Category Archives: Hedonism

Wirehead hedonism versus paradise-engineering

Posted: July 25, 2016 at 3:47 pm

"The mind is its own place, and in itself Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heaven" Satan, in Milton's Paradise Lost

Far-fetched? Right now, the abolitionist project sounds fanciful. The task of redesigning our legacy-wetware still seems daunting. Rewriting the vertebrate genome, and re-engineering the global ecosystem, certainly pose immense scientific challenges even to a technologically advanced civilisation.

The ideological obstacles to a happy world, however, are more formidable still. For we've learned how to rationalise the need for mental pain - even though its nastier varieties blight innumerable lives, and even though its very existence will soon become optional.

Today, any scientific blueprint for getting rid of suffering via biotechnology is likely to be reduced to one of two negative stereotypes. Both stereotypes are disturbing, pervasive, and profoundly ill-conceived. Together, they impoverish our notion of what a Post-Darwinian regime of life-long happiness might be like; and delay its prospect.

Rats, of course, have a very poor image in our culture. Our mammalian cousins are still widely perceived as "vermin". Thus the sight of a blissed-out, manically self-stimulating rat does not inspire a sense of vicarious happiness in the rest of us. On the contrary, if achieving invincible well-being entails launching a program of world-wide wireheading - or its pharmacological and/or genetic counterparts - then most of us will recoil in distaste.

Yet the Olds' rat, and the image of electronically-triggered bliss, embody a morally catastrophic misconception of the landscape of options for paradise-engineering in the aeons ahead. For the varieties of genetically-coded well-being on offer to our successors needn't be squalid or self-centred. Nor need they be insipid, empty and amoral la Huxley's Brave New World. Our future modes of well-being can be sublime, cerebral and empathetic - or take forms hitherto unknown.

Instead of being toxic, such exotically enriched states of consciousness can be transformed into the everyday norm of mental health. When it's precision-engineered, hedonic enrichment needn't lead to unbridled orgasmic frenzy. Nor need hedonic enrichment entail getting stuck in a wirehead rut. This is partly because in a naturalistic setting, even the crudest dopaminergic drugs tend to increase exploratory behaviour, will-power and the range of stimuli an organism finds rewarding. Novelty-seeking is normally heightened. Dopaminergics aren't just euphoriants: they also enhance "incentive-motivation". On this basis, our future is likely to be more diverse, not less.

Perhaps surprisingly too, controlled euphoria needn't be inherently "selfish" - i.e. hedonistic in the baser, egoistic sense. Non-neurotoxic and sustainable analogues of empathogen hug-drugs like MDMA ("Ecstasy") - which releases a lot of extra serotonin, dopamine and pro-social oxytocin - may potentially induce extraordinary serenity, empathy and love for others. An arsenal of cognitive enhancers will allow us be smarter too. For feeling blissful isn't the same as being "blissed-out".

Ultimately, however, using drugs or electrodes for psychological superhealth is arguably no better than taking medicines to promote physical superhealth. Such interventions can serve only as dirty and inelegant stopgaps. In an ideal world, our emotional, intellectual and physical well-being would be genetically predestined. A capacity for sustained bliss may be a design-feature of any Post-Darwinian mind. Indeed some futurists predict we will one day live in a paradise where suffering is physiologically inconceivable - a world where we can no more imagine what it is like to suffer than we can presently imagine what it is like to be a bat.

Technofantasy? Quite possibly. Today it is sublime bliss that is effectively inconceivable to most of us.

Olds mapped the whole brain. Stimulation of some areas - the periaqueductal grey matter, for instance - proved aversive: an animal will work hard to avoid it. "Aversive" is probably a euphemism: electrical pulses to certain neural pathways may be terrifying or excruciating. Euphemisms aside, our victims are being tortured.

Happily, more regions in the brain are rewarding to stimulate than are unpleasant. Yet electrical stimulation of most areas, including the great bulk of the neocortex, is motivationally neutral.

One brain region in particular does seem especially enjoyable to stimulate: the medial forebrain bundle. The key neurons in this bundle originate in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the basal ganglia. VTA neurons manufacture the catecholamine neurotransmitter dopamine. Dopamine is transported down the length of the neuron, packaged in synaptic vesicles, and released into the synapse. Crucially, VTA neuronal pathways project to the nucleus accumbens. VTA dopaminergic neurons are under continuous inhibition by the gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) system.

In recent years, a convergence of neuropharmacological evidence, clinical research, and electrical stimulation experiments has led many researchers to endorse some version of the "final common pathway" hypothesis of reward. There are anomalies and complications which the final-common-pathway hypothesis still has to account for. Any story which omits the role and complex interplay of, say, "the love hormone", oxytocin; the "chocolate amphetamine", phenylethylamine; the glutamate system; the multiple receptor sub-types of serotonin, noradrenaline and the opioid families; and most crucially of all, the intra-cellular post-synaptic cascade within individual neurons, is going to be simplistic. Yet there is accumulating evidence that recreational euphoriants, clinically useful mood-brighteners, and perhaps all rewarding experiences critically depend on the mesolimbic dopamine pathway.

One complication is that pleasure and desire circuitry have intimately connected but distinguishable neural substrates. Some investigators believe that the role of the mesolimbic dopamine system is not primarily to encode pleasure, but "wanting" i.e. incentive-motivation. On this analysis, endomorphins and enkephalins - which activate mu and delta opioid receptors most especially in the ventral pallidum - are most directly implicated in pleasure itself. Mesolimbic dopamine, signalling to the ventral pallidum, mediates desire. Thus "dopamine overdrive", whether natural or drug-induced, promotes a sense of urgency and a motivation to engage with the world, whereas direct activation of mu opioid receptors in the ventral pallidum induces emotionally self-sufficient bliss.

Certainly, the dopamine neurotransmitter is not itself the brain's magic pleasure chemical. Only the intra-cellular cascades triggered by neurotransmitter binding to the post-synaptic receptor presumably hold the elusive, tantalising key to everlasting happiness; and they are not yet fully understood. But it's notable that dopamine D2 receptor-blocking phenothiazines, for example, and other aversive drugs such as kappa opioid agonists, tend to inhibit activity, or increase the threshold of stimulation, in the mesolimbic dopamine system. Conversely, heroin and cocaine both mimic the effects of direct electrical stimulation of the reward-pathways.

Comparing the respective behavioural effects of heroin and cocaine is instructive.If rats or monkeys are hooked up to an intravenous source of heroin (or other potent mu opioid agonist such as fentanyl), the animals will happily self-administer the drug indefinitely; but they still find time to sleep and eat. If rats or monkeys have the opportunity to self-administer cocaine without limit, however, they will do virtually nothing else. They continue to push a drug-delivery lever for as long as they are physically capable of doing so. Within weeks, if not days, they will lose a substantial portion of their body weight - up to 40%. Within a month, they will be dead.

Humans don't have this problem. So what keeps our mesolimbic dopamine and opioidergic systems so indolent? Why does a "hedonic treadmill" stop us escaping from a genetically-predisposed "set-point" of emotional ill-being? Why can't social engineering, politico-economic reform or psychotherapy - as distinct from germ-line genetic re-writes - make us durably happy?

Evolutionary biology provides some plausible answers. A capacity to experience many different flavours of unhappiness - and short-lived joys too - was adaptive in the ancestral environment. Anger, fear, disgust, sadness, anxiety and other core emotions each played a distinctive information-theoretic role, enhancing the reproductive success of our forebears. Thus at least a partial explanation of endemic human misery today lies in ancient selection pressure and the state of the unreconstructed vertebrate genome. Selfish DNA makes its throwaway survival-machines feel discontented a lot of the time. A restless discontent is typically good for promoting its "inclusive fitness", even if it's bad news for us. Nature simply doesn't care; and God has gone missing, presumed dead.

On the African savannah, naturally happy and un-anxious creatures typically got outbred or eaten or both. Rank theory suggests that the far greater incidence of the internalised correlate of the yielding sub-routine, depression, reflects how low spirits were frequently more adaptive among group-living organisms than manic self-assertion. Group living can be genetically adaptive for the individual members of the tribe in a predator-infested environment, but we've paid a very high psychological price.

Whatever the origins of malaise, a web of negative feedback mechanisms in the CNS conspires to prevent well-being - and (usually) extreme ill-being - from persisting for very long.

Life-enriching emotional superhealth will depend on subverting these homeostatic mechanisms. The hedonic set-point around which our lives fluctuate can be genetically switched to a far higher altitude plateau of well-being.

At the most immediate level, firing in the neurons of the ventral tegmental area is held in check mainly by gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA), the major inhibitory neurotransmitter in the vertebrate central nervous system. Opioids act to diminish the braking action of GABA on the dopaminergic neurons of the VTA. In consequence, VTA neurons release more dopamine in the nucleus accumbens. The reuptake of dopamine in the nucleus accumbens is performed by the dopamine transporter. The transporter is blocked by cocaine. Dopamine reuptake inhibition induces euphoria, augmented by activation of the sigma1 receptors. [Why? We don't know. Science has no understanding of why sentience - or insentience for that matter - exists at all.] Amphetamines block the dopamine transporter too; but they also act directly on the dopaminergic neurons and promote neurotransmitter release.

The mesolimbic dopamine pathway passes from the VTA to the nucleus accumbens and ascends to the frontal cortex where it innervates the higher brain. This architecture is explicable in the light of evolution. Raw limbic emotional highs and lows - in the absence of represented objects, events or properties to be (dis)satisfied about - would be genetically useless to the organism. To help self-replicating DNA differentially leave more copies of itself, the textures of subjective niceness and nastiness must infuse our representations of the world, and - by our lights - the world itself. Hedonic tone must be functionally coupled to motor-responses initiated on the basis of the perceived significance of the stimulus to the organism, and of the anticipated consequences - adaptively nice or nasty - of simulations of alternative courses of action that the agent can perform. Natural selection has engineered the "encephalisation of emotion". We often get happy, sad or worried "about" the most obscure notions. One form this encephalisation takes is our revulsion at the prospect of turning ourselves into undignified wirehead rats - or soma-pacified dupes of a ruling elite. Both scenarios strike us as too distasteful to contemplate.

In any case, wouldn't we get bored of life-long bliss?

Apparently not. That's what's so revealing about wireheading. Unlike food, drink or sex, the experience of pleasure itself exhibits no tolerance, even though our innumerable objects of desire certainly do so. Thus we can eventually get bored of anything - with a single exception. Stimulation of the pleasure-centres of the brain never palls. Fire them in the right way, and boredom is neurochemically impossible. Its substrates are missing. Electrical stimulation of the mesolimbic dopamine system is more intensely rewarding than eating, drinking, and love-making; and it never gets in the slightest a bit tedious. It stays exhilarating. The unlimited raw pleasure conjured up by wirehead bliss certainly inspires images of monotony in the electrode-naïve outsider; but that's a different story altogether.

Yet are wireheading or supersoma really the only ways to ubiquitous ecstasy? Or does posing the very question reflect our stunted conception of the diverse family of paradise-engineering options in prospect?

This question isn't an exercise in idle philosophising. As molecular neuroscience advances, not just boredom, but pain, terror, disgust, jealousy, anxiety, depression, malaise and any form of unpleasantness are destined to become truly optional. Their shifting gradients played a distinct information-theoretic role in the lives of our ancestors in the ancestral environment of adaptation. But their individual textures (i.e. "what it feels like", "qualia") can shortly be either abolished or genetically shifted to a more exalted plane of well-being instead. Our complicity in their awful persistence, and ultimately our responsibility for sustaining and creating them in the living world, is destined to increase as the new reproductive technologies mature and the revolution in post-genomic medicine unfolds. The biggest obstacles to a cruelty-free world - a world cured of any obligate suffering - are ideological, not technical. Yet whatever the exact time-scale of its replacement, in evolutionary terms we are on the brink of a Post-Darwinian Transition.

Natural selection has previously been "blind". Complications aside, genetic mutations and meiotic shufflings are quasi-random i.e. random with respect to what is favoured by natural selection. Nature has no capacity for foresight or contingency-planning. During the primordial Darwinian Era of life on Earth, selfishness in the technical genetic sense has closely overlapped with selfishness in the popular sense: they are easily confused, and indeed selfishness in the technical sense is unavoidable. But in the new reproductive era - where (suites of) alleles will be societally chosen and actively designed by quasi-rational agents in anticipation of their likely behavioural effects - the character of fitness-enhancing traits will be radically different.

For a start, the elimination of such evolutionary relics as the ageing process will make any form of (post-)human reproduction on earth - whether sexual or clonal - a relatively rare and momentous event. It's likely that designer post-human babies will be meticulously pre-planned. The notion that all reproductive decisions will be socially regulated in a post-ageing world is abhorrent to one's libertarian instincts; but if they weren't regulated, then the Earth would soon simply exceed its carrying capacity - whether it is 15 billion people or even 150 billion. If reproduction on earth does cease to be a personal affair and becomes a (democratically accountable?) state-sanctioned choice, then a major shift in the character of typically adaptive behavioural traits will inevitably occur. Taking a crude genes' eye-view, a variant allele coding for, say, enhanced oxytocin expression, or a sub-type of serotonin receptor predisposing to unselfishness in the popular sense, will actually carry a higher payoff in the technical selfish sense - hugely increasing the likelihood that such alleles and their customised successors will be differentially pre-selected in preference to alleles promoting, say, anti-social behaviour.

Told like this, of course, the neurochemical story is a simplistic parody. It barely even hints at the complex biological, socio-economic and political issues at stake. Just who will take the decisions, and how? What will be the role in shaping post-human value systems, not just of exotic new technologies, but of alien forms of emotion whose metabolic pathways and substrates haven't yet been disclosed to us? What kinds, if any, of inorganic organisms or non-DNA-driven states of consciousness will we want to design and implement? What will be the nature of the transitional era - when our genetic mastery of emotional mind-making is still incomplete? How can we be sure that unknown unknowns won't make things go wrong? True, Darwinian life may often be dreadful, but couldn't botched paradise-engineering make it even worse? And even if it couldn't, might not there be some metaphysical sense in which life in a blissful biosphere could still be morally "wrong" - even if it strikes its inhabitants as self-evidently right?

Unfortunately, we will only begin to glimpse the implications of Post-Darwinism when paradise-engineering becomes a mature scientific discipline and mainstream research tradition. Yet as the vertebrate genome is rewritten, the two senses of "selfish" will foreseeably diverge. Today they are easily conflated. A tendency to quasi-psychopathic callousness to other sentient beings did indeed enhance the inclusive fitness of our DNA in the evolutionary past. In the new reproductive era, such traits are potentially maladaptive. They may even disappear as the Reproductive Revolution matures.

The possibility that we will become not just exceedingly happier, but nicer, may sound too good to be true. Perhaps we'll just become happier egotists - in every sense. But if a genetic predisposition to niceness becomes systematically fitness-enhancing, then genetic selfishness - in the technical sense of "selfish" - ensures that benevolence will not just triumph; it will also be evolutionarily stable, in the games-theory sense, against "defectors".

Needless to say, subtleties and technical complexities abound here. The very meaning of being "nice" to anyone or anything, for instance, is changed if well-being becomes a generic property of mental life. Either way, once suffering becomes biologically optional, then only sustained and systematic malice towards others could allow us to perpetuate it for ever. And although today we may sometimes be spiteful, there is no evidence that institutionalised malevolence will prevail.

From an ethical perspective, the task of hastening the Post-Darwinian Transition has a desperate moral urgency - brought home by studying just how nasty "natural" pain can be. Those who would resist the demise of unpleasantness may be asked: is it really permissible to compel others to suffer when any form of distress becomes purely optional? Should the metabolic pathways of our evolutionary past be forced on anyone who prefers an odyssey of life-long happiness instead? If so, what means of coercion should be employed, and by whom?

Or is paradise-engineering the only morally serious option? And much more fun.

Refs and further reading

Roborats James Olds Homeostasis Robert Heath Orgasmatrons Future Opioids BLTC Research Hypermotivation Superhappiness? Empathogens.com The Orgasmic Brain Social Media (2016) The Good Drug Guide The Abolitionist Project Utilitarianism On The Net The Hedonistic Imperative The Reproductive Revolution Critique of Brave New World MDMA: Utopian Pharmacology? When Is It Best To Take Crack Cocaine? Wireheads and Wireheading in Science Fiction Pleasure Evoked by Electrical Stimulation of the Brain Wireheads and wireheading: Definitions from Science Fiction

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Wirehead hedonism versus paradise-engineering

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CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Hedonism – NEW ADVENT

Posted: July 9, 2016 at 8:06 pm

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(hedon, pleasure).

The name given to the group of ethical systems that hold, with various modifications, that feelings of pleasure or happiness are the highest and final aim of conduct; that, consequently those actions which increase the sum of pleasure are thereby constituted right, and, conversely, what increases pain is wrong.

The father of Hedonism was Aristippus of Cyrene. He taught that pleasure is the universal and ultimate object of endeavour. By pleasure he meant not merely sensual gratification but also the higher forms of enjoyment, mental pleasures, domestic love, friendship, and moral contentment. His followers, however, reduced the system to a plea for self-indulgence (see CYRENAIC SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY).

To the Cyrenaic succeeded the School of Epicurus, who emphasized the superiority of social and intellectual pleasures over those of the senses. He also conferred more dignity on the hedonistic doctrine by combining it with the atomic theory of matter ; and this synthesis finds its finished expression in the materialistic determinism of the Roman poet Lucretius. Epicurus taught that pain and self-restraint have a hedonistic value; for pain is sometimes a necessary means to health and enjoyment; while self-restraint and prudent asceticism are indispensable if we would secure for ourselves the maximum of pleasure (see EPICUREANISM). With the decay of old Roman ideals and the rise of imperialism the Epicurean philosophy flourished in Rome. It accelerated the destruction of pagan religious beliefs, and, at the same time, was among the forces that resisted Christianity.

The revival of hedonistic principles in our own times may be traced to a line of English philosophers, Hobbes, Hartley, Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, the two Austins, and, more recently, Alexander Bain, who are popularly known as Utilitarians. Herbert Spencer adopted into his evolutionary theory of ethics the principle that the discriminating norm of right and wrong is pleasure and pain, though he substituted the progress of life for the hedonistic end.

Contemporary Hedonists are sometimes classed into egoistic and altruistic. The classification, however, is not quite satisfactory when applied to writers; for many Hedonists combine the egoistic with the altruistic principle. The distinction, however, may conveniently be accepted with regard to the principles that underlie the various forms of the doctrine. The statement that happiness is the end of conduct at once raises the question: whose happiness? To this egoism answers: the happiness of the agent; while altruistic Hedonism replies: the happiness of all concerned, or, to use a phrase that is classic in the literature of this school, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number". Perhaps the only thoroughgoing egoistic Hedonist is Thomas Hobbes, though in many places Bentham too, proclaims himself the uncompromising apostle of selfishness (see EGOISM), while elsewhere he, like J.S. Mill, expands into altruism . The intrinsic difficulties in the task of constructing any decent code of morals on the egoistic principle, together with the destructive criticism which any such attempts encountered, led Hedonists to substitute the happiness of all concerned for the happiness of the individual. The transit from the one to the other is attempted through a psychological analysis which would show that, through the operation of the law of association of ideas, we come to love for their own sakes objects which in the first instance we loved from a selfish motive. This is true to a certain extent, but the cases in which it may occur fall far short of the range which the principle would have to cover in order to justify the theory. Besides, by adopting the happiness of others as the end, the Hedonist loses the only semblance of a proof which he had to offer in support of his first contention, that happiness is the end, viz. that every man does desire happiness and can desire nothing else; it is only too plain that not everybody desires the happiness of everybody else. Another modification was introduced to meet the criticism that, if pleasure is the standard of right and wrong, sensual indulgence is just as good as the noblest form of self-sacrifice. The Hedonists, or at least some of them, replied that not merely the quantity of pleasure but also the quality is to be taken into account. There are higher and lower pleasures; and the higher are more desirable than the lower; therefore conduct which aims at the higher is the better. But if pleasures are thus to be divided into higher and lower, irrespective of quantity, the hedonistic standard is, by the very fact, displaced, and some other ultimate scale of moral valuation is appealed to or implied. The subjective norm, pleasurable feeling, is made to retire in favour of some unnamed objective norm which dictates what the agent ought to pursue. This is the suicide of Hedonism. Other advocates of the system have, contrary to its initial principle, introduced a primary altruistic impulse co-ordinate with and controlling the egoistic as a spring of action .

The fundamental errors of Hedonism and the chief unanswerable objections to the theory may be briefly summed up as follows:

(1) It rests on a false psychological analysis; tendency, appetite, end, and good are fixed in nature antecedent to pleasurable feeling. Pleasure depends on the obtaining of some good which is prior to, and causative of, the pleasure resulting from its acquisition. The happiness or pleasure attending good conduct is a consequence, not a constituent, of the moral quality of the action.

(2) It falsely supposes that pleasure is the only motive of action. This view it supports by the fallacy that the pleasurable and the desirable are interchangeable terms.

(3) Even if it were granted that pleasure and pain constitute the standard of right and wrong, this standard would be utterly impracticable. Pleasures are not commensurable with one another, nor with pains; besides no human mind can calculate the quantity of pleasure and pain that will result from a given action. This task is impossible even when only the pleasure of the agent is to be taken into account. When the pleasure and pain of "all concerned" are to be measured the proposal becomes nothing short of an absurdity.

(4) Egoistic Hedonism reduces all benevolence, self-sacrifice, and love of the right to mere selfishness. It is impossible for altruistic Hedonism to evade the same consummation except at the cost of consistency.

(5) No general code of morality could be established on the basis of pleasure. Pleasure is essentially subjective feeling, and only the individual is the competent judge of how much pleasure or pain a course of action affords him. What is more pleasurable for one may be less so for another. Hence, on hedonistic grounds, it is evident that there could be no permanently and universally valid dividing line between right and wrong.

(6) Hedonism has no ground for moral obligation, no sanction for duty. If I must pursue my own happiness, and if conduct which leads to ha
ppiness is good, the worst reproach that can be addressed to me, however base my conduct may be, is that I have made an imprudent choice.

Hedonists have appropriated the term happiness as an equivalent to the totality of pleasurable or agreeable feeling. The same word is employed as the English rendering of the Latin beatitudo and the Greek eudaimona, which stand for a concept quite different from the hedonistic one. The Aristotelean idea is more correctly rendered in English by the term well-being. It means the state of perfection in which man is constituted when he exercises his highest faculty, in its highest function, on its highest good. Because they fail to give due attention to this distinction, some writers include eudmonism among hedonistic systems. Hedonism sometimes claims the credit of much beneficent effort in social reform in England which has been promoted by professed Utilitarians; and everywhere movements popularly designated as altruism are pointed out as monuments to the practical value of the hedonistic principle "the greatest good of the greatest number ". But it must be observed that this principle may have another genesis and another part to play in ethics than those assigned to it by Hedonism. Besides, as Green has pointed out, the Utilitarians illogically annexed it, and the fruits it bore in their political activity are to be credited to it in its democratic, rather than in its hedonistic, character .

APA citation. Fox, J. (1910). Hedonism. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07187a.htm

MLA citation. Fox, James. "Hedonism." The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 7. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910. <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07187a.htm>.

Transcription. This article was transcribed for New Advent by Rick McCarty.

Ecclesiastical approbation. Nihil Obstat. June 1, 1910. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor. Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.

Contact information. The editor of New Advent is Kevin Knight. My email address is webmaster at newadvent.org. Regrettably, I can't reply to every letter, but I greatly appreciate your feedback especially notifications about typographical errors and inappropriate ads.

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CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Hedonism - NEW ADVENT

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Hedonism II | Top Clothing Optional Resorts In Negril, Jamaica

Posted: July 8, 2016 at 7:45 am

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Hedonism II | Top Clothing Optional Resorts In Negril, Jamaica

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Hedonism II | Top Clothing Optional Resorts In Negril, Jamaica

Posted: July 7, 2016 at 4:06 pm

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Hedonism II | Top Clothing Optional Resorts In Negril, Jamaica

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Christian Hedonism | Desiring God

Posted: July 5, 2016 at 7:06 am

If you must, forgive me for the label. But don't miss the truth because you don't like my tag. My shortest summary of it is: God is most glorified in us when we are most satisfied in him. Or: The chief end of man is to glorify God by enjoying him forever. Does Christian Hedonism1 make a god out of pleasure? No. It says that we all make a god out of what we take most pleasure in. My life is devoted to helping people make God their God, by wakening in them the greatest pleasures in him.

If we must sell all, we should do it, Jesus said, "with joy" because the field we aim to buy contains a hidden treasure (Matthew 13:44).

By Christian Hedonism, I do not mean that our happiness is the highest good. I mean that pursuing the highest good will always result in our greatest happiness in the end. But almost all Christians believe this. Christian Hedonism says more, namely, that we should pursue happiness, and pursue it with all our might. The desire to be happy is a proper motive for every good deed, and if you abandon the pursuit of your own joy you cannot love man or please God - that's what makes Christian Hedonism controversial.

Christian Hedonism aims to replace a Kantian morality with a biblical one. Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher who died in 1804, was the most powerful exponent of the notion that the moral value of an act decreases as we aim to derive any benefit from it. Acts are good if the doer is "disinterested." We should do the good because it is good. Any motivation to seek joy or reward corrupts the act. Cynically, perhaps, but not without warrant, the novelist Ayn Rand captured the spirit of Kant's ethic:

An action is moral, said Kant, only if one has no desire to perform it, but performs it out of a sense of duty and derives no benefit from it of any sort, neither material nor spiritual. A benefit destroys the moral value of an action. (Thus if one has no desire to be evil, one cannot be good; if one has, one can.)2

Against this Kantian morality (which has passed as Christian for too long!), we must herald the unabashedly hedonistic biblical morality. Jonathan Edwards, who died when Kant was 34, expressed it like this in one of his early resolutions: "Resolved, To endeavor to obtain for myself as much happiness in the other world as I possibly can, with all the power, might, vigor, and vehemence, yea violence, I am capable of, or can bring myself to exert, in any way that can be thought of."3

C. S. Lewis put it like this in a letter to Sheldon Vanauken: "It is a Christian duty, as you know, for everyone to be as happy as he can."4

And southern novelist Flannery O'Connor gives her view of self-denial like this: "Always you renounce a lesser good for a greater; the opposite is sin. Picture me with my ground teeth stalking joy - fully armed too, as it's a highly dangerous quest."5

The Kantian notion says that it's O.K. to get joy as an unintended result of your action. But all these people (myself included) are aiming at joy. We repudiate both the possibility and desirability of disinterested moral behavior. It is impossible, because the will is not autonomous; it always inclines to what it perceives will bring the most happiness (John 8:34; Romans 6:16; 2 Peter 2:19).

Pascal was right when he said "All men seek happiness without exception. They all aim at this goal however different the means they use to attain it. . . .They will never make the smallest move but with this as its goal. This is the motive of all the actions of all men, even those who contemplate suicide."6

But not only is disinterested morality (doing good "for its own sake") impossible; it is undesirable. That is, it is unbiblical; because it would mean that the better a man became the harder it would be for him to act morally. The closer he came to true goodness the more naturally and happily he would do what is good. A good man in Scripture is not the man who dislikes doing good but toughs it out for the sake of duty. A good man loves kindness (Micah 6:8) and delights in the law of the Lord (Psalm 1:2), and the will of the Lord (Psalm 40:8). But how shall such a man do an act of kindness disinterestedly? The better the man, the more joy in obedience.

Kant loves a disinterested giver. God loves a cheerful giver (2 Corinthians 9:7). Disinterested performance of duty displeases God. He wills that we delight in doing good and that we do it with the confidence that our obedience secures and increases our joy in God.

Oh, that I could drive the notion out of our churches that virtue requires a stoical performance of duty - the notion that good things are promised merely as the result of obedience but not as an incentive for it. The Bible is replete with promises which are not appended carefully as non-motivational results, but which clearly and boldly and hedonistically aim to motivate our behavior.

What sets off biblical morality from worldly hedonism is not that biblical morality is disinterested, but that it is interested in vastly greater and purer things. Some examples:

Luke 6:35 says, "Love your enemies, and do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return; and you reward will be great." Note: we should never be motivated by worldly aggrandizement ("expect nothing in return"); but we are given strength to suffer loss in service of love by the promise of a future reward.

Again, in Luke 14:12-14: "When you give a dinner or a banquet, do not invite your friends or your brothers or your kinsmen or rich neighbors, lest they also invite you in return, and you be repaid. But when you give a feast, invite the poor . . . and you will be blessed, because they cannot repay you. You will be repaid at the resurrection of the just." Note: don't do good deeds for worldly advantage; but do them for spiritual, heavenly benefits.

But the Kantian philosopher will say, "No, no. These texts only describe what reward will result if you act disinterestedly. They do not teach us to seek the reward."

Two answers: 1) It is very bad pedagogy to say, "Take this pill and I will give you a nickel," if you think the desire for the nickel will ruin the taking of the pill. But Jesus was a wise teacher, not a foolish one. 2) Even more importantly, there are texts which not only commend but command that we do good in the hope of future blessing.

Luke 12:33 says, "Sell your possessions, and give alms; provide yourselves with purses that do not grow old, with a treasure in the heavens that does not fail." The connection here between alms and having eternal treasure in heaven is not mere result but aim: "Make it your aim to have treasure in heaven, and the way to do this is to sell your possessions and give alms."

And again, Luke 16:9 says, "Make friends for yourselves by means of unrighteous mammon, so that when it fails they may receive you into eternal habitations." Luke does not say that the result of a proper use of possessions is to receive eternal habitations. He says, "Make it your aim to secure an eternal habitation by the way you use your possessions."

Therefore, a resounding NO to Kantian morality. No in the pew and no in the pulpit. In the pew the very heart is ripped out of worship by the notion that it can be performed as a mere duty. There are two possible attitudes in genuine worship: delight in God or repentance for the lack of it.

Sunday at 11 a.m., Hebrew 11:6 enters combat with Immanuel Kant. "Without faith it is impossible to please Him. For whoever would draw near to God must believe that He exists and that He rewards those who see
k Him." You cannot please God if you do not come to him as rewarder. Therefore, worship which pleases God is the hedonistic pursuit of God in whose presence is fullness of joy and in who hand are pleasures for evermore (Psalm 16:11).

What a difference it will make if we are Christian hedonists and not Kantian commanders of duty! Jonathan Edwards, the greatest preacher-theologian that America has ever produced, daringly said, "I should think myself in the way of my duty to raise the affections of my hearers as high as possibly I can, provided that they are affected with nothing but truth, and with affections that are not disagreeable to the nature of what they are affected with."7 The ultimate reason Edwards believed this was his duty is his profound and biblical conviction that

God glorifies himself towards the creatures also [in] two ways: (1) by appearing to them, being manifested to their understanding; (2) in communicating himself to their hearts, and in their rejoicing and delighting in, and enjoying the manifestations which he makes of himself. . . . God is glorified not only by his glorys being seen, but by its being rejoiced in. . . . [W]hen those that see it delight in it: God is more glorified than if they only see it. . . . He that testifies his idea of Gods glory [doesnt] glorify God so much as he that testifies also his approbation of it and his delight in it.8

This is the ultimate foundation for Christian Hedonism.

As Christian Hedonists we know that everyone longs for happiness. And we will never tell them to deny or repress that desire. Their problem is not that they want to be satisfied, but that they are far too easily satisfied. We will instruct them how to glut their soul-hunger on the grace of God. We will paint God's glory in lavish reds and yellows and blues; and hell we will paint with smoky shadows of gray and charcoal. We will labor to wean them off the milk of the world onto the rich fare of God's grace and glory.

We will bend all our effort, by the Holy Spirit, to persuade people

We will not try to motivate their ministry by Kantian appeals to mere duty. We will tell them that delight in God is their highest duty. But we will remind them that Jesus endured the cross for the joy that was set before him (Hebrews 12:2), and that Hudson Taylor, at the end of a life full of suffering and trial, said, "I never made a sacrifice."9

Read a condensed version of this article titled We Want You to Be a Christian Hedonist.

1. For the full story of what I call "Christian Hedonism," see John Piper, Desiring God: Meditations of a Christian Hedonist (Sisters, OR: Multnomah Publishers, 1996); or the small version, The Dangerous Duty of Delighting in God (Sisters, OR: Multnomah Publishers, 2001).

2. Ayn Rand, For the Intellectual (New York: Signet, 1961), p. 32.

3. Resolution #22 in Edwards' Memoirs in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Vol. 1 (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1974), p. xxi.

4. From a letter to Sheldon Vanaukehn in Vanauken's book, A Severe Mercy (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 189.

5. The Habit of Being, ed. by Sally Fitzgerald (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1979), p.126.

6. Blaise Pascal, Pascal's Penses, trans. by W. F. Trotter (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1958), p. 113 (thought #425).

7. Jonathan Edwards, Some Thoughts Concerning the Revival, in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Vol. 4, ed. by C. Goen (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 387.

8. Jonathan Edwards, The "Miscellanies," a-500, ed. by Thomas Schafer, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Vol. 13 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 495. Miscellany #448; see also #87, pp. 251-252; #332, p. 410; #679 (not in the New Haven Volume). Emphasis added. These Miscellanies were the private notebooks of Edwards from which he built his books, like The End for Which God Created the World.

9. Howard and Geraldine Taylor, Hudson Taylor's Spiritual Secret (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, n. d.), p. 30.

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Christian Hedonism | Desiring God

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Hedonism – By Branch / Doctrine – The Basics of Philosophy

Posted: July 1, 2016 at 9:41 pm

Introduction | History of Hedonism

Hedonism is the philosophy that pleasure is the most important pursuit of mankind, and the only thing that is good for an individual. Hedonists, therefore, strive to maximise their total pleasure (the net of any pleasure less any pain or suffering). They believe that pleasure is the only good in life, and pain is the only evil, and our life's goal should be to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.

Psychological Hedonism is the view that humans are psychologically constructed in such a way that we exclusively desire pleasure. Ethical Hedonism, on the other hand, is the view that our fundamental moral obligation is to maximize pleasure or happiness. It is the normative claim that we should always act so as to produce our own pleasure.

Hedonism usually pre-supposes an individualist stance, and is associated with Egoism (the claim that individuals should always seek their own good in all things). Epicureanism is a more moderate approach (which still seeks to maximize happiness, but which defines happiness more as a state of tranquillity than pleasure). A similar but more altruistic approach results in Utilitarianism, the position that the moral worth of any action is determined by its contribution to overall utility in maximizing happiness or pleasure as summed among all people.

The Paradox of Hedonism (also called the Pleasure Paradox), points out that pleasure and happiness are strange phenomena that do not obey normal principles, in that they cannot be acquired directly, only indirectly and we often fail to attain pleasures if we deliberately seek them.

The term "hedonism" is derived from the Greek "hedone" meaning simply "pleasure". In common language, Hedonism has come to mean devotion to pleasure as a way of life, especially to the pleasures of the senses, and is synonymous with sensualism, libertinism, debauchery and dissipation.

Perhaps the earliest example of Hedonism (and one of the most extreme) was the philosophy of the Cyrenaics, an early Socratic school founded by Aristippus of Cyrene, in the 4th Century B.C. (although, arguably, Democritus had propounded a very similar philosophy even earlier). The Cyrenaics emphasized one side only of Socrates' teaching that happiness is one of the ends of moral action (Eudaimonism), while denying that virtue has any intrinsic value. They maintained that pleasure was the supreme good, especially physical pleasure, which Aristippus considered more intense and preferable to mental or intellectual pleasures, and especially immediate gratification, which he argued should not be denied for the sake of long-term gain.

Epicureanism is considered by some to be a form of ancient Hedonism. Its founder, Epicurus, agreed that pleasure is the greatest good, but he identified pleasure with tranquillity rather than bodily gratification, and emphasized the reduction of desire over the immediate acquisition of pleasure. Thus, for Epicurus, the highest pleasure consists of a simple, moderate life spent with friends and in philosophical discussion. Epicurus was also careful not to suggest that we should live a selfish life which impedes others from obtaining their own pleasure.

During the Middle Ages, Christian philosophers largely denounced Hedonism, which they believed was inconsistent with the Christian emphasis on avoiding sin, doing God's will, and developing the Christian virtues of faith, hope and charity. However, Renaissance philosophers such as Erasmus and Sir Thomas More revived Hedonism to some extent, defending it on the religious grounds that pleasure was in fact compatible with God's wish for humans to be happy.

Libertinism is a philosophy related to Hedonism, which found adherents in the 17th, 18th and 19th Centuries, particularly in France and Britain, including the 2nd Earl of Rochester (1647 - 1680), the Marquis de Sade (1740 -1814) and the occultist Aleister Crowley (1875 - 1947). Libertinism ignores, or even deliberately spurns, religious norms, accepted morals, and forms of behaviour sanctioned by the larger society, and encourages gratification of any sort, especially sexual.

The 19th Century ethical theory of Utilitarianism, propounded by the British philosophers John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, developed and refined Hedonism, concluding that we should perform whichever action is best for everyone ("the greatest good for the greatest number"). Bentham believed that the value of a pleasure could be quantitatively understood, while Mill perferred a qualitative approach dependent on the mix of higher quality pleasures and lower quality, simple pleasures.

Ayn Rand (1905 - 1982), one of the biggest modern proponents of Egoism, has rejected Hedonism as a comprehensive ethical system on the grounds that, although pleasure can be the purpose of ethics, it cannot be the standard or guide to action, as that would result in intellectual and philosophical abdication.

Contemporary Hedonists, as represented by an organization known as Hedonist International, strive first and foremost for pleasure, as did their predecessors, but with an additional emphasis on personal freedom and equality. Christian Hedonism is a recent controversial Christian doctrine, current in some evangelical circles, which holds that humans were created by God with the priority purpose of lavishly enjoying God through knowing, worshiping and serving Him.

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Hedonism - By Branch / Doctrine - The Basics of Philosophy

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Posted: June 28, 2016 at 2:42 am

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Hedonism Wikipedia

Posted: June 22, 2016 at 11:32 pm

Hedonism (av grekiska hedone, "njutning", "lustknsla") r en familj av filosofiska och psykologiska teorier som stter njutning som centralt ml fr mnniskans strvanden.[1]Psykologisk hedonism r teorin om att skande efter njutning och undvikande av lidande r mnniskans enda drivkraft eller motivation. Etisk hedonism r teorin om att mngden resulterad njutning r den enda mttstocken p en handlings moraliska vrde. Vrdeteoretisk hedonism r teorin att njutning r det enda intrinsikalt vrdefulla.[2] Dessutom talar man idag ofta om vad som utgr ett gott liv, eller vad som bidrar till ens vlmende, och hedonistens svar r d att njutning r det enda betydelsefulla i skapandet av en mnniskas livsbana. Idag ses hedonismen som en av de tre mest betydelsefulla teorierna om vlmende, bredvid begrsrelaterade teorier och objektiv lista-teorier.[3]

Hedonismen sprar sina rtter till antikens filosofer. ven om Platon under en period tycks ha haft hedonistiska sikter s r Epikuros utan tvekan teorins - i alla dess dtida varianter - mest betydelsefulla fresprkare. Under vissa perioder av historien har ngon form av hedonism fungerat nstan som ett axiom i filosofiska sammanhang, men dess nstfljande storhetsperiod gde rum under senare halvan av 1800-talet med fretrdare som Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill och Henry Sidgwick.

Termen "hedonist" anvnds ibland till vardags som synonym till "livsnjutare".

Epikuros r historiskt sett hedonismens frfader, i teorins alla dvarande bemrkelser. Han menade att det som r efterstrvat ocks r det som r efterstrvansvrt. Han betraktade praktisk vishet som frmgan att p ett korrekt stt kunna kalkylera mngden njutning och lidande. Dygder och rationell aktivitet hrleder sitt vrde frn njutning och r sledes endast instrumentellt vrdefulla. Epikuros skilde mellan aktiva och stillsamma njutningar och ansg att de senare r bttre eftersom de varar lngre. Distinktionen ska inte ses som synonym till kroppsliga- respektive sjlsliga njutningar. ven minnen av njutningar r njutningar. Epikuros hedonistiska instllning hr delvis samman med hans radikala empirism; det enda vi har sker kunskap om r vra sensationer och bland dem ingr njutning och lidande.

Platon hade en hedonistisk period vilket framfr allt mrks i hans dialog Protagoras. Hans sokratiska antagande, att man inte kan veta det goda utan att ocks gra det goda, kombinerat med hans psykologiska hedonism, ledde honom till att acceptera en slags etisk hedonism. Han vergav den emellertid senare till frmn fr en form av vrdeteoretisk pluralism, detta eftersom han vergav den psykologiska hedonismen. Platons senare lyckobegrepp innefattar bde njutning och kunskap.

Aristoteles menade att njutning kompletterar rationell aktivitet och r allts inte det enda, eller ens det hgsta, goda. Han menade att endast de "dla njutningarna" r vrdefulla och att deras vrde varierar med vrdet p aktiviteten som de framspringer ur. Hos Aristoteles hade "lycka" en mer central plats n "njutning" och den frra innefattar delvis den senare.

Den brittiske filosofen Jeremy Bentham var utilitarist. Han menade att all njutning r god, vilket gr honom till kvantitativ utilitarist, till skillnad frn Mill som skilde mellan njutning av olika kvaliteter. Bentham menade att det r omjligt att bevisa hedonismen, den utgr grunden fr alla andra frklaringskedjor. Han stllde sig bakom bde psykologisk- och etisk hedonism och gjorde ingen skarp distinktion mellan vad vi gr och vad vi br gra. Njutning fungerar bde som frklarande- och rttfrdigande orsak till vrt beteende.

John Stuart Mill ansg inte heller att ett bevis behvde ges fr att rttfrdiga hedonismen, men presenterade likvl ett argument som bestr av tv steg. Fr det frsta frsker han bevisa hedonismen och fr det andra frsker han drifrn rttfrdiga utilitarismen. Hans frsta steg gr i korthet ut p att han pstr att det enda trvrda r det vi faktiskt trr. Drifrn frsker han bevisa utilitarismens rimlighet genom att formulera ett njutningsbegrepp som inte plockar ut individer. Mill fresprkade en kvalitativ hedonism, det vill sga en hedonism som skilde mellan kvalitativt olika njutningar. Han gjorde ingen distinktion mellan lycka och njutning. Hans argument har kritiserats av bland andra G.E. Moore.

En annan brittisk filosof som emellertid frnekade den psykologiska hedonismen var Henry Sidgwick. Han omfattade nd den etiska hedonismen och likstllde njutning med "trvrda medvetandetillstnd", en fenomenologiskt heterogen klass av mentala tillstnd. Sidgwick stllde upp fyra, enligt honom sjlvklara, principer som stdde hans utilitarism. Fr det frsta betyder "rtt fr mig" "rtt fr alla". Fr det andra r tidslig placering irrelevant. Fr det tredje har all njutning lika vrde, oavsett vems. Fr det fjrde r det alltid rationellt att efterstrva det goda.

Under 1900-talet upplevde hedonismen en stark tillbakagng. Roger Crisp har identifierat tre viktiga anledningar till att filosofer brjade betrakta hedonismen som tillbakavisad. Fr det frsta betraktade mnga filosofer John Stuart Mills infrande av distinktionen mellan kvalitativt olika njutningar som antingen ett vergivande av hedonismen eller som inkoherent. Fr det andra har de sttt sig p G.E. Moores teori om intrinsikala vrden och med hjlp av denna argumenterat fr att det r "absurt" att hvda att njutning skulle vara det enda intrinsikalt goda. Slutligen har de hnvisat till Robert Nozicks tankeexperiment om upplevelsemaskinen, vilket ofta anvnds fr att snabbt avvisa hedonismen som en teori om vlmende och sedan g vidare med att underska mer levande teorier.[4][5]

Eftersom hedonismen placerar njutning s centralt har det med tiden dykt upp en rad olika teorier om vad njutning egentligen r. Att definiera njutning har varit viktigt inte bara fr hedonisterna, utan ven fr kritikerna, som med hjlp av en viss definition har frskt visa att hedonismen r felaktig eller kontraintuitiv.

Enligt upplevelse-orienterade frklaringar r njutning och smrta distinkta medvetna upplevelser, eller tminstone delar av sdana upplevelser.[6]Gilbert Ryle har framfrt ett argument mot uppfattningen om njutning som en sensation, som gr ut p att alla sensationer har ett speciellt omrde dr de knns, men att olika njutningar saknar ett sdant gemensamt "knningsomrde".[7] Wayne Sumner har gjort en distinktion mellan tv huvudsakliga teorier om njutning som r upplevelse-orienterade: den intrinsikala- och den extrinsikala uppfattningen.[8]

Enligt teorin om njutning som en intrinsikal upplevelse "upplevs" njutning p ett speciellt stt; det har en distinkt intrinsikal karaktr, exempelvis genom dess fenomenologi, dess qualia eller knslan som det medfr. Bland andra G.E. Moore uppfattade njutning p detta stt. Han menade att njutning var ett odefinierbart "ngonting", som dock r separerbart frn allting annat. ven om detta "ngonting" inte gr att frklara eller beskriva nrmare, s gr det helt klart att isolera det som just njutning.

En klassisk invndning mot denna syn p njutning r att vi genom introspektion upptcker att det inte finns ngon gemensam komponent hos allt det vi ser som njutningatt lsa en vlskriven bok, att ha sex, att lsa ett matematiskt problemsom gr det till just njutning.[4] Henry Sidgwick formulerade denna invndning i sin The Method of Ethics.[9] Ett annat argument, som inte bara riktar sig mot denna uppfattning om njutning, gr ut p att inte allt det som definieras som njutning faktiskt r njutning och kan sgas ka personens vlmende. Slutligen gr en tredje invndning ut p att inte endast njutning r intrinsikalt vrdefullt. Dessa tre invndningar kallas ibland frkortat fr "none such", "not all" och "not only" p engelska.[6]

Den extrinsikala synen p njutning som en distinkt upplevelse liknar den intrinsikala i det att bda ser p njutning som en upplevelse, exempelvis en knsla eller en mer kognitiv upplevelse. Den skiljer sig emellertid frn denna i det att dess kriterium fr vad som r njutning fokuserar p utomstende omstndigheter kring upplevelsen, snarare n egenskaper hos upplevelsen sjlv. Den gr ut p att en upplevelse r njutning om och endast om personen som har upplevelsen ocks har en speciell positiv attityd gentemot den. Exakt vilken attityd det rr sig om skiljer sig t; det kan vara en trosfrestllning, frmodan, frvntan, begr, preferens etc. Sidgwick anammade detta synstt i och med hans avvisande av den intrinsikala uppfattningen: "Pleasure as a feeling which is at least implicitly apprehended as desirable" (fritt versatt ungefr: "Njutning en knsla som tminstone implicit uppfattas som efterstrvansvrd").[9]

Den extrinsikala uppfattningen undviker argumentet om att det inte finns ngon gemensam komponent hos allting vi kallar njutning. Fresprkaren av denna uppfattning kan g med p att det vi kallar njutning innefattar en bred uppsttning knslor och mentala tillstnd utan ngon minsta gemensam nmnare, men nd kategorisera allt detta som njutning p basis av personens instllning gentemot dessa tillstnd. Den extrinsikala uppfattningen har dock egna problem. Det allvarligaste av dessa r "killjoy"-argumentet. Enligt detta argument finns det medvetandetillstnd som vi har de relevanta attityderna mot, men som knappast kan betraktas som njutningsfulla. Ett exempel r skam; man kan knna skam infr ngonting man har gjort, och faktiskt vilja knna skammen, som ett bevis p att man r en moraliskt knslig person. Men om man har en sdan attityd gentemot skamknslan s tycks det enligt den extrinsikala uppfattningen implicera att skammen r njutningsfull, vilket fr de flesta av oss r starkt kontraintuitivt. Denna invndning r en av de s kallade "not all"-invndningarna.

En annan klass av teorier om njutning r de attityd-orienterade frklaringarna. Enligt dessa bestr njutning av ett intentionalt tillstnd, som en trosfrestllning eller ett begr. Dessa intentionala tillstnd kan vara riktade antingen mot en sjlv eller mot den yttre vrlden. Skillnaden frn de upplevelse-orienterade frklaringarna r att dessa attityd-orienterade teorier identifierar njutning med sjlva attityden, snarare n attitydens objekt, som den extrinsikala uppfattningen gr gllande.

Attityd-orienterade frklaringar har den frdelen att de undviker en del av invndningarna som riktas mot upplevelse-orienterade frklaringar. De kan ven redogra fr njutningens kvantitet, genom att hnvisa till sdant som lngden och intensiteten hos attityderna. Dremot kan "killjoy"-invndningen ven glla fr dessa teorier; det verkar konstigt att pst att attityden, i det frra exemplet med skammen, till skamknslan var njutningsfull, ven om det var en positiv attityd. Ett annat problem r existensen av defekta attityder, som missriktade eller destruktiva attityder.

Fred Feldman menar att stndpunkten som bland andra Sidgwick fr fram, att njutning r intrinsikalt vrdefullt p grund av vissa attityder gentemot knslan som r njutningsfull, kombinerat med G.E. Moores syn p intrinsikalt vrde, r inkoherent. Feldman analyserar frst Sidgwicks definition av njutning som "a feeling which, when experienced by intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended as desirable...." Denna syn p njutning har den frdelen att den undviker heterogenitets-argumentet, det vill sga invndningen att olika sorters njutningar (njutningsfulla knslor) inte har ngot gemensamt som kan pekas ut som utgrandes sjlva njutningen. ven andra filosofer har anammat en liknande syn p njutning, ven om de har bytt ut Sidgwicks "desirable" mot exempelvis "wish to prolong". Det viktiga i sammanhanget r att man definierar njutning i termer av ngon extern instllning gentemot knslan som sgs vara sjlva njutningen.

Feldman gr sedan vidare och analyserar den mooreanska uppfattningen om intrinsikalt vrde. I korthet gr Feldmans argument ut p att Moores begrepp om intrinsikalt vrde sger att dessa vrden endast supervenierar p objektets intrinsikala egenskaper, det vill sga egenskaper som r helt oberoende av objektets frhllande till resten av vrlden. Men om en knsla av njutning r vrdefull p grund av att den som har knslan betraktar den som njutningsfull tycks dess vrde vara extrinsikalt, eftersom det r beroende av agentens instllning till knslan; en instllning som r extern i frhllande till knslan. Allts r Sidgwicks hedonism inkoherent.

Efter att ha identifierat denna inkoherens hos Sidgwicks attityd-orienterade syn p njutning frsker Feldman att komma med ett alternativt synstt som undviker denna svrighet. Han gr detta genom att frndra definitionen av njutning. Feldman behller synen p njutning som beroende av personers attityder, men talar om "propositionella attityder". Dessa attityder r inte knslor; de r riktade mot olika sakfrhllanden. Att njuta av ngonting r att njuta av att ett specifikt sakfrhllande freligger. Han identifierar vidare sdana sakfrhllanden som bestende av en person som njuter av att han eller hon sjlv till en viss intensitet upplever ngonting vid ngon tidpunkt, det vill sga en individ, en viss intensitet av intrinsikal propositionell njutning, en speciell tidpunkt och ett specifikt objekt.

Hedonismen har kritiserats av en rad filosofer, inte minst under 1900-talet. G.E. Moore argumenterade i sin Principia Ethica mot vrdeteoretisk hedonism, teorin om att lycka eller njutning r det enda intrinsikalt goda.[10] Moore ansg att en hedonist r tvungen att g med p att en vrld med endast njutning, utan sdant som krlek, kunskap och sknhet, skulle vara bttre n en vrld som innehll dessa ting men som var lite mindre njutbar. Denna tanke fungerar som ett reductio ad absurdum-argument hos honom; det vill sga, eftersom hedonismen leder till detta s mste den anses vara felaktig som teori om intrinsikala vrden.

Ett annat argument som av mnga har betraktats som en slutgiltig vederlggning av hedonismen och andra mentala tillstnds-relaterade teorier om vrde r Robert Nozicks tankeexperiment "upplevelsemaskinen". Nozick tnker sig en maskin som kan framkalla vilka mentala upplevelser som helst hos personen som anvnder den. En hedonist br d rimligtvis g med p att ett liv i en sdan maskin, med de ultimata instllningarna, br vara ett fullndat liv. Eftersom det endast r de mentala tillstnden som r vrdefulla s br det inte spela ngon roll huruvida dessa r ett resultat av faktiska hndelser eller artificiellt producerade av avancerade neuropsykologer. Men detta strider mot de flesta mnniskors intuitioner om ett gott liv; vi vill exempelvis inte bara uppleva krlek, vi vill lska och bli lskade p riktigt.

Nozicks argument framstod lnge, och framstr fortfarande fr mnga, som ett slutgiltigt slag mot hedonismen. P senare tid har detta emellertid delvis kommit att frndras. Filosofen Matthew Silverstein skrev r 2000 en artikel i tidskriften "Social Theory & Practice" med titeln In defense of happiness: A response to the Experience Machine. Silverstein menar att han identifierar vissa gmda premisser i Nozicks resonemang, premisser som vid en nrmare underskning inte visar sig vara hllbara. En betydande brist hos Nozick r, enligt Silverstein, att han frn det faktum att vi vill ha ("desire") mer n blott simulerade lyckoupplevelser i vrt liv, drar slutsatsen att mnniskors vlfrd ("well-being") beror p mer n blott simulerade lyckoupplevelser. Om man tolkar hedonismen som en teori om vad som utgr ett gott liv, vad som betingar en mnniskas vlfrd, s behver inte mnniskors faktiska viljeattityder vara relevanta fr huruvida hedonismen r rimlig eller inte. Silverstein tar upp flera exempel dr tillfredsstllandet av det vi faktiskt vill inte bidrar till att ka vr vlfrd, till exempel vad gller irrationella begr. Om man kan skilja mellan vad en person vill och vad som bidrar till dennes vlfrd tycks Nozicks upplevelsemaskinsargument tminstone vara frsvagat.[11]

Jason Kawall medger att de allra flesta av oss skulle vlja att inte kopplas in i Nozicks upplevelsemaskin, om vi fick det valet. Men, menar han, detta r inte ett argument mot mentala tillstnds-teorier om vlmende. En fresprkare av mentala tillstnds-teorier, det vill sga en person som hvdar att endast mentala tillstnd bidrar till vr vlfrd, positivt och negativt, kan g med p att vi vrdestter andra saker n vra egna mentala tillstnd. Vi har moraliska vrden, vi har frpliktelser mot andra mnniskor etc. Det r emellertid konsistent att bde hvda att det finns sdana vrden, och att de inte r komponenter av vr vlfrd.

Misstaget som kritikerna enligt Kawall begr, r att knyta mental tillstnds-fresprkaren (hrefter endast "fresprkaren") till stndpunkten att alla vrden betingas av sitt frhllande till mentala tillstnd. Det enda fresprkaren behver hvda r att endast sdant som visar sig i mentala tillstnd pverkar vr vlfrd. Uppfyllandet av ens frpliktelser pverkar ens vlfrd endast i den mn som jag r medveten om att man faktiskt uppfyller dem. Vidare kan det vara vrdefullt att uppfylla ens frpliktelser ven om detta inte tar sig uttryck i mentala tillstnd. Detta vrde r d emellertid inte ett "vlmende-vrde", och att g med p detta r fullt frenligt med att hvda att endast mentala tillstnd bidrar till ens vlfrd. Det kan till och med vara s att andra vrden str i konflikt med ens vlmende, p s stt att uppfyllandet (i de fall dr det rr sig om stadkommanden) av de frra frsmrar det senare. terigen ppekar Kawall att detta inte r ngot problem fr fresprkaren. Slutligen pekar Kawall p att kritikerna tycks vara knutna till en underlig stndpunkt: att soldaten som offrar sitt eget liv fr sina kamrater gr detta fr att ka sitt eget vlmende. Fresprkaren kan frklara detta mer i enlighet med vra intuitioner; nmligen genom att frklara att han offrade sitt eget vlmende fr sina kamraters vlmende.

Heterogenitetsargumentet riktar sig till intrinsikala njutningsteorier. Det gr ut p att det inte finns ngon gemensam komponent hos allt det vi kallar njutning, som r det som konstituerar njutningen. Filosofen Stuart Rachels har presenterat tre frslag p hur en hedonist kan bemta denna invndning:[12]

Roger Crisp menar att det tredje frslaget egentligen r en form av externalism, och att de andra tv r ganska lika varandra. Han argumenterar fr att i synnerhet det andra frslaget gr att bygga vidare p, och gr sjlv ocks detta. Han skriver (fritt versatt): "Om fresprkaren av heterogenitetsargumentet sker efter ngonting i stil med en speciell sensation, som stma eller ett kittlande eller en knsla i ngon speciell del av kropppen [...] eller ngonting som en sinnlig egenskap som rdhet, i njutningsfulla erfarenheter, s kommer hon att misslyckas. Men det finns ett stt som njutningsfulla erfarenheter knns p: de knns njutningsfulla." Crisps pong r att det "r p ett speciellt stt" att knna njutning. Han medger att olika njutningar kraftigt skiljer sig t, men menar att det nd finns ngonting som r gemensamt fr dem alla, nmligen att de "knns bra".

Efter kritik av sina samtida om att hans hedonism var en "svinens filosofi" frskte John Stuart Mill frsvara sig genom att infra en distinktion mellan hga och lga njutningar. Detta ansgs av mnga vara antingen ett vergivande av hedonismen eller inkoherent.[13][14]

Roger Crisps teori, som bygger vidare p Mills, mjliggr enligt honom sjlv att man kan skilja olika njutningar t kvalitativt. Crisp menar att det gr att rdda Mills distinktion, som tycks vara ndvndig fr att hedonismen ska knnas intuitivt riktig. Om man omformulerar Mills uppfattning om intensitet och lngd som att det handlar om sjlva upplevelsens intensitet och lngd snarare n njutningen i sig, s kan man gra samma sak med upplevelsers kvalitet. Upplevelser kan allts vara lngt mer njutningsfulla just p grund av att de r av hgre kvalitet, men pongen r att det inte r sjlva njutningen som r av hgre kvalitet. Ett annat stt att uttrycka detta p r genom att skilja mellan upprknande och frklarande teorier. Litterr kvalitet kan till exempel ing i en upprkning av faktorer som kar ens vlmende, men det r samtidigt konsistent att frklara detta genom att hvda att anledningen till att det gr just detta r att det kar njutningen i upplevelsen. P det stter menar Crisp att han lser dilemmat som Mill stlls infr med sin distinktion mellan hga och lga njutningar. Detta r allts ingen snllare tolkning av Mill utan ett vergivande eller omformulering av en del av hans teori.

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Hedonism – New World Encyclopedia

Posted: March 28, 2016 at 12:44 pm

Hedonism (Greek: hdon ( from Ancient Greek) "pleasure" +ism) is a philosophical position that takes the pursuit of pleasure as the primary motivating element of life, based upon a view that "pleasure is good." The concept of pleasure is, however, understood and approached in a variety of ways, and hedonism is classified accordingly.

The three basic types of philosophical hedonism are psychological hedonism, which holds that the tendency to seek pleasure and avoid pain is an essential attribute of human nature; evaluative or ethical hedonism, which sets up certain ethical or moral ends as desirable because attaining them will result in happiness; and reflective, or normative hedonism, which seeks to define value in terms of pleasure. The ancient Greek philosophers Democritus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus (341 270 B.C.E.) and their followers developed ethical theories centered on the good life (the ideal life, the life most worth living, eudaimonia, happiness) and the role of pleasure of achieving it. During the Middle Ages, hedonism was rejected as incompatible with Christian ideals, but Renaissance philosophers revived it on the grounds that God intended man to be happy. Nineteenth-century British philosophers John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham established the ethical theory of Utilitarianism with a hedonistic orientation, holding that all action should be directed toward achieving the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.

There are many philosophical forms of hedonism, but they can be distinguished into three basic types: psychological hedonism; evaluative, or ethical hedonism; and reflective, or rationalizing hedonism. Psychological hedonism holds that it is an essential aspect of human nature to seek pleasure and avoid pain; human beings cannot act in any other way. A human being will always act in a way that, to his understanding, will produce what he perceives as the greatest pleasure, or protect him from undesirable pain. Psychological hedonism is either based on observation of human behavior, or necessitated by a definition of desire. Psychological hedonism is often a form of egoism, preoccupied with pleasure of the individual subject, but it can also be concerned with the pleasure of society or humanity as a whole. Altruistic versions of psychological hedonism involve deep-seated convictions, cultural or religious beliefs which motivate a person to act for the benefit of family or society, or the expectation of an afterlife. Problems of psychological hedonism include the definitions of desire and pleasure. Is desire tied to the satisfaction of physical sensations or does it extend to mental and rational conceptions of pleasure? Are all positive experiences, even minor and mundane ones, psychological motivations?

Evaluative hedonism is an attempt to set up certain ends or goals as desirable, and to persuade others that these goals ought to be pursued, and that achieving them will result in pleasure. Evaluative hedonism is sometimes used to support or justify an existing system of moral values. Many altruistic and utilitarian moral systems are of this type, because they encourage the individual to sacrifice or restrict immediate sensual gratification in favor of a more rational gratification, such as the satisfaction of serving others, or the maintenance of an egalitarian society where every individual receives certain benefits. Evaluative hedonism raises the problem of deciding exactly what ends are desirable, and why.

Reflective, normative, or rationalizing hedonism, seeks to define value in terms of pleasure. Even the most complex human pursuits are attributed to the desire to maximize pleasure, and it is that desire which makes them rational. Objections to determining value based on pleasure include the fact that there is no common state or property found in all experiences of pleasure, which could be used to establish an objective measurement. Not all experiences of pleasure could be considered valuable, particularly if they arise from criminal activity or weakness of character, or cause harm to others. Another objection is that there are many other types of valuable experiences besides the immediate experience of pleasure, such as being a good parent, creating a work of art or choosing to act with integrity, which, though they could be said to produce some kind of altruistic pleasure, are very difficult to categorize and quantify. Normative hedonism determines value solely according to the pleasure experienced, without regard for the future pleasure or pain resulting from a particular action.

Among the ancient Greek philosophers, discussion of ethical theory often centered on the good life (the ideal life, the life most worth living, eudaimonia, happiness) and the role of pleasure of achieving it. Various expressions of the concept that pleasure is the good were developed by philosophers such as Democritus, Aristippus, Plato, Aristotle and Epicurus and their followers, and vigorously disagreed with by their opponents. Aristippus (fifth century B.C.E.) and the Cyrenaic school maintained that the greatest good was the pleasure of the moment and advocated a life of sensual pleasure, on the grounds that all living creatures pursue pleasure and avoid pain. This position reflected a skepticism that only the sensations of the moment could be known, and that concern with the past or the future only caused uncertainty and anxiety and should be avoided.

Ancient Greeks looked to the natural world and agreed that every organism was motivated to act for its own good, but differed as to whether that good was pleasure. Democritus (c. 460 c. 370 B.C.E.) is reported to have held that the supreme good was a pleasant state of tranquility of mind (euthumia), and that particular pleasures or pains should be chosen according to how they contributed to that tranquility. In the Protagoras, Socrates (470 -399 B.C.E.) presented a version of Democritean hedonism which included a method for calculating relative pleasures and pains. Socrates argued that an agents own good was not immediate pleasure, and that it was necessary to differentiate between pleasures that promoted good, and harmful pleasures. In his later dialogues, Plato (c. 428 -347 B.C.E.) agreed that while the good life was pleasant, the goodness consisted in rationality and the pleasantness was an adjunct.

Aristotle challenged the definition of pleasure as a process of remedying a natural deficiency in the organism (satisfying hunger, thirst, desire), declaring instead that pleasure occurs when a natural potentiality for thought or perception is realized in perfect conditions. Every kind of actualization has its own pleasure; the pleasure of thought, the pleasure of art, the bodily pleasures. Eudaimonia (the ideal state of existence) consists of the optimal realization of mans capacity for thought and rational choice; it would naturally be characterized by the greatest degree of pleasure.

Epicurus (341 270 B.C.E.) and his school distinguished two types of pleasure: the pleasure that supplying the deficiency of an organism (such as hunger or desire) and the pleasure experienced when the organism is in a stable state, free from all pain or disturbance. He gave supremacy to the latter type, and emphasized the reduction of desire over the immediate acquisition of pleasure. Epicurus claimed that the highest pleasure consists of a simple, moderate life spent with friends and in philosophical discussion, and discouraged overindulgence of any kind because it would ultimately lead to some kind of pain or instability.

We recognize pleasure
as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good. (Epicurus, "Letter to Menoeceus")

Christian philosophers of the Middle Ages denounced Epicurean hedonism as inconsistent with the Christian aims of avoiding sin, obeying the will of God, cultivating virtues such as charity and faith, and seeking a reward in the afterlife for sacrifice and suffering on earth. During the Renaissance, philosophers such as Erasmus (1465 1536) revived hedonism on the grounds that it was Gods wish for human beings to be happy and experience pleasure. In describing the ideal society of his Utopia (1516), Thomas More said that "the chief part of a person's happiness consists of pleasure." More argued that God created man to be happy, and uses the desire for pleasure to motivate moral behavior. More made a distinction between pleasures of the body and pleasures of the mind, and urged the pursuit of natural pleasures rather than those produced by artificial luxuries.

During the eighteenth century, Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747) and David Hume (1711-1776) systematically examined the role of pleasure and happiness in morality and society; their theories were precursors to utilitarianism.

The nineteenth-century British philosophers John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham established fundamental principles of hedonism through their ethical theory of Utilitarianism. Utilitarian value stands as a precursor to hedonistic values in that all action should be directed toward achieving the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. All actions are to be judged on the basis of how much pleasure they produce in relation to the amount of pain that results from them. Since utilitarianism was dealing with public policy, it was necessary to develop a hedonistic calculus to assign a ratio of pleasure to pain for any given action or policy. Though consistent in their pursuit of the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest number of people, Bentham and Mill differed in the methods by which they measured happiness.

Jeremy Bentham and his followers argued a quantitative approach. Bentham believed that the value of a pleasure could be understood by multiplying its intensity by its duration. Not only the number of pleasures, but their intensity and duration had to be taken into account. Benthams quantitative theory identified six dimensions of value in a pleasure or pain: intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, fecundity, and purity (Bentham 1789, ch. 4).

John Stuart Mill argued for a qualitative approach. Mill believed that there are different levels of pleasure, and that pleasure of a higher quality has more value than pleasure of a lower quality. Mill suggested that simpler beings (he often referenced pigs) have easier access to the simpler pleasures; since they are not aware of other aspects of life, they can simply indulge themselves without thinking. More elaborate beings think more about other matters and hence lessen the time they spend on the enjoyment of simple pleasures. Critics of the qualitative approach found several problems with it. They pointed out that 'pleasures' do not necessarily share common traits, other than the fact that they can be seen as "pleasurable." The definition of 'pleasant' is subjective and differs among individuals, so the 'qualities' of pleasures are difficult to study objectively and in terms of universal absolutes. Another objection is that quality is not an intrinsic attribute of pleasure; the quality of pleasure is judged either its quantity and intensity or by some non-hedonistic value (such as altruism or the capacity to elevate the mind).

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain, and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. (Bentham 1789)

Christian Hedonism is a term coined in 1986 for a theological movement originally conceived by a pastor, Dr. John Piper, in his book, Desiring God: Meditations of a Christian Hedonist. The tenets of this philosophy are that humans were created by (the Christian) God with the priority purpose of lavishly enjoying God through knowing, worshiping, and serving Him. This philosophy recommends pursuing one's own happiness in God as the ultimate in human pleasure. Similar to the Epicurean view, the highest pleasure is regarded as something long-term and found not in indulgence but in a life devoted to God. Serious questions have been raised within the Christian community as to whether Christian Hedonism displaces "love God" with "enjoy God" as the greatest and foremost commandment.

A typical apologetic for Christian Hedonism is that if you are to love something truly, then you must truly enjoy it. It could be summed up in this statement: "God is most glorified in us, when we are most satisfied in Him."

More recently, the term Christian Hedonism has been used by the French philosopher Michel Onfray to qualify the various heretic movements from Middle-Age to Montaigne.

In common usage, the word hedonism is often associated with self-indulgence and having a very loose or liberal view of the morality of sex. Most forms of hedonism actually concentrate on spiritual or intellectual goals, or the pursuit of general well-being.

All links retrieved February 13, 2014.

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