Category Archives: History

On the far western edge of Yemen, far from any cities or well-traveled roads, theres a black mark in the desert, like a giant eye peering up from the earth. Regardless of how uncanny it looks from above, it is a natural phenomenon, a perfectly round and profoundly deep sinkhole called the Well of Barhout, or the Well of Hell. Its easy to see why. Without the help of wings or long ropes, anything that disappears into this 367-foot-deep hole is not going to come out.

For centuries, sinister legends have swirled around the Well of Barhout. Its said that visiting or even talking about it can bring bad luck. Its also said to be a prison for uncontrollable jinn, a range of spirits that haunt Islamic mythology. The jinn, according to legend, will claim the head of anyone brave (or foolish) enough to descend to the bottom. Yes, [locals] always told us about that, says geologist and caver Mohammad Al-Kindi, matter-of-factly. They also mentioned wild animals. They mentioned strange voices or people screaming below. They mentioned also that the air there is really bad. You will not be able to breathe. But despite all those warnings, Al-Kindi says he didnt feel any trace of fear before he recently became the first person to descend to the bottom (and come back up). His head remains attached to his body.

On a hot, clear September day, Al-Kindi and six other members of the Omani Caves Exploration Team (OCET) parked their four-wheel drives yards from the caves open maw. After an hour and a half of set-up, Al-Kindi, who had twice tried to make the descent before, was the first of five team members to rappel in. The set up was actually quite easy, he says, because its just a single drop and the rope doesnt touch the rock face at all. As soon as I went down the first 30 meters [100 feet], I could start seeing the details of the cave, its formations. I would be able to see if it had wild animals, crocodiles specifically, he adds with a laugh. (One local had suggested he might find them down there.) It was a very happy moment, just going down, enjoying the scene. That is, until he reached the end of his rope50 feet above the cave floor. Luckily, I had a walkie-talkie with me, he says, and he called up to ask for a longer rope to be sent down.

Actually, there was a concern more sinister than reptiles and spirits when Al-Kindi finally reached the bottom: unexploded ordnance. Since 2014, Yemen has been in the midst of a bloody civil war and, Al-Kindi explains, pilots sometimes drop bombs into caves, since people seek shelter inside. So that got me worried a bit, he says. Apart from that, it was a very enjoyable moment.

In total, the team spent around four to five hours exploring the bottom of the sinkhole. There are loads of beautiful cave deposits, says Al-Kindi, including stalagmites, stalactites, and even cave pearls (formed the same way stalagmites do, except in the presence of flowing water) gleaming beneath underground waterfalls. It also has its own kind of ecosystem, says Al-Kindi, with toads, snakes, beetles, birds, and lizards. For Al-Kindi, the whole experience was quite spectacular.

The goal of the expedition was to make the first documented study of the sinkhole, but dispelling the dark air thats hung around the geological formation came with the territory. Theres long been rumors of a terrible odor rising from the depths of the well, for example. Al-Kindi says that most of the cave smells fine except for certain areas and thats only because there are some birds that died and fell down to the floor and obviously as they decompose they smell bad. The snakes they saw are also a normal feature of sinkholes. Once they work their way down, theres a smorgasbord that falls from above, and few or no predators to keep their numbers down.

While the opening at the top of the sinkhole is about 98 feet across, the cave widens to 380 feet at its base. The 367-foot-deep cave passes through two layers of rock, Al-Kindi says. The top layer, about 200 feet thick, is porous and permeable allowing water to filter down to a second, less permeable layer, at which point it flows into the cave, creating four 150-foot tall waterfalls.

For millennia, this water was said to be poisonous. Even the prophet Muhammad knew better than to mess with it. In a hadith, a saying attributed to him, the prophet warns, the worst water on the face of the earth is the water at Wadi Barhut in Hadramawt, which is like locusts in comparison with other pests. It gushes in the morning and is dry by the evening.

When asked if the water is poisonous, Al-Kindi laughs. Well, apparently not, he says. Im still alive! He drank at least a bottle of it while he was down there. I also took samples and analyzed it with some colleagues in one of the local universities here in Oman, he adds. Its very fresh, very normal water.

Sam Lasman, an expert in Middle Eastern literature at the University of Cambridge, says that most of the wells sinister reputation likely comes from this seventh-century hadith. In the ninth or 10th century, This [hadith] gets interpreted into this idea of a barzakh, which is sort of like the Islamic limbo, he says. The souls of good people go to Zamzam, the best water in the world, and the souls of unbelievers or wicked people go to Barhout, the worst water in the world. Over the course of several centuries, Barhout shifts from a place with poisonous water to a place of sinful souls.

Personally, I dont think anything like what is described in this hadith exists, says Al-Kindi. I think all the caves have just normal features, including another site thats also been saddled with the infamous Barhout name. The term might also just apply to this region of Yemen.

Al-Kindi estimates the sinkhole could be several million years old, but its origin, too, is the subject of local legend. One legend says an ancient king forced jinn to carve the well as a place to hide his treasure. In others, the well has always served to contain evil, uncontrollable jinn.

In Islam, jinn are one of the three classes of intellectual beings, says Lasman, alongside humans and angels. While angels are bound by Gods will, jinn and humans possess free will. Humans are created from blood and earth, while jinn are created from smokeless fire, says Lasman. They occupy an invisible world, known in the Quran as Al-Ghaib. They have this sort of ephemeral, sometimes almost intangible quality. Theyre thought of as shapeshifters, he says. Like humans, jinn have the capacity for both good and evil. The jinn in the well were of an evil-choosing sort, known in Islam as the ifrit.

While most of the sinister reputation of the well can be explained by the hadith and its frankly intimidating appearance, its not entirely clear how it got associated with jinn, but thats also not a huge mystery. The association of jinn with scary places, dark places, subterranean places, vermin-infested places, thats everywhere in Islamic stories, says Lasman. Jinn can also disguise themselves as other creatures, in particular snakes or insects.

Al-Kindi guesses that there were local legends swirling around the cave long before the prophets hadith. If [people] dont know about a place, if they cant reach it, they will invent around it all kinds of stories, he says. Sometimes they do that for a reason. Maybe they want to prevent their kids from going there. Maybe they want to tell people that we do own this place, for instance, and we get support from jinn or ghosts or whatever.

Throughout the world, different cultures have their own version of jinn, human-like creatures that exist in a parallel, unseen world, from Japans onry to La Patasola in Colombia to Irelands Tuatha D Danann. Such creatures, Lasman says, offer a framework for understanding physical illness, mental illness, history, foreignness, various sorts of social mysteries, social traumas, and social obsessions in ways that a lot of different cultures find helpful.

Certainly, the OCET mission to the bottom of the Well of Barhout wont eradicate the millennia-old belief in Al-Ghaib and the beings who are said to reside there, but it will serve an educational purpose. Al-Kindi says that at one point a crowd of 80 locals had gathered to watch the cavers. At first they were full of warnings, but when Al-Kindi resurfaced unharmed, they gathered around, asking what he had seen. Al-Kindi answered their questions, showed them photos and even gave them samples of water and cave deposits. As news of the expedition has spread, Al-Kindi says, the findings have reassured people. What we did here I think is essential, because we changed peoples minds at least about one of these places.

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The History and Mystery of Yemens Well of Hell - Atlas Obscura

The all-time series between Oklahoma State and Iowa State appears close OSU owns a 33-19-3 advantage overall but it has definitively been a one-sided battle of late. OSU under Mike Gundy is 10-3 against the Cyclones under his tenure and 8-1 against them in the last nine meetings.

Thats not to say it hasnt been competitive the last three wins for OSU in the series are by an average of only six points but OSU has owned the series. And a win Saturday would mark its fifth consecutive win against ISU in Ames.

Lets dive into more of the numbers of this series history (with some fun nuggets courtesy of Winsipedia).

Iowa States last win in the series came in Stillwater in 2018 when it defeated No. 25 Oklahoma State 48-42. Brock Purdy, then a freshman, led ISU in passing and rushing. Taylor Cornelius threw for four touchdowns and 289 yards. Justice Hill had 66 yards on 24 carries and all of Tylan Wallace, Landon Wolf, Tyron Johnson and Jelani Woods scored touchdowns.

Of ISUs five wins in the series since 2000, only two 2001 (28-14) and 2005 (37-10) came by greater than single digits. Both games were in Ames.

The largest margin of victory for OSU in the series came in 2008 when it won 59-17. The largest margin of victory for ISU in the series came in 1971 when it won 54-0.

OSUs longest winning streak in the series spanned six games from 2012-2017. ISUs longest winning streak spanned four games from 1960-1963.

The first game in the all-time series between OSU and ISU was played in 1926. OSU won 13-0. The two schools did not play again until 1960.

Only once have these two teams not settled their battle in regulation. (That came, you guessed it, in a double OT affair in 2011. We need not discuss.) OSU has won three of its last four overtime games overall.

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Series History: OSU Owns Advantage Over ISU, and Has Dominated of Late - Pistols Firing

EAST RUTHERFORD, N.J. (AP) The game betweeen the Carolina Panthers and New York Giants on Sunday matches two struggling NFL teams. Theres so much more to the story, starting with the coaches.

Matt Rhule of the Panthers (3-3) and Joe Judge of the Giants (1-5) are going to be linked to the wild coaching searches that followed the 2019 season.

Rhule, a former Giants assistant who was coaching at Baylor, was considered the front-runner to replace Pat Shurmur with the Giants after a 4-12 season. He had an interview set with the team hierarchy in early January.

Panthers owner David Tepper went to Rhules home in Waco, Texas and beat the Giants to the punch. He offered Rhule seven-year, $9 million annually contract, and got an agreement.

Rhule allegedly offered the Giants a chance to match the deal. However, New York decided to hire Judge, the special teams coordinator for the Patriots.

I had a chance to have a conversation with them, Rhule said Thursday. I was unbelievably flattered, but the truth is it never really got to that point. I got offered the job in Carolina and took it. It just seemed like the right thing for us at the time.

The storylines extend beyond the coaches.

The game also was supposed to be a matchup of two of the NFLs best running backs: Christian McCaffrey of the Panthers and Saquon Barkley of the Giants. McCaffrey is on injured reserve with a hamstring injury and Barkley has a badly sprained ankle.

The contest also marks the return of former Jets quarterback Sam Darnold and wideout Robby Anderson to MetLife Stadium. Anderson left New Jersey two years ago and Darnold was traded to Carolina in the offseason.

Carolina has lost three games in a row. The Giants are coming off their two worst losses of the season.

I just want to win, baby, Giants safety Jabrill Peppers said. I want to make plays, go out there and win ballgames.

RUN THE ROCK

Rhule said the Panthers will recommit to the running game this week. He thinks they have become too pass heavy and he doesnt believe that Darnold throwing the ball 40 times per game is the formula for success. He wants at least 30 rushing attempts as the team looks to find an identity without McCaffrey. The halfback has missed the last three games with a hamstring injury.

Rookie running back Chuba Hubbard is expected to carry the load.

We have ran the ball well, but we have not been committed enough to running it and thats going to change, I can tell you right now, Rhule said.

ROTATING O-LINE

Injuries have caused the Giants to change their line in some way every game this season. With LT Andrew Thomas going on injured reserve this week with foot and ankle injuries, the line will change again. Expect Nate Solder or Matt Peart to replace Thomas, with the other starting on the right side. Billy Price and Will Hernandez probably will start at center and right guard, respectively, for the sixth straight week. The left guard will either be Matt Skura for the fourth straight week or Wes Martin. Judge said Corey Cunningham will rotate at both tackles in the game.

NO PASS RUSH

The Panthers are eager to do anything to generate a pass rush. They had 14 sacks in the first three games, but only two in the last three outings.

Panthers defensive end Brian Burns said opposing teams have been keeping an extra player in to protect the quarterback in recent games. Teams also have used three-step dropbacks and quick releases to reduce the sacks.

The (Vikings) put a tight end and a receiver on both sides usually when they were about to pass the ball, Burns said. They were really double-chipping frequently throughout the game. Just putting guys in our way just to mess with our eyes or whatever to slow us down.

DOWN DEFENSE

Giants coordinator Pat Graham got on his defense before the Rams game and asked them to respond. While he said the group played hard, opponents have been shredding the unit.

Quarterbacks are hitting 74% of their passes and the Giants have given up 44 and 38 points the last two games. The offense has helped opponents with turnovers.

Still stuff to clean up, whether its the run game, the pass game, all that stuff in all facets coaching as well, in terms of on me, Graham said. Im never complaining about the effort. I thought there were flashes. There were flashes and weve got to build on that for this week.

WHERES ROBBY?

Anderson has been a major disappointment since signing a three-year, $37.5 million contract extension this summer. He has failed to develop a chemistry with Darnold, which is perplexing considering they played together for two seasons with the Jets.

A year ago quarterback Teddy Bridgewater targeted Anderson 51 times in the first six games and he caught 40 catches for 566 yards and one touchdown. Through six games this year Anderson has been targeted 40 times by Darnold and has 15 receptions for 190 yards and two touchdowns.

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AP Sports Writer Steve Reed contributed to this report.

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Rhule and Judge have history as Panthers face Giants - Associated Press

Hunter Renfroe tied an embarrassing MLB postseason record in Red Sox ALCS loss

Hunter Renfroe has fallen apart at the worst possible time for the Boston Red Sox.

Instead of stepping up in the ALCS, he has taken a massive step back, and not only could it cost them the series, its also historically bad for him, personally.

On Wednesday night, Renfroe went 0-for-3 with a strikeout as the Red Sox fell to the Astros 9-1 in Game 5.

Worse yet, Renfroe tied two MLB records in Game 5, when he ground into his fifth double play of the postseason. According to Alex Speier, Irv Noren of the 1955 Yankees was the only other player in postseason history to have multiple multi-GIDP games in a single postseason. Five GIDP is also the postseason record, so Renfroe tied that, too.

Ironically, the last player to have five GIDP was former Sox infielder Julio Lugo, during the 2007 championship run.

Renfroe started the postseason with a six-game hitting streak that stretched from the Wild Card game through Game 1 of the ALCS. Since then, he is hitless in 11 bats over the last four games, with six strikeouts, though he did have two walks in both Games 3 and 4.

That the Red Sox went from setting a postseason record with multiple grand slams to setting one for GIDP is fitting of the feast-or-famine narrative that has surrounded this team all season and for much of the last two decades. Theyve swung from worst to first and back again multiple times, as evidenced by the last-place seasons in between their four championships. While theyve certainly bounced back faster than most rebuilding teams, the whiplash is starting to sting. Now, in this series, they went from a commanding 2-1 series lead to looking like lifeless victims, down 3-2 to the Astros.

At this point, Renfroe is overdue for the kind of major moment that endeared him to fans in the regular season. After all, he hit 31 homers and drove in 96 runs before the postseason, and led MLB in outfield assists, surpassing any of Mookie Betts seasons in Boston.

Hopefully, Renfroe can find his bat power before its too late.

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Hunter Renfroe makes postseason history in the worst way in Red Sox loss - BoSox Injection

Photo: Twentieth Century Fox

Variety reports today that Hulu has signed a streaming-series deal with an upstart wunderkind comedy filmmaker by the name of Mel Brooks. After 40 years, the director and screenwriter is finally penning the follow-up to his 1981 farce, History of the World, Part I. Brooks will write and executive-produce the series, naturally called History of the World, Part II, alongside a stacked team including Wanda Sykes, Nick Kroll, and Ike Barinholtz. I cant wait to once more tell the real truth about all the phony baloney stories the world has been conned into believing are History! Brooks saidadorably.

The first History of the World covered historical ground real and imagined, ranging from prehistory to biblical times to the French Revolution to a sci-fi future, but theres still a ton of untapped material for Brooks & Co. to work with on the series, which will be available to stream in 2022. The whole thing could be made up of historical events from the 40-year hiatus between History of the World installments and wed still eat it up. How about a sketch from the 95-year-old Brooks on the rise of the Kardashians, hmmm? Were not saying it wouldnt work

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40 Years Later, Mel Brooks Is Making History of the World, Part II - Vulture

WASHINGTON The Biden administration has approved a significant and permanent increase in the levels of food stamp assistance available to needy familiesthe largest single increase in the programs history.

Families in October have seen the average benefits for food stamps (officially known as the SNAP program) rise more than 25 percent above pre-pandemic levels. The increased assistance is indefinite to all 42 million SNAP beneficiaries.

The aid boost was first reported by The New York Times and the details were confirmed by a spokeswoman for the Department of Agriculture. They were formally announced by Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack.

The aid boost is being packaged as a major revision of the USDAs Thrifty Food Plan. In concrete terms, the average monthly per-person benefits will rise from $121 to $157.

The increase is part of a multi-pronged Biden administration effort to strengthen the countrys social safety net. Poverty and food security activists maintain that longstanding inadequacies in that safety net were laid bare by the COVID-19 pandemic, presenting an opportunity to make generational improvements that reach beyond the current public health crisis.

Activists say the previous levels of pre-pandemic SNAP assistance simply werent enough, forcing many households to choose cheaper, less nutritious options or simply go hungry as the funds ran low toward the end of the month.

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SNAP (food stamps) benefits have largest increase in history - WTRF

Italy witnessed the start of a new chapter in history this week following the first flight of ITA Airways. This event was the latest in a series of twists and turns that the countrys air travel market has gone through over the last century. With this latest move, lets take a brief look at the history of Italian aviation.

Unlike several European nations, Italy was late to the commercial aviation party. It had its hands in military projects but didnt initially take the leap in the civil sector until the 1920s.

The first modern aviation operation founded by the government was Aero Expresso Italiana (AEI), which was formed on December 12th, 1923. Yet, it would take three years for this company to offer flights. The airline was soon followed by Societ Area Avio Linee Italiane (ALI), Societ Italiana Servizi Aerei (SISA), the Societ Area Navigazione Aerea (SANA), and Societ Area Mediterranea (SAM) as members of the Italian aviation community.

The U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission shares that ALI was the only Italian aviation outfit that wasnt state-supported. It was backed by the vehicle powerhouse, Fiat. It would be SISA, SANA, and SAM that would dominate the majority of the market, transporting approximately 10,000 passengers each year by the turn of the 1930s.

This was an impressive figure, as activity was sparse during the mid-1920s. This quick rise helped Italy have the third-busiest air travel industry, behind Germany and France. The airlines helped passengers connect to neighboring European and North African countries.

During the 1930s, Italy followed a trend across Europe and consolidated its industry. As a result, SAM, SANA, and SISA merged to form Ala Littoria in the summer of 1934. The new state-owned outfit gave Benito Mussolinis government an opportunity to showcase the countrys resources. Notably, the authorities wanted to use the operations to conquer land across the Mediterranean and Africa. In effect, Ala Littoria helped connect the Italian mainland with other territories.

Aircraft used during this period included the Dornier Wal and Super-Wal, Junkers G-24 and F.13, and Fokker F.7b. The Caproni and Savoia-Marchetti flying boats were also spotted. Planes produced in Italy became more and more fashionable as nationalism rose heading into the 1940s. Thus, the likes of the Savoia-Marchetti S.73 monoplane increased their presence.

After overcoming challenges with long-haul expansion, Ala Littoria began passenger service between the likes of Rome and Mogadishu, Somalia, opening up new opportunities for Italian air travel. However, the airline had to cease operations due to World War II. Only the independent ALI managed to continue some sort of service, which was between Italy and fellow Axis power Germany.

After the fall of WWII, Europe saw a rebooted aviation economy. The new-look industry saw exciting passenger segments arise. International powerhouses such as Trans World Airlines (TWA) and British European Airways (BEA) helped the Italian market to regroup with crucial funding. From this financing, Aerolinee Italiane Internazionali (Alitalia) and Linee Aeree Italiane (LAI) emerged. The airlines helped kick off a consistent commercial aviation scene in Italy, which grew during the 1950s.

The two carriers united in September 1957. The Alitalia name remained, which became a staple in its country for decades to come.

Alitalia merged with LAI and became Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane with 3,000 employees and a fleet of 37 aircraft. In the international airline company rankings, Alitalia jumped from 20th to 12th place. Alitalia was the official carrier of the Rome Olympics and for the first time carried more than 1 million passengers in one year. The first jets entered service, the new Leonardo da Vinci airport in Fiumicino was opened and Alitalia transferred its operations base here, Alitalia stated.

(Between 1969 and 1970,) Alitalia modified its logo and aircraft livery: the Winged Arrow was replaced by the tri-color A. The Boeing 747 jumbo jet entered service and Alitalia became the first European airline company to fly with an all jet fleet. The fleet renewal continued with the insertion of the Airbus A300, twin-engine jets with great capacity, and the new MD Super 80 for medium-haul flights, while the B747 Combi became part of the fleet, permitting greater flexibility in passenger and cargo transport.

The introduction of the trijet MD-11 in the early 1990s helped Italian passengers fly direct over 12,000 km (6,480 NM). During this period, Giorgio Armani designed new uniforms for Alitalia, and he also helped with the cabin design amid the launch of the carriers MilleMiglia Program.

The turn of the millennium saw Alitalia start its downward spiral. European deregulation created tight competition across the continent, in a similar manner that saw the rise of new players and the collapse of veterans in the United States.

Officials also attempted to privatize the national carrier, and during this era, passenger service began to decline and a rise in trade union tensions. The Italian government kept pumping money into Alitalia over the years to support it following labor difficulties.

Worryingly, 1998 was the only year that Alitalia reported a profit. Moreover, it reported net losses of over 3.7 billion between 1999 and 2008, and the operator declared bankruptcy in 2017 due to its overwhelming financial difficulty and lack of investment.

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Several attempts at rejuvenating Italys aviation industry in recent years were conducted. There were high hopes with Air Italys rebranding in 2018, a name that traced its roots back to 2005 under the ownership of Meridiana, which was a privately owned airline that was formed 58 years ago. However, Air Italy ceased operations in early 2020, giving it a lifespan of fewer than two years.

Nonetheless, prospects look like they are finally on the right track again with the formation of ITA, the new flag carrier of Italy, which commenced operations just this week after Alitalias closure. There are clear intentions of a fresh start with this outfit amid the revelation of a new blue livery. The new airline plans to have over 100 aircraft by the middle of the decade as it follows a more focused path.

What are your thoughts about the history of Italian aviation? What do you make of the changes in the countrys market over the years? Let us know what you think about the journey in the comment section.

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A Brief History Of The Italian Aviation Industry - Simple Flying

This article is a part of our inaugural Next Wave Awards. For the full list of 2021 winners, check out the whole series here.

With bourbons popularity continuing to surge, Uncle Nearest Premium Whiskey is setting itself apart from the pack. Not only is it the best-selling African-American-founded spirit brand in history, it is the fastest-growing American whiskey of all time and it continues to rack up awards.

At its helm is Fawn Weaver, CEO and founder of Grand Sidney, Inc., the private investment company that owns and operates Uncle Nearest. Weaver, who considers herself a serial entrepreneur, is also a New York Times best-selling author and philanthropist.

Don't miss a drop!

Weaver founded Uncle Nearest back in 2016, a Tennessee Whiskey brand named in honor of Nathan Uncle Nearest Green, a former slave who became one of Tennessees premier whiskey distillers. Though Greens account never made its way into history books or mainstream journals, Weaver discovered his forgotten story that he was the one who first taught Jack Daniel how to distill whiskey, and became the Tennessee Whiskey brands first master distiller.

Crafted with Greens legacy in mind, Uncle Nearest now offers three unique whiskeys: 1820 Single Barrel, 1856 Premium Aged Whiskey, and 1884 Small Batch.

Weaver is also the founder of the Nearest Green Foundation, a non-profit organization that offers full college scholarships to each of Greens descendants. The foundation has also worked to provide personal protective equipment (PPE) to frontline workers and to disadvantaged communities amid the Covid-19 pandemic.

This June, Weaver launched the Uncle Nearest Venture Fund, a $50 million venture capital fund intended to help grow women- and BIPOC-owned and founded businesses in an effort to diversify the industry and uplift business owners like her.

That same month, Uncle Nearest reopened the doors to its 323-acre distillery in Shelbyville, Tenn. Weaver says that one of the best parts about her job has been seeing the absolute amazement and wonder when people walk through the doors of Nearest Green Distillery. Whatever they were expecting before they arrived is always surpassed.

Between amplifying Black history and raising money to make the industry a better place, theres no telling whats next for Weaver and Uncle Nearest. But for now, Weaver is focusing on her continuous efforts to provide whiskey lovers with new and delicious spirits. Our premium Tennessee whiskey that we began laying down in 2017 and 2018 is coming of age, she says. I just had the pleasure of tasting some today thats nearly ready, and I am excited for the world to get a sip of what weve been maturing. Its so good!

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Uncle Nearest's Fawn Weaver Is Using Whiskey to Amplify Black History and Diversify the Industry - VinePair

Is the world entering a new cold war? Our answer is yes and no. Yes if we mean a protracted international rivalry, for cold wars in this sense are as old as history itself. Some became hot, some didnt: no law guarantees either outcome. No if we mean the Cold War, which we capitalize because it originated and popularized the term. That struggle took place at a particular time (from 194547 to 198991), among particular adversaries (the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies), and over particular issues (postWorld War II power balances, ideological clashes, arms races). None of those issues looms as large now, and where parallels do existgrowing bipolarity, intensifying polemics, sharpening distinctions between autocracies and democraciesthe context is quite different.

Its no longer debatable that the United States and China, tacit allies during the last half of the last Cold War, are entering their own new cold war: Chinese President Xi Jinping has declared it, and a rare bipartisan consensus in the United States has accepted the challenge. What, then, might previous conteststhe one and only Cold War and the many earlier cold warssuggest about this one?

The future is, of course, less knowable than the past, but its not in all respects unknowable. Time will continue to pass, the law of gravity will still apply, and none of us will outlive our physiological term limits. Are similarly reliable knowns shaping the emerging cold war? If so, what unknowns lurk within them? Thucydides had such predictabilities and surprises in mind when he cautioned, 24 centuries ago, that the future would resemble the past but not in all respects reflect iteven as he also argued that the greatest single war of his time revealed timeless truths about all wars to come.

Our purpose here, then, is to show how the greatest unfought war of our timethe Soviet-American Cold Waras well as other prior struggles, might expand experience and enhance resilience in a Sino-American rivalry whose future, hot or cold, remains unclear. That history provides a framework within which to survive uncertainty, and possibly even thrive within it, whatever the rest of the twenty-first century throws our way.

Our first known is geography, which continental drift will in time alter, but not in our time. China will remain chiefly a land power, beset by an ancient dilemma. If, in search of strategic depth, it tries to expand its perimeters, it is likely to overstretch its capabilities and provoke resistance from anxious neighbors. If, to regain solvency, it contracts its perimeters, it risks inviting in enemies. Even behind great walls, uneasy lie the heads of those whose boundaries remain unfixed.

The United States, in contrast, benefits from boundaries that geography has determined. Thats why the United Kingdom, after 1815, chose not to contest its offsprings primacy in North America: sustaining armies across 3,000 miles of ocean would have been too costly even for the worlds greatest naval power. Geography gave the Americans hybrid hegemony: control of a continent and unimpeded access to two vast oceans, which they quickly connected with a transcontinental railroad. That allowed them to develop the military-industrial means with which to rescue Europeans in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War from the attempted continental consolidations they confronted.

Why, though, from so safe a perch, did the Americans undertake such daunting commitments? Perhaps they looked in the mirror and feared what they saw: their own example of a country dominating a continent and its oceanic approaches. The trigger warning was Russias completion of its trans-Siberian railroad in 1904, a slapdash project soon overtaken by war and revolutionbut not before eliciting the British geopolitician Halford Mackinders portentous warning that heartland control of Eurasian rimlands could empower new and globally ambitious forms of hybrid hegemony. President Woodrow Wilson had that prospect in mind when he declared war on imperial Germany in 1917, and President Franklin Roosevelt took the argument one step further in 194041, insistingcorrectly, historians have now confirmedthat Adolf Hitlers ultimate target was the United States itself. So when the American diplomat George Kennan, in 1947, called for containing an emboldened World War II ally, the Soviet Union, he had long legacies on which to draw.

Xis Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) evokes similar concerns. The belt is to be a network of rail and road corridors across Eurasia. The road will be sea routes in the Indo-Pacific and, if global warming permits, also in the Arctic, sustained by bases and ports in states made friendly by the BRI's benefits. Nothing Germans or Russians ever attempted combined such ambition with such specificity: China seeks hybrid hegemony on an unprecedented scale. Which brings us to our first unknown: What might that imply for Eurasia and the world beyond?

Theres a remarkable record, over the past three centuries, of offshore balancers thwarting aspirants to onshore domination: first Great Britain against France in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, then an Anglo-American coalition against Germany twice during the first half of the twentieth century, followed by a U.S.-led coalition against the Soviet Union in the second half. Its too easy to claim that maritime states project power without generating resistance, for if that were the case, colonialism would still thrive. But the relationship between geography and governance is clear enough to be our second known.

ContinentsNorth America exceptedtend to nurture authoritarians: where geography fails to fix boundaries, harsh hands claim the right and duty to do so, whether as protection from external dangers or to preserve internal order. Liberty, in these situations, is decreed from the top down, not evolved from the bottom up. But that holds such regimes responsible for what happens. They cant, as democracies regularly do, spread the blame. Autocracies that fall shortsuch as the Soviet Unionrisk hollowing themselves out from within.

Chinas postCold War leaders, having compulsively studied the Soviet example, sought to avoid repeating it by transforming Marxism into consumer capitalism without at the same time allowing democracy. They thereby flipped what they saw as Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachevs greatest error: permitting democracy without ensuring prosperity. This latest rectification of namesthe ancient Chinese procedure of conforming names to shifting realitiesseemed until recently to have succeeded. The Chinese leader Deng Xiaopings post-Mao pro-market reforms solidified support for the regime and made China a model for much of the rest of the world. Xi, on taking power, was widely expected to continue along that path.

But he hasnt. Instead, Xi is cutting off access to the outside world, defying international legal norms, and encouraging Wolf Warrior diplomacy, none of which seems calculated to win or retain allies. At home, he is enforcing orthodoxy, whitewashing history, and oppressing minorities in ways defunct Russian and Chinese emperors might have applauded. Most significant, he has sought to secure these reversals by abolishing his own term limits.

Hence our second unknown: Why is Xi undoing the reforms, while abandoning the diplomatic subtlety, that allowed Chinas rise in the first place? Perhaps he fears the risks of his own retirement, even though these mount with each rival he imprisons or purges. Perhaps he has realized that innovation requires but may also inspire spontaneity within his country. Perhaps he worries that increasingly hostile international rivals wont allow him unlimited time to achieve his aims. Perhaps he sees the prevailing concept of world order itself as at odds with a mandate from Heaven, Marx, or Mao.

Or it could be that Xi envisions a world order with authoritarianism at its core and with China at its center. Technology, he may expect, will make human consciousness as transparent as satellites made the earths surface during the Cold War. China, he may assume, will never alienate its foreign friends. Expectations within China, he may suppose, will never find reasons not to rise. And Xi, as he ages, will gain in the wisdom, energy, and attentiveness to detail that only he, as supreme leader, can trust himself to provide.

But if Xi really believes all of this, then hes already losing sight of the gaps between promises and performance that have long been Catch-22s for authoritarian regimes. For if, like Gorbachevs predecessors did, you ignore such fissures, theyll only worsen. But if, like Gorbachev himself, you acknowledge them, youll undermine the claim to infallibility on which legitimacy in an autocracy must rest. That is why graceful exits by authoritarians have been so rare.

Democracy in America has its own gaps between promises and performance, so much so that it seems at times to suffer from Brezhnev-like paralysis. The United States differs from China, though, in that distrust of authority is constitutionally mandated. The separation of powers secures a center of gravity to which the nation can return after whatever bursts of activity crises may have demanded. The result is what evolutionary biologists call punctuated equilibrium: a resilience rooted in rapid recovery from unforeseen circumstances. China has it the other way around. Respect for authority permeates its culture, but stability is punctuated by protracted upheavals when authority fails. Recovery, in the absence of gravity, can require decades. Autocracies often win sprints, but smart investors put their marathon money on democracies. Our third known, then, is sharply different roots of resilience.

The pattern emerges clearly from the two costliest civil wars of the nineteenth century. The Taiping Rebellion of 185064 took some 20 million Chinese lives, about five percent of the population. The American Civil War of 186165 killed 750,000 combatants, 2.5 percent of a much less crowded country. And yet by the testimony of its current leaders, China after the Taiping Rebellion underwent decades of turmoil from which it emerged only with Maos proclamation of the Peoples Republic in 1949. The United States, by that same account, recovered quickly enough to join the European predators victimizing China at the end of the nineteenth century and has continued doing so ever since. Leave aside issues of accuracy in this view of history. Our point is that Xis growing reliance on this narrative and the nationalism it stokes implies an inflammability in Chinese culture that is currently useful to the regimebut that might not be easily extinguished.

Hence our third unknown: Can Xi turn internal outrage on and off, as Mao did repeatedly during his years in power? Or is Xi locking himself into the same dependence on external hostility without which Joseph Stalin, as Kennan put it in 1946, did not know how to rule? Because nothing could reassure such a regime, Kennan insisted, only cumulative frustrations would convince Stalin or, more likely, his successors that it was in their best interests to alter their systems worst aspects. That strategy depended, however, on neither side setting deadlines: Kennan carefully pointed out that it would never have worked with Hitler, who had a fixed timetable, dictated by his own mortality, for achieving his aims.

Mao, craftily, gave his regime 100 years to recover Taiwan. Xi has ruled out passing that problem from generation to generation, although he has not yet set a date for resolving it. Nonetheless, his increasingly aggressive rhetoric adds to the risk that the Taiwan issue could cause a Sino-American cold war to become hot, for the United States has deliberately left its own Taiwan policy unclear. All of which eerily evokes how Europe went to war in 1914: an ambiguity of great-power commitments combined with the absence of an escalation off switch.

Except that we have, in the Cold War, an intervening known to draw on: how that conflict transformed itself into a long peace. The first half of the twentieth century offered no support for the idea that great-power rivalries could be resolved peacefully. A future war with Soviet Russia, the American diplomat Joseph Grew predicted in 1945, is as certain as anything in the world can be certain. What allowed the Cold War superpowers to escape that prospect, and how relevant are those circumstances today?

One answer is that history itself during those years became prophecy. Given what most leaders had experienced in a second world war, few anywhere were eager to risk a third. It helped also that those in Washington and Moscow, if for different reasons, saw time as an ally: the Americans because the strategy of containment relied on time to thwart Soviet ambitions, Stalin because he expected time to produce fratricidal capitalist wars that would ensure proletarian revolutionary triumphs. Once Stalins successors realized the extent of his miscalculations, it was too late to reverse their effects. The Soviet Union spent the rest of the Cold War failing to catch up.

But what if determinations to avoid the next war fade with the memories of the last one? Thats how some historians have explained World War I: a century had passed without a European great war. Does it matter that three-quarters of a century now separate American and Chinese leaders from the great wars of their predecessors? Americans have had some combat experience in the limited and low-intensity conflicts in which they have been involvedwith decidedly mixed resultsbut the Chinese, except for their brief invasion of Vietnam in 1979, havent fought any significant wars for more than half a century. That may be why Xi, with his heads bashed bloody rhetoric, seems to celebrate bellicosity: he may not know what its costs can be.

Taiwanese military exercises near Pingtung, Taiwan, April 2010

A second way in which historians have explained the long peace is that nuclear weapons suppressed optimism about how wars might end. Theres no way to know for sure what deterrence in the Cold War deterred: thats a history that didnt happen. But this in itself suggests a balanced lack of resolve, for whatever Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and U.S. President John F. Kennedy may have said publicly, neither wanted to die for Berlin. Instead, they accepted a walled city inside a partitioned country in the middle of a divided continent. No grand design could have produced such an oddity, and yet it held up until the Cold War evolved its own peaceful, if equally unexpected, end. None of this could have happened without nuclear capabilities, for only they could put lives on the line simultaneously in Washington and Moscow.

So what about Washington and Beijing? Even with recent enhancements, the Chinese deploy less than ten percent of the number of nuclear weapons the United States and Russia retain, and that number is only 15 percent of what the two superpowers had at the height of the Cold War. Does this matter? We doubt it, given what Khrushchev achieved in 1962: despite a nine-to-one disadvantage in nuclear weapons, he deterred the postBay of Pigs invasion of Cuba that Kennedy had been planning. The United States has lived ever since with its own adjacent anomaly: a communist island in the middle of its self-proclaimed Caribbean sea of influence.

Its even less plausible today that the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend Taiwan, for that island is more important to Beijing than Cuba or Berlin ever was to Moscow. Yet that implausibility could lead Xi to believe that he can invade Taiwan without risking a U.S. nuclear response. Chinas growing cyber- and antisatellite capabilities may also encourage him, for they bring back possibilities of surprise attacks that the Cold Wars reconnaissance revolution seemed, for decades, to have diminished.

But then what? What would Xi do with Taiwan if he captured it? The island is not Hong Kong, an easily controlled city. Nor is it Crimea, with a largely acquiescent population. Nor are other big islands in the regionJapan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealandteetering dominoes. Nor would the United States, with its unmatched power-projection capabilities, be likely to sit idly by, as the Chinese might put it: ambiguity means keeping options open, not ruling out any response at all.

One such response might be to exploit the overstretch that comes from Chinas forcefully expanding its perimeters, the self-created problem that once plagued Moscow. Suppressing the Prague Spring was simple enough for the Soviet Union in 1968, until military morale plummeted when the Czechs made it clear to their occupiers that they didnt feel liberated. The Brezhnev Doctrinethe commitment to act similarly wherever else socialism might be at riskalarmed more than it reassured the leaders of other such states, notably Mao, who secretly began planning his 1971 opening to Washington. By the time the Soviet Union invoked the doctrine again, in Afghanistan in 1979, it had few allies left anywhere and none on whose reliability it could count.

Xis threats to Taiwan could have a similar effect in states surrounding China, which may in turn look for their own openings to Washington. Extravagant Chinese claims in the South China Sea have already increased anxieties in that region: witness Australias unexpected alignment with the Americans and the British on nuclear submarines, as well as Indias expanded cooperation with Indo-Pacific allies. Central Asians may not indefinitely ignore repressions of Tibetans and Uyghurs. Debt traps, environmental degradation, and onerous repayment terms are souring recipients on the BRIs benefits. And Russia, the original source of early-twentieth-century concerns about the heartland, could now find itself surrounded by Chinese rimlands in Asia, eastern and southeastern Europe, and even the Arctic.

All of which raises the possibility that American unipolarity may end not with a precarious Sino-American bipolarity but with a multipolarity that restrains Beijing by making assertiveness self-defeating. Metternich and Bismarck would have approved. So would a crafty American Cold Warrior who, following their example, hoped to deploy a similar strategy. I think it will be a safer world and a better world, President Richard Nixon told Time magazine in 1972, if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other.

Our final known is the inescapability of surprises. International systems are anarchic, theorists tell us, in that no component within them is fully in control. Strategy may reduce uncertainty but will never eliminate it: humans are fallible, and artificial intelligences will surely be also. There are, though, patterns of competition across time and space. It may be possible to derive from theseespecially from the Soviet-American Cold Warcategories of surprises likely to occur in the Sino-American cold war.

Existential surprises are shifts in the arenas within which great powers compete, for which neither is responsible but that endanger them both. U.S. President Ronald Reagan had this in mind when he surprised Gorbachev at their first meeting, in 1985, with the claim that a Martian invasion would force the United States and the Soviet Union to settle their differences overnight: Werent nuclear weapons at least as dangerous? Martians havent yet arrived, but we do face two new existential threats: the accelerating rate of climate change and the almost overnight outbreak, in 2020, of a global pandemic.

Neither is unprecedented. Climates have always fluctuated, which is why it used to be possible to walk from Siberia to Alaska. Thucydides described the plague that struck Athens in 430 BC. What is new is the extent to which globalization has accelerated these phenomena, raising the question of whether geopolitical rivals can collaboratively address the deep histories that are increasingly altering their own.

The Soviet-American Cold War showed that cooperation to avoid catastrophe need not be explicit: no treaty specified that nuclear weapons, after 1945, would not again be used in war. Instead, existential dangers produced tacit cooperation where negotiated formalities almost surely would have failed. Climate change may present similar opportunities in the Sino-American cold war, even if COVID-19 has so far spurred only Chinese abrasiveness. The point should be to keep landing sites for Martian equivalents opennot to welcome existential problems but to explore whether collaborative outcomes can result from them.

Intentional surprises originate in efforts by single competitors to startle, confuse, or dismay their adversaries. Surprise attacks, as on Pearl Harbor, fit this category, and intelligence failures can never be ruled out. The Cold Wars greatest surprises, however, arose from reversals of polarity, of which Mao was a master. When he leaned east, in 194950, he blindsided the Truman administration and opened the way for the Korean War and a communist offensive in Asia. When he leaned west, in 197071, he made the United States an ally while rendering the Soviet Union vulnerable on two fronts, a disadvantage from which it never recovered.

Thats why an American opening to Moscow might someday turn it against Beijing. The original Sino-Soviet split took two decades to develop, with the Eisenhower administration seeking to speed the process by driving Mao into a mutually repulsive relationship with Khrushchev. Xis BRI may be accomplishing this on its own with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has long complained about U.S. containment of Russia. Chinese containment, from the Kremlins perspective, may ultimately become the greater danger.

A wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow, May 2015

One other form of intentional surprise comes from supposed subordinates who turn out not to be. Neither Washington nor Moscow wanted the offshore island crises of 195455 and 1958: Chiang Kai-shek, in Taipei, and Mao, in Beijing, made them happen. The communist leader Walter Ulbrichts warnings of an imminent East German collapse forced Khrushchev to provoke the Berlin crises of 195859 and 1961. Smaller powers pursuing their own agendas derailed Soviet-American dtente in the 1970s: Egypt by attacking Israel in 1973; Cuba by intervening in Africa in 197577; and Hafizullah Amin in Afghanistan, whose reported contacts with U.S. officials triggered a self-defeating Soviet invasion in 1979. None of this, though, was unprecedented: Thucydides showed Corinth and Corcyra doing something similar to the Spartans and the Athenians 24 centuries earlier.

The potential for tails wagging dogs in the Sino-American cold war is already evident: rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait have resulted as much from changes in Taiwanese politics in recent years as from deliberate decisions in Washington or Beijing. And while China is trying, through the BRI, to create a system that maximizes its power, it may end up building, through its relationships with insecure and unstable regimes, just the sort of inverse dependency that vexed the Cold War superpowers. That can be a formula for volatility: history is full of instances in which local actors embroiled larger powers.

Finally, there are systemic surprises. The Cold War ended in a way no one at the time had expected: with the sudden collapse of a superpower and its accompanying ideology. Two visionaries who had foreseen such a possibility, however, were that doctrines mid-nineteenth-century founders, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Capitalism, they were sure, would eventually destroy itself by creating too great a gap between the means of production and the benefits it distributed. Kennan, a century later, turned Marx and Engels upside down. The gap between productive means and distributed benefits would instead, he insisted in 194647, bring about the collapse of communism within the Soviet Union and its postWorld War II satellite states. Kennan didnt welcome what finally happened in 199091: the implosion of the Soviet Union itself was too great a disruption in the balance of power even for him. But he did understand how stresses within societies can themselves greatly surprise.

No one can predict when some new geopolitical earthquake might occur: geological earthquakes are difficult enough to anticipate. Geologists do know, however, where to expect them: that is why California gets earthquake warnings but Connecticut does not. Does the very brittleness of authoritarian regimestheir strange belief in the immortality of top-down command structuresleave them similarly vulnerable? Or does the entrenched recalcitrance of democraciestheir resistance to being commandedpose even greater dangers to them? Only time will tell, probably sooner than we expect.

This aggregation of knowns, unknowns, and surprises leaves us with the historical equivalent of a three-body problem: given the coexistence of predictability and its opposite, well know the outcome only when weve seen it. Strategy, however, doesnt have that luxury. Its success requires living with uncertainties, of which the future will not be in short supply. The strategy of containment, although imperfect in its accomplishments and at times tragic in its failures, did successfully manage its own contradictions while buying the time necessary for those within the Soviet system to become obvious, even, in the end, to its own leaders.

It did this chiefly by combining simplicity of conception with flexibility in application, for even the clearest of destinations may not always, or even often, reveal the paths by which to reach them. It may be necessary, for example, to cooperate with Stalin to defeat Hitler, or with Tito to resist Stalin, or with Mao to confound Brezhnev: not all evils are equally so at all times. Nor are arms buildups always bad or negotiations always good: Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, and Reagan employed both to begin transformations of the adversaries confronting them. Kennan distrusted such elasticities in the pursuit of containment, but it was precisely this maneuverability that ensured the strategys safe arrival at its intended destination.

A second way in which containment succeeded was by treating spontaneity as a strength. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was as much a European as an American creation, in striking contrast to its Moscow-dominated rival, the Warsaw Pact. Nor, outside of Europe, did the United States insist on ideological uniformity among its friends. The objective instead was to make diversity a weapon against a rival bent on suppressing it: to use the resistance to uniformity embedded within distinctive histories, cultures, and faiths as a barrier against the homogenizing ambitions of would-be hegemons.

A third asset, although it didnt always seem so at the time, was the American election cycle. Quadrennial stress tests for containment unnerved its architects, upset sympathetic pundits, and alarmed overseas allies, but they were at least safeguards against ossification. No long-term strategy can succeed if it allows aspirations to outrun its capabilities or capabilities to corrupt its aspirations. How, though, do strategists develop the self-awarenessand the self-confidenceto acknowledge that their strategies are not working? Elections are, for sure, blunt instruments. They are better, though, than having no means of reconsideration apart from the demise of aged autocrats, the timing of whose departure from this world is not given to their followers to know.

There are thus, in the United States, no exclusively foreign affairs. Because Americans proclaim their ideals so explicitly, they illustrate departures from them all the more vividly. Domestic failures such as economic inequality, racial segregation, sexual discrimination, environmental degradation, and top-level extraconstitutional excesses all go on display for the world to see. As Kennan pointed out in the most quoted article ever published in these pages, Exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within this country can have an exhilarating effect on external enemies. To defend its external interests, then, the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.

Easily said, not easily done, and therein lies the ultimate test for the United States in its contest with China: the patient management of internal threats to our democracy, as well as tolerance of the moral and geopolitical contradictions through which global diversity can most feasibly be defended. The study of history is the best compass we have in navigating this futureeven if it turns out to be not what wed expected and not in most respects what weve experienced before.

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The New Cold War: America, China, and the Echoes of History - Foreign Affairs Magazine

From left are seventh hour students Troy Watt (Michelangelo), Bailey Broecker (Donatello), Cy Olson (Machiavelli), Eric Mackey (Petrarch), Paige Janousek (Leonardo DaVinci), Ben Trevillian (Charles V), Ava Peters (Catherine de Medici).

KINGSFORD There are so many times a student enters a history class and will think history is repetitive reciting of facts, dates, and names and never think to understand why any of it matters.

Students without a passion for history like to think that was in the past, who cares? History takes a hands-on approach in Jessica Garvaglias classroom at Kingsford High School.

Here at KHS, we strive to make history come alive for our students and become an exciting topic students want to learn more about, she said. We dont just memorize facts, we look at turning points, movements, and how and why history shapes our future.

Garvaglia believes in project based learning to get students engaged and using higher level thinking skills to connect with the content. World History students recently finished learning about the time period of Renaissance and Reformation. The students each adopted the persona of a historical figure from the unit. During a party, the students spoke about themselves and acted like people from history.

Students celebrated their learning by attending a Renaissance Feast as their selected historical figure. Students were encouraged to dress up as their selected figure.

The room had guests such as Queen Elizabeth, Anne Boleyn, and Henry the VIII, as well as Martin Luther, Charles the V, and Pope Paul the III. Students could even meet some high Renaissance artists such as Leonardo DaVinci, Raphael, and Michelangelo, or hear some tales from famous writers, Chaucer, Christine de Pizan, or William Shakespeare.

The students were also encouraged to bring Renaissance dishes to the party. The students were able to sample peasant bread, Italian Renaissance shortbread, apple tarts, Renaissance candied oranges, rice pudding, chocolate mousse, Renaissance lemon cakes, and Panforte, just to name a few. The students agreed that many of the Renaissance desserts can be difficult to make and you also have to research what the measurements are in todays units.

All agreed that the Renaissance dinner party is a fun and engaging way to learn about the variety of people and time period.

Fourth hour students Cole Myllyla (Albrech Duerer), Trent Maki (Pope Paul III), Angela Hurtubise (Jane Seymour).

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