Daily Archives: August 29, 2022

Six months on from his invasion of Ukraine, the world is still trying to figure out exactly what it is that Vladimir Putin wants from this war, or "special military operation" as it's known in Russia.

Is he trying to reclaim what he sees as the lost glory of the Soviet Union? Is it a power grab by a leader looking to burnish his reputation as a strong leader with his own people? Is it an almost inevitable step from a leader in power for 20 years who has come to believe he is invincible?

Perhaps one of the best ways to try to understand the Vladimir Putin of 2022 is to look back at how he got here, by examining six pivotal points in his leadership.

The sinking of the Kursk submarine during a naval exercise in the Barents Sea in 2000 was the first major domestic test of Vladimir Putin's leadership.

Tortuous efforts to save the 118 people on board continued for days, but to no avail.

Amid criticism that rescue efforts had been slow and that authorities had failed to accept help from other countries, Putin visited the Kursk's home port of Vidyayevo, where he met bereaved relatives.

In a sign of just how different things were then, the anger of those families who had lost loved ones in the disaster was broadcast across Russia.

In what would have been an embarrassing encounter for any leader, Putin offered his apologies.

But he also looked to share the blame, turning on many of the tycoons who ran the television channels that broadcast the exchanges.

The Kursk tragedy showed a leader still struggling with the expectations of his new role. The criticism clearly stung, but perhaps also taught the president a lesson in control.

In the years ahead, there would be far less general interaction with members of the public and Putin came to see the media tycoons who chastised his reaction in a very different light.

The relationship between Vladimir Putin and Boris Berezovksy is a template for many other Russian oligarchs.

Initially an ardent supporter of President Putin, Berezovksy began to criticise elements of Putin's leadership with which he did not agree.

His television network criticised the Kursk rescue efforts, and the relationship between the two men began to deteriorate.

Boris Berezovsky left Russia, going into exile in the UK, where he was eventually granted political asylum in 2003, and where he would die a decade later.

Police said Berezovsky took his own life, but there was continued intense speculation that his death might have been suspicious.

The coroner returned an open verdict saying the burden of proof set such a high standard that it was impossible to say definitively if it was really suicide.

The breakdown in the relationship between Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Putin acted as a warning to other oligarchs not to step out of line.

To do so risked their relationship with the president, as well as risking their assets and their freedom.

Others, such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, would eventually follow Berezovsky into exile, leading a string of Russian emigres warning about the dangers of a Russian leader they characterised as out of control and on the path to dictatorship.

'We showed ourselves to be weak. And the weak get beaten' - Vladimir Putin

The worst school shooting in history, the Beslan school siege of 2004 led to the deaths of 333 people - 186 of which were schoolchildren - who were rounded up in their school and held in the gymnasium by a group of armed Chechen terrorists.

The standoff, which involved more than 1,100 hostages, initially continued for several days, as the brutality of the attack shocked the world.

At first there were attempts to negotiate with the hijackers, but eventually the school was stormed by Russian forces.

Amid accusations of censorship and disinformation from the Kremlin, President Putin visited some of the Beslan wounded in hospital in what were sometimes uncomfortable encounters.

Some of those families would later blame Russian special forces for killing their loved ones when they stormed the school.

In the days after the awful events in Beslan, Putin addressed the nation, saying: "We stopped paying the required attention to defence ... we showed ourselves to be weak. And the weak get beaten."

Putin had learned that he did not want to be seen as weak, and began working on widespread political reforms which would see power consolidated more in the Kremlin and him become increasingly dominant.

Less than a year after the Beslan massacre, the influence of what had happened at the school was clear from the tone of President Putin's address to the nation in April 2005.

The president told a nation still grieving and grief-stricken that the collapse of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century" and a "genuine tragedy" which had left millions of Russians outside of the Russian Federation.

He described a USSR weakened by fragmentation and more at risk as a result.

It seemed to purposely capture the nostalgia already in the air, just weeks before the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe, or the Great Patriotic War as it is known in Russia.

That patriotism ran throughout Putin's comments and acted as an early indicator for Western powers that Putin might be more enticed by the Soviet Union of the past than they had at first believed.

It was a portent of things to come in the decades ahead, as Putin harked back to an imperial power which he clearly believed had been a golden era.

If Western leaders were operating on the basis of "by his speeches ye shall know him" then Putin's speech just two years after his comment about the demise of the Soviet Union would set out what many now see as a blueprint for his leadership.

The 2007 Munich security conference harked back to a language and rhetoric that many in the West thought was gone.

President Putin began by saying the conference structure allowed him "to avoid excessive politeness" and he certainly followed through on that.

Gone was the backslapping joviality displayed in his first meeting with US President George W Bush in 2001, when the US leader talked of having got a sense of Putin's soul, declaring the Russian leader to be "very straightforward and trustworthy".

"I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. I was able to get a sense of his soul." - US President George W Bush in 2001

This time, Putin railed against US attempts to create a unipolar world which had one leader - the US.

And his ire was also aimed at NATO, saying that expansion of the organisation "does not have any relation with the modernisation of the alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of trust".

Putin described a West which held no value for Russia, as he laid down the gauntlet to Western leaders about where he saw Russia's future.

Boris Nemtsov died within sight of the Kremlin, gunned down as he walked along the banks of the Moskva river.

He had once been a government insider, a former deputy prime minister of Russia under Boris Yeltsin.

But by the time of his death in 2015 he was the leading opposition figure in Russia, an ardent critic of the Russian president, who highlighted issues of corruption under Putin's leadership and organised large anti-Putin rallies.

The world had watched as other Putin critics - like journalist Anna Politkovskaya - were killed in Russia and others, like Alexander Litvinenko, were killed abroad.

But the death of Boris Nemtsov would push the boundaries even further, leading many in the opposition movement to finally conclude that no one was safe once they criticised the Russian president.

When authorities announced that any CCTV cameras which might have filmed the shooting just happened to have been turned off at the time it added further insult to injury.

The death of Boris Nemtsov taught figures like Alexei Navalny that to continue opposing the Russian president was to put their life on the line.

For many who had taken part in demonstrations the risks became too great. Many fled, or stopped protesting out of fear of what it would mean for them or their families.

Vladimir Putin in 2022

The war in Ukraine is very likely to be the defining event of Vladimir Putin's lengthy time as Russian leader.

It has killed thousands, displaced millions, upended global fuel and food prices and rewritten geopolitics.

It has brought war to Europe, something considered almost incomprehensible just over a half a year ago.

Once the first missiles flew in the early hours of 24 February, the world changed in a way we are still trying to comprehend.

The six events outlined above are just some of those that could have been chosen from a leadership which stretches back over two decades.

But each gave an indication of where Putin's beliefs might lead, not just for him, but ultimately for the whole world.

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Putin - The Russian leader in six acts - RTE.ie

Rumors of the Russian leader Vladimir Putin's failing health may just be a proven fact as Kremlin insiders saidhe will no longer be attending meetings. The General SVR Telegram channel recently made claims that the Russian tyrant is seeking to shut down their services as senior officials will reportedly explain in the coming weeks Putins absences and blame it on the recurring Covid pandemic that requires himto remain in isolation.

The channel, which is reputedly anti-Russian government, has made claims that Putin is indeed enduring a battle with cancer despite past claims that he is also suffering from Parkinsons disease. At some point, it was also said that Putin was manifesting a schizoaffective disorder, Expressreported.

With a high degree of probability, we can say that soon the President will not be able to personally hold meetings and participate in large events,"the channel claimed.

Sources have also remarkedthat Putins lead security advisor, Nikolai Patrushev has told the leader to find a way out of Russias current situation. Since then, Kremlin insiders saidPutin is nowcaught between a rock and a hard spot with his invasion of Ukraine. Word has it the leader is undecided about accepting his defeat as he may be contemplating resorting tothe use of nuclear weapons as desperate means to stay ahead of his offensives.

With Putin seemingly running out of good options in his war, SVR Telegram said Putin has privately voiced his extreme choice decisions with his senior officials. Thiscould mean the surrender of Russian-occupied regions in Ukraine as Crimea faced a recent drone attack by a Ukrainian military counterstrike.Russian defense chiefs have weighedout the attack to be quite effective.

The channel wenton to say that Russian government officials are scrambling to discuss its various options on how to proceed with its military operations in Ukraine. One of the options on the table is the possible mobilization and use of tactical nuclear weapons. Opening a second front in a third country was also up for deliberation as well as implementing gestures of goodwill by returning Russian-occupied regions back to Ukraine.

However, SVR Telegram also stated that such a move and the surrender of these regions could signal the end of Putins reign. With Russias military suffering huge losses both in ground troops and weapons, the entire Russian military leadership is said to have cast all its blame on their leader

Russian President Vladimir Putin seen during the Summit of Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) at the Grand Kremlin Palace, May,16,2022, in Moscow, Russia. Leaders of post-Soviet states have gathered at the Kremlin for the summit of CSTO marking its 30th anniversary this year. Photo by Contributor/Getty Images

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Is Vladimir Putin Really Ill With Cancer Or Parkinson's? - LatinTimes

The Correlates of War sounds like it could be the title of a thriller from an airport bookstore.

But known by its somewhat undignified acronym,the COW project is actually a large collection of research on the history of wars and their causes.

And one of the much-debated issuesthe COW project is still struggling to resolve is overTrade-Peace Theory, the idea that close economic interdependencehelps to discouragecountries from going to war.

As Russiantroops marched into Ukraine in February and China sent warplanes soaring over the Taiwan Strait earlier this month, resolving the question of whether our economic best interests can save us from conflict or whether it is just a liberalIllusion, as one author suggested in the title of her book may never have been so pertinent.

"We do as a species have a tendency to go to war," University of Ottawa anthropologist Scott Simon said in a phone interview last week. "From the beginning of our species, basically, we've had this tendency to either trade with other people or to go to war with them."

Simon quotes the French philosopher Raymond Aron that war is a particular kind of social arrangement.

In the era of enormously powerful nuclear weapons, it is asocial arrangement where even the smallest conflict could result in millions of deaths.

The idea that a spat over the China-claimedSpratly Islands and over Taiwan would expand into a nuclearconflict wasan interesting topic for the sci-fi book 2034: A Novel of the Next World War. It may seem unlikely in reality.

But that is exactly the subject of a nonfictionarticle in last week's Financial Times titled "America Must Consider the Risk a War Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear."

"If the fast-gelling opinion of Washington's foreign policy elite is correct that such a war is no longer simply possible but likely then assessing such a risk needs to be at the forefront of every discussion," wrote Michael Auslin, a fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

Besideshis anthropologist's views on humanity'spropensity to war, Scott Simon has a second qualification for discussing a potential invasion of Taiwan by China: He'sthe co-holder of the Chair of Taiwan Studies at the University of Ottawa and has spent more than a decade on the democratic island that Beijing insists is a disloyal province of the People's Republic of China.

Despite and perhaps partly because of Vladimir Putin's attack onUkraine, Simon is convinced a Chinese invasion is not imminent. Military experts say that with a reserve army of more that a million, missiles, aircraft and other defences solely directed at a potential Chinese offensive, a Ukraine-style incursion into Taiwan would be costly.

"The military capability is there to deter an invasion," Simon said.

But as hesketched out in an article last week for the Centre for International Policy Studies, Taiwan also remainsan indispensablesource of semiconductors the chips used in everyday consumer goods and in many military applications, not just for the West but for China as well.

Despite a planned surge of new investment as part of the CHIPS and Science Act that U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law by executive order last week, neither the United States nor China are yet prepared to go it alone in the globally integrated manufacture ofmicroelectronics.

Jia Wang, interim director of the Edmonton-based China Institute at the University of Alberta, said that while Taiwanese microchips get most of the attention, a conflict as serious as an attempted invasion or a blockade of Taiwan would create a breakdown in trade between China and North America that is worth hundreds of billions of dollars annually.

And as a small trading nation, Canada would be moreaffected than either the U.S. or China, which both have huge domestic markets.

Despite attempts by both sides to find or create alternative sources of essential goods and services, the Chinese and North American economies are complementary, she said, and a collapse in the exchange of food and raw materials on one side and cheap consumer goods dependent on mass labouron the other could devastate both economies.

According to a reportlast week in the Japanese business publication Nikkei Asia, a "Taiwan emergency" that led to Western sanctions on China could lead to the evaporation of $2.6 trillion from the global economy.

Dan Ciuriak, an economist and senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, based in Waterloo, Ont.,is a strong advocate forthe idea that economic self-interest can prevent countries from going to war.

Critics of the idea point to many contrary examples, most famously the First World War,when many assumed an economically integrated Europe would never throw it all away in years of deadly combat.

Some think of that war as an accident. Others point out the many differences from the current era, including the existence of nuclear warheads and the strategy of mutually assured destruction.

Most recently, Putin's invasion of Ukraine seems to prove the case thatan autocratic leader canmakea fatal miscalculation, imaginingan easy victorywith political oreconomic benefits.

"The wild card is Xi," Ciuriak said, referring to Chinese PresidentXi Jinping, currently angling for a third term as the country's supreme leader. "You cannot exclude thepossibility that he will do something incredibly stupid."

Like Simon, Ciuriakthinks that is unlikelyand that with China already suffering the effects of a protracted pandemic, a domesticproperty collapse and a series of bad overseas loans, Xi will be guided by economic interests that will secure his people's access to foreign imports, including food, and to the sale of their exports overseas.

Of course in war, it takes two to tangle, and Ciuriaksays it is important for Canada to try to defuse the potential conflict and helpconvince both sides of what seems obvious to him: that trade is better than war.

Cost of Living9:00Trading with the frenemy and how Canada-China trade relations move forward

Canadians should remind China that its economy is growing by three Taiwans a yearand that it would bea costly, wasted effort even to bother to crush the reluctant province militarily. The two are already becoming more integrated, sharing investment and technology.

It is also essential to convince China hawks in the U.S. that inwhat has become a multipolar world, theU.S. cannot expect toretain theeconomic and military dominanceit had at the end of the Cold War.

To help avoid conflict, one lesson learned from Europe, cut off from crucial energysupplies, is to prepare ourselves so that Canada cannot suffer a similar fate.

"We just have to make sure that in areas where we would be liable to be held hostage ... we need to diversify our supply sourcing, make sure that we've either got it domestically or in a friendly country," Ciuriaksaid. That doesn't just apply to microchips.

With one-fifth of the world's population, it is reasonable thatChina will eventually represent about a fifth of the world's economy or maybe a bit more, he said.And as it grows, it will become an even more valuable trading partner for Canada and for the U.S.

Ciuriak insists that China is not going away and that Canadians must fight for the idea thatit is betterto keep trading with a country that maynot be a fast friend than to lose our trade and the benefits of peace by engaging in a war with a certain enemy where everyone will lose.

Follow Don on Twitter @don_pittis

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Can crucial trade ties save the world from war? Putin's invasion has created doubters - CBC News

After six months of war in Ukraine, President Vladimir Putins military offensive has stalled. Now, as winter looms, Putin is aggressively playing the energy card. Russia is deliberately deepening Europes energy crisis to the gravest level since the Arab oil shock of 1973.

Half a century ago, the OPEC oil crisis was staged partly for political reasons, partly for economic ones. Led by Saudi Arabia, OPEC sought to help Egypt and Syria destroy Israel in the Yom Kippur war. The six-month oil embargo quadrupled world oil prices.

Today, Putin seeks to destroy Ukraine as an independent nation. He already is reaping the benefits of high prices for gas, oil and coal. As in 1973, lagging American oil production is tightening world markets.

On the nuclear front, Russias Defense Ministry threatened to close the largest nuclear power plant in Europe. Russian soldiers occupy the plant at Zaporizhzhya and use it as a base from which to fire on nearby Ukrainian territory.

At best, a shutdown would cut off Ukraine from the source of 20% percent of its electricity. Nuclear experts warn that the delicate process of shutting down the reactors could cause an accident. Putin warned President Emmanuel Macron of the danger of a large-scale catastrophe that could lead to radiation contamination of vast territories.

In addition to nuclear blackmail, Putin is using natural gas to put the European Union in an energy hammerlock. Over the last decade, a succession of European politicians most notably Angela Merkel ignored clear warnings from Washington about the dangers over reliance on cheap Russian gas.

Now, Putin is turning off the tap. Politicians worry that Putin will eventually shut off all gas exports.

To fill the gap, the EU has started a crash program to cut natural gas usage by 15% before winter. Air conditioning is cut off in hallways. Heat is turned off in swimming pools. Germany is restarting several coal-fired electricity plants and is debating decommissioning its last three nuclear power plants. World coal prices have increased six-fold over the last year.

Over the last five years, European natural gas prices have averaged about twice as highas those in America. Currently, they are eight times as high.

Now, to some degree, America is coming to the rescue. The Paris-based International Energy Agency reportedlast month that this summer, for the first time in history, America exported more gas to the EU than Russia. LNG, though, is too expensive to revive German factories built to run on cheap, pipeline gas. While the LNG imports will keep the lights on, the costs of LNG will likely sink the German and many other European economies into deep recession.

Putin can afford to pinch the natural-gas hose to the EU, because he makes his real money selling oil. Western sanctions have backfired. In a tight oil market, Russia is making more money selling less oil. Despite President Joe Bidens visit to Saudi Arabia last month, OPEC did not increase oil production.

The oil-market victory means Putin can afford to forego revenue by restricting natural-gas sales to Europe, putting pressure on Berlin, Paris and London, which are bracing for massive retail energy-price increases and potential shortages that may lead to rationing this winter, Javier Blas wrote this month. Moscow is making so much money selling oil it can afford to restrict crude supply to Eastern European nations, too.

In a world of tight energy markets, a tight oil market is pushing up oil prices. But, with world demand high, Bloomberg reports that distillate inventories in the US mid-Atlantic are at a 30-year low.

To counteract American concerns, Americas energy secretary, Jennifer Granholm predicted in an interviewthat America will see record oil production starting next year.

In Europe, gas prices this winter are expected to go so high that markets will break down, industries will close and governments will impose rationing. In advance, some Europeans are chopping wood.

In Belgium and the Netherlands, firewood prices have doubled. In Germany, Google searches for firewood have spiked. In Hungary, logging restrictions have been loosened. Last week, Bulgaria banned wood exports outside the EU.

The winter is coming, and we dont know how cold it will be, the Czech Republics minister of industry and trade, Jozef Sikela, said last month. But what we know for sure is that Putin will continue to play his dirty games.

James Brooke is fellow for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Alonger version of this columnoriginally appeared in The New York Sun.

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Putin's squeeze on European energy is threatening disaster across the continent - New York Post

The sanctions did have an impact when Putin nonetheless invaded Ukraine. Putin hasnt gone away, though. He has also successfully countered Russias counter-sanctions. Who is winning the sanctions war now that it has been going on for almost six months and is in its third phase: first deterrence, then compilation, and now attrition? Sanctions as a key component of deterrence in the first phase failed. Putin may have been impenetrable because of his Greater Russia vision and conviction that triumph was imminent; he recalled that Russian soldiers carried dress parade outfits in their bags.

However, even if he were not yet prepared to invade, we know from other incidents that, while sanctions have occasionally been effective in achieving modest goals of policy change, they have never been able to stop a determined aggressor from starting a war. Not the Soviet Union, not former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, not former Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, who invaded Ethiopia-Abyssinia in 1935, or former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who invaded Kuwait in 1990.

Phase two, the broad sanctions put in place when Russia invaded, aimed to cause enough hardships, along with NATO assistance for the Ukrainian resistance, to force Putin to back down. Financial sanctions shut off Russia from a large portion of the global financial system, blocking about half of the $640 billion in foreign hard currency reserves.

Technologies like semiconductors, which are essential for both commercial and military items like telephones and automobiles, were restricted. More than 1,000 global corporations stopped doing business in or with Russia, as opposed to the end-around used in many other sanctions situations.

Putin and his family are among the almost 600 Russian billionaires and siloviki elites who have received personal sanctions. Although oil and natural gas play a crucial role in the Russian economy, accounting for one-third of the GDP and roughly half of the federal budget before the war, sanctions have been slower to take effect and have a smaller impact due to the energy dependence of those who are issuing them.

Overall, the sanctions program did have a significant economic effect. The greatest reductions in Russian GDP estimates since the disorganized 1990s have been seen. The value of the ruble decreased by about 50% in March, going from 84 to 154 rubles per dollar. Moscows mayor issued a warning that 200,000 jobs were in jeopardy in mid-April.

Inflation throughout the entire economy was close to 18 percent, and it was significantly higher in the industries most dependent on global supply networks. As a result of the Ukrainian opposition destroying so much fighting gear and sanctions preventing resupply operations, Russian front-line soldiers were experiencing shortages.

However, Russia has turned to three key sanctions defense strategies: alternative trade partners; sanctions breaching; and internal offsets, as sanctioned nations so frequently do to control those costs. Although many nations participated in the sanctions, some significant ones did not.

Although it hasnt been as totally supportive as the Russia-China no boundaries cooperation suggested before the invasion, China has boosted its imports of Russian oil, contributed some military equipment, and offered encouraging words. As a result of price breaks and close military relations, India raised its imports of Russian oil from 1% to 20%.

Although Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates refused to considerably raise output, earnings were, by some estimates, greater than the previous year because of global price increases that more than compensated for Russias use of discounts.

The tripled number of oil tankers that are going dark to escape detection and the concealment of Russian oil mixed in with other types of oil by shippers and refiners are not even factored into those figures for oil revenues. The grain from Ukraine, worth hundreds of thousands of metric tonnes, was stolen and sent to Russian friends.

There have been several more instances of sanctions-busting, such as billionaires and Putin allies locating safe harbors for their super yachts and offshore tax and banking havens. The Kremlin has used a combination of economic corrective measures and political repression to offset the expenses that are currently being incurred.

The ruble recovered from its early severe depreciation and reached a seven-year high in late June thanks to increases in central bank interest rates and capital controls. The typical Russian has been given some relief by increases in retiree pensions and corporate bailouts. The initial wave of domestic demonstrations was put down by arrests and other forms of political repression. A price has been paid by the few billionaires who have dared to speak out.

Russian counter sanctions are beginning to strike back, most notably by shutting off natural gas supplies to the European Union. Pipeline volumes, which were above 400 million cubic meters per day (mcm/day) a year earlier, were only about 100 mcm/day as of July 31. Between January and June, the price of electricity in Germany quadrupled, from 140 to 260 euros per megawatt-hour. Major sectors are already reducing production as a result of gas constraints. Measures to reduce consumption and change suppliers and fuel sources have made modest progress.

The latest gas-sharing agreement between the EU and member states still contains enough flaws to raise the possibility of winter rationing. Rationing has already begun in certain areas. In Spain, commercial air conditioning must be set no lower than 27 degrees Celsius (or 80 degrees Fahrenheit), the Netherlands encourages 5-minute shower limitations, and urban insurgents are turning off storefront lights in France amid one of the hottest summers on record.

Then there are the repercussions on a larger, global scale. Climate change is once more being compromised. Domestic oil and gas drilling restrictions are being loosened in the US, and coal is once again being used in Europe. The current estimate for global GDP growth is 2.9 percent, down from the January prediction of no more than 4.1 percent and 5.7 percent for 2021.

Even though oil prices have recently decreased, there are still worries that they might reach $200 per barrel as Russian oil sanctions tighten. At least 40 million people have been forced into poverty as a result of all of this, which has been extremely hard on emerging and poor countries. Even while Russian military tactics are mostly to blame for the food shortages that affect over half of the worlds population, Western sanctions are also held accountable in a large portion of the global south.

According to several evaluations, including those in this magazine, sanctions are causing the Russian economy more serious structural harm. Despite being supported, the rubles decline may be seen in black market exchange rates. Gazprom failed to provide a dividend, causing its shares to decline for the first time since 1998. In one industry after another, import substitution has fallen short.

Its telling that Elvira Nabiullina, the head of the Russian Central Bank, cautioned that the economy cannot survive on reserves forever. An estimated 500,000 people, many of whom are highly educated, have expertise in the computer industry, and are essential components of any economys talent base, have left the nation.

Sanctions are requiring jerry-riggged resupply operations, such as stealing semiconductors from refrigerators and dishwashers, as Russian forces are claimed to have lost 2,600 armored vehicles and fired close to 70% of their precision-guided missiles.

The economic-military pincer may get much tighter if Western sanctions weariness doesnt set in and the NATO-backed Ukrainian opposition keeps causing significant harm on the ground. Putin shouldnt be expected, though. The claims that sanctions are Putins military machine and are sending Russia into economic ruin are not accurate.

Also, this goes beyond Putinology. The history of sanctions is replete with instances when significant economic damage did not result in a policy change: For instance, sanctions against Cuba have been in place for more than 60 years, but the regime is still in place; sanctions against North Korea have been in place for decades, but leader Kim Jong Un keeps building up his nuclear arsenal; and the former U.S.

President Donald Trumps maximum pressure campaign against Iran reduced GDP by 10%, increased inflation to 40%, and decreased youth unemployment to nearly 30%, but there were no protests from Tehran either. Two variables have been crucial in cases where sanctions have changed the economic impact of policy compliance. Two variables have been crucial in cases where sanctions have changed the economic impact of policy compliance.

One is whether domestic elites and other important political players behave as circuit breakers or transmission belts, obstructing or advancing sanctions pressure against the regime depending on whether compliance or resistance serves their interests. Because they applied economic pressure without engaging in political hostility, previous U.S. President Barack Obamas Iran sanctions succeeded in their policy goal, unlike Trumps, which failed to do so.

In 2003, when sanctions imposed by the United States, Europe, and the United Nations had caused Libyas oil industry to deteriorate due to a lack of foreign technology and investments, pragmatist technocrats surrounding Muammar al-Qaddafi, the former leader of Libya, were better able to argue that concessions on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction programs would be in their and his best interests.

Reports of growing internal resistance from Russian families and dissidents shouldnt be overemphasized, but they also shouldnt be discounted either given that estimates of Russian troops dead or injured range from 70,000 to 80,000, significantly more than in their eight-year war in Afghanistan.

The same goes for situations where certain important power broker elites exert pressure to find a workable solution for their nationalist reasons; pride being injured by having to turn to North Korean volunteers or shielding the military from further harm.

The diplomatic approach that uses sanctions to strengthen its position in exchange for advantageous but still somewhat reciprocal conditions is the second important component. Despite certain contrasts, the instances of Iran and Libya are instructive here as well.

When an agreement with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was achieved, many of the sanctions were withdrawn because Obamas Iran sanctions caused Iran enough economic hardship to have them genuinely engage in nuclear nonproliferation negotiations. Any legitimate foundations for reciprocity were eliminated by Trumps rejection of anything like a meaningful diplomatic procedure.

Similar to the agreement reached with Libya, the agreement reached by American and British negotiators (led by William Burns, then-assistant secretary of state of the United States and current director of the CIA) offered sanctions relief in exchange for terrorism concessions and the destruction of WMD; the significance of this agreement has become increasingly clear in the wake of the chaos and instability that followed the 2011 Arab Spring.

With Russia, it will be much more difficult to reach substantively relevant and politically feasible agreements than it was with Iran and Libya. Which sanctions are eased, and in exchange for what? Do some remain in place permanently? The key will be to be sufficiently harsh to have support from the United States, Europe, and Ukraine while also establishing a foundation for Putin or any future Russian leader to agree on these and other issues.

edited and proofread by nikita sharma

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The Russian Economy Has Suffered From The West, But Putin Has So Far Kept The Expenses Under Control. - Inventiva

'The weapons have to fall silent, the left wing of Germanys ruling Social Democratic party suggested this week, in their latest public appeal for peace in Ukraine. The authors argued that it is time to find a way of living with the Russian government, putting pressure on the Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

The intervention could well be a watershed moment for the Chancellor, whose own support for Ukraine during the conflict has been mixed to say the least. Now Scholz has been presented with a choice: either he faces down the appeasers in his own party, or signals once again that Germany is an unreliable ally to Ukraine.

The left-wing SPD appeal itself demands a ceasefire in Ukraine even if that means accepting realities one may not like. There is little mention of the fact that the realities of war in Ukraine means rape, torture and summary executions. The reports authors forget that Russia is holding the world hostage with the seizure of nuclear power plants and threats of nuclear war. And that Russia launched a war of aggression in order to wipe an entire country off the map of Europe. Instead, the SPD appeal talks of Ukraine and Russia as war parties that have to find a way to come to terms as if both sides share equal blame and responsibility for the prolonged conflict.

In fact it doesnt appear to matter at all how much destruction Russian troops wreak in Ukraine. The clamour to reward Putin for the war never seems to cease among elements of the German political establishment, and especially Scholzs party. No matter that Moscow marked the six month anniversary of its war of aggression with a rocket strike on a railway station that killed 25 people, including two children.

The blind pacifism of the SPDs left wing is as naive as it is callous. The signatories hope that third countries can step in as mediators. China is named directly due to its comparatively amicable relations with Russia. The signatories envision a role for China as a neutral country and want to draw it in to end the war just as Beijing ramps up its own aggression against Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Indo-Pacific region as a whole.

This is not only morally wrong but also runs contrary to Germanys current foreign policy. Evidence of detention centres and other human rights abuses in China, combined with Beijings aggressive economic expansion, have made the German government and industry wary of their immense dependence on China. Scholzs coalition is in the process of formulating a new China policy which will be better aligned with Natos, and the German airforce is this year taking part in Australias Pitch Black military exercise for the first time to underline the change. A plea for diplomatic aid from China would undermine efforts of deterrence and peacekeeping elsewhere in the world.

Given how at odds the appeal is with government policy, its tempting to brush this it off as the work of a fringe group. After all, even the Ukrainian ambassador in Berlin is cautiously optimistic that Germany is on the right track in increasing its aid to Kyiv. The German public also still supports Ukraines war effort. In a recent survey 71 per cent said they would want this to continue even if it means higher energy prices. Among SPD voters, the figure was even higher.

Nonetheless Scholz should confront the pacifist faction in his party head-on. Among the signatories were parliamentarians, the mayor of Dortmund and the former mayor of Bremen. With his muddled messaging Scholz gives their voices resonance. It is never entirely clear how committed he is to upholding security and the rule of law again Russian aggression.

After a lot of dithering in the build-up to the invasion, Scholz surprised many, including the majority of his fellow SPD members with his declaration of the war as a Zeitenwende a watershed era. Party colleagues reluctantly joined the standing ovations in parliament as their Chancellor declared that Germany would invest 100 billion into its military to keep warmongers like Putin in check.

But since then the ongoing war in Ukraine has sorely tested the unity of the SPD. The partys co-leader Lars Klingbeil made headlines in June when he called on Germany to take its place as a leading power in the world. After nearly 80 years of restraint, he argued, Germany must learn to accept military force as a legitimate means of politics. He was immediately criticised by the Young Socialists, the partys youth wing, whose leader said Klingbeil was completely wrong and the SPD should work towards perspectives of disarmament.

Scholz has done little to resolve the tension that is tearing his party apart and there seems to be no attempt to take ownership of the SPDs ideological direction. As a result, voters are beginning to turn away from last years election winner. A new survey puts Scholz as their third choice for chancellor with only 18 per cent rooting for him. The SPD too have fallen into third place with only 19 per cent saying they would still vote for them.

If Scholz ignores the latest attempt of those on the left of his party to undermine his credibility as a principled leader, it will not only cost him dearly but Germany, Ukraine and Europe too. This war is not a conflict between two aggrieved parties but an attempt to restore Russian overlordship in Eastern Europe. Putin could end it tomorrow, but at the moment there is not enough conviction behind Scholzs words and deeds to suggest he can steer his country through a tough winter while continuing to support Ukraine.

Neither Berlin nor Beijing can coax Putin to the negotiating table. The key to peace in Europe lies not in misguided pacifism but in bullish determination to do the right thing.

ENDS

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Olaf Scholz needs to deal with the Putin appeasers in his party - The Spectator