Category Archives: NATO

San Francisco The U.S. State Departments top cybersecurity official said Thursday that countries are taking advantage of the differing views among NATO members on whether cyberattacks could trigger a collective military response.

Since the onset of Russias invasion of Ukraine last year, debate has raged about whether a damaging cyberattack could trigger Article 5 the foundational principle of NATO that an attack on any member would necessitate a military response from all.

Article 5 has only been triggered once after the 9/11 terrorist attacks but has been a topic of interest for several European countries facing a barrage of crippling cyberattacks since the start of Russias invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

At the RSA Conference this week, U.S. Ambassador at Large for Cyberspace & Digital Policy Nathaniel Fick said that NATOs adversaries seek to do things to us using digital means that they would never do to us using kinetic means because of the clarity of the response policies.

Nathalie Jaarsma, the Netherlands ambassador at-large for security policy and cyber, said during the same panel that in general, cyberattacks do fall below the threshold for triggering Article 5. But she mentioned that some countries have pushed for an accumulation of cyberattacks to be factored into Article 5 considerations.

Its really a case-by-case situation and about the impact. [We need] to have internal discussions about what we do see as the thresholds for our potential range, she said.

Fick said it would be to NATOs collective advantage to clarify and enforce how they respond to cyber incidents.

He echoed Jaarsmas comments in acknowledging that most cyberattacks fall far below the threshold for military response. But he wondered whether there is a middle between the nuisance attacks and serious incidents involving critical infrastructure or loss of life.

Fick referenced the ransomware attack allegedly launched by Iran against Albania as a situation that might live in that middle. Albanias status as a NATO member prompted the U.S. to offer significant financial and technical help, but Fick questioned whether tougher deterrence efforts were needed.

I think the implicit assumption is that we need to extend the full power of deterrence into the digital world, using not only cyber means but every ounce of economic, informational and diplomatic means necessary, he said.

Mandiant CEO Kevin Mandia noted that despite the fears referenced by NATO members, it appeared that Russia understands the level of cyberattack that would trigger Article 5.

While Ukraine has faced several damaging cyberattacks, many experts believe Russia has largely held back from causing the kind of digital destruction that was expected.

I think there is some evidence out of Russia in 2022 that maybe they were also trying to figure out what is the skirmish level below the threshold of Article 5 in cyber because we didnt see the new and novel innovation that they probably do have in Ukraine, he said.

It stretches credulity to think they're not sitting on at least one to five zero days right now. Theyre not using it so maybe they are saying were not sure about the collateral damage if we do these things.

Fick noted that after Russias devastating attack on satellite provider Viasat, several European countries on the eastern flank wanted a more assertive response.

But he said the U.S. was not in a hurry to invoke Article 5 and in the end, the bedrock of NATO is that the alliance speaks with one voice.

Jonathan Greig is a Breaking News Reporter at Recorded Future News. Jonathan has worked across the globe as a journalist since 2014. Before moving back to New York City, he worked for news outlets in South Africa, Jordan and Cambodia. He previously covered cybersecurity at ZDNet and TechRepublic.

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US cyber ambassador: NATO must extend 'deterrence into the ... - The Record by Recorded Future

The U.S. Army Cyber Command told defense contractors it planned to surveil global social media use to defend the NATO brand, according to a 2022 webinar recording reviewed by The Intercept.

The disclosure, made a month after Russias invasion of Ukraine, follows years of international debate over online free expression and the influence of governmental security agencies over the web. The Armys Cyber Command is tasked with both defending the countrys military networks as well as offensive operations, including propaganda campaigns.

The remarks came during a closed-door conference call hosted by the Cyber Fusion Innovation Center, a Pentagon-sponsored nonprofit that helps with military tech procurement, and provided an informal question-and-answer session for private-sector contractors interested in selling data to Army Cyber Command, commonly referred to as ARCYBER.

Though the office has many responsibilities, one of ARCYBERs key roles is to detect and thwart foreign influence operations, a military euphemism for propaganda and deception campaigns, while engaging in the practice itself. The March 24, 2022, webinar was organized to bring together vendors that might be able to help ARCYBER attack, defend, influence, and operate, in the words of co-host Lt. Col. David Beskowof the ARCYBER Technical Warfare Center.

While the event was light on specifics the ARCYBER hosts emphasized that they were keen to learn whatever the private sector thought was in the realm of possible a recurring topic was how the Army can morequickly funnel vast volumes of social media posts from around the world for rapid analysis.

At one point in the recording, a contractor who did not identify themselves asked if ARCYBER could share specific topics they plan to track across the web. NATO is one of our key brands that we are pushing, as far as our national security alliance, Beskow explained. Thats important to us. We should understand all conversations around NATO that has happened on social media.

He added, We would want to do that long term to understand how what is the NATO, for lack of a better word, whats the NATO brand, and how does the world view that brand across different places of the world?

Beskow said that ARCYBER wanted to track social media on various platforms used in places where the U.S. had an interest.

Twitter is still of interest, Beskow told the webinar audience, adding that those that have other penetration are of interest as well. Those include VK, Telegram, Sina Weibo, and others that may have penetration in other parts of the world, referring to foreign-owned chat and social media sites popular in Russia and China.(The Army did not respond to a request for comment.)

The mass social media surveillance appears to be just one component of a broader initiative to use private-sector data mining to advance the Armys information warfare efforts. Beskow expressed an interest in purchasing access to nonpublic commercial web data, corporate ownership records, supply chain data, and more, according to areporton the call by the researcher Jack Poulson.

Tracking a brands reputation is an extremely common marketing practice. But a crucial difference between a social media manager keeping tabs on Casper mattress mentions and ARCYBER is that the Army is authorized to, in Beskows words, influence-operate the network and, when necessary, attack. And NATO is an entity subject to intense global civilian scrutiny and debate.

While the webinar speakers didnt note whether badmouthing NATO or misrepresenting its positions would be merely monitored or actively countered, ARCYBERs umbrella includes seven different units dedicated to offense and propaganda. The 1st Information Operations Command provides Social Media Overwatch, and the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command works to gain and maintain information dominance by conducting Information Warfare in the Information Environment, according to ARCYBERs website.

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Though these are opaque, jargon-heavy concepts, the term information operations encompasses activities the U.S. has been eager to decry when carried out by its geopolitical rivals the sort of thing typically labeled disinformation when emanating from abroad.

The Department of Defense defines information operations as those which influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own, while influence operations are the United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

ARCYBER is key to the U.S.s ability to do both.

While the U.S. national security establishment frequently warns against other countries weaponization of social media and the broader internet, recent reporting has shown the Pentagon engages in some of the very same conduct.

Last August, researchers from Graphika and the Stanford Internet Observatory uncovered a network of pro-U.S. Twitter and Facebook accounts covertly operated by U.S. Central Command, an embarrassing revelation that led to a sweeping audit of how it conducts clandestine information warfare, according to the Washington Post. Subsequent reportingby The Intercept showed Twitter had whitelisted the accounts in violation of its own policies.

Despite years of alarm in Washington over the threat posed by deepfake video fabrications to democratic societies, The Intercept reported last month that U.S. Special Operations Command is seeking vendors to help them make their own deepfakes to deceive foreign internet users.

Its unclear how the Army might go about conducting mass surveillance of social media platforms that prohibit automated data collection.

During the webinar, Beskow told vendors that the government would provide a list of publicly facing pages that we would like to be crawled at a specific times, specifically citing Facebook and the Russian Facebook clone VK. But Meta, which owns Facebook and Instagram, expressly prohibits the scraping of its pages.

Asked how the Army planned to get around this fact, Beskow demurred: Right now, were really interested in just understanding whats in the realm of the possible, while maintaining the authorities and legal guides that were bound by, he said. The goal is to see whats in the realm of possible in order to allow our, uh, leaders, once again, to understand the world a little bit better, specifically, that of the technical world that we live in today.

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Army Cyber Command: Surveil Social Media to Protect NATO Brand - The Intercept

Helicopters take part in NATO exercise Noble Jump in Romania in 2017. Noble Jump 23 kicked off April 26, 2023, in Sardinia, Italy, with elements of NATO's quick reaction spearhead force. Approximately 2,200 multinational troops will take part in the exercise being hosted by Italy. (Jasper Verolme/Mediacentrum Defensie)

Elements of NATOs quick-reaction spearhead force are being put through their paces this week in Sardinia, where a series of drills is intended to showcase its fighting capabilities.

The unit is part of the NATO Response Force and was activated for the first time in its history after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The roughly 2,200 troops participating in Noble Jump 23 will spend about two weeks drilling on ranges on the Mediterranean island, NATOs Joint Force Command in Naples said in a statement Wednesday.

The exercise is a statement of our resolve and our capabilities, Navy Capt. William Urban, spokesman for the command, said in the statement.

The exercise will involve personnel from several NATO countries militaries, the statement said.

The spearhead unit is a 5,000-strong force carved out of NATOs larger response force of some 40,000 troops.

The unit was formed in the aftermath of Russias initial 2014 military incursion in Ukraine, but in the years afterward was involved mainly in periodic training events. That changed one day after Russias Feb. 24, 2022, full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The decision to mobilize the so-called Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, led by the French at the time, amounted to a political victory for the NATO alliance, which had long faced questions about whether allies could muster unanimous support for such a deployment in a pinch, given varied threat perceptions of Russia in the alliance.

NATOs Naples command on Wednesday said its response force was drilling to ensure that it can respond to an array of crises, ranging from combat situations to peacekeeping missions.

The Noble Jump 23 exercise demonstrates that NATO is united, ready and willing to defend allies, Urban said.

The German army is currently leading the multinational task force. It took command in January amid uncertainty about its ability to carry out the mission.

At the time, reports emerged that armored vehicles to be assigned to the quick reaction force were in disrepair, with some unable to function.

Former Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht, in the days before the Germans were set to take command, called the developments a major setback but one the army could overcome to fulfill its NATO commitments.

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NATO's high-alert task force to test fighting mettle in Sardinia exercise - Stars and Stripes

In May 2008, victims families from Murino filed a lawsuit against the state of Montenegro, seeking compensation in individual amounts ranging from 13,000 to 20,000 euros.

They cited an article in the Law on Obligations which says that the state is liable for deaths, bodily injuries or damage caused by acts of violence or terror if state institutions were obliged under the countrys legislation to prevent them.

In the lawsuit, 28 victims relatives accused the Montenegrin authorities of failing to detect attacks by NATO aircraft over its territory and to warn the public of possible impending dangers. They claimed that the authorities had been informed by NATO about every target that would be attacked.

Velija Muric, a lawyer representing the families, argued that the Montenegrin authorities were obliged to warn villagers in Murino before the bomb attack by sounding alarms or issuing a public warning.

NATO forces announced every raid and overflight for humanitarian reasons, they claimed. Montenegro is to blame for the fact that neither the local authorities in Murino, nor the police or the army, made it known that people should take shelter. The state authorities are responsible for not doing it, both morally and in humanitarian terms because these victims were innocent, Muric told BIRN.

In August 2010, the Basic Court in Podgorica ruled that the state should pay 69,000 euros in compensation to five family members of Manojlo Komatina, one of those who was killed in the bombing. After the state appealed to the Higher Court in Podgorica and the case was heard again twice, the ruling was confirmed and the compensation was paid.

But in July 2015, the Supreme Court annulled the ruling, asking the victims relatives to return the compensation and pay court costs.

Another six cases for compensation were thrown out in September and October 2014 by the Higher Court, which ruled that the claims are out of date.

In February 2020, lawyer Velija Muric and the Human Rights Action NGO called on the government led by Dusko Markovic to come to a settlement with the victims families. This proposal was also put to subsequent governments led by Zdravko Krivokapic and Dritan Abazovic, but there was no response from any of the three administrations.

The head of Human Rights Action, Tea Gorjanc Prelevic, argued that Montenegro still has a moral obligation to pay compensation. The total amount claimed is around 500,000 euros.

The total amount of the compensation would represent a negligible burden on the state budget, especially compared to the importance that the settlement would have both for the victims and for Montenegro, Gorjanc Prelevic said.

NATO opponents use bombing as symbol

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'It's Offensive': NATO Bomb Victims' Families 'Ignored' by ... - Balkan Insight

LONDON, April 25 (Reuters) - NATO's largest ever air deployment exercise, set to take place in June, is unlikely to lead to commercial flight cancellations, Europe's lead air traffic manager said, after Germany's aviation industry expressed worries that it could cause disruption.

"We do not anticipate that there will be any need for air operators to make cancellations in order to accommodate the needs of the exercise," Eurocontrol told Reuters in a statement.

Air Defender 23 will be one of the largest air drills in NATO history, with 25 countries taking part in the joint exercise in German, Dutch and Czech airspace. It will use air corridors that have often been used for training purposes, according to the German air force.

Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, the commercial airspace over Ukraine has been closed. That has led to less available commercial airspace in Europe, resulting in more traffic gathering over the south of the continent.

Air traffic control strikes in France and elsewhere have exacerbated that limited airspace, increasing fears of costly cancellations and delays across the continent.

Germany's aviation sector in particular was concerned about the exercise's detrimental impact on commercial aviation. German industry group BDLS has called for tight coordination around the drill to prevent disruption.

"Coordinated action will allow this major military event to take place while, at the same time, accommodating civil air traffic with the lowest possible impact in terms of air traffic delays and re-routing actions," Eurocontrol added.

Reporting by Joanna Plucinska, Ilona Wissenbach and Sabine Siebold; editing by Jonathan Oatis

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No flight cancellations expected during largest NATO air drill in history - Reuters

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In late March, images of the first Polish Army live fire exercises involving South Korean-built K2 Black Panther tanks were released, demonstrating the tremendous speed with which these assets have been integrated into active service just eight months after they were ordered in July. The first tanks began to arrive in Poland in December 2022, six months after orders were placed, with the Polish Army expected to field over 1,000 of the vehicles. This will provide it with a tank force widely expected to be the most capable in Europe by a significant margin, in line with the ambitious new ground force goals outlined by Polish officials.

The K2s introduction to Europe is a potential game changer for the balance of power on the ground, and one that has potentially serious implications for Russian security amid high tensions with the West and with Warsaw in particular.

Although South Korea has for over a year resisted considerable Western pressure to begin arming Ukraine, its emergence as a major supplier of equipment to emerging military powers in Eastern Europe allows its industry to play a major role both in the broader conflict between Russia and NATO, as well as to influence the Russian-Ukrainian War indirectly. The Korean tanks deliveries will free up more of Polands old arsenals of T-72, PT-91, and Leopard 2 tanks for delivery to Ukraine, all of which have already been integrated into the Ukrainian Army from Polish stocks.

The speed with which the K2s have been supplied thus directly affects Polands capacity for bolstering its neighbors forces. This contrasts to the German Leopard II and American M1 Abrams, the only Western tanks in production, for which clients have to wait several years for deliveries to begin. South Koreas defense industrial base, particularly for ground equipment, is by several metrics the healthiest in the world producing NATO-compatible weaponry, which makes it particularly valuable to the Western blocs overall fighting strength.

Get briefed on the story of the week, and developing stories to watch across the Asia-Pacific.

K2 orders are just one example of major arms orders from South Korea significantly increasing the Wests capacity to arm Ukraine, a more recent example being the American order earlier in April for large quantities of Korean munitions specifically to allow its ally to send more of the U.S. Armys stockpiles to Ukraine.

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The K2 began entering service in the mid 2010s, making it 35 years newer than its rivals the Leopard II and Abrams, which entered service in 1979 and 1980 respectively. This age gap is reflected in many aspects of its performance, despite modernization of the older Western tanks over the last four decades. They provide the Polish Army with not only the most capable tanks in Europe, but also with a significant advantage over Russian tanks for multiple reasons.

Russia has neglected to invest in ambitious modernization of its frontline armor since the Cold Wars end, and the bulk of its fleet consists of modernized Soviet built T-72s such as the T-72B3M. Although the Soviet Union had been developing a highly promising new generation of armor, such as the ambitious T-95 tank, Russia cancelled these. Even its T-14 Armata tank considered a toned down successor to the T-95 was never operationalized despite on paper having the potential to provide key advantages over the K2. The T-72 and other Cold War era designs were considered more than sufficient when modernized to counter the Abrams and Leopard 2, which similarly were upgraded Cold War era designs. The mass introduction of Korean vehicles into NATO armies rapidly overturns that calculus. Against a genuinely clean sheet 21st century tank from South Korea the older Russian vehicles face prospects of a tremendous disadvantage.

The K2 combines relatively modest operational costs and maintenance needs with high mobility, an autoloader providing a high rate of fire and reduced crew requirements, aswell as double the engagement range of its Western counterparts. It also integrates a range of advanced sensors including a millimeter band radar, which provides high situational awareness both to each individual vehicle and to the broader network, including early warning of potential threats from anti-tank assets. While a lack of serious Western investment in new tanks after the Cold Wars end allowed Russia to remain complacent, introducing more modern tanks from South Korea into NATO quickly and in very large numbers can quickly transform the balance of power on the ground.

Polands acquisition of K2 tanks is likely to be particularly concerning for Moscow because, far from being isolated, it represents part of a broader trend toward cutting edge South Korean armaments making NATO forces near Russian territory far more potent than they would have otherwise been if relying on Western equipment. Lookin at the K2 alone, Turkey is expected to acquire over 1,000 of the tanks in the form of the domestically produced Altay derivative, while Norway and Finland are considered leading potential clients.

The K9 artillery piece, which similarly boasts many advantages over both Russian and Western rivals, is already operated by Estonia, Finland, Norway, and Turkey with Poland expected to field close to 1,000. The K9 already holds around half of the global tracked howitzer market and the overwhelming majority of the market for NATO-compatible tracked howitzers. Later in 2023, Poland is also expected to begin receiving the first of 288 Chunmoo rocket artillery systems, with Norway and Romania both considered likely clients.

Acquiring tanks and artillery even on very large scales, as Poland is doing, remains considerably cheaper than modernizing aviation or surface navies. Large acquisitions even of costly equipment like the K2, K9, and Chunmoo are thus viable even for lower income European countries. This and the sheer speed with which they can be delivered, where Western tanks often take close to half a decade after orders to begin deliveries, will require a major calculus shift for Russian security on its eastern border. Where the Russian and Western defense industrial bases have declined considerably since the end of the Cold War, South Koreas has grown rapidly, making it a potential game changer for NATOs position against Russia particularly for its ground forces.

Where NATO can rely on South Korean industry, however, Russia appears to have no similar partners abroad that can supply its forces. China has refrained from exporting arms to Russia. North Korea, likely largely due to ongoing U.N. arms embargoes, appears not to have made any particularly significant equipment transfers despite the growing sophistication of its latest defense products and their compatibility with those Russia fields.

South Korean arms supplies highlight the contrasting trends between the countrys defense sector and broader industrial base and those across the Western world over the past 30 years. These trends could make Russia pay a high price for neglecting the modernization of its ground forces equipment since 1992. Beyond Russia, European defense manufacturers, and Germany in particular, which supplied the continents primary battle tanks in the last two generations, are expected to be major losers as the contrast between what they and South Korean industry can deliver, not only in armor but a broad range of asset types, becomes increasingly clear.

Korean competition is expected to accelerate the trend toward European defense industrial decline. Pressure is already coming from the United States, especially in fighter aviation where the F-35 has won every single tender on the continent when going up against local fighters. What the F-35 has done in aviation, the K2, K9, Chunmoo, and other Korean land systems are now well positioned to do on the ground.

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South Korean Industry Arming NATO Is a Terrifying Prospect For ... - The Diplomat

I am convinced that Ukraine will become a member of the European Union and NATO, Czech President Petr Pavel, who arrived in Kyiv on Friday on a visit with Slovak President Zuzana aputov, said.

We brought the message to the Ukrainian authorities that we will be on their side. It is absolutely clear that Ukraine has fully deserved membership of NATO and the EU, Pavel said at a joint press conference with aputov and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

It [Ukraine] has earned it with its resilience, courage, opposition [to the Russian aggressor], and fight for freedom, Pavel noted, declaring that Prague is ready to share with Kyiv its experience on the road to membership.

The Presidents of the Czech Republic and Slovakia - Petr Pavel and Zuzana aputov - are in Ukraine. They witnessed the devastating effects of the...

The Ukrainian president also referred to the planned counter-offensive of the Ukrainian army and the supply of weapons necessary. Every aid given to Ukraine, air defense system, combat aircraft, every cannon and armored vehicle with the help of which we defend ourselves against Russian aggression is a rescue for our people, he said.

I believe that one of the main conclusions of our talks today should be that there can be no defense taboos in matters of security assistance. Any artificial restriction for Ukraine is another terrorist opportunity for the Russian Federation, Zelenskyy emphasized.

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I am sure Ukraine will become an EU and NATO member, says ... - TVP World

Switzerland aspires to work more closely with the Western defence alliance. But to do this, it must pay a heavy price: saying no, once and for all, to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

This content was published on April 26, 2023April 26, 2023

Where does Switzerland stand? Where is it heading? Its developments are my focus.

Last March, Swiss defence minister Viola Amherd met NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in Brussels. On the agenda was closer military cooperation. Russias attack on Ukraine has all but driven neutral Switzerland into the arms of the Western military alliance.

Being drawn under the NATO defence umbrella comes at a price, however. According to the newspaper Le TempsExternal link, Stoltenberg asked Amherd not to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The nuclear powers United States, France and Britain are thought to also be putting pressure on Switzerland to not join the treaty.

The TPNW was negotiated in 2017 by 122 states. So far 92 states have signed up and 68 have ratified it. All the nuclear powers were opposed to it, including NATO, which defines itself as a nuclear alliance.

This puts Switzerlands political leaders in an awkward position on a host of issues.

The TPNW declares nuclear weapons illegal, and its ultimate goal is step-by-step disarmament, ending with a nuclear-free world. That was also the aim of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, which was initiated by the nuclear powers themselves (US, France, Britain, Chinaand the Soviet Union). To this day the aspiration remains just that an aspiration.

The slow pace of nuclear disarmament eventually led to the TPNW. At first Switzerland had supported the treaty. A year later, however, the federal government decided not to sign it for defence-policy reasons. Ironically, it was Switzerland that had initiatedExternal link the process which led to the TPNW, on the occasion of a review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty back in 2010.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine shook the framework of European security to its foundations. NATO, which French President Emmanuel Macron had previously dismissed as brain-dead, is now getting a new lease of life with the accession of Finland, with once-neutral Sweden next in line to join the alliance.

Switzerland is not considering NATO membership, but wants a rapprochement. Since 1996, under the Partnership for PeaceExternal link, the Alpine country has held the status of NATO partner. This involves military cooperation and sharing of information and experiences. There are no binding legal obligations or automatic mechanisms involved, however and above all no obligation of collective defence, which NATO membership requires.

With rapprochement, Swiss army participation in NATO exercises and closer collaboration in the area of cyber-security and civil defence are conceivable.The goalExternal linkis to work out an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) by the summer. The IPCP is a new instrument devised by NATO for cooperation with partner states.

How soon if at all this agreement can be achieved is far from clear. Switzerland enjoys no great reputation in the alliance these days. Stoltenberg himself said after his meeting with Amherd in Brussels that several of the allies have reservations because Switzerland did not agree to them passing ammunition on to Ukraine. He was referring to the ban, on the grounds of Swiss neutrality, on re-exporting Swiss ammunition that had been sold to various European states years before.

That Western powers are putting pressure on Switzerland to reject the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is no great surprise. In the past, other states, including Germany and the then-neutral Sweden, were put under pressure not to sign the text.NATO is raising the price of friendship knowing that it does not depend on Switzerland, but that the opposite is true.

Domestically, however, the pressure is altogether different. The Swiss parliament has debated the merits of joining the TPNW, votedExternal link in favour of signing it, and called upon the government to do just that but so far without success. The government has put off signing the treaty, citing an ongoing review. A final decision is expected in the coming weeks.

If a nation wants to enjoy the protection of a nuclear alliance, then it needs to accept its nuclear deterrence capability: so goes the NATO argument. Still, signing up to the TPNW does not seem to be any grounds for exclusion: Austria and New Zealand have ratified the treaty, and are both still NATO partner states.

Swiss politicians and NGOs regularly call on the government to sign the treaty. As the depository state of the Geneva Conventions and with its proud humanitarian tradition, they say, Switzerland can hardly afford not to take a clear position on matters of nuclear disarmament. This year, for the first time, Switzerland is a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Joining the TPNW would thus have a symbolic effect.

Of course the conflict in Eastern Europe has shaken many certainties. Even inside traditionally NATO-sceptical groups in Switzerland, there is now less opposition to cosying up to the military alliance than in the past. The Russian invasion has led to new geostrategic realities in Europe though not necessarily of the kind that Russia was expecting.

During the Cold War, plans were afoot in Switzerland to develop the countrys own A-bomb. Fear of a nuclear exchange between the superpowers led to a wish to increase Switzerlands own military deterrence capability. So the Swiss government stated in 1958External link: In keeping with our centuries-old tradition of self-defence, this government is of the opinion that the army must have the most effective tools at its disposal to defend our independence and protect our neutrality. The atomic bomb is one of these tools.

This plan remained a pipe dreamdue to a lack of nuclear know-how, source of uranium and the financial resources required. In 1969 Switzerland pressured by the nuclear powers signed up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Swiss atomic bomb project was finally consigned to the bin in 1988.

Edited by Marc Leutenegger, adapted from German by Terence Macnamee/gw

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Progress made in pre-concept stage, Ministry of Defence expects concept phase to run over the next three years.

An update has been provided on the NATO Next Generation Rotorcraft Capability programme after Kevan Jones, MP for North Durham, inquired about the status of the project.

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what recent progress his Department has made on the NATO Next Generation Rotorcraft Capability project.

James Cartlidge, Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence, provided an update on the progress made.

Cartlidge explained that the UK has led the NGRC project through the Pre-Concept stage since the signing of the Letter of Intent (LOI) in October 2020. The project advanced to the Concept Phase, which is expected to last three years, following the signing of the NGRC Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on June 16, 2022.

Since the signing of the Letter of Intent (LOI) in October 2020, the UK has guided the NATO Next Generation Rotorcraft Capability (NGRC) project through the Pre-Concept stage. The NGRC Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed on 16 June 2022, marked the transition of the project to the Concept Phase which is expected to run over the next three years.

The NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) established the NGRC program office in November 2022. The office is currently drafting the Statements of Work and contracts for the initial concept studies. The Army, DSTL, and Defence Equipment and Support hold key positions within the Program Office, Steering Board, and Partnership Committee.

The NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) run NGRC program office was stood up in November 2022 and is currently writing the Statements of Work and contracts for the initial concept studies. The Army, DSTL and Defence Equipment and Support have pivotal roles within the Program Office, Steering Board, and Partnership Committee.

The NGRC project aims to develop a revolutionary rotorcraft that will remain relevant against future threats and serve as a suitable replacement for current fleets of medium helicopters used by the UK and NATO Allies.

We expect the NATO NGRC project to develop a transformational Next Generation Rotorcraft that will remain relevant against future threats and will be a suitable candidate to replace current fleets of Medium Helicopters in service with the UK and NATO Allies.

Cartlidge assured that the UK is fully engaged with the NATO NGRC project to explore options for potential replacements across Defence.

The UK is fully engaged with the NATO NGRC project to develop options for potential replacements across Defence.

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Update on UK involvement in NATO Next Gen Rotorcraft Project - UK Defence Journal

A delegation of Okanagan College students recently returned from a cross-Canada adventure where they took part in a unique exercise, to represent Spain and the United Kingdom in the Carleton Model NATO, participating in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Military Committee (MC).

Student representative Dandara Peraro de Sousa reflected on the experience, Model NATO was a great learning experience, I met incredible students from OC and universities in Canada, and now I understand better how NATO works and its role in current politics.

Despite facing unexpected obstacles, the team of students -Dandara, Alexander Riches, Charles Jones, and Foion Meeks and Professor Rosalind Warner pulled together for a full day of participation in Model NATO, an event held at Carleton University that simulates NATO decision making. The delegation had the opportunity to hear from guest speakers discussing Canada's role in world events and tackled issues such as energy, partnerships and security challenges faced by NATO countries.

The EAPC addressed three critical issues: European Energy Security, Eastern Flank Partnerships, and Caucasus Security Challenges. After a full day of deliberations, the Committee prepared a final consensus communique.

The Military Committee, which consists of the Chiefs of Defense (CHODS) of all NATO member countries, discussed issues related to NATO's defense and security, including security measures in the North, challenges of cybersecurity, and security along NATO's Eastern Flank. They also engaged in 'wargaming' using a variety of scenarios and crisis challenges.

In addition to the Model NATO, the delegation also had the opportunity to tour Canada's new Senate building and Parliament Hill.

Political science student Alexander Riches said it was a great experience. "Model NATO was an illuminating event for anyone hoping to learn more about the realities of modern international politics. I would recommend any political science students to take up this opportunity."

Professor Rosalind Warner expressed her gratitude to the Government of Canadas Canadian Defence and Security Network MINDs Collaborative Network Research Grant for making the event possible and funding the OC delegation's trip. She commended the OC students for their professionalism and preparation and stated that the event was enriching and provided valuable real-world experience that can be applied to their academic and professional pursuits.

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OC students represent Spain and the UK in Model NATO delegation - Okanagan College