Are Ukraine’s Airstrikes Inside Russia Strategically Effective in the … – Foreign Policy

In addition to using airstrikes to attack Russian military forces on or near the battlefield, Ukraine has also conducted more than 100 attacks, mostly with an array of drones, inside Russia itself and against Russian-occupied Crimea. Ukraine has bombed not only numerous military targets, but also the Expo Center exhibition complex and a skyscraper under construction in Moscow, oil facilities in Crimea, and infrastructure in other areas, such as an electric substation. These strikes are now a regular occurrence and, while causing few casualties, have temporarily shut down various airports and otherwise disrupted daily life.

In addition to using airstrikes to attack Russian military forces on or near the battlefield, Ukraine has also conducted more than 100 attacks, mostly with an array of drones, inside Russia itself and against Russian-occupied Crimea. Ukraine has bombed not only numerous military targets, but also the Expo Center exhibition complex and a skyscraper under construction in Moscow, oil facilities in Crimea, and infrastructure in other areas, such as an electric substation. These strikes are now a regular occurrence and, while causing few casualties, have temporarily shut down various airports and otherwise disrupted daily life.

These attacks hinder Russian warfighting, but Ukrainian leaders probably also seek to have a more strategic impact, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declaring that the strikes show that war is gradually returning to Russia. How might Ukraines air attacks coerce Russia, if at all?

Most studies of the strategic use of air power warn that having a major impact on adversary decision-making through air power alone is difficult. Drawing on the history of strategic bombing in World War II, Vietnam, the first Gulf War, Kosovo, and other campaigns, scholars have concluded that strategic effects are rare. Adversary leaders and publics rally in the face of bombing, at times becoming more supportive of their regimes or, at the very least, finding themselves unable to rebel against powerful governments, and these campaigns can divert air assets from the battlefield.

Yet these and other works also suggest that strategic bombing can have a range of effects, from diverting scarce air defense resources to building up morale in the country carrying out the bombing.

The Russia-Ukraine war differs from many past uses of air power. In this conflict, neither side has true air superiorityboth continue to bomb the other using drones and missiles, among other means. In addition, the strategic air campaign is at best a minor part of the overall struggle. The vast majority of air attacks are part of the clash of conventional forces. Finally, in the case of Ukrainian attacks on Russia, the strikes are at best minor, causing few casualties and only minimal disruptions to daily life, in contrast to the much more massiveand deadlyRussian bombing of Ukraine.

Most of the overall effort to coerce Moscow involves economic pressure and the clash of armies along various fronts in Ukraine. The United States and its European allies have orchestrated extensive financial, import and export, and other sanctions on Russia. Moscow has weathered these sanctions so far, but the pressure continues. Part of the goal is to undermine popular support for Russian President Vladimir Putins regime, putting pressure on it to end the conflict. A separate goal is to increase elite dissatisfaction, which may also put pressure on Putin and could even lead to a coup. In addition, Ukrainian bravery and resourcefulnessbacked by massive U.S. and European aidhas thwarted Russias expansive military goals. Continued resistance and counteroffensives are a form of coercion by denial, essentially sending a message to Moscow that it will not achieve its maximal objectives and that, as a result, continued fighting will achieve little.

Compared with these two coercive prongs, airstrikes deep into Russia are less importantbut they are not irrelevant. One possible effect is that Russians become afraid of the airstrikes and turn against their government. This seems highly unlikely. It is unclear if Ukraine has killed any Russians in these air attacks (though it is possible that Russia is covering up a small death toll), but in any event, the numbers would be small, especially for a big country like Russia.

In addition, the airstrikes are not that frequent and only hit small parts of the country. The vast majority of Russians can go about their daily lives largely unaffected. Perhaps most important, even if they are angry and terrified, it is hard for citizens to rebel against an authoritarian regime, though a rapid change is at least conceivable.

A more realistic goal would be to augment the strategy of military denial by making it clear to ordinary Russians and the Russian elite that they are not winning. Continued Ukrainian airstrikes can interrupt the steady drumbeat of regime propaganda, showing that Ukraines will to fight remains strong. Putin has successfully convincedor forcedordinary Russians to support the war, but they will be less enthusiastic the more apparent it is that they are not winning.

Even more important, these airstrikes, even if limited, can hearten Ukrainian resistance. Coercion is usually dynamic, with both sides trying to convince the other side that it cannot win and thus should make concessions. Ukraines efforts may seem paltry when compared with Russias bombing campaign, which has targeted civilians in Kyiv and other cities, as well as Ukraines power grid, grain shipping facilities in Odesa, and other sites. These attacks regularly kill civilians, sometimes in large numbers, such as the bombing of a theater-turned-shelter in Mariupol that reportedly killed around 300 Ukrainians.

Nevertheless, when punishment is one-sided, it is hard to convince people to stay in the fight. But the demonstrated ability to hurt the other side gives people hope. Shortly after Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, the United States conducted a daring bombing raid on Japan itself, known as the Doolittle Raid. Although the operation itself did only limited damage to Japan, and the United States lost most of the aircraft and several of the crew involved, it buoyed American spiritsthe United States was striking back and making its enemy pay.

Finally, airstrikes might force Russia to divert resources to protect its cities and infrastructure, including resources that might be better used on the battlefield. The Doolittle Raid led Japan to station four of its fighter groups in the home islands during 1942 and 1943, a time when it desperately needed air power elsewhere, as well as to increase its overall defensive perimeter, which made its supply lines vulnerable. To the extent that Putin is feeling political heat from Ukrainian attacks, he may feel compelled to have the Russian military increase air defenses around Russian cities and other targets, with less available for the battlefield.

Despite these possible benefits, coercive airstrikes can have several potentially negative effects. First, it is very difficult to send messages about willpower, surrendering, or red lines through the use of military force. Misperceptions, the fog of war, and other biases quickly come into play. Even accidents can be considered part of an overall design. The United States shot down Iran Air flight 655 in 1988, mistaking it for an Iranian military aircraft at a time of a military confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz and killing all 290 passengers aboard. As Iran expert Kenneth Pollack wrote, The Iranian government assumed that the attack had been purposeful as part of a U.S. plan to help Iraq in its war against Iran.

In the Russia-Ukraine context, it is possible that Ukrainian strikes meant to demonstrate resolve or show the Russian elite that Moscow is losing could instead convey a different, and quite unintended, message.

The adversary may even escalate in response. Ukraines attacks on civilians or civilian infrastructure could bolster Putins argument that the Ukrainians are barbaric and that Russias own numerous atrocities are justified. They could also discredit voices calling for peace or restraint and even strengthen domestic support for a regime that can now claim it is acting in self-defense.

They may even lead to more brutality against Ukrainian citizens. In addition to bolstering its air defenses after the Doolittle Raid, Japan carried out brutal reprisals in China, fearing that the nationalist government there posed a more dangerous threat than anticipated because of its sheltering of U.S. air forces. In August, Russia unleashed a barrage of missile and drone attacks, claiming that it was a response to a Ukrainian attack on a Russian tanker.

For Ukraine, the most important risk might be diplomatic. Although some supporters of sanctions and other anti-Russia measures are staunch, many care little about the conflict and would prefer to resume trade with Russia. Being able to use Ukrainian strikes as a false form of moral equivalency may allow some governments to reduce support for Ukraine.

Ukraines coercive airstrikes must be thought of in the broader context. The most important use of air power remains on the battlefield, but the strikes on Russia itself might have a range of benefits, not least to Ukrainian morale. At the same time, Ukraine must carefully balance how such strikes are perceived in Russia and abroad.

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