Category Archives: NATO

File photo of an F-15C Eagle assigned to the 493rd Fighter Squadron launching for a sortie at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, Dec. 18, 2018. (U.S. Air Force photo by Madeline Herzog)

According to a NATO Allied Air Command press release, US fighter jets are about to start their stay at the ask Air Base in central Poland to enhance the NATOs collective defence posture and support the NATO Air Policing mission.

In particular, the U.S. Air Force would deploy its 48th Fighter Wings F-15C and F-15D jets, normally stationed at RAF Lakenheath in the UK; the Eagles are scheduled to join the Polish and Danish assets working in the region deployed to Siauliai in Lithuania, within the framework of NATOs BAP (Baltic Air Policing) mission. The reinforcement is said to boost readiness, deterrence, and defensive capabilities of the alliance, amidst the Russian military buildup around Ukraine.

Along with the routine sorties flown to support the NATO Air Policing, the deployment is to involve thorough work with other allies stationed in the region.

The deployment of U.S. F-15s to Poland elevates the collective defense capabilities on NATOs Eastern flank and the enhanced Air Policing mission, said General Jeff Harrigian, Commander Allied Air Command and Commander U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa. The commitment of U.S. aircraft and Airmen demonstrates the solidarity of the Alliance, as we continue to work together in unity to execute our defensive mission.

As usual, in case of the eAP (enhanced Air Policing) initiative, the US jets would be coordinated by the CAOC UE (Combined Air Operations Center in Ueden, Germany). This body is responsible for directing, tasking, and coordinating the assets deployed to Northern Europe, in peacetime, crisis, and conflict, as the NATOs release specifies. In essence, the fact that the jets remain at different locations does not necessarily mean that they are separately commanded, as CAOC views the eAP as one, big operation. CAOCs staff is multinational and remains in touch with Control and Reporting Centres, National Air Policing Centres and dedicated Quick Reaction Alert bases routinely to execute NATOs Air Policing mission.

Enhanced Air Policing is one of the tools that has been implemented as a part of the Assurance Measures promoting the regional stability. Even though Baltic Air Policing has so far been associated mainly with the Siauliai AB in Lithuania, NATO currently has numerous assets stationed in multiple locations, boosting the deterrence and air potential in the area. Not only have the jets been stationed in Lithuania (Polish Air Force, Royal Danish Air Force), as currently they also remain on location in Iceland (currently Portuguese Air Force), Estonia (Belgian Air Component, USAF), Poland (USAF) and Romania (Italian and German Air Force).

Anyway, F-15s of the 48th FW have already deployed to Poland operating within theframework of an Agile Combat Employment exercise. For instance, in April 2021, 20x F-15s (both E and C models from RAF Lakenheath, UK) and 4x F-16s (assigned to the 480th Fighter Squadron, 52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany) deployed to ask (EPLK) and Krzesiny (EPKS) airbases for Aviation Detachment Rotation (AvRot) 21-2.

By the way, as we write this article, U.S. B-52s from Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, are deploying to RAF Fairford, UK, as part of a Bomber Task Force rotation..

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U.S. F-15s Deploy to Poland To Boost Defensive Capabilities On NATO's Eastern Flank - The Aviationist

It is unusual for Finlands defense policy to attract much international attention. But this is turning out to be an unusual year. As Russia surrounds Ukraine with military forces, media outlets and pundits across the transatlantic space and elsewhere have been speculating about whether Finland is considering joining NATO. Even President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken have aired the possibility of Finland joining the alliance. Is Finland on the verge of making such a strategic shift? Probably not.

As opposed to the vivid international speculation, Finnish leaders have emphasized the continuity of the countrys current policy. Rejecting Russias recent demands to stop the further enlargement of NATO, Finnish President Sauli Niinist pointedly said in a speech to mark the new year that Finland, if it so chooses, could apply for NATO membership. Some commentators took this to mean that Finland would seek to join NATO should Russia invade Ukraine, coming as it did on the heels of a similar statement by the president weeks before. But these voices ignore that in the same speech Niinist also said that Finlands foreign and security policy line remains stable.

Finland has already de facto aligned its defense policy with NATO, having taken on more strategic importance since Russias 2014 assault on Ukraine. In fact, despite its non-allied status, Finland is already an integral security player in Northern Europe, with capabilities that contribute to Western deterrence efforts in the region. Observers of European security would benefit from a deeper understanding of Finlands role in Northern European security, the underpinnings of Finnish defense policy, and the significance of NATO to Finland and vice versa.

The Integral Role of Finland in Northern European Security

Finland, with its 830-mile border with Russia, straddles the Baltic Sea region and the High North right on Russias doorstep. Since Russias illegal seizure of Crimea and the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the Baltic Sea region is routinely spoken of as a NATO-Russia flashpoint. The strategic importance of the European Arctic has also grown significantly in recent years.

These developments in European security have bolstered Finlands significance. Its geographic position and the strength of its armed forces make it an essential player when considering a conflict with Russia. At a minimum, Finlands ability to defend its own territory would help NATO, and especially the United States, to carry out its collective defense mission in Northern Europe.

Unlike most European countries, when the Cold War ended Finland decided to maintain a sizeable army. The wartime strength of the Finnish Defense Forces is 280,000 personnel a striking contrast to its 23,000-personnel peacetime posture. Moreover, Finland has one of the largest and best-equipped artillery forces in Europe, with 1,500 artillery pieces and precision-strike capabilities. In December 2021, Finland decided to replace its F/A-18 fleet with 64 F-35s, which, when operational, will significantly enhance Finlands defense capability. The fact that the United States has been willing to sell the country sophisticated weaponry is seen as a signal that a capable Finland serves American security interests in Northern Europe.

While Finland is not a member of any alliance, its security policy is rooted in the understanding that it cannot isolate itself from a European conflict. Finlands main and minimal contribution to allied efforts would be the protection of southern Finland from a Russian incursion, thereby denying Moscow the use of Finnish territory or airspace to operate against its Baltic neighbors. But Finland could do more. In wartime, certain NATO allies would likely seek to use Finlands airspace to defend the Baltic countries a request that would be hard to deny given Finlands dependence on the West. Finland is reliant on the flow of trade and supplies from the West across the Baltic Sea, and would need its partners assistance in a conflict to keep these crucial lines of communication open and, if necessary, to find alternative routes through Sweden or Norway.

In the European Arctic, Finland offers NATO a buffer zone defending the northern coast of Norway a reality that Finnish defense planners readily admit. The control of northern Norway is critical to the alliance in order to guard the Norwegian Sea and passage to the northern Atlantic, which are in turn critical to Americas ability to reinforce the European theater. In a war, Russia could try to gain control of northern Norway and use it as a spring board to disrupt the flow of U.S. reinforcements to Europe. Thus, from NATOs point of view, Finlands determination to defend its territory is linked to the defense of the North Atlantic.

Understanding Finlands Alignment with NATO

Before 2014, Finnish cooperation with NATO was primarily concerned with crisis management. But Russias attack on Ukraine in 2014 changed things. Finland intensified military cooperation with Sweden and several NATO allies to encompass territorial defense and regional security. The above-mentioned security dynamics in Northern Europe rendered Finland an interesting partner from the perspective of several NATO allies, who, after years of soul searching, were returning to the alliances traditional core task: collective defense.

Finland now boasts deeper defense relationships with Sweden and Norway, as well as with the United States and the rest of NATO. Geography and shared threats make Sweden and Norway natural partners for Finland, and the United States is an indispensable partner in terms of potential wartime reinforcements. The Enhanced Opportunities Partnership with NATO also grants Finland access to the alliances demanding exercises, developing Finlands interoperability with allied forces.

Although the scope of these defense partnerships varies, Finlands defense cooperation policy has explicit aims, which were most recently outlined in the governments 2021 defense report. This document highlights that defense cooperation, inter alia, raises the threshold against aggression and creates prerequisites for providing and receiving political and military assistance. The report also clearly indicates that Finnish peacetime cooperation creates a basis for collaboration during emergency conditions.

Finnish policymakers have clarified the principles of this defense cooperation policy by highlighting the likely importance of ad hoc coalitions in a European conflict and the decisive role of shared interests in operational cooperation. In 2017, Niinist pointed out that in case conflict breaks out, coalitions can take shape without treaty applications. The following year, the then defense minister stated in a speech that Finland hopes that its strong defense forces make it an interesting partner who others want to cooperate with, and that Finlands readiness to defend itself benefits its partners. That said, Finnish decision-makers understand that NATO has no formal commitment to assist Finland in the event of a conflict. Given its extensive military cooperation and the willingness to prepare for operational collaboration in wartime, Finlands policy cannot be called neutrality or military non-alignment. But Finland is not allied either. How could its status be portrayed, then?

In one of the classics of international relations alliance literature, Glenn Snyder distinguishes an alignment from an alliance. An alignment, he argues, occur when a group of friendly states, based on mutual interest and threat perceptions, coalesce to prevent and, if necessary, to counter aggression from a shared adversary. Alliances, per Snyder, are merely formalizations of existing alignments. Finland is aligned but not allied with NATO. Finland and most NATO allies share a potential adversary Russia and the aim of their respective policies is to deter Russian aggression in Europe. Finnish policymakers increasingly see effective Western deterrence as the best way to ensure that Finland never ends up being a party to a military conflict. Moreover, and importantly, Finland and its partners are developing prerequisites for conducting joint operations in wartime. Due to decades-long efforts, Finlands interoperability with the United States, for example, is high, and the two countries currently aim to achieve genuine day-zero interoperability for operations in Northern Europe.

Deep cooperation notwithstanding, Finland has not formalized its alignment by joining NATO. This has ramifications for Finlands position. The deterrent effect of a formalized treaty is stronger than the impact of alignment. Moreover, Finland is not under the American nuclear umbrella, making it, at least in theory, more susceptible to nuclear coercion. Lastly, Finnish-NATO/American interoperability is not yet seamless, but different measures, such as more regular table-top exercises, have been envisioned to help close the gap.

NATO Is Still an Option

This all invites the question: If Finland has already aligned its defense policy with the transatlantic alliance, why is it not making things simpler and just applying for NATO membership? There are at least three reasons why Finlands unorthodox security arrangement is likely to endure.

First, Finnish public opinion remains against NATO membership. Things may be changing, though. Opposition to membership has steadily declined for several years, although the opponents still retain the upper hand in public surveys. Interestingly, a recent poll showed that although most Finns are hesitant to join NATO now, they could support joining the alliance in the future. However, only two out of 10 parties in the Finnish parliament one large, the other small currently support NATO membership, and there is no real pressure from the public to change Finlands course. Moreover, Finland is a consensus-seeking society, and strategic shifts such as joining a military alliance are not likely to take place without broad political support.

Secondly, the Finnish leadership sees the countrys current status as a useful tool for maintaining the delicate regional status quo and preventing escalation in Northern Europe. Since 2014, NATO allies and Finland have found a functional, non-escalatory way to intensify cooperation. Preserving regional stability has been a lodestar of Finlands foreign policy for decades, and Finnish politicians are hesitant to rock the boat. Moscows approach to NATO is currently outright hostile, and a decision to seek NATO membership could lead to Russian coercive countermeasures against Finland, potentially destabilizing the whole Baltic Sea region.

Moscows precise response to a Finnish NATO bid is hard to predict. It would likely use many means simultaneously, ranging from coercive diplomacy to economic pressure, such as harassing or restricting Finnish companies operating in Russia or banning certain Finnish goods. Retaliatory economic measures could be painful to the Finnish economy, as Russia is the fifth biggest destination for Finnish exports. Other measures could include the weaponization of migrant flows which Finland has already experienced. Cyber operations targeting Finlands critical infrastructure are also possible. The use of military force against Finland would nevertheless be highly unlikely. Rather, Russia would probably enhance its force posture in Finlands vicinity. Broader regional consequences could include military saber-rattling in and around the Baltic Sea something that the area witnessed in the immediate aftermath of the initial outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict.

Thirdly, there is a strong consensus in Finland on maintaining a functional relationship with Russia despite grave disagreements concerning European security. Finlands peculiar small-state realism has traditionally put a strong emphasis on reassuring Russia about Finlands friendly intentions. Moreover, regular interaction between Niinist and Russian President Vladimir Putin has given Finland a decent grasp of the Kremlins thinking, making it a useful interlocutor in the eyes of major players like the United States, Germany, and France. Furthermore, Russias force posture close to Finlands borders is limited, and Russia has not been as antagonistic with Finland as it has with Sweden and Norway. A Finnish bid for NATO membership would shake the foundations of its Russia policy, which is a genuine but not necessarily insurmountable concern for its policymakers.

Be that as it may, Finlands current policy is not set in stone. There are conceivable paths to NATO membership in the coming decade. A first avenue would be a Swedish decision to seek membership in the alliance. Swedens membership could jeopardize the future of deep bilateral defense cooperation, making Finlands position as the only non-allied Nordic-Baltic country politically untenable. Decision-makers in Helsinki and Stockholm know this, and seeking membership together would be the sensible course of action.

Secondly, persuasion from NATO, and particularly from the United States, for Finland to join the alliance could alter Helsinkis calculations. Hitherto, NATO allies have been agreeable to developing cooperation without treaty obligations. If this approach changed, or if there were a real risk of NATO closing its door for good, Finnish leaders could be ready to hand in the application. The instrumentalization of the option to join NATO is a crucial part of the Finnish security policy doctrine, and it is used as a soft deterrent against Russia like Niinist did in his new years speech. If NATO closed its door, Finland would see its options diminish.

Another possible path to getting Finland into NATO would be a change in Russias policy vis--vis Finland. Should Moscow take on a more aggressive posture, Helsinki might come to see joining the alliance as its best option. Russian leaders probably understand this, and it is likely the chief reason for their pragmatic policy towards Finland.

Ultimately, Finlands potential NATO membership boils down to a cool-headed cost-benefit analysis: Would the benefits of joining NATO outweigh the risks related to the danger of regional escalation and Russian countermeasures? From a purely defense policy point of view, NATO membership would be more credible than the status quo. It would not, however, be a silver bullet. Finns are asking legitimate questions about whether a diverse alliance can reach unanimity in a crisis or whether any NATO allies besides the United States have the capacity to reinforce Finland in a conflict. Furthermore, before making any choices Finland would have to be certain that its membership bid would enjoy unanimous backing among NATO members. The timing of the potential decision would also be of the essence in mitigating escalation risks. Presently, Western-Russian ties are extremely tense, and several allies could see NATOs enlargement closer to Russias borders as an unnecessary escalation. Indeed, the tenser the security situation gets, the more wary NATO members may be to accept new allies. This is something that stability-seeking Finnish leaders should be mindful of.

From the perspective of enhancing NATO deterrence in Europe, having Finland in the alliance would make strategic sense. Finlands membership would not bring substantial new burdens for the alliance. Its self-sufficient approach to defending its territory would likely continue, and Helsinki would take its alliance obligations, including that of assisting the Baltic States, seriously. But this would not be a big difference from what Finland is already doing. Even if it were to join NATO, the other members of the alliance would not necessarily expect Finland to provide significant reinforcements in a regional conflict. Rather, Finlands chief priority would continue to be the defense of its territory, to the benefit of its neighbors. On the other hand, if Finland and Sweden were to join NATO, this would allow the alliance to prepare operational plans for the whole Northern European strategic region. This fact should be kept in mind if the discussion on halting NATO enlargement gathers more steam in the United States and in the alliance more broadly.

Matti Pesu,Ph.D., is a senior research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. His research interests include Finnish foreign, security, and defense policy, Northern European security, and Euro-Atlantic security.

Image: U.S. Air Force (Photo by Airman 1st Class Viviam Chiu)

See original here:
As Finland Watches: From Alignment to Alliance? - War on the Rocks

An armed guard patrols near the temporary barbed-wire fencing set up at the Latvia-Belarus border. The European Union says Belarus is flying in thousands of people from the Middle East and pushing them to cross into EU and NATO members Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.Gints Ivuskans/The Globe and Mail

NATOs eastern flank at the Latvian-Belarus border is lined with new barbed-wire fencing that runs as far as the eye can see a stark symbol of the state of emergency Riga has declared for the 172-kilometre frontier.

Russias menacing of Ukraine has set off alarms in Eastern European countries that border Russia and close ally Belarus, a second territory where Moscow has been massing troops as fears of military action against Kyiv remain high.

Latvias border patrols and national guard say theyre ready for the worst-case scenario where a threat to the Baltics emerges from the chaos of war in Ukraine. It doesnt matter if it comes from Russia or Belarus or Kaliningrad. We are prepared for total defence, Colonel Gunars Vizulis with the Latvian National Guard said at a training camp for new recruits at Meza Mackevici, about 35 kilometres from the frontier with Belarus.

Whats the latest in Russia and NATOs standoff over Ukraine? The story so far

Russia accuses West of ramping up pressure by supplying Ukraine arms

But officials say the biggest challenge for Latvia right now and the reason for this new barbed-wire fence is the continuing migration crisis orchestrated by neighbouring Belarus.

Juris Kusins, Lieutenant colonel of State Border Guard of Latvia Border Latvia-Belarus at the Silene border point.Gints Ivuskans/The Globe and Mail

More than 1,500 people from countries such as Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East were intercepted by Latvian patrols in January trying to enter the country illegally from Belarus. Thats up from 1,400 attempts in December and 500 to 600 a month when this began last summer, said Lieutenant-Colonel Juris Kusins with Latvias State Border Guard.

Those caught tell Latvian authorities that the Belarusian army directed them to the border.

Col. Vizulis blames the illegal migration on Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko, accusing him of political mischief. The European Union says Belarus is flying in thousands of people from the Middle East and pushing them to cross into EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization members Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.

He speculated that the Belarusians are trying to exhaust the Baltic countrys resources by engineering these migrant crossings. Its tiring. We are strong and will do our best if needed but nevertheless we are a small country.

Around 130,000 Russian troops equipped with everything

from tanks and artillery to ammunition and air power are

now surrounding Ukraine on all sides.

Four NATO

multinational

battlegroups:

5,000 troops

POLAND

4,000 U.S.

troops

stationed

Donbas:

Territory

controlled by

pro-Russian

separatists

Craiova: NATOs

multinational

brigade 5,000

troops

Sevastopol:

Russian

Black Sea

Fleet HQ

Crimea:

Annexed by

Russia in 2014

graphic news, Sources: Janes; NATO, Reuters;

The New York Times; Rochan Consulting

Around 130,000 Russian troops equipped with everything

from tanks and artillery to ammunition and air power are

now surrounding Ukraine on all sides.

Four NATO

multinational

battlegroups:

5,000 troops

POLAND

4,000 U.S.

troops

stationed

Donbas:

Territory

controlled by

pro-Russian

separatists

Craiova: NATOs

multinational

brigade 5,000

troops

Sevastopol:

Russian

Black Sea

Fleet HQ

Crimea:

Annexed by

Russia in 2014

graphic news, Sources: Janes; NATO, Reuters;

The New York Times; Rochan Consulting

Around 130,000 Russian troops equipped with everything from tanks and artillery to ammunition and

air power are now surrounding Ukraine on all sides.

Four NATO multinational

battlegroups: 5,000 troops

Other military

or air instal-

lations

POLAND

4,000 U.S.

troops

stationed

Transnistria:

Russian-backed

breakaway region

of Moldova

Donbas:

Territory

controlled by

pro-Russian

separatists

Craiova: NATOs

multinational brigade

5,000 troops

Sevastopol:

Russian

Black Sea

Fleet HQ

Crimea:

Annexed by

Russia in 2014

See original here:
On NATO's eastern flank, Latvia contends with a migration crisis orchestrated by neighbouring Belarus - The Globe and Mail

NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was formed in 1949 with the aim, first and foremost, of acting as a deterrent to the threat of Soviet expansion in Europe after World War II. Beyond that, the United States saw it as a tool to prevent the resurgence of nationalist tendencies in Europe and to foster political integration on the continent.

Its origins, however, actually go back to 1947, when the United Kingdom and France signed the Treaty of Dunkirkas an alliance to counter the eventuality of a German attack in the aftermath of the war.

The original 12 founding members of the political and military alliance are: the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal.

At its core, the organization acts as a collective security alliance with the aim of providing mutual defense through military and political means if a member state isthreatened by an external country.

This cornerstone is laid outin article 5 of the charter, the collective defense clause:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

Article 5 has been invoked once, by the United States, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

The Soviet Union responded to NATO by creating its own military alliance with seven otherEastern European communist states in 1955, dubbed the Warsaw Pact.

But the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, paved the way for a new post-Cold War security order in Europe.

Freed from their Soviet shackles, a number of former Warsaw Pact countries became NATO members. Visegrad Group members Hungary, Polandand the Czech Republic joined in 1999. Five years later, in 2004, NATO admitted the so-called Vilnius Group, made up of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.Albania andCroatia joined in 2009.

The most recent additions were Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020, bringing the total number of member states to 30. Three countries are currently categorized as "aspiring members": Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine.

Against the backdrop of thestandoff between Russia and Ukraine at their common border, the latter's ambition to join the alliance has again gathered pace. At NATO's Bucharest summit in 2008, the alliance formally welcomed both Ukraine and Georgia's membership aspirations, but stopped short of granting membership action plans. For Russia, the notion of its former Soviet satellite Ukraine joining NATO is a red line.

NATO's so-called open door policy, as outlined in article 10 of the treaty, allows any European country that can enhance and contribute "to the security of the North Atlantic area" to join.

"Countries aspiring for NATO membership are also expected to meet certain political, economic and military goals in order to ensure that they will become contributors to Alliance security as well as beneficiaries of it," it says on NATO's site.

Edited by: Martin Kuebler

Continued here:
What is NATO and why was it created? - DW (English)

NATOis uncharacteristically divided on how to deal with Russia in the escalating crisis over Ukraine. "The US and the UK favor deterrence and a hard line; Germany, France and Italy are emphasizing dialogue, and a third group, including Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, wants to stay out of the conflict and any troop deployment," says Stefan Meister, an expert on Russia and eastern Europe at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

He told DW that, while Germany is usually the moderate link between these groups, that link is currently missing because of weak leadership.

He warns that, in addition, NATO is already weakened by populism, Trump, and Brexit. "Russia's President Vladimir Putin is trying to exploit this to negotiate a new security order in Europe without the United States," he explains. And in this situation, the NATO countries of southeastern Europe have an unusually important role to play.

However, there are some strident, and conflicting, voices making themselves heard in the region. At the end of January, the president of Croatia, Zoran Milanovic, caused confusion both at home and abroad when he declared that, in the event of a conflict in Ukraine, his country would retreat. Speaking in the Croatian capital, Zagreb, Milanovic said: "If it comes to an escalation, we will withdraw, down to the last Croatian soldier." He did not, however, specify exactly what he meant. There are no Croatian soldiers stationed in Ukraine.

The feud between Croatian President Zoran Milanovic (left) and Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic (right) has led to conflicting statements about Ukraine

The government of Croatia a member of both the EU and NATO immediately issued a contradictory statement. "The president does not speak for Croatia, but for himself," said the Croatian foreign minister, Gordan Grlic Radman. "We are and remain a loyal member of NATO."

What is most peculiar about the Croatian president's threat is that no one not NATO, not the US, not Ukraine had requested the Croatian military's involvement. "Milanovic's statements serve domestic political purposes. They have to be seen against the background of his ongoing feud with Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic," explained Filip Milacic of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Vienna, in an interview with DW. "Lately, the president seems to be playing the nationalist card. He has called Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader, a 'partner,' and he wants to pander to Croatian nationalists, who dream of redrawing the borders in Bosnia, with Russian support."

In an appearance on Bulgarian television BTV on February 1, 2022, Russian ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova made it very clear what Russia is demanding of NATO: that it withdraw behind the borders of states that were members of the organization in 1997. This would require NATO to withdraw all its troops from countries like Romania and Bulgaria and close its bases there. Mitrofanova said that these countries could formally remain NATO members but only formally.

Bulgaria's defense minister, Stefan Yanev, is apparently comfortable with the idea. In December 2021 he was publicly reprimanded by the prime minister, Kiril Petkov, after he spoke out on Facebook against the redeployment of NATO troops to Bulgaria. In a parliamentary hearing the following month, Yanev then declared: "We should stop reading the foreign press and speculating. We should be bulgarophiles, and think in terms of Bulgarian national interests." If any NATO troops were to be stationed in Bulgaria, he said, they should be exclusively Bulgarian.

There is a domestic political background to the emphasis on "national interests" in Bulgaria, too. In December 2021, the nationalist Rebirth party entered parliament, and since then it has been putting pressure on the government. The ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova is well aware of Bulgarian nationalists' traditionally pro-Russian sympathies. "Russia has an influence in Bulgaria: our common history," she says. "That is the most important lobbyist, the most important influencer in our relations."

The situation in Romania is quite different. Along with Germany and Poland, it is one of the countries to which additional USand NATO troops are already being deployed. According to a survey by the INSCOP Research polling institute, of all the countries in the region, Romania is the one where NATO enjoys the highest level of trust among the population. "Additional NATO troops are not just welcome, they're also a political asset for the government," Sorin Ionita, a political scientist at the Expert Group think tank in Bucharest, told DW. "Not even the nationalists dare to speak out against it."

The Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orban (left), maintains a 'special relationship' with Russian president Vladimir Putin

Hungary is also a focus for NATO troop deployments, since, like Romania, it shares a border with Ukraine. Prime Minister Viktor Orban has maintained a "special relationship" with Russia for years. His public admiration for President Putin, and rejection of sanctions against his regime, have earned him the nickname "Putin's pinscher."

A few days ago, at the start of February 2022, Orban traveled to Moscow on what he called a "peace mission." However, the main issues under discussion were actually supplies of Russian gas, which Hungary buys at well below market value, and Russian involvement in the expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant. Consequently, Budapest is avoiding any discussion of Hungary getting more involved in NATO activities.

Turkey is a strategically important NATO member that also has a particularly complex relationship with Russia. Putin and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are cooperating in the Syrian civil war, but in Libya they support different groups. Erdogan first snubbed his NATO partners by buying Russian S-400 air defense missiles then Ankara supplied Ukraine with military drones. Like Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria, Turkey is also dependent on Russian gas and oil.

On his recent visit to Kyiv, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan (right) offered to mediate between Ukraine and Russia

"It's a delicate balancing act for Ankara," says Asli Aydintasbas of the European Council on Foreign Relations. "Erdogan has a special connection with Ukraine, and will support both it and NATO. On the other hand, he mustn't anger Putin so much that he turns off the gas, or seeks revenge in Syria."

"Putin knows exactly what he wants in eastern Europe unlike the West," the British eastern Europe expert Timothy Garton Ash comments in the Guardian newspaper. "He wants to restore as much as possible of the empire, great power status and sphere of influence that Russia lost so dramatically 30 years ago, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union." In southeastern Europe, the Kremlin aims to achieve this by means of cheap gas and nationalism.

Filip Milacic of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation adds: "Russia is also offering the nationalist elites in the western Balkans something the West is not offering, and should not offer: the promise of redrawing the borders in the region."

However, in the view of Stefan Meister of the DGAP, cheap gas, nationalism, and disagreement will not be enough to divide NATO in the event of a conflict. "Right now, as the leading power, the US is able to assert itself.NATO is relatively united on deterrence, and when it comes down to it, even if smaller states pull out, they won't call their loyalty to the alliance into question. Weapons are being supplied, troops are being reinforced and time is being bought where Russia is concerned."

This story was originally published in German.

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NATO and Russia: Conflicting views in southeastern Europe - DW (English)

The Russian army may be poised to annex Ukraine, but Americas most activist ice cream manufacturer thinks US troops should stay at home instead of heading to Eastern Europe to fight.

In a tweet, the official Ben & Jerrys account called on US president Joe Biden to de-escalate tensions and work for peace rather than prepare for war. You cannot, the account insisted, simultaneously prevent and prepare for war.

Biden, for his part, met with German chancellor Olaf Scholz at the White House on Feb. 7, reportedly telling him the US and Germany are in lockstep over Ukraine. And Anthony Blinken, US secretary of state, said there would be real and profound consequences should Russia choose to continue aggression.

It was not the message Ben & Jerrys was hoping for.

The tweet was completely in character for the company. Though Ben & Jerryhas been owned for more than 20 years by Unilever, it was started by two Vermont ice cream makers who were unafraid to be activists. In fact, the Ben & Jerrys brand has a steady record of advocating that the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reduce their presence in Europe.

In 1998, when NATO was expanding into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, Ben & Jerrys thought it was crazy. In an interview with the New York Times, Ben Cohenone of the brands titular founderstried to find an ice cream industry analogy for NATO pushing toward Russias borders:

Our biggest competitor is Haagen-Dazs. So it would be as if one day Haagen-Dazs announced that after all these years of competing with us, it had decided to go out of the ice cream business and instead would sell only hot dogs. And then one day Haagen-Dazs Hot Dogs comes to Ben & Jerrys and says, We would like to be partners with you and sell your ice cream in our hot dog shops. But we said to them: No, we wont let you sell our ice cream. We still want to drive Haagen-Dazs out of business, even though youre not in the ice cream business anymore, because we remember you were once in the ice cream business. And furthermore, were going to spend $2 billion to kill your hot dog business to make sure youll never sell ice cream again.'

A nonprofit called Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities, founded by Cohen, took out a full-page advertisement in the New York Times that same year, accusing US defense contractors of lobbying hard for a NATO expansion that was really a $60 billion boondoggle. Other ads revealed the ice cream companys (unintentionally ironic) worry that alienating Russia would start a new Cold War.

Ben & Jerrys stance against military aggression of any kind first became visible in 1988, when Cohen founded 1% For Peace, a campaign that aimed to divert 1% of the US defense budget into peace-promoting activities and projects.

The company built a reputation for other kinds of activism as well, including championing same-sex marriage, pulling out of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and calling for the resignation and impeachment of Donald Trump after the Capitol riot in January 2021.

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Ben & Jerry's thinks NATO should chill a little over Ukraine - Quartz

President Emmanuel Macron of France invoked a Cold War-era term on Monday, telling reporters on his flight to Moscow that Finlandization of Ukraine was one of the models on the table for defusing tensions with Russia.

On Tuesday, standing alongside President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine in Kyiv, Macron denied making the remark, which appeared to put him at odds with not only the Ukrainians but also the United States. But the idea is once again being discussed in diplomatic circles.

The term refers to Finlands strict neutrality during the Cold War, enshrined in a 1948 treaty with Moscow when tensions between the Soviet Union and the West were at a high. The treaty ensured Finland that unlike other countries in Eastern Europe, it would not face a Soviet invasion, but in return, it agreed to stay out of NATO and allowed the giant next door to exercise significant influence over its domestic and foreign policy.

Ukraine, formerly a part of the Soviet Union, has increasingly tilted toward the West, economically and politically, while resisting Russian influence. In 2008, NATO said it planned eventually for Ukraine to join the alliance, a popular idea within the country, though it has never actually applied for membership and NATO officials say it would not happen any time soon.

Finlandization would appear to rule out that possibility, and allow Moscow a heavy hand in Ukrainian affairs concessions Kyiv and NATO have rejected as unacceptable.

All of this goes against what Ukraine has been striving for, said Anna Wieslander, director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council. It would be a big shift from a long-term political aim of joining NATO and joining the E.U., which is what they have wanted.

The arrangement Mr. Macron appeared to suggest is a way of solving a problem by making a decision over the head of the Ukrainians, said Richard Whitman, an associate fellow at the policy analysis group Chatham House.

President Biden has said that nations must be free to choose their own alliances.

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has long maintained that Ukraine and Russia are effectively one country, with insoluble historic and cultural ties. In 2014, after mass protests forced out a pro-Russian Ukrainian president, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, and supported a separatist war in eastern Ukraine that is still dragging on.

With Mr. Putin determined to expand his sphere of influence and undermine an independent Ukrainian government, and the West making it clear it would not go to war against Russia to defend Ukraine, some experts have argued that Finlandization is the best course Ukraine can take.

The Kremlin is acutely aware that Finland, once a neutral buffer state between the Soviets and NATO, has become far less neutral, tilting strongly toward the West since the Soviet Union collapsed.

While it remains outside NATO to this day, said James Nixey, the director of European Union-Russia relations at Chatham House, Finland is completely compatible with NATO, and with Western security architecture, and is very much on side as far as a unified concept of European security is concerned.

Excerpt from:
What is 'Finlandization,' a Status Proposed for Ukraine? - The New York Times

Following World War II, Russia annexed adjacent countries forming the Soviet Union. Stalin then sent Russians to live in these countries thus diluting the native population.

That happened in Ukraine and currently Russia has a stalemate war with Ukraine on the NE corner of the country where Russian speaking people live.

Following World War I when the Austro-Hungarian Empire was dismantled, German speaking Austria and Germany were split into separate countries.

As Hitler rose to power, the nationalistic fervor of unification of German speaking peoples (known as Anschluss) led to a disinformation campaign in Germany, allowing Hitler to invade Austria.

Putin is now using the same play book. His PR to the Russian people is to re-establish the power and prestige of the former Soviet Union. Remember the current democratically elected government of Ukraine followed the ousting of the Russian puppet who fled to Russia after the revolt.

Putin is now justified in not only protecting Russians in Ukraine but re-establishing the rightful government aligned with Russia.

Crimea was occupied without resistance six years ago. Putin believes he will not be challenged again if he invades Ukraine and establishes his own government, thus re-uniting the lost country of the Soviet Union and protecting Russian speaking people of Ukraine.

Putins fear of NATO seems even more irrational since none of the countries in NATO plan to invade Russia. And yet Putin projects his own behavior onto others thus perceiving them as a threat.

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Kempner reader asserts that Putin has an irrational fear of NATO - The Killeen Daily Herald

Vladimir Putin doesnt need to send troops into Ukraine. He has already achieved his strategic goals for now.

The leading European Union powers, France and Germany, are competing against each other for Putins ear, while Britain is competing against them by shipping arms to Ukraine. The United States is exposed as an unreliable protector, unable to defend its overextended position on Russias doorstep in Ukraine. Nato is divided and powerless, a shadow of imperial overreach.

A decrepit caste of corrupt leaders is incapable of managing a controlled retreat from imperial overreach. America today, or Russia the day before yesterday? Putin witnessed the decay and collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent expansion of Nato up to Russias borders. He is now returning the favour. He is pushing American and European influence out of Ukraine, and unpicking the already frayed bonds of Nato and the EU.

Geopolitics is not about morality. It is about the effective use of power. For thirty years, the smart opinion in Washington was that post-Soviet Russia was no threat to anyone because it had an economy the size of Portugal and its economy ran on carbon fuel exports. That these statistics were true shows how well Putin has played his limited hand and how arrogantly the US has mishandled relations with Russia while its experts tell each other flattering fictions.

When George Kennan, the architect of Cold War containment, reviewed the American diplomacy of the 1890s, he noted an 'overestimation of economics, of trade, as factors in human events and the corresponding underestimation of psychological and political reactions of such things as fear, ambition, insecurity, jealousy and perhaps even boredom as prime movers of events.'

Kennan habitually decried the crusading idealism of Wilsonian foreign policy. Here, he detects idealisms shadow, the tendency to overemphasise material interest, as an obstacle to understanding what we are dealing with.

This applies to allies as it does to rivals. It is not hard to see why Putin might want to redraw the map of eastern Europe, rebalance the power dynamics of the European continent and push the United States out of Europe by breaking up Nato. Kennan saw the Clinton administrations triumphalist expansion of Nato and the EU up to Russias doorstep as containment continued past its sell-by date. He called it 'a tragic mistake' and saw where it would lead:

'I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. There is no reason for this whatsoever.'

It is, though, harder to see why Germany might want to go along with Putins big play, or why France might, as it usually does, do everything it can to hamper the United States when the chips are down. The motivations for the behaviour of France and Germany are harder to understand because they go against both the bottom line of material interest and the higher aspirations of the American ethos. Understanding them requires modesty before the basic facts of history and culture.

Why did the Germans allow Angela Merkel to turn off their nuclear power stations and make them dependent on Russian gas? Because the Germans have a primitive worship of Nature, because they think it makes them better than other people, and because, geography being what it is, they always have to choose between Russia and France. Theyre not doing it out of guilt over World War II. They're doing it because they lost the war and still think theyre special which, looking at it this way, they are, one way or another.

Why did Emmanuel Macron scramble to organise a summit with Russia in Paris rather than allow the US, the senior partner in Nato, to set the table? Because the French despise the US even more than the Germans do, and they too think this might be a chance to slough off the boorish Americans. Because French foreign policy since 1945 has been a long campaign against the true enemies of civilisation, les Anglo-Saxons, because the Germans no longer need the French to rehabilitate them, and because the French genuinely believe the United States is little more than England on steroids and hence, culturally speaking, a worse influence than Russia, which at least has a soul where the Anglo-Saxons have a wallet.

It is the task of professional diplomats to understand their material, regardless of whether they approve of it. But the United States was in many respects founded to repudiate local variations of fact and history, and to install a better and universal way of doing things. This is why Americans do not make good diplomats and why Kennan, one of the greatest diplomatic analysts of Americas imperial century, left no school of followers in the think tanks.

Russia is not the only empire that the US humbled in the twentieth century. When FDR committed the US to smashing the German empire, he also committed the US to unmaking the British and French empires. Long after the last American had left the last base in Europe, the British, French and Germans will still be there, and so will the Russians. Now, as American credibility and coherence fall away, theyre responding by being more British, French, German and Russian than ever, just as the US is accelerating its strategic decline by falling ever further back on the American creed.

What the US needs now is Kennans subtle and cynical policy toward Russia: respect and understand your antagonist, remember that the Russian people are not the same as their leaders, build your foreign policy on your domestic strengths, avoid extremes in policy and action. If you think Joe Biden is capable of any of that, I have a dacha in Crimea to sell you.

This article originally appeared on Spectator World

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Putin is unpicking the frayed bonds of Nato and the EU - Spectator.co.uk

PARIS The standoff with Russia over Ukraine enters a critical phase this week. The United States has snapped NATO to attention and moved forces east. Moscow has readied still more forces on the Ukraine border. But beneath those tensions, diplomatic avenues are being feverishly explored and the outlines of potential solutions, still amorphous, may be taking form.

President Biden meets Monday with Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and President Emmanuel Macron of France, at the same time, will visit his Russian counterpart, Vladimir V. Putin, in Moscow before traveling to Kyiv.

With the Biden administration staking out a hard line, Germany lying low and Mr. Putin seemingly determined to force a solution to Russias security grievances, it is Mr. Macron who has positioned himself at the center of the diplomacy in Europe. To Moscow, he is a quality interlocutor, as Mr. Putin called Mr. Macron, according to a senior official in the French presidency, speaking on the condition of anonymity in keeping with French government practice.

For Mr. Macron the chance to lead the effort to create a new European security architecture has placed him front and center on perhaps the biggest stage of his presidency, just two months before elections. It has given him an opportunity to step into a larger leadership role for all of Europe and to put some flesh on his sometimes grandiose visions for a Europe allied with, but more independent of, the United States.

Do we want a Russia that is totally aligned with China or one that is somewhere between China and Europe? Bruno Le Maire, the French economy minister, who is very close to Mr. Macron, said on Friday as Russia and China declared no limits to their friendship and called on NATO to abandon its ideologized Cold War approaches.

For France, the choreographed embrace of Mr. Putin and President Xi Jinping of China on the eve of the Beijing Winter Olympics was a demonstration of the ominous wider ramifications of the Ukraine crisis, as Mr. Macron embarks on several days of intense diplomacy.

The risks are as great as the potential payoffs for Mr. Macron. Solutions to the crisis seem fiendishly elusive for now, even if Mr. Putin has appeared less directly threatening toward Ukraine over the past week.

The French president has a double purpose: to stop the war that a massive Russian troop concentration at the Ukrainian border threatens; and to allay the festering Russian grievances that NATOs expansion eastward in 1999 and 2004 provoked, with the eventual aim of integrating Russia in a new European security system that offsets its lurch toward China.

Its a tall order, but Mr. Macron has never lacked for audacity. He will need to tread carefully. Theres frustration in European countries, including Germany, with Mr. Macrons tendency to forge ahead and then yell at them for not doing anything, said Jeremy Shapiro, a former State Department official who is now the research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. That weakens him.

French officials described in broad outline the twin approaches Mr. Macron would adopt in his meetings with Mr. Putin and President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine.

The first is to use the Normandy Format a grouping of France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia to bolster the 2015 Minsk 2 agreement, a deeply ambiguous document that secured a cease-fire in eastern Ukraine but that has proved largely inoperable, not least because nobody agrees on its meaning.

Could some interpretation of the accord, involving the eventual powers of the breakaway Donbas region over national policy, go some way toward satisfying Mr. Putins insistence that Ukraine never join NATO, a demand the United States and its allies, including France, are adamant in rejecting?

The second, in close consultation with Mr. Biden, is to secure a concrete signal of de-escalation that reverses the Russian military buildup and, as a means to achieving that, explores what Mr. Putins ultimate red line is in the confrontation.

The senior official at the French presidency said the nucleus of the Western conflict with Mr. Putin lay in the extension of NATO and the inclusion in it of countries from the former Soviet space, which created an area of volatility that has to be reduced. He added that Mr. Putin had told Mr. Macron that he wanted a conversation of substance that goes to the heart of the matter.

In effect, France appears to be saying that Mr. Putins demands, which include pushing NATO back out of formerly Soviet-controlled countries, cannot ever be satisfied but that getting to the heart of the matter involves acknowledgment that NATO expansion created permanent grievances with Russia even as it secured freedom for 100 million central Europeans.

No one believes that Romania, Lithuania and other states that joined an expanded NATO are ever going to leave it, or that NATO is ever going to abrogate its 2008 Bucharest statement that Ukraine will become a member of the alliance. But, as Turkeys almost 60-year flirtation with the European Union illustrates, there are ways of turning a candidacy for membership of an organization into an indefinite holding pattern.

We can take a step toward Putin, recognize he is not completely wrong, said Justin Vasse, the former head of policy planning at the French foreign ministry who now heads the Paris Peace Forum.

The senior official at the French presidency said, Ukraine is not a member of NATO and, to my knowledge, will not be for a while.

Mr. Macron wants to explore whether American offers last month could be complemented by further confidence-building measures that permit a way out of the crisis.

The American proposal involved more transparency about missile deployment in Eastern Europe and a call for reciprocal commitments by both the United States and Russia to refrain from deploying missiles or troops in Ukraine. Mr. Putin has rejected the American response to his demands as inadequate.

Conceivably the arms control offers of the other day could be combined with some sort of consultative mechanism for changes in NATO status, or some sort of moratorium on NATO expansion, or some creative interpretation of the Minsk agreement that gives a Donbas constituent assembly veto powers over what the government will do, Mr. Shapiro, the former State Department official, suggested.

None of this appears likely, however, given Mr. Putins unprovoked direct threat to Ukraine, his annexation of Crimea, his invasion of Georgia in the short war of 2008 and his history of tearing up treaties when it suits him. The Biden administration, with muscular proactive diplomacy, has signaled it is in no mood for compromise.

Ominous warnings. Russia called the strike a destabilizing act that violated the cease-fire agreement, raising fears of a new intervention in Ukraine that could draw the United States and Europe into a new phase of the conflict.

The Kremlins position. President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who has increasingly portrayed NATOs eastward expansion as an existential threat to his country, said that Moscows military buildupwas a response to Ukraines deepening partnership with the alliance.

Mr. Putin, it often seems, is only the latest exponent of what Joseph Conrad called Russian officialdoms almost sublime disdain for the truth.

Despite this, Mr. Macron, who knows that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would send gas costs spiraling higher at a time when the French electorate is angry about lost purchasing power, sees some potential in the Normandy Format. A first meeting last month ended with limited progress, a second meeting is scheduled soon, and a summit of French, German, Russian and Ukrainian leaders has been suggested.

The Minsk 2 agreement calls for a decentralization of Ukraine that confers special status on areas of the east now controlled by separatists, with the specificities to be agreed on with representatives of these areas.

Russia, in a creative interpretation of these specificities, has argued that they should include granting the elected representatives in these areas a veto on Ukrainian foreign policy decisions, including membership in NATO. In this way, Ukraine would effectively become part of Russias sphere of influence.

This is not going to happen, Dmytro Kuleba, the Ukrainian foreign minister, said last week. Never.

Mr. Zelensky, the president, has sounded more ambivalent. If it is not NATO, then point to some other security guarantees, he said last month. It was unclear what he had in mind.

The security guarantees offered by the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, in which Russia vowed to respect Ukraines existing borders and sovereignty, proved worthless.

Absent other avenues, the Normandy Format at least brings the parties together. Mr. Shapiro argued that it could help forge stability.

Instability is the Russian strength. Stability is our strength, he said. NATO and the European Union expansion were a very powerful way to secure democracy in Eastern European countries. But we got out of it what we could. If you believe in the superiority of the Western economic and political model, as I do, stability makes that evident, and spheres of influence are a pretty good way to establish that.

Mr. Putin, the French official said, wants long-term visibility on Ukraine and Europe. That appears to leave Mr. Macron playing a potentially dangerous game, trying to balance the new European security order he has said he seeks with his commitment to the United States and the NATO alliance.

Andrew E. Kramer contributed reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine.

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Macron Tries to Avert a European War and Reshape European Security - The New York Times