A Framework for Sino-Russian Relations in the Arctic – The Arctic Institute

Novateks Yamal LNG facility in Sabetta, northern Russia. Photo: Novatek

Chinas Arctic engagement has increased considerably during the past decade, which has not only offered plentiful economic opportunities but also created new risks and concerns among the eight Arctic states, non-state actors, and peoples. To increase understanding of dimensions of Beijings Arctic activities, The Arctic Institutes new China series probes into Chinas evolving Arctic interests, policies, and strategies, and analyses their ramifications for the region (and beyond).

During the last twenty years of increased activity in the Arctic, China has become one of Russias most successful Asian partners. The scale of the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects stimulates discussion on further strengthening of bilateral cooperation. At the same time, during the analysis of this new area of relations, it is important to take into account several factors.

For both Russia and China, Arctic activities are associated with the development of territories, which has long remained a challenge. This factor, in spite of its high importance, is not discussed with the same thoroughness as the demand for having sources of energy supply and new routes.

However, the Russian Arctic today is inextricably linked with the development of the Russian Far East. The Northern Sea Route along the circumpolar coast of the Arctic country attracts the transit of cargo by sea and Siberian rivers, and helps to increase the connectivity of previously inaccessible and sparsely populated territories. The Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and the Arctic oversees infrastructure development projects aiming to unite the land.

For China, emergent Arctic logistics also promise to give new impetus to the economically lagging northeastern Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces. Both provinces actively cooperate with Russias northern and Far Eastern administrations and strive to formalize their role within the northern branch of the Silk Road.

These domestic motivations add value to national politics in raising the GDP and seeking new routes for strategic maneuvering. This factor emphasizes the natural difference between the national interests of the two states.

Sino-Russian collaboration in the Arctic remains a part of the general outline of bilateral relations. Today, the comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation of the two states, thanks to a series of joint statements, have included the Arctic as an important sphere of partnership. In the same context, the discussed docking of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with its polar branch also shapes a new framework for the implementation of Arctic projects. Besides, for the reasons described above, Arctic cooperation is associated with border relations between the two countries. In this regard, for example, such projects as Primorye-1 and Primorye-2 turn out to be embedded in logistics focused on deliveries of cargo via the Northern Sea Route.

All the above brings new political leverage for promoting Arctic cooperation. At the same time, it allows involving a larger bunch of international and bilateral mechanisms from the already established, to the potentially effective for the reasons of security and regional cooperation.

The legacy of bilateral affairs affects the relations between Russia and China in the Arctic. It would seem, quite rightly, that for Russia and China, cooperation in the Arctic has no historical precedents. With the exception of some exotic examples, such as activities of the Russian-American Company, which at one time included the delivery of Chinese goods to Alaska, the countries do not have enough experience of interacting in the region. Nevertheless, as part of bilateral relations, they are developing the hard-won principles of cooperation, which above all include the desire to be equal partners and remain independent from each other. Chinas pragmatic approach to the Arctic, even more, encourages Russia to adhere to these rules and develop interaction with other Asian partners. Therefore, the bilateral cooperation in the region inevitably remains a balance between the largest Arctic state with a developing resource-based economy and the Arctic newcomer riding the wave of the economic boom.

The strategic shifts in the Arctic affect Sino-Russian relations in the region. The climatic drive for circumpolar development opened up a new geopolitical environment. The increase in shipping access to Asia through the Bering Strait involves the states of the North Pacific with strategic interaction. Thus, the determination of Russia and China intersects with the interests of Japan, North and South Korea, and the United States, bringing to life a new balance of power.

Another aspect related to the development of the circumpolar north is the emerging of a new international route from Europe to Asia. Both states are hoping to use this opportunity in their national interests: Russia strives to turn the Northern Sea Route into an international transport corridor, and China aspires to develop the initiative of the Polar Silk Road.

For these reasons, differences in approaches, the legal interpretation, discrepancies and the issues of the strategic balance invariably appear in documents and stay in the framework of bilateral cooperation in the Arctic.

Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic are of a complicated nature and are tightly bound to a whole scope of diversified factors from the domestic motives of the territorial development to the historical background and strategic interests. In this regard, the nuanced approach to the analysis may provide a more precise and unbiased assessment of Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic.

Dr. Mariia Kobzeva is a Postdoctoral Fellow at UiT-The Arctic University of Norway, Troms.

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A Framework for Sino-Russian Relations in the Arctic - The Arctic Institute