Daily Archives: July 9, 2024

Farage himself may have given a hint of his disruptive desires during an interview with the Suns Never Mind the Ballots YouTube show in May.

Referring to his friend Trumps MAGA takeover of the Republican Party, he said: What Trump did, of course, is he was able to hijack the conservative party in America. Id love to have had a crack at that here in this country.

But of course, theres no open primary in this country. The Conservative Party, several times, said they wouldnt have me as a member

For some Tories, a change of heart may be underway, amid a feeling on the right of the party that Farage would be at home in their faction and could unite the countrys right-leaning voters too. Those who argue in favor of allowing Farage in include expected leadership contender Suella Braverman.

Tory MP Edward Leigh, now the Father of the House as parliaments longest-serving member, told the BBC on Friday that the Tories must invite Reform voters and Farage to join us.

Because otherwise in five years time, we are going to have a similar debacle. We cant have a divided right-wing vote, he said.

Others disagree. Robert Goodwill, an ex-Tory MP who stood down at the election, told POLITICO: We either tack right and cozy up to Farage or stay in the center where elections are won.

Tom Lubbock, former Tory Party data chief and founder of JL Partners polling firm, said the lego bricks theory of adding the two votes of Conservatives and Reform together is actually quite appealing and has taken hold in the party.`

He said that while most leadership contenders had ruled this out before the election, he believes the final results may change perspectives among senior Tories.

The exit poll and result was a cleansing fire, which will reset a lot of peoples thinking on Reform, Lubbock said.

Whatever conclusion the Tories come to may be a moot point, however; given his strong position, Farage could well fancy riding the Western wave of populism without the help of the Conservative Party.

As well as Reforms strong performance in the U.K. general election, recent international events may lead Farage to have a change of heart about the best vehicle for his ambitions.

The rise of Le Pens National Rally, which finished top in the first round of the countrys legislative elections, and its quest to replace Frances version of the Tory Party (the Republicans) presents an apt model for him to emulate.

Surging populist right-wing parties in places including Germany and the Netherlands could also portend a unique moment for upstart right-wing parties in Europe.

The official Reform line is that the party has no interest in joining forces with the Conservatives, and that its end goal is to dominate the right all by itself.

Farage told the Independent Saturday that the Tories can join us if they want but we dont need them and wont be chasing them.

We dont really need the poison they will bring, he said.

Howard Cox, Reforms defeated candidate in Dover and Deal, told POLITICO: A center-right party will now evolve led by Nigel Farage with those true Conservatives who have been betrayed by Sunaks regime.

Real Tories with Thatcherite values of low taxation, small state and strong borders will join Nigels revolution.

A Reform official, granted anonymity to comment candidly on the election fallout, was more blunt.

There is no chance anybody is joining that rabble they are already ripping shreds off each other, they said.

Bethany Dawson and Esther Webber contributed reporting.

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Can Nigel Farage ride the wave of right-wing populism? - POLITICO Europe

A recent study published in the American Behavioral Scientist has shed light on the link between life dissatisfaction and the rise of right-wing populist movements in Europe. By analyzing survey data from 14 countries collected between 2012 and 2018, researchers found that individuals who are dissatisfied with their lives are more likely to hold negative views on immigration and distrust political institutions, which in turn increases their likelihood of supporting right-wing populist parties.

The researchers aimed to understand the psychological underpinnings of the growing support for right-wing populist parties across Europe. Previous studies have suggested that economic insecurity and cultural changes contribute to the success of these parties, but the role of personal dissatisfaction with life had not been systematically explored.

The researchers hypothesized that life dissatisfaction might be an important factor linking economic and cultural discontent to support for populist parties. By examining this link, they hoped to uncover a more comprehensive understanding of the motivations behind right-wing populist voting.

The study used data from the European Social Survey, which included responses from over 54,000 individuals across 14 countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Only those who reported voting in the last national election were included in the analysis. The researchers focused on responses related to life satisfaction, political trust, attitudes towards immigration, and voting behavior.

Participants rated their life satisfaction on a scale from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating greater satisfaction. Political trust was measured by asking respondents to evaluate their trust in various political institutions, while attitudes towards immigration were assessed through questions about the perceived impact of immigration on the economy, culture, and society. The main outcome of interest was whether participants voted for a right-wing populist party in the most recent national election.

The study revealed a significant association between life dissatisfaction and support for right-wing populist parties. Specifically, individuals in the lowest quartile of life satisfaction were almost twice as likely to vote for these parties compared to those in the highest quartile. This relationship held even after controlling for other factors such as age, gender, education, economic insecurity, and health.

Additionally, the researchers found that life dissatisfaction indirectly influenced right-wing populist voting through two key attitudes: political distrust and anti-immigration sentiment. Dissatisfied individuals were more likely to distrust political institutions and view immigration negatively, which in turn increased their likelihood of voting for right-wing populist parties. Notably, anti-immigration sentiment emerged as the stronger of the two mediators.

The study also found some variation across countries. For instance, the direct link between life dissatisfaction and right-wing populist voting was not significant in countries like Hungary and Italy, suggesting that contextual factors may influence this relationship. However, in most countries, anti-immigration sentiment consistently served as a critical path through which life dissatisfaction translated into support for right-wing populist parties.

While the study provides valuable insights, it also has several limitations. The cross-sectional design of the survey data means that causal relationships cannot be definitively established. The findings suggest associations, but they do not prove that life dissatisfaction causes individuals to vote for right-wing populist parties. Future research using longitudinal data would help to confirm these causal pathways.

The study, Life Dissatisfaction and the Right-Wing Populist Vote: Evidence from the European Social Survey, was authored by Annika Lindholm, Georg Lutz, and Eva G. T. Green.

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Unhappy lives linked to recent rise of right-wing populism in Europe - PsyPost

Frederik Henriksen analyses anti-systemic populist movements during the Covid-19 pandemic. Here, he explains how these movements rely on alternative news media to establish their own digital information environments, and shows how ideological partisanship evolved in these echo chambers

This Future of Populism series has rightfully challenged the tendency to categorise populism and populists as exclusively left- or right-wing. Indeed, series editors Mattia Zulianello and Petra Guasti argue that populism transcends the left/right spectrum because it can interact with, and combine, a variety of ideas.

If that is the case, should we study populism beyond the left/right spectrum, of which theoretical orientations are critical to understanding the phenomenon? Dani Filc proposes a framework relying on three dimensions for a more nuanced analysis of populism. His model addresses economic structures and policies, cultural and identity issues, and democratic conceptualisation. Notably, the second and third dimensions pertain to contemporary expressions of populism, which were particularly pronounced during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The pandemic gave rise to new protest movements that transcended the conventional left/right spectrum. Movements across the globe, including the Canadian Freedom Convoy and Germanys Querdenken, emerged in response to perceived illegitimate, anti-democratic government interventionism in peoples lives and in all other aspects of society.

Fuelled by a blend of Covid denialism, anti-statism, anti-vaxxism, anti-scientism and conspiracy theories, these groups disseminated populist anti-establishment narratives. Through online and street-level activism, they challenged the (epistemic) authority of state officials, mainstream media, scientific experts, and global health bodies.

Movements protesting Covid restrictions challenged the authority of state officials, mainstream media, and scientific experts

These movements exemplify a particular form of anti-systemic populism beyond the left/right spectrum. Like valence populist movements and parties, they align instead with Filcs third democratic dimension. Anti-systemic populism uses populist communication to pit ordinary people against supposedly corrupt, failing, and/or self-interested elites. Anti-systemic populism combines this style with a range of ideas related to conspiracy theories, anti-statism, anti-vaxxism, and anti-scientism.

The phenomenon of anti-systemic populism extends beyond extra-parliamentary activism. Think of Donald Trumps allusions to a deep state or Wolfgang Gedeon of Germany's far-right Alternative fr Deutschland claiming the virus was an American bioweapon. Both these theories exemplify anti-systemic populism in formal political discourse. The deep state conspiracy theory perceives these elites as a systemic whole, hence the anti-systemic. But it is primarily social movements led by activists, ordinary citizens, political influencers, and even reality TV celebrities, that drives the spread of this form of populist communication.

During the pandemic, anti-systemic movements established alternative information environments on many digital platforms. These environments fuelled the anti-systemic movements, while countering information from state-authorised experts and health institutions. Alternative news media were instrumental in developing and sustaining these information ecologies, reinforcing and validating the perspectives and demands of anti-systemic groups.

Alternative news media define themselves as alternatives to what they see as a deficient mainstream media landscape. They are often characterised as populist, echoing populisms fundamental dichotomy of the people versus the elites. While not inherently partisan, many alternative news media exhibit hyper-partisanship. They adopt a transgressive style, showing strong biases towards certain political figures, while attacking others.

Research shows that opposition to social distancing, mask-wearing and vaccination increases with exposure to alternative news media

Marcel Lewandowsky shows how partisanship can reinforce support for populist and illiberal candidates, often at the expense of democratic principles. During the pandemic, scholars found that support and opposition to social distancing, mask-wearing and vaccines were directly related to exposure to alternative news media.

One useful way to study partisanship in information environments is by partisan homophily. This is the tendency for people connect with those who share similar beliefs. Homophily can lead to the formation of echo chambers, in which like-minded individuals interact predominantly with each other. This, of course, limits their exposure to diverse viewpoints, which is vital in democratic societies for the development of a well-informed electorate.

It is natural for people to connect with others who share similar beliefs. But this limits exposure to diverse viewpoints, and risks undermining democracy

Partisan heterophily, on the other hand, denotes a willingness to engage with opinions that differ markedly from ones own. Such cross-partisan engagement can foster political tolerance and limit polarisation. In the context of populism in wider information environments, particularly the type that fosters insular and anti-systemic movements, partisan heterophily can play a crucial role.

In collaboration with Eva Mayerhffer and Jakob Bk Kristensen, I researched the dynamics of partisanship within digital alternative news environments during the Covid-19 pandemic. We focused on a specific variant of heterophily known as source heterophily. This is the extent to which individuals accessed information from diverse sources, particularly those outside their usual political affiliations. Scholars have used source heterophily to explain growing polarisation in Western countries, but also to explain how biased and misconstrued worldviews gain traction.

Using digital information environments in Austria. Denmark, Germany and Sweden, we measured source heterophily as the tendency of users to disseminate a wide array of content. In the four case countries, we considered all larger platforms Twitter-X, Facebook, Reddit, YouTube, Telegram, VKontakte, TikTok, Instagram and Gab in one single information network. By so doing, we mitigated the risk of platform-specific biases.

Our findings revealed an interesting pattern. At the onset of the Covid-19 crisis, there was a temporary phase of cross-partisan engagement across all countries, which suggests an overall increase in source heterophily. This trend, however, was short-lived. Entrenched left/right polarities soon grew to dominate once again and, in some instances, became even more pronounced. In Germany and Austria, anti-systemic sharing communities gradually aligned with right-wing communities. This left the pre-existing partisan landscape largely intact.

Our research highlights how quickly new movements can arise during disruptive global events. It also underlines the resilience of partisanship along ideological divides over time. The findings reveal just how important it is to investigate partisanship, and to analyse and interpret the digital landscape of populist politics.

No.85 in a Loop thread on the Future of Populism. Look out for theto read more

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

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Anti-systemic populism during the Covid-19 pandemic - the Loop: ECPR

Tight Focus

During a brief visit to Trieste in northern Italy, Pope Francis declared that democracy is in bad shape and urged politicians to reject populism in favor of cooperation and addressing voter apathy. It is evident that democracy is not in good health in todays world, he said.

Big Picture

This visit to Trieste marks the Popes fourth Italian trip in just over two months as he preps for his longest journey yeta 12-day tour across Asia this September. Despite his age and health issues, the 87-year-old pontiff remains an active advocate for political and social change.

Key Detail

At a Roman Catholic social affairs convention, Francis said it is critical to educate children about democratic values. Indifference is a cancer of democracy, he said. I am concerned about the small number of people who went to vote. Why is it happening?

Real Surprise

Francis used the metaphor of democracy as a wounded heart, vulnerable to corruption and exclusion. He emphasized that democracy isnt just about voting but about creating conditions for everyone to participate and express themselves.

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Nikki Haley Not Invited to Republican Convention - The Daily Beast

There has been an earthquake in British politics, reporters say. Everyone from the Guardian to the Sun to CNN is reaching for the metaphor of shifting tectonic plates to describe Labours victory over the Tories in the General Election. And in a sense theyre right. The political ground has shaken. Rumblings have been felt. But it wasnt drab, grey Labour that did it it was the millions of voters who rejected both Labour and the Tories and in the process delivered one of the most devastating sucker punches to the political duopoly in decades.

To see the true quake, you need to look beyond Labours mirage-like landslide. As is now becoming clear, Labour has not been swept to power on anything like a wave of public enthusiasm. On the contrary, it won its 412 seats on the second lowest electoral turnout since 1885, and more as a result of peoples exhaustion with the Tories than their love for Sir Keir. No, it is those who refused to vote Labour who have brilliantly unsettled British politics. It is those who took a punt on Nigel Farages Reform party who have planted a bomb in the political landscape that will not be easily defused.

For me, the most fascinating stat of the election is the share of the vote received by Labour and the Tories. Labour won around 34 per cent of vote, the Tories around 24 per cent. Lets leave to one side what a lame landslide it is if only 34 per cent of the people who could be bothered to vote put an X in your box. More striking is the fact that the combined vote share of Labour and the Tories, the parties that have dominated British politics for a century, was 58 per cent. That is staggeringly and, if you will allow me, hilariously low.

To put it in historical context: at the last General Election, in 2019, their combined vote share was 75.8 per cent. In 2017 it was even higher: 82.4 per cent. In the elections of the 2000s it hovered around 70 per cent. Why has it now dropped to less than 60 per cent, giving rise to the possibility that in the next few years the two parties that have run this country for decades might see their combined vote drop to less than half of all votes cast? Largely, because of Reform. And a few independents, too. Reforms vote share is around 14 per cent, enough to shatter the Labour / Tory duopoly and to unravel the two big parties arrogant belief that they and they alone have a right to rule.

The speedy turnaround of the Reform revolt was extraordinary. It was only a few weeks ago that Farage ditched his plans to go to America to assist the Trump campaign and instead decided to become leader of Reform. He has now been elected MP for Clacton. Reform has won four seats in total. Whats shocking is that the Liberal Democrats won 71 seats despite getting fewer votes than Reform. The Lib Dems got around 12 per cent of the vote, to Reforms 14 per cent. That the democratically less popular party of the two will wield far greater power in the Commons is a testament to how busted our first-past-the-post electoral system is. This is unsustainable. It is outright undemocratic.

And yet, even without the parliamentary representation their vote share deserves, Reform has struck a blow for democracy. Their voters, in thinking for themselves and rejecting both the Labour and Tory variety of technocracy, have forcefully created a new opening in political life. They have burst a few of the buckles on the political straitjacket that is our two-party system. The last time this happened was with Farages UK Independence Party, in the 2015 General Election, when it won 12.6 per cent of the vote, reducing the Tory / Labour vote share to 67.3 per cent. But where UKIP was mostly a one-issue party, dedicated to getting Britain out of the EU, Reform has broader policy goals. The millions of working-class people who voted for it are saying something very clear indeed: We want something different.

Labours naff, Obama-lite slogan was Change. But little will change under Labour. It will be the same shit, different suit. The people who really voted for change were the masses who opted for Reform. They have voted for a party that rejects Net Zero, which is sceptical of hate-speech laws, which absolutely does not long to rejoin the EU, and which knows brace yourselves that if you have balls you are not a woman. The significance of this cannot be overstated: many, many Brits have voted to overturn almost every facet of elite consensus opinion, from green hysteria to trans mania. Now thats change.

The true story of the election is that populism isnt going anywhere. Those who thought Labour would soar to power and swiftly euthanise the post-Brexit rumblings of the pesky masses have had a rude awakening this morning. Labour is in charge, sure, but on the basis of a largely accidental landslide. And nipping at its heels is a very big section of the public who outright reject the political ideas, moral crusades and green lunacy of the establishment. Will this populist pushback grow? I think it will. Voters have made it abundantly clear in this election that the duopoly is not the only game in town. That the ruling class is not a forever thing. That other voices can burst through, bit by bit. Both the elites and ordinary people will be clocking this development, the former with dread, the latter with fascination.

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The true story of this election? Populism is here to stay - Spiked