Category Archives: First Amendment

Posted Tue, January 20th, 2015 7:46 am by Amy Howe

In 2009, Lanell Williams-Yulee sent out a letter announcing that she was running for county court judge in Hillsborough County, Florida. The letter from the Tampa lawyer, which was also posted on her campaign website, asked for contributions of as much as five hundred dollars to fund her campaign.

As fundraising appeals go, the mass mailing was a flop: it did not result in any campaign contributions. But it did draw the attention of the Florida Bar, the organization responsible for (among other things) disciplining lawyers in the state. The bar filed a complaint charging that Williams-Yulee had violated a rule that prohibits candidates for judgeships from personally soliciting campaign funds including through mass mailings like the one that Williams-Yulee had sent to would-be donors.

The Florida Supreme Court, the ultimate arbiter of attorney discipline in that state, rejected Williams-Yulees argument that the Florida rule prohibiting her from soliciting campaign contributions violated the First Amendment. Instead, it publicly reprimanded her for violating the rule and ordered her to pay for the costs of the disciplinary proceeding approximately $1800.Williams-Yulee may find a more receptive audience for her First Amendment argument at the U.S. Supreme Court, which will hear her case today. She contends that the rule cannot pass the very difficult legal test known as strict scrutiny that courts apply to laws or policies that prohibit speech based on its content. She acknowledges that one of the purposes of the rule preventing favoritism and corruption could provide the kind of compelling government interest that might allow the rule to pass constitutional muster. However, she challenges the Florida Bars contention that the rule is also necessary because the government has a strong interest in preventing the appearance of bias and corruption, suggesting that such a standard is too vague.

But in any event, she adds, the Supreme Court doesnt need to decide whether preventing the appearance of corruption and bias is a compelling interest because the rule cant pass the second part of the strict scrutiny test. That prong of the test looks at whether a restriction on speech is narrowly tailored, which means that it carefully targets only the speech that needs to be restricted to accomplish its purpose no more, no less. In some ways, Williams-Yulee argues, the rule doesnt target enough speech. For example, it still allows a prospective judge to know who has contributed to her campaign, and therefore still creates the opportunity for bias, and it allows candidates to ask individuals to support their campaigns in other ways, such as by donating volunteer services instead of money. At the same time, she continues, the rule prohibits too much speech: it even applies to impersonal communications like mass mailings, website postings, and speeches to large groups, none of which are likely to create the impression that a recipient, reader, or listener must choose between making a campaign contribution or receiving less favorable treatment in future court proceedings. And, she concludes, the government has other options such as requiring a judge to recuse herself from proceedings involving a contributor or limiting campaign contributions that can combat judicial bias and corruption without restricting speech.

For its part, the Florida Bar paints a very different picture of the rule as an unremarkable and narrow restriction necessary to prevent both corruption and the appearance of corruption. The bar emphasizes not only that there is abundant evidence that the public perceives campaign contributions to judicial candidates as having an undue influence on judges decisions, but also that many state judges themselves have indicated that campaign contributions may affect their rulings. And in particular, the bar suggests, the possibility for corruption or the appearance thereof arises from the direct link between the contributor and the candidate for a judgeship; it is that link, the bar maintains, that the rule prohibiting personal solicitation of campaign contributions targets. And therefore, the bar continues, it doesnt matter that a candidate for a judgeship can eventually learn who has contributed to her campaign. It also doesnt matter, the bar contends, that a would-be judge can personally ask someone to contribute his time to the campaign: giving money, the bar suggests, speaks louder than holding signs and licking envelopes. All that the rule does, the bar concludes, is prevent a candidate for a judgeship from personally soliciting contributions. It does not otherwise restrict what she can say, and she can still raise campaign funds through a committee.

Those who believe that judges should not be elected at all (a group that includes retired Justice Sandra Day OConnor) will be watching this case closely. In their view, its bad enough that judges have to raise money for their campaigns, but allowing judges and candidates for judgeships to personally solicit campaign contributions will increase the possibility of favoritism in decision making.

The case could be even more significant, though, as the latest chapter in the Roberts Courts campaign-finance jurisprudence. Last year, in a case called McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, the Court ruled that Congress cannot put overall caps known as aggregate limits on the amount that someone can contribute to candidates for federal offices, political parties, and political action committees. Although a ruling for Williams-Yulee might be an incremental step toward the further deregulation of the campaign-finance system, it would be a step nonetheless. Well know more about where the Court might be headed in this case after todays arguments.

Posted in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, Featured, Merits Cases

Recommended Citation: Amy Howe, The First Amendment and campaign solicitations: In Plain English, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 20, 2015, 7:46 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/the-first-amendment-and-campaign-solicitations-in-plain-english/

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The First Amendment and campaign solicitations: In Plain English

The Making Of The Twenty First Amendment Part 7
Think. Create. Inspire. Relax. Become.

By: LPTrax

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The Making Of The Twenty First Amendment Part 7 - Video

The Making Of The Twenty First Amendment Part 9
Think. Create. Inspire. Relax. Become.

By: LPTrax

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The Making Of The Twenty First Amendment Part 9 - Video

- South Miami Police - First amendment
Trying to gain evidence on my location for accountability and this unprofessional cop decides to not let me record. Claiming it #39;s for his safety. Talk about violation of my constitutional rights.

By: Manny Prades

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- South Miami Police - First amendment - Video

The Subtext of the First Amendment

To the Editor:

As a fellow Harvard grad (though not a former Lampoon editor!), Id like to reply to the letter from David Binger ( Charlie Isnt Funny or Helpful, Jan. 14) about Charlie Hebdo. He takes issue with the title, the quality of the cartoons and the editorial tone, and asks how a country that loved Honor Daumier could support such trash.

First, I would posit that our own beloved land is the world leader in the degradation of taste. Were the country, after all, that not only produced Larry Flint and Hustler but supported his right, in the Supreme Court, to publish a highly offensive cartoon that depicted not the Prophet Muhammad, May Peace Be Upon Him, but a known, specific individual. Virtually all American newsstands hawk tabloids full of salacious trash, partially fabricated stories and outright lies. All of this is protected by our glorious (and widely misunderstood) First Amendment, the first item in the Bill of Rights.

More to the point: Certainly there is a world of difference between Charlie Hebdo, on the one hand, and The Harvard Lampoon and The New Yorker on the other. I grew up with and appreciated both publications, but they clearly appeal to different audiences and readerships. There is a place for the high and the low, and times have changed since Daumiers day. A certain amount of shock value is needed to gain the attention of readers in this high speed, Internet-crazed world. The tragedy in Paris, albeit horrific and a shock in its own right, at least elevated Charlie Hebdo, for a time, into the ranks of newspapers known around the world. Thankfully, we Americans are free to choose what we think and read, and I would suggest that an unwritten subtext of The First Amendment is that any one of us has the right, if he or she chooses, not to hold any religion, not to petition the government, not to peaceably assemble, and not to read anything offensive.

A. E. Norton

Woodstock

Bring Vermont Inmates Home

To the Editor:

Thank you for the article by Laura Krantz of VtDigger covering the modest reduction in out-of-state placements in the Vermont Corrections system (Vt. Out-of-State Prison Population to Dip, Jan. 14).

Continue reading here:
Sunday Forum: The Subtext of the First Amendment; Bring Vermont Inmates Home; Universal Health Care Cant Wait

Advocacy - First Amendment Video

By: Dustin Nelson

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Advocacy - First Amendment Video - Video

C.A.B.B. Notes: First Amendment Rights - 10/10/14
Topic: "First Amendment"

By: CATTV Bennington

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C.A.B.B. Notes: First Amendment Rights - 10/10/14 - Video

Know Your Rights: What Isn #39;t Free Speech?
Yes, you have a right to free speech as an American citizen, but where does that right end? AJ+ gives you a cheat sheet on which kinds of speech are NOT protected under the First Amendment....

By: AJ+

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Know Your Rights: What Isn't Free Speech? - Video

January 15, 2015|7:42 am

(Photo: REUTERS/Gary Cameron)

The exterior of the U.S. Supreme Court is seen in Washington March 5, 2014. U.S. Supreme Court justices on Wednesday appeared to look for a compromise that would enable them to avoid overruling a 26-year-old precedent that made it easier for plaintiffs to negotiate large class action settlements.

On January 12th, I attended Supreme Court oral arguments in a caseReed v. Town of Gilbertwhich will determine how easily the government can restrict signs giving directions to church services. Specifically, the Court is set to decide whether, under free speech protections of the First Amendment, a local government's mere assertion that its sign code (despite on its face discriminating based on content) lacks a discriminatory motive renders the sign code content-neutral and justifies the code's differential treatment of signs pointing the way to a church's meeting location.

In this case, the Town of Gilbert had divided signs up based on whether they were ideological, political, or directionaland imposed different restrictions on each category of sign. Good News Community Church in Gilbert, Arizona, and its pastor, Clyde Reed, sued, claiming that signs pointing the way to their Sunday morning service (which contained religious speech and directions, and thus resulted in them being placed in the directional sign category) were treated less fairly and that this unfair treatment violated the First Amendment.

At oral arguments, both sides received their fair share of questions, but the justices were noticeably more skeptical of the town's argumentespecially its claim that it could severely restrict a sign containing ideological content announcing an event if the sign also included directions to that event, while at the same time easing restrictions on a sign containing the same exact ideological content and yet lacking directions.

The town attempted to defend itself by arguing it had an interest in preventing roadside clutter arising from numerable directional signs. But then it admitted it was granting preference to ideological and political signs because of the special First Amendment protection offered them, which prompted questions from the justices asking how the town was not impermissibly discriminating based on the content of the signs.

A breakthrough moment occurred when the town's counsel admitted under questioning by Justice Breyer that the town could put up a sign saying: "Come to the next service next Tuesday, 4th and H Streets," but could not add "three blocks right and two blocks left" to that same sign because that would make it a directional sign. Justice Breyer's response: "Well, my goodness. I meanI mean, on that, it does sound as if the town is being a little unreasonable, doesn't it?", pretty well captured the justices' view of the case.

The justices will now consider the legal issues and issue a written opinion deciding the case sometime before the end of June 2015.

While seeming more innocuous than some of the other high profile social issues which have reached the court over the last year or so, this case matters (significantly) to free speech law. It therefore matters a lot to Americans of all opinions and interests who want to take part in public debates and discussions over numerable issues in our country. Even if it doesn't matter to them personally, it shouldfor it affects their legal rights under the First Amendment.

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US Supreme Court: Can Government Restrict How a Church Can Use Signs?

When Is Annoying Illegal?
Subscribe! http://bitly.com/1iLOHml The First Amendment protects free speech, but there are some exceptions. How annoying can you be before it becomes illegal? Learn More: There #39;s Actually...

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When Is Annoying Illegal? - Video