Category Archives: NATO

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg welcomed the President of Estonia, Alar Karis, to NATO headquarters on Thursday (13 January 2022).

He praised Estonias contributions to the Alliance, including for hosting one of NATOs battlegroups in the Baltic region, its leadership in defence spending, and the vital role it plays in strengthening the Alliances cyber defences.

The two leaders discussed the security situation in Europe, including Russias military build-up in and around Ukraine. The Secretary General underlined that during yesterdays NATO-Russia Council meeting, Allies made clear that any further aggression against Ukraine would carry a heavy price for Russia. He added that Allies have also expressed willingness to engage in further dialogue. The Secretary General went on to say, our goal is real de-escalation from Russia and engagement in good faith and on substance, in the interests of everyones security and he stressed that we will never compromise on fundamental principles of European security.

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NATO Secretary General discusses the security situation in eastern Europe with the President of Estonia - NATO HQ

For decades, Stanley R. Sloan has belonged to the small group of NATO-watchers who offer eminently readable accounts of where the Alliance comes from and where it is going. US historian Lawrence Kaplan calls Sloan the most important American authority in the field of NATO historiography.

Sloan worked in the Congressional Research Service for 25 years as the senior specialist in international security policy. His work for Congress, for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and for the Senate NATO Observer Group makes him a seasoned observer of transatlantic security affairs scene. Through several books, numerous articles and countless public speaking engagements on both sides of the Atlantic, Sloan has become the grey eminence of NATO affairs.

After having reviewed the first edition of Sloans Defense of the West some years ago, the second edition warrants another look. The reason becomes clear when one compares the sub-headings. In the first edition, it reads NATO, the European Union and the transatlantic bargain. By contrast, the second edition reads Transatlantic security from Truman to Trump. The reader can guess the reason for this change. In the second edition, Sloan covers the Donald Trump presidency a presidency that challenged NATO in unprecedented ways. Since the main part of the book is largely identical to the previous edition, this review focuses mostly on the new material.

Defense of the West is the fifth book of a series that started in 1984, with Sloans NATOs Future: Towards a New Transatlantic Bargain. In this book and in many that followed, Sloan effectively built on former US NATO Ambassador Harlan Clevelands description of NATO as a transatlantic bargain. That bargain was the United States commitment to the rebuilding of Western Europe after the devastation of World War II, in exchange for Europe gradually organising for its own defence. In Clevelands view, the bargain worked because the bargaining goes on within a framework of common interest, perceived and acknowledged. Cleveland acknowledged that burden-sharing issues would remain difficult, even labelling NATO an organized controversy about who is going to do how much, yet he insisted that no matter how much the bargain changes, the constant is a consensus among allies that there has to be a bargain.

In Sloans view, a new transatlantic bargain would include greater European responsibility as well as continued North American engagement in European security affairs. Such a bargain was neither to come about overnight, nor was it to be measured merely by comparing defence expenditures. This becomes clear throughout the main part of his book, which offers a solid history of NATO. By contrast, Trumps transactional view of NATO reduced the transatlantic bargain to a mere business deal and a bad one at that, as the Europeans, in his view, were freeriding at the expense of the US taxpayer. Sloan agrees that many Allies did not spend as much on defence as they should have. However, Trumps insistence that the Allies owed the US past dues was, as Sloan points out, completely inconsistent with the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty and the allies practice over the past 70 years.Sloan puts the Trump disruption in its broader context: the rise of illiberalism and populism in many Western countries, the global financial crisis, and the Brexit shock had shattered the Wests optimism in the attractiveness of its own political and economic model. He clearly shows that Donald Trumps political rise was not a singular event. Still, with his unique personal style, Trump confronted NATO with a major challenge.

While Trump did not spare with criticism of NATO, he refused to criticise Russia and its aggression against Ukraine. At the Brussels Summit in May 2017, he avoided any direct reference to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the crucially important clause that postulates an obligation to help an Ally in case of attack. A few weeks later, in a speech in Warsaw, Trump finally committed to Article 5, but the damage had already been done. The US seemed bent on abdicating its leadership of the Western Alliance.

Sloan praises NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, who had followed a deliberate strategy of continuously complimenting allies for their accomplishments urging them to do more, and praising Trump for having produced whatever progress had been achieved. Stoltenbergs panache in handling the US President did not go unnoticed. He was invited to address a joint session of the US Congress the first head of an international organisation ever to do so. This invitation demonstrated that despite Trumps unilateralist mannerism there was still another multilateralist United States out there.

Sloan contends sarcastically that Trump helped unite the Europeans, but he largely united them against the Unites States, rather than behind it. While Sloan admits that Trump (and Brexit) did compel the EU to agree several steps toward closer security cooperation, he views these steps less as being within the logic of a new transatlantic bargain, but rather as expressions of scepticism about the future of this very bargain. In combination with the global decline of the public image of the United States under Donald Trumps presidency, Sloan worries whether the damage done may even be beyond repair. He concludes his analysis of the Trump years with a blunt verdict: On balance, by 2020 Donald Trump had done more to weaken American leadership of the West than even his most severe critics might have anticipated before his inauguration.

So far, so bad. And now? Can the Biden Administration which came into office after Sloans book was released repair the transatlantic relationship? In the final part of his book, in which Sloan sets out the numerous external and internal challenges that the West is facing, it becomes clear that meeting them will require much more than a more cooperative and conciliatory US Administration. As far as external challenges go, Sloan notes a revisionist Russia, conflict and instability in the Middle East and North Africa, the continuing fragility of Afghanistan, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats, information wars, and the Chinese challenge. He also mentions the pandemic and environmental challenges, although only briefly.

Sloan starts his list of the Wests internal challenges with the ambivalence surrounding the future of US leadership. He is worried that a polarised dysfunctional American political system will not generate the political continuity that Washington needs if it wants to be an effective leader. Other internal challenges arise from inadequate European defence spending, European economic and political vulnerabilities, and insufficient cooperation between NATO and the European Union. The latter is particularly dear to Sloans heart.While he has discarded his earlier idea of a Transatlantic Community Treaty, which was supposed to bring together all NATO and EU member states in one unifying framework, he realises that the comprehensive approach to meeting modern security challenges requires more NATO-EU cooperation. This cooperation would focus on the external threats to transatlantic security and values rather than on competing philosophies and organizational structures.

Overall, compared to his previous books, Sloan appears more pessimistic about the future of the transatlantic security relationship. In part, this is because of the shock caused by President Trump, who at times seemed to be willing to withdraw the US from NATO altogether. But Sloan is also concerned about the West getting it wrong more broadly, notably by not standing up to defend its values. Perhaps the future of the West, he contends, comes down to a very fundamental choice: Should the United States and its European partners acquiesce in Russias geopolitical demands for a buffer zone between Putins kleptocracy and the democratic West or should they assert with actions as well as words, the liberal values that they hoped would shape post-Cold War Europe? It is clear how Sloan would answer this question, but he is less sure how some parochial Western democracies would answer it.

Like the previous version, the book is clearly aimed at a student audience, as demonstrated by the questions for discussion at the end of each chapter. This comprehensiveness is also a weakness, however. There is a considerable amount of repetition, and while some issues are discussed in depth, others are just briefly touched upon, as if the author did not have the time to analyse them in greater detail. Still, Defense of the West is an impressive volume: it offers a well-informed, jargon-free history of NATO, as well as some almost philosophical reflections of a seasoned observer of the transatlantic community.

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NATO Review - Review of Stanley R. Sloan, Defense of the West (2nd Edition, Manchester University Press, 2020) - NATO HQ

Iowa National Guard Adjutant General Ben Corell

Iowa National Guard Adjutant General Benjamin Corell has alerted several units that they are likely to be called to active duty this year. It includes a mission in support of NATO the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as fears rise about a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

We anticipate we will deploy members of the 209th Medical Company from Iowa City and members of the 1133rd Transportation Company from Mason City to support Operation Atlantic Resolve in Poland, Corell said yesterday. Atlantic Resolve is part of the Deterrence Initiative focused in Eastern Europe. This enables the U.S. to provide deterrence to adversaries while supporting our NATO partners.

In 2010, Corell was the commander of Iowa National Guard soldiers deployed to Afghanistan. He said this summers withdrawal was very difficult to watch.

I take solace knowing that I, along with those that served beside me, did everything in our ability each day that we served there to achieve an outcome different than what exists today, Corell said.

Corell delivered the annual Condition of the Guard address to legislators yesterday and that was his only direct reference to the end of the war in Afghanistan. Last year, more than 1600 Iowa Guard soldiers and over 200 Iowa Airmen were deployed to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

We have a new generation of heroes in our midst. The men and women who returned home after serving in the Global War on Terrorism are carrying freedoms torch in the same proud tradition as veterans of previous conflicts, Corell said.

As Radio Iowa reported yesterday, about 80% of Iowa Army and Air National Guard members are fully vaccinated, but Corell said the Secretary of Defenses order that all soldiers and airmen get Covid-19 shots is creating dilemmas within the ranks as unvaccinated members retire or await Pentagon decisions on religious and medical exemptions.

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Iowa Guard units likely going to Poland, in support of NATO - Radio Iowa

NATO membership in the near future is not possible for Georgia and Ukraine, and the alternative arming Ukraine is a tricky issue, ECFR expert Kadri Liik told EURACTIV in an interview.

Kadri Liik is a senior policy fellow with the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR).

In your view, what are the consequences of the current crisis, initiated by Moscow, especially for those you Eastern European states that are aspiring to join NATO, like Ukraine and Georgia?

I think it has been widely realised that NATO membership in the near future is not possible for Georgia and Ukraine. The process has been de facto frozen ever since the [Russo-Georgian] war in 2008. Now, Moscow wants to formalise it. Their demand is that Ukraine must never ever become a member of NATO. I do not see how the West can agree to that, to spelling it out like this. That said, I think de facto the issue is not in the agenda, and is unlikely to return to the agenda until there are changes in the strategic environment. So for a long time.

To clarify, in your reading, de facto nothing changes with the current situation?

Things can change. Right now, as I understand it, the US is offering Russians some talks on arms control and exercises. They hope this will help to handle the Ukrainian issue so that it satisfies Moscow. You can avoid institutional questions by discussing military posture, that is possible. However, we are not sure if that is enough for President Putin, because his diplomats have made it very clear that Russia wants formal and binding guarantees. So there always remains an option that when Moscow is not satisfied with what they can get via diplomatic means, they will try military means. I, for one, dont think that Moscow will launch an all out land war against Ukraine, despite the troops being seemingly assembled for exactly that. I just dont see it. I mean, that would be hugely unpopular among Russian society. And so unpopular that I think even Putins would have to fear the consequences. But I dont exclude at all a more limited military action. And not necessarily even now, that option will be in Moscows back pocket also ever after. They can demobilise the troops if it seems that visible mobilisation has fulfilled its task of kickstarting diplomatic talks, but the option for something quick, fast and ugly, be it airstrike, be it [something else], that will still remain.

Youve mentioned that you dont see any movement on the institutional questions such as membership until there is change strategic environment. What kind of changes are thinking of here?

That is sort of futuristic talk. I dont see the landscape changing into anything more benign. In a benign environment, where Russia and the West are like minded, it would lose importance who is a NATO member and who is not. But we are moving away from such environment. We never had it properly, Moscow was always uneasy with enlargement, but at the turn of the century you could still claim that if NATO is not your enemy, why do your mind if the Baltic states join, and that argument worked. But now, you cannot really because if NATO thinks that Russia threatens NATO, and it automatically vice versa, as well. Defence planners, they dont look at intent, they look at capabilities. I dont think the environment can get so benign that membership would become possible. And Im not a great believer in the scenario of Georgia and Ukraine being integrated hastily amidst a crisis. I dont think the West would embark on that either.

A much softer version of this integration outside of NATO is the defence and technical assistance of the European Union. The latest draft of the EUs strategic compass seems to put forward a much stronger support for Eastern partners. Do you think this is enough to bother Russia the same way institutional questions on NATO membership do? Or this is all soft assistance enough for Moscow not to take notice?

I dont think its decisive. I think what Moscow is after is formal guarantees that Ukraine not become a NATO member. Russia is always so much more powerful that these things would not be decisive. Although it depends, of course. There is some equipment that is more sensitive than other equipment. And arming Ukraine, thats happening also by the United States. It is a tricky question in the sense that of course, if you expect Ukraine to be a victim of an attack you want to offer your support and arm them. And that is good, right and fine as long as Russia also sees it as that. When Russia starts seeing arming Ukraine as a means to an end that has to do with Russia, arming Ukraine so that they can be hostile to Russia, then that could inspire Russia to lash back somewhere else. I hope that the rationale behind our support to Ukraine is also correctly understood in Moscow.

My last question is more specific to Georgia. Where does Georgia fit into all of this? Does the current situation affect Georgia at all? And if not, do you think that the status quo there with Abkhazia and South Ossetia is going to move?

Of course, if there is talk about formal agreements then that would apply to Georgia as well. But, Georgia is a lot less sensitive for Moscow, I think. Ukraine is the real burning issue and Belarus would be if NATO membership for Belarus would ever be in the agenda, which it is not. I think Georgia is one step further from Moscow and also historical links are not the same. Its a different degree of sensitivity. I dont think that should Russia launch military action that would inevitably spill over into Georgian territory. Although, of course, if Russia goes to war with Ukraine, that would inevitably escalate at least tensions in many corners of the world. Because then Eastern NATO members start demanding fortifications, and then Russians look at these and start planning their own military preparedness and so forth. It will result in some escalation but not necessarily utterly dramatic on the Georgian territory. The biggest danger to Georgia right now is their own messy domestic politics.

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Expert: NATO membership is not an option and arming Ukraine is a tricky issue - EURACTIV

In the past two months, Vladimir Putin has ramped up the pressure in Europe in a bid to force the U.S. and its allies back to the negotiating table. Russia has staged 100,000 troops along the border with Ukraine, threatening to unleash new aggression against Ukraine unless Russian demands are met. Belarus, Russias ally, continues to pressure Eastern European nations through hybrid attacks that include the weaponization of migrant flows. In the Balkans, Russia continues to foment separatism and unrest, while closer to home it has unleashed its position as energy kingmaker in Europe to divide the continent.

The U.S. would have been wise not to walk willingly into an obvious trapREF and to eschew top-level meetings with Russia until the Putin regime met certain preconditions.REF Regardless, this week, the U.S. will meet with Russia in several high-level formats following an opening round of bilateral talks in Geneva, which took place on Monday. The U.S. will also take part in a meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)Russia Council on Wednesday, and a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (of which both Russia and the U.S. are participating states) on Thursday.

Russia has entered the talks wielding a list of demands, rather than approaching with a series of positions to be negotiated in good faith. Russia is offering no concessions aside from presumably worthless promises to de-escalate tensions in Ukraine, which have been manufactured for the express purpose of forcing the West back to the negotiating table. The U.S. and its allies cannot and must not negotiate with Russia at the point of a gun. The U.S. must approach future discussions with Russia from a position of strength, following seven rules for exiting the current flurry of discussions with minimum damage.

The Biden Administration has sent all the wrong signals since day one. After Russias May 2021 hack of the Colonial Pipeline in the U.S., which temporarily knocked a major thoroughfare for gasoline and jet fuel in the Eastern and Southern U.S. offline, President Joe Biden assured the public of an aggressive response, yet none has been publicly verified.REF After unilaterally capitulating on the Russian Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, the Biden Administration engineered the humiliating and disorderly retreat from Afghanistan. Then, throughout the summer and fall, it sent a steady stream of envoys to Moscow, signaling a near-desperate desire for accommodation.

Putin, who views President Biden as fundamentally weak, is seeking to seize a window of opportunity to force concessions from the West. Many U.S. allies who have been deeply dismayed by U.S. leadership under President Biden, particularly the lack of consultations about the Afghan withdrawal (to say nothing of the botched withdrawal itself), are worried. Recent reportsREF that the Biden Administration is considering offering Russia reduced exercises and troop deployments to Eastern Europe, while quickly denied by the Administration, has many allies worried about upcoming talks. Countries in Eastern Europe well remember being stabbed in the back by the Obama Administration over a decade ago in regard to ballistic missile defense deployments.

To bolster its demands for concessions, Russia likes to rely on a few crucial myths, among them that the U.S. gave verbal assurances to Russia on limits to NATO expansion, that the 1997 NATO Russia Founding Act prohibits the establishment of permanent military bases in former Warsaw Pact countries that are now NATO members, and that NATO has encircled Russia.

On the issue of basing troops in former Warsaw Pact countries, the 1997 agreement states:

When reading the phrase in the current and foreseeable security environment, it is important to remember that Russia and NATO agreed to this act 25 years ago. Moscows commitment to Euro-Atlantic security has changed since the days of goodwill in 1997, and Putin has chosen a path for Russia that is different from the one chosen by his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. This alone justifies permanently basing NATO troops in Central and Eastern Europe.

Regarding the Russian myth of encirclement, NATO notes that

Putin is also fond of painting the U.S. forces as menacingly threatening Russia, however, in reality, the paltry number of U.S. forces permanently based in nations bordering Russia (and invited their by allies) are far fewer than the number of Russian forces permanently based outside Russian borders on NATOs perimeter (and in the cases of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine there via occupation not invitation).

Time may be on the side of the U.S. and its allies: Russia cannot, for domestic financial and political reasons, maintain its massive buildup near Ukraine indefinitely; nor can it ignore that in a few weeks, winter will recede in Ukraine (thus making defense easier), that Ukrainian forces continue to field new systems that will make further incursion more costly, or that its intervention in Kazakhstan has changed some of the geopolitical calculus.

Having agreed to talks with Russia, the U.S. and its allies must exit them with as little damage as possible, then set about the task of further bolstering NATOs collective defense and Ukraines ability to defend itself. Therefore, in this weeks talks, the Biden Administration should adhere to the following seven rules. The U.S. must:

1. Not offer to close NATOs door, even halfway.The key concession that Putin demands is an assurance that additional nations, especially Ukraine, will never be allowed to join NATO. The U.S. and its allies must send a clear message that NATOs open-door policy remains firmly in place for those countries that meet the criteria set out in Article 10 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. While the Administration may be tempted to offer up a moratorium on new membership in exchange for de-escalation (especially for nations that are far from ready to join), such guarantees are not only wrong in principle, but Russia would also pressure the Alliance to extend such a moratorium in perpetuity, thereby receiving a de facto veto on enlargement.

2. Not sacrifice invaluable training exercises with European partners. Russias list of demands includes proposals for the withdrawal of areas of operational exercises at an agreed distance from the Russia NATO contact line alongside complaints about U.S. and allied exercises in the Black Sea. Americas greatest asset is its network of alliances, and the grease that keeps those alliances humming from a military standpoint are regular training exercises, which help allies to develop cohesiveness and joint operational awareness, while stress testing command and control, new capabilities, and tactics.

3. Not allow Russia to dictate when, where, and with whom the U.S. exercises. Russia cannot be allowed to dictate the terms of U.S. interactions with its allies, including Ukraine. NATO-led training exercises in western Ukraine have helped to create a professional and capable Ukrainian military, which is why Russia wants them stopped. However, continuing them is in NATOs long-term interest.

4. Not negotiate Ukraines right to self-defense. Ukraine, which Russia invaded, has a right to self-defense. As authorized by successive National Defense Authorization Acts, the U.S. should appropriate funds to increase its assistance to the Ukrainian military, including more anti-armor weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, and small arms with fewer, or more flexible, restrictions. As the right to self-defense does not stop at the shoreline, the U.S. should seek ways to support the development and capabilities of the Ukrainian navy.

5. Not pull U.S. troops from Europe. U.S. troops remain in Europe first and foremost because it is in U.S. national security interests. The presence of U.S. forces in Europe contributes to the collective defense of U.S. allies on the continent serving as the rock on which the Alliance has been built. Basing forces in Europe offers a plethora of benefits, including broader and swifter options for U.S. policymakers. Any agreement to draw down U.S. forces would signal extreme weakness, undermine NATOs Article 5 guarantee, and confirm to Putin that he would be free to establish a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe without fear of U.S. reprisal.

6. Not concede U.S. and NATO presence in Allied Eastern European countries. Another key concession demanded by Russia is the withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops and weapons systems from any NATO member that joined the Alliance after 1997.REF The U.S. and NATO should reject Russias demands, which would affect nearly half the Alliance members,REF outright. Far from abandoning its Eastern European allies, the U.S. should establish a permanent military presence in Eastern Europe.

7. Not agree to vague promises, which the U.S. may regret in the future. While it may be tempting to concede to a Russian demand that is not immediately relevant, whether NATO membership for nowhere-near-ready countries, limits on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and intermediate-range systems in Europe, or even U.S. support for civil society in Russia and neighboring nations, guarantees made in haste may come back to haunt the U.S. in the decades to come. The world today looks much different than it did 25 years ago at the signing of the NATO Russia Founding Act, and it will surely look much different in 2047. Tying the hands of future U.S. policymakers for immediate expediency would be foolish.

With domestic problems mounting for President Biden, his Administration has shown a willingness to put foreign policy crises in the rearview mirror as quickly as possible, with little regard for the consequences. The debacle in Afghanistan is a tragic example. President Biden needs to resist the temptation to offer concessions to Russia to end the crisis in Ukraine. President Putin cannot be trusted and, as long as he remains in power, Russia cannot be a credible partner for the transatlantic community. Now is the time for U.S. leadership and strengthnot for weakness and meekness.

Daniel Kochis is Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. Luke Coffey is Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy, of the Davis Institute.

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Seven Rules for Exiting Misplaced U.S. and NATO Talks with Russia - Heritage.org

With the aim to train reinforcement of northern Norway, Cold Response will be the largest NATO exercise inside the Arctic Circle since the 1980s. Some 35,000 soldiers from 28 nations will participate and a significant portion of the training that kicks off in March will be at sea and in the air.

Preparationfor the long-time planned exercise is already well underway and is not directly linked to the current standoff between NATO and Moscow over Russias massive military buildup of troops at Ukraines border. However, a conflict in eastern Europe could spill over to the Arctic as the Kola Peninsula is home to some of Russias most powerful weapon systems, including hypersonic cruise missiles and the naval component of the strategic nuclear triad.

On December 24, President Vladimir Putin said his military forces successfully fired a simultaneous salvo of the Tsirkon hypersonic missile. The weapon is now ready for deployment with the Northern Fleet on both frigates and the 4th generation multi-purpose submarines of the Yasen-class.

Launched from the Russian sector of the Barents Sea, the Tsirkon missiles could reach targets in the Norwegian Sea in about 10 to 15 minutes if Moscow in a war conflict chose to activate its Bastion defense concept aimed at denying NATO forces control of the Norwegian and Greenland seas.

Russian military observers posit that Tsirkon, with ability to maneuver mid-flight, easilycan bypass any US or British carrier groups surface-to-air self-protection systems.

On January 11, the United Kingdoms Royal Navy announced that its newest aircraft carrier, the HMS Prince of Wales, will sail to the Arctic to lead naval involvement in the large-scale Norwegian-led exercise Cold Response.

NATO is the cornerstone of the UK defence and our commitment to the alliance is absolute and it is a privilege to be the UK Maritime Component Commander moving into our vital role this year, said Rear Admiral Mike Utley, Commander UK Strike Force.

The Royal Navy is global, modern, ready and well placed to support NATO in all its endeavours, Utley said.

For the next 12 months, the HMS Prince of Wales is responsible for leading NATOs Maritime High Readiness Force, a task group formed to deal with major global events.

The brand new aircraft carrier is the second in the Queen Elizabeth-class and can operate an air wing of 24 to 36 F-35 fighter jets and 14 helicopters, including the Apache that Britains Armed Forces first time started to train with from Bardufoss air station in Arctic Norway in 2019.

Cold Response 2022 (CR22) kicks off in the second half of March and will continue to the beginning of April.

First intended to sail through the Suez into the Gulf, the American carrier group USS Harry S Truman has due to Russias military threat to Ukraine been held in the Eastern Mediterranean. Norways frigate Fridtjof Nansen is part of the carrier group.

Norways Minister of Defense, Odd Roger Enoksen, said in an interview with newspaper VG this week that the American carrier group and the Norwegian frigate in February will sail to the North Atlantic where the plan is to take part in the NATO exercise Cold Response 2022.

During NATOs Trident Juncture exercise in 2018, the US aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Trumansailed north of the Arctic Circle in the Norwegian Sea for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The carrier stayed in the waters around Lofoten archipelago.

USS Harry S Truman (CVN-75) is of the Nimitz-class and can bring 90 fighter jets and helicopters. The ship is powered by two nuclear reactors.

According to the latest update from the Norwegian Armed Forces, Exercise Cold Response will consist of 14,000 soldiers on land, 13,000 at sea and 8,000 serving aircraft and headquarters at different bases.

In times of growing distrust between Russia and Europe, Norway seeks to build its security in partnership with NATO allies and Nordic neighbors.

The main action during Cold Response 2022 will be by navy and air force capacities in the Ofoten area.

The region is near to the Armys northern brigade and training areas where U.S., British and Dutch soldiers frequently drill Arctic warfare. This week, the first British soldiers arrived at Bardufoss air station, preparing for the winter exercise.

Ofotenis also home to Evenes airport where Norways new fleet of P8 Poseidon maritime surveillance planes will be based together with NATOs two northernmost Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) F-35s fighter jets on standby to meet Russian military planes flying near Norwegian air space. For NATO and the Nordic countries defense partnership, Ofoten is core strategic important in case of a larger global conflict involving Russia in the North-Atlantic.

The area is about 600 kilometers fromthe Kola Peninsula where the Northern Fleets nuclear submarines are based.

Head of the Norwegian Armed Forces, General Eirik Kristoffersen, said tothe Barents Observer last year that Russia is informed about the exercise in accordance with international standards and agreements.

Under theVienna Document, member states in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) invite each other to observe military exercises.

Russia will be invited to observe Cold Response 2022, Kristoffersen said.

Following Moscows annexation of Crimea in 2014, Oslo, like most other NATO members, cut defense ties with Russia. The Norwegians, though, maintain a hotline from the military Headquarters near Bod to the Northern Fleet Headquarters in Severomorsk.

On Thursday, the OSCEs Permanent Council met in Vienna aimed at defusing tensions on Russias border to Ukraine and other security-related matters in Europe. The meeting is the third in a row this week where the escalating military troubles are up for discussion. First, Russia and the US held bilateral talks and on Wednesday, a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council took place.

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Two NATO carrier groups will sail north for exercise Cold Response - The Independent Barents Observer

None of this means Russia has the right to dominate Ukraine. If Americas regional bullying is wrong, Moscows cruder version which currently consists of troops massed on Ukraines border is even worse. But the problem with the Biden administrations willful navet about U.S. policy toward Latin America is that it fosters a willful navet about the way international politics actually works.

Of course, Ukraine has the right to forge an independent foreign policy. But foreign policy isnt an exercise in abstract morality; it involves questions of power. And the United States and its European allies lack the power to deny Russia a say over Ukraines future because they are not willing to send their sons and daughters to fight there. Implicitly, the Biden administration has already conceded that: NATO has no plans to admit Ukraine anytime soon because doing so would commit the United States and Europe to Ukraines defense. And theres no chance the United States and Europe will make that commitment if it could mean fighting Russian troops.

So long as Moscow is ready to threaten war, it can keep Ukraine out of NATO. The Biden administration just doesnt want to admit that publicly, for fear of demoralizing the Ukrainian government and encouraging Mr. Putin to make even greater threats. As Thomas Graham and Rajan Menon have suggested, the best solution may be artful diplomatic language that allows Moscow to claim it has blocked Ukraine from entering NATO and the United States and Ukraine to insist that it could still join in some distant, theoretical, future.

Americas highest priorities should be preventing a wider war and ensuring that Ukraine remains a free society at home. A deal that tacitly acknowledges Russias veto over Ukraines military alliances is worth swallowing in order to achieve that, since in practice, Russia already wields that veto. Its far better than a full-scale Russian invasion, which would expose the limits of Americas commitment to Ukraine and turn the entire country into a battlefield.

But this kind of compromise, which acknowledges the brute facts of geopolitical power, is harder when officials in Washington pretend that only tyrants like Mr. Putin expect a say over the behavior of their weaker neighbors. The United States must stop lying to itself. The more willing the Biden administration is to admit that it, too, expects a sphere of influence in its corner of the globe, the better able it will be to ensure that Russias sphere of influence doesnt destroy Ukraine or plunge Europe into war.

Peter Beinart (@PeterBeinart) is a professor of journalism and political science at the Newmark School of Journalism at the City University of New York. He is also an editor at large of Jewish Currents and writes The Beinart Notebook, a weekly newsletter.

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Opinion | On Russia, NATO and Ukraine, the U.S. Must Stop Lying to Itself - The New York Times

While HMS Queen Elizabeth may be the flagship of the Royal Navy, her sister ship HMS Prince of Wales has assumed command of the NATO Response Force from the French Marine Nationale as of January 1. HMS Prince of Wales will be the flagship of the alliance's maritime task force, which will take the vessel to Arctic, Baltic, and Mediterranean waters over the next year.

On Tuesday, the NATO flag was transferred to HMS Prince of Wales during an official ceremony on the 65,000-tonne aircraft carrier. The warship departed from Portsmouth on Wednesday morning to begin her 12-month journey as the command platform for Rear Admiral Mike Utley, the leader of the NATO task group. She will spend 200 days at sea while operating globally with NATO allies and other partner nations. It will be the first mission for HMS Prince of Wales since the 3.2 billion vessel entered service in late 2019.

Despite the early morning departure, many gathered at the best lookout points in Portsmouth to wave the warship off.

A Fresh Start

This new command for the warship comes just a year after the vessel experienced significant flooding that caused damage to her electrical cabling. Following repairs last spring, Prince of Wales began sea trials in April. In October 2021, the Royal Navy declared the aircraft carrier fully operational after she successfully took part in an international exercise off the Scottish coast. The vessel was joined by her sister vessel HMS Queen Elizabeth, which had recently completed her maiden deployment to the Far East.

The ship has proven to be more than ready to take on the flagship role of the NATO Response Force, a coalition that was formed to address major global incidents.

"We have got our orders loud and clearwe've got to be ready to respond and we will be," Prince of Wales' Captain Steve Higham told The News on Wednesday. "The great advantage for us is that we will be working with partners and allies from across the NATO alliance and that strength in depth is what gives us the real edge. This is the start of HMS Prince of Wales's fifty-year life. And to start right at the heart of NATO, as the NATO flagship, is really important."

The Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier currently carries both Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II stealth multirole fighters and Merlin helicopters for airborne early warning and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).

"NATO is the cornerstone of the UK defense and our commitment to the alliance is absolute, and it is a privilege to be the UK Maritime Component Commander moving into our vital role this year," said Rear Adm. Utley. "The Royal Navy is global, modern, ready and well-placed to support NATO in all its endeavors."

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Reuters.

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The HMS Prince of Wales is NATO's Newest Aircraft Carrier - The National Interest

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on Friday warned that Moscow is running out of patience with the West as Russia continues to levy demands that the US and NATO have dismissed as non-starters.

"We have run out of patience," Lavrov said at a news conference, per the Associated Press. "The West has been driven by hubris and has exacerbated tensions in violation of its obligations and common sense."

Lavrov insisted that the US and its allies respond to Russia's demands in writing next week. "They must understand that the key to everything is the guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward," Lavrov said, alluding to Russia's demand that NATO never accept Ukraine and Georgia as members. Both the US and NATO have repeatedly made clear that the alliance's open-door policy is non-negotiable, but Russia has not backed down.

Russia has gathered tens of thousands of troops along Ukraine's border in recent weeks. The Kremlin claims it has no plans to invade, but European leaders have expressed serious concerns that a new war is on the horizon. Russia invaded and annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, and has since supported separatists in a war against Ukrainian forces in the eastern Donbass region.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said that Russia effectively has a "gun pointed at Ukraine's head." But Russian President Vladimir Putin has painted NATO as the antagonist, ignoring the fact that his aggressive actions in the region over the past decade or so have fostered the present tensions.

Diplomatic talks in Europe between Russia and Western powers this week did not lead to any major breakthroughs, and there are growing concerns that Moscow will use the largely fruitless discussions as a pretext for war."We're facing a crisis in European security. The drumbeat of war is sounding loud, and the rhetoric has gotten rather shrill," Michael Carpenter, the US ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, said at a press briefing Thursday.

The US has warned Russia that it will face massive economic consequences if it invades Ukraine, including potential sanctions aimed directly at Putin. The Kremlin on Thursday warned that slapping sanctions on Putin would lead to a complete rupture in US-Russia relations.

Sen. Chris Murphy of Connecticut, an influential Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on Thursday told Insider that sanctioning Putin would be a necessary step in the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

"Russia should be treated as a pariah state if it chooses to march an army into a neighboring nation," Murphy said. "I think Putin's getting nervous. I think he's seeing the world aligning against him ... And he's starting to make threats with the intent of trying to scare the rest of the world into changing behavior."

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Russia warns it's 'run out of patience' with the West amid fears of Ukraine invasion - Business Insider

The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) has no records on the Royal Navys submarines being stationed at the site of the Russian submarine Kursk sinking in the Barents Sea in August 2000, the UK Navy Command Secretariat told RIA Novosti.

In November, retired Adm. Vyacheslav Popov, Russian Northern Fleet commander in 19992001, told Sputnik that the Kursk sank as a result of a collision with a NATO submarine that approached it too closely.

The US navy nuclear submarines Memphis and Toledo as well as the British navy Splendid reportedly were in the area of Russias naval drills in August 2000. The Russian Defense Ministry filed a query to the US and UK defense, requesting the submarines inspection, which was denied saying that all the submarines were operational.

Recently, RIA Novosti issued a request to the UK Navy Command seeking the confirmation of a British submarines presence in the vicinity of the Kursk disaster.

In response to the part of your request seeking confirmation that the Russian Defense Ministry requested for the UK MOD to inspect its nuclear submarines after the Kursk disaster, I can confirm that the MOD holds no record of any request for the UK to inspect its nuclear submarines, the British Naval Command Secretariat said in a written reply.

Furthermore, the British Parliament archive dated November 14, 2000, indicates that following the Kursk incident, then Minister of State for Europe Keith Vaz said that State Secretary for Defense Geoff Hoon had already assured the Russian Defense Minister that there were no British submarines in the Kursk wreckage area.

The Secretary of State made no representations to Russia in respect of claims that a British submarine was involved in the Kursk disaster. The Secretary of State for Defence, who led on this issue, has already assured the Russian Defence Minister, that there were no Royal Navy submarines in the area at the time the Kursk sank, the parliamentary records read.

The Kursk sank on August 12, 2000 during the naval exercises in the Barents Sea, with all 118 crew members found dead in the accident. The officially-recognized cause of the tragedy was a torpedo explosion.

The Kursk submarine sank at a depth of 108 meters (354 feet) on August 12, 2000, during an exercise. According to the investigation teams report, the submarine was hit by two explosions. The first was caused by a leak of hydrogen peroxide fuel inside the fourth torpedo launcher. It caused heavy fire and a further blast of the ammunition.

The pain that was 20 years ago, burning and absorbing, has certainly changed. We have learned to live with it. We have more bright memories of people who lived and perished and are proud of them. Well, children and grandchildren give strength. It is a pity that they will not see their grandchildren, one of the female relatives told reporters during its anniversary in 2020.

The Kursk tragedy became one of the deadliest submarine accidents in the worlds history, second only to the loss of USS Thresher in 1963, which left 129 people dead. The accident is widely believed to have been caused by the overall poor state of the Russian armed forces at the time.

The tragedy also triggered a serious overhaul of the Russian Navys emergency rescue service. At that time, the country lacked any capabilities to rescue the crew at such a depth and finally had to request international assistance. It was nine days after the disaster that Norwegian divers managed to open the submarines airlock to see all the seamen dead.

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Worlds Second Deadliest Nuclear Submarine Accident Not Caused By Collision With NATO Subs UK To Russia - EurAsian Times