive demands and undermine NATO collective defense at a time when allied trust in President Biden has cratered.

The Biden Administration should clarify the U.S. position as supporting a meeting of the NRC only once certain conditions are met. Furthermore, the President should reiterate that NATOs open-door policy is not up for negotiation, nor does Russia have a veto right over any nations membership in NATO. President Biden should tread carefully, making sure that a diplomatic blunder does not become a monumental mistake.

The 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (NATORussia Founding Act) created the NATORussia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in part to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia.REF The PJC was replaced by the NRC in 2002 as a result of the declaration on NATORussia Relations: A New Quality. The declaration states that [t]he NATO-Russia Council will serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia.REF Typically, NRC meetings occur at the level of ambassador, foreign minister, or defense minister, rarely at the heads of state and government level. The last such NRC meeting, which was attended by President Barack Obama, took place in November 2010 after the NATO Lisbon Summit.REF

In April 2014, following Russias invasion of Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea, NATO suspended

After a two-year suspension, NRC meetings resumed in 2016,REF with 10 meetings occurring between 2016 and 2019, the last in July 2019.REF In February 2020, NATO proposed a further NRC meeting, a proposal that Russia has yet to accept.

In October 2021, Russia suspended its mission to NATO after the Alliance withdrew the accreditation of eight Russian intelligence officers working at the Russian mission in Brussels.REF Shortly thereafter, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reiterated the Alliances willingness to convene an NRC meeting.REF While NATORussia meetings at the political level have not taken place since 2019, military-to-military engagement has continued. For example, in February 2020, General Tod Wolters, NATOs Supreme Allied Commander Europe met his Russian counterpart in Baku, Azerbaijan, to aid in transparency and deconfliction measures.REF While the usefulness of consistent military-to-military engagement is evident, the U.S. governments and NATOs willingness to continue NRC meetings despite Russias egregious actions is ill considered.

Russia prefers that issues related to NATORussian relations and the future of Ukraine be decided between the U.S. and Russia or with a small cadre of large European nations and the United States. The Biden Administration must resist the temptation to assent to such a format. Any discussion on NATORussian relations should be conducted through the NRC format; furthermore, the U.S. must insist that any discussions on the future of Ukraine include Ukraine at the table as an equal partner.

Putins behavior resembles that of the czars more than that of his Soviet predecessors. Everything this imperial leader does aims to maximize and secure his personal power. The impact of his reign has been bad for Russia. In recent years, democracy has been in retreat, basic freedoms (of speech, assembly, and a free press) have been eroded, minority groups and political opposition figures are often oppressedand sometimes killedand the countrys economy is in tatters.

To distract his people from their many woes, Putin has pursued a dangerously aggressive and expansionist foreign policy. Along the way, he has undone the postWorld War II world order and undermined Americas strategic interests in many parts of the world.

Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and continues to occupy, illegally, 20 percent of that countrys internationally recognized territory. Six years later, Putin invaded Ukraine and illegally annexed the Crimean Peninsulathe first time one European country used military force to annex part of another since the days of Hitler. Russia still fuels a separatist conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine that did not exist before 2014. Since April 2021, Russia has been stationing troops along the eastern border of Ukraine for a potential invasion. Its troop numbers currently sit at more than 94,000,REF and that number could increase to 175,000REF in the coming weeks.

Russia has sowed anxiety and instability throughout most of the rest of Europe, as well. It has weaponized its natural gas exports to Europe, turning off the tap when countries dare go against its wishes. NATOs members and partners have been under constant cyberattack. Russia has used banned chemical weapons as part of assassination attempts of political opposition leaders and Russian dissidents across Europe. Russia has constantly meddled in elections in the United States and across Europe in an attempt to undermine legitimate state structures and democratic processes. Russia has even gone as far as to conduct military exercises simulating a nuclear strike against NATO member Poland.

When Russia decided in March 2014 to illegally annex Crimea and invade the Donbas region of Ukraine, it proved once again that it was no longer a trustworthy actor in the transatlantic community. NATO duly ceased meeting with Russia in the formal NRC format, but only briefly, with meetings resuming in 2016.

Before Russia is invited to meet with NATO at the head of state level, Moscow mustat a minimummeet the following seven conditions. Russia must:

The Biden Administrations offer of a meeting to discuss the future of Russias concerns relative to NATO writ large is a highwire act that could easily play into Putins hands by lending credence to false Russian propaganda narratives. Before engaging with Russia any further, the Biden Administration should:

Under the current circumstances, President Biden is wrongto suggestthat Moscow should be awarded a high-level meeting with NATO. The NRC should only meet again at the heads of state/government level once Russia demonstrates that it is a responsible and collegiate actor in the transatlantic community. Realistically, this is unlikely to occur while Putin is in power. The Russian people will continue to suffer, and Russian influence on the international stage will continue to be marginalized. Now is the time for U.S. leadership and strengthnot weakness and meekness.

Daniel Kochis is Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. Alexis Mrachek is Research Associate in Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy of the Davis Institute. Luke Coffey is Director of the Allison Center.

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Seven Actions Russia Must Take Before Receiving Another Meeting with NATO - Heritage.org

It is sometimes said that when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined NATO in 2004 each still harbored some lingering regret that they were not joining the NATO of 1949 an alliance with a resolute and single-track focus to deter any territorial threat that Moscow could contemplate. The alliance that the Baltic states joined had by 2004 been transformed into a multi-purpose security organization, with stabilization in Afghanistan as its main focus. After the fallout over the Iraq war in 2003 between France and Germany on one side and the US on the other, NATOs command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan beginning in August 2003 represented a major initiative to ease tensions in the transatlantic partnership. Defined by Peter Forster and Stephen Cimbala as the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal, burden-sharing towards the common objective to restore stability to Afghanistan became an important responsibility for every NATO ally. This was a particularly daunting new responsibility for the Baltic states, which had only just completed the NATO accession process involving a strenuous program of post-communist military reforms during the 1990s and early 2000s.

When the US-led War on Terror began after the 9/11 attacks, the Baltic states possessed only limited experience with out-of-area operations, each had to develop niche capabilities to support ISAFs objectives. There were many contribution options, military tasks included: combat; assisting reform in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); peacekeeping; and disposal of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Civilian tasks in post-conflict reconstruction were focused on agricultural production; improving infrastructure; development assistance; and poverty reduction. When considering these options, Baltic policymakers continued to contemplate their own territorial security situation, understanding that their transatlantic link could still be strengthened by demonstrating solidarity with the US, the UK and other NATO allies in Afghanistan. As alliance newcomers, Baltic governments understood that strong performance for ISAF would allow them to prove themselves as capable members in the multi-purpose NATO. Nevertheless, while a strong response to NATOs burden-sharing aims could boost their reputation, any effort below the expectations of NATOs leading allies could reinforce the undesired label of problematic NATO free-riders.

Washington expected stronger collective NATO burden-sharing for military combat in the unruly provinces of southern Afghanistan. While crucial for stabilization, many NATO allies were reluctant to contribute to these operations because they involved the significant risk of soldier casualties. Starting in 2006, Estonia deployed rotations of approximately 165 troops without caveats limiting combat exposure to Helmand province, an area that soon became a target for Taliban violence (Conversely, many established NATO allies hesitated to send troops into the province). The Estonian Defense Force (EDF) suffered nine soldier fatalities in Afghanistan among NATOs highest per capita fatality rates. Many more Estonian soldiers returned home wounded. Through this involvement, Estonia became a highly effective niche contributor to this vital part of NATOs stabilization effort. This has been acknowledged by many directly involved. Speaking in 2012, NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, stated: I particularly welcome the fact that Estonian forces are operating in Afghanistan without restrictions. Because that means they can be deployed quickly whenever, and wherever, extra troops are needed to improve security.

The diplomatic and military benefits of ISAF participation were also stressed by Estonias leaders. Visiting EDF units in Afghanistan in 2013, then Minister of Defense Urmas Reinsalu remarked: Thanks to your [Estonian military] contribution to our relations with allies, our international ties, credibility and visibility are greater than ever before. Everyone knows how good Estonian soldiers are in battle. Working closely with the US, the UK was a leading NATO ally for operations in Helmand; writing in 2014, British Ambassador to Estonia Christopher Holtby praised the EDFs achievements in Afghanistan, noting that this would improve military ties between Tallinn and London into the future: Fundamentally, the UK military wants to work closely in the future with Estonian forces because we know they are capable and effective. This has been proved in Afghanistan.

Latvia undertook multiple tasks to support stabilization in Afghanistan, starting with its lead role in coordinating the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) that established a supply route for ISAF through Rigas major port on the Baltic Sea. The NDN connected Europe to Afghanistan through Russia and some Central Asian states; it offered a welcome alternative for NATO, which would otherwise have had to direct more supplies through uncertain channels, including the notoriously risky Khyber Pass in the mountainous terrain that links Pakistan with Afghanistan. The US formed separate agreements with its suppliers using the NDN, but supply-chains for other NATO members were coordinated under the Latvian Lead Nation Concept. This was vital to allow greater cost-efficiency and improved delivery frequencies through shared transit space and pooled cargoes.

Latvias military provided support for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capacity-building through NATOs Operational Mentorship and Liaison Team (OMLT). At the height of the ISAF mission between 2007 and 2012, Latvia maintained a military contingent in Afghanistan that fluctuated between approximately 170 and 360 soldiers, many of these units were focused on improving ANSF capacity in the countrys northeastern provinces. Under the direction of the Obama administration between 2009 and 2011, the US military led a surge, but this could not ultimately subdue the Taliban. As the US and NATO drawdown began in 2012, Latvia sent 140 personnel through the Nordic Transition Support Unit (NTSU) to assist a smooth logistical withdrawal for ISAFs Nordic participants and to strengthen the ANSF as local forces began to gain increased responsibility for public order in Afghanistan.

Lithuanias main response to NATOs burden-sharing aims occurred as US military commitments multiplied in Afghanistan and Iraq by 2005. Washington called on its allies to assist by taking greater responsibility for ISAFs stabilization burden. There were exploratory discussions on a possible joint-Baltic-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan, but an agreement could not be reached. Lithuania decided that it could be a lone PRT leader, and was eventually charged with the PRT in Ghor province. Initially, PRT leadership was perceived as an optimal way to improve Lithuanias reputation in NATO, but this task soon became an agonizing and arduous obligation for Vilnius. The PRT required expertise and resources that stretched Lithuanian capacities to threadbare limits. As the only NATO member to lead a PRT from its second post-Cold War enlargement round in 2004, Lithuanian officials were often left to rue some of their own misguided over-ambition.

Early enthusiasm in 2005 gave way to disenchantment by 2009, with some Lithuanian policymakers expressing regret about their initial PRT decision seemingly taken without a realistic assessment of the enormous task involved. The move was criticized as driven too much by status-seeking within NATO, scoring [political] points had distracted Vilnius from the severe reconstruction problems putting its PRT coordination under serious strain in Ghor. Lithuania felt significant pressure from local stakeholders, in 2007 and 2009; two successive Afghan governors in Ghor criticized its PRT management, insisting that reconstruction responsibilities be handed over to better resourced ISAF contributors. This happened partially as the PRT developed when some civilian relief projects were passed to the US and Japan, but Lithuania was still able to overcome many difficulties and sustain its PRT leadership until its planned conclusion in 2013. While PRT leadership caused Vilnius some considerable policy pressure, taking a broader NATO outlook, high pressure and stress were mainstays for the select number of NATO governments that committed to ISAFs most important burden-sharing aims. Persisting to the end without walking away from PRT responsibilities was important to enhance Lithuanias standing within NATO.

Prominently referencing Baltic contributions to ISAF in 2013, then US Vice President Joe Biden explained how shared experience in Afghanistan had changed US-Baltic relations for the better. According to Biden, the Baltic states had effectively committed to a number of important civilian and military stabilization tasks, successfully altering the logic of their transatlantic diplomacy from a single-track focus on how the US could assist Baltic security to a more balanced position where the US and Baltic governments could cooperate closely in response to some vexing global security problems. The chaotic final US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 has led many to equate US involvement in Afghanistan over the past 20 years with its experience in Vietnam during the 1960s and 70s. A point often overlooked in these discussions is that Americas NATO allies did not militarily support the US campaign in Vietnam, while most did in Afghanistan. While only narrowly focused on Afghanistans metropolitan areas, Western-led reconstruction efforts did have some limited success in supporting a more open and prosperous Afghan society. Nevertheless, the death toll that has been recorded after 20 years of conflict puts the military failure to fully guarantee public safety into stark perspective. 2,448 US soldiers and 1,114 soldiers from other NATO states had lost their lives in the war by April 2021, but Afghan society has undoubtedly suffered the largest costs as more than 47,000 Afghan civilians and 66,000 Afghan military and police were killed due to violence over the same period.

Culpability for the ultimate inability to defeat the Taliban and stabilize Afghanistan must rest with NATO collectively and not just the US alone. The overall NATO burden-sharing effort produced only mixed results, as some of the larger European allies did not commit themselves as strongly as they could have an argument prominently underscored by self-imposed military caveats issued by some European allies to restrict combat exposure for operations against the Taliban. Observing this trend in 2011, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned of NATOs decline into a two-tiered alliance, divided between allies capable of making effective military contributions to important operations and others unable to do so. Small size and scale will always curtail Baltic influence, but the turbulent US-led campaign in Afghanistan still highlighted that the Baltic states were ready to stand up and contribute effectively when some of NATOs more established allies were ambivalent to do so.

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Afghanistan Was a Turbulent NATO Proving Ground for the Baltic States - Foreign Policy Research Institute

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg welcomed Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili to NATO Headquarters on Wednesday (15 December). They discussed political and practical cooperation as well as the security situation in the region.

The Secretary General reaffirmed NATOs continued strong political and practical support to its partners, and reiterated Allies firm support for Georgias sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Secretary General underlined that Georgia is one of NATOs closest partners and thanked Georgia for contributing to NATOs efforts in Afghanistan over the years.

The Secretary General addressed the security situation in the region, including Russias military build-up in and around Ukraine and its destabilising activity in the Black Sea region. The Secretary General emphasized that "any future Russian aggression would come at a high price and have serious political and economic consequences for Russia".

The two leaders also addressed Georgias domestic reforms and implementation of the Annual National Programme. The Secretary General underlined, "it is vital that the work on judiciary reform, media freedom and accountability of the security sector continues".

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NATO Secretary General and Prime Minister of Georgia discussed the security situation in the region - NATO HQ

The situation in Bosnia is no longer a political crisis, but a rapidly deteriorating security crisis.

The assembly of the Republic of Srpska, the Bosnian Serb entity comprising 49 percent of the country,voted yes on a set of provisions that would see it gradually opt out of national institutions. This was by far the most dangerous step taken by Bosnian Serb secessionists led by Milorad Dodik since the end of the war.

Drafting new entity-level laws would essentially allow the Bosnian Serb region to withdraw from the Bosnian national army, intelligence and security services, tax system, and judiciary.

In other words, this is secession in all but name.

Dodik, once touted as a pro-Western politician, has become so radicalised over the past 15 years that the Serb Democratic Party, founded by genocidaire Radovan Karadzic, now seems as a moderate political party. He has referred to Bosniak Muslims as converts and a servile nation while members of his political party have used pejorative terms that disparage or belittle Bosniak Muslims.

He does not hide his disdain for Bosnia and has on numerous occasions called it a failed state and a failed experiment. In a more sinister and warmongering tone, he has threatened to take over Bosnian army barracks once he forms his own military, threatening to call his friends for help should the West intervene interpreted by many regional experts as referring to Serbia and Russia. To make matters worse, Serb opposition parties share Dodiks vision, but disagree on how toimplement it in practice.

Bosnian Croats, despite paying lip service to joining the EU and NATO, have been mostlyin cahoots with Bosnian Serb hardliners and cosying up to Russia. Bosnian Croats are now seeking what they failed to achieve during the 19921995 war: an independent or at least highly autonomous statelet for themselves.

Independent Serb and Croat statelets within the borders of present day Bosnia and Herzegovina would confine the countrys majority its Bosniak Muslims to a landlocked Bantustan whose borders would be controlled by rather unfriendly forces. They therefore oppose such a move and instead advocate maintaining a unified and multiethnic country.

Most Bosniaks are willing to adopt a civic state model whereby each citizens vote, regardless of ethnicity, would carry equal weight. However, both Serb and Croat leaders have openly said that a civic state would be equal to having an Islamic state implying that they would not want to live in a country where the democratic will of the countrys majority population, Bosniak Muslims, would decide on key state matters.

Instead, Bosnian Serbs and Croats opt for entrenching the current apartheid-like system whereby the two smaller ethnic groups disproportionately outnumber the countrys majority Bosniak population in key governmental, administrative and judicial positions, in addition to having the veto power to block any decision deemed unjust to their national interests.

However, Dodik would not have been able to carry out such brazen and direct attacks against Bosnias territorial integrity without the explicit support of neighbouringSerbia, Croatia, and Russia.

BothCroatia and Serbia have been fuelling the current deteriorating political and security atmosphere by constantly interfering in Bosnias internal affairs. Neither country takes a neutral stance.

Serbia is ruled by Aleksandar Vucic, an autocratic nationalist who presents himself as the poster boy for EU integration, but is simultaneously on excellent terms with some of the leading global autocrats, including Russias Vladimir Putin and Chinas Xi Jinping.

Croatia, on the other hand, is ruled by a right-wing nationalist, Zoran Milanovic, who has referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina as not a state, but a big shit and has even questioned the judicially established truth regarding the Srebrenica genocide.

Dodiks other patron isRussia, which is behind his moves, if not directly administering them. Russias strategic objective in the Western Balkans is not only to block aspiring nations from joining NATO but to stymie the development of pro-Western liberal democracies.

Putin is using Bosnia and Herzegovina as a bargaining chip to show the West he can destabilise the Western Balkans region at will. As far as he is concerned, a dysfunctional Bosnia and Herzegovina or a low-intensity conflict is far better than yet another member state of the EU and NATO in the Balkans.

Numerous Bosnians analysts and intellectuals are anxious about what could come out of this, with Russias recent military manoeuvres near the Ukrainian border fresh in their minds, as well as its engineered migrant crisis on the Belarus-Poland border, and its regular violations of Baltic airspace.

The EU seems disorientated and rudderless while the US seems to be making ad hoc decisions without having a clear plan of what it wants to achieve. It is extraordinary that the EU cannot defuse a crisis within its backyard. Such impotence is hugely damaging its credibility and authority.

The situation has now officially crossed the Rubicon and reached the point of no return. It is no longer a political crisis, but a rapidly deteriorating security crisis. If Bosnian Serbs declare independence, an unrecognised pro-Russian Abkhazia-like statelet will be formed on the borders of two NATO member states, Croatia and Montenegro.

Once Bosnia spirals of control, it would be a highly pernicious illusion to think that the rest of the region will remain stable.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of TRT World.

We welcome all pitches and submissions to TRT World Opinion please send them via email, to opinion.editorial@trtworld.com

Source: TRT World

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A secession in Bosnia is underway and NATO must be worried - TRT World

Residents in Morave and Kucova in Albania havebeen protestingagainst plans to expand a NATO airfield onto their land, claiming the government compensation offered is far below the market rate.

Albania joined NATO in 2009, and now plans are underway to upgrade and extend the Kucova Air Base, located in the centra-south part of the country. The project wasfirst announcedin 2019, noting it would bring Kucova Air Base up to NATO standards by renovating runways, taxiways, and storage facilities.

When you take a look at the Adriatic, when you take a look at the southern flank of the European continent, and its proximity in the region towards the European continent, it is important to have peace and prosperity, said Commander of NATOs Allied Air Command, General Tod D. Wolters. Hence, Albania in the Balkans, especially in the western Balkans, becomes a critical place, he added.

Butresidents are not happy about the plans, which will see some lose agricultural land. At a first round of protests earlier this month, they said the defence ministry had offered them just 1.90 per square metre.

Residents say the land value is more than ten times that amount and demand to be fairly compensated. A second protest has already been scheduled, and residents said they would escalate them if necessary.

On 9 December, Defence Minister Niko Peleshi said those impacted by the plans would be compensated according to market value and without delay. Additionally, he said works would commence at the start of January, describing it as good news for the country and region in terms of security.

He also said it was good news for local inhabitants as tens of thousands of euros will be invested in the surrounding area.

(Alice Taylor | Exit.al)

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Residents protest NATO airfield to be built on their land - EURACTIV

Russia: Civil activist warns of propaganda against Ukraine

With Russia having already sent approximately 100,000 troops to the border of Ukraine, and reports that Moscow might be planning an incursion as soon as next month, fears of war are emerging. A recent virtual meeting between President Biden and President Putin failed to completely stem the crisis, with Russia stating that the situation is being fuelled by Western support for Ukraine on Russias doorstep.

Speaking exclusively toExpress.co.uk, Professor of Russian and European Politics from the University of Kent Richard Sakwa suggested western allies are adding fuel to the fire.

Asked what the core reasons for the current tension in Ukraine related to, Professor Sakwa said: The recent escalation is all about diplomacy.

"Moscow feels that its security concerns have been ignored, basically since 1991 (a feeling shared by Yeltsin), and now feels that a critical juncture has arrived.

He added: With the irresponsible and dangerous arming of Ukraine etc and the trends running against Moscow parties need to act now to finally get some sort of new security arrangement in place hence the two documents released last week.

The documents, published last Friday, also call for a ban on sending US and Russian warships and aircraft to areas from where they can attack each others territory as well as a halt to NATO military drills near Russias borders.

The proposals were submitted to the United States and its allies earlier this week and contain elements such as an effective Russian veto on future NATO membership for Ukraine that the West has already ruled out.

Speaking of what may happen if a conflict did arise, and Russia for example did choose to take military actions, the Professor said: A full-scale invasion very unlikely, unless actions started by Ukraine which is also unlikely.

The expert added: Moscow wants to get back to the sort of arrangements that operated in the late Cold War period.

READ MORE:Russia facing gas ban in Europe with tough sanctions

Speaking of the wider complications, he added: If there is an invasion, the punitive sanctions such as SWIFT, embargoes, gas cut-off etc will be severe, but will be damaging globally; and note that any action will be taken in conjunction with the Chinese.

The Professor ended by saying the West need to rethink their actions by saying: Both states argue that it is time for the irresponsible and dangerous West to wake up to the changing security needs of these states, in conditions of a quasi-military alliance.

With Ukraine keen on joining NATO, to the point where President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy implored the alliance to accelerate its application procedure in order to join sooner, questions remain on whether Ukraine will actually join, as well as the role of other non-state actors, such as the EU.

Speaking of the idea, Professor Sakwa said: I think most experts accept that NATO membership for Ukraine is not on the cards any time soon but some sort of bilateral deal with the US would be just as destabilising.

He added: I think the US now understands this, hence the recent flurry of diplomatic activity.

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Suggesting the only way to resolve the crisis is between Washington and Moscow, the expert said: Ultimately NATO and the EU are irrelevant its the US that decides, although will have to get its allies and Congress on board.

He added: Its possible the alternative could well be war. The situation is akin to the Cuban missile crisis where each side found the face-saving formula to step back from the brink. Talk of appeasement then and now is suicidal.

Russia has also escalated its diplomatic rhetoric on the situation.

For the past several years, people around Vladimir Putin have joked with respect to foreign powers, if they cannot deal with Sergei Lavrov then they will have to deal with Sergey Shoigu, (referring to the Russian defence minister).

Yet, Russia has added a buffer between the two, in the form of the more open and frank diplomat Sergei Ryabkov.

As relations with the United States and the EU have heated up in recent weeks over the buildup of Russian forces at the border with Ukraine, Mr Ryabkov has been speaking to the press and has done so in an undiplomatic, in-your-face fashion.

When one reporter asked him a week ago about how some of Russias partners in the West would react to something, he snapped back: We have no partners in the West, only enemies. I stopped using the word partner some time ago.

Western powers still hope that diplomatic efforts will divert a disaster.

If they are wrong, Ukrainians hope the prospect of a bloody and prolonged war could yet be enough to make Russia's president think twice.

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NATO and EU irrelevant' - Only Biden and Putin can prevent war - Daily Express