The Name of the Rose: De-evolution of Europe – Modern Diplomacy

The perpetual topic of Russia-Europe relations was one of the centralthemes at the recently concluded annual Munich Security Conference. It is nosecret that these relations have, for a long time, been in a state of profoundcrisis. This was not only caused by the events in Ukraine, even though theirsignificance and consequences for both Russia and Europe should by no means beunderstated. The roots are more profound, related to both parties beingunprepared to develop optimal forms of their current interaction.

Nonetheless, speeches and discussions at the Conference showed signs thatthe involved parties are demonstrating a certain readiness to develop anoptimal model for relations. In his opening speech, Germanys PresidentFrank-Walter Steinmeier clearly said, Europe should notput up with the ever-greater alienation of Russia. We need other, betterEU-Russia relations. Most European leaders speaking at the Conference agreed,in one way or the other, with the notion that the current state of relationsbetween Moscow and its western neighbours is unreasonable and needs to berevised. As always, it boils down to the matter of what specific, mutuallyacceptable parameters new relations could have.

For nearly five decades, I happened to be directly involved in thepractical issues of developing cooperation first between the USSR and Europe,and then between Russia and Europe. Over this lengthy historical period, theparties consecutively tested three interaction models, yet none of themultimately withstood the test of time.

The first model, that of controlled confrontation, emerged during theCold War when the USSR and Europe were divided by unsurmountable ideological,political, military and strategic barriers. Back then, the main task was toprevent a direct military engagement between the sides through reliance on thefundamental documents of the postwar world order. Where possible, the partiesstrove to resolve conflicts through dialogue and simultaneously build mutuallyadvantageous cooperation. The Final Act of the 1975 Conference on Security inEurope and an entire package of treaties and agreements in arms control andconfidence measures are among the starkest examples of such policy.

It should be said that, while being far from perfect, this policy made itpossible to guarantee peace in Europe in the second half of the 20thcentury. In some way, back then, the situation in Europe was more stable andpredictable than it is today. The rules of the game were acceptable for theopposite party, and dangerous red lines in the West and East weremore evident than they are now.

The second model, that of a Greater Europe, was tested afterthe fall of the Soviet Union and the consequent collapse of the entiresocialist bloc and its institutions. The Charter of Paris for a New Europesigned in November 1990 by the heads of state and government of the OSCEdeclared that the era of confrontation and division of Europe has endedand a new era of democracy, peace and unity of Europe has started. The Charterfor European Security signed in November 1999 in Istanbul was intended tocontribute to the formation of a common and indivisible security space on theEuropean continent. This document, as well as many others, signed by Russia,the European Union, NATO and other parties, was the foundation for establishingfar-reaching plans to build a Greater Europe, a Common space stretching fromVladivostok to Lisbon and shared spaces in various cooperation areas, etc.

These developments transpired in front of our very eyes and, to ourprofound regret, never materialized. Today, after some time, we can objectivelyassess the steps of Russia and Europe after the Cold War to establishcooperation within the framework of a new reality. Without attempting to shiftthe blame on the other party, we can confidently say that the differentinterpretation of both the unfolding historical events and the future directionof the development of our relations constituted the key problem of ourpartnership.

Without focusing on the details, perhaps failures in implementinglarge-scale projects of building a new Europe stemmed from conceptualdifferences between Russia and Europe in their understanding of the fundamentalprinciples of building such a European space, and not from craftiness andmalicious intent (which also cannot be ruled out entirely). These differencesbecame apparent and began to gain momentum as political agreements were beingput into practice. Europe viewed the shaping of common spaces as the process ofintegrating Russia into the existing European bodies. At the same time, Russiasaw it as the parties being equal participants in developing new mechanismsthat accounted for new realities and the parties legitimate interests. Suchirreconcilable stances were bound to turn into conflict sooner or later, whichis precisely what happened.

The third relations model emerged after the acute stage of the 2014Russia-West crisis. Subsequently, the European Union labelled it selectiveengagement, and this wording was included in Federica Mogherinis fiveguiding principles. The idea was of Europe interacting with Russia where itsuited Brussels interests, and opposing Russia where the interests of Moscowand Brussels diverged. On the whole, this concept was in line with Russiansentiment. It appeared that selective engagement would delineate mutuallyacceptable parameters of the new normalcy for a long time to come.

However, the new model appeared to have shown its deficiency as well, atleast because the European Union still failed to form a united opinion on whatdegree of engagement in relations with Moscow was necessary. A newalgorithm of interaction with Russia has never been elaborated in a single EUdocument. Additionally, the interests and capabilities of Moscow and Brusselsare clearly asymmetrical; therefore, finding a mutually acceptable balance ofinterests in every specific area appears to be exceedingly difficult.

We believe, though, it to be far more critical that selectiveengagement essentially reduces the positive interaction between Brusselsand Moscow exclusively to tactical, situational cooperation pertaining tocurrent problems and specific, rigidly delineated areas. However, thechallenges Moscow and Brussels face today are not only tactical andsituational, but also strategic and long-term, and the responses, therefore,should also be strategic and long-term.

Unless they want to continue repeating old mistakes, both historians andpoliticians should focus their attention on past experiences. What conclusionscan we draw from the past 30 years of Russia-EU relations?

Our relations should be primarily based on pragmatic assessments of currentopportunities and limitations, and not on emotions. As a result of diverginghistory, culture, religion, and lifestyle traditions, Russia and the EuropeanUnion are not ready to create common spaces in the principal areas of theiractivity (apart from shared spaces, say, in the humanitarian, cultural, oreducational areas). Swept by the euphoria induced by the end of the Cold War,we were clearly too hasty in declaring the prospect of creating a GreaterEurope. No matter how attractive this goal appears, we will not comeclose to implementing it soon.

In the current state, Russia and the European Union are tackling variousdevelopment tasks that are sometimes far from being identical and can evencontradict each other. This applies to politics, economy, and security. Anycooperation mechanisms will be workable only if they account for both sharedinterests and objectively existing diverging interests. This means that bycooperation we should imply combining common or coincidinginterests, as well as minimizing expenses and costs stemming from inevitablerivalry and even elements of confrontation.

If this is the case, pragmatism should form the foundation of Russia-Europerelations. However, pragmatism alone is not sufficient for building stablerelations. The selective engagement model claimed to build upon thepragmatic dialogue between Brussels and Moscow. However, the experience of thepast six years demonstrated that bare pragmatism is barely different fromopportunism and attempts to outmanoeuvre the partner somehow using onesrelative advantage in a particular area.

Therefore, the concept of pragmatism should be supplemented with theidea of responsible interaction. Responsibility here entailsprimarily the parties ability and readiness to account both for theirimmediate situational interests and their long-term strategic interests. Onedoes not need to be Nostradamus to arrive at the obvious conclusion that thefurther into the future we look, the more areas of coinciding Russian andEuropean interests we see. We should not allow the sentiment and emotions ofthe current moment to block the view of long-term prospects.

Additionally, responsibility entails accounting not only forones own interests, for also for those of ones partner, as well as thebroader interests of the entire international system. Both the future ofRussia-Europe bilateral relations and largely the future of the world orderdepend on Russia and Europe today. As we think of interaction in areas such asglobal and regional stability, nuclear non-proliferation, combatinginternational terrorism, managing climate and migration flow, we need to alwayskeep our collective responsibility for the emerging world order in mind. Wesimply do not have the right to think that a game without rules or a war ofall against all is the historically inevitable new world order.

Combining pragmatism and responsibility will require significantintellectual and political efforts of both parties. At first, Russia and Europeshould embark on building such interaction mechanisms, including cooperation atthe highest political level, that would promote better understanding and openup opportunities for fruitful cooperation. Naturally, such an effort should bebolstered by persistent work on all other levels and in all other venues,including joint work of officials, diplomats, military personnel, experts, andcivil society activists.

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The Name of the Rose: De-evolution of Europe - Modern Diplomacy