Category Archives: Fourth Amendment

In less than two months after terrorists brought down the Twin Towers, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, granting federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies expanded authorities to engage in surveillance to hunt down suspected terrorists.

The bill sailed through Congress. The House of Representatives voted 357-66 to pass it. Then-Rep. Ron Paul (RTexas) was one of only three Republicans to oppose it. In the Senate, only one senator, Russ Feingold (DWis.), voted against it.

In a speech on the Senate floor, Feingold warned against compromising our own civil liberties as we pursued Osama bin Laden and others who might mean Americans harm. He took note of the many, many times in America's history where the government chose security over liberty and the results were not pretty:

There have been periods in our nation's history when civil liberties have taken a back seat to what appeared at the time to be the legitimate exigencies of war. Our national consciousness still bears the stain and the scars of those events: The Alien and Sedition Acts, the suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the internment of Japanese-Americans, German-Americans, and Italian-Americans during World War II, the blacklisting of supposed communist sympathizers during the McCarthy era, and the surveillance and harassment of antiwar protesters, including Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., during the Vietnam War. We must not allow these pieces of our past to become prologue.

Twenty years after the Sept. 11 attacks, we can see now that Feingold's warnings were on point (as were many warnings by many civil liberties experts). The USA PATRIOT Act ultimately led to a massive federal campaign of internal domestic surveillance that, when revealed, outraged many Americans even as government officials attempted to downplay and mislead citizens about what was happening.

Edward Snowden became a household name for good reason. In 2013, Snowden, a military intelligence contractor, leaked classified documents showing how the National Security Agency (NSA) was using the authorities of the USA PATRIOT Act to collect massive reams of communication data not just from suspected terrorists but from millions of Americans as well. Government officials (when they weren't lying to Congress about the existence of the program) downplayed what the NSA was doing. President Barack Obama responded to the outrage by insisting, "Nobody was listening to your phone calls."

But what the government was doing was collecting lots and lots of information about everything else related to those calls. The term "metadata" slid into the popular lexicon. Metadata refers to all the information about a communication outside of the actual contents of itwho people call, when, and where they are when they do so. One of the lessons Americans learned about all this domestic surveillance was how easy it isas communications technology over the past two decades turned our phones and personal devices into actual computersfor the government to keep track of your behavior even when they aren't listening to your phone calls. Did you call a clinic that provides abortions? A person with a criminal history of dealing drugs? A leader of an organization with a history of protesting government behavior? Metadata collection allowed the government to collect all of this information about citizen behavior absent any suspicion of a crime or an individualized warrant, bypassing the protections of the Fourth Amendment entirely.

One man apparently shocked by the breadth of this surveillance was Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner (RWis.), the man responsible for authoring the PATRIOT Act in the first place. Sensenbrenner did not intend for Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act to allow for mass, warrantless collection of records of millions of Americans. He blasted the Department of Justice under the Obama administration for interpreting it that way, pointing out that the records of every American's phone calls are assuredly not relevant to any investigation of terrorism.

But the genie is not going back into the bottle easily. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act did finally expire, replaced by the USA Freedom Act, which formalized some of these surveillance tools but added restrictions. NSA has since said that it is no longer collecting all of this data, and, by 2020, their authority to do so formally expired. It has never been shown to assist them in catching any terrorists.

Nevertheless, fear of terrorism has been used all this time and continues to be used to try to scare the public into making it easier for the government to snoop on them. The technology used to track terrorists' location data through their phones can and is used to track citizens through the commandeering of cell tower signals. The same thing has happened with facial recognition software. So-called Department of Homeland Security "fusion centers" formed in the wake of Sept. 11 were sold to the public as information clearinghouses between the feds and local police departments that allow them to better communicate with each other about potential terrorist threats. In reality, a Senate report from 2012 found no examples where they helped uncover a potential terrorist threat. Instead, there have been examples of these centers snooping on domestic activist groups and protests.

In recent years, fears of terrorism have been used by police and lawmakers to attack encryption, particularly end-to-end encryption, which helps protect the privacy of data on your computers, phones, and tablet devices. Encryption makes it harder for hackers and criminals to access your data. It also makes it harder (if not impossible) for the government to access your info without your knowledge or permission.

When two Muslim homegrown terrorists killed 14 people in an attack in San Bernardino, California, in 2015, the FBI attempted to force Apple to disable the phone's security to access the data within. The feds did have a warrant to search the phone, but Apple declined to assist, arguing that undermining their own encrypted security system via what's known as a "back door" would create security risks for users. Eventually, the FBI was able to turn to a third party to hack into a phone, which turned out to not have any information relevant to the attack stored on it.

Nevertheless, the war on terror has been invoked repeatedly by police, prosecutors, and lawmakers as a reason why tech companies should be required to allow for these back doors to allow officials access to data. Tech companies, privacy rights advocates, and cybersecurity experts are all pretty much in agreement here: Encryption back doors are very, very bad. There is no such thing as an encryption bypass that only the "right" people can access. Any mechanism that can break through this security can fall into the hands of criminals or authoritarian governments.

And even when they don't, the lesson of the PATRIOT Act is that we really cannot trust the government to accept limits on surveillance tools unless there is a transparent public mechanism of enforcement. The same government agencies who insist they'd be careful with encryption bypasses and would seek warrants are the same government agencies who had been secretly collecting whatever data they can about our personal communications as part of the War on Terror.

Feingold warned about all of these potential dangers in his critique of the PATRIOT Act:

But under this bill, the government can compel the disclosure of the personal records of anyoneperhaps someone who worked with, or lived next door to, or went to school with, or sat on an airplane with, or has been seen in the company of, or whose phone number was called bythe target of the investigation.

And under this new provisions all business records can be compelled, including those containing sensitive personal information like medical records from hospitals or doctors, or educational records, or records of what books someone has taken out of the library. This is an enormous expansion of authority, under a law that provides only minimal judicial supervision.

Under this provision, the government can apparently go on a fishing expedition and collect information on virtually anyone. All it has to allege in order to get an order for these records from the court is that the information is sought for an investigation of international terrorism or clandestine intelligence gathering. That's it. On that minimal showing in an ex parte application to a secret court, with no showing even that the information is relevant to the investigation, the government can lawfully compel a doctor or hospital to release medical records, or a library to release circulation records. This is a truly breathtaking expansion of police power.

This speech was given on Oct. 21, 2001. And it's exactly what happened.

See original here:
America's Post-9/11 Surveillance Authorities Were Inevitably Turned Against Its Own Citizens - Reason

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

Nothing reveals peoples true selves like death.

Take the new law passed by the state legislature in Texas, for instance, regulating abortion of humans who have a detectable heartbeat.

It seems like a pretty reasonable place for a society to begin the discussion about that moment at which an unborn human baby assumes God-given and constitutionally protected rights to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Perhaps even that most precious Fourth Amendment right to privacy.

Oh, but this is not a reasonable discussion with honest, fair-minded people who care about rights, liberty, life, or even privacy. No, they are frothing zealots who peddle death with a rage hotter than the Taliban and bow to every abortion with blind, religious fervor.

A reasonable reporter seeking reasonable answers asked a reasonable question about President Biden last week. Who does he believe then should look out for the unborn child? the reporter asked.

White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki could not contain the rage that flickered behind her black eyes.

He believes that its up to a woman to make those decisions, she replied. And up to a woman to make those decisions with her doctor.

In other words: Heartbeat? What heartbeat? I dont hear a heartbeat.

Perhaps realizing she had failed to answer the simple question, Ms. Psaki shifted from not answering the question to attacking the reporter for being born without reproductive organs.

I know youve never faced those choices, nor have you ever been pregnant, the Merchant of Death spat with contempt. But for women out there who have faced those choices, this is an incredibly difficult thing. The president believes that right should be respected.

Wait? What?

What right? Whos right? The right to life? The right to kill? Or the right to privacy? For the baby with a heartbeat?

End of discussion for the Merchant of Death.

A person named Richard Hanania picked up the discussion where Ms. Psaki left off.

You cant screen for Down syndrome before about 10 weeks, and something like 80% of Down syndrome fetuses are aborted, Mr. Hanania wrote on the Twitter website, retreating to the well-worn euphemism fetus instead of human or baby.

If red states ban abortion, we could see a world where they have five times as many children with Down syndrome, and similar numbers for other disabilities.

Well, Mr. Hanania certainly makes a case for heartbeat abortions, but I dont think its the one he intends to make. Its more like that old question about whether if you had an opportunity to kill Hitler when he was a baby, would you?

To Mr. Hananias credit, at least he is more honest than Ms. Psaki and willing to engage her argument to its logical conclusion. He makes no pretenses that the abortion industry in America is about anything other than eugenics, which of course, was the whole basis for Planned Parenthood in the first place. And Hitlers political party as well.

Another good question for Ms. Psaki and the Fourth Reich: Does the president support the right of a woman to abort a baby who has a heartbeat but not reproductive organs? Or, how about aborting a baby with a heartbeat because she does have reproductive organs? Or does that right only extend to babies with disabilities, such as Down syndrome?

How about the right to abort a baby with a heartbeat who is suspected might turn out gay? Or born with gender dysphoria? You know, as Mr. Hanania explained, those abnormalities can give a place a bad reputation.

Charles Hurt is the opinion editor at the Washington Times.

New and improved commenting system coming soon.

More here:
Merchants of Death - Washington Times

U.S. Supreme Court

Following the death of George Floyd, the nation focused attention on the enormous problems of police violence and racism in law enforcement, but there is a failure to put blame where much belongs: on the United States Supreme Court.

Many provisions of the Constitution exist to limit what police can do and to protect the rights of all of us, including those suspected and accused of crimes. Yet the court has done an ineffective, and indeed a poor job, of enforcing provisions of the Constitution intended to constrain the police. The Supreme Court has historically and consistently empowered the police to engage in racialized policing that especially harms people of color.

That is the thesis of my new book, Presumed Guilty: How the Supreme Court Empowered the Police and Subverted Civil Rights. There are many provisions of the Constitution meant to limit police behavior. The Fourth Amendment restricts the ability of the police to seize people and to search them. The Fifth Amendment protects the privilege against self-incrimination and constrains police questioning. The due process clauses of the Fifth and 14th Amendments impose many restrictions, including preventing suggestive police identification procedures, such as lineups.

Yet through almost all of American history, the Supreme Court has done little to enforce these provisions and to constrain the police. For the first century after the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the court virtually never decided a case about them, leaving the police unchecked by the Constitution. Except for a brief time during the Warren Court, particularly from 1961-1969, the court has narrowly interpreted these constitutional protections and instead has consistently ruled in favor of the police.

It is not hyperbole to say that under current law, as developed by the Supreme Court, the police can stop any person at any time and frisk the person, a power that is disproportionately used against Black and brown people. There is little protection of individuals from coercion in police interrogations, so long as the police dont use physical force. The court has virtually ignored the problem of false eyewitness identifications that have led to convictions of many innocent people, especially when a person is identifying someone of a different race. The court has made it difficult for victims of police abuse to successfully sue, even when an officer used egregious excessive force leading to serious injuries or death. In fact, the court has weakened, or gutted, all of the remedies that might be used to challenge police misconduct.

In empowering law enforcement, the courts decisions have led to enormous racial disparities in policing. In 2016, Black males aged 15-34 were nine times more likely than other Americans to be killed by law enforcement officers, according to the Guardian. They were also killed at four times the rate of young white men, a study in the American Journal of Public Health found. It also showed Hispanic men are nearly twice as likely to be killed by police as white men. The United States Civil Rights Commission concluded that while people of color make up fewer than 38% of the population, they make up almost 63% of unarmed people killed by police. Overall, civilian deaths from shootings and other police actions are vastly higher in the United States than in other developed nations.

And even when death does not result, there is a serious problem of excessive police force, especially directed at racial minorities, that causes physical and psychological injuries. There are seemingly endless accounts of police unnecessarily striking suspects, especially men of color, with batons, using tasers, applying chokeholds, and employing far more force than needed under the circumstances. The Center for Policing Equity found that 1 in 5 Americans interacts with law enforcement yearly. Of those encounters, 1 million result in use of force. And if youre Black, you are 2-4 times more likely to have force used than if you are white.

Discussions about the problems with policing usually do not focus on the Supreme Court, which does not hire or train or supervise or discipline police officers. It does not set budgets for police departments or manage their operations. As people focus on what police do on the streets, the connection to Supreme Court rulings is not apparent and seems remote. But the Constitution contains crucial provisions limiting how policing is to be done and what the Supreme Court says about them, or more importantly does not say, has an enormous effect on what police do every day. Without enforcement of the Constitutions constraints on police, all too often the rights of criminal suspects and defendants become illusory.

To take one example, under the Supreme Courts decisions, police can stop and frisk virtually any person at any time. Studies in many cities show that police disproportionately use this power against people of color.

The court opened the door to this practice in Terry v. Ohio, in 1968, under the liberal Warren Court. Notwithstanding the language of the Fourth Amendment, which requires probable cause for a police stop or search, the court said that only a lesser standardreasonable suspicionneeded to be met. To this day, the court never has defined reasonable suspicion other than to say that it requires more than a hunch and less than probable cause.

In subsequent decisions, the court made it easy for the police to find reasonable suspicion in almost any situation. Whren v. United States, from 1996, is particularly important. Undercover officers in Washington, D.C., became suspicious when a car stopped at a stop sign for about 30 seconds. They followed the car until the driver committed a minor infraction, turning without a signal. Even though undercover officers in D.C. were not allowed to enforce traffic laws, the police pulled the car over, ordered the driver and passenger out of the vehicle and searched the area of the car where they were sitting. They found illegal drugs.

The traffic stop clearly was a pretext; the officers had no authority to enforce traffic laws and no interest in doing so. The court said that does not matter. The actual motivation of the officers is irrelevant. The court said that the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. So long as the officer has probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion, that a traffic law has been violated, the officer may stop the vehicle.

If police officers follow anyone long enough, they will observe a driver changing lanes, turning without a signal, exceeding the speed limit by a mile or two an hour, orand this is the easiest for policethe car not stopping long enough, or too long, at a stop sign. It is irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes that the officers actual motivation for the stop had nothing to do with traffic enforcement. And studies show that this power is used disproportionately against people of color. Emma Pierson and the Stanford Open Policing Project analyzed data on vehicle stops from 21 state patrol agencies and 35 city police departments from 2011 to 2018. They found that Black drivers were stopped 43% more often than white drivers relative to their share of the population.

This is just one example of how the Supreme Court has empowered the police and how it has led to highly racialized policing. But what can be done about it?

In light of the political composition of the Supreme Court, now and for the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that it will interpret the Constitution to control the police. If the court continues to fail, and I fear it will given that a majority of the justices have shown no concern or awareness of the problems with policing in the United States, then we must turn to other institutions to control the police, check police abuses and end racist policing in the United States. Congress, state legislatures and city councils can enact new laws to reform policing. After the tragic death of George Floyd, bills were introduced into Congress and into state legislatures to impose crucial new checks on the police. Unfortunately, these have stalled; even the progressive California legislature failed to enact new laws last year.

State courts can interpret state constitutions to protect rights and to impose limits on state and local police departments. State constitutions always can provide more protection of rights than the United States Constitution. For example, some state courts, such as in Arkansas and Washington, have rejected Whren and prohibited pretextual police stops.

The U.S. Department of Justice can aggressively enforce existing laws to reform police departments. A federal law, 42 U.S.C. 14141, authorizes the DOJ to sue police departments when there is a pattern and practice of civil rights violations. This has been used to reform many major police departments, such as in Los Angeles, Seattle, Baltimore and Cincinnati. The Trump administration expressly refused to use this authority, but Attorney General Merrick Garland has said that once more the Justice Department will be bringing suits under it.

All of these actions can make a big difference in how policing is done in the United States. And perhaps someday, the court will fulfill its duty of enforcing the parts of the Constitution that are meant to control the police and ensure equal justice under the law.

Erwin Chemerinsky is dean of the University of California at Berkeley School of Law. He is an expert in constitutional law, federal practice, civil rights and civil liberties, and appellate litigation. Hes the author of several books, including The Case Against the Supreme Court (Viking, 2014) and The Religion Clauses: The Case for Separating Church and State, written with Howard Gillman (Oxford University Press, 2020). His latest book is Presumed Guilty: How the Supreme Court Empowered the Police and Subverted Civil Rights (Liveright, 2021).

More here:
Chemerinsky: The Supreme Court has done a poor job protecting against police abuse of power and racism - ABA Journal

A man charged with attempted murder after firing at Minneapolis police officers in the chaotic protests that followed George Floyds death has been acquitted of all charges against him

By AMY FORLITI Associated Press

September 3, 2021, 9:02 PM

4 min read

MINNEAPOLIS -- A man charged with attempted murder after firing at Minneapolis police officers in the chaotic protests that followed George Floyds death has been acquitted of all charges against him.

Jaleel Stallings argued self-defense during his July trial, testifying that he fired at the unmarked white van after he was struck in the chest with what turned out to be a nonlethal rubber bullet fired by police.

Stallings, 29, testified that he thought he was being attacked by civilians, had been struck by a bullet and was potentially bleeding out, his attorney, Eric Rice, told The Associated Press on Friday. Court documents show that after Stallings was hit, he fired three shots toward the van as a warning, then took cover. He surrendered when he realized he had fired at police. No officers were hit.

Stallings case drew new attention this week when an online digital news outlet, Minnesota Reformer, reported on his acquittal and examined the case in depth. The Reformer published body camera footage of his arrest that shows Minneapolis SWAT officers punching and kicking Stallings as he lay on the ground.

A booking photo of Stallings taken after his arrest shows visible facial injuries. Rice said Stallings testified he had a suspected eye socket fracture, bruising and cuts. Court documents say he also had labored breathing after the arrest, which Rice said was likely due to the impact of the rubber bullet to his chest.

Rice said hes not aware of any pending investigation or discipline for the officers, but requested such information if it existed and believes it should have been disclosed as part of trial discovery.

When asked if the officers were being investigated or disciplined for use of force, Minneapolis police spokesman John Elder said he cant release any information because the matter is under internal review.

Stallings is now seeking the courts permission to allow him to release body camera footage that became public evidence during trial, after a prior order in the case restricted dissemination of videos. A hearing on that issue is scheduled for later this month.

Stallings May 30, 2020, arrest made headlines during a time of unrest in Minneapolis, which included the burning of a police station, in the days after Floyds death. He was charged with two counts of second-degree attempted murder, multiple counts of assault and other charges. His case got added attention when the Minnesota Freedom Fund, a local nonprofit group, paid $75,000 in cash to get him released on bail.

According to court documents in his case, when Stallings realized he had fired at police officers, he immediately put his gun on the ground and lay face down, with his hands on the ground. A pretrial order from Judge William Koch said Stallings was motionless for 20 seconds and posed no obvious threat before Officer Justin Stetson and Sgt. Andrew Bittell approached him. The order says Stetson began kicking and punching Stallings in the head and neck, and Bittell began kneeing and punching him in the stomach, chest and back.

The judge found that Stetson and Bittell violated Stallings' Fourth Amendment rights during the arrest and that their actions were objectively unreasonable.

Officer Stetson and Sergeant Bittell allowed their anger and/or fear to overtake their faculties and they beat Mr. Stallings for nearly 30 seconds before attempting to place him in handcuffs, Koch wrote. The video evidence does not support their testimony Mr. Stallings was resisting arrest in any way, instead he surrendered to their authority.

The new attention on the case comes just months before Minneapolis voters will be asked to weigh in on a ballot question that would eliminate the police department and replace it with a new Department of Public Safety that would use a more comprehensive public health approach.

View original post here:
Man who shot at cops in unrest over Floyd death is acquitted - ABC News

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks and the U.S. governments subsequent war on terror. As part of this war, the government has engaged in extensive military operations abroad.

While attention is currently focused on its withdrawal from Afghanistan, we must note that in prosecuting its war on terror, the U.S. government has also massively expanded its powers at home. While these powers have been adopted in the name of protecting people and freedom in America, they also pose a threat to our liberty. The anniversary of the attacks offers an opportunity to take stock of these long-lasting government powers.

Less than two months after the attacks, Congress passed the PATRIOT Act, which expanded the governments domestic surveillance powers, including the power to review information about people that is held by third parties. It also weakened Fourth Amendment protections related to trap and trace searches, in which incoming phone calls to a person are recorded. In addition, President George W. Bush issued an order to ease the constraints imposed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) on the National Security Agency (NSA). This allowed the agency to execute warrantless searches of American citizens emails and phone calls.

After several reauthorizations, key provisions of the PATRIOT Act expired in March 2020. However, its spirit is alive and well. The underlying surveillance apparatus, which was expansive even before 9/11, is still in place. And many surveillance activities and programs outside of the PATRIOT Act still exist in expanded form and will be with us for the foreseeable future.

A second domestic legacy of the war on terror is the militarization of domestic police forces. According to one estimate, since 9/11, the Department of Defense has transferred $1.6 billion worth of equipment to law enforcement agencies for items like mine-resistant vehicles, machine guns, grenade launchers and military aircraft. Domestic police departments have also obtained stingrays, or cell site simulators, which can be used to make cell phones transmit information, such as location and other identifiers. Originally developed for military and intelligence use abroad, these devices are now used by local law enforcement, which can spy on people in the United States with little to no oversight.

A final domestic legacy of the war on terror is civil asset forfeiture, which allows the police to seize assets from anyone suspected of illegal activity, but without having to charge them with a crime. The PATRIOT Act weakened earlier protections against forfeiture abuse, making it easier for the government to seize the property of anyone suspected of being associated with terrorist activity. Once property is seized, owners who want it back have the onus of demonstrating innocence. Further compounding this perverse system is the arrangement in which state and federal authorities share the proceeds from the sale of seized assets. Law enforcement thus has an incentive to take property assets, since the evidentiary bar is low and the benefits are high.

These expanded government powers impose high costs on many innocent people. The hardest hit are people who lack the money and time to fight back through the courts.

The famous sociologist William Graham Sumner (1840-1910) once observed that, it is not possible to experiment with a society and just drop the experiment whenever we choose. The experiment enters into the life of society and never can be got out again.

This is certainly the case with the post-9/11 expansions of government powers. In the wake of the police killing of George Floyd in May 2020, there were protests against police brutality throughout the country. Protestors were monitored through aerial surveillance, and a range of military-grade equipment was deployed. More recently, since the Jan. 6 Capitol Hill riot, there have been calls for a new war on domestic terror.

Perhaps the lasting legacy of the war on terror is the expansion and entrenchment of government power over the lives of Americans.

Christopher J. Coyne is senior fellow at the Independent Institute and professor of Economics at George Mason University. He is the co-author of Police State, USA which appears in the fall edition of The Independent Review.

Link:
The domestic legacy of our global 'war on terror' | TheHill - The Hill

from the can't-make-crime-fighting-omelettes-without-breaking-a-few-Constitutional-eg dept

How much does it take to establish reasonable suspicion needed to subject a person to an at least temporary removal of most of their rights? Not much, says the Fifth Circuit Appeals Court, which appears willing to keep poking the SCOTUS bear with its mind-boggling interpretations of Constitutional rights and the power of law enforcement to bypass them.

This recent decision, highlighted by defense lawyer/"Constitutional cultist" Andrew Fleischman, says all cops need are a few seconds of observation and some vague assertions about criminal activity in the general area.

Here's the setup, as presented by the Fifth Circuit [PDF]:

Otha Ray Flowers, convicted of a federal gun violation, appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The questions on appeal are whether Flowers and Jeremy Mayo were seized when five or six patrol cars parked behind and around Mayos Cadillac with their patrol lights flashing, and if they were seized, whether Officer Stanton had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop.

Some cops were doing some cop stuff in the area. According to the facts on record, the officers were "looking for suspicious behavior," a supposedly "proactive" effort in an allegedly high-crime area that is meant to deter criminal acts by, apparently, rolling up en masse on anyone viewed as suspicious by these Direct Action Response Team (yes, that spells DART) officers.

Flowers and Mayo were sitting in the parking lot of a convenience store. The officers were in the area because their supervisor had directed them to patrol near there because of "recent violent crimes and burglaries." This sounds suspiciously like "predictive policing," which sends cops to where crimes have been committed under the assumption that lightning strikes twice/people are less white. The Jackson, Mississippi panopticon works, I guess. But only on the assumption that people living, working, or temporarily idling a vehicle in a high-crime area have fewer rights than those fortunate enough to be elsewhere.

So, what were these two "suspects" doing that raised enough suspicion a stop involving five police cars and six officers was warranted? Failing to do anything other than sit in a car for less time than it takes to read the previous two paragraphs:

As Officer Stanton was turning from Capitol Street onto Road of Remembrance, he saw a silver Cadillac parked in the south end of a small parking lot connected to an open convenience store. It was dark outside, but Officer Stanton observed that the vehicle was occupied by two men, one in the drivers seat and one in the passengers seat. Officer Stanton observed the vehicle for approximately 10 to 15 seconds and noticed the occupants didnt appear to be exiting the vehicle, [and] didnt appear to be patronizing the establishment. Therefore, he decided to conduct what he characterized as a field interview.

Apparently, even non-movements can be furtive. The response to this momentarily-observed lack of activity was a literal swarm of police officers.

Officer Stanton testified that at this point, he and five to six other officers, all in separate patrol cars, converged upon the silver vehicle with their blue lights activated. The parking lot in front of the store was narrow, with very little space or room to maneuver. Officer Stanton later acknowledged that it would have been impossible for the silver vehicle to leave the parking lot because of the way the officers parked their cars around it.

Behold the majestic absurdity of the following assertion:

Officer Stanton got out of his patrol car and approached the silver vehicle, as did other officers. He testified that the men in the vehicle were still free to leave at this point in the encounter, but he did not communicate that to them.

Who amongst us with five or six police cars surrounding our car would feel "free to leave," whether or not that option was communicated to us by one of the six surrounding the car? No one. Not a goddamn person would feel this encounter was still voluntary.

At least the Fifth Circuit Appeals Court said it was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Pretending it was still consensual was a step too far for even this notoriously law enforcement-friendly circuit. But the very least a court should do when presented with this kind of assertion is to apprise officers that literally no one -- not even the officer making this sworn statement -- actually believes this kind of "interaction" is consensual.

The end result was the discovery of some marijuana, a gun, and an outstanding warrant. This led to felony charges. And the Fifth Circuit is fine with this outcome because, hey, don't sit in a car in a high crime area, I guess.

It bears repeating that apart from the presence of a number of police cars, the tenor of Officer Stantons encounter with Flowers was entirely benign until Stanton smelled marijuana. He conducted no physical frisk of Flowerss person but simply approached the Cadillac to ask some questions. If this course of conduct is constitutionally impermissible, then it is difficult to see how any active policing can take place in communities endangered and impoverished by high crime rates.

That's the takeaway from this decision. Cops can wander over Constitutional lines as long as a court is willing to grant their "high crime area" assertions credibility. There's no legal definition of "high crime," so it can be whatever cops want it to be. And when they assert this in front of judges prone to grant every benefit of a doubt to fellow government employees, it will work nearly every time.

Flow our proxy tears, the court advocating on behalf of the policeman said:

Officers in such areas may well require safety in numbers, while the law-abiding citizens desperately need protection that will be denied if law enforcement officials believe that incriminating evidence will be suppressed or they will be sued for alleged violations of rights.

If the cops can't roll over rights to fight crime, how can they possibly fight crime? That's the question the Fifth Circuit is asking. And it should have an answer that says cops can't disregard rights just because they're patrolling areas where criminal activity is claimed to be "higher" than theoretical areas where it's apparently lower. But instead, the Appeals Court gives us this:

Under the circumstances of this case and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Government, assuming arguendo that these individuals were seized, there was reasonable suspicion to do so. We AFFIRM.

And that is that. The court has basically written a permission slip for stops based on nothing more than a few seconds of observation backed by officers' assertions that criminal activity has occurred nearby at some point in the past. Looking past the legalese, the Appeals Court is telling people their rights mean less if they happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, with the "wrong time" being a few seconds of non-movement while observed by officers trained to view literally anything as suspicious.

If there's any saving grace to this published decision, it's the dissent, which casts a whole lot of shade on the majority's conclusions while taking a shot at the overreacting cops.

As for the dawdling of approximately ten to fifteen seconds, the men could have been finishing a conversation, responding to text messages, watching with curiosity as a six-car police caravan passed, or engaging in other reasonable behavior that explains the delay. The facts in this case simply do not support an officers reasonable suspicion.

That should have been the majority's conclusion. Instead, it chose once again to elevate police officers over the policed, and ensured the poorest of the police can be treated the worst without officers feeling they might be held accountable in a court of law for the rights violations they've committed.

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Filed Under: 4th amendment, 5th circuit, high crime areas, jeremy mayo, otha ray flowers, police, predictive policing, searches, suspicion

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Ten Seconds Of Doing Nothing Is Reasonably Suspicious, Says The Fifth Circuit Appeals Court - Techdirt

It ended in chaos, Americas almost-20-year disaster in Afghanistan. But is the war on terror itself over? Apparently not. Remember when, in May 2003, President George W. Bush declared Mission accomplished as he spoke proudly of his invasion of Iraq? Three months later, Attorney General John Ashcroft proclaimed, We are winning the war on terror.

Now, nearly 20 years after the 9/11 attacks, Joe Biden the fourth war-on-terror president is bringing the most obvious aspects of that war to a close, no matter the consequences. It is time to end the Forever War, he said.

Eighteen years after the invasion of Iraq, a shifting definition of the role of the 2,500 or so U.S. troops still stationed there is also underway. Instead of more combat missions, the American role will now be logistics and advisory support.

Putting a fine point on both the Afghan withdrawal and the Iraqi change of direction, many in Congress have acknowledged the need to remove the authorizations passed long ago for those forever wars. In June, the House of Representatives voted to repeal the 2002 Authorization for the Use of Force (AUMF) in Iraq that paved the way for that invasion.

The removal of that 2002 law remains painfully overdue. Plans are also now on the table for the repeal of the even more impactful 2001 AUMF, in which no enemy was actually named, passed by Congress one week after 9/11. Like the Iraq War authorization, its use has been expanded in ways well beyond its original intent namely, the rooting out of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Under the 2001 AUMFs auspices, in the last nearly two decades, the U.S. has conducted military operations in ever more countries across the Middle East and Africa.

Traditionally, when a war ends, theres a resolution, perhaps codified in a treaty or an agreement of some sort acknowledging victory or defeat, and a nod to the peace that will follow. Not so with this war.

However unsuccessful, the war on terror is likely to continue. The only difference: It wont be called a war anymore. Instead, there will be a variety of militarized counterterrorism efforts around the globe. With or without the moniker of war, the U.S. remains at war in numerous places, for instance recently launching airstrikes on Somalia to counter the terrorist group al-Shabaab.

Domestically, theres a similarly disturbing persistence when it comes to the war on terror look at the Patriot Act of 2001 that downgraded Fourth Amendment protections, enabling law enforcement to conduct mass warrantless surveillance on Americans. While some of its authorities were eliminated, some were maintained with the Freedom Act of 2015.

The future of such powers and policies at home and abroad is now in a strange kind of limbo. At present, it looks as if those forever wars have created a new form of forever law, forever policy, forever power and a forever-changed America.

More here:
While the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is over, the war on terror has become its own Forever War. - Monterey County Weekly

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has been making consistent efforts to update and reconstruct the alternate investment space. Pursuant to the SEBIs Consultation Paper on Introduction of the Concept of Accredited Investors (February Consultation Paper) published on 24 February 2021, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 (AIF Regulations) were amended on 3 August 2021 vide the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Alternative Investment Funds) (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2021 (Third Amendment), which primarily introduced the concept of Accredited Investors and granted certain relaxations for Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) with Accredited Investors.

Further, in line with SEBIs vision to streamline the registration process and investments by AIFs, SEBI vide the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Alternative Investment Funds) (Fourth Amendment) Regulations, 2021 (Fourth Amendment) dated 13 August 2021, further amended the AIF Regulations to give effect to the modifications approved during SEBIs Board Meeting dated 6 August 2021. The key changes across both these amendments are highlighted as follows:

1. Introduction of the concept of Accredited Investor

The Third Amendment, consistent with the recommendations under the February Consultation Paper, has introduced the concept of Accredited Investors:

(a) Who is an Accredited Investor?

The Third Amendment inserted the definition of Accredited Investors to the AIF Regulations, which means any person who is granted a certificate of accreditation by an Accreditation Agency, subject to meeting the financial parameters prescribed. In addition to the investors who are eligible for accreditation by meeting the prescribed thresholds, the Third Amendment also provides a list of persons who shall be deemed to be Accredited Investors, without requiring such investors to go through the accreditation process.

Comment: Unlike the definition of Accredited Investors under the Portfolio Managers regime, the Third Amendment lays down objective criteria to be met for an investor to qualify as an Accredited Investor and to avail the benefits / relaxations granted to such Accredited Investors. The rationale behind the introduction of the concept, as highlighted under the February Consultation Paper, is to recognise the class of investors who are well-versed with the risks of investments and have the knowledge as well as financial capacity to undertake the risk.

(b) Who will certify an Accredited Investor?

An Accreditation Agency will grant certificates of accreditation to the investors who are eligible as Accredited Investors. Accreditation Agency has been defined to mean a subsidiary of a recognized stock exchange / a subsidiary of a depository / any other entity as may be specified by SEBI from time to time.

Comment: While the framework and process for granting accreditation, including the process for applications, timelines and duration of validity of the accreditation, is yet to be put in place, the industry is hopeful that Accreditation Agencies will exercise flexibility in accrediting overseas investors and entities receiving foreign capital.

(c) What requirements must potential Accredited Investors fulfil?

As mentioned earlier, the Third Amendment categorises Accredited Investors into 2 (two) categories: (i) investors who meet the specified eligibility criteria and are granted certificates of accreditation by an Accreditation Agency; and (ii) deemed Accredited Investors.

The annual income / net worth thresholds which are to be met by entities to apply for accreditation are:

(I) Individual, Hindu Undivided Family, family trust or sole proprietorship:

(A) annual income of at least INR 2,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees Two crores); or

(B) net worth of at least INR 7,50,00,000 (Indian Rupees Seven crores and Fifty lakhs), out of which not less than half (i.e., INR 3,75,00,000 (Indian Rupees Three crores and Seventy Five lakhs)) is in the form of financial assets; or

(C) annual income of at least INR 1,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees One crore) and minimum net worth of INR 5,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees Five crores), out of which not less than half (i.e., INR 2,50,00,000 (Indian Rupees Two crores and Fifty lakhs)) is in the form of financial assets;

(ii) body corporate is a net worth of at least INR 50,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees Fifty crores);

(iii) trust (other than family trust) is a net worth of at least INR 50,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees Fifty crores); and

(IV) partnership firm (incorporated under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, each partner must independently meet the applicable eligibility criteria (detailed above) for accreditation, depending on their form.

Deemed Accredited Investors: Further, government, developmental or fund entities of the Centre and State, qualified institutional buyers under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018, Category I foreign portfolio investors, sovereign wealth funds and multilateral agencies, and other entities notified by the SEBI shall be deemed to be Accredited Investors, with no requirement to obtain a certificate of accreditation.

Comment: While the February Consultation Paper referred to a distinct set of thresholds for non-resident Indians (NRIs) and foreign entities, the Third Amendment does not differentiate between the criteria for resident Indian and NRIs / foreign entities. It is to be seen how the Accreditation Agencies apply the eligibility conditions laid down to entities / persons outside India.

(d) Relaxation in minimum investment value

The AIF Regulations have been amended to grant a relaxation to Accredited Investors from investing a minimum quantum of INR 1,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees One crore), a change that shall be well-received.

Comment: In line with the idea that Accredited Investors are sophisticated investors who require lesser regulatory protection, the minimum investment threshold applicable for investing in AIFs has been done away with for such Accredited Investors, thus allowing them greater flexibility to structure their investments.

2. Large Value Fund for Accredited Investors

To identify AIFs consisting of Accredited Investors only, the Third Amendment has also introduced the concept of Large Value Fund for Accredited Investors, which is an AIF / scheme of an AIF in which each investor (other than service providers / employees of the AIF and investment manager) is an Accredited Investor and invests not less than INR 70,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees Seventy crores).

The following relaxations in respect of Large Value Fund for Accredited Investors, have been granted:

(a) The AIF Regulations relating to filing of placement memorandum with SEBI at least 30 (thirty) days prior to launch of a scheme, and incorporation of SEBIs comments in placement memorandum prior to launch of scheme, will not apply to Large Value Fund for Accredited Investors.

Comment: This indicates that while the SEBI may continue to undertake the review and diligence of an AIF being set-up, in the event the first scheme of an AIF is a Large Value Fund for Accredited Investors, it may not examine the private placement memorandum (PPMs) of such Large Value Fund for Accredited Investors.

(b) Large Value Funds for Accredited Investors are permitted to extend their tenure beyond 2 (two) years, subject to terms of the contribution agreement, other fund documents and such conditions as may be specified by SEBI from time to time.

Comment: The relaxation is basis the assumption that the Accredited Investors have the required knowledge, advice and bargaining power to negotiate the terms of investment and accordingly, need not be bound by pre-decided tenure.

(c) Large Value Funds for Accredited Investors of Category I and II AIFs are permitted to invest up to 50% (fifty per cent) of the investable funds (as opposed to 25% (twenty five per cent)) in an investee company directly or through investment in the units of other Alternative Investment Funds. Similarly, Large Value Funds for Accredited Investors of Category III AIFs are permitted to invest up to 25% (twenty five per cent) of the investable funds (as opposed to 10% (ten per cent)) in an investee company directly or through investment in units of other AIFs.

Comment: The diversification requirement restricts the flexibility of AIFs formed for specific investment opportunities and platforms funds wherein the big-cheque investors come together with the Manager group to invest in pre-identifies assets. Relaxation to the diversification requirement should go a long way in allowing investors as well as the Managers the required room to structure larger, specific investments.

Comment: The concept of Accredited Investors has been prevalent in various other developing and developed jurisdictions, and introduction of the same in India is a step forward in the right direction. Pertinently, the idea of Accredited Investors was floated when the AIF Regulations were formulated. The rationale behind such accredited / qualified / professional investors (as variably described across jurisdictions) is that these investors have the required market knowledge / advice and a high-risk bearing capacity to take informed decisions. Therefore, entities providing financial products and services to this class of investors would be eligible to a regulation-light space, i.e., a lower standard of regulatory prescription from the regulators in terms of funds raising capital from such investors.

The changes prescribed by the Third Amendment, particularly for Large Value Fund for Accredited Investors, has immense potential to afford flexibility to platform structures and funds which are raising capital from Ultra High-Net-Worth Individuals (UHNI) / large ticket investors. Considering that many of these investors may be funds themselves, it will be interesting to see how these thresholds are applied and calculated for funds, and whether the commitment from investors can be taken into consideration for determining their accreditation status, or the asset base.

3. Merchant bankers role

The PPMs that accompany the application for the launch of a scheme of AIF shall now have to be filed with SEBI through a merchant banker. Further, the AIF Regulations now provide that SEBI shall communicate the required changes/ comments to the PPMs to such merchant banker, and it will be the merchant bankers responsibility to ensure that these changes are made before the launch of the Scheme.

This modification would come into effect from the 91st day from the date of publication of the Fourth Amendment, i.e., from 14 November 2021.

Comment: The recommendation to route PPMs for applications to launch a scheme of an AIF through merchant bankers may seem counterintuitive at first since it may potentially increase the cost and time taken to set up a new fund, among other considerations. The recommendations seem to equate products meant for High Net-worth Individuals (HNIs) (with a minimum investment bracket) to a general listing of a company. Further, there could be learning curve for the players of the merchant banking industry as well, who are not typically exposed to or acquainted with such fund structures but may pump synergy into the AIF industry.

4. Revision to definitions

(a) The Fourth Amendment has revised the definition of debt funds to include securitized debt instruments.

Comment: The expansion in the definition of debt funds to include securitised debt instruments, has provided the required clarity by the industry for investment by AIFs in instruments such as asset backed / mortgage-backed securities.

(b) The definition of investable funds has been revised to clarify that net of expenditure for administration and management of the fund is to be estimated for the entire tenure of the fund. Further, the Fourth Amendment has also clarified that tenure refers to the duration of scheme from the day of its launch till last day of the term as specified in the fund documents.

Comment: This clarification may materially impact the deployable corpus available to an AIF. Prior to this clarification, Managers would typically consider only the expenditures which would be borne from capital contributions while calculating investable funds of an AIF, and exclude the expenditures borne out of the income of the fund. This is especially important for credit funds, infrastructure funds and other funds which usually start earning income (in the form of interests or otherwise) from an early stage during the life cycle of the fund, and typically do not account for the expenditures which are taken care of from the income for the calculation of investible funds.

(c) The definition of units now includes fully or partly paid up units, wherein partly paid-up units means the portion of committed capital invested by the investor in Alternative Investment Fund or scheme of the Alternative Investment Fund.

Comment: While several AIFs have been issuing partly paid-up units, the clarity and codification of the same is a welcome change to clarify the same and settle the dust around issuance of partly paid-up units.

5. Minimum amount of grants by Accredited Investors to Social Venture Funds

Grants by Accredited Investors to social venture funds has been exempted from meeting the requirement of making a minimum grant of INR 25,00,000 (Rupees Twenty Five lakhs).

6. Investment conditions for Category I AIFs

(a) Prior to the Fourth Amendment, Category I fund of fund AIFs were permitted to invest in the units of other Category I AIFs of the same sub-category. The Fourth Amendment has expanded the range of investments by such Category I fund of fund AIFs to include Category II AIFs.

(b) Category I Venture Capital Funds must now invest 75% (seventy five percent) of its investable funds (as opposed to the earlier requirement of two-thirds of its investable funds) in unlisted equity shares or equity linked instruments of a venture capital undertaking, or companies listed or proposed to be listed on a SME Exchange or SME segment of an exchange. This threshold of 75% investment is to be met by the end of the life cycle of the Fund.

(c) The remaining conditions that not more than one-third of the investible funds of a Category I Venture Capital Fund should be invested in initial public offerings of unlisted entities, debt instruments of venture capital undertakings, preferential allotment of shares of a listed entity and equity shares of a financially weak company or sick company whose shares are listed, has been done away with.

7. Temporary Investments

Prior to the Fourth Amendment, the AIF Regulations stated that an AIF could make temporary investments out of the un-invested portions of the investible funds. In line with the market practice, the Fourth Amendment has codified that temporary investment can be made from the divestment proceeds pending distribution to the investors as well. Further, from the list of instruments for temporary investments, Collateralized Borrowing and Lending Obligation (CBLOs) has been substituted by Triparty Repo Dealing and Settlement (TREPS), considering that CBLOs have been discontinued from November 2018 and all CBLOs have TREPS.

The content of this document do not necessarily reflect the views / position of Khaitan & Co but remain solely those of the author(s). For any further queries or follow up please contact Khaitan & Co at [emailprotected]

Read more from the original source:
ERGO Analysing Developments Impacting Business: Significant Changes to the AIF Regulations: Slow, but Steady Move towards a New Regime - Lexology

Police around the country have drastically increased their use of geofence warrants, a widely criticized investigative technique that collects data from any user's device that was in a specified area within a certain time range, according to new figures shared by Google. Law enforcement has served geofence warrants to Google since 2016, but the company has detailed for the first time exactly how many it receives.

The report shows that requests have spiked dramatically in the past three years, rising as much as tenfold in some states. In California, law enforcement made 1,909 requests in 2020, compared to 209 in 2018. Similarly, geofence warrants in Florida leaped from 81 requests in 2018 to more than 800 last year. In Ohio, requests rose from seven to 400 in that same time.

Across all 50 states, geofence requests to Google increased from 941 in 2018 to 11,033 in 2020 and now make up more than 25 percent of all data requests the company receives from law enforcement.

It should be a last resort, because its so invasive.

Jake Laperruque, Project on Government Oversight

A single geofence request could include data from hundreds of bystanders. In 2019, a single warrant in connection with an arson resulted in nearly 1,500 device identifiers being sent to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Dozens of civil liberties groups and privacy advocates have called for banning the technique, arguing it violates Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, particularly for protesters. Now, Googles transparency report has revealed the scale at which people nationwide may have faced the same violation.

Theres always collateral damage, says Jake Laperruque, senior policy counsel for the Constitution Project at the nonprofit Project on Government Oversight. Because of their inherently wide scope, geofence warrants can give police access to location data from people who have no connection to criminal activities.

"We vigorously protect the privacy of our users while supporting the important work of law enforcement, Google said in a statement to WIRED. We developed a process specifically for these requests that is designed to honor our legal obligations while narrowing the scope of data disclosed."

Just this week, Forbes revealed that Google granted police in Kenosha, Wisconsin, access to user data from bystanders who were near a library and a museum that was set on fire last August, during the protests that followed the murder of George Floyd. Google handed over the GPS coordinates and data, device data, device IDs, and time stamps for anyone at the library for a period of two hours; at the museum, for 25 minutes. Similarly, Minneapolis police requested Google user data from anyone within the geographical region of a suspected burglary at an AutoZone store last year, two days after protests began.

Laperruque argues that geofence warrants could have a chilling effect, as people forgo their right to protest because they fear being targeted by surveillance. Just this week, Kenosha lawmakers debated a bill that would make attending a riot a felony. Critics noted that such a bill could penalize anyone attending peaceful demonstrations that, because of someone elses actions, become violent. Similarly, geofence data could be used as evidence of guilt not just by being loosely associated with someone else in a crowd but by simply being there in the first place.

Geofence warrants work differently from typical search warrants. Usually, officers identify a suspect or person of interest, then obtain a warrant from a judge to search the persons home or belongings.

With geofence warrants, police start with the time and location that a suspected crime took place, then request data from Google for the devices surrounding that location at that time, usually within a one- to two-hour window. If Google complies, it will supply a list of anonymized data about the devices in the area: GPS coordinates, the time stamps of when they were in the area, and an anonymized identifier, known as a reverse location obfuscation identifier, or RLOI.

Read the original here:
An Explosion in Geofence Warrants Threatens Privacy Across the US - WIRED

Pro-life activist David Benham, along with four other anti-abortion advocates, filed an amended complaint Monday against North Carolina officials after they were arrested last year for offering prayer to women while standing outside an abortion clinic.

Benham is president of Cities4Life, an organization that provides counseling to women on their way to abortion clinics by supporting them with prayer and guidance.

In April 2020, Benham and other representatives of pro-life groups were across the street from an abortion clinic in Charlotte, North Carolina to offer counseling and prayer to expectant mothers considering abortion.

As CBN News reported, police arrested the activists and cited them for violating COVID-19 restrictions and guidelines, even though they were following all the health and safety requirements including social distancing.

***Please sign up forCBN Newslettersand download theCBN News appto ensure you keep receiving the latest news from a distinctly Christian perspective.***

The plaintiffs are being represented by the conservative law firm, Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF).

Denise Harle, senior counsel with ADF, told The Christian Post (CP) that the activists chose to amend their complaint (link) because the charges against them were later dropped - showing that their arrests were "improper."

"The dropping of the charges actually underscores why this amended complaint should prevail," Harle said. "What we've added in this amended complaint is Fourth Amendment claims, based on the unlawful stop, unlawful detention, and unlawful arrests, the fact that the city and the county dropped the charges against David Benham shows that those arrests were improper."

She added, "The fact that they're not even pursuing the charges is a pretty clear admission that there's no there, there. And that's exactly what we're bringing to the federal court in this amended complaint is that those arrests themselves were a violation of the Fourth Amendment."

Harle believes the arresting officers violated the First Amendment, which was "motivated by a targeting of free speech and animosity toward certain religious views."

"The government certainly is welcomed to protect public health, but if it is going to do that, it needs to do so in an evenhanded way that has a rational basis," she explained to the CP. "What it can't do is enact a law and then apply it unfairly only to select groups of people whose viewpoint the government disagrees with."

During a previous interview with CBN News, Benham said we need to love our neighbors and not let our pro-life views be silenced because of COVID.

"It's viewpoint discrimination. They're using this COVID emergency as an opportunity to grasp and silence our voices so we have a constitutional issue on our hands and we really have to stand against it," Benham said.

Watch Charlotte police arrest Benham below:

See original here:
'Those Arrests Were Improper': Pro-Life Activist David Benham Moves Forward with Lawsuit Against NC Officials - CBN News