Daily Archives: May 14, 2023

Much has been said and written about the rise of populism around the world and the threat it poses to traditional politics, dominated as it has been by the centre right and centre left. As the new wave of populism sweeps across various continents, the Middle East has been somewhat absent from the conversation. Crushed under the weight of authoritarianism, the region is seen to be immune from populist backlash and, moreover, had its populist moment under the wave of Pan-Arabism, also called Arab nationalism, peaking during 1958-61 in a political union between Egypt and Syria, in the form of the United Arab Republic.

The Arab Spring could be held up as a populist moment but there are important differences between the current strain of populist politics and the mass uprising which began in Tunisia in 2010. Firstly, there was no single leader around whom protestors rallied behind. This is a key marker of populism, which did not exist during the Arab Spring. Leaders like the former US President Donald Trump, India's Narendra Modi and Hungary's Victor Orban are typical of the top down, elite-led popularism garnering power and momentum. Whatever one may think of the Arab Spring, it was a genuine bottom-up movement calling for democracy.

A second important difference is that the Arab Spring was a revolt by the masses against authoritarianism and not, as is the case with the populist backlash, fuelled by fear over minorities. A dark undercurrent of racism flows through the current wave of populism, especially in India where the Muslim minority faces horrific levels of discrimination. The same crop of populist leaders inspiring these movements fuel racial and culture divides and present themselves as "heroes" in a war waged on two fronts: the manufactured culture war and the feud against an imagined global elite. That said, it would be inaccurate to assume that the Middle East is fully immune to populism. Under the right conditions, populism can become a major force, a fact that was powerfully demonstrated to me during a recent trip to Algeria.

The North African country continues to defy many of the long-held assumptions and stereotypes common amongst Western analysts. I was invited by a member of the governing coalition, the National Construction Movement (NCM), known in Arabic as the Harakat Al-Bina' Al-Watani. With 39 seats out of 407 in Algeria's People's National Assembly, the party has the fifth highest number of elected representatives. The President of Harakat Al-Bina' Al-Watani is Abdelkader Bengrina. He is a former member of Algeria's largest Islamist party, the Movement for a Society of Peace (MSP), a self-avowed branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. With 65 seats, MSP is second only to the National Liberation Front (FLN), the party which spearheaded Algeria's liberation movement against the French. In one of the many splinters within the Islamist groups, Bengrina left the MSP in 2008, alongside other dissidents.

Though unfamiliar with details of the split between Bengrina and Algeria's Muslim Brotherhood, the reasons for their differences became all too apparent during the 61-year-old's address at the 10,000 capacity International Conference Centre where thousands of party members, foreign delegates, including representatives of various government and political parties gathered to celebrate the second congress of Harakat Al-Bina' Al-Watani.

"Our nation is our creed" declared Bengrina during his hour-long address, steeped in the kind of nationalist fervour typical of populist leaders elsewhere. "Our country is a belief and an idea, and whoever neglects his country, it will be easy for him to neglect his religion and belief," Bengrina declared while laying out NCM's vision. "Whoever neglects his country, it will be easy for him to neglect his honour, homeland and people," he continued. "The homeland is soil and sovereignty, and the homeland is a state and institutions. Whoever tears the fabric of society and united the people is a traitor. Whoever abandons an inch of the homeland and does not defend it, is a traitor. Whoever distorts the institutions of his state or abuses them is a traitor."

READ:Algeria supports any deal to organise elections in Libya

Evoking nationalist sentiments further, Bengrina urged Algerians to offer themselves as "mukhbirs" informants against anyone who wishes to undermine the country's security and prosperity. He made the remark within the context of Algeria's long feud with Morocco. The two countries have bitter differences over Western Sahara, where Algiers backs the Polisario against Rabat. The nationalistic crescendo ended with a narration of the prophet Muhammed (PBUH) justifying "love of the homeland".

Beside Bengrina's strong appeal to nationalism, which had become a source of unease for several delegates I spoke to, there was little to separate between the political programme of NCM and other Islamist parties. There was the unequivocal denunciation of violence. In fact, Bengrina went beyond most leaders on this issue. "None of us hurt the elites and challenge the institutions," he said extolling his party's non-violent stance. "None of us sow doubt and confusion, none of us conspires against the institutions of his state." For Bengrina "democracy is the gift of civilisation for making political change". Speaking about Israel and Palestine, which featured heavily throughout the event, including addresses by the major Palestinian factions, Bengrina described it as "our greatest concern".

Nonetheless, in the days that followed Bengrina's rousing speech, all the talk had come to be about his powerful appeal to nationalism. What did Bengrina mean when he said, "our nation is our creed?" Is he really asking Algerians to "spy" on their fellow citizens on behalf of the state? Is Bengrina a new model of Islamist leaders and does his party represent a future of political Islam elsewhere?

Since their founding, there has existed a tension within Islamist political parties over the universalist concept of Ummah (Islamic community of believers), a supranational or transnational union and the idea of a nation state as the post-colonial normative model for how the Muslim world is politically arranged. "Islam is not Algerian, Tunisian or Egyptian. Islam is universal" remains a common sentiment amongst many Islamists. As this tension played out in Algeria, pan-Islamic aspirations were said to have been dismissed as irrelevant, to the context in which parties like the MSP and its later rival, NCM, had operated.

"The struggle against French colonial forces and, later, against 'imported' extremism together bolstered the requirement of indigeneity and hypernationalism, and made being viewed as a foreign current profoundly hazardous for movements, political groups and individuals alike" said Vish Sakthivel, Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Program. According to Sakthivel, Algerians view the notion of a meddling foreign hand with a collective and institutionalised anguish. Allegations of influence under a foreign hand whether Saudi Arabia and Egypt in decades past or Qatar and Iran have been weaponised against Islamists in Algeria. Commenting on Algeria's largest Islamist party, Sakthivel explained that "to avert suspicions of extra-nationalist loyalty, the MSP often oscillates between emphasising and downplaying its ties to the transnational Muslim Brotherhood, as well as broader discourses on the 'global umma.'"

Senior Harakat Al-Bina' Al-Watani officials were keen to press on me the importance of the evolution that their party had undergone and the progress they had made. One of the party's founders, Ahmed Al-Daan, agreed with the view that Bengrina is a populist, but not in the way we know populist leaders to be in other parts of the world. His argument is that Algeria is not just a Muslim majority country; it is "one hundred per cent Muslim." The difference between the two is significant, according to Al-Daan as, unlike Muslims states with large non-Muslim minorities, Algeria is "hundred per cent Muslim" and, therefore, the argument goes, a genuine leader representing the popular will cannot be anything but a Muslim populist.

READ:Egypt, Saudi, UAE, Algeria, Bahrain seek to join BRICS bloc

Al-Daan continued stressing that it was impossible to separate Islam and nation within the context of Algeria. The bond between the three Islam, nation and Algerians was sealed during the long anti-colonial movement. This view of Algeria was powerfully illustrated to us during our pre-arranged trip to the Army Museum. Upon arrival, visitors are greeted by the magnificent and imposing figure of Algeria's most revered leader, Emir Abdelkader. As well as being a major religious figure, he was also a military leader who led the struggle against the French colonial invasion of Algiers. For secular and religious Algerians, the spirit of their nation is embodied in Abdelkader, who epitomised religious virtue and Algeria's struggle for freedom from French colonial rule.

Populism within the Algerian context is not the same as populism in the US, Al-Daan insisted. I had some sympathy for the argument as there is a danger to populism in countries with large minorities, which does not necessarily exist in a homogenous state like Algeria. Like many others in the party I spoke to, Al-Daan stressed the idea of service. "Service to the people, service to the country and service to Islam" was one and the same thing in the eyes of Harakat Al-Bina' Al-Watani loyalists.

Perhaps Algeria a country whose history and struggle against colonialism is unlike any other is a unique case, and our model and categories, including Islamist, secularist and populists, are unsuited for understanding the politics and history of the country. There was a confidence in NCM members in that they did not feel the need to assert the "Islamicness" of their party. It is a given, they would say. What mattered more than anything was giving voice and expression to the people of Algeria and the spirit of their nation. Democracy, they argued, if done properly and is allowed to reflect the will of the people, would preserve the values of Islam in a country that is "One hundred per cent Muslim."

READ:Gaza and the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool for collective punishment

Perhaps Harakat Al-Bina' Al-Watani has found a formula for overcoming the false choice between Islamism and authoritarianism that has plagued the Middle East. Or, maybe, in their embrace of nationalism and their seemingly absolute loyalty to the state, Algerians' second largest Islamist party is playing a dangerous game. In the second chapter of the series, I will look to answer those questions.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

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Algeria: A populist leader challenging our notions of what is possible in the Middle East - Middle East Monitor

The arrest this week of former Pakistan prime minister and cricket legend Imran Khan has triggered nationwide protests targeting military and other institutions, some of which have turned violent.

Pakistans political crisis has worsened significantly since Khan lost a no-confidence motion in parliament and was ousted from power last April. Since then, Khans populist rhetoric has stoked divisions in society, leading to extreme polarisation and the violent reactions weve seen this week.

Khan began sowing these divisions even before he left office. Before his ouster, he had blamed Pakistans one-time close ally, the United States, for conspiring against his government and trying to push him from power.

His party, the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf, has a long history of labelling its political opponents as Western slaves, so this narrative reverberated among his supporters.

Khan then shifted his anger towards the army and its then-chief, General Qamar Bajwa, claiming they were trying to bring down his government.

Khan and the military were once close. Soon after he rose to power in 2018, many of the leaders in his party claimed it was perhaps the first time a civilian government and the military establishment were on the same page in Pakistan.

But the relationship started to fray over the appointment of a new head of Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistans powerful intelligence agency, in 2021. Khan wanted the then-chief of the agency, General Faiz Hameed, to continue in the role, while the military wanted someone else.

Then, last November, Khan survived an assassination attempt at a political rally in Punjab province. A day later, he pointed the finger at three senior government figures as being behind the attack the new prime minister, the interior minister and a senior intelligence official.

The military establishment issued a statement accusing Khan of fabricating the allegations. Khan responded immediately by saying that he stood by his allegations.

While political violence has a long history in Pakistan, it has certainly increased in the wake of Khans populist attacks on the military and other institutions and the political polarisation that has ensued. The new governments pursuit of Khan has also sparked anger among his supporters.

After removing Khans party from power last year, the Pakistan Democratic Alliance an alliance of several other parties, including the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and Pakistan Peoples Party formed a government and immediately began targeting Khan and his party officials in whatever ways possible.

In the so-called Toshakhana case, the government accused Khan and his wife of corruption for illegally keeping gifts given to them by other countries. The case refers to the Toshakhana department in the government responsible for storing expensive gifts given to public officials. Just last week, the Islamabad High Court found the case to be illegal and dismissed it.

Khan has faced a flood of other allegations, however, ranging from corruption to sedition. By some counts, he faces more than 100 cases around the country. There are elements of revenge politics here because Khans government had also targeted rival political leaders through corruption charges when it was in power.

The new government has made several attempts to arrest him in recent months. A small team from the federal police was sent to his house in Lahore in March, but faced heavy resistance from Khan supporters. A popular slogan emerged among Khans supporters: Khan is our red line. It was a warning to the state not to arrest him.

Although the government has tightly controlled the mainstream media, Khans party has reached its supporters through social media to stoke dissent. And despite crackdowns on Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf leaders, party workers and Khan sympathisers for speaking out against the state on social media, the government hasnt been able to control the simmering anger across the country.

This week, Khan was finally arrested on corruption charges related to another case involving the Al-Qadir University Trust. Khan is accused of using state funds to compensate a real estate giant, Malik Riaz, for land that would be used to build a new university called Al-Qadir.

Khans lawyers challenged the legality of the arrest, but the High Court upheld it. Doubts have remained over whether the authorities followed the proper procedures, however, so it was not surprising that Khans supporters reacted the way they have. Within hours of the arrest, party workers and supporters gathered in many major cities and began openly attacking key military buildings.

The headquarters of Pakistans army was attacked by a mob in Rawalpindi, as was the house of a corps commander in Lahore. This is unprecedented the army headquarters have only ever been targeted by terrorists before.

The military was singled out due to Khans earlier allegations the army conspired to oust him from power and also the fact he was arrested by rangers and not the police.

So far, no one knows Khans exact location or whether he is under civilian or military custody. It is very likely the protests will continue and with that, increasing levels of violence until Khan is released.

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How Imran Khan's populism has divided Pakistan and put it on a knife's edge - The Conversation

The departed but mostly unlamented coalition government, the first version of which was pieced together in February 2020 by four parties in a push to unseat Ficos Smer party following eight years of increasing authoritarianism and corruption, certainly wasnt helped by circumstances.

The COVID-19 pandemic hit immediately after it assumed office, helping to unseat the combustible Igor Matovic leader of OlaNO, a ragtag centre-right populist party that surprised everyone by garnering most votes in the election from the prime ministers chair. Russia then unleashed its war in neighbouring Ukraine, followed by an energy crisis and vicious inflation spike.

With Matovic demoted but continuing his provocative behaviour from the seat of the Finance Ministry, the grip of his replacement Heger slipped late last year, when after months of ill-tempered sniping, the SAS coalition party quit the government.

Opposition parties called for a snap election, but the governing parties resisted and delayed the vote to September 30. President Zuzana Caputova allowed Heger to limp on with a minority cabinet.

But having failed to win a vote of confidence in parliament, that cabinet remained precarious. Hence, a corruption scandal around the agriculture minister that flared up late last week swiftly engulfed it, and Heger fell on his sword on Sunday.

Caputova has been quick to name a temporary technocratic replacement. After half a year of waiting in the wings, Ludovit Odor will finally get his chance to govern Slovakia, when his caretaker government is appointed as expected on May 15.

The deputy governor of the central bank had been lined up in the background, ready for such a collapse, since the start of the year. The economist is little known by the public, but has long served in public institutions. His pro-European democratic credentials fit well with Caputovas own outlook.

The president has not yet revealed the rest of her government of the experts, noting only that none of the temporary ministers will seek election in September.

It will be a government of the people, for whom governance will not be an election campaign, the president stated. The members of the new government were chosen according to expertise, so naturally there will be people from both conservative and liberal backgrounds.

That mixed make-up is also a nod to the fact that the cabinet will need to try to secure parliamentary approval within 30 days of its appointment. Should it fail in that, the president must dismiss it, but can ask it to continue in a caretaker capacity.

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Slovakia to Get 'Expert' Government But Return to Populism Looms - Balkan Insight

To overcome populism, generational change must be accelerated by empowering the youth, particularly regarding political participation, Portuguese President Rebelo de Sousa told MEPs in Strasbourg on Wednesday.

Time is pressing, and Europe cannot afford to waste any more time in fulfilling the EUs aims, Rebelo de Sousa told EU lawmakers in Strasbourg.

Commenting on the European Parliament, he said it cannot remain just an abstract idea, one or another working group, revelling in debates on institutional details that have nothing to do with the day-to-day lives of Europeans.

It is only by looking at the medium and long term that the future can be won, he added.

The European Union must thus accelerate the generational change of political actors, increase the participation of young people, the rejuvenation of the political, economic and social systems of member states.

Otherwise, there is a risk of creating voids that will be filled by populism and anti-systemic movements, the president added.

According to the Portuguese president, the European Union must advance in the political, economic-financial and social reforms it advocates to present itself as a global power: National egoisms must give way before the EU [], the world deserves a stronger Europe.

Speaking of the blocs response to Russiasillegal, unjust and immoral invasion of Ukraine, Rebelo de Sousa said the Union has responded with principles, firmness and unity.

Still, the president warned that the EU-27 must continue to show the world that the war in Ukraine is not just a European problem but also a global one.

(Andr Campos Ferro; edited by Cristina Cardoso Lusa.pt, Daniel Eck)

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Portuguese president: empowering youth will be the death of populism - EURACTIV

Ever since the 1987 publication of philosopher Harold Blooms seminal The Closing of the American Mind, theres been a steady stream of books critical of higher education, many with comparable descriptors of the American mind in their title. By 2019, 59 percent of Republicans thought universities were bad for America (Pew Research Center). This is but one measure of the increasingly positive correlation between conservative ideology, populism, and anti-intellectualism.

As a form of anti-establishment politics, populism pits presumably virtuous, united, ordinary folk whose concerns are constantly disregarded against purportedly corrupt, condescending, self-serving elites whose privilege constantly prevails. Populism thereby presents itself as a product of class struggles. Furthermore, it proposes simplistic and divisive solutions to problems that require complex thinking and increased cooperation.

In his 1964 Pulitzer-Prize winning Anti-intellectualism in American Life, historian Richard Hofstadter described anti-intellectualism as the view that intellectualsare pretentious, conceited and snobbish; and very likely immoral, dangerous, and subversive The plain sense of the common [person] is an altogether adequate substitute for, if not actually much superior to, formal knowledge and expertise.

Hofstadter argued that anti-intellectualism was a product of the historical democratization of knowledge. Or as scientist Isaac Asimov put it more curtly, democracy means that my ignorance is just as good as your knowledge, insinuating that all states of mind are equally helpful. Ironically, and problematically, anti-intellectualism then easily reverses into anti-democratic, authoritarian leadership that appeals to emotions instead of knowledge.

In sum, anti-intellectualism is a generalized mistrust of experts and intellectuals, a social attitude that systematically denigrates science-based facts, ivory tower academics, and the pursuit of theory and knowledge, whether it be of the character and consequences of capitalism, climate change, or COVID-19. It clings to fervently held beliefs, despite little or no supporting evidence. Remarkably, social scientific research shows that subjects with high levels of anti-intellectualism actually increase their opposition to expertise when presented with it.

Sociologist Daniel Rigney identified three types of anti-intellectualism. First, unreflective instrumentalism is the belief that pursuing knowledge is unnecessary unless it can be wielded for practical means such as a lucrative career. Second, religious anti-rationalism is the rejection of reason, logic, and scientific facts in favor of experiences, emotions, morals, and religious absolutes, as documented in Christian historian Mark Nolls award-winning The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind. And third, populist anti-elitism is the rejection of authoritative institutions as well as those persons categorized as the social and/or intellectual elite.

Curiously, populists typically view K-12 public education as good and necessary, but post-secondary education as bad and even dangerous, unless it is the commodified credentialling of the professions or business skills provided by universities. They characteristically regard everything else, especially in the humanities and social sciences, as woke ideology while being oblivious to their own unawakened ideology. Hence, they think for themselves and do their own research regardless of how limited or selective it is, or how relatively (un)able they are to evaluate in an informed way what they find online or in print. Their classic exemplar is Benjamin Franklin, the archetypal self-made man who did not need higher education to succeed.

Further survey research conducted by Pew in pre-COVID 2019 revealed that 74 percent of Canadians on the political left trusted scientists to do what was best for the public, compared to 35 percent of Canadians on the right. In America, only 20 percent on the political right trusted science. Moreover, American intellectuals were disproportionately Democratic, whereas anti-intellectuals were disproportionately Republican.

Though some have never trusted science, there has by now been a well-documented decades-long loss of trust in all social institutions, from education to politics, media, religion, family, medicine, and more. This loss of trust combined with the expression of unwarranted factual certitude epistemic hubris is a major contributor to the intemperance and intransigence that plague our society.

Intellectual humility is imperative for both anti-intellectuals and intellectuals. Indeed, while the uneducated can be duped, the educated can be seduced. But by the very nature of their systematic, publicly accountable pursuit of true knowledge, intellectuals are more likely to be willing and able to turn answers into questions, and acknowledge what they do not know. Sadly, the emergence of our post-truth society is some solid evidence that anti-intellectualism has now morphed into anti-rationalism.

Of course, everything Ive written here can be readily dismissed, because, after all, Im just another one of those academic elites yes, a university professor of the social sciences which apparently for populists can alone discredit me.

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LETTER TO THE EDITOR: The anti-intellectualism of conservative ... - Winnipeg Free Press

This is the authentic voice of populism. It is a swingeing attack on what its author, the academic Matthew Goodwin, casts as a small, liberal, university-educated elite who treat everyone else with contempt. And that contempt is clearly reciprocated by Goodwin. He criticises them for, among other things, promoting identity politics (despite this book doing basically the same thing). He sees white, working-class men as the ultimate victims because they are not allowed to express their identity and beliefs when every other group can. Voting Brexit was their reaction to this culture war against them.

Goodwin is right that white, working-class men have had a tough time, but the book is almost entirely about culture wars and lacks any serious account of economic pressures. Manufacturing has shrunk from 25 per cent of GDP in the 1970s to 10 per cent today. Pay has stagnated. There is no way around the pain and anger that those economic changes have created. But what was the cause?

Goodwins answer seems to be the graduate elite, who, apparently, did not care about these sorts of people doing those sorts of jobs. Instead, we embraced hyper globalisationwhat used to be called free trade. That meant the incorporation in the global market of other players, notably India and China, which prompted manufacturing decline. But the UK could not have stopped this on its own. And it is not clear what an attempt to keep those rising economic powers out of an exclusively western trading system would have meant for our peace and prosperity, if we had tried.

These out-of-touch policymakers, who supposedly didnt care about the effects of this change in the global economy, actually put a lot of effort into promoting key manufacturing sectors such as aerospace and automotive, which are, incidentally, heavily located outside the south east of England. Any success was closely related to the single market, which made us the preferred location for reaching the European market. That model has been destroyed by Brexit and there has been a shocking decline in car output partly as a result. So it is not yet clear that Brexit has been in the economic interests of the white working classwhich rather weakens Goodwins claim that the old elite didnt care about these types of jobs, while the new Brexit coalition does.

The book is almost entirely about culture wars and lacks any serious account of economic pressures

This decline in predominantly male manufacturing jobs has occurred alongside the rise of services, which often provide many more opportunities for women. It has undermined the sense of self-worth of some men. It has also weakened families based on the idea of the male breadwinner.

So, again, Goodwin is on to a real cultural phenomenon. Indeed, one of the distinctive beliefs of Brexit voters was that opportunities for women in the jobs market had gone too far. But, also again, it is hard to see how the move of more women into education and then employment could have been stoppedand, of course, whether doing so would have possibly been right.

This was a widespread western trend. It wasnt a plot by an out-of-touch elite. It was accompanied by an intense culture war about the role of men and women. That included wrongheaded attacks on the value of the stable family, but there were also attempts to support families through tax reliefs and other financial measures. There had been rules reinforcing the traditional modelfor example, requiring women to leave professional jobs if they marriedbut sweeping those away was surely right and irreversible. It is hard to see how we could turn back the clock, even if anyone wanted to.

Goodwins alternative, which he sees as the opportunity for the Conservative party, is to be left in economics and right on culture. It is a bracing counterpoint to that clich of dry in economics and wet in social policy, with which I was always slightly uncomfortablenot least because, on its own, it neglects the deep sources of human satisfaction that come from belonging to families and communities. And, very crudely, family breakdown is expensive as the state takes on some of the old financial roles of the male breadwinner.

However, Goodwins specific approach sounds a lot like the 1970s or earlier: it is a reversion to pre-EU Britain. Ironically, in both the UK and US, the traditional cultural values that he espouses are most powerfully expressed by some immigrant groups. That cuts across the hostility to immigration that forms another part of his agenda.

Opposition to immigration is another key tenet of the Brexit coalition, and Goodwin expresses their anger that it is running at such a high level now. He has a telling critique of what is conventionally called the Australian points-based system, by which points are accorded to immigrants labour skills. Calling it Australian brings with it a subtext suggesting that it favours immigration from the white Commonwealth, but the reality, Goodwin points out, is very different: it looks to be leading a surge in migration from Nigeria and the Indian subcontinent. Brexit and the shift to the new system mean that there is no longer any recognition of our close links to our own European neighbourhood. All that matters is levels of skill. Maybe there was a Brexit elite who wanted us to be entirely cosmopolitan and global in our migration priorities, but that may not be what their supporters wanted.

Goodwins specific approach sounds a lot like the 1970s or earlier: it is a reversion to pre-EU Britain

Goodwins new Brexit coalition has other tensions, too. Older people are an important part of it, and Goodwin is explicit about both that and their voting power, but they are heavy recipients of benefits and users of the NHS. Prioritising them pushes up public spending.

To some extent, spending on them can be funded by cutting spending on otherssince 2010, benefits for pensioners have gone up by 666 on top of inflation, whereas benefits for everyone else have been cut by 816 below inflationbut surely there are limits to such intergenerational transfers from young to old. Conservatives could get away with borrowing the money when there were clear crises, such as Covid or energy price rises, but now the long-term cost of a big state for Tory voters has to be confronted. It directly challenges the belief of many Conservatives that they are the party of tax cuts.

Goodwin seems to think that younger people are a lost cause, especially since so many of them now go to university. He believes that there is a widely held, snobbish assumption that graduates are somehow better people than non-graduates; which would certainly be an indefensible viewpoint, though there is no evidence that it is as pervasive as he claims. Besides, it is equally repellent to assume that young, white, working-class men should know their place and not go to university. Indeed, half the time, Goodwins grievance does indeed appear to be that they are not gaining access to this powerful opportunity for social mobility.

If these men do go to university, will they be corrupted by the wilder doctrines of critical race theory and end up voting Labour? That seems to be the fear of many Tories now. Graduates are indeed more likely to be socially tolerant and politically engaged. They are more likely to have voted Remain and are also more sceptical of the state.

Graduates are also, incidentally, more likely to believe fewer people should go to universitya classic example of pulling up the ladder after you. It is non-graduates, the ones who miss out, who are more likely to believe in expanding higher education. And these young non-graduates are not voting Conservative either. The Conservative partys real problem is with young people, whether they went to university or not.

Goodwin is angry on behalf of the white working class. He wants a political programme that offers them more protection from the gales of international economic competition and from the erosion of their socially conservative values.

There is a respectable centre-right tradition that gets all this: it is European Christian Democracy. That is not just what we see now in Italy or Poland, it is also the Catholic strand of European conservatism personified by great figures such as Konrad Adenauer. It is enjoying a revival in Europe and, as an economic policy, could be viable across the EU, with its internal competition but external protections. It is particularly potent if environmentalism is added to the mix.

Perhaps one of the many ironies of Brexit is that it has cut us off from what is probably the best single political and economic opportunity to practise the beliefs that Goodwin himself expounds.

The rest is here:

The populism of Matthew Goodwinand its many problems - Prospect Magazine