Daily Archives: July 14, 2022

Earlier this month, NATO has participated to the Eighth Biennial Meeting of State Parties on the Programme of Work to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons, held in New York, under the United Nations auspices.

As stated during the Summit in Madrid this past June, NATO is committed to continue work with partners to meet common interests and to address shared security concerns,

Mrs. Eirini Lemos-Maniati, Deputy Director of the Arms Control Directorate at the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division at NATO Headquarters said. NATO is committed to support partners, including in the Western Balkans region, to right size their weapons stocks, to manage them safely and securely, and to destroy excess and aged arms and ammunition. NATO will also continue supporting international initiatives to address these challenges in the region; NATOs approach is not only about destroying weapons, ammunitions and securing stockpiles, but also about building sustainable institutional capacities and regulatory frameworks as these challenges require long-term solutions; this is the core aim of NATO partnerships: to help partners building their capacities to address and mitigate security concerns, she added.

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NATO reaffirms its firm commitment to support arms control at UN meeting - NATO HQ

After more than 200 years of military non-alignment, Sweden is in the process of joining NATO and will help strengthen Euro-Atlantic security as a new Ally. During exercise BALTOPS 22, Swedish troops trained with US Marines and other Allied forces on the Swedish island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea.

Im sorry sir, said the US Marine Lieutenant, I dont speak any Swedish. Is English OK?.

Sure, the farmer said. In Sweden, practically everyone is multilingual.

The officer introduced himself and explained that his platoon was here on the island of Gotland for Exercise Baltic Operations 22 (BALTOPS 22), a US-led military exercise hosted by Sweden. Would it be OK if they cut through the farmers property to reach their objective?

Of course, said the farmer. With thanks, the lieutenant waved his platoon on, and soon, a file of Marines bristling with rifles and communications gear moved down the dirt road, passing a field of cud-chewing cows under a powder-blue sky.

Defending the key to the seas

As the sun shone down on the peaceful rural landscape, the US Marines moved onwards to carry out their primary objective: repelling the simulated invasion of Gotland.

The defence of the island is an important part of the larger BALTOPS exercise scenario, which is designed to strengthen forces abilities to respond to threats across the region, with the ultimate goal of preserving the freedom of navigation and security in the Baltic Sea.

Bucolic in summer and storm-swept in winter, Gotland is more than just beachside cottages and sheep pastures. Sitting between the Baltic coasts of Sweden and Latvia (and along the maritime route between Saint Petersburg and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad), Gotland is key to controlling the surrounding seas and would be a highly valuable target in any conflict.

This is why Sweden is determined to defend Gotland and its approximately 60,000 residents against any threat. Doing so may require speedy reinforcement, and Sweden has well-rehearsed methods of rushing troops to the island. Some are fairly conventional utilising a fleet of civilian ferries to haul hundreds of troops and vehicles, for example and others, less so.

During BALTOPS 22, Swedish air controllers landed a C-130 Hercules (which has a wingspan of 40 metres and can weigh over 70,000 kilograms when fully loaded, depending on the model) on a rural road north of the islands capital, Visby, while Gripen fighters sliced through the sky above. The burly transport hogged the asphalt as it taxied, pulled an about-face, and disgorged a platoon of Swedish Rangers lugging assault rifles and anti-tank missile launchers.

The US Marines, meanwhile, practised coming ashore from the amphibious landing ship USS Gunston Hall. Their light armoured vehicles, or LAVs, splashed off the landing craft and drove onto the pebbly beach of Gotlands Tofta Training Area. They then linked up with a contingent of Swedish troops and armour from Swedens Gotland Regiment before heading north to repel the notional invaders.

The Gotland Regiment whose flag bears a heroic ram carrying a red banner, based on the islands coat of arms is itself a sign of the times, having been reactivated in 2018 after a 13-year dormancy.

For its commander, Colonel Magnus Frykvall, the regiments mission has never been more relevant, or personal.

I mean, everything is much more real, he said, standing on Tofta Beach as US Marines crunched on the rocks behind him.

Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 was a wake-up call, showing how far this Baltic Sea neighbour was willing to go. But Sweden had already been introducing new measures to strengthen its defensive posture since Russias illegal annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea in 2014. Sweden reintroduced military conscription in 2017, calling thousands of men and women into service. It undertook a robust public information campaign to raise awareness about Swedens total defence concept, which would align civil and military efforts in a whole-of-society effort to resist foreign aggression.

I feel secure, and I really feel that my work has meaning, said Colonel Frykvall. And its important. I mean, we are appreciated from the civilian society in a bigger way than we were earlier. So its a big difference.

From military manoeuvres to diplomatic discussions

BALTOPS 22 wasnt the first time that US troops have marched down the roads of Gotland, nor was it the first time that Sweden and NATO Allies have teamed up for a military exercise. But it was hard to deny that this time felt different. There is war on the European continent, and the security environment has changed so drastically that Sweden has abandoned its long-held military non-alignment and has begun the process of joining the Alliance, alongside Finland.

Sweden has been a NATO partner since the mid-1990s, maintaining a close working relationship with the Alliance even sending forces to participate in military operations like the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan while avoiding both the obligations and the guarantees that come with full NATO membership. This cooperation has deepened since 2014 (another measure that Sweden took following Russias illegal annexation of Crimea), with more joint military exercises and increased political dialogue culminating in Swedens official application for NATO membership in May 2022.

As the US Marines and Swedish Rangers moved into attack positions, politicians in Stockholm and Brussels continued to discuss Swedens entry into the Alliance. A year ago, this would have been unthinkable neutrality was as Swedish as flat-pack furniture, a political hallmark and even a point of pride.

But for the Swedish military and for Swedens government and society, a majority of whom support NATO membership there was the world before 24 February, and the world we live in now.

The threat is real, said Colonel Frykvall. And we have seen what, in this case, Russia is prepared to do to a neighbouring country.

This article is part of a series of dispatches from the field, showing what life is like on the ground for NATO and partner armed forces. Check out the other articles for more stories of troops exploring new countries, enduring the elements and cooperating with friends.

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Some assembly required NATO Allies and soon-to-be Ally Sweden train to keep Gotland secure - NATO HQ

I am a firm believer in the value of periodic Summit meetings. A meeting of all the Alliance heads of state and government is in itself an important event. It has to be a success. Neither the Alliance as a whole nor the individual participants can afford anything else. But there is more to it than this. A Summit provides a useful catylist for demonstrating the cohesion of the Alliance, for reaffirming its objectives and for setting a course for future action. No one expects the participants to discuss in detail the documents they approve.

There is never enough time for this; indeed it could lead to disaster if they attempted to do so, since the essence of success is the appearance of unanimity, which requires careful advance preparation. This preparation involves many hours of arduous negotiation and bargaining between the Permanent Representatives of all the member countries and their staffs, reflecting instructions received from their Governments. Inevitably, this process demands compromises by all concerned. But this does not mean that the documents should be regarded merely as attempts to paper over the cracks, to produce a spurious and ephemeral unity. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the preparatory work is equal in value to the Summit meeting itself, since it is here that genuine efforts are made by all the Allies to reconcile differences of view and approach, with the aim of reaching agreement on the texts to be submitted to the heads of Government.

The NATO leaders attending the Bonn Summit assemble for the photographers. But did the meeting get the Press attention it deserved?

So it was with the Summit meeting of 1974, which met to ratify, and thereby give added status and authority to, the Declaration on Alliance Relations, which had been in course of preparation for a year and had been approved by Foreign Ministers a week earlier in Ottawa to mark the 25th anniversary of the Alliance. The heads of Government followed this up by meeting again in 1975 to review and reaffirm the commitments in the Declaration. The London Summit of 1977 established a programme of work for the Alliance, the results of which were reviewed at the Washington Summit in 1978. This meeting was of outstanding importance. The heads of Government approved a study on the long-term trends in East-West relations, the essentials of which remain valid today; and they endorsed the aim of three per cent real annual increases in defence expenditure and the Long Term Defence Programme, which, besides providing a framework for improvements in Alliance conventional defence during the 1980s, led to the double-track decision of December 1979 on Intermediate Range Nuclear Force modernisation and arms control. Alliance defence planning is still based on the implementation of these decisions.

The latest in the series of Summit meetings was held in Bonn on 10 June this year. The requirement for success was no different, but it was particularly important for President Reagan, the Summit being the culmination of his first visit to Europe since he took office 18 months earlier. So it was appropriate that a fine sounding declaration was unanimously approved, containing a Programme for Peace in Freedom". The meeting lasted only a few hours, but the declaration plus accompanying documents on arms control and defence were, as usual, the outcome of many weeks of hard discussion to which all members of the Alliance contributed. In them, the principles and purposes of the Alliance were reaffirmed, clearly and unexceptionably. These documents should leave no doubt that the Alliance is united on fundamentals, that the behaviour of the Soviet Union is still seen by all as the principal threat to peace and stability, that the constancy of the United States' commitment remains unaltered and that deterrence and dtente continue to be the twin pillars of Alliance policy. In short, the Summit apparently achieved its primary purpose.

So far so good. After several years during which the public image of the Alliance had so often been one of disarray, this display of unity could only be welcomed. At this point onewould like to have been able to add "and the Alliance lived happily ever after". But there is no hope of this.

People who have claimed to see in the transatlantic disputes of recent years the seeds of disintegration are wide of the mark or have short memories. The United States could no more afford to abandon the Alliance with Europe than the reverse. The political, strategic and economic interests of the two sides of the Atlantic are too closely bound together to be unravelled, however exasperating or frustrating each may find the other. Moreover, there is nothing very new about the disputes, except that the international scene in which they occur is constantly evolving; many of those experienced in the past have seemed at the time just as traumatic. On the other hand there is no plateau in intra-Alliance relations. Nor is there any golden age of harmony to look back to. Many disputes arise from differences which are ineradicabledifferences of size, of geography, of history and of economic circumstances. Others arise from different national priorities and perceptions, which are difficult to reconcile. The fact is that cohesion between the 15now 16independent member Governments is not, and never has been, maintained without constant effort in all fields of Alliance activity. So the important question to ask about the Summit is how far it will contribute towards resolvingor mitigatingthe Alliance's problems. Here I have to I admit to disappointment. The Summit Declaration is strong on broad principles but lamentably weak on specifics and guidelines for the future. Of course developments over the next few months may prove me wrong. I hope they will. So far there are few signs of this. What then are the main problems?

First is public presentation. There is something wrong with the Alliance's image. There is much ignorance about why it is needed, what it does and how it contributes to Peace in Freedom"; in particular, why strengthening defence is not only consistent with, but a necessary condition for, progress in arms control negotiations. The motives of many in the "Peace Movement" are sincere, if misguided. The support they receive from those who are by no means ignorant of, but are hostile to, the Alliance's objectives is less sincere.

Within its limited budget and terms of reference, the NATO Information Service does its best. But the message is not getting through. For example, the Alliance has produced two admirable documents this year: the first ever comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in April, 2 and the Special Edition of the NATO Review in June containing articles by distinguished contributors on different aspects of Alliance policy. The first is a sobering analysis; the second a realistic assessment. I know little about the reaction to them in other countries, but I have neither seen nor heard any mention of either in the British media. Moreover, news of the Summit itself has been virtually non-existent: so far as the man in the street-even the general newspaper reader- was concerned it might not have taken place. Yet there are points in the Declaration, and in the statement on arms control, which if handled imaginatively could have rivalled President Brezhnev's undertaking on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons which was timed to hit the headlines on the eve of the second UN Special Session on Disarmament. It will be said that this is largely a matter for individual governments, and that each country has its own particular requirements. This is quite true, but the results are, or should be, very much a matter for concern to the Alliance as a whole. believe the question of public presentation is becoming of such importance and urgency that it justifies a major effort at co-ordination on an Alliance basis. This could involve some reorganisation of the Brussels bureaucracy.

Next, defence. The need is clear: to maintain a credible deterrent posture and to avoid any lowering of the nuclear threshold. The task is well documented in the force comparisons paper, to which I have I referred. The problem is, as it has long been, how to reduce the growing adverse balance. As far as it goes, the Summit commitment to "continue to strengthen NATO's defence posture, with special regard to conventional forces" cannot be faulted. But it does not go very far. The measures proposed to achieve this commitment are little more than repetition of those which have been the basis of NATO's defence planning for several years. There is one conspicuous absentee: the aim of three per cent annual real increases in defence spending, which was endorsed at the 1978 Summit. European fulfilment of this aim, has, to say the least, been patchy. It was reaffirmed by the Defence Ministers last May, but its omission from the Bonn Summit document is bound to imply doubt about the continued Alliance commitment to it. This is pity. The unpalatable fact is that more defence means more money at a time when money is everywhere short. Three per cent is a useful, if rough and ready, benchmark for assessing national effort (the military authorities have suggested that four per cent is needed).

Exploring "ways of achieving greater effectiveness in the application of national resources to defence" could go some way towards mitigating the additional financial burden. But hitherto this has not been outstandingly successful. If results are to be achieved in the future, it will be necessary to break some accepted moulds. For this to happen, a strong political impetus will be needed. Yet there is little sign of this. It could have been provided if the Summit had directed the Alliance to examine specific steps, such as readjustment of rles, rationalisation of deployment, functional specialisation and co-operation on logistic and service tasks. As David Greenwood suggested in the June Special Edition of the NATOReview, the Alliance might consider organising itself as a "collective enterprise" rather than continuing to function as a "joint venture".

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns a have a discussion before the start of the Bonn Summit.

The third problem is the handling of East-West relations. Consultation about East-West relations has long been a feature of Alliance activity. In practice, it has always been the pre-requisite for coordinating defence policies. Since the adoption in December 1967 of the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (known as the Harmel Report after the initiator of the exercise, the then Belgian Foreign Minister), which stressed the equal importance of pursuing measures designed to promote dtente, such consultation has become indispensable and continuous. This has been one of the most successful and constructive aspects of the political development of the Alliance. Indeed. as the state of East-West relations goes to the heart of Alliance security, it would have been disastrous for Alliance cohesion if this had not been so.

There has been no shortage of argument, often heated. But, I believe it is true to say that, in the main, there has been no serious divergence of views about Soviet behaviour or indeed over the assessment of Soviet intentions. The disputes, of which the most acute have been between the two sides of the Atlantic, reflect differencesoften major onesabout what can and should be done about them. The distinction between the American view of East-West relations as global and the European view as regional is too simplistic and anyway outmoded (at least since the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which highlighted it). But it still contains a germ of truth: for the Europeans, dtente is a necessary condition for peaceful co-existence (and valuable commercial exchanges) in the same continent: whereas for the Americans it is less an end in itself than the desirable outcome, which may or may not be attained, of efforts to "manage" super-power confrontation.

There is plenty about East-West relations and dtente in the Summit Declaration, all of it (naturally) in terms which all 16 Governments were able to accept. But any illusions that the differences might somehow have been resolved were quickly dissipated by subsequent disputes over, for example, trade credits and the gas pipeline. There is no need to expand on these. But they demonstrate the pressing need for the Alliance to work out a Codeof Conduct for East-West relations, something which would provide specific guidance on the application of the agreed principles in the Declaration. It will certainly not be easy, and will involve compromises. But unless the effort is made, continuation of the existing differences will put an increasing strain on transatlantic relations.

Finally, the handling of issues outside the Treaty area. It has often been claimed that this is the most important current problem facing the Alliance in the 1980s. Though do not rate it above the others have mentioned, it has certainly emerged as a matter in which newthinking is needed, if the Alliance is to be in a position to react constructively to threats to stability and to the vital interests of its members which do not directly impact on the Treaty commitment.

The importance of these issues to the Alliance was recognised in the 1967 Harmel report, which said: "The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance". So Harmel recommended continuing Alliance consultation on these issues. But in the 1974 Declaration on Atlantic Relations the emphasis was much reduced: "(The Allies) are firmly resolved to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means which may be appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world".

It is little exaggeration to say that the practice has been largely confined to briefings and limited exchanges of information. These may, and do, reveal differences between members of the Alliance over substance and method, as well as over national priorities. It should be the function of consultation to reconcile these differences. But, to be effective, such consultation has to be a genuine two-way process with no Issues excluded because they are too sensitive or too controversial. The Alliance has, admittedly, to tread a delicate path between the appearance of overt interference in the affairs of other countries and of inability to concert its views on how best to safeguard its interests. Unfortunately the impression sometimes given is that it is the latter rather than the former which is the inhibiting factor. Is there perhaps a role here for Political Co-operation among the Ten of the European Community? Much has been done by the Ten to improve their coordination of foreign policy and to develop a "European view". If the results could in some way be used to strengthen the consultation process in the Alliance, this could only be beneficial. The Bonn Summit Declaration goes no further than the communiqus issued by the Foreign Ministers after their two meetings in 1981. But this is surely not the last word on this subject.

None of this can detract from the real achievements of the Alliance. Its survival for 33 years is ample evidence of its success and, if it did nothing else, the Summit Declaration demonstrated its continued vitality and importance to all its members. That the Alliance has the ability and can muster the will to act collectively is not in doubt; in recent years, the double-track decision on intermediate Range Nuclear Forces in December 1979, the firm stand on Poland, backed by contingency planning, in December 1980, and the impressive display of Allied solidarity at the Madrid Review Conference on European Security throughout 1981, both in presenting the Western case on human rights and in support of the French initiative on confidence building measures are outstanding examples.

All its life, the Alliance has needed, and has not lacked, resilience: this was shown by the way it recovered its balance in the summer of 1980 after a distressing period of disunity following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and again in January 1982 after similar signs of disarray following the declaration of martial law in Poland. But the agenda for the 1980s remains formidable. If we are to retain public support, especially of the younger generation, we must get the public image right; if we are to maintain the credibility of deterrence, we must find ways of improving the effectiveness of our conventional forces; if we are to present a coherent response to the Soviet challenge, we must somehow reconcile our divergences over East-West relations; if we are successfully to resist threats to Alliance interests world-wide, we must devise means for better co-ordination of our strategies.

The Alliance recovered its balance after a period of disunity following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Above, armed soldiers were posted outside Kabul mosques shortly after the invasion.

No single Summit could be expected to resolve these problems. What this one might have done would have been to indicate the way in which they were to be tackled, possibly with a declared intention to review progress at a further Summit next year. Since this was not done, the initiative is left to the Foreign and Defence Ministers, who are due to hold their regular meetings towards the end of the year. They may not find it easy, in the absence of clear guidance from the heads of Government. But there is one expedient to which I hope they will give serious consideration. This is the establishment of a Special Review outside the normal Alliance framework. It has been adopted on two previous occasions. First, in 1956, when a Committee ("The Three Wise Men") was set up "to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community". The Three Wise Men produced a masterly report from which the political practices and procedures as they exist today have evolved. Second, in December 1967, when the Foreign Ministers approved the Harmel Report, which had been based on studies directed by five senior officials nominated by different member governments. Its broad principles are still relevant to Alliance policies and activities.

Excellent though both these reports are, they date from 26 and 15 years ago respectively. It is high time a new review took place to deal with the changed problems and circumstances of the 1980s. The two precedents are quite different. The Three Wise Men operated more or less independently; the Harmel exercise was carefully controlled. I believe the needs of the Alliance would best be served by adopting the former model. I but I can well understand that cautious Governments may prefer the latter. But whichever model is chosen, I have little doubt that, if the Alliance is to prosper in the 1980s, as it has in the three previous decades, the decision should be made soon, and the one option which is not open is to do nothing.

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NATO Review - The 1982 Summit and after: a personal view - NATO HQ

NATO and the EU are sounding the alarmover the rising threat of weapons smuggling out in Ukraine, according to a Financial Times report.

Several NATO countries are in talks with Kyiv over implementing a tracking system for the historically unprecedented volume of military aid pouring into Ukraine as the Russian invasion continues into its fifth month, Western officials familiar with the discussions told the Financial Times.

Another source told the Times that Ukraines government is currently working on a tracking system with the help of Western countries. All these weapons land in southern Poland, get shipped to the border and then are just divided up into vehicles to cross: trucks, vans, sometimes private cars, one of the officials said. And from that moment we go blank on their location and we have no idea where they go, where they are used or even if they stay in the country.

U.S. officials previously said they have no means to track the weapons they send to Ukraine after they change hands at the Polish border. Then its up to the Ukrainians to determine where they go and how theyre allocated inside their country, said Pentagon press secretary John Kirby.

Czech defense minister Jana ernochov seemed to suggest to reporters that some amount of weapons smuggling is inevitable in Ukraine. Its hard to avoid trafficking or smuggling we didnt achieve it in former Yugoslavia and probably wont avoid it in Ukraine, she said.

Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) attempted to redress the current lack of oversight during the passage of a $40 billion Ukraine aid package in May. Paul moved to amend the mammoth aid bill with the appointment of a special inspector general to monitor exactly how the funds are being spent. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) teamed up with Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) to get the bill through the finish line with any amendments.

Russian and Bulgarian media outlets have published unverified reports alleging that some of the Western military aid, notably including Frances CAESAR self-propelled howitzers, is being sold to Russia by Ukrainian actors through proxies and intermediaries. Ukraines Economic Security Bureau chief Vadim Melnik reportedly acknowledged that cases of illegal resales of Western-provided weapons in Ukraine were confirmed and are being investigated.

Kyiv officials have dismissed rising concerns over weapons smuggling in Ukraine as a Russian propaganda ploy. All the weapons received by Ukraine, including long-range ones, are carefully accounted (for) and sent to the frontline, said Presidential advisor Mikhailo Podolyak. All the other rumors are banal propagandistic throwaways aiming to disrupt supplies.

EU officials announced earlier this week that they are creating a center, called the EU Support Hub for Internal Security and Border Management, in Moldova to stem arms and human trafficking in Ukraine.

Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters.

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NATO and EU Look to Crackdown on Illegal Weapons Smuggling in Ukraine - The National Interest Online

For the first time since the Mongol invasion of Europe in the 13th century, Europe now views an Asian power as a direct security threat. Unlike Japan, which overran Europes East Asian colonies during World War II, China is a superpower with global reach. In NATOs new Strategic Concept, adopted at its Madrid summit last month, the alliance identifies Chinas ambitions and coercive policies as a challenge to its members interests, values, and security. However, focusing on China will be fundamentally different from the blocs traditional role of warding off territorial threats in Europe, with several fault lines between the United States and NATOs European members already built in.

Five factors explain NATOs landmark decision. Some have been familiar parts of the security debate for years; others gained salience only recently.

Firstand most obviouslyNATOs strategy is responding to Chinas rise and the emergence of a new bipolar international system, replacing the so-called U.S. unipolar moment of the 1990s and early 2000s. With Chinas economy estimated to be 25 percent larger than the United States by 2026 (measured in GDP at purchasing power parity), Beijing has the resources to further increase a defense budget that is already four times larger than Russias. As realists such as political scientist Kenneth Waltz have emphasized, a bipolar power structure compels other states to choose a side. Although the United States announced its rebalance to Asia in 2011, geographic distance and a certain strategic sloth have slowed Europes response to Chinas growing power. Thus, it has taken Europe and NATO another decade to categorize Chinas rise as a security challenge.

For the first time since the Mongol invasion of Europe in the 13th century, Europe now views an Asian power as a direct security threat. Unlike Japan, which overran Europes East Asian colonies during World War II, China is a superpower with global reach. In NATOs new Strategic Concept, adopted at its Madrid summit last month, the alliance identifies Chinas ambitions and coercive policies as a challenge to its members interests, values, and security. However, focusing on China will be fundamentally different from the blocs traditional role of warding off territorial threats in Europe, with several fault lines between the United States and NATOs European members already built in.

Five factors explain NATOs landmark decision. Some have been familiar parts of the security debate for years; others gained salience only recently.

Firstand most obviouslyNATOs strategy is responding to Chinas rise and the emergence of a new bipolar international system, replacing the so-called U.S. unipolar moment of the 1990s and early 2000s. With Chinas economy estimated to be 25 percent larger than the United States by 2026 (measured in GDP at purchasing power parity), Beijing has the resources to further increase a defense budget that is already four times larger than Russias. As realists such as political scientist Kenneth Waltz have emphasized, a bipolar power structure compels other states to choose a side. Although the United States announced its rebalance to Asia in 2011, geographic distance and a certain strategic sloth have slowed Europes response to Chinas growing power. Thus, it has taken Europe and NATO another decade to categorize Chinas rise as a security challenge.

Second, technological developments have finally forced Europes hand. Here, too, many European countries enjoying growing trade with China and preferring to view Beijing as a partner on all kinds of issues were slow to rise to the challenge. The opportunities for Beijing to weaponize cybertechnology, 5G, and other fourth industrial revolution technologies have brought China closer to Europe. More than any other topic, restricting Huaweis operations in Europe has dominated the debate on China between Washington and European capitals over the last three or four years.

What accelerated Europes shift on China is a third factor: increased uncertainty in Europe about U.S. long-term commitments to trans-Atlantic security. As long as Washington was committed to containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Europe could take the U.S. security guarantee for granted. This, of course, is no longer the case. For the past decade, Europe has seen the United States gradually rebalancing its strategic focus and resources to Asia, and then-U.S. President Donald Trump abruptly awakened European elites to the possibility that a U.S. withdrawal from Europe could be just one election away. In hopes of binding the United States to Europe more closely, European NATO members are aligning themselves with Washingtonincluding by shifting their stance on China sooner than they might otherwise have chosen.

Fourth, Chinas ideological shifts also accelerated Europes categorization of China as a threat. Beijings increasingly authoritarian turn under Chinese leader Xi Jinping, its tightened grip on Hong Kong, and its iron rule policy in Xinjiang did much to destroy Chinas image in Europe. The European Unions decision in 2021 to put the European Union-China investment agreement on ice was a direct response to Beijings policy in Xinjiang against it Uyghur population. Chinas more aggressive wolf-warrior diplomacy and increasing ability to block EU decisions in Brussels via its client states in Europe didnt go unnoticed either.

The fifth factor accelerating NATOs shift on China is the evolving Sino-Russian axis, most recently enhanced by Russias invasion of Ukraine. This is molding a distinct geopolitical divide. By stepping up its economic and diplomatic support for Russia since the start of the invasion, China has inserted itself as an actor into the most momentous war in Europe since 1945.

Nonetheless, even though the new Strategic Concept sends a strong signal of trans-Atlantic unity, it is too early to conclude that it enables a joint and well-coordinated U.S.-European approach on China. The reason for caution is geography. The U.S.-China rivalry presents NATO with a different challenge than the U.S.-Soviet one. During the Cold War, from its pivotal position in the Eurasian heartland, the Soviet Union constituted a threat to the entire Eurasian rim, from Europe all the way to the Far East, and it was a two-flank challenge to the United States. Europe was the core area of the Cold War strategic theater, and this consolidated not only a united threat perception among the United States and its European allies but also a common military strategy. Chinas geographic position, on the other hand, does not preordain trans-Atlantic unity in a similar way.

Moving from strategy to policy implementing the Strategic Concept, the United States and European NATO members will find that the geopolitical logic of U.S.-China rivalry will shape a new, and not always easy, trans-Atlantic division of labor in three major ways.

First, from its geographic position on the Asian rim facing the Pacific Ocean, China represents a one-flank challenge to the United States. U.S. balancing of China will thus be largely regional, focusing on the Indo-Pacific with a lower priority for the trans-Atlantic flank. In fact, the new U.S. National Defense Strategy presented in Marchafter the Russian invasion of Ukraine had already startedclearly states that priority will be given to deter the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific. One important outcome of the war in Ukraineand the consolidation of the European side of NATO with Finland and Sweden as new membersis a more balanced burden-sharing within NATO, which allows the United States to channel more resources to Asia over the long term. Even before Russias invasion of Ukraine, the debate had increasingly shifted toward putting Europe in a position to defend itself. With Germany and other European countries committing to greater defense expenditures in the wake of Russias war, European defenses will indeed be bolstered.

Secondly, balancing China in the Indo-Pacific theater will require the United States to lean more on Quadrilateral Security Dialogue members and other Asian partners than on NATO. In recent years, the larger European nations have eagerly deployed naval vessels to sail in Asian waters, though some of these deployments have been little more than symbolic. NATO is strengthening relations with its formal Asia-Pacific partnersAustralia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealandwith an agreement to step up cooperation in areas such as cybersecurity, other new technologies, and countering disinformation. Nevertheless, it is still nebulous how exactly European militaries will add value to U.S. balancing efforts in Asia. European navies have been in constant decline since the end of the Cold War, whereas the Chinese navy has surpassed its U.S. counterpart in terms of number of vessels. China is now building theequivalentof the entire French Navy every four years. Elbridge Colby,co-founder of the Marathon Initiative, has suggested that it might serve the United States better to have Europe play to its strengths in the Euro-Atlantic area, an opinion echoed by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Commenting on the British deployment of its new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, to the Indo-Pacific region in 2021, Austin indicated that Britain is more helpful closer to home than in Asia.

Finally, due to its limited geographic reach across Eurasia, China will remain a lesser threat to European security than Russia. With Russia an openly belligerent threat for the foreseeable future, European resources will be pinned down at home, impeding the implementation of a joint trans-Atlantic approach in the Far East. For instance, NATO plans to increase the strength of its rapid reaction force dedicated to the defense of its Eastern European members nearly eightfold to 300,000 troops. Even though U.S. armed forces will remain engaged in Europe, the bulk of NATOs increased presence along its Eastern European frontier will have to be provided by European countries. And the security challenges in Europes own neighborhood are by no means limited to Russia. At a time when the United States is increasingly preoccupied in Asia, Europe faces crumbling stability in the Middle East, North Africa and other regions directly affecting Europe, not least through potential migration and refugee crises.

Against this background, it is inevitable that the main challenge for the United States and European allies over the coming years will be to design a trans-Atlantic division of labor. The problem is that this division has to be crafted in a more sophisticated fashion than the simple logic of Europe deterring Russia while the United States balances China. Such a simplistic division of labor not only risks a trans-Atlantic drift, but it could also result in a gradual military transformation gap, leaving NATO and Europe behind as a second-rate defense force. Moreover, deterring Russia is no simple, one-dimensional task. In Eastern Europe, it is a land-based theater, whereas in Northern Europe, it is largely sea based. Each creates different requirements for trans-Atlantic collaboration.

The division of labor debate has already begun. The Aspen Strategy Group has made the simple and obvious recommendation that Washington and Europe strengthen the trans-Atlantic dialogue on China. Others emphasize how the United States could save billions of dollars by suggesting NATO transcend geographic boundaries by focusing on defending cyber and outer space. As these examples show, the discourse is still in its infancy. A successful strategy will require much more work and fine-tuning, including inputs from policymakers, diplomats, defense officials, and the wider strategic communities in the United States, Europe, and Asian partner countries. NATOs belated acknowledgment in Madrid of a new global balance of power means this work can finally start.

Excerpt from:
NATO's New Division of Labor on Russia and China Won't Be Easy - Foreign Policy

President Biden summed up the results of discussions concerning support for Ukraine at the late June NATO summit this way: We are going to stick with Ukraine, and all of the Alliance is going to stick with Ukraine, as long as it takes, to make sure they are not defeated by Russia. The U.S. and NATO didnt seek this situation but we are in it. Nobody wants a war with Russia, but we are in too deep to get out now and must see this to the end.

Russian propaganda aside, Ukraine did nothing to provoke Russias attack. This is nothing less than an attempt by Vladimir Putin, who evidently considers himself the reincarnation of Peter the Great, to recreate the Russian Empire.

With strong U.S. leadership, NATO is rejuvenated and doing a good job of providing Ukraine heavier and more modern weapons to defend against a more powerful Russian army. But after four months of war, the consequences are starting to spill over into the larger global community. Rising prices at the gas pump, soaring inflation, and food shortages in some regions from a Russian blockade that prevents the export of Ukrainian crops, are causing pundits to suggest its time for Ukraine to seek a negotiated settlement even if Ukraine had to cede a substantial part of the country to the invader.

Others continue to speculate whether Western unity, which is key to helping Ukraine resist aggression, might begin to fracture. Gas is costing us more and our investments are not doing well, so lets force the victim of naked aggression to call it quits. But as Biden has stated, it is up to the Ukrainians to decide their fate.

In reality, Ukraine is fighting our war, too, because if Putin is successful in dominating or absorbing all of Ukraine into Russia which still appears to be his goal he then will turn on other former members of the defunct Soviet Union and Russia-dominated Warsaw Pact, some of whom are now members of NATO. Thousands of Ukrainians are dying while fighting for the same freedom and sovereignty that the American colonies sought in 1776. As Benjamin Franklin reportedly said then about the need for unity: We must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.

But, thus far, the U.S. and NATO have been self-deterred when deciding what type of support to provide Ukraine: Artillery yes, but not with ranges long enough to hit targets on Russian territory where Russian logistics bases have sanctuary. Old Russian fighters from former Warsaw Pact members are OK, but no modern fighters because Putin might consider this escalatory. But as Biden himself is fond of saying, Come on. The Ukrainians deserve our full support to prevent their defeat, no matter what it takes.

And lets end the slow dribbling of sanctions on Russia. Sanctions take time to work, and they are starting to have an impact on the Russian economy. But doling out another one or two after each outrageous Russian action just gives Russia time to adapt. If any Russian banks or major corporations that support the Russian military have not been sanctioned yet, lets do it now. Sanctions can impact the Russian armys ability to obtain repair parts and force them to take older and less capable equipment out of storage. So, while Ukraine is getting a steady stream of modern equipment from the West, Russia is resorting to outdated equipment.

Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, a former Supreme Allied Commander Europe and superintendent of West Point, advised three American presidents on national security issues. He once responded to a question from a confused cadet who pointed out that most of the situations being discussed had several variables and there always seemed to be two or three sides to the issue. How do you decide what decision to make? Goodpaster replied, I just ask myself what is best for my country.

In the Ukraine/Russia conflict, one must determine the one thing that either must or must not happen to establish a guidepost for making hard decisions. Its a bad situation, to be sure, but heres the bottom line: The one thing that must not happen is allowing Putin to come away as the perceived winner. If that happens, the rules-based global order that has kept the peace among the major powers since World War II will be mortally wounded. Europe will be destabilized for the indefinite future and NATO likely will be forced to defend one or more of its members. So, we need to do whatever is necessary to ensure that Putin has made a colossal mistake.

This is a fight the U.S. and Europe cannot allow Ukraine to lose. The best chance to avoid direct NATO conflict with Russia is to stop being self-deterred by measuring every decision against whether or not Putin will consider it to be escalatory, and provide Ukraine with the capabilities it needs to defeat this Russian invasion. Putin can rattle his nuclear saber but no matter how bad his situation becomes at the conventional level, it wont be improved by using nuclear weapons.

Ultimately, NATO may have to fight if not now to save Ukraine, then later to save itself.

John Fairlamb, Ph.D., is a retired Army colonel who served for 45 years as a commissioned officer and Department of the Army civilian in various Joint Service positions formulating and implementing national security strategies and policies. His doctorate is in comparative defense policy analysis.

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Increase support for Ukraine, or NATO may have to fight - The Hill