Category Archives: Fourth Amendment

WTVD, ZOOM, BROWN FAMILY, CNN

By Jamiel Lynch and Devon M. Sayers, CNN

The estate of Andrew Brown, Jr. has settled its lawsuit against a North Carolina county sheriffs office over his shooting death during an arrest last year, according to an attorney for the estate.

Browns family settled with Pasquotank County for $3 million, according to attorney Bakari Sellers, who represents the family and is also a CNN political analyst.

Brown, a 42-year-old Black man, was killed April 21, 2021, in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, by Pasquotank County deputies attempting to serve a warrant for his arrest. His death resulted in protests against the shooting as critics accused police of a lack of transparency.

Browns family is satisfied with the settlement, according to attorneys representing his estate in the case.

This case was not about finance but about family, attorney Harry Daniels said at a news conference.

This settlement will do exactly what we intended to do and take care of Andrew Brown Jrs children for years to come. Theres no amount of money that can recover or take place the loss that the family is experiencing and will continue to experience for years to come, he said.

Brown has seven children, including five minors, according to the attorneys.

Due to the pending federal investigation into the case, Pasquotank County Sheriff Tommy Wooten answered few questions regarding the case at the news conference, but said changes have been made in the county in light of the circumstances of Browns fatal shooting by deputies.

Changes include advanced training for deputies and the development of a citizens advisory council.

Wooten said the advisory council will look like the community we serve.

We train every day. Its no secret to nobody in todays society, law enforcement was not what it was 20 years ago, he said.

We have had more advance training to capitalize on de-escalation techniques, Wooten added.

Pasquotank County District Attorney Andrew Womble later concluded the shooting which Browns family described as an execution was justified, saying Brown recklessly drove at the officers on the scene while trying to flee arrest.

Much of the attempted arrest was captured on body cameras worn by some of the deputies involved, however North Carolina law restricted its release without a court order. In a news conference nearly a month after Browns death, Womble showed videos captured by deputies.

Three of the seven deputies on scene fired a total of 14 shots at Brown, according to Womble. A state autopsy later confirmed Brown died of a gunshot wound to the back of the head.

While the district attorney concluded that no criminal law was violated, this was a terrible and tragic outcome, and we could do better, Wooten said, adding two deputies did not turn on their body cameras during the incident.

The three deputies who fired at Brown would be reinstated and retrained, Wooten said at the time. One of them has since retired and the other two were back on the force.

Browns family and their attorneys said the same body-camera and dash-camera videos show Brown was trying to drive away from officers and was not a threat.

Attorneys for Browns estate filed a $30 million civil rights lawsuit in July, claiming deputies violated Browns Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force.

An amended complaint further alleged the arrest warrant for Brown was unlawful because it was not signed by a judge. The suit also said the two ranking officers initially on the scene when Brown was confronted told investigators they did not fire their weapons because they did not see any indication Brown had a weapon. One of them told investigators he did not think Browns car was going to hit him, the lawsuit said.

The FBI has announced a federal civil rights investigation into the shooting.

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Estate of Andrew Brown Jr., who was fatally shot by North Carolina deputies last year, reaches $3 million settlement with county - kuna noticias y...

Harrison Epstein, Daily Herald

Utah County Attorney candidate Jeff Gray has a long list of changes he plans on making if hes elected over incumbent David Leavitt.

Gray has been a prosecutor for 31 years, and running for county attorney was never in his plans until now.

Certainly, what I saw in Leavitts policies prompted me to run, Gray said.

Grays first act would be to reinstate the special victims unit that Leavitt disbanded.

That is a team of prosecutors who are specially trained to prosecute against crimes against women and children, and his approach to it is a disaster, said Gray. Leavitt will say he split up the unit and they trained everyone else, so now everyone is adept in prosecuting these kinds of crimes, but it isnt true. Ive spoken to several prosecutor and they arent getting that training.

Gray also told the Daily Herald he chose to run because he believes the county attorneys office needs to have a better working relationship with law enforcement.

All Ive heard from the county attorney is criticisms for police, but he hasnt done anything to help train police so they know what they can and cant do, Gray claimed.

Gray has been the Search and Seizure Director for the Utah Attorney Generals office for almost ten years. He said he would bring the necessary training to law enforcement officers within the county, if elected.

I regularly train law enforcement officers on the Constitution, specifically on the fourth amendment, on what they can and cant do, he said. I will bring that to this office and provide that training. We are on the same team, so we better be on the same page, and currently we arent on the same page.

Along with law enforcement, Gray sees a need for more training for prosecutors as well.

If I have to shift resources so that we have both victim advocates and training, I will do that, he said. I want this office to be the best prosecutors office in the state. We need attorneys that are well-trained and abreast with the law.

While commending what he called fine prosecutors in the office, he remarked the team is youthful.

I believe they are hardworking, but they are very young, and I think thats going to be a challenge when I take office, Gray said.

He is also in favor of pursuing the death penalty, and said it is the county attorneys duty to pursue it when appropriate to do so. Leavitt announced in September 2021 that he would no longer pursue the death penalty in capital cases.

As the chief prosecutor of the county, when the people of the state see fit to have the death penalty, its his obligation as the attorney who took an oath to pursue the law to pursue it, he said. When he says he will never pursue the death penalty, he is in violation of that oath. I will pursue the death penalty in appropriate cases.

According to Gray, the county currently has three crime victim advocates. He believes more are needed and would like to double that number, at least.

Gray also wants to incorporate an idea from his new ally, Adam Pomeroy, who wanted to ensure there are more fluent Spanish-speaking advocates.

We have a large percentage of our community that is Spanish speaking, so we need to be able to be attendant to their needs as well, he said.

After talking to thousands of people during this campaign, Gray believes his goals align with what the public wants.

Our experience is that they have overwhelmingly agreed with these things, he said. The residents support police. They realize the difficult jobs they have. Sheriff Smith, I think is very well liked. They universally believe we need a special victims unit. The death penalty is little bit more of a controversial issue, but by and large folks we have talked to support it.

Ballots have been mailed for the Republican primary. The election will culminate on June 28 between Gray and Leavitt.

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Gray seeks to undo Leavitt's actions if elected as Utah County Attorney - Daily Herald

Most modern cars know their locations better than their owners do. As suites of connected-car apps become mainstream for both emergency functionality (such as General Motors' OnStar) or for owner conveniences such as remote start or parking guidance, new vehicles are overflowing with data needed to support always-on connectivity.

While most owner concerns (and popular attention) have been fixed on unallowed hacks into such systems by bad actors, there are still massive troves of automatically generated data open to anyone with the knowledge to access it, and even the "proper" use of this data can be a risk to consumers who seek privacy. Your home, your work, every trip you've taken no matter how private: it all can be seen by companies, countries, and individuals you've never given permission to follow your travels, and completely legally.

Struggling to think of a need for privacy besides what's already been extensively reported and debated? One recent example: As certain states attempt to make previously legal medical care (such as abortion, contraception, and basic trans-related medication and care) illegal to access, the modern connected car and its troves of data have the potential to become a governments unintentional best friend and a driver's worst enemy as prosecution intensifies. Even if you're not immediately affected by your car tracking your habits, state law has been changing increasingly rapidlyfamilies in Texas found their access to trans care restricted within a week of the governor's directive to eliminate itand you may find yourself criminalized a week from now unexpectedly over some other arbitrary decision.

The good news is there's already proposed legislation to combat the current freewheeling fate of our privacy. The bad news is we don't know how long that legislation will take to pass, if it does at all.

To understand how driving a car could incriminate someone, its worth examining just what kind of data the car itself collects and transmits.

In 2021, 90 percent of cars sold in the United Statesand around 130 million total cars sold worldwidecontained some form of embedded connectivity. This built-in connectivity can take many forms (built-in Wi-Fi connectivity, infotainment systems that connect to cellular networks, and even Bluetooth systems) but all of them share a few things in common: They collect (and transmit) massive amounts of data, they are usually truly embedded in the physical car (and comprise some core functionality of it), and owners rarely have control of where it ends up. This trove of data is known as telematics, and its a multi-billion-dollar industry with wide-reaching implications for consumers.

Most consumers never have an inkling of just how powerfuland plentifulthis telemetry data is. The raw amount of information itself is overwhelming to consider; a case study by the Washington Post on a 2018 Chevrolet Volt showed that the car generated up to 25 gigabytes per hour of data across every category imaginable; for context, browsing Instagram for an hour uses a mere 720 megabytes. This deluge of data the Volt created included location specifics, even when the GPS was not being actively used by the driver. In the case of the Chevy that was studied, researchers even bought a used Volt navigation system on eBay and were able to construct the previous owners daily life and routine down to their home, workplace, and oft-frequented gas station, simply by poring through stored location data that the infotainment system automatically logged.

An earlier study from 2017, undertaken by a student at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology, pulled similar location data from a variety of late-model vehicles infotainment systems that logged exact coordinates even when the GPS was not engaged. In certain versions of Fords Sync infotainment system installed in mid-2010s-era Fords, the researcher found that vehicle and system generated events also generated GPS coordinates which can further be used to prove the vehicle users exact location at specific times (for e.g. when the vehicle shifts gear and vehicle doors are opened/closed, GPS coordinates are generated).

An example demonstration log in the study, pulled from a 2013 Ford F-150, shows GPS coordinates being stored when opening or closing a car door. With this frequency and precision, its easy to retrace exactly where that truck has been.

But it's not just the data inside your infotainment system that's a concern. All of the data discussed abovethe GPS coordinates of every gear change, the location of every ECU bootis not just stored onboard the car itself, but is frequently sent back to an automaker for storage and analysis.

This massive dataset has extremely advantageous, non-invasive uses for a host of businesses, including the automakers and drivers themselves. Telematics can help professional drivers spot and avoid traffic by analyzing previous patterns; urban planners can use similar data to identify roads prone to jams and create more efficient streets; insurance companies can use it to spot fraud or dangerous driving habits; and manufacturers or fleet owners can identify potential malfunctions to repair (if engines report misfires or check engine lights after driving at high altitudes, for example).

All of this is possible thanks to OEMs sharing these troves of telematics data with other companies, which then provide their own unique analyses. One example of a company like this is Otonomowhich, according to internal presentations shown to investors, is partnered with nearly a dozen automakers including Kia, BMW, Ford, Toyota, Stellantis, GM, and even heavy equipment manufacturer Bobcat. Otonomo offers an array of services all underpinned by its large collection of automobile data to a variety of consumers, which include tech behemoths Amazon and Microsoft, smart-city planners such as BeMobile, and parts manufacturers such as Hella and Continental.

Yet, with this billion-dollar business comes massive privacy implications. Even in massive data sets comprised of millions of different peoples' locations, all of whom are theoretically anonymous, identifying any one person out of those millions is a simple job without a strict concern for data privacy. In a 2019 feature story, The New York Times studied the difficulty of anonymizing location data as it relates to phones, and discovered individuals identities with ease in supposedly anonymous data sets containing timestamped locations of cell phones. Connected cars face the same issues that anonymization cell phones suffer from because the underlying premise of location tracking is that it is deeply difficult to anonymize, especially when the device in question travels with a person to their work and home.

How hard could it really be to anonymize this data? Well, a 2013 study published in Nature showed that four spatio-temporal [GPS locations with a timestamp] points are enough to uniquely identify 95 percent of the individuals," even while using a dataset of 1.5 million people. That is, even with millions of generic data points without a name attached to them, having four from a single person is enough to identify one of them. The only way the researchers found to add back any privacy to users that were anonymously tracked was to coarsen both location and timestamp data: making it less accurate by reducing the accuracy of location logging and giving wider time ranges for each timestamp. This, of course, reduces the usefulness of that data.

But companies have very little incentive to reduce the usefulness of location data because often its specificity is what makes it so valuable. McKinsey, a business strategy group, estimates the telematics data market will be worth a staggering $750 billion dollars by the time the decade is out. The best way to get a share of that lucrative market is with accurate data so that advertisers, police states, and corporations can get the most use from it.

Thats not to say some companies dont try to protect consumer privacy; Otonomo specifically employs what it calls data blurring," which ideally hides the privacy of drivers in compliance with European GDPR laws while still offering useful data for its customers. Otonomo acknowledged a request for comment from The Drive regarding how its data blurring works but was unable to provide technical details on what exact steps it takes for anonymity.

But there are no laws in the U.S. requiring that manufacturers anonymize any of the telematics they collect, and some third-party companies sell services explicitly offering to track specific, targeted vehicles. Not only can this be used by less-than-scrupulous buyers, but previous court precedent in the U.S. allows for federal agencies to buy location datasets to sift through personally identifiable data that would otherwise require a warrant.

With this in mind, The Drive reached out to four auto manufacturersFord, Honda, Kia, and BMWthat all offer modern connected-car functionality in many of their models, and whose privacy policies for use of their vehicles leave the possibility of third-party sale of telematics open. I asked, specifically, what their policies were on third-party data sale and sharing and, if they do share telematics with outside companies, how easily consumers can opt out of it at will.

Ford declined to comment. BMW acknowledged the request but did not provide any details on its data practices in time for publication.Honda referred to its privacy policy and owners manual disclosures for information regarding its telematics policies. In the policy, Honda noted that it can collect trip log information, including trip start time and end time, trip start and end location and that this information can be shared with third parties. The document also noted that this data is generated and transmitted automatically regardless of whether drivers use connected technologies such as HondaLink, although, in the past, the company has declined to track unsubscribed cars without a warrant.

Kia had a stronger approach to data protection. In a statement to The Drive, the company stated that Kia America collects geolocation data only on consumer-owned vehicles in the United States that are equipped with connected vehicle technology and have been enrolled by the owner in our Kia Connect service. Furthermore, the automaker noted,[Kia America] does not aggregate vehicle geolocation data, nor do we sell such data to third parties. While affiliated global Kia companies may have a working relationship with Otonomo, [Kia America] does not share vehicle data with that company. The company said that the only time that geolocation data is shared with law enforcement is when presented with a valid court order or warrant, or if an owner consents to share it during an active vehicle-theft investigation.

Separately, a Genesis representative assured us in another story that the biometric data the GV70 can collect for the SUV's fingerprint unlock and startup capabilities stays with the car itself and does not get shared with the company.

With this level of data on hand, few safeguards legislatively in place, and a very scattered set of privacy policies that can vary widely by manufacturer, the potential for a car to betray a persons privacy in a newly fraught legal landscape is clear. For example, there are already states that have not just banned care but also made it legally questionable to travel to another state for it, with Texass anti-abortion and anti-trans-care laws being the most obvious.

The states anti-abortion law weaponizes civil courts against anyone suspected of assisting in abortion (including, for example, driving someone out of state to a clinic where abortions are legal to obtain). Its anti-trans-care laws are somewhat differently formatted, but they allow state Child Protective Services to investigate any parents suspected of confirming their childs gender identity, which includes driving out-of-state to clinics where puberty blockers or trans-specific therapy are offered to minors. Idaho recently attempted to pass a similar bill punishing parents with up to life in prison for traveling out-of-state to get their children trans-related care; the bill died in the state Senate, but lawmakers indicated that they would be willing to pass a more narrowly targeted bill in the future.

With the troves of data offered by patients cars, however, theres a very clear risk, as what was once considered basic medical care becomes criminalized. Even assuming every other step for data privacy is takensuch as not traveling with a cell phone and avoiding digital communication while seeking carehaving a car automatically log that its doors were opened at an out-of-state Planned Parenthood could be enough to potentially be enough to warrant investigation, civil lawsuits, or even criminal proceedings. To make matters worse, data like this is already out there in the open on the public market, specifically targeting people who've been to clinics such as Planned Parenthood. Poland, for example, is strictly anti-abortion and recently created a registry to track every person who becomes pregnant and seeks any care. The location data for every pregnancy clinic a patient has visited would be a valuable addition to those lists.

Even more shockingly, accessing this data does not require a warrant. The techniques discussed above have already been put into practice by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, which has been deemed exempt from needing a warrant to search digital devices in general at the border. Thanks to a loophole in the Fourth Amendment (the amendment that prohibits unreasonable search and seizures), state police can also download telematics data during routine police stops if they feel the need to, which means that a traffic stop could quickly become an examination of every place a driver has been for weeks.

However, this still relies on direct access to the car in question, which means that for such searches of telematics to be effective, state action would need to be targeted at specific, already-on-the-radar individuals such as activists and doctors (or used against already marginalized groups who are more frequently pulled over). But what if a police agency could just browse through everywhere cars have been, looking for interesting patterns, and tying back specific locations to individuals?

While Kias approach is much more likely to protect drivers privacy, the patchwork manufacturer-driven state of vehicle security means that while a Sorento may be able to glide under the radar, other vehicles may not. The easiest solution to unify the current state of driver privacy would likely come from the top downthat is, closing the Fourth Amendments loophole allowing vehicle telematics to be accessed without a warrant. While there is proposed bipartisan legislation that would do just that and prohibit warrantless vehicle surveillance by U.S. authorities, it hasnt been voted on since its introduction late last year.

In the meantime, I spoke with Mary Stone Ross, the chief privacy officer at the privacy-focused technology firm OSOM and a former employee of the CIA, for thoughts on how consumers could protect themselves. Unfortunately, despite her familiarity with the issue, there wasn't much comfort to be offered.

"I saw how powerful information was from a government perspective [at the CIA], where there actually was quite a bit of oversight and regulation. And then, what these companies had was so much more intrusive and they could do whatever they want," she explained. While she noted that she worked on California's data privacy law, the CCPA, in the pastwhich is currently the strongest privacy law in the nationshe also pointed out that most companies can still do what they want with personal data as long as any use of it has been disclosed in the fine print of a privacy policy.

Even then, it's still better than living elsewhere, as "all of the laws that you've seen passed by [other] states are so much weaker," Ross went on. "And then, there's been really no movement on the federal level... The tech companies are spending so much money, and any sort of privacy regulation they see as an existential threat to their business model, whether it is or isn't."

When I asked if there's anything consumers can do to protect themselves in the absence of strong federal law, she said, "I don't even know what my advice is [to consumers], because even with the rental cars, without safeguards on consumer data at the manufacturer level, its a free-for-all." Yet, in a world where privacy is likely to rapidly go from an afterthought to a central legal battle, her hope is still "that it actually puts pressure on Congress to pass federal privacy laws."

Until legislation is passed, then, consumers should be aware that their car could be an incredible weak point for their personal safety and privacy. If you can, perhaps stick with the ancient beaters, whose most advanced technology is fuel injection.

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Your Car Is Tracking You Just as Much as Your Smartphone Isand Your Data Is at Risk - The Drive

Item 1.01 Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement.

On May 31, 2022, MobileSmith, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Company"),entered into a Fourth Amendment to Loan and Security Agreement (the "FourthAmendment") with Comerica Bank ("Comerica").

As background, the Company and Comerica are parties to a Loan and SecurityAgreement dated June 9, 2014, as amended (the "Loan Agreement"), wherebyComerica agreed to loan the Company up to $5,000,000. Currently, there is$5,000,000 in principal outstanding under the Loan Agreement and the previouslyextended maturity date of the Loan Agreement was June 9, 2022.

The Fourth Amendment to the Loan Agreement extends the previously extendedmaturity date of the Loan Agreement from June 9, 2022 to June 9, 2024.

Except for extending the maturity date as described above, the Fourth Amendmentdoes not amend any other term of the Loan Agreement in any material respect.

The foregoing description of the Fourth Amendment does not purport to becomplete and is qualified in its entirety by reference to the full text of theFourth Amendment, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 10.1 and isincorporated herein by reference.

The original Loan Agreement is filed as Exhibit 10.1 to the Company's QuarterlyReport on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2014 filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on August 13, 2014, a copy of which is attached heretoas Exhibit 10.2 and is incorporated herein by reference.

Item 2.03 Creation of a Direct Financial Obligation or an Obligation under anOff-Balance Sheet Arrangement of a Registrant.

All information set forth in Item 1.01 of this Current Report on Form 8-K ishereby incorporated herein by referenced.

Item 9.01 Financial Statements and Exhibits.

Edgar Online, source Glimpses

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MOBILESMITH, INC. : Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement, Creation of a Direct Financial Obligation or an Obligation under an Off-Balance Sheet...

Last week, journalist Joan Biskupic reported that Supreme Court Marshal Gail Curleywho heads the internal investigation into the leak of Justice Samuel Alitos draft opinion overruling the constitutional right to abortionwas seeking signed affidavits and mobile phone records from law clerks. Ironically, the very first paragraph of Biskupics article attributes the revelation to three sources with knowledge of the efforts, thus indicating that even the investigation of the leak is leaking.

Irony aside, the leak and the investigation of it should be kept in perspective. Chief Justice John Roberts was not wrong to characterize the opinions leak as a betrayal and an egregious breach of the trust that the Court lodges in its personnel and staff. However, the leak pales in comparison to the much more egregious breach that Justice Alito and four of his colleagues seem poised, even eager, to allow government to undertakea breach of the very bodies of those Americans who find themselves carrying unwanted pregnancies. Accordingly, in focusing todays column on the leak investigation, I do not mean to distract attention from the much larger and imminent betrayal of the Constitution by a majority of Justices sworn to uphold it.

The leaked draft that Politico published last month shows staple marks and was thus likely handed over as hard copy rather than as a computer file. In theory, anyone working at or with access to the Courts restricted areas, including cleaning staff or even an invited guest, could have obtained a printout of the draft from an unmonitored desk or elsewhere, but as a practical matter that seems unlikely. Although Politico published the leaked draft without identifying its source, the initial story attributed further information to a person familiar with the courts deliberations. Subsequent stories, including but not limited to Ms. Biskupics article last week, indicate that several knowledgeable persons have been in contact with journalists. Thus, as a practical matter, Ms. Curleys team can probably focus most of their attention on the law clerks.

Many commentators have speculated about who leaked the draft and why. The leading hypotheses, in my view, are: (1) a liberal law clerk outraged by the decision, hoping to bring negative public attention to the Court, possibly in the further hope of leading one or more Justices to temper the draft or result, and/or possibly seeking to give political actors advance warning in shaping proposed legislation and electoral campaigns; or (2) a conservative law clerk worried that Justice Alitos draft might not end up as the majority opinion and hoping that Justices who voted to overrule Roe v. Wade at conference would have their spines stiffened by public opposition. These competing theories depend on different predictions about the reaction of the Justices to the anticipated public reaction to the leak.

Other possibilities also exist. Perhaps one of the Justices themselves leaked the draft or approved of a law clerks doing so. Or maybe the initial leak was accidentala result of improper handling of a sensitive draft that fell into the wrong handsbut it was followed by someone with knowledge talking to reporters. At this point, we outside observers can only speculate.

So far as I am aware, the leak violated no law. Attorney Mark Zaid, who has represented leakers, confirmed that view to the Washington Post last week. Supreme Court draft opinions are not, after all, classified.

Nonetheless, the leak was a clear breach of a very strong norm. I recall that when I started my year as a law clerk at the Court thirty-one years ago, Chief Justice William Rehnquist admonished all the new clerks to keep the Courts confidences. I do not recall whether he referred us to any formal written policy, but it was made crystal clear that we were not to discuss pending casesor anything involving the Courts workwith journalists or other outsiders. Clearly not everyone heeded that admonition. News stories and books about the Court from time to time report on internal deliberations and changed votes that could only have come from Justices or law clerks. Still, no one doubts that leaking a draft opinion was, as Chief Justice Roberts declared, an egregious breach of the Courts norms.

Nor is the Chief Justice mistaken in his view that leaking a draft opinion undermines trust within the Court as an institution. The argument for confidentiality of judicial deliberations parallels similar arguments in other settings, including within the executive branch of government as well as more mundane contexts, such as the management team of a company making a sensitive hiring decision. The risk of leaks undermines frank deliberations. There is thus nothing problematic about the Chief Justice or other Justices being upset about this leak or wishing to deter future leaks.

The difficulty is that the leak investigation seems to be intensifying the very harm that the leak itself presents. With law clerks freaking out about the investigation and considering hiring attorneys to represent them, the atmosphere at the Court can hardly be harmonious or even conducive to the regular conduct of business. Moreover, the request to turn over mobile phone records is problematic.

Even if leaking a draft opinion were a crime, that would not provide the government with the authority to search the mobile phones of every possible suspect. In the 2014 case of Riley v. California, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a unanimous Court that police need a warrant based on probable cause to search a mobile phone. Each Justice has four law clerks, plus one for retired Justice Kennedy, for a total of 37. That means that the likelihood that any one law clerk was the leaker is less than 3 percent. Although the courts resist quantifying probable cause, a less-than-three-percent chance of turning up evidence surely does not qualify.

However, Rileys logic might not apply because that case involved searching an entire mobile phone, which, as Chief Justice Roberts observed, contains an enormous quantity and variety of data, amounting to the sum of an individuals private life. By contrast, at least according to Ms. Biskupics reporting, the investigators seek only mobile phone records. If the investigators seek only the phone numbers that law clerks called, the controlling precedent would be the 1979 decision in Smith v. Maryland, which allowed the warrantless use of a pen register, a device that records the numbers a phone dials. Whether Riley or Smith applies could depend on how much mobile phone data the leak investigators seek. If they only seek the numbers that the law clerks called, then Smiths permissive rule governs.

But perhaps the investigators want more information, including incoming as well as outgoing calls and text messages. That would make the case more like Riley, both as a legal matter and in terms of the impact on the law clerks. Even if less intrusive than requiring law clerks to unlock and turn over their entire phones, requiring call and text records is still extraordinarily intrusive. Investigators could learn that a clerk talked to a psychotherapist, exchanged texts revealing their hitherto-private sexual orientation, or communicated with family members about their financial, medical, or other private challenges. Where the government has probable cause to believe that it will find evidence of crime, such interests in privacy may be overridden, but a less than 3 percent likelihood of detecting a non-criminal breach of a workplace norm falls far short of that standard.

Does the fact that the government acts here in the role of employer rather than sovereign make a difference? Yes and no. In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, decided in 1989, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to drug tests of government employees. However, the employment rather than law enforcement context meant that the government employer needed to satisfy only a standard of reasonableness; warrants based on probable cause were not required. The Court further held that it was reasonable to subject employees seeking promotion to positions involving drug interdiction or the carrying of firearms to routine drug testing; the Court also said, however, that it would not be reasonable to subject every government employee to such drug testing.

Accordingly, one might think that requiring law clerks to turn over cell phone records need only be subject to a reasonableness standard. To be sure, the individualized nature of the inquiryseeking information about a particular leakmight make the warrant/probable-cause regime more applicable (under Riley, albeit not under Smith), but even if judged only by a standard of reasonableness, the intrusive nature of the mobile-phone-data search and the low probability that any particular set of data will produce evidence of leaking suggest that the requirement to turn over the records is unreasonable.

Now perhaps none of the foregoing legal analysis applies for a different reason. Ms. Biskupics reporting leaves open the possibility that the Court investigators have only requested, rather than required, law clerks to divulge mobile phone records. Yet given the fact that law clerks are essentially employees at willserving at the pleasure of the Justices who hired themthat distinction seems highly formalistic. A law clerk who does not comply with the request risks grave suspicion and even dismissal.

* * *

I have analyzed the request for law clerks mobile phone records in accordance with the Supreme Courts own precedents. As the discussion above reveals, exactly how the legal arguments would play out is somewhat uncertain. But in a sense, that is all beside the point.

Even if legal, the investigation reeks of hypocrisy in two respects. First, it violates the spirit (and perhaps even the letter) of the Courts Fourth Amendment cases. Second, in focusing on law clerks but not Justices, it amounts to self-dealing. If the Courts investigators really want and need mobile phone data, they should also seek it from others who might have had access, starting with the Justices and their spouses.

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Is the SCOTUS Leak Investigation Legal? Maybe, But It Is Also Hypocritical and Potentially Counterproductive - Justia Verdict

Item 1.01 Entry Into a Material Definitive Agreement.

On May 26, 2022, AutoWeb, Inc. ("Company") entered into a Fourth Amendment toLoan, Security and Guarantee Agreement ("Credit Facility Fourth Amendment") withCIT Northbridge Credit LLC ("CNC") to amend the Company's existing Loan,Security and Guarantee Agreement with CNC initially entered into on March 26,2020, as amended on May 18, 2020, July 30, 2021, and September 13, 2021 (theexisting Loan Agreement, as amended to date, is referred to herein collectivelyas the "Credit Facility Agreement").

The Credit Facility Fourth Amendment provides for (i) a reduction in the minimumborrowing usage requirement from forty percent (40%) to twenty percent (20%) ofthe aggregate revolver commitments under the Credit Facility Agreement, whichresults in a reduction in the minimum borrowing usage requirement from $8.0million to $4.0 million; (ii) a reduction in the base amount used to calculatethe underusage fee from $10.0 million to $6.0 million; and (iii) application ofthe approximately $4.0 million in the Company's restricted cash account used ascollateral under the Credit Facility Agreement to reduce the current outstandingloan balance under the Credit Facility Agreement by this amount.

The Credit Facility Fourth Amendment also amends the Credit Facility Agreementto allow the financing of insurance premiums for the 2022-2023 renewal periodunder the Credit Facility Agreement and that any liens on the associatedinsurance policies or proceeds thereof that secure the financing of theinsurance premiums shall be permitted liens.

The foregoing description of the Credit Facility Agreement and Credit FacilityFourth Amendment is not complete and is qualified in its entirety by referenceto the Loan, Security and Guarantee Agreement dated as of March 26, 2020, by andbetween the Company and CIT Northbridge Credit LLC, which is incorporated hereinby reference to Exhibit 10.1 to the Current Report on Form 8-K filed withthe SEC on March 26, 2020 (SEC File No. 001-34761), as amended by the FirstAmendment to Loan, Security and Guarantee Agreement dated as of May 18, 2020,which is incorporated herein by reference to Exhibit 10.1 to the CurrentReport on Form 8-K filed with the SEC on May 19, 2020 (SEC File No. 001-34761),the Second Amendment to and Consent Under Loan, Security and Guarantee Agreementdated as of July 30, 2021, which is incorporated herein by reference to

Exhibit 10.1 to the Current Report on Form 8-K filed with the SEC on August2, 2021 (SEC File No. 001-34761), the Third Amendment to Loan, Security andGuarantee Agreement, dated as of September 13, 2021, which is incorporatedherein by reference to Exhibit 10.1 to the Current Report on Form 8-K filedwith the SEC on September 15, 2021 (SEC File No. 001-34761), and the FourthAmendment to Loan, Security and Guarantee Agreement, a copy of which is filed asExhibit 10.1 to this Current Report on Form 8-K and is hereby incorporated byreference.

Item 5.02 Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors;

On May 27, 2022, Michael A. Carpenter notified the Chairman of the Board ofDirectors ("Board") of the Company that, effective immediately, he was resigninghis position as a member of the Board and as a member of the Board's AuditCommittee ("Audit Committee").

Mr. Carpenter was a member of the Board's Audit Committee. Mr. Michael J. Fuchshas been appointed by the Board to serve as a member of the Audit Committee toreplace Mr. Carpenter.

Item 5.03 Amendments to Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws; Change in Fiscal Year

On June 1, 2022, the Board approved an amendment ("Bylaw Amendment No. 2") toSection 3.02 of the Company's Seventh Amended and Restated Bylaws ("Bylaws") todecrease the number of authorized directors on the Board from eight (8) to five(5) members. Bylaw Amendment No. 2 will be effective upon expiration of the termof the Board's Class III Directors upon commencement of the 2022 Annual Meetingof Stockholders ("Effective Time"). Bylaw Amendment No. 2 supersedes AmendmentNo. 1 to the Bylaws that was previously reported and that was to be effective asof the Effective Time to reduce the number of authorized directors of theCompany from eight (8) to seven (7).

Item 9.01 Financial Statements and Exhibits.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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AUTOWEB, INC. : Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement, Change in Directors or Principal Officers, Amendments to Articles of Inc. or Bylaws;...

College Park/Atlanta (US), Jun 5 (The Conversation) Every so often stories of genetic theft, or extreme precautions taken to avoid it, make headline news. So it was with a picture of French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin sitting at opposite ends of a very long table after Macron declined to take a Russian PCR COVID-19 test.

Many speculated that Macron refused due to security concerns that the Russians would take and use his DNA for nefarious purposes. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz similarly refused to take a Russian PCR COVID-19 test.

While these concerns may seem relatively new, pop star celebrity Madonna has been raising alarm bells about the potential for nonconsensual, surreptitious collection and testing of DNA for over a decade. She has hired cleaning crews to sterilize her dressing rooms after concerts and requires her own new toilet seats at each stop of her tours.

At first, Madonna was ridiculed for having DNA paranoia. But as more advanced, faster and cheaper genetic technologies have reached the consumer realm, these concerns seem not only reasonable, but justified.

We are law professors who study how emerging technologies like genetic sequencing are regulated. We believe that growing public interest in genetics has increased the likelihood that genetic paparazzi with DNA collection kits may soon become as ubiquitous as ones with cameras.

While courts have for the most part managed to evade dealing with the complexities of surreptitious DNA collection and testing of public figures, they wont be able to avoid dealing with it for much longer. And when they do, they are going to run squarely into the limitations of existing legal frameworks when it comes to genetics.

Genetic information troves You leave your DNA behind you everywhere you go. The strands of hair, fingernails, dead skin and saliva you shed as you move through your day are all collectible trails of DNA.

Genetic analysis can reveal not only personal information, such as existing health conditions or risk for developing certain diseases, but also core aspects of a persons identity, such as their ancestry and the potential traits of their future children. In addition, as genetic technologies continue to evolve, fears about using surreptitiously collected genetic material for reproductive purposes via in vitro gametogenesis become more than just paranoia.

Ultimately, taking an individauls genetic material and information without their consent is an intrusion into a legal domain that is still considered deeply personal. Despite this, there are few laws protecting the interests of individuals regarding their genetic material and information.

Existing legal frameworks When disputes involving genetic theft from public figures inevitably reach the courtroom, judges will need to confront fundamental questions about how genetics relates to personhood and identity, property, health and disease, intellectual property and reproductive rights. Such questions have already been raised in cases involving the use of genetics in law enforcement, the patentability of DNA and ownership of discarded genetic materials.

In each of these cases, courts focused on only one dimension of genetics, such as privacy rights or the value of genetic information for biomedical research. But this limited approach disregards other aspects, such as the privacy of family members with shared genetics, or property and identity interests someone may have in genetic material discarded as part of a medical procedure.

In the case of genetic paparazzi, courts will presumably try to fit complex questions about genetics into the legal framework of privacy rights because this is how they have approached other intrusions into the lives of public figures in the past.

Modern US privacy law is a complex web of state and federal regulations governing how information can be acquired, accessed, stored and used. The right to privacy is limited by First Amendment protections on the freedom of speech and press, as well as Fourth Amendment prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizure. Public figures face further restrictions on their privacy rights because they are objects of legitimate public interest. On the other hand, they also have publicity rights that control the commercial value of their unique personally identifying traits.

People whose genetic material has been taken without their consent may also raise a claim of conversion that their property has been interfered with and lost. Courts in Florida are currently considering a conversion claim in a private dispute where the former CEO of Marvel Entertainment and his wife accused a millionaire businessman of stealing their DNA to prove that they were slandering him through a hate-mail campaign. This approach replaces the narrow legal framework of privacy with an even narrower framework of property, reducing genetics to an object that someone possesses.

What the future may hold Under existing laws and the current state of genetic technology, most people dont need to worry about surreptitious collection and use of genetic material in the way that public figures might. But genetic paparazzi cases will likely play an important role in determining what rights everyone else will or will not have.

The US Supreme Court is very unlikely to recognise new rights, or even affirm previously recognized rights, that are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. Therefore, at least at the federal level, individual protections for genetic material and information are not likely to adapt to changing times.

This means that cases involving genetics are likely to fall within the purview of state legislatures and courts. But none of the states have adequately grappled with the complexities of genetic legal claims. Even in states with laws specifically designed to protect genetic privacy, regulations cover only a narrow range of genetic interests. Some laws, for example, may prohibit disclosure of genetic information, but not collection.

For better or for worse, how the courts rule in genetic paparazzi cases will shape how society thinks about genetic privacy and about individual rights regarding genetics more broadly. (The Conversation) NSA

This report is auto-generated from PTI news service. ThePrint holds no responsibility for its content.

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Genetic paparazzi are right around the corner, and courts arent ready to confront the legal quagmire of DNA theft - ThePrint

In the fall of 1991, Agent William Elliott of the US Department of the Interior began to suspect that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana at home in Florence, Oregon. But mere suspicion was not going to get him very far. For Kyllo to be brought to justice, his house had to be physically searched, and no judge was going to issue a warrant on the basis of a hunch. Which is why, on 16 January 1992, Elliott pointed a thermal imager at Danny Kyllos home, and, having detected heat signatures consistent with the sort of high-intensity hallide lamps used for indoor marijuana cultivation, the agent was able to convince a judge to issue a warrant. Kyllo was arrested and indicted on a federal drug charge. Once in court, Kyllo moved to suppress the evidence that had been seized from his home. The thermal scan, he argued, was a violation of his Fourth Amendment Right against unreasonable search and all evidence flowing from that was the fruit of a poisoned tree. He had an expectation of privacy within his home and it didnt matter that the government had not set a foot inside to obtain the initial evidencetheir use of thermal imaging technology from afar was as much of an intrusion as an actual break-in.

That case went all the way up to the US Supreme Court, which, in a split (5-4) decision, ruled in favour of Kyllo. If the government uses a device that is not in general public use (such as thermal-imagers at the time) to explore details of a private home that were previously unknowable without physical intrusion, Americas apex court held, such surveillance would be a Fourth Amendment search" that could not be conducted without a warrant.

To the layman, this decision might seem surprising. If our objective is to bring criminals to book, does it really matter how we go about it? Isnt growing marijuana a crime? If so, how does it really matter if evidence of the commission of this crime was obtained using remote scanning technology?

It is important to remind ourselves that the state has a monopoly over the use of violence. It is, therefore, important to ensure that the exercise of state power is always subject to appropriate checks and balances. Failure to do so would make victims out of innocent citizens, and this, in our modern conceptualization of the states role, is unacceptable.

There is probably no situation where the stakes are greater than in a criminal investigation. It is here that the state machinery is under the greatest pressure to deliver criminals to justice, and where, as a result, either accidentally or with calculated disregard, the rights of the innocent are most likely to be trampled upon. Therefore, it is here that checks and balances are most important.

When these restrictions are applied, law enforcers are constrained in what they can do to bring criminals to justice. As a result, some law-breakers will inevitably get away. We need to recognize that this will happen, and accept it for what it is, because the alternative would be to have innocent bystanders subject to egregious intrusions at the hands of the stateand that is far, far worse.

India does not apply the concept of due process in exactly the same way as the US does, but the underlying principlethat the power of the state must always be subject to reasonable restrictionsis well established in Indian jurisprudence. When the Indian Supreme Court held that mandatory linkage of Aadhaar numbers to our bank accounts was disproportional exercise of state power, it pointed out that [U]nder the garb of prevention of money laundering or black money, there cannot be such a sweeping provision which targets every resident of the country as a suspicious person." And yet, despite decisions like this, we need look no further than the morning papers to see restraints on state power flagrantly violatedoften on a daily basis, unfortunately.

Technology exacerbates the problem. Almost always, new technologies are more pervasive than the ones that preceded it. They make what was previously impossible relatively trivial to carry out, often at a much larger scale than before. If we allow the state to use technology in the exercise of its power and fail to impose checks and balances properly tailored to the harms these new technologies could cause, the innocent will inevitably suffer.

We are seeing this play out in the context of online messaging services, where the states desire to intercept messages exchanged between criminal elements is pushing the government to remove the protection that end-to-end encryption offers. The state maintains that it has no option but to intervene in this manner; criminals have no constraint on what technology they can or cannot use and if law enforcement agencies are forced to fight them with hands tied behind their backs, the bad guys will win.

Not only is this approach constitutionally unsustainable, it is downright lazy. Advances in technology have always made it easier for criminals to stay ahead of the law. But the response of law enforcement must never be to weaken the checks and balances under which law enforcers are legally constrained to operate. Basic principles require as much. Instead, they must work to get up to speed with the new technology in question, develop novel investigative techniques that work within the new paradigm we all find ourselves in, and find ways to catch criminals in spite of any technological advantage they might have.

As impossible as this might seem, I know it is possible. Because we have done this before and can do it again.

Rahul Matthan is a partner at Trilegal and also has a podcast by the name Ex Machina. His Twitter handle is @matthan

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We Own This City takes nonlinear storytelling to an extreme, but once you get on its wavelength it rewards your patience.

Language: English

The truth about Baltimores systemic dysfunction has always been stranger, uglier and knottier than fiction. Reading about its drug, homicide, policing and administrative problems can take you into a rabbit hole you cant get out of. The bleak reality of the city shaped five seasons ofThe Wire, which remains one of the most incisive feats in longform storytelling on TV. David Simon, theBaltimore Sunreporter who was the creator of the HBO series, returns to the corners, the streets and the police precincts to sound another warning about a system in paralysis.

Baltimore stays on as the lead character in Simons new miniseries,We Own This City. Epitomising the incurable malady afflicting the city this time around is the Gun Trace Task Force (GTTF), an elite Baltimore Police Department (BPD) unit tasked with getting guns and drugs off the street. The reality was far different: these officers pocketed the money during seizures, sold stolen drugs, planted evidence, robbed law-abiding citizens, and made overtime claims for unworked hours. The reign of terror ended with federal indictments, with eight members sentenced to prison. The GTTFs blatant abuse of power was the subject of Baltimore Sun journalist Justin Fentons book,We Own This City: A True Story of Crime, Cops, and Corruption, and now its adaptation by Simon and frequent collaborator George Pelecanos.

The show presents a demoralising account of how the publics trust in the police, the elected officials and the government is destroyed when those meant to protect and serve are the very ones habitually violating peoples constitutional rights. Whats worse is the establishment continued to protect and serve these rogue policemen, despite repeated complaints filed by the apprehended criminals and the general public. To trace the rise and the fall of the GTTF, the episodes cover a time period from 2003 to 2017 to draw the whole picture.

Jon Bernthal as Wayne Jenkins

Director Reinaldo Marcus Green, who is coming off the recent success of King Richard, shines a light on how corruption, racism and violence intersect in a majority black city. As he takes nonlinear storytelling to an extreme, the show often undercuts itself by toggling back and forth between one too many characters, perspectives and timelines.

There are moments when you are not sure whos when and where. Once you get on its wavelength, the show rewards your patience.

The chief investigation is led by the police corruption task force made up of federal prosecutor Leo Wise (Lucas Van Engen), FBI agent Erika Jensen (Dagmara Domiczyk) and BPD officer John Sieracki (Don Harvey). We follow the trio right from the beginning of their investigation to their interrogation of the arrested GTTF members Momodu Gondo (McKinley Belcher III), Jemell Rayam (Darrell Britt-Gibson), and Maurice Ward (Rob Brown). A secondary investigation takes us to what was the beginning of the end for GTTF.

Detectives David McDougall (David Corenswet) and Scott Kilpatrick (Larry Mitchell), two Narcotics officers, track down a local dealer whose bad batch of heroin is linked to multiple overdoses. On arresting him, they find two tracking devices on his car: one is their own, the other was lent to Gondo. Our proxy in the story is Nicole Steele (Wunmi Mosaku), a Civil Rights attorney conducting an inquiry into the culture of police brutality and corruption in Baltimore. Steeles bafflement, anger and eventual resignation mirrors our own emotional journey across the six episodes.

Darrell Britt-Gibson as Jemell Rayam

With the fallout over the death of Freddie Gray and the rising crime rate, the BPD brought on Sergeant Wayne Jenkins (Jon Bernthal) to lead the GTTF to seize the drugs and guns flooding the streets. As the show reveals, he did to a degree, only not by the book. While he upped the arrest quotas, he also upped the corruption by many levels. Bernthal is an absolute force of nature as Jenkins, a charismatic, hubristic, revolting and delusional man who can justify any moral transgression as a necessary evil. We watch Jenkins steal money and drugs, engage in fatal car chases, and call a colleague to help plant a toy gun after killing an unarmed suspect all without oversight. We hear how squad member Daniel Hersl (Josh Charles) had as many as 50 complaints of brutality on his record, but was allowed to patrol the streets simply because he more than delivered the quota.

Through GTTF member turned homicide detective Sean Suiter (Jamie Hector), we get a glimpse of how Jenkins peer-pressured members of his squad. Suiter died under mysterious circumstances a day before he was scheduled to testify against Jenkins and his gang of criminals. The show leans towards the ruling of the independent review which ruled it to be a death by suicide suggesting Suiter may have taken his own life over the guilt of his brief GTTF involvement. That Jenkins passed the blame onto the dead officer to evade a false evidence charge tells you everything you need to know about him.

Dagmara Domiczyk as Erika Jensen

Indeed, the Jenkins, the Hersls and the Gondos are a symptom of a rot that goes much deeper. The show puts the entire system on trial, not just a bunch of dirty cops. A system that endorses a shoot first, ask questions later policy, offers state-sponsored impunity for police abuse, pushes for results over method, and treats everything, lives included, as a numbers game. In the show, we see mayors and commissioners elected to office outline bold visions, only to resign within months over fraud and tax evasion charges. As there remains a huge gap between policing and public policy in theory and in practice, there also remains a mutual distrust between the community and its government. The failures of policing communities of colour stem from a long history of institutional racism in the US. And the failures of public policy have left the community in an endless cycle of poverty, addiction and violence.

Wunmi Mosaku as Nicole Steele

In one of the shows more telling conversations, Steele meets with Brian Grabler, an ex-cop who became a teacher after becoming disillusioned with the system. Grabler retraces the source of the rot to the so-called war on drugs, a five-decade-old public policy that has only been counterproductive, adding to the violence rather than reducing it. Everything changed when they came up with that expression, The War on Drugs. What an idiotic fucking thing to say. Waging a war against citizens by definition is separating us into two opposing camps. And with the war comes police militarisation. SWAT teams, tactical squads, stop-and-frisk, strip searches, a complete gutting of the Fourth Amendment. And its like were, were fighting terrorists on foreign soil. And you cant just blame the cops. We serve the politicians, who thrive on being tough on crime, he says, before perfectly summing it up in a follow-up conversation, And in a war, you need warriors. In a war, you have enemies. In a war, civilians get hurt and nobody does anything. In a war, you count the bodies and then you call them victories.

All six episodes of We Own This City are now streaming on Disney+ Hotstar.

Prahlad Srihari is a film and music writer based in Bengaluru.

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We Own This City review: Spiritual follow-up to The Wire exposes a failure of policing and public policy - Entertainment News , Firstpost - Firstpost

Two of the major cases awaiting Supreme Court decisions involve opposite sides of the same coin. A New York case involves the power of the states to regulate guns; a Mississippi case involves the power of the states to regulate abortions.Many of those who support the power of the state in one situation oppose it in the other because the politics point in opposite directions.

There are constitutional differences between the cases, but there also are similarities. Both should be considered in a nonpartisan manner.

New Yorks gun caseinvolves a construction of theSecond Amendment, which guarantees that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. But it guarantees that right in the context of a well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state. The juxtaposition of the right to bear arms with a well-regulated militia strongly suggests that the Constitutions framers intended the bearing of arms to be well regulated, as a militia would be.The Framers could simply have articulated the right as absolute (in the way theFirst Amendmentdoes) without preceding it by a limiting reason.

Accordingly, there is a strong constitutional argument that the states which in colonial times had the power to regulate their militias maintain the power to regulate gun ownership and use. This view is strengthened by theTenth Amendment, which relegates to the states or to the people all the powers not specifically delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it.

Thus, the issue of state power to regulate guns under the Second Amendment is squarely before the court. So, too, is the issue of state power to regulate abortions.

Unlike arms, abortion is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.But theFourth Amendmentdoes guarantee the right of the people to be secure in their persons.This surely has some implication for the right of women to decide whether or not to bear a child. The state may well have the power to regulate abortion to some degree but, as with guns, the issue before the Supreme Court is howmuchpower does the state have?

Here theNinth Amendmentcomes into play.It says that the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.The people include pregnant women, and the question is whether the Ninth Amendment, taken together with the Fourth Amendment, accords pregnant women some degree of control over their persons.Although the Fourth Amendment does not mention the word privacy, it uses a word that commonly included what we now regard as the right of privacy namely, security.

Most Americans believethat a woman should have control over her pregnant body during the early months of her pregnancy but not during the late months.They recognize that a fetus is not like an appendix, which can be removed simply at the will of the person and their doctor. The fetus is asomething; even at its earliest stage, it is a potential life.

When exactly it becomes an actual life, subject to legal protection against abortion, is a complex matter of science, morality and religion.For most Americans, it is a matter of degree but for some, on both sides of the political spectrum, it is not. For deeply religious Catholics and evangelicals, life begins at conception, and there is no matter of degree involved; they regard the earliest fetus as no different than a child. For some advocates of a womans right to choose, that choice extends even to the end of pregnancy; they regard the fetus as constitutionally indistinguishable from an appendix which a woman can simply chose to remove at any stage.

In the abortion case before the Supreme Court, the issue presented is whethera Mississippi statutewhich prohibits abortion after 15 weeks is constitutional if a state decides on that cutoff.The issue before the court, therefore, isnotwhether Roe v. Wade should be overruled but whether it should be limited to the first 15 weeks of pregnancy.

If theleaked draft opinionby Justice Samuel Alito turns out to be the final majority decision, the court would have reached out to decide an issue not properly before it. Such a decision would constitute judicial activism and would violate the constitutional limitations on the courts to decide only cases and controversies that are properly before them. Courts, including the Supreme Court, have no constitutional authority to render advisory opinions on issues that are not necessary to decide in order to resolve the specific case.

In these two controversial cases, the current court is likely to decide in favor of more state power to regulate abortions than guns.This may reflect the political leanings of the justices as much as neutral constitutional principles regarding the allocation of power and rights among the states, federal government, courts and people.

Alan Dershowitz, professor emeritus for Harvard Law School, is the author of numerous books, including The Case Against the New Censorship, and The Case for Color-Blind Equality in an Age of Identity Politics. Follow him on Twitter@AlanDersh.

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What powers do states have to regulate guns and abortions? - The Hill