Category Archives: Fourth Amendment

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If you have any legally incriminating information sitting in your PSN account, don't count on the Fourth Amendment to protect it from "unreasonable search and seizure" by Sony without a warrant. A district court judge in Kansas has ruledin a recent case that information Sony finds has been downloaded to a PlayStation 3 or a PSN account is not subject to the "reasonable expectation of privacy" that usually protects evidence obtained without a warrant.

The case involves Michael Stratton, who went by the handle Susan_14 on PSN. According to Sony, Stratton was reported to PSN multiple times for sending spam messages asking about interest in child pornography. After reviewing the Susan_14 account in response to these complaints, Sony found that several images containing child porn had been downloaded by and uploaded to the account.

Sony shared information about the Susan_14 account and the images with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. The NCMEC then coordinated with the FBI to get additional information about Susan_14's e-mail address and IP address from Google and CenturyLink via subpoena. This action led to a warrant on Stratton's Kansas home, the discovery of child pornography stored on his PS3, and his arrest.

At trial, the defense tried to argue that Stratton had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" for the images on his PSN account and that Sony therefore couldn't share those with authorities absent a subpoena or warrant. In this case, the court ruled that Sony's PSN terms of service "explicitly nullified its users reasonable expectation of privacy." Those terms state explicitly that Sony reserves the right to monitor PSN activity and that Sony may turn over evidence of illegal activity to the authorities.

(The defense also made the related argument that Sony's terms of service were an adhesion contract that put an "unconscionable" and "patently unfairly... take-it-or-leave-it" burden on Stratton. The defense didn't provide enough evidence to demonstrate that claim, according to the court.)

Separately, the defense argued that Sony was acting as a "government agent" when it searched Stratton's PSN account, and, therefore, any evidence obtained needed to be subject to a warrant. This argument hinges in part on the federal "Failure to Report Child Abuse" statute, which requires those that learn of child abuse to "make a timely report" or suffer jail time or fines. Through this law, the defense argued, Sony was essentially being recruited to search for child pornography at the government's request and without any warrant.

The case is not all that different from other cases in which online service providers have worked with law enforcement to report child pornography when found on their services or devices. The main difference here is that the circuit court has found that these same legal arguments apply to the tightly controlled world of the PlayStation 3 and the attached PlayStation Network and not just the more "open" world of personal computers.

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US court says PSN data doesnt get Fourth Amendment ...

Legal Topics > Government > Constitutional Law > Constitutional Laws

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects individual privacy interests by preventing unreasonable searches and seizures. An individual's privacy interests are referred to as a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. The Fourth Amendment protects this interest by limiting when and how police can conduct a search of a citizen's house, papers, effects, or physical person.

However, the Fourth Amendment only protects people against "unreasonable" searches. "Reasonable" searches can override a person's Fourth Amendment privacy concerns. Generally, the police need two things before they can invade a persons reasonable expectation of privacy:

Under certain circumstances however, the police can conduct searches without a warrant.

The Fourth Amendment only applies to searches that violate a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. If no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, then the Fourth Amendment cannot protect that search. Courts ask two questions when determining whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy:

A search warrant is an order authorizing police officers to search for specific objects or materials at a specific time and location. Police obtain these warrants by showing a judge that they have probable cause to believe that criminal activity is taking place and that illegal contraband will be found at the place to be searched.

The Fourth Amendment does not define probable cause; it is a term developed by judges and lawyers to assist in determining the reasonableness of a search. Probable cause occurs where the facts and circumstances of a situation combined with a police officer's knowledge and experience lead him to believe that criminal activity is occurring. Thus, probable cause is somewhere above a mere suspicion but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

Generally, in cases where a police officer seeks a search warrant, and his probable cause is mistaken but made in good faith, the search can still be considered valid and reasonable.

A lawyer can help you navigate through the complex legal system and restore your privacy rights. If a search is unreasonable, the police cannot use any evidence obtained in the search. Therefore, it is important to discuss the search with a criminal defenselawyer who can evaluate the search procedure.

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Privacy Protection - 4th Amendment Legal Issues ...

Our Constitutions Fourth Amendment reads as follows: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

As with nigh all the rest of our Constitution, the federal government has long been ignoring the Fourth. Likely the most notorious example is the National Security Administration (NSA)s bulk data collection. Which is the Feds: (S)toring the online metadata of millions of internet users for up to a year, regardless of whether or not they are persons of interest to the agency.

The NSA has been amassing so much data on persons notof interest that it built a $1.2 billion data center thats seven times larger than the Pentagon. (If youre questioning whether the Fourth Amendments papers protection applies to digital data imagine hitting Print.)

Let me guess what youre wondering now: How could the NSA possibly be issued this sort of mass, blanket warrant, under the auspices of the Fourth Amendment if millions of these persons are notof interest? I.e. totally devoid of any probable cause? A very reasonable question.

The NSA laid claim to the authority to do this under the auspices of the Patriot Act. Which is not how things are supposed to work. Congress cant pass laws that eviscerate Constitutional protections they must amend the Constitution to eviscerate said protection. So, of course, the poorly written Patriot Act is trumped (no pun intended) by the Constitution.

The Senate has long been ignoring another Constitutional charge to properly vet federal judges prior to confirmation. So our judiciary is addled throughout by men and women in black gowns who shouldnt be. Because they impose their personal policy preferences rather than rule within the confines of the Constitution.

Even under these conditions, we do occasionally get good legal decisions. In May 2015, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the NSAs build data collection is unconstitutional. In response, President Barack Obamas Attorney General Loretta Lynch said: she was unaware of privacy violations under its existing program.

Madame Attorney Generals blissful ignorance is emblematic of the Washington, D.C.-wide problem. (As, too, was her being confirmed AG by a yet-again-too-compliant Senate.)

And, of course, the Feds arent just massively overreaching on domestic data they are overreaching overseas as well.

Under the auspices of the now-woefully-outdated 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the Feds obtained a warrant against tech giant Microsoft. With which they tried to collect data stored on servers Microsoft has outside of the United States (in this instance, in Dublin, Ireland).

This would be horrendously bad precedent as tin horn dictators the world over could and would start looking to get at data contained within our borders. To allow the Feds to do this to Microsoft would be to allow one of the worst genies ever out of its bottle.

Thankfully, the very same Second Court of Appeals that dumped the NSAs bulk data collection agreed and unanimously told the Feds they couldnt have access to Microsofts overseas servers. (God bless them.)

The very same Attorney General Lynch still bathing in her blissful ignorance has filed to reopen the case. Which brings us to Congress Fourth Amendment reminder we mentioned at the outset. Which would stop Madame Attorney Generals abuse here and a whole lot of abuses elsewhere.

The (Senate) bill is called the International Communications Privacy Act (ICPA). It is, amongst other things, a DC unicorn it is bipartisan. And bi-cameral as members of the House have joined in its crafting.

And it will rein in an overreaching federal government that is forcing companies to violate the laws of other countries in which they operate to give the U.S. government data to which it really shouldnt have access.

Because the Fourth Amendment (and the rest of the Constitution) is limited to our territorial bounds. Else wed better start invading a whole lot of places in which all sorts of our Constitutional rights are being routinely violated in their jurisdictions.

Obviously, the Feds need a reminder of this fact. ICPA is that reminder. It is pathetic that you need a Congressional backstop to a Constitutional right but were dealing with DC here, so we are oft dealing in things pathetic.

I am on the record as being nigh always against lame duck Congressional action. I dont like officials We the People just said should no longer be voting on legislation voting on legislation. But ICPA is a perfectly reasonable exception that proves this rule.

You can almost certainly pass ICPA just with people who will again be here in the next Congress. And ICPA has been languishing for more than two years all the while (and going back years and years before) the Feds have been vastly exceeding their Constitutional bounds. And in the Microsoft case are looking to do so yet again.

So the overreaches must be ended. ICPA ends them. So lets pass ICPA.

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Unfortunately, Congress Needs to Pass This Fourth Amendment ...

Placing a video camera on a utility pole and conducting surveillance can be a useful law enforcement tool to gather information without requiring an in-person presence by officers at all times. But this tool may be subject to the Fourth Amendment restrictions. This post reviews the evolving case law, particularly since the United States Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).

Jeff Welty in a 2013 post reviewed video surveillance generally, not just pole cameras, and discussed Jones and the few cases decided in light of its ruling. This post, after reviewing Jones, will discuss a few pole camera cases decided in federal courts since his post and whether officers should seek approval from a court before conducting pole camera surveillance.

United States v. Jones. Officers installed a GPS device without a valid search warrant on a suspected drug-traffickers vehicle and then tracked the vehicles movements for about four weeks. The holding of Jones was that the installation of the GPS tracking device on a suspects vehicle was a Fourth Amendment search because it involved a physical intrusion (a trespass) into the vehicle for the purpose of obtaining information. In addition, five Justices (the four who joined Justice Alitos concurrence in the judgment plus Justice Sotomayor, who also had joined the Courts opinion) expressed the view that prolonged GPS monitoring intrudes upon a suspects reasonable expectation of privacy and is a search under the Fourth Amendment. These Justices reasoned that although short-term monitoring of a suspects movement on the public roads may not intrude upon a reasonable expectation of privacy, long-term monitoring generates so much information about a suspects movements and activities that the aggregate effect is an invasion of privacy.

Although Jones involved tracking a suspects movements, it could be used to support a broader argument about long-term electronic surveillance. One could contend that under Jones, while officers are free to observe a suspects residence from the public streets or a neighbors property to see who comes and goes, permanent round-the-clock video surveillance is substantially more intrusive and constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.

Post-Jones cases on pole camera surveillance. The Jones ruling revived the trespass theory in Fourth Amendment analysis concerning what constitutes a search, so the trespass theory and the separate reasonable expectation of privacy theory both must be considered in appropriate cases.

Trespass theory. All the cases that have considered the issue have rejected a defendants argument based on the trespass theory that the installation of the camera was a trespass under Jones, because in most cases the utility pole is not on the defendants property or, even it is located there, the utility had an easement to access the pole as needed. United States v. Nowka, 2012 WL 6610879 (N.D. Ala. 2012); United States v. Root, 2014 WL 4715874 (E.D. Wash. 2014); United States v. Wymer, 40 F. Supp.3d 933 (N.D. Ohio 2014).

Reasonable expectation of privacy theory. I have found one post-Jones cases that ruled that warrantless pole camera surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment under the reasonable expectation of privacy theory. That case is Shafer v. City of Boulder, 896 F. Supp. 915 (D. Nev. 2012), where a pole camera surveilled the defendants backyard without a search warrant for 24 hours a day for 56 days, and the camera was long-range, infrared, and waterproof. The defendants backyard was protected by a solid fence and within the homes curtilage. The court cited two pre-Jones cases in support of its ruling, but not Jones, probably because it was unnecessary to do so based on the facts.

Most of the cases have ruled that warrantless pole camera surveillance did not violate the Fourth Amendment under the reasonable expectation of privacy theory. For example, a recent federal appellate case, United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2016), found that ten weeks surveillance with a camera installed on a utility pole about 200 yards from a trailer used as a residence on a farm did not violate a residents reasonable expectation of privacy because the camera recorded the same view of the residence as that enjoyed by people on nearby public roads. The court believed that the Jones case did not require a different result. Interestingly, a concurring opinion in Houston believed that Jones required the officers to obtain a search warrant.

A few case have upheld surveillance with reservations, being bound by prior pre-Jones precedents. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 2015 WL 5145537 (D. Mass. 2015).

There have been no North Carolina appellate court or United States Supreme Court cases on pole camera surveillance since Jones.

Advice to officers. Nothing in Jones or lower court cases after Jones calls into question the use of surveillance cameras that are focused on public streets, parks, and other public areas. For example, if drug activity is commonplace at a particular intersection, the Fourth Amendment does not preclude placing a surveillance camera on a light pole facing that intersection.

It would not be surprising if in the relatively near future the United States Supreme Court decides a case on pole camera surveillance, and there is a reasonable probability that the Court might rule that extensive video surveillance of a residence requires a search warrant or its functional equivalent, such as a court order. Of course, predicting future Court rulings is highly speculative and subject to reasonable disagreement.

In the meantime, a cautious officer may wish to seek a court order authorizing the use of a pole camera directed at a residence or at least consult with the officers agencys legal advisor or a prosecutor before deciding not to do so. No case or statute sets out the proper procedure for obtaining such an order, but it likely would be similar to obtaining a search warrant or other investigative court order that could be sought ex parte and would need to be supported by an affidavit establishing probable cause. If a court order is sought, the order might limit pole camera surveillance to a relatively short period, such as 30 days, and apply again if additional surveillance is needed.

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Pole Camera Surveillance Under the Fourth Amendment ...

In a dangerously flawed decision unsealed today, a federal district court in Virginia ruled that a criminal defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal computer, located inside his home. According to the court, the federal government does not need a warrant to hack into an individual's computer.

This decision is the latest in, and perhaps the culmination of, a series of troubling decisions in prosecutions stemming from the FBIs investigation of Playpena Tor hidden services site hosting child pornography. The FBI seized the server hosting the site in 2014, but continued to operate the site and serve malware to thousands of visitors that logged into the site. The malware located certain identifying information (e.g., MAC address, operating system, the computers Host name; etc) on the attacked computer and sent that information back to the FBI. There are hundreds of prosecutions, pending across the country, stemming from this investigation.

Courts overseeing these cases have struggled to apply traditional rules of criminal procedure and constitutional law to the technology at issue. Recognizing this, we've been participating as amicus to educate judges on the significant legal issues these cases present. In fact, EFF filed an amicus brief in this very case, arguing that the FBIs investigation ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment. The brief, unfortunately, did not have the intended effect.

The implications for the decision, if upheld, are staggering: law enforcement would be free to remotely search and seize information from your computer, without a warrant, without probable cause, or without any suspicion at all. Tosay the least, the decision is bad news for privacy. But it's also incorrect as a matter of law, and we expect there is little chance it would hold up on appeal. (It also was not the central component of the judge's decision, which also diminishes the likelihood that it will become reliable precedent.)

But the decision underscores a broader trend in these cases: courts across the country, faced with unfamiliar technology and unsympathetic defendants, are issuing decisions that threaten everyone's rights. As hundreds of these cases work their way through the federal court system, we'll be keeping a careful eye on these decisions, developing resources to help educate the defense bar, and doing all we can to ensure that the Fourth Amendment's protections for our electronic devices aren't eroded further. We'll be writing more about these cases in the upcoming days, too, so be sure to check back in for an in-depth look at the of the legal issues in these cases, and the problems with the way the FBI handled its investigation.

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Federal Court: The Fourth Amendment Does Not Protect Your ...

United States Constitution

Twenty-fourth Amendment, amendment (1964) to the Constitution of the United States that prohibited the federal and state governments from imposing poll taxes before a citizen can participate in a federal election. It was proposed by the U.S. Congress on August 27, 1962, and was ratified by the states on January 23, 1964.

In 1870, following the American Civil War, the Fifteenth Amendment, guaranteeing the right to vote to former slaves, was adopted. The Twenty-fourth Amendment was adopted as a response to policies adopted in various Southern states after the ending of post-Civil War Reconstruction (186577) to limit the political participation of African Americans. Such policies were bolstered by the 1937 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Breedlove v. Suttles, which upheld a Georgia poll tax. The Supreme Court reasoned that voting rights are conferred by the states and that the states may determine voter eligibility as they see fit, save for conflicts with the Fifteenth Amendment (respecting race) and the Nineteenth Amendment (respecting sex). It further ruled that a tax on voting did not amount to a violation of privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In short, because the tax applied to all votersrather than just certain classes of votersit did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.

During the civil rights era of the 1950s, particularly following the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, such policies increasingly were seen as barriers to voting rights, particularly for African Americans and the poor. Thus, the Twenty-fourth Amendment was proposed (by Sen. Spessard Lindsey Holland of Florida) and ratified to eliminate an economic instrument that was used to limit voter participation. Two years after its ratification in 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court, invoking the Fourteenth Amendments equal protection clause, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Electors, extended the prohibition of poll taxes to state elections.

The full text of the amendment is:

Section 1The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.

Section 2The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

amendment (1920) to the Constitution of the United States that officially extended the right to vote to women.

...the United States to deny federal funds to local agencies that practiced discrimination. Efforts to increase African American voter participation were also helped by the ratification in 1964 of the Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which banned the poll tax.

...in Southern states into the 20th century. Some states abolished the tax in the years after World War I, while others retained it. Its use was declared unconstitutional in federal elections by the Twenty-fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, effective in 1964. In 1966 the Supreme Court, going beyond the Twenty-fourth Amendment, ruled that under the equal protection clause of...

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ABA Journal's Blawg 100 (2015)

by John Wesley Hall Criminal Defense Lawyer and Search and seizure law consultant Little Rock, Arkansas Contact / The Book http://www.johnwesleyhall.com

2003-16, online since Feb. 24, 2003

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Fourth Amendment cases, citations, and links

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General (many free): LexisWeb Google Scholar | Google LexisOne Legal Website Directory Crimelynx Lexis.com $ Lexis.com (criminal law/ 4th Amd) $ Findlaw.com Findlaw.com (4th Amd) Westlaw.com $ F.R.Crim.P. 41 http://www.fd.org FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (2008) (pdf) DEA Agents Manual (2002) (download) DOJ Computer Search Manual (2009) (pdf) Stringrays (ACLU No. Cal.) (pdf)

Congressional Research Service: --Electronic Communications Privacy Act (2012) --Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (2012) --Outline of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (2012) --Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (2012) --Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Discussion of Proposed Revisions (2012) ACLU on privacy Privacy Foundation Electronic Frontier Foundation NACDLs Domestic Drone Information Center Electronic Privacy Information Center Criminal Appeal (post-conviction) (9th Cir.) Section 1983 Blog

"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." Me

I still learn something new every day. Pete Townshend, The Who 50th Anniversary Tour, "The Who Live at Hyde Park" (Showtime 2015)

"I can't talk about my singing. I'm inside it. How can you describe something you're inside of?" Janis Joplin

"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government." Shemaya, in the Thalmud

"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).

"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).

"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment." Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).

"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)

"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)

"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has notto put it mildlyrun smooth." Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)

"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)

Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Governments purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

Libertythe freedom from unwarranted intrusion by governmentis as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark. United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)

"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." Mick Jagger & Keith Richards

"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for meand by that time there was nobody left to speak up." Martin Niemller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]

You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men! ---Pep Le Pew

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EFF: The Playpen Story: Some Fourth Amendment Basics and Law ...

I recently posted a revised draft of my forthcoming article, The Effect of Legislation on Fourth Amendment Interpretation, and I thought I would blog a bit about it. The article considers a recurring question in Fourth Amendment law: When courts are called on to interpret the Fourth Amendment, and there is privacy legislation on the books that relates to the governments conduct, should the existence of legislation have any effect on how the Fourth Amendment is interpreted? And if it should have an effect, what effect should it have?

I was led to this question by reading a lot of cases in which the issue came up and was answered in very different ways by particularly prominent judges. When I assembled all the cases, I found that judges had articulated three different answers. None of the judges seemed aware that the question had come up in other cases and had been answered differently there. Each of the three answers seemed plausible, and each tapped into important traditions in constitutional interpretation. So you have a pretty interesting situation: Really smart judges were running into the same question and answering it in very different ways, each rooted in substantial traditions, with no one approach predominating and no conversation about which approach was best. It seemed like a fun issue to explore in an article.

In this post Ill summarize the three approaches courts have taken. I call the approaches influence, displacement and independence. For each approach, Ill give one illustrative case. But theres a lot more where that came from: For more details on the three approaches and the cases supporting them, please read the draft article.

1. Influence. In the influence cases, legislation is considered a possible standard for judicial adoption under the Fourth Amendment. The influence cases rest on a pragmatic judgment: If courts must make difficult judgment calls about how to balance privacy and security, and legislatures have done so already in enacting legislation, courts can draw lessons from the thoughtful judgment of a co-equal branch. Investigative legislation provides an important standard for courts to consider in interpreting the Fourth Amendment. Its not binding on courts, but its a relevant consideration.

The Supreme Courts decision in United States v. Watsonis an example of the influence approach. Watson considered whether it is constitutionally reasonable for a postal inspector to make a public arrest for a felony offense based on probable cause but without a warrant. A federal statute expressly authorized such warrantless arrests. The court ruled that the arrests were constitutional without a warrant and that the statute was constitutional. Justice Whites majority opinion relied heavily on deference to Congresss legislative judgment. According to Justice White, the statute authorizing the arrests represents a judgment by Congress that it is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for postal inspectors to arrest without a warrant provided they have probable cause to do so. That judgment was entitled to presumptive deference as the considered judgment of a co-equal branch. Because there is a strong presumption of constitutionality due to an Act of Congress, the court stated, especially when it turns on what is reasonable, then obviously the Court should be reluctant to decide that a search thus authorized by Congress was unreasonable and that the Act was therefore unconstitutional.

2. Displacement. In the displacement cases, the existence of legislation counsels against Fourth Amendment protection that might interrupt the statutory scheme. Because legislatures can often do a better job at balancing privacy and security in new technologies as compared to courts, courts should reject Fourth Amendment protection as long as legislatures are protecting privacy adequately to avoid interfering with the careful work of the legislative branch. The existence of investigative legislation effectively preempts the field and displaces Fourth Amendment protection that may otherwise exist.

Justice Alitos concurrence in Riley v. Californiais an example of the displacement approach. Riley held that the government must obtain a search warrant before searching a cellphone incident to a suspects lawful arrest. Justice Alito concurred, agreeing with the majority only in the absence of adequate legislation regulating cellphone searches. I would reconsider the question presented here, he wrote, if either Congress or state legislatures, after assessing the legitimate needs of law enforcement and the privacy interests of cell phone owners, enact legislation that draws reasonable distinctions based on categories of information or perhaps other variables.

The enactment of investigative legislation should discourage judicial intervention, Justice Alito reasoned, because [l]egislatures, elected by the people, are in a better position than we are to assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost certainly will take place in the future. Although Fourth Amendment protection was necessary in the absence of legislation, the enactment of legislation might be reason to withdraw Fourth Amendment protection to avoid the very unfortunate result of federal courts using the blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment to try to protect privacy in emerging technologies.

3. Independence. In the independence cases, courts treat legislation as irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment. Legislatures are free to supplement privacy protections by enacting statutes, of course. But from the independence perspective, legislation sheds no light on what the Fourth Amendment requires. Courts must independently interpret the Fourth Amendment, and what legislatures have done has no relevance.

An example of independence is Virginia v. Moore, where the Supreme Court decided whether the search incident to a lawful arrest exception incorporates the state law of arrest. Moore was arrested despite a state law saying his crime could not lead to arrest; the question was whether the state law violation rendered the arrest unconstitutional. According to the court, whether state law made the arrest lawful was irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment. It was the courts duty to interpret the Fourth Amendment, and what the legislature decided about when arrests could be made was a separate question. History suggested that the Fourth Amendment did not incorporate statutes. And the states decision of when to make arrests was not based on the Fourth Amendment and was based on other considerations, such as the costs of arrests and whether the legislature valued privacy more than the Fourth Amendment required. Constitutionalizing the state standard would only frustrate the states efforts to achieve those goals, as it would mean los[ing] control of the regulatory scheme and might lead the state to abandon restrictions on arrest altogether. For that reason, the statute regulating the police was independent of the Fourth Amendment standard.

Those are the three approaches. The next question is, which is best? Ill offer some thoughts on that in my next post.

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Should privacy legislation influence how courts interpret the ...

ABA Journal's Blawg 100 (2015)

by John Wesley Hall Criminal Defense Lawyer and Search and seizure law consultant Little Rock, Arkansas Contact / The Book http://www.johnwesleyhall.com

2003-16, online since Feb. 24, 2003

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Fourth Amendment cases, citations, and links

Latest Slip Opinions: U.S. Supreme Court (Home) Federal Appellate Courts Opinions First Circuit Second Circuit Third Circuit Fourth Circuit Fifth Circuit Sixth Circuit Seventh Circuit Eighth Circuit Ninth Circuit Tenth Circuit Eleventh Circuit D.C. Circuit Federal Circuit Foreign Intell.Surv.Ct. FDsys, many district courts, other federal courts, other Military Courts: C.A.A.F., Army, AF, N-M, CG State courts (and some USDC opinions)

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Research Links: Supreme Court: SCOTUSBlog S. Ct. Docket Solicitor General's site SCOTUSreport Briefs online (but no amicus briefs) Curiae (Yale Law) Oyez Project (NWU) "On the Docket"Medill S.Ct. Monitor: Law.com S.Ct. Com't'ry: Law.com

General (many free): LexisWeb Google Scholar | Google LexisOne Legal Website Directory Crimelynx Lexis.com $ Lexis.com (criminal law/ 4th Amd) $ Findlaw.com Findlaw.com (4th Amd) Westlaw.com $ F.R.Crim.P. 41 http://www.fd.org FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (2008) (pdf) DEA Agents Manual (2002) (download) DOJ Computer Search Manual (2009) (pdf) Stringrays (ACLU No. Cal.) (pdf)

Congressional Research Service: --Electronic Communications Privacy Act (2012) --Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (2012) --Outline of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (2012) --Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (2012) --Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Discussion of Proposed Revisions (2012) ACLU on privacy Privacy Foundation Electronic Frontier Foundation NACDLs Domestic Drone Information Center Electronic Privacy Information Center Criminal Appeal (post-conviction) (9th Cir.) Section 1983 Blog

"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." Me

I still learn something new every day. Pete Townshend, The Who 50th Anniversary Tour, "The Who Live at Hyde Park" (Showtime 2015)

"I can't talk about my singing. I'm inside it. How can you describe something you're inside of?" Janis Joplin

"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government." Shemaya, in the Thalmud

"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).

"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).

"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment." Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).

"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)

"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)

"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has notto put it mildlyrun smooth." Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)

"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)

Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Governments purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

Libertythe freedom from unwarranted intrusion by governmentis as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark. United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)

"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." Mick Jagger & Keith Richards

"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for meand by that time there was nobody left to speak up." Martin Niemller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]

You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men! ---Pep Le Pew

See more here:
New law review article: The Original Fourth Amendment by ...

In Arizona v. Evans, 63 U.S.L.W. 4179 (March 1, 1995)(7-2), the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence seized by the police on the basis of a mistaken computer entry generated by court employees (rather than the police them- selves). In a combination of concurring and dissenting opinions, however, five members of the Court expressed great concern about the proliferation of computerized criminal justice records and their potential impact on personal privacy. Accordingly, the decision stops far short of creating a general good faith excep- tion to the exclusionary rule for any Fourth Amendment violation based on a computer mistake. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting the defendant's claim that the evidence was properly excluded in this case regardless of which agency bore responsibi- lity for the underlying computer error. Summary of Argument in ACLU amicus brief

In Wilson v. Arkansas, 63 U.S.L.W. 4456 (May 22, 1995)(9-0), the Court ruled that the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment generally requires the police to "knock and announce" their presence when executing a search warrant. The Court acknowledged that this presumption may be overcome in exigent circumstances. However, the Court did not give law enforcement officials a carte blanche to ignore the "knock and announce" rule in all cases. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief arguing in favor of the "knock and announce" rule. Summary of Argument in ACLU amicus brief

In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 63 U.S.L.W. 4653 (June 26, 1995)(6-3), the Court upheld a program of random, suspicionless drug testing for middle or high school athletes. The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, acknowledged that drug testing constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. The Court nevertheless concluded that students have diminished Fourth Amendment rights that are outweighed by the state's interest in addressing the problem of drugs in schools. In a strongly worded dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for "dispens[ing] with the requirement of individualized suspicion . . ." Id. at 4659. The ACLU represented the student plaintiff in this case. Summary of Argument in ACLU amicus brief

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FOURTH AMENDMENT | American Civil Liberties Union