Daily Archives: September 17, 2022

On May 8, 1945, the guns in Europe fell silent. Nazi Germany unconditionally surrendered to the victorious allies the United Kingdom, France, the United States and the Soviet Union.

For the moment, there was peace. World War II caused millions of deaths in Europe military and civilian. This included Nazi Germanys systematic effort to effect the Final Solution and kill Jews and others they considered inferior.

The war was over in Europe, but it continued in the Pacific, and the U.S. Army the largest and best-equipped force in the world at the time was sending combat divisions to the war on Japan.

A New Worry

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki meant the end of World War II, but it also signalled the start of a new era and a new worry for the world.

In Europe, the Soviets and the Americans confronted each other from their occupation zones. Germany was divided into four zones, as was Berlin, the German capital that was squarely in the Soviet zone.

The Soviets wanted Germany to be the communist centerpiece of Europe. With Germany a Soviet satellite, dictator Josef Stalin could see western Europe falling under the domination of the USSR.

Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was among the first to warn of the Soviet danger. On March 5, 1946, in Fulton, Missouri, Churchill sounded the warning. From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent, he said. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.

Some dismissed the British statesman. Others heeded him. The Soviet Unions own actions left little doubt of their intentions. The Soviet Union launched a coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, placed a communist government in power in Poland and extended its sway to every Eastern European country it occupied since 1945.

In June 1948, the Soviet imposed a land blockade of Berlin in hopes of starving the Western allies out of Berlin.

A Search for Peace

In response, the allies launched the Berlin Airlift a nonviolent strike back at an aggressor. No country had ever tried to resupply a city by air before, but the Western allies the U.S., the U.K and France succeeded.

This was the backdrop as talks proceeded on the North Atlantic Treaty in early 1949. The clear Soviet provocations created the urgency for collective defense of Western Europe.

The European nations were still clawing their way out of the destruction of WWII, and to be credible, any collective defense agreement had to include the U.S. and Canada. Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the U.K. joined their transatlantic allies in signing the treaty, April 4, 1949, in Washington.

From the beginning, the treaty was a defensive alliance. "By this treaty, we are not only seeking to establish freedom from aggression and from the use of force in the North Atlantic community, but we are also actively striving to promote and preserve peace throughout the world," U.S. President Harry S. Truman said about the North Atlantic Treaty.

The goal was to defend the North Atlantic region. The nations sought to block Soviet expansion into Western Europe. The key to the treaty was and is Article 5. That article states The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.

Deterrence

The treaty put teeth in deterrence in Europe. An attack on West Germany or France would be met by an alliance backed with the tremendous power of the United States military. This served the nations in good stead. The only time the alliance invoked Article 5 was in response to the terror attacks on the United States on Sept. 11, 2001.

The headquarters for the alliance was in France, and the first secretary general was Britains Lord Ismay. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was NATOs first supreme commander in Europe.

The Soviet Union gathered its subject states in Central and Eastern Europe and formed the Warsaw Pact in response to NATO.

Public support for the alliance has ebbed and flowed throughout its history, but internally, the nations were as one in their decisions. In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined the alliance. In 1955, West Germany joined. In 1982, Spain formally joined the alliance.

Testing the Alliance

The Soviets tested NATO in a number of ways. In 1956, the Soviets brutally put down the Hungarian revolution. Thousands of people escaped to the West as Soviet tanks confronted demonstrators in Budapest.

East Germany was bleeding people throughout the 1950s as there was no hard border in the occupied city of Berlin. East Germans could simply walk into West Berlin and freedom. In 1961, the Soviet-backed East German government built the Berlin Wall. It was a time of rising tensions between the superpowers, and Berlin could have been a flashpoint. The wall stopped most of the exodus, but never really sealed off the West from those wishing to escape communist rule.

The Prague Spring of 1968 in Czechoslovakia looked promising. The communist government of the nation looked to give people basic human rights. The Soviets rolled into the city and crushed the nascent renaissance.

In the 1980s, Polish workers looked for more rights and freedoms and those in Gdansk demonstrated against Soviet control.

Through all this, the alliance remained strong. It was more than a military pact; it became a symbol of freedom to the people of Europe and the cornerstone of Americas commitment to freedom on the Continent.

Looking for Freedom

And it worked. On June 12, 1987, President Ronald Reagan gave a speech at the Berlin Wall. He called on Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down this wall. The economic foundations of the Soviet Union and the military ties among the Warsaw Pact nations were already crumbling when Reagan made the speech, and a little more than two years later, the Berlin Wall did come down breached by joyous Germans both East and West. It was followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Many people assumed that, with the fall of the Soviet Union, that the NATO alliance would itself dissolve.

But the alliance adapted. Leaders on the continent saw the need of the organization to maintain peace and to act collectively.

The first case was in the Balkans. When Yugoslavia broke apart, NATO peacekeepers stepped in to maintain peace in an unstable part of the world. Russia provided troops to the NATO effort and worked alongside American forces to keep the peace. There are still NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo today.

And nations that were once under the Soviet boot now sought to join NATO. In March 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO the first former Warsaw Pact nations to do so. They were followed in 2004 by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

In 2009, Albania and Croatia joined, and then Montenegro in 2017. North Macedonia is well on its way to completing the accession process and should join later this year.

Invoking Article 5

In 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 of its founding treaty for the first time. Member nations responded together to the 9/11 attacks in the United States.

The alliance reached out to North African and Middle East nations to strengthen their institutions and help them build conditions where young men would not be driven to extremism.

Today, the NATO nations work together in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The lessons the forces have learned in 70 years of the alliance also serve when nations work together individually in other areas of the world.

In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and occupied two provinces in the small country. NATO protested the illegal occupation.

In 2014, Russia illegally annexed Crimea from Ukraine and continues to provide fighters in Eastern Ukraine, and NATO has met Russian aggression with resolve.

The alliance members still dream of a Europe whole and free as President George H.W. Bush said in 1989.

Continue reading here:
A Short History of NATO - U.S. Department of Defense

NATO stands for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was formed in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II and at the outset of the Cold War.

After the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, Germany was occupied by the victorious Allied powers, inclduing the U.S., U.K., France and the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union blocked Allied access to parts of Berlin in 1948, Germany was split into two separate nations: the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The U.S., Canada and ten European nations responded by signing the North Atlantic Treaty, in response to the perceived threat from the Soviet Union.

Article 5 of the treaty states that NATO members will respond collectively to an attack against any other member. "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all," it reads, according to the official NATO website. Participating countries are not obligated to respond with military force, but can choose to support other members with political, economic or other forms of aid.

"NATO's essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means," the Brussels-based group's website states.

But the group's embrace of military action is unambiguous: "If diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military capacity needed to undertake crisis-management operations."

NATO has also expressed a commitment to "democratic values" and the sharing of resources that will enhance the defense and security of member nations by preventing conflict, according to the U.S. Mission to NATO.

There are currently 30 member states in NATO. The 12 original members from 1949 are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.

According to the organization's website, any European state is able to join the group, providing it further the "principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

In 2004, one year after NATO took command of the coalition of nations fighting in Afghanistan, another set of countries joined: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. In 2009, Albania and Croatia gained membership.

Besides its member nations, NATO has strategic partnerships with other countries through its "Membership Action Plan," which offers assistance and advice to nations seeking membership in NATO. Four countries are currently trying to join NATO through those plans: Georgia, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Montenegro and the Macedonian Republic.

The 30 member states are (with the year they joined).

In 2006 it was agreed that each member state commit 2 per cent of their GDP to defense spending, in order to uphold their treaty obligations towards one another in the event one is attacked. However, very few member states have met this spending level, while the U.S. spends as much as 3.6 per cent on defence, according to Time Magazine (opens in new tab).

The member nations of NATO are represented by a delegation, each with one presiding "permanent representative" who is generally a seasoned diplomat or military officer. These representatives form the North Atlantic Council, the primary administrative body within NATO.

The chair of the North Atlantic Council and the overall director of NATO is the Secretary General, who is appointed by consensus of NATO members. The Secretary General usually serves a term of four years, though that term may be extended.

The leader of NATO's military operations is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who has typically been an American military leader (the Secretary General has typically been a European).

The current NATO Secretary General is Jens Stoltenberg, the former prime minister of Norway and UN Special Envoy, according to the official NATO website.

In the years following the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, NATO's mission has shifted somewhat in response.

In the Balkan conflicts that occurred in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, NATO troops performed their first wartime actions, which included shooting down Bosnian aircraft, bombing campaigns and other airstrikes. NATO forces still maintain a presence of around 3,500 troops in Kosovo.

There was also a NATO response to the Iraqi invasion of neighboring Kuwait in 1991, which triggered the first Gulf War. However this mission, named Operation Anchor Guard, was largely to observe and help support any offensive against member state Turkey.

Following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, NATO troops were called into action to fulfill the group's charter. In 2003, NATO assumed control of military operations in the anti-terrorist occupation of Afghanistan, leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) until Jan 1, 2015.

NATO forces have also been active in anti-piracy efforts off the east coast of Africa, and in the 2011 civil war in Libya.

After the annexation of the Ukrainian region of Crimea by Russia, NATO played a role in managing the diplomatic crisis. Alhough neither Russia nor Ukraine are members of NATO, Russia's president Vladimir Putin did express an interest in joining the alliance, the Guardian reported (opens in new tab). The prospect of Ukraine joining the alliance is strongly opposed by Russia, has been cited as a major cause of the crisis in February 2022, which threatened to begin a war between the two nations, according to the New York Times (opens in new tab).

The U.S. Office of the Historian (opens in new tab) has a thorough history of NATO, while the non-profit institution Brookings has a in-depth article (opens in new tab) on NATO's role in the Bosnian conflict, written by Ivo H. Daalder, a former U.S. Ambassador to NATO.

See the article here:
What is NATO? | Organization, mission and members | Live Science

From 16 to 18 September 2022, the Allied Chiefs of Defence gathered for their annual conference, in Tallinn, Estonia. For the first time, Finland and Sweden attended the Military Committee Conference as NATO Invitees. The agenda reflected the changed security environment as well as the implementation of the decisions taken at the NATO Summit in Madrid, last June.

The NATO Military Committee was welcomed to Tallinn during an official opening ceremony by the President of the Republic of Estonia, His Excellency Alar Karis. In his welcome address, the President highlighting the drastic change in the security environment since Russias invasion of Ukraine and the invaluable reinforcement Allies has provided to NATOs Eastern flank. The Chair of the NATO Military Committee underscored the essential role played by Estonia, especially in the digital domain and when it comes to supporting NATOs digital transformation.

On the morning of the 17th of September, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia Kaja Kallas set the scene for the days meetings. She stressed the importance of broad international support for Ukraine. In his opening remarks, the Chair laid out the agenda and expectations for the conference: Without a doubt: a new era for global security has begun. The entire international rules-based order is under attack. And it is up to the free, democratic nations of the world to protect it. Winter is coming, but our support for Ukraine shall remain unwavering.

The first session allowed the NATO Chiefs of Defence to discuss the implementation the far-reaching decisions on NATOs deterrence and defence posture taken, by the political leadership at NATOs Summit in Madrid as well as the operationalisation of NATOs deter and defend strategy. This strategy makes sure that national plans are more closely interlinked with Alliance plans; military leaders have a common frame of reference for both Alliance wide threats and regional threats; and that we enhance the speed and effectiveness of our rapid deployable forces, underlined Admiral Bauer.

The next meeting was led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Christopher Cavoli, who provided his strategic considerations on NATOs current and future posture on the Eastern flank and across the whole spectrum of the Alliances 360-degree approach to security. In a session dedicated to the future of Armed Forces, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General Philippe Lavigne provided the Chiefs of Defence his insights in promoting cooperation across domains and service branches and enabling digital transformation.

In a session dedicated to promoting diversity in the Armed Forces, the Chiefs of Defence exchanged ideas on how to create a more diverse talent pool in their workforce. Admiral Bauer: This is important in order to increase our effectiveness on the battlefield. And because creating a culture of inclusion is fundamental for the trust between men and women in uniform. Without trust, we cannot function, underscored the Admiral.

Admiral Bauer, Chair of the NATO Military Committee and Lieutenant General Martin Herem, Chief of the Estonian Defence Forces, concluded the conference by briefing the media on the outcomes of the meetings.

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NATO Chiefs of Defence discuss operationalisation of Madrid Summit decisions - NATO HQ

In just the past week, Ukraines military has liberated some 2,400 square miles of territory captured by Russian forces since the war began in February. These gainsthe most tangible turning point in the war so farare in part due to prolific support from NATO, the military alliance between 28 European countries plus Canada and the United States.

NATOs support, however, raises several questions. How long can these 30 democracieseach with their own internal domestic concerns and economic pressurescontinue to arm and assist Ukraine? How can NATO continue to repel Russian cyberattacks and other threats? And in the longer term, in light of the meeting this week between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, how does NATO prepare for a growing challenge from Beijing?

I put those questions, among others, to NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, who has headed the alliance since 2014 and was previously prime minister of Norway. Subscribers can watch the complete 30-minute FP Live discussion on video by clicking here. What follows is a condensed and edited transcript.

In just the past week, Ukraines military has liberated some 2,400 square miles of territory captured by Russian forces since the war began in February. These gainsthe most tangible turning point in the war so farare in part due to prolific support from NATO, the military alliance between 28 European countries plus Canada and the United States.

NATOs support, however, raises several questions. How long can these 30 democracieseach with their own internal domestic concerns and economic pressurescontinue to arm and assist Ukraine? How can NATO continue to repel Russian cyberattacks and other threats? And in the longer term, in light of the meeting this week between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, how does NATO prepare for a growing challenge from Beijing?

I put those questions, among others, to NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, who has headed the alliance since 2014 and was previously prime minister of Norway. Subscribers can watch the complete 30-minute FP Live discussion on video by clicking here. What follows is a condensed and edited transcript.

Foreign Policy: Lets start with the news from the last week. What do Ukraines recent territorial gains mean for the trajectory of the conflict in the coming weeks and months?

Jens Stoltenberg: The gains the Ukrainians have made over the last weeks are extremely encouraging because it proves that Ukraine has the capability to liberate occupied territory. This is a great recognition of the strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forcesof their courage, their bravery, their skills, and their determination. It has boosted morale throughout Ukraine. Of course, these advances are not only due to their own courage but also the fact that NATOs allies and partners have provided unprecedented support with ammunition, weapons, and different capabilities over months. This is now making a difference on the battlefield every day. At the same time, we need to realize that the war is not over. Russia still controls roughly 20 percent of Ukraines territory, and Russia still has substantial military powers. Moscow can mobilize even more. We need to continue to provide support to Ukraine and be prepared for the long haul.

FP: Indeed. But the war began in February. Ukraines recent gains beg the question: Why did it take so long to supply Kyiv with rocket launcher systems?

JS: I think we need to realize that all wars are very unpredictable. We were very precise in predicting the invasion. When the invasion happened, we reacted immediately. After the invasion, we further increased our presence with more troops and also with more naval and air power to send a clear message to Russia that we are there to protect every inch of NATOs territory and enable NATOs allies to do what they do to provide support to Ukraine. The type of capabilities and weapons we are delivering has been evolving. Our allies have stepped up and are doing more.

FP: Given the level of involvement among NATOs allies in this war, is there a sense of regret that perhaps Ukraine could have been admitted into NATO a year ago or two years ago to prevent this war from happening?

JS: NATOs alliance of democracies makes decisions by consensus. All our allies need to agree. And we made a decision that Ukraine will become a member of NATO back in 2008. But allies have had different views on when Ukraine should become a member. And what we have agreed on is the need to support and help Ukraine, and NATO allies have supported and helped since 2014. NATO helped to modernize the Ukrainian Armed Forces so that their armed forces are much bigger, much stronger, much better equipped, much better trained. And so the focus now is on enabling the Ukrainians to defend themselves. The issue of NATO membership is something we need to address when we are in a more stable situation.

FP: NATO is heavily reliant on American support. And given thats the case, I have to ask, how worried are you about a win for Republican candidates backed by former U.S. President Donald Trump in the upcoming midterm elections?

JS: Its not for NATO or for me to go into domestic discussions on elections in different countries. But Im confident that all NATO allies, including the United States, are ready to continue to provide support to Ukraine. This is a moral responsibility, but its also about our own security interests because if we allow Putin to win in Ukraine, its not only bad for Ukrainians but the security of all their allies will be worse off. Thats dangerous for all of us.

FP: My question was more hypothetical. Were America to reduce its levels of support, would that be damaging for NATOs support of Ukraine right now?

JS: Yes, of course, because the United States is so important. A reduction of U.S. support will be very negative for the efforts of all of us to provide support to Ukraine and to uphold or to prevent Putin from winning.

FP: Theres a school of thought that goes that Putin is essentially betting that he can wait Europe out. Winter will be tough, gas prices will rise, and so on. What other cards do you expect Putin to play over the next several months to regain control of the war? What are you preparing for?

JS: We are monitoring very closely Russias behavior, especially when it comes to those countries in Europe which are not NATO members but close partners, such as Georgia, Moldova, and some of the Western Balkan countries. At the same time, I think we also have to recognize that with more than 80 percent of Russias land forces now committed to the operation in Ukraine, they have limited scope for going into another country. What we have to be prepared for is more Russian cyberattacks, disinformation, and other ways of trying to undermine the unity of NATO and our partners.

FP: NATO named China as a strategic threat for the first time this year. Can you explain why? There are critics who will say that this designation benefited America much more than it did European countries. Is that right?

JS: China is a challenge to our values, to our security, and to our interests. But at the same time, we are ready to engage with China on issues of common interestfor instance, arms control and climate change. But you are right that the fact that NATO is addressing China in its documents is something new. We didnt do that before, but that reflects that the global balance of power is shifting. Chinas economic and military strength is important for the whole allianceand also for Europe.

FP: Doesnt that change the nature of what NATO was founded for? How would European members of NATO react to, for example, Chinese aggression on Taiwan, then? Could NATOs Article 5 get triggered outside of the European theater?

JS: It doesnt change the fundamental purpose of NATO, which is to preserve peace through collective defense and through security guarantees. An attack on one NATO ally will be regarded as an attack on the whole alliance. And by doing that, we are preventing any attack on NATO allies. NATOs there not to provoke a conflict but to prevent the conflict by having constant support and credible deterrence and defense.

But, of course, we do these things in a different world than we did when NATO was founded in 1949 and throughout the Cold War. NATOs been on the forefront in the fight against terrorism that has led to NATOs presence in Asia, in Afghanistan. Its nothing new. What is new is the security reality we have to take into account as an alliance is China. They are investing heavily in new modern military capabilities. They will most likely soon have a thousand nuclear weapons. Advanced weapons. They are modernizing their army. And Chinas coming closer to us. We see them in the Arctic, in Africa. We see them trying to control critical infrastructure. NATO remains an alliance of North America and Europe, but to protect this region, we need to face global threats and challenges. And China is a challenge to our security.

FP: Circling back to the war at hand, is there a concern that NATO allies are running out of military equipment and munitions to send into Ukraine? And if that is a concern, whats your plan for backfilling militaries to make up for all the material thats been sent in over the past six months?

JS: There was an urgent need to provide support to Ukraine. And allies have done that in a way we had never seen before. This is now key to the progress Ukraine is making on the battlefield. The only way to do that was to reduce existing stocks. But, of course, those stocks need to be replenished. NATO is now working closely with the defense industry to ramp up production to enable us to continue to provide support to Ukrainebut also to replenish stocks. Yes, we are focused on that.

FP: There are several different ideas for what NATO could become, as our columnist Stephen M. Walt has written. It could keep on keeping on as is, Europe could take on more responsibility, or the alliance could focus more on the Asia-Pacific region. What is your assessment of the best model for what NATO should become in the future?

JS: NATO is the most successful alliance in history because of two things. First, our unity, the fact that we have been able to bring Europe and North America together. If we are divided, we are weak and vulnerable, and there are a lot of risks that we are not able to face alone. But we are able to face them together. Together, we represent 50 percent of the worlds military might. I dont believe in Europe alone. I believe in Europe and North America together.

The second reason why we are the most successful alliance in history is our ability to change when the world changes. For 40 years, we deterred the Soviet Union. Then the Cold War ended, and we addressed other threats and challenges: the Western Balkans, the fight against terrorism, cyber, all the other threats and challenges that have evolved over the last years. We will remain an alliance of North America and Europe, but we need to take into account the fact that China might disrupt security. And that is reflected in the decisions we made at NATOs Madrid summit.

See more here:
NATO's Jens Stoltenberg on Russia's War in Ukraine and China's Rise - Foreign Policy

Banners displaying the NATO logo are placed at the entrance of new NATO headquarters during the move to the new building, in Brussels, Belgium April 19, 2018. REUTERS/Yves Herman/File Photo

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MOSCOW, Sept 14 (Reuters) - The Kremlin said on Wednesday that Ukraine's ongoing ambitions to join the Western NATO military alliance presented a threat to Russia's security and highlighted the necessity for Russia to conduct what it calls a "special military operation" in Ukraine.

Moscow was responding to the publication of a draft set of security guarantees by President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's office on Tuesday that outlined Ukraine's "aspiration to join NATO and benefit from its mutual defence arrangements".

In a conference call with reporters, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia viewed the document negatively, saying the idea of Ukraine joining NATO was "the main threat to Russia":

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"It once again emphasises the relevance and urgent need for us to ensure our own security and our own national interests."

Before Russia sent its armed forces into Ukraine in February, Moscow was demanding legally binding guarantees that Ukraine would never be admitted to the U.S.-led transatlantic defence alliance.

Kyiv and the West say Moscow used this as a pretext, among others, to launch a pre-planned military campaign against Ukraine.

The nine-page document published on Tuesday, a package of recommendations on "international security guarantees for Ukraine", was prepared by former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Andriy Yermak, the head of Zelenskiy's presidential administration.

On Tuesday, Zelenskiy said the package - which called for Western countries to provide "political, financial, military and diplomatic resources" to boost Kyiv's ability to defend itself in the years before it joins the NATO alliance - should form the basis of a new security settlement for Ukraine.

The proposal triggered outrage in Moscow, which saw it as reinforcing Kyiv's determination to join NATO and a strategy that could pave the way for the deployment of more Western weaponry near its borders.

Peskov on Wednesday also criticised Kyiv's use of Western support to guarantee its security, saying Zelenskiy could boost Ukraine's security by giving in to unspecified Russian demands right away.

"The leadership of Ukraine must take actions that eliminate the threat to Russia, and they know perfectly well what those actions must be," he said, without providing details.

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Reporting by Reuters; Editing by Kevin Liffey and Tomasz Janowski

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Kremlin says Ukraine's NATO ambitions remain a threat to Russia - Reuters

In a world of constant change, the endurance of the trans-Atlantic partnership stands out. NATO is older than I am, and Im no youngster. It has been around even longer than Queen Elizabeth II reigned in Britain. Its original rationaleto keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans downis less relevant than it used to be (Russias war in Ukraine notwithstanding), yet it still commands reflexive reverence on both sides of the Atlantic. If youre an aspiring policy wonk hoping to make your mark in Washington, Berlin, Paris, London, etc., learning to praise NATOs enduring virtues is still the smart career move.

This longevity is especially remarkable when one considers how much has changed since NATO was formed and the idea of a trans-Atlantic community began to take shape. The Warsaw Pact is gone, and the Soviet Union has collapsed. The United States has spent 20-plus years fighting costly and unsuccessful wars in the greater Middle East. China has risen from an impoverished nation with little global clout to the worlds second-most-powerful country, and its leaders aspire to an even greater global role in the future. Europe itself has experienced profound shifts as well: changing demographics, repeated economic crises, civil wars in the Balkans, and, in 2022, a destructive war that seems likely to continue for some time.

To be sure, the trans-Atlantic partnership hasnt been entirely static. NATO has added new members throughout its history, beginning with Greece and Turkey in 1952, followed by Spain in 1982, then a flurry of former Soviet allies beginning in 1999, and most recently Sweden and Finland. The distribution of burdens within the alliance has fluctuated as well, with most of Europe cutting their defense contributions drastically after the end of the Cold War. NATO has also gone through various doctrinal shifts, some of them more consequential than others.

In a world of constant change, the endurance of the trans-Atlantic partnership stands out. NATO is older than I am, and Im no youngster. It has been around even longer than Queen Elizabeth II reigned in Britain. Its original rationaleto keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans downis less relevant than it used to be (Russias war in Ukraine notwithstanding), yet it still commands reflexive reverence on both sides of the Atlantic. If youre an aspiring policy wonk hoping to make your mark in Washington, Berlin, Paris, London, etc., learning to praise NATOs enduring virtues is still the smart career move.

This longevity is especially remarkable when one considers how much has changed since NATO was formed and the idea of a trans-Atlantic community began to take shape. The Warsaw Pact is gone, and the Soviet Union has collapsed. The United States has spent 20-plus years fighting costly and unsuccessful wars in the greater Middle East. China has risen from an impoverished nation with little global clout to the worlds second-most-powerful country, and its leaders aspire to an even greater global role in the future. Europe itself has experienced profound shifts as well: changing demographics, repeated economic crises, civil wars in the Balkans, and, in 2022, a destructive war that seems likely to continue for some time.

To be sure, the trans-Atlantic partnership hasnt been entirely static. NATO has added new members throughout its history, beginning with Greece and Turkey in 1952, followed by Spain in 1982, then a flurry of former Soviet allies beginning in 1999, and most recently Sweden and Finland. The distribution of burdens within the alliance has fluctuated as well, with most of Europe cutting their defense contributions drastically after the end of the Cold War. NATO has also gone through various doctrinal shifts, some of them more consequential than others.

It is therefore worth asking what form the trans-Atlantic partnership should take in the future. How should it define its mission and distribute its responsibilities? As with a mutual fund, past success is no guarantee of future performance, which is why smart portfolio managers seeking the best returns will adjust a funds assets as conditions change. Given past changes, current events, and likely future circumstances, what broad vision should shape the trans-Atlantic partnership in the future, assuming it continues to exist at all?

I can think of at least four distinct models going forward.

Model 1: Business as Usual

One obvious approachand given bureaucratic rigidity and political caution, perhaps the most likely oneis to keep the present arrangements more or less intact and change as little as possible. In this model, NATO would remain primarily focused on European security (as the phrase North Atlantic in its name implies). The United States would remain Europes first responder and unchallenged alliance leader, as it has been during the Ukraine crisis. Burden-sharing would still be skewed: Americas military capabilities would continue to dwarf Europes military forces, and the U.S. nuclear umbrella would still cover the other members of the alliance. Out-of-area mission would be deemphasized in favor of a renewed focus on Europe itself, a decision that makes sense in light of the disappointing results of NATOs past adventures in Afghanistan, Libya, and the Balkans.

To be fair, this model has some obvious virtues. Its familiar, and it keeps Europes American pacifier in place. European states wont have to worry about conflicts arising between them as long as Uncle Sam is still there to blow the whistle and break up quarrels. European governments that dont want to trim their generous welfare states to pay the costs of rearmament will be happy to let Uncle Sam bear a disproportionate share of the burden, and countries closest to Russia will be especially desirous of a strong U.S. security guarantee. Having a clear alliance leader with disproportionate capabilities will facilitate more rapid and consistent decision-making within what might otherwise be an unwieldly coalition. Thus, there are good reasons why die-hard Atlanticists sound the alarm whenever someone proposes tampering with this formula.

Yet the business-as-usual model has some serious downsides as well. The most obvious is opportunity cost: keeping the United States as Europes first responder makes it hard for the Washington to devote sufficient time, attention, and resources to Asia, where threats to the balance of power are significantly greater and the diplomatic environment is especially complicated. A strong U.S. commitment to Europe may dampen certain potential causes of conflict there, but it didnt prevent the Balkan wars in the 1990s, and the U.S.-led effort to bring Ukraine into the Western security orbit helped provoke the current war. This is not what anyone in the West intended, of course, but results are what matters. Ukraines recent successes on the battlefield are extremely gratifying, and I hope they continue, but it would have been far better for all concerned had the war not occurred at all.

Moreover, the business-as-usual model encourages Europe to remain dependent on European protection and contributes to a general complacency and lack of realism in the conduct of European foreign policy. If youre confident the worlds mightiest power will leap to your side as soon as trouble starts, its easier to ignore the risks of being overly dependent on foreign energy supplies and overly tolerant of creeping authoritarianism closer to home. And though hardly anybody wants to admit this, this model has the potential to drag the United States into peripheral conflicts that may not always be vital to the security or prosperity of the United States itself. At the very least, business as usual is no longer an approach we should endorse uncritically.

Model 2: Democracy International

A second model for trans-Atlantic security cooperation highlights the shared democratic character of (most of) NATOs members and the growing divide between democracies and autocracies (and especially Russia and China). This vision lies behind the Biden administrations efforts to emphasize shared democratic values and its openly stated desire to prove that democracy can still outperform autocracy on the global stage. Former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussens Alliance of Democracies Foundation reflects a similar conception.

Unlike the business-as-usual model, which is focused primarily on European security, this conception of the trans-Atlantic partnership embraces a broader global agenda. It conceives of contemporary world politics as an ideological contest between democracy and autocracy and believes this struggle must be waged on a global scale. If the United States is pivoting to Asia, then its European partners need to do so as well, but for the broader purpose of defending and promotive democratic systems. Consistent with that vision, Germanys new Indo-Pacific strategy calls for strengthening ties with that regions democracies, and the German defense minister recently announced an expanded naval presence there in 2024 as well.

This vision has the merit of simplicitydemocracy good, autocracy badbut its flaws far outweigh its virtues. For starters, such a framework will inevitably complicate relations with autocracies that the United States and/or Europe have chosen to support (such as Saudi Arabia or the other Gulf monarchies, or potential Asian partners such as Vietnam), and expose the trans-Atlantic partnership to a charge of rampant hypocrisy. Second, dividing the world into friendly democracies and hostile dictatorships is bound to reinforce ties among the latter and discourage the former from playing divide-and-rule. From this perspective, we should be glad that then-U.S. President Richard Nixon and his advisor Henry Kissinger did not adopt this framework in 1971, when their rapprochement with Maoist China gave the Kremlin a new headache to worry about.

Finally, putting democratic values front and center risks turning the trans-Atlantic partnership into a crusading organization seeking to plant democracy wherever it can. However desirable that goal might be in the abstract, the past 30 years should show that no member of the alliance knows how to do this effectively. Exporting democracy is exceedingly hard to do and usually fails, especially when outsiders try to impose it by force. And given the parlous state of democracy in some of NATOs current members, to adopt this as the alliances primary raison dtre seems quixotic in the extreme.

Model 3: Going Global vs. China

Model 3 is a close cousin of Model 2, but instead of organizing trans-Atlantic relations around democracy and other liberal values, it seeks to enlist Europe in the broader U.S. effort to contain a rising China. In effect, it seeks to unite Americas multilateral European partners with the bilateral hub-and-spoke arrangements that already exist in Asia, and bring Europes power potential to bear against the only serious peer competitor that the United States is likely to face for many years to come.

At first glance, this is an appealing vision, and one could point to the AUKUS agreement between the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia as an early manifestation of it. As Michael Mazarr of the Rand Corp. recently observed, there is growing evidence that Europe no longer views China as simply a lucrative market and valuable investment partner, and is beginning to soft balance against it. From a purely American perspective, it would be highly desirable to have Europes economic and military potential lined up against its primary challenger.

But there are two obvious problems with this model. First, states balance not against power alone but against threats, and geography plays a critical role in those assessments. China may be increasingly powerful and ambitious, but its army is not going to march across Asia and strike at Europe, and its navy isnt going to sail around the world and blockade European ports. Russia is far weaker than China but a whole lot closer, and its recent behavior is worrisome even if its actions have unwittingly revealed its military limitations. One should therefore expect the softest of soft balancing from Europe and not a serious effort to counter Chinas capabilities.

NATOs European members do not have the military capacity to affect the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region in any significant way, and they are unlikely to acquire it any time soon. The war in Ukraine may lead European states to get serious about rebuilding their military forcesfinallybut most of their efforts will go to acquiring ground, air, and surveillance capabilities designed to defend against and deter Russia. That makes good sense from Europes perspective, but most of these forces would be irrelevant to any conflict involving China. Sending a few German frigates to the Indo-Pacific region may be a nice way to signal Germanys stated interest in the evolving security environment there, but it is not going to alter the regional balance of power or make much difference in Chinas calculations.

Europe can help balance China in other ways, of coursehelping train foreign military forces, selling weapons, participating in regional security forums, etc.and the United States should welcome such efforts. But nobody should count on Europe to do much hard balancing in the Indo-Pacific theater. Trying to put this model into place is a recipe for disappointment and increased trans-Atlantic rancor.

Model 4: A New Division of Labor

You knew this was coming: the model I think is the right one. As Ive argued before (including most recently here in Foreign Policy), the optimal future model for the trans-Atlantic partnership is a new division of labor, with Europe taking primary responsibility for its own security and the United States devoting much greater attention to the Indo-Pacific region. The United States would remain a formal member of NATO, but instead of being Europes first responder, it would become its ally of last resort. Henceforth, the United States would plan to go back onshore in Europe only if the regional balance of power eroded dramatically, but not otherwise.

This model cannot be implemented overnight and should be negotiated in a cooperative spirit, with the United States helping its European partners design and acquire the capabilities they need. Because many of these states will do everything in their power to convince Uncle Sam to stay, however, Washington will have to make it crystal clear that this is the only model it will support going forward. Unless and until NATOs European members really believe they are going to be mostly on their own, their resolve to take the necessary steps will remain fragile, and backsliding on their pledges is to be expected.

Unlike Donald Trump, whose bluster and bombast during his time as U.S. president annoyed allies to no good purpose, his successor Joe Biden is in an ideal position to start this process. He has a well-earned reputation as a dedicated Atlanticist, so pushing for a new division of labor wouldnt be seen as a sign of resentment or pique. He and his team are uniquely positioned to tell our European partners that this step is in everyones long-term interest. Mind you, I dont really expect Biden & Co. to take this stepfor reasons Ive explained elsewherebut they should.

See the article here:
What Kind of NATO Do Europe and the United States Need? - Foreign Policy

Listen also to our podcast episode on the same topic!

Sometimes protocol can expose power politics in its rawest form. Upon his arrival in Samarkand for this weeks Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, Chinese leader Xi Jinping was honoured with a welcome from Uzbek president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev. But when Russian president Vladmir Putin arrived he had to make do with the prime minister. So, even before the summit began in earnest, clues had emerged about which of these two big hitters wields the greater influence in the SCO. It perhaps heralded the difficulties Putin would encounter in framing the organisation as an anti-Western alliance even with the presence of incoming member Iran and dialogue partner Turkey.

The SCO began life as the Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan) an informal gathering to deal with border security issues between China and its post-Soviet neighbours. In June 2001, the founding members took the decision to transform the group into a formal organisation, with a focus on fighting terrorism and religious extremism. This, in turn, conferred it an international legitimacy in the aftermath of 9/11, while allowing each of its members to address homegrown movements (such as Chechen and Uyghur organisations, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or the Tajik Islamic Renaissance Party). With the successive enlargement of the organisation, the topics it addressed extended to infrastructure and economic development, turning it into a forum for political exchange between Russia, China, and their common neighbours in central and southern Asia. Now, members of the organisation four of which are nuclear powers represent 44 per cent of the worlds population.

Recently, Russia has sought to frame the SCO as a sort of anti-NATO. It has pushed for a reinforcement of the organisations military dimension, proposing a joint military exercise on Russian soil next year. Moscow sees the SCO as the core of a China- and Russia-led anti-Western bloc. That Putin invited Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan to attend a summit that Russia was not even organising speaks volumes about the active role it intends to play in the organisation. At the same time, the fact that two of the SCO founding members Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan experienced violent border clashes on the day of the summit illustrates the limited capacities of the organisation to foster collective security in the region.

Recently, Russia has sought to frame the SCO as a sort of anti-NATO.

Other summit participants, however, may be uncomfortable with Russias vision. The Uzbek organisers made it clear that they did not want the summit to turn into an anti-Western gathering, while Kazakhstani officials have repeatedly expressed their refusal to support Russias war against Ukraine. In their interactions, both countries leaders steer away from global geopolitical issues, preferring to focus on regional projects plans in which Russia, for its part, is far being pivotal. Rather, they involve mostly Chinese and Turkish investments in infrastructure that will actually allow Central Asian countries to circumvent Russia and diversify their export routes.

As for Turkey, President Tayyip Erdogan was the only NATO leader at the SCO meeting in Samarkand. From his perspective, this will kill two birds with one stone.

Ankaras main goal is to appease Moscow. Turkey has grown economically and politically closer to Russia over the past few years, even purchasing Russian S-400 defence systems which prompted US sanctions. Erdogan and Putin get along well; they may stand on opposite sides of various conflicts, but they seem united in their belief that a handshake between strongmen delivers a better international order than the liberal one.

In recent months, Ankara has also grown economically dependent on Moscow to provide the money necessary to prevent a balance of payments crisis before the Turkish elections in 2023. In light of this, Turkey has unsurprisingly not joined the Western-led economic sanctions on Russia. Ankaras commercial relationship with Moscow from natural gas to trade is significant for the formers balance sheets. The Turkish economy is in a perilous state, mainly due to mismanagement and Erdogans adamant pursuit of his own economic theories.But, since the beginning of the year, more than $20 billion of unknown origin serendipitously appeared on Turkeys balance sheets. Turkish economists assume much of this has come from Moscow, including an upfront payment by Russias state atomic energy company, Rosatom which is building Turkeys first nuclear power plant.For now, therefore, despite Turkeys drone sales to Ukraine, Erdogans economic and political survival may depend on Putin.

But Erdogans appearance at the summit also serves a purpose in Turkeys relations with the West as a signal that Turkey has options. Turkeys dialogue partnership with the SCO sends just about the right message: Ankara is no longer a loyal transatlanticist and wants a non-aligned foreign policy, with a foot in each camp. For Erdogans government, this provides Turkey with the leverage to maximise its influence in the region and pursue its geopolitical goals.

This SCO meeting is a golden moment for Tehran. More than a decade after it applied to join, Iran has signed a memorandum to fulfil obligations to become a full member which it expects to do by 2023. Rumours have swirled for years that Moscow and Beijing were blocking the Iranian SCO application, in large part because they sought to protect themselves and the organisation from tensions between the Washington and Tehran. Prior to the 2015 nuclear deal, China justified denying Iran membership due to the latters Irans status as a sanctioned country under the UN Security Council.

Now, at a time of geopolitical tensions between east and west, the political optics are advantageous for Tehran. China and Russia who like Iran now face increasing Western isolation and sanctions are looking to grow the club of countries pushing to establish a multipolar world, and a less powerful United States.

Just days before the UN General Assembly, Iran is seeking to use SCO participation to show the West that it has options in this multipolar world order. Talks between Iran, the US, and European states on restoring 2015 nuclear deal have once again hit an impasse. Iran can therefore demonstrate that it is not beholden to a deal with the US and can instead cooperate more intensely with China and Russia to build immunity against Western sanctions and pressures. In turn, SCO membership will provide Iran with an insurance policy in case of a showdown at the UN Security Council over the talks where Tehran would be banking on Moscow and Beijing to thwart attempts at renewed sanctions.

However, the SCO is unlikely to remedy Irans biggest problems so long as US sanctions linger and tensions with Washington remain. The big economic player in the SCO club is China. And the two sides have likely hit the ceiling of trade mostly comprising Iranian oil exports that is possible, given US secondary sanctions and while Beijing remains mindful of their repercussions. It is unlikely that other major economies in the SCO, such as India, will be willing to risk coming under US sanctions by boosting economic trade and investment with Iran.

On the security front, if the nuclear talks collapse, Iran will face growing escalation with Israel and possibly with the US. Under these circumstances, it is hard to imagine the SCO stepping in to protect Iran: the organisation does not have a NATO-style collective security arrangement and has remained largely passive in recent conflicts which is in part because SCO decisions require consensus. Chinas and Russias responses to recent Israeli attacks against Iran indicate that political outreach with the former would be the extent of their support. Finally, the SCO has also balanced Irans membership by inviting Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to become dialogue partners.

In short, the SCO brings Iran a degree of prestige and political cover, but does little to advance its core economic and security priorities.

This summit is the first time Xi has travelled outside China since the start of the covid-19 pandemic. But, ahead of the Chinese Communist Party congress next month, the president has grasped the opportunity to reassure his friends and foes inside and outside China that he is firmly in control and that his diplomatic self-isolation has not resulted in Chinas absence from the world stage. Quite the contrary, in fact: Chinas power and global heft have only grown.

His appearance at the summit reaffirms Chinas partnership with Russia at this crucial time. But it also reasserts Chinese interests in central Asia, and even more importantly sends a message to the rest of the world. Earlier this year, NATO leaders condemned China as a threat to global order. The G7, moreover, issued a statement warning China against further escalation in the Taiwan Strait. This SCO meeting is the embodiment of a counter-narrative. It is a version of multilateralism, but one squarely within Beijings and Moscows comfort zone. For example, Xi has conceded just enough in Chinas lingering border dispute with India that Narendra Modi is in attendance in Samarkand. In this way, he is providing substance to Chinas claims that the West invoking the international community for its causes rings increasingly hollow. China has created an alternative multilateral reality, which is not entirely anti-Western, not fully anti-democratic, but most importantly at a time of growing system rivalry is certainly not anti-Chinese.

On the eve of the summit, alongside the border clashes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, two other SCO members Armenia and Azerbaijan were on the verge of another war. Against this backdrop, it seems highly unlikely that an organisation which includes long-time foes such as India and Pakistan or China and India will become a closer security alliance or even manage to settle its own internal conflicts.

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

Excerpt from:
Rogue NATO: The new face of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation - European Council on Foreign Relations

Over the past decade, we have witnessed the global proliferation of military cyber commands. As militaries try to build up an operational cyber capacity, they are looking for opportunities to share the burden and cooperate in this new domain of warfare.

But certain kinds of cooperation are more difficult in the cyber realm. It turns out that transferring cyber arms, while technically easy, is actually a lot more complicated than delivering conventional weapons.

Selling fighter jets to an ally doesnt make the planes in your own fleet dramatically less effective. But when an exploit or tool is shared with a country and then used, its usefulness is reduced for everyone. This means that governments are more likely to help other states develop their own offensive capabilities by providing the expertise to find exploits, develop tools, and innovate themselves. This can include providing technical training and selling cyber training facilities. But an advanced cyber power would only consider this type of transfer with countries it is particularly close to.

This explains NATOs operationalization of the cyber domain: the alliance actively promotes exercises and training. But it calls on its member states to volunteer sovereign cyber effects instead of sharing capabilities.

Rivalrous Goods

When it comes to conventional capabilities, arms-producing countries generally transfer either finished systems or the basic engineering know-how used to reproduce existing weapon technology. These relatively straightforward transfers are well suited for bolstering the suppliers defense industry, strengthening political ties, and consolidating alliances. The seller is less likely to engage in transfers that help to adapt weapon technology or provide the capacity to innovate at the technological frontier. Innovation involves greater financial barriers and potential socio-cultural obstacles. Plus, there is little financial logic. Helping buyers build their own weapons risks reducing sales and, potentially, the security of the arms supplier.

But this logic works differently in cyberspace. To understand why, consider two key elements of a militarys offensive cyber capability: exploits and tools. Exploits involve code that takes advantage of software or hardware vulnerabilities to gain and maintain or increase access to target networks. Tools are sets of code used to create, debug, maintain, or otherwise support programs or applications. Like most digital goods, the opportunity to transfer tools and exploits is readily available, as they can be effortlessly replicated and shared just as easily as any other file on your computer. This is what economists call jointness of supply, which results in a situation in which the cost of supplying a good to the first user is the same, or nearly the same, as supplying it to many users.

Yet, states are less willing to share these assets because exploits and tools are also transitory in naturethey have a short shelf life. An assets transitoriness is not static; it is influenced by a number of factors. For example, all things being equal, an exploit used in an operation that causes a high level of visible damage is more likely to be discovered than one used in an espionage operation. Similarly, a tool is more likely to be detected and reported when used against a more technologically sophisticated country.

The number of targets matters as well. Even if an exploit is potentially effective against a wide set of systems or networks, an attacker can decide to use it against only a few high-value targets to reduce the chances of discovery and increase its longevity. The transitory nature of exploits and tools turns them into what economists call rivalrous goods. A good is said to be rivalrous if consumption by one user prevents or weakens consumption by another user. If I share my exploit with you, and you use it, there is an increased likelihood that I am no longer able to use it afterward.

Attribution dynamics may further complicate the incentives at play. If a state decides to share malicious code or its techniques for using it, this may increase the likelihood of misattribution following use by another state. Most of the time, this creates another cause for concern when sharing customized tools. In certain circumstances, however, it could also be an advantage, creating ambiguity and making it harder for the target to retaliate.

Writers have frequently pointed out the operational similarities between cyber espionage operations and cyber effect operations. Yet the incentives for sharing espionage and surveillance tools are significantly higher. Cyber effect operationsthose that seek to disrupt, deny, degrade, and/or destroyare more likely to lead to the detection and disclosure of exploits and tools. Whats more, intelligence cooperation comes with a stronger deconfliction imperative: to prolong covert collection, allies want to avoid having two or more different malware platforms running on the same target system. Finally, in the case of espionage capabilities, the supplying state can more easily piggyback on the purchasing states intelligence-collection activities, thereby benefitting directly from the cooperation.

Stronger incentives also exist for states to help their allies and partners develop their own military cyber capabilities. This can be done in a number of different ways, including setting up testing facilities and training personnel. For example, finding unknown vulnerabilities is often done through a dynamic process called fuzzing, which involves automatically inputting massive amounts of data, called fuzz, to uncover potential vulnerabilities. A state actor with a more mature capability can offer a training course for foreign analysts to help them better use this technique to search for software vulnerabilities. However, an advanced cyber power would only consider this type of transfer with governments it trusts. In 2016, for example, the French-based company Thales Group built the cyber range of the Dutch Defence Cyber Command, which can be used to simulate cyber incidents and test cyber tactics and techniques.

NATO Sovereign Cyber Effects

These dynamics play out even in an alliance as close as NATO. There are several NATO-affiliated programs that focus on training and infrastructure development. For example, the NATO Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) has, since 2012, organized the annual Locked Shields exercise, which is aimed at enabling cyber security experts to enhance their skills in defending national IT systems and critical infrastructure under real-time attacks.In 2019, Locked Shields had over 1000 participants and over twenty-three blue teams. The center also organizes Crossed Swordsan annual technical red teaming cyber exercise training penetration testers, digital forensics experts and situational awareness expertwhile supporting other training programs, such as the Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXercise, Trident Juncture, Trident Jaguar, and Cyber Coalition.

Yet when it comes to operational deployment, NATO focuses on coordinating sovereign cyber effects. According to David Bailey, senior national security law advisor for Army Cyber Command, the idea of sovereign cyber effects provided voluntarily by allies is good. But that will not fall under the command and control of the actual NATO commander. It will still fall under the command and control of the country that contributes. In my mind, its going to be difficult to achieve that level of coordination that were used to in military operations, even in a NATO context.

To facilitate the coordination of these sovereign cyber effects, NATO has established the new Cyber Operations Center (CyOC). This center is located at NATOs Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium, and aims to be fully operational with a seventy-person team by 2023.

This approach means that NATO members do not share their modus operandi with each other. Instead, a member state notifies the alliance that it has the (potential) ability to achieve a desired effect without sharing how it achieved it. Because states do not actually have to disclose their capabilities, this overcomes the main barrier to cyber arms transfer while still facilitating cyber operations within the alliance structure. To date, at least nine states are known to have signed up to offer their sovereign cyber effects, when available and needed, to the alliance.

However, this does not mean that the U.S. military cannot seek partnerships in the cyber domain through other mutually beneficial avenues. Specialists from U.S. Cyber Command have been deployed abroad to sixteen other nationswith their consentfor hunt forward operations to seek intelligence from allies computer networks. Gen. Paul M. Nakasone, head of U.S. Cyber Command and the NSA, confirmed that in one such hunt forward deployment, U.S. military specialists were based in Ukraine from December 2021 to February 2022, leaving just before the invasion. As Kim Zetter notes, these deployments can help Ukrainians uncover threats inside their networks without the United States directly hacking into Russian systems.

Outside of these hunt forward missions, however, Nakasone confirmed that the U.S. Cyber Command has conducted a series of operations across the full spectrum; offensive, defensive, [and] information operations in response to the Russian invasion. While we dont know what these operations involved, they were not coordinated or requested by the NATO Cyber Operations Center. For America and its partners, this mix of unilateral action and piecemeal cooperation will likely remain the default in the cyber realm.

As states start to operationalize their cyber commands, they will have to stand on their own feet and not expect much help from their friends.

See the rest here:
Why NATO Countries Don't Share Cyber Weapons - The National Interest Online

Poland has long been a thorn in the unity of the EU and rightfully so. Warsaw has been on the frontlines of the sentiment that encourages a common stand against the hegemony of some nations in the EU. France, Germany and Italy have long used the size of their economies to bully smaller nations of the union and it seems like Poland has had enough of it.

As a consequence of its hefty support to Ukraine, Warsaw is now in the grip of record high inflation, swirling at the highest rates in a quarter of a century. Understandably, Polands leaders are slowly coming to a consensus with the realities of the world and starting to take an anti-EU stance.

Poland has reportedly signed a multibillion-dollar contract with South Korea to import the latters home-grown light combat aircraft. SBS TV, citing a well-informed industry source, said, a representative of Korea Aerospace Industries Ltd. (KAI), the developer of the supersonic FA-50, left for Poland on Tuesday to sign a contract this week to export 48 of the aircraft for some US$3 billion.

Poland has already become a party against the Russians in the war and understands that it needs to ramp up its defenses in case the fire of war spreads westwards. However, the nation had already pledged a substantial amount of its weapons to Ukraine at the EUs request but it looks like the EU does not know how to extend gratitude.

Read More: A dispirited Poland joins hands with South Korea to teach Germany and US a life lesson

Poland has always rejected any sort of European supremacy over national legislation. Finding fault with Polands judicial reforms, the EU delayed the approval of 23 billion euros ($26bn) in EU grants and 34 billion euros ($39bn) in cheap loans that were spared to help the country recover from Covid-19s economic impacts. Warsaw has now been increasingly distancing itself from EU under the latters discriminatory policies.

It seems like Polish leaders do not want to continue to be used as a vessel state for the United States and Germany. Constant humiliations at the hands of the west have forced Warsaw to turn toward one of Asias leading industrial military complexes.

The EU has failed to cater to the needs of Poland as it is busy carrying Washingtons agenda by allocating all its resources to Ukraine. Naturally, Warsaw has now been scouting for alternate sources of equipment.

Poland is also reportedly rebelling against the idea of the European Union to encourage all nations in its influence to adopt the Euro as their sole trading currency. The Polish central bank Governor, Adam Glapinski, said Germany is pressuring his country to adopt the Euro and vowed to prevent it as long as hes in charge of the monetary policy.

Read More: Polands trillion dollar jolt is enough to flatten the German economy once and for all

If Warsaw adheres to the EUs plan and adopts the Euro, its long-held dream of becoming the strongest military force in Europe will go into the drain as it will make it vulnerable to hindrances when doing defense deals in the newly mentioned currency i.e Euro.

You see, Polands dream of becoming a leading force in Europe cannot be fulfilled if it maintains a pro-western stand. Polands leaders have taken a smart step by beginning to distance themselves from the poisonous European grouping and are trying to become self-sufficient by looking for alternatives to undermine the unions silent attack.

More:
Poland has one foot in NATO and the other in Asia - TFI Global News