Daily Archives: February 3, 2024

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WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Over the past two decades, the European Union and NATO have weathered many storms, from the Iraq War to the European debt crisis, Brexit and the invasion of Ukraine. Both are also expanding.

A new Gallup analysis suggests the ability of these international institutions to survive -- and thrive -- may be tethered to the actions of powerful member states and the confidence that people in member states have in their domestic political institutions.

In the near term, continued broad approval for these international institutions may hinge on the coming 2024 elections in the United States and 2025 elections in Germany.

When Gallup asked people in their respective member states in 2022 whether they approved of NATO leadership and EU leadership, the responses varied widely, but the overall picture looked positive:

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By far the strongest predictor of the way people in member states view NATO and the EU is their views of major global powers. This relationship is not wholly unexpected, but the magnitude of the effect is almost outsized.

Controlling for other factors, an individual who approves of U.S. and German leadership -- pillars to these Western institutions -- was 7.7 times more likely to approve of NATOs leadership and 6.5 times more likely to approve of the EUs leadership than an individual who approves of neither.

For powers outside the Western bloc, the picture is mixed. Views of Chinas leadership are not strongly associated with views of EU and NATO leadership. However, a respondent who disapproves of Russias leadership is roughly twice as likely to approve of EU and NATO leadership as an individual who does not disapprove.

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Gallups Migrant Acceptance Index was born largely out of reaction to the migrant crisis that swept Europe in 2015, with migration into the EU remaining an especially salient and divisive political issue ever since. After years of wrangling, the EU only recently reached an agreement on reforms to deal with the numbers of migrants and refugees coming into the bloc.

The index gauges people's acceptance of migrants based on three questions that ask whether people think migrants living in their country, becoming their neighbors and marrying into their families are good things or bad things.

Controlling for other factors, a respondent who says all three scenarios are a good thing is 1.3 times more likely to approve of NATOs leadership and 1.7 times more likely to approve of the EUs leadership compared with an otherwise similar respondent who says none of those scenarios is a good thing.

The National Institutions Index is based on whether respondents expressed confidence in the military, judicial system, national government, financial system and honesty of elections in their own country.

Accounting for other factors, a respondent who expresses confidence in all five institutions is 3.8 times more likely, on average, to approve of NATOs leadership and 4.4 times more likely to approve of the EUs leadership compared with an otherwise similar respondent who lacks confidence in any domestic institution.

These relationships are statistically robust but conceal interesting differences. For instance, the relationship between confidence in domestic institutions and approval of EU or NATO leadership varies significantly across member states.

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Believers -- those who express confidence in four or all five domestic institutions -- approve of EU and NATO leadership more than skeptics -- those who express confidence in two or fewer domestic institutions. The sole exception is Hungary, where approval of EU leadership is slightly higher among those with less confidence in national institutions.

In some countries like Spain and Poland, the gaps in approval toward EU and NATO leadership do not differ dramatically between believers in and skeptics of domestic institutions. However, this gap between believers and skeptics is at least 20 percentage points in most countries for NATO leadership (22 out of 31) and EU leadership (20 out of 27).

The gaps are largest in Finland and Slovakia, where approval of EU and NATO leadership is over 50 points higher among believers than among skeptics. Yet, this similarity obscures a significant difference. Believers in domestic institutions (82%) far outnumber skeptics (10%) in Finland, whereas skeptics (52%) outnumber believers (31%) in Slovakia.

The EU and NATO undergird the economic and security ties that bind the Western international political order together. In turn, these international institutions depend on sustained elite and popular support across democratic member states. Approval of the EU and NATO are most strongly associated with attitudes toward domestic institutions and major global powers. These factors are potential sources of cohesion and fragility.

Internal and external efforts to sow mistrust in domestic institutions will likely erode support for these international institutions. Conversely, the ability of democratic political systems to deliver results that secure broad societal confidence in domestic institutions will likely boost support for the EU and NATO. In this case, an institutionalist at home appears more likely to be an institutionalist abroad.

Leadership by the most powerful countries in the EU and NATO -- Germany and the United States, respectively -- also matters. Policies and actions that nurture favorable attitudes toward these great powers will likely strengthen popular support for these international institutions, while policies and actions that elicit unfavorable attitudes will likely weaken popular support for the Western international political order.

* Includes Finland, which joined NATO in 2023

To stay up to date with the latest Gallup News insights and updates, follow us on X.

For complete methodology and specific survey dates, please review Gallup's Country Data Set details.

Learn more about how the Gallup World Poll works.

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Can NATO and the EU Survive and Thrive? - Gallup

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia once proclaimed the dissolution of the Soviet empire the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. At the time, back in 2005, few expected him to do anything about it.

But then came Russias occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia in 2008, its backing for Ukrainian separatists and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and, most resoundingly, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Now, with the rise of former President Donald J. Trump, who in the past has vowed to leave NATO and recently threatened never to come to the aid of his alliance allies, concerns are rising among European nations that Mr. Putin could invade a NATO nation over the coming decade and that they might have to face his forces without U.S. support.

That could happen in as few as five years after a conclusion of the war in Ukraine, according to some officials and experts who believe that would be enough time for Moscow to rebuild and rearm its military.

We have always kind of suspected that this is the only existential threat that we have, Maj. Gen. Veiko-Vello Palm, the commander of the Estonian Armys main land combat division, said of a possible Russian invasion.

The past few years have also made it very, very clear that NATO as a military alliance, a lot of countries, are not ready to conduct large-scale operations meaning, in simple human language, a lot of NATO militaries are not ready to fight Russia, General Palm said during an interview in December. So its not very comforting.

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For Europe and NATO, a Russian Invasion Is No Longer Unthinkable - The New York Times

WASHINGTON, D.C. U.S. Senator Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) yesterday questioned witnesses during a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation about the possible process for Ukraine to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the future.

You all have the belief that in this upcoming Summit that some process should be offered to Ukraine for a future in NATO is that fair to say? asked Sen. Menendez. And so, the question then becomes, what is that process? Is it a merely an invitation with a long-term opportunity? Is it something more substantial? Is it something that is just another stronger statement that its future is in NATO? What would be desirable to walk away from the Summit, especially at this point in time with Ukraine and its challenges that it has with Russia?

Sen. Menendez quoted Ambassador Douglas Lute, former U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO and retired Lieutenant General of the U.S. Army, when in 2016 he stated that there was no chance of NATO expansion [] because of fears it could destabilize Russia. The Senator asked what the Ambassadors assessment is of the Alliance in terms of expansion destabilizing Russia.

In 2021, NATO for the first time identified systemic challenges posed by Chinas assertive behavior and coercive policies. And since then, it has sought to enhance cooperation with governments in the Indo-Pacific region, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, and strengthened resilience guidelines for member states, including for critical infrastructure and supply chains, to maintain NATOs technological edge, said Sen. Menendez. Id offer this to anyone in the panel, what additional steps can the Alliance take to address challenges posed by China, and what type of agreement is there within the Alliance on the extent of these challenges?

Sen. Menendez also asked witnesses about their thoughts on NATO establishing cooperation with Arab nations as Iran-backed militia groups continue to sow chaos in the region.

In December, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg made a historic visit to Saudi Arabia, becoming the first sitting secretary-general to visit an Arab state, said Sen. Menendez. I applaud that he went, but it seems to me that its a totally different challenging theatre for NATOs engagement."

In November, during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing entitled U.S. National Security Interest in Ukraine, Sen. Menendez asked Secretary OBrien a series of questions regarding the impact of pulling support for Ukraine on U.S. national security, economy and relationship with allies.

In October, Sen. Menendez met with 25 members of the New Jersey delegation of the American Coalition for Ukraine to highlight the Senators advocacy on behalf of the country and Ukrainian-American citizens. The Senator has reaffirmed his unshakeable commitment to ensure Ukraine receives the resources it needs, and remains committed to calling out Russian aggressions and holding Putin accountable for his actions against the people of Ukraine.

In July, Sen. Menendez introduced the Responding to the Energy Security Crisis in Ukraine and Europe (RESCUE) Act of 2023, which addresses Ukraines fuel needs while helping it reconstruct and modernize its energy infrastructure. In January 2022, Sen. Menendez led 38 of his Senate Democratic colleagues in introducing the Defending Ukraine Sovereignty Act, critical legislation to authorize security assistance for Ukraine and required sanctions against Russia.

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Sen. Menendez Questions Witnesses During SFRC Subcommittee Hearing About the Possible Process for Ukraine to ... - Senator Menendez

New Atlanticist

February 1, 2024

By Jason Davidson

When the leaders of NATO member states gather for the Alliances seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington in July, they will have several high-profile items on the agenda. Russias war on Ukraine and NATO members aid for Ukraine will almost certainly dominate discussions. However, there is another item on the agenda that has not received as much attention in the press as it should: NATO is scheduled to adopt its first ever Southern Flank Strategy at the Washington summit.

Despite the critical importance of the Ukraine War for the Alliance, several NATO members are also concerned about instability on the Alliances Southern Flank, which in the Alliances parlance refers to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the Sahel, and the Mediterranean Sea that links those areas to allies shores.

Allies will, however, face significant challenges in adopting a meaningful Southern Flank Strategy, because allies differ on threat assessments and hold varied views on the Alliances scope. There are also limits to NATOs capacity. NATO leaders may ultimately agree on a consequential Southern Flank Strategy at the Washington summit, but it is not a foregone conclusion.

The underlying problem with the Southern Flank is instability in the region, which is rooted in political, security, economic, and demographic problems that are exacerbated by climate change.

This instability on the Alliances Southern Flank has important consequences for NATO members. The International Organization for Migrations data suggests that 286,122 people migrated to Europe in 2023, a significant increase from the 189,620 who migrated in 2022 and 151,417 in 2021. In recent years, a few terrorist acts in Europe have involved migrants staying illegally on the continent, sparking broader security concerns. Large-scale irregular migration also brings with it concerns over the trafficking of humans and contraband substances, and other illegal activities.

Instability on the Alliances Southern Flank also has economic consequences. Since Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Europe has decreased oil and gas imports from Russia and increased imports from the MENA region. As of the last quarter of 2023, the European Union (EU) imported 21 percent of its oil from three MENA countries: Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. The EU also imported 17.8 percent of its gaseous-state natural gas from Algeria and 24.1 percent of its liquefied natural gas from Libya and Qatar. Instability on NATOs Southern Flank is also a potential threat to the maritime commerce that flows through the Mediterranean Sea, which accounts for 15 percent of the worlds shipping by port calls and 10 percent of the worlds shipping by vessel weight.

Russias behavior in the MENA region and the Sahel is another reason why NATO needs to take the Southern Flank seriously. The Wagner Group, which the United States has labeled a proxy of the Kremlin, has a significant presence in Libya, Mali, and Sudan. Wagner provides thousands of mercenary troops, weapons, and training in these countries and Russia undoubtedly gains significant political influence with the host governments. Recent reporting suggests that Russia may directly take over Wagner activities with an Africa Corps that will man a network of Russian bases on the continent. Russia also has a naval base in Tartus, Syriahome to its Mediterranean Squadron, which includes Kilo-class submarines, a cruiser, and a frigate. In 2023, Spanish and Italian navies reported incidents of the Russian frigate Admiral Kasatonov sailing with a Russian tanker in the Mediterranean. Russias naval presence in the Mediterranean could be used for offensive, defensive, or hybrid operations against members of the Alliance or their interests.

One significant challenge facing the development of a meaningful Southern Flank Strategy is the differing threat perceptions of leading NATO members.

On the one hand, NATO members along the Alliances Southern Flank view instability there as a security concern and a domestic political imperative. Italy and Spain, for example, see instability in the Mediterranean as a direct threat to their security. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, in her press conference after NATOs 2023 Vilnius summit, stressed Italys role in getting allies to agree to develop a Southern Flank Strategy in 2024. Meloni referred to herself as the bearer of the view that problems on the Southern Flank are not just Italys problem, but NATOs as well. She went on to say that the Alliances greater awareness of the Southern Flank was due to Italy.

On the other hand, nearly two years since Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATOs Eastern Flank members continue to focus on the threat that the Kremlin poses to their security. Given the urgency of the Russian threat and the limited resources available, it is understandable for Eastern Flank members to worry that any new significant NATO activities in the south could draw resources away from the defense of the Alliances eastern border.

The second challenge facing the development of a Southern Flank Strategy is a fundamental difference in views on NATOs mission and scope. Some members take an expansive view that NATO should act to help allies address their security concerns without limits to the nature of activities or geographical space. Others, most vocally France, argue NATO should focus primarilyeven exclusivelyon territorial defense. Frances view has grown stronger since Russias 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Policymakers in Paris have come to recognize the urgency of the threat Russia poses and the lack of an alternative to NATO in terms of territorial defense. Frances 2022 National Strategic Review, for example, says that Russia is pursuing a strategy that seeks to undermine European security, of which the war against Ukraine, is the most open and brutal manifestation. It goes on to say that NATO is still the foundation and essential framework for Europes collective security. Frances views on what NATO should do suggest that it will resist any moves to expand NATOs remit on the Southern Flank.

The final challenge has to do with NATOs limits relative to the challenges facing the Southern Flank. Leaving aside debates about what NATO should and should not do, it is fundamentally a military alliance. As such, it lacks certain capabilities that are necessary in improving the conditions on the Alliances Southern Flank. NATO, for example, lacks the capacity to engage in any significant economic development activities. It is also not well equipped to engage in activities to strengthen democracy or the rule of law in the countries along its Southern Flank. Finally, NATO faces limits in terms of its image in the region that would put it at a disadvantage if it were to engage in any high-profile, public-facing activities.

There are two basic possibilities for the Washington summit: an embrace of the status quo or a more ambitious attempt to confront the challenges allies on the Southern Flank face.

Given the challenges, under the most likely scenario, the Alliance might enhance existing intelligence gathering and sharing activities. The Southern Flank Strategy could also commit to a marginal increase in the Alliances maritime security operations under Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean. Finally, the Southern Flank Strategy could entail a commitment to deepen cooperation with regional partners through the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

But what might a more ambitious and consequential Southern Flank Strategy look like? First, NATO could engage in a significant increase in counterterrorism training and assistance with regional partners. Second, NATO could better prepare for future military operations in the region by engaging in additional advanced planning and by establishing a multinational division for the Southern Flank. Third, NATO could agree to significantly enhance the resources for Operation Sea Guardian, allowing for more maritime situational awareness, more maritime counterterrorism, and, especially, more maritime security capacity building with regional partners. Finally, NATO could commit to coordinating its activities with the EU and support and encourage the blocs efforts to address the Southern Flanks economic and political challenges.

While a status quo scenario, perhaps with some additions, is most likely to emerge as the new Southern Flank Strategy at the Washington summit, a more ambitious approach, like the one outlined above, would be a better choice for the Alliance.

First, the more ambitious approach would be more likely to stabilize the Alliances Southern Flanka problem that ultimately matters for all members of the Alliance. Second, by embracing an ambitious Southern Flank Strategy, NATO would demonstrate that it is sensitive to the concerns of all members, not just those most concerned with the threat Russia poses. Such a move would reward those Southern Flank allies, such as Italy, that have sent troops to bolster the Eastern Flank and have borne significant economic costs because of sanctions on Russia. An ambitious approach to the Southern Flank would be politically popular in the Southern Flank countries, as well, allowing governments to tout the benefits of their countrys membership in NATO.

The United States has the outsized leverage in the Alliance to overcome those who might resist an ambitious strategy. It also does not have any obvious reasons to oppose it. What remains to be seen is whether it will recognize the benefits of a bold Southern Flank Strategy and exert its influence accordingly at the upcoming summit.

Jason W. Davidson is a professor of political science at the University of Mary Washington and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Councils Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is the author of Americas Entangling Alliances: 1778 to the Present (Georgetown University Press) and is currently completing a book on NATO after the Ukraine War.

Thu, Aug 3, 2023

Report By Matteo Villa and Alissa Pavia

Irregular migration from North Africa to Europe, especially through the Central Mediterranean route connecting Libya and Tunisia to Italy, is increasing once more. Italy has witnessed a surge in irregular arrivals, with approximately 136,000 migrants disembarking between June 2022 and May 2023, almost comparable to the high arrival period of 2014-2017 when around 155,000 migrants landed each year.

Fri, Dec 15, 2023

Report By Atlantic Council Task Force on Black Sea Security

This report outlines the strategic setting, regional challenges and threats, key planning assumptions, risk and risk mitigation, and finally DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) based recommendations for enhancing security and stability in the Black Sea region.

Image: Ships from multiple NATO nations including Italy, Spain, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom, participate in Exercise Mare Aperto 22-2, a high-end exercise sponsored by the Italian Navy aimed at strengthening and enhancing the combat readiness of participating assets in the conduct of maritime operations. Forrest Sherman (DDG 98) is the flagship for Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2), a multinational integrated task group that projects a constant and visible reminder of the Alliances solidarity and cohesion afloat and provides the Alliance with a continuous maritime capability to perform a wide range of tasks, including exercises and real-world operations in periods of crisis and conflict. (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Ezekiel Duran, October 11, 2022)

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NATO should be ambitious with its new Southern Flank Strategy - Atlantic Council

BRUSSELS Americas closest allies in Europe are warning that Russia could initiate a new war on the continent as soon as this decade and that they are chillingly ill-prepared.

British Defense Secretary Grant Shapps, in his inaugural speech on the job, cautioned last month that the country is shifting from a postwar to a prewar world, a view shared increasingly among senior European civilians and military officials.

How unready is Europe to face down Russian President Vladimir Putin should he choose to test the West, perhaps with an attack on the vulnerable smaller nations on NATOs eastern flank, as many believe he might after rapidly rebuilding Russias forces depleted in Ukraine? Lets count the ways.

Britains own army has shrunk to a mini-me version of its former self, with fewer troops than at any point since the Napoleonic wars of the early 19th century. U.S. generals have warned that Britains military is dangerously diminished amid reports that its forces would run short of ammunition days into a ground war.

Germany has left its armed forces to atrophy and lacks adequate supplies of soldiers, equipment and even Band-Aids, as its inspector general warned a year ago.

Funding and munitions in the armed forces of Belgium, the scene of fierce battles in both world wars, are so scarce that its army would have to throw stones to defend itself, according to a retired general.

The antidote to those shortcomings is NATOs bulk and brawn, led by the approximately 100,000 U.S. troops on European soil a bigger active-duty force than the entire British army can muster. Increasingly, though, that U.S. security guarantee looks wobbly.

That is the case not only, or even mainly, because of the prospect of a second term for Donald Trump, whose disdain for NATO I addressed in my column last week. It is also the reality given Chinas rising threat, which has displaced Russia as Washingtons No. 1 concern even as Putin presses his pitiless war in Ukraine.

When U.S. strategists discuss a pivot to Asia, what they also mean is a turn that will leave Europe to plug the gaps. That has given rise to an arms-buying spree on the continent, mainly of U.S.-made weapons.

Notably, U.S. allies in Europe have received or ordered more than 600 U.S.-made F-35 fighter jets, at a combined cost of more than $50 billion. In addition to their military value, thats a European bet on bilateral ties with Washington, no matter who occupies the White House.

Nonetheless, a senior European NATO official told me, Europeans are worried about the prospect of being left to defend themselves. NATO without American leadership is no longer NATO, the official said. The whole point of deterrence is that Putin knows if he attacks Europe, hell be at war with a mighty U.S.

The fact that Europe is increasingly vulnerable is underlined by dramatic announcements that yield little follow-up.

A prime example was Chancellor Olaf Scholzs announcement, days after Putins 2022 invasion of Ukraine, that Germany had arrived at a dramatic turning point. The new world, he said, demanded that Germany shed its pacifist posture and launch a $110 billion fund to overhaul its military and defense industrial capacity.

Two years later, Germany has emerged as Europes leading donor of military and financial aid to Ukraine. But Scholzs government, saddled with an anemic economy and red tape, has been slow to bulk up Germanys armed forces, despite Defense Minister Boris Pistoriuss insistence that it be ready for war by the end of the decade.

A top French official in the European Union, Thierry Breton, is pushing the 27-nation bloc to establish a defense fund of almost $110 billion. His proposal chimes with historical precedent a French-led plan at the Cold Wars outset to create a European army, 100,000 troops strong, funded by a common budget.

That idea died in Frances own legislature, as it became clear that the continents security would be assured by U.S. troops and nuclear weapons through NATO, whose champion, Dwight D. Eisenhower, became president in 1953.

Bretons half-baked initiative it includes no funding source has been shrugged off as the latest French buy European initiative and an attempt to weaken the continents bonds with the United States. Yet it should be the basis for serious conversation.

Theres an old tension between transatlantic and European-only solutions to European security problems, Seth Johnston, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University who has led NATO missions as a U.S. Army officer, told me. The episode in the early 1950s is an early example that European proposals often dont work out, and NATO ends up having to reinvent or adapt itself to the new problem.

For NATOs European members, spending more on defense is a quadruple win: a strategy to ensure Ukraines survival, deter Putin from further aggression, respond to Washingtons pivot to Asia, and convince Trump, should he regain office, that the alliance is a good deal.

The alternative is to maintain the status quo: a soft-bellied Europe shuffling into a menacing new era, inviting disaster.

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Opinion | As war risks mount, Europe is sluggish to response - The Washington Post

Enlarging the European Union and NATO after the Cold War raised hopes it would unleash an important advance for freedom in a part of the world that had enjoyed little. Integrating former Eastern Bloc countries into keystone Western institutions and requiring democratic and market-oriented reforms for them to join exclusive clubs of wealthy nations would discourage anti-Western nationalism and intolerance. For the most part, this strategy has worked, with countries that once suffered behind the Iron Curtain now vibrant democracies.

Yet the strategy came with risks, chiefly that countries would regress after joining the Western order and undermine from within the Wests commitment to promoting freedom and democracy. So it is with Hungary, whose nationalist and authoritarian prime minister, Viktor Orban, has built what he calls an illiberal state and has spoiled European efforts to advance democracy in Ukraine. European leaders meet Thursday to discuss what to do; anything but determination to curb Mr. Orban would signal European weakness at a time when strength is essential for global security.

The E.U., which Hungary entered in 2004, is devoted to building societies in which pluralism, nondiscrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. NATO, which Hungary joined in 1999, seeks to create a lasting peace in Europe based on members common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Mr. Orban has sabotaged both.

The latest example is his foot-dragging on Swedens admission to NATO, a proposed enlargement of the alliance spurred by Russias aggression in Ukraine. Mr. Orban has pledged that Hungary will approve but has stood by as the parliament he controls has delayed action. Hungary now is the last holdout in the alliance. On Jan. 23, Mr. Orban invited Swedens prime minister, Ulf Kristersson, to Budapest to negotiate on Swedens ascension, an unseemly extension of his hand for an undeserved reward.

Mr. Orbans behavior in the E.U. is equally as troubling. In December, he abstained from a vote on allowing Ukraine to begin the process of membership, stepping out of the room as the other 26 members of the bloc voted a green light. But at the same summit, Mr. Orban directly blocked a $55 billion E.U. aid package for Ukraine and vowed to fight it well into the future, saying there are about 75 occasions when the Hungarian government can stop this process.

Thus, the E.U.'s consensus-based process enables Mr. Orban to serve Russian President Vladimir Putin, who would like nothing better than to paralyze the European Union as he seeks to destroy Ukraine. It was Ukraines strong desire to join the European club, and not be under Mr. Putins thumb, that led to Mr. Putins invasions of Ukraine, in 2014 and 2022. Should Mr. Orban continue to block Ukraine aid, E.U. members can use bilateral channels to send help, effectively bypassing Hungary, but this could take longer and would be more unwieldy.

When it began, Hungarys Fidesz party was made up of young people committed to progressive values. But under Mr. Orbans leadership in the 1990s it shifted to a conservative right-wing outlook, and after a landslide election victory in 2010, he neutered the constitutional court and drafted a new constitution that reflected a collectivist, nationalist worldview, no longer basing its system of fundamental rights on the individual, according to Zsuzsanna Szelnyi, author of Tainted Democracy, a 2022 book about Mr. Orban. Mr. Orban nationalized much of the economy, undercut free and fair elections and human rights, and enabled allies to take over most of the national media. His rhetoric bristles with hostility to immigrants, LGBTQ+ people and the European Union.

There is no E.U. mechanism to suspend or expel a member, but the bloc can withhold funds and suspend voting rights. Largely out of concern over Mr. Orbans poor rule-of-law record, the European Commission had withheld funds for Hungary; but in December, at the time of the Ukraine discussion, the commission released approximately $11 billion, saying that Hungary had met conditions for judicial independence. The commission continues to lock up about $23 billion. Continued financial pressure is critical to deliver the message that a member cannot corrode the blocs values.

Members of the European Parliament and some others have called for exploring a more severe option: suspending Hungarys voting rights. Doing so risks diminishing the bloc in the future, should populists take power in other E.U. nations. A better option is to make the E.U. less vulnerable to Orban-like manipulation, reforming voting rules so that fewer decisions require unanimity. Majority or supermajority rule would suit a bloc devoted to democracy and curb the likes of Mr. Orban from destroying from within one of the Wests most successful institutions.

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Opinion | How the E.U. and NATO should respond to Hungarys authoritarian Orban - The Washington Post

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Principe, Democratic Republic of Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Senegal, Republic of Serbia and Montenegro Seychelles, Republic of Sierra Leone, Republic of Singapore, Republic of Slovakia (Slovak Republic) Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia, Somali Republic South Africa, Republic of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands Spain, Spanish State Sri Lanka, Democratic Socialist Republic of St. Helena St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Pierre and Miquelon St. Vincent and the Grenadines Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Suriname, Republic of Svalbard & Jan Mayen Islands Swaziland, Kingdom of Sweden, Kingdom of Switzerland, Swiss Confederation Syrian Arab Republic Taiwan, Province of China Tajikistan Tanzania, United Republic of Thailand, Kingdom of Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of Togo, Togolese Republic Tokelau (Tokelau Islands) Tonga, Kingdom of Trinidad and Tobago, Republic of Tunisia, Republic of Turkey, Republic of Turkmenistan Turks and Caicos Islands Tuvalu Uganda, Republic of Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland Uruguay, Eastern Republic of Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of Viet Nam, Socialist Republic of Wallis and Futuna Islands Western Sahara Yemen Zambia, Republic of Zimbabwe

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ARTHUR CYR: NATO The Enduring Alliance | Opinion | henryherald.com - Henry Herald