Now is not the right time to split NSA and CYBERCOM – C4ISRNet

In addition to the big Russian hack, some other surprising news occurred in the cybersecurity world this holiday season. The Pentagon is reportedly considering ending the dual-hat arrangement that allows the commander of U.S. Cyber Command to simultaneously serve as director of the National Security Agency.

This idea, which has surfaced repeatedly since the standup of CYBERCOM, will not advance U.S. national security. The current arrangement has served both organizations well for years. There is no immediate need to split the two offices right now.

According to reports, the plan to end the dual-hat arrangement has been sent to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Mark Milley, who, according to public law, would have to sign off on the split along with acting Secretary of Defense Chris Miller.

This initiative has caused some consternation in Congress, since lawmakers enacted legislation to address this very issue. The fiscal 2017 and 2018 National Defense Authorization Acts put certain roadblocks in place to ensure a proposal to make the split would not harm national security. In essence, both the secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs need to sign off and certify the plan will not harm national security before the arrangement is ended.

The dual-hat arrangement started in 2009 when Cyber Command was created in order to provide it with the support and resources it needed to conduct its mission. The arrangement gave the growing Cyber Command the ability to borrow manpower and other resources from the NSA.

A lot has changed since 2009. Cyber Command has built 133 Cyber Mission Force teams and has conducted sophisticated operations, such as the cyber campaign against the Islamic State, which disrupted the latters ability to distribute propaganda online. This means CYBERCOM has gained in experience and developed capacity.

But how ready is it to split its command, and can that be done without affecting its operations? More fundamentally, should splitting the command be a long-term goal?

The initial push to end the dual-hat started during the Obama presidency and was politically motivated in the wake of the Snowden controversy. But military necessity should guide this shift, not politics. So what are the arguments for and against?

Sign up for the C4ISRNET newsletter about future battlefield technologies.

(please select a country) United States United Kingdom Afghanistan Albania Algeria American Samoa Andorra Angola Anguilla Antarctica Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Aruba Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bermuda Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Bouvet Island Brazil British Indian Ocean Territory Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Cayman Islands Central African Republic Chad Chile China Christmas Island Cocos (Keeling) Islands Colombia Comoros Congo Congo, The Democratic Republic of The Cook Islands Costa Rica Cote D'ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Faroe Islands Fiji Finland France French Guiana French Polynesia French Southern Territories Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Gibraltar Greece Greenland Grenada Guadeloupe Guam Guatemala Guinea Guinea-bissau Guyana Haiti Heard Island and Mcdonald Islands Holy See (Vatican City State) Honduras Hong Kong Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Republic of Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lao People's Democratic Republic Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macao Macedonia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands Martinique Mauritania Mauritius Mayotte Mexico Micronesia, Federated States of Moldova, Republic of Monaco Mongolia Montserrat Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands Netherlands Antilles New Caledonia New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Niue Norfolk Island Northern Mariana Islands Norway Oman Pakistan Palau Palestinian Territory, Occupied Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Pitcairn Poland Portugal Puerto Rico Qatar Reunion Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Helena Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Pierre and Miquelon Saint Vincent and The Grenadines Samoa San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia and Montenegro Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa South Georgia and The South Sandwich Islands Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Svalbard and Jan Mayen Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syrian Arab Republic Taiwan, Province of China Tajikistan Tanzania, United Republic of Thailand Timor-leste Togo Tokelau Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Turks and Caicos Islands Tuvalu Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States United States Minor Outlying Islands Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela Viet Nam Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, U.S. Wallis and Futuna Western Sahara Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

Subscribe

By giving us your email, you are opting in to the C4ISRNET Daily Brief.

Advocates for ending the dual-hat argue that one commander can lead to unfair prioritization of one organization NSA or CYBERCOM over the other. They also question the ability for one person to effectively manage two large organizations and claim that increased use of the NSAs advanced tools could lead to their premature exposure, possibly through a CYBERCOM operation.

Advocates for keeping the current arrangement focus on the close cooperation and synergy it allows between the two organizations that help their operations, the faster decision-making process it enables and the more efficient use of resources, since the two organizations can more easily share.

While there are arguments on both sides and many see the split happening at some point down the road, two things seem clear. A split should not be done hastily or prematurely. The close cooperation between the two organizations must be preserved.

And lets not forget the timing. Right now, the U.S. government is reeling from a massive breach by suspected Russian hackers with sweeping consequences, making this an inopportune moment for large organizational changes that could hinder cyber operations.

Both the former commander, Adm. Michael Rogers, and current commander, Gen. Paul Nakasone, have expressed caution about ending the arrangement prematurely. Both have said the arrangement works and enables the close relationship between the two organizations.

The two organizations operate under different legal authorities. Cyber Command draws its authorities from Title 10, which governs military forces, and NSA usually operates under Title 50 governing intelligence functions. This mirrors how cyber operations work as well, with the need for close collaboration between intelligence and military operations.

This means that Cyber Command and the NSA are able to collaborate in a way that other military forces are not able to cooperate with their intelligence counterparts. They currently enjoy a large degree of corporate synergy, where their close cooperation and unified command makes them more effective than if they were apart.

As Gen. Nakasone has said, The National Security Agency is our most important partner; the strength of this relationship will remain critical to the defense of the nation. The agencys world-class expertise, technical capabilities and accesses are crucial to USCYBERCOMs success.

Ending the dual-hat should only be done if it will enhance the effectiveness of both organizations in their operations, and a clear plan should be created with support from Congress, as it will need congressional support to be successful. Policymakers should continue to support the growth and development of Cyber Command to ensure that it would be ready for a future split down the road.

James Di Pane is a researcher at the Heritage Foundations Center for National Defense who focuses on military cybersecurity issues.

Excerpt from:
Now is not the right time to split NSA and CYBERCOM - C4ISRNet