Daily Archives: March 29, 2022

Russia-Ukraine News Live Updates:

Talks between Ukraine and Russia began in Turkey on Tuesday without a handshake, Ukrainian television reported. "There was a cold welcome, no handshake," a Ukrainian reporter said, without making clear whether he had witnessed the delegation's meeting or had been told this by officials.

Mykhailo Podolyak, a political adviser to President Volodymr Zelenskiy, said on Twitter the delegations were discussing "the fundamental provisions of the negotiation process. Delegations are working in parallel on the entire spectrum of contentious issues."

The Russian invasion of Ukraine entered its 34th day today, even as negotiation talks between the two sides so far have not yielded any positive results.

The more than month-long invasion, the biggest of a Western nation since World War Two, has seen over 3.8 million people flee abroad, left thousands dead or injured, and brought the isolation of Russia's economy. Nearly 5,000 people have been killed, including about 210 children, in the port city of Mariupol amid heavy Russian bombardment, according to figures from the mayor.

First Published:Mar 29, 2022, 07:45 AM IST

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Russia-Ukraine War News Live Updates: 'Cold welcome, no handshake' as peace talks between Moscow and Kyiv begi - CNBCTV18

The deputy mayor of Mariupol, Sergiy Orlov, describes people sheltering in basements trying to survive without food, medicine or a power supply, and drinking melted snow because the water has been cut off. In Chernihiv, March 16, a line of 10 civilians queuing for bread outside a grocery shop were killed by Russian troops. Ukrainian intelligence reports indiscriminate shelling and targeting of agricultural machinery, fields and grain stores; and civilians are being blocked from leaving besieged towns and cities or killed whilst fleeing. This is a playbook familiar to any monitoring similar starvation crimes in Syria, Yemen, Tigray or South Sudan.

A few very elderly Ukrainians will remember the forced starvation of the Holodomor of 1932-33, when a combination of brutally enforced collectivization and punitive confiscation of food killed about three million Ukrainians through the resulting famine. It was the occasion for Stalins infamous remark if only one man dies of hunger, that is a tragedy; if millions die, thats only statistics. He was wrong: every Ukrainian knows the story, deeply carved into their collective memory. After Ukrainian independence, monuments to the victims of famine were constructed in Kiev and Kharkhiv.

It was another starvation crime that Volodymyr Zelenskiy chose to invoke when appealing to the Russians last week [16 March]. He said, Citizens of Russia, how is your blockade of Mariupol different from the blockade of Leningrad during World War Two?

During the 900-day siege of Leningrad, a million people perished of starvation and cold. Less well known is that a similar number died in Ukraine at the same time, victims of the aptly named German Hungerplan. Famine of this scale isnt in prospect today. Scores of people have died from lack of medical care over the last three weeks and there are increasing reports of individuals perishing from thirst and suffering extreme hunger and cold.

The absenceto dateof mass death from hunger doesnt mean that the Russian forces are innocent of the war crime of starvation. The crime is defined in Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as:

Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.

Each element of the crime is engaged in Ukraine today.

First, it is intentional. The Russian commanders are waging war in such a way that, in the normal course of events, people will starve. Thats enoughthe soldiers dont need to have a blueprint for famine to be guilty of the crime.

Second, theyre attacking civilians. The lawfulness of siege tactics can be debated, but it there is no grey area when it comes to civilians: they must never become the targets of attack.

Third, its a war. Despite Vladimir Putin calling it a special military operation it meets any objective definition of an international armed conflict. The International Court of Justice made this clear when it issued a provisional order to Russia to suspend its military operations on March 15.

Four, the Russians are depriving Ukrainians of objects indispensable to survival. In law, starvation goes beyond our everyday understanding of extreme lack of food. It is the denial of anything that is necessary for life, such as farms, cattle, drinking water, irrigation works, medical supplies, means of shelter, and fuel and electricity. The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator has described the damage in Ukraine which is leaving civilians without the basics for day-to-day life.

And lastly, there are also reports of humanitarian aid convoys being blocked from accessing Mariupol or looted on their way in, and efforts to evacuate civilians from the city being blocked.

The Ukrainian Prosecutors Generals Office and civil society organisations have been documenting war crimes in Ukraine since 2014, supported by Global Rights Compliance, a foundation based in The Hague. The evidence base for starvation crimes is accumulating daily, alongside other war crimes.

Its notoriously hard to apprehend war criminals and bring them to court. And in those cases where there have been prosecutionssuch as Cambodia and Former Yugoslaviano one has been charged with starvation crimes.

Just four years ago, the Russian representative at the UN Security Council cast his vote in support of resolution 2417, on the topic of armed conflict and hunger. The resolution affirms that using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare may constitute a war crime. Despite the ever-increasing use of hunger as a weapon of war in conflicts around the world, the UN has yet to utilize its authority to call out the culprits. Whether in Ethiopia, Myanmar, Syria or Yemen, hunger is inflicted with impunity.

Its time for our tacit tolerance of weaponized starvation to end. The evidence is in our faces; the law is in our hands; what is lacking is public clamour and political leadership. Starvation crimes should be put in their rightful place at the head of the list of acts of inhumanity so reprehensible that they are prohibited without question. Ukrainians should not be condemned to starve for the third time in a hundred years.

Alex de Waal is executive director of the World Peace Foundation, Boston Massachusetts

Catriona Murdoch is a partner at Global Rights Compliance, an international foundation specialising in international criminal, humanitarian, and human rights law

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Russia could be guilty of starvation crimes in Ukraine. We must act - The Guardian

Wally Adeyemo, deputy U.S. Treasury secretary, speaks during a news conference at the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., U.S., on Monday, Nov. 8, 2021.

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The U.S. will hold accountable any actor that seeks to help Russia bypass economic sanctions amid the Kremlin's unprovoked onslaught on Ukraine, Deputy U.S. Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo told CNBC on Tuesday.

The U.S. and international allies have imposed a barrage of punitive measures against Russia since the country launched its invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24.

The conflict has triggered adevastating humanitarian crisis,sent shock wavesthrough financial markets and left Russiaincreasingly isolatedon the global stage.

"We have not seen to date that Russia has been able to evade our sanctions in a meaningful way, but we know that they are attempting to do so and we know they are going to try and use every means possible," Adeyemo told CNBC's "Street Signs Europe."

He cited cryptocurrencies and opaque shell companies as possible means that Russia may exploit to bypass the economic sanctions.

"What we want to make very clear to crypto exchanges, to financial institutions, to individuals, to anyone who may be in a position to help Russia take advantage and evade our sanctions: We will hold you accountable," Adeyemo said.

"We will come and we will find you, and we will ensure that Russia does not have the ability to get around the sanctions that we have put in place in order to make it harder for them to prosecute the illegitimate war that they have in Ukraine."

His comments come shortly after the G-7 major economies pledged to ensure the Russian state, elites, proxies and oligarchs would not be able to leverage digital assets to sidestep the impact of international sanctions.

The G-7 group is comprised of the U.K., U.S., Canada, Japan, Germany, France and Italy.

Digital currencies have provenuseful in boosting Ukraine's defenses, with the government raising millions of dollars in crypto donations from the public. At the same time, regulators are worried about their potential use in evading sanctions imposed on Russia.

Read more of CNBC's politics coverage:

People who transact in cryptocurrencies are kept anonymous, which has often made them a prime target for cybercriminals. However, experts say it is possible to trace the movement of funds thanks to the public nature of the blockchain, an immutable record of all digital currency transactions.

Nevertheless, crypto exchanges have come under pressure from politiciansincluding Democratic Sen. Elizabeth Warren of Massachusettsto introduce tougher checks to ensure they can prevent sanctioned individuals and companies from moving their money into crypto.

CNBC's Ryan Browne contributed to this report.

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We will come and we will find you: U.S. issues warning to anyone helping Russia bypass sanctions - CNBC

Traders work on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in New York City, U.S., March 21, 2022. REUTERS/Brendan McDermid

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March 29 (Reuters) - U.S. stocks rose on Tuesday, lifted by signs of progress in peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, while a widely tracked part of the Treasury yield curve flashed warning signs for the economy as it neared inversion.

Moscow has decided to drastically cut military activity around Kyiv and northern Ukraine, while Ukraine proposed adopting a neutral status but with international guarantees that it would be protected from attack. read more

Risk-on sentiment returned with European stocks rallying and gold prices slipping, while Brent crude prices dropped to $108 a barrel.

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"This market right here has turned into very much a headline-driven market," said Robert Gilliland, managing director at Concenture Wealth Management.

"The challenge is that I'm not certain that many people actually believe in the long term. What people are doing is looking for short-term opportunities and, therefore, buyers are driving up the market here."

Nine of the 11 major S&P 500 indexes advanced in afternoon trading.

Oil majors Exxon Mobil Corp (XOM.N) and Chevron Corp (CVX.N) fell more than 2% each, while the broader S&P 500 energy (.SPNY) declined 2.4%. Material stocks (.SPLRCM) dipped.

Russia's invasion, which began on Feb. 24, has triggered a rally in commodity and metal prices, fueling worries over surging inflation as the U.S. Federal Reserve and other major central banks start withdrawing stimulus put in place during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Data showed U.S. consumer confidence edged higher in March from a year-low reading a month earlier, with Americans' assessment of current economic conditions improving on the back of a healthy job market, offsetting concerns over inflation.

At 12:14 p.m. ET, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (.DJI) was up 194.92 points, or 0.56%, at 35,150.81, the S&P 500 (.SPX) was up 29.76 points, or 0.65%, at 4,605.28, and the Nasdaq Composite (.IXIC) was up 172.74 points, or 1.20%, at 14,527.64.

While all the three major U.S. indexes are on course to end March higher on the back of strong economic data and gains in megacaps, they are set to record their worst quarter since the first three months of 2020 when the pandemic wreaked havoc on financial markets.

Meanwhile, the spread between U.S. 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields narrowed below five basis points, moving another step closer to inversion, as traders bet that faster rate hikes would hurt the U.S. economy over the longer term. read more

"People are understanding that cash is going to lose when you have high inflation. Bonds have risk to them. And, therefore, people are looking at where they can put money and that's why you're seeing some of this with stocks," said Gilliland.

Megacap companies like Meta Platforms Inc (FB.O), Apple Inc (AAPL.O) and Alphabet Inc (GOOGL.O) gained between 1.2% and 2.4%.

FedEx Corp (FDX.N) gained 4.1% after the global delivery conglomerate named operating chief Raj Subramaniam as its top boss. read more

Advancing issues outnumbered decliners by a 2.92-to-1 ratio on the NYSE and a 3.11-to-1 ratio on the Nasdaq.

The S&P index recorded 45 new 52-week highs and no new lows, while the Nasdaq recorded 57 new highs and 27 new lows.

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Reporting by Bansari Mayur Kamdar and Amruta Khandekar in Bengaluru; Editing by Arun Koyyur and Sriraj Kalluvila

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Wall St buoyed by signs of progress in Russia-Ukraine peace talks - Reuters.com

While securing accurate fatality numbers from a war zone is very difficult, evidence is mounting that the Russian military casualty rate in Ukraine is extremely high.

NATO has estimated the number of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine since the invasion began at between7,000 and 15,000. That higher estimate roughly equals the number of Soviet soldiers killedin over a decade of fighting in Afghanistan.

According to a report in the New York Times in mid-March, United States intelligence officials said they were confident that up to 7,000 Russians had been killed by that point in the conflict.

The Washington Post reported around the same time that a Russian news website posted a file and then swiftly took itdown again claiming that up to10,000 soldiers had been killed so far in the conflict.

CBC News takes a closer look at why Russia's losses have been so high andhow long they canbe sustained, and the difficulty of getting accurate statistics out of a war zone.

While experts say there are reasons to believe some of the Russian fatality estimates are close to the mark, getting a clear accountof the battlefield death toll is almost impossible.

"In war conditions you have the fog of war, which makes it very difficult to get accurate numbers," said Walter Dorn, a professor of defence studies at the Royal Military College.

"In order to see deaths you'd have to go to places where there's people dying, which usually means there is a dangerous threat. So it's hard for objective observers to get that kind of number."

Stephen Saideman, the Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Carleton University and the director of the Canadian Defence and Security Network, told CBC News that experts don'tlike to place their trust in figures provided by either Russia or Ukraine.

"Each side has an incentive to inflate the damage they do, and deflate the damage that's been done to them," he said. "It's part of every war to do that."

Experts from the U.S. and NATO use models to calculate losses that are informed by intelligence on the ground, satellite imagery and awareness of the Russian military, making them the most trustworthy sources we'relikely to get, said Saideman and Dorn.

"We know the size of a Russian battalion, we know how many guys go into a Russian tank, which tank takes four, which tank takes three, and we have plenty of video and pictures," Saideman said.

Sean Maloney isa professor of military history at the Royal Military College who served as the Canadian army's historian for the conflict in Afghanistan. He told CBC that, based on his knowledge of Russia's military andsources inside of Belarus and Russia,the high-end NATO estimate of Russian casualties is likely accurate.

"I am confident, with the sources that I have, that the number of Russians killed in action is above 15,000," Maloney said.

If that estimate is accurate,it raises a question: Why has a single month of war in Ukraine killed almost as many Russian soldiers as did the Soviet Union'sdecade-longwar in Afghanistan?

"This was always going to be bloodier than the wars that we've become accustomed to because it's just a higher level of explosive power meeting a higher level of explosive power," Saideman said.

Experts say Western democracies have come to expectcasualty numbers similar to those generated by U.S. conflicts in the Middle East. Saideman and Maloney saidthis is a very different kind of war.

Afghanistan and Iraq have been "low-intensity conflicts," Maloney said.

"Yes they are violent, yes people get killed," he said. "But [in Ukraine]we are dealing with high-intensity, mechanized warfare where you have large numbers of vehicles, large numbers of personnel, lots of air support colliding at the same time, all over the place. This is continual, across the board."

Another reason for the large number of casualties, said Saideman, is poor Russian strategy.

"The Russians did not prepare the battlefieldat all," he said. "They did not do many of the things that America/NATO doctrine would usually do, which is to take as much of the anti-aircraft ability away, hit the command nodes.

"The fact that Ukrainians still have power, they still have the Internet, they still have communications means it's a lot easier for the Ukrainians to make smart decisions and communicate them effectively."

Saideman said Russia's military medical serviceshave been substandardas well, which has contributed to the fatality rate. Reports out of Ukraine suggestRussian medics are not properly treating casesof frostbite, along withmore serious injuries.

And because there was no pre-invasion bombardment, he said, airspace over Ukraine remains contested. Ukrainian forces have been able to shoot down helicopters that may have been carryingwounded soldiers back from the front.

Maloney said the poor state of the Russian military has left troops on the ground with inadequateequipment.

"They don't care about their personnel, their vehicles are not equipped to protect their people. They are not like our vehicles with fire suppression systems and all that," he said.

"I have not seen an armoured ambulance this entire war. We have thembut I haven't seen an armoured ambulance at all."

To sustain theseheavy losses and continue the war,Russian President Vladimir Putin mustmaintain battlefield morale and hold on to the autocratic regime he leads. Experts say there are reasons tobelieve both Russia's ability to prosecute the war and Putin's grip on power could beunder threat.

Maloney said Russia's military is poorly trained. He saidthatan estimated 31 senior Russian military officers, from colonels to generals, have been killed in action, as have manyhighly trained soldiers.

Losing officers and experienced fighters can underminetroop morale. But poor training, lacklustre logistics and substandard medical support are having a bigger effect on Russia's war effort, experts said.

"The soldiers who are currently fighting, if they see that their colleagues are not being acknowledged they will lose their will to fight," Dorn said. "If they see their dead comrades, whom they're bereaved about are not being returned home it's going to have a huge effect on Russian troop morale."

Despite his iron grip on Russia, Putin also has to keep in mind the threat of a backlashat home.

"His power base is the intelligence and the military and if he loses the support of the generals and the foot soldiers, then he knows he can't stay in power very long. There's a huge risk for him," said Dorn.

Retired majorMichael Boire, a former NATO war planner and assistant professor of military history at Royal Military College, disagreed. He said that while a high death toll would be a problem forcountry like Canada, Russians are used to bad news.

"A democracy would say these are high, unacceptable, grislynumbers. The average Russian would say, 'That's war, that's the way it is, that's the way you do business,' Boire said.

"The average Russian, he or she expects life to be rough."

Saideman said that during the Soviet war inAfghanistan, a group of mothers organizedto press the regime to end the war and bring their sons home. In the short term, he said, battlefield losses in Ukraine will require Putin to spend more resources to hold on to power. In the longer term, he added,it could go one of two ways.

"At some point there will be a large gathering of people and the Russian oppression apparatus will show up and they'll face a choice of whether to shoot at these protesters or not," he said. "And we never know how that will play out until it actually plays out."

Have questions about this story? We're answering as many as we can in the comments.

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Russia's military losses in Ukraine continue to mount. Here's a look at why the death toll is so high - CBC News

The United Arab Emirates' energy and infrastructure minister has insisted that Russia will always be a part of OPEC+ even as governments across the globe shun the oil exporter over its war in Ukraine.

Speaking to CNBC on Monday, Suhail Al Mazrouei, a former president of the oil alliance, said no other country could match Russia's energy output and argued politics should not distract from the group's efforts to manage energy markets.

"Always, Russia is going to be part of that group and we need to respect them," he told Hadley Gamble at the Atlantic Council's sixth annual Global Energy Forum in Dubai.

"OPEC+, when they speak to us, they need to speak to us including Russia," he said, referring to the group's negotiations with energy importers.

The U.S., Europe and Japan have called on oil-producing nations to do more to tackle record-high prices amid the war in Ukraine and ongoing supply shortages.

But, Al Mazrouei said Russian oil would play a vital role in achieving that. The comments come as Western allies express concern that Russian energy imports are indirectly topping up President Vladimir Putin's war chest with oil and gas revenue.

"Who can replace Russia today? I cannot think of a country that can in a year, two, three, four or even 10 years replace 10 million barrels. It's not realistic," he said.

OPEC+, led by Saudi Arabia and Russia, has the capacity to increase oil output and bring down crude prices, which have jumped to over $100 a barrel.

They are doing something but expecting the opposite reaction, and it's not going to happen.

Suhail Al Mazrouei

UAE Minister of Energy and Infrastructure

"We are in agreement with their target or their objective of trying to calm the market and balance the market," Al Mazrouei said. "But you don't do it this way. You don't do it by putting sanctions on a hydrocarbon that you cannot replace unless you want the prices to go high."

"They are doing something but expecting the opposite reaction, and it's not going to happen."

OPEC and non-OPEC ministers are slated to meet on Thursday via videoconference to determine the next phase of production policy.

It comes amid renewed pressure for the influential alliance to boost oil supplies after G-7 energy ministers said OPEC "has a key role to play" in easing market tensions.

"We call on oil and gas producing countries to act in a responsible manner and to examine their ability to increase deliveries to international markets particularly where production is not meeting full capacity noting that OPEC has a key role to play," G-7 energy ministers said in a joint statement on March 10.

"This will help to ease tensions and note with appreciation announcements already made to this end."

The G-7 group of major economies is comprised of the U.K., U.S., Canada, Japan, Germany, France and Italy.

OPEC+ is in the process of unwinding record supply cuts of roughly 10 million barrels per day. The historic production cut was put in place in April 2020 to help the energy market recover after the coronavirus pandemic cratered demand for crude.

Most recently, the group's been raising output by 400,000 barrels per day each month. The energy alliance has stayed the course despitesustained pressure from top consumers to pump more to cool prices and aid the economic recovery.

OPEC alone accounts for around 40% of the world's oil supply.

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Russia will 'always' be a part of OPEC+, UAE energy minister says - CNBC

Regardless of how things play out in Ukraine over the near-term, it appears all but certain that Russia and the West will find themselves locked in a protracted confrontation for years to come. Will that confrontation be global or confined to Europe? All-encompassing or limited? Regulated by some residual rules or totally anarchic? As answers to these questions begin to crystallize, the Middle East will be a key region to watch.

The Syrian civil war and the Iran dossier provide good test cases for assessing how the new Russian-Western confrontation could affect the Middle East. In Syria, Russia and the West have in recent years competed for influence, deconflicted to avoid clashes, while cooperating selectively on counter-terrorism, humanitarian issues, and a political process under U.N. auspices. On Iran, they have managed to insulate cooperation on the nuclear dossier even amid growing tensions surrounding Ukraine, yet failed to join forces in tackling a broader regional arms-control agenda.

Russia will likely seek to avoid coming to blows with NATO forces in Syria while its military remains fully committed inside Ukraine. However, Russias previous nod to U.S. counter-terrorism strikes in Syria, or acquiescence to limited flows of international humanitarian aid into the countrys northwest, could change. Restoration of the Iran nuclear deal might still succeed, but additional efforts on regional arms control could take a backseat amid Russian equivocation and U.S. preoccupations elsewhere. Overall, the Syrian and Iranian dossiers suggest that heightened Russian-Western confrontation will likely manifest in the Middle East through a mix of aversion to direct military confrontation, yet intensified competition and shrinking opportunities for cooperation.

Syria Intensified?

Russias intervention in Syria in September 2015 laid the foundation for a sustained military presence in the Levant. Its anti-access/area-denial deployments at the Tartus naval port and the Khmeimim air base allowed the Russian military to establish a buffer zone on its southern flank and signal that it has the capacity to push back against NATO forces outside of Europe. Russian exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean last summer, which involved Tu-22M3 bombersand MiG-31K interceptorswithKinzhalair-launched ballistic missiles, served as a reminder that Russia canquicklypositionserious naval and aerial assets to Syria. Ten days prior to its invasion of Ukraine, Russia redeployed the same systems to the area. Such Russian military muscle-flexing has complicated the operations of NATOs navies and air forces, given the potential for unsafe and unprofessional intercepts or aggressive actions by Russian forces. While 2021 saw a reduction in incidents of brinkmanship between Russian and U.S. troops in northeast Syria, the United States complained about increased occurrences of Russian harassment in the weeks prior to the invasion of Ukraine.

Now that Russia has the bulk of its active-duty military committed to Ukraine and faces a war of attrition, the risk of it picking a fight with U.S. forces in Syria in the near future should be lowered. Though Russia technically maintains the capacity to lash out in Syria with existing aerial and naval assets, it is in a weaker position to do so since invading Ukraine, where it now desperately seeks to gain momentum. Reports of Russia recruiting Syrian fighters for urban warfare in Ukraine are indicative of the shortages faced by the Russian military. Against that backdrop, collision with U.S. or Turkish forces in northern Syria would now come with far greater risks to Russia. Recently, Gen. Kenneth McKenzie indicated that Russian forces in Syria have shown no signs of intent to escalate tensions with U.S. troops there since Russia invaded Ukraine.

While we might see such Russian risk aversion in the immediate term, it is not a given that Moscows acquiescence to U.S. counter-terrorism operations will stand the test of time. U.S.-Russian counter-terrorism cooperation was always hindered by stark disagreements over the anti-Assad armed opposition, but Russia usually refrained from challenging U.S. air access for counter-terrorism strikes. Deconfliction channels for air security and ground operations enabled the U.S. military to safely operate within specific boundaries, though the Pentagon was adamant that such mechanisms did not constitute cooperation with Russia.

Just a few weeks prior to Russias invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. military killed Islamic State leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi in an airstrike, reportedly informing its Russian counterpart of the planned operation in advance. As Mackenzie noted, Sustained [counter-terrorism] pressure is what prevents groups from being able to grow, to train, to think about plotting beyond their immediate survival, for example up and down the Euphrates River Valley in Iraq and Syria. Should terrorist cells remain in Syria, and even regain strength, Americas ability to maintain such sustained pressure is not cast in stone. Russia, all-consumed by the Ukraine battlefield, might refrain from challenging U.S. forces in Syria in the near-term given resource constraints, risk aversion, and the fact that it is far from obvious how military action on its southern flank would help it turn the tide in Ukraine. Taking the longer view, however, the U.S.-Russian deconfliction mechanism in Syria could become a victim of their intensified and protracted confrontation.

Heightened Russian-Western friction could also adversely affect the situation in Syria in other ways. Going forward, Western capitals will be eager to further complicate Russias efforts at normalizing Syrias position in the region, since such normalization would enhance Russias own net gains by easing the burden of shouldering reconstruction costs for the war-ravaged country. The West will also be hard-pressed to ease pressure on the Syria dossier at the U.N. Security Council, notwithstanding rumors to the contrary. Further, neither Russia nor Western countries should be inclined to see their Syrian partners yield in negotiations led by the constitutional committee, whose small body is presently convening in Geneva.

It is also conceivable that Russia might stop cooperation on the humanitarian dossier. Last summer, the U.N. Security Council unanimously agreed to extend the mandate for the transport of aid to Syria through a crossing on the border with Turkey, adopting Resolution 2585. In July, that resolution will be up for renewal and a Russian veto could precipitate a crippling humanitarian crisis for millions of Syrian civilians. Hopefully, Moscow will calculate that the last thing it needs on its hands now is a humanitarian crisis in Syria. Government-controlled parts of the country where intermittent instability has caused headaches for the Russians will likely have to contend with reduced Russian wheat supplies as a result of the war in Ukraine. It is not a given that Russia will want to accelerate a wider food crisis by shutting down cross-border aid, especially if an endgame in Ukraine remains elusive. Still, some observers recommend an overhaul of U.S. Syria policy toward a freeze and build strategy, one that pivots away from tactical emergency assistance toward strategic stabilization across northern Syria. Amid such an overhaul, Western early recovery projects in government-held Syria might appear less politically palatable. Such projects were endorsed as part of a package-deal compromise in Resolution 2585, following years of Western agonizing over the concern that such aid would effectively constitute development assistance to a pariah state. Going forward, any and all forms of humanitarian assistance to Syria could well be looked at again through the lens of competition with Russia.

Iran Inflamed?

In past years, Russian-Western engagement on the Iran nuclear dossier remained remarkably insulated from broader tensions, whether during President Barack Obamas second term, or through 2021. Even as Russia invaded Ukraine in late February, its diplomats and Western counterparts proceeded with talks in Vienna, aimed at restoring the Iran nuclear deal, largely uninterrupted. Whether such insulation can continue was thrown into doubt when Moscow surprised Washington and irritated Iran by demanding written U.S. guarantees that Russias trade, investment, and military-technical cooperation with Tehran would not be hindered by the sanctions imposed against it over Ukraine. Russia appears to have walked back its pushy rhetoric since, yet restoration of the nuclear deal is still hanging in the balance.

Even if Russia and its counterparts can push that deal across the finish line, tensions in Europe could affect all sides desire and bandwidth to prevent further nuclear or missile proliferation in the Middle East. In the past, U.S.-Russian cooperation was instrumental for arms-control gains in the region. Though Moscow and Washington often disagreed on the right balance between carrots and sticks in dealing with nonproliferation-averse players, past initiatives such as the Arms Control and Regional Security working group in the 1990s, or the Glion/Geneva consultations in 2013 and 2014 benefited from U.S. leadership and Russian support. In the absence of U.S. leadership, initiatives usually struggled for relevance. The U.N. conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East is a case in point.

Amid new confrontation in Europe, Russia might be less inclined to support Western-led initiatives for arms control in the Middle East. To be sure, its ambivalent stance on the Iranian missile and proxy threats is hardly new and has been rooted in the calculation that those can play into Moscows hands. Tehrans offensive defense strategy has been viewed by the Kremlin as convenient, in that it pins down U.S. attention while allowing Moscow to pose as chief regional intermediary. Iran or its proxies overstepping and inviting outright military escalation would not be in Russias interest now, while its own diplomatic and military resources are consumed by Putins Ukraine gambit. At the same time, Moscow will see preciously little incentive to work with the West toward even the most modest and incremental regional arms-control process anytime soon.

On the back of the Ukraine war, Russias lukewarm disposition toward supporting arms control in the Middle East could be compounded by reduced U.S. bandwidth. Already in recent years, regional states efforts at balancing between the United States, Russia, and China were largely driven by perceptions of limited U.S. attentiveness to, or unpredictable policies in the Middle East. Washingtons perceived handling of the Iran nuclear dossier and insufficient push-back against Iranian proxies, as well as its failure to turn the tide in the Syrian civil war, unnerved the Arab Gulf states and Israel. U.S. military drawdowns from Afghanistan, the Gulf, and Iraq further amplified the perception of an American pivot to the east. Having long sought opportunities for freeing up resources for the Indo-Pacific theatre, the United States might feel even greater compulsion to realize a low-cost posture in the Middle East, now that the war in Ukraine has ignited great-power competition in Europe.

Could the combination of Russian equivocation and U.S. distraction compel regional adversaries to pursue arms control and trust-building more proactively? It was the perception of U.S. disengagement from the region that partially motivated several Arab states to normalize relations with Israel over the past eighteen months. The Baghdad Conference for Cooperation and Partnership last August and Iranian-Saudi talks were further indicators of a growing realization among regional states that they need to talk to their adversaries rather than just shore up deterrent capabilities. Developments since the Ukraine invasion be it the recent Iranian strikes on Israeli targets in Erbil, the suspension of Iranian-Saudi talks, or Fridays Houthi attack on an oil depot in the Saudi city of Jeddah raise doubts over the robustness of that realization, however. Meanwhile, the United States warns that Russia (and China) will seek to capitalize on any opportunities afforded by perceptions of U.S. disengagement from the Middle East amid intensified great-power confrontation.

Dont Be Optimistic

Assuming that Russia and the West have entered a new era of protracted and heightened confrontation, their appetite for taking that contest to the Middle East, insulating cooperation on urgent matters there, and freeing up resources to stay engaged in the region will impact stability for better or worse. In that context, Syria and Iran offer useful test cases for assessing what to expect. In Syria, Russian concerns with overstretching itself should lead its military to refrain from escalating tensions in the foreseeable future. Humanitarian aid flows, U.S. counter-terrorism efforts, and whatever is left of the political process, however, could all suffer as Syria turns into an arena of heightened Russian-Western competition. Regarding Iran, the soon-to-be-decided fate of the nuclear deal will be indicative of a joint Russian-Western ability to insulate regional arms control and nonproliferation in the future. Whether the Middle East can move forward on these issues will also depend on Moscows disposition and Washingtons bandwidth to pay attention.

Hanna Notte, Ph.D. is a senior research associate with the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, where she focuses on arms control and security issues involving Russia, the Middle East, their intersection, and implications for U.S. and European policy. She holds a doctorate and M.Phil. in international relations from Oxford University and a B.A. in social and political sciences from Cambridge University. Her contributions have appeared in The Nonproliferation Review,Foreign Policy,The National Interest,andCarnegie,among others.

Image: TASS (Russian Ministry of Defence)

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Will Western-Russian Confrontation Shake the Middle East? - War on the Rocks

This week saw the first briefing from the Russian military on their "special military operation" in Ukraine.

Speaking in front of a massive screen showing maps and videos from Russia's Ukraine operations, Colonel General Sergei Rudskoi's short update provided several interesting pieces of information.

Of course, these should not be taken at face value. From long before this war began, the Russians have consistently misled Western observers about their intentions. Several aspects bear scrutiny.

First, Rudskoi noted that "the main tasks of the first stage of the operation have been completed".

This is true. But not because the relative halt in Russian operations was part of their overall operational design. The first phase is over because it is being enforced by the courageous Ukrainian defensive strategy, large amounts of Western military aid, and Russian military incompetence in their ground tactics, air campaign and logisticsupport to their troops.

As I described in my analysis last week, Russia's forces in Ukraine have culminated after just one month of combat operations.

Rudskoi noted in his briefing that "the combat potential of the armed forces of Ukraine has been significantly reduced". I am almost certain that this is true. But, as Obi-Wan Kenobi once explained, this would only be from a certain point of view.

Ukraine has taken combat casualties, and it has had many of its civilians killed and maimed by Russian forces. But in a relative sense, the Ukrainians have not lost the same amount of combat power as the Russians. Indeed, with their superior leadership, strong sense of purpose and vastly better morale, the combat potential of the Ukrainian military has probably grown stronger as the weeks have passed.

The Russian general described how, when it came to Ukraine's cities, "we did not plan to storm them in order to prevent destruction and minimise losses among personnel and civilians". This is very difficult to credit. In Syria and Chechnya, the Russian military playbook has consistently featured attacks on civilians and urban areas. The Russians were also quick to implement this approach in Kharkiv, Mariupol, Sumy and beyond.

Rudskoi's update was a sanitised version of Russia's disastrous Ukrainian campaign so far.

Theinitial plan, to rapidly seize Kyiv and other centres in the hope the Ukrainian government and military (and the West) would acquiesce, failed. They thenhad to implement a Plan Binvasion that was focused on weakening and wearing down the Ukrainian armed forces.

This had some success, but primarily in terrain seized rather than reducing the combat power of the Ukrainians.

The Russian Plan C then became the deliberate targeting of Ukrainian cities, infrastructureand civilians to terrorise the Ukrainian people and their government into a political accommodation.

None of this has worked for the Russians.

Therefore, the Russian military high command, feeling the pressure from a frustrated Putin, is developing a revised plan for their Ukrainian debacle. The new plan (or an evolved Plan C) is likely to have three defining elements.

First, the Russians will continue to bombard the cities with artillery, rockets and dumb bombs delivered by reticent Russian Air Force planes. Despite the assurances of Rudskoi, the Russians will continue to do this because it is easier to lob massed artillery into cities than fight for them and because (in their world view) it places pressure on the Ukrainian government to succumb to Russian pressure in war termination negotiations.

Second, the Russians will continue to broaden the scope of the war to western Ukraine. This has been a desultory effort by the Russians so far. They have lobbed less than a dozen missiles at western Ukrainian cities. But the value in this western campaign is less military than political. Unless there is a ground invasion from Belarus in this region, this will remain the case.

While the Russians may destroy fuel depots or transhipment locations for Western aid, the military impact will be limited. However, it sends a message to Western governments that Russia will not tolerate the inflow of Western lethal aid or foreign recruits. This is why the attack over the weekend was timed to coincide with the visit of US President Joe Biden to Poland.

A final element of Russia's new campaign design for Ukraine featured prominently in Rudskoi's briefing.

He described an important part of the Russian mission as "the liberation of Donbas". He mentioned this at least three times in the briefing.

While this might well be deception for other Russian plans, there is a certain logic to this. Russian operations in Luhansk and Donetsk have made steady progress, although they have been very costly in Russian (and Ukrainian proxy) lives. Given the Russians now control most of Ukraine's southern coast, an offensive in the east might deliver a "victory" that Putin could sell to both domestic and international audiences.

For the last couple of weeks, Russian forces have attempted to advance from areas in the south towards Zaporizhzhia. At the same time, Russian forces have been trying to advance south from Kharkiv. The logical operational goal here would be the capture of the city of Dnipro. This would give Russia control over a large proportion of eastern Ukraine.

If the Russians were to pause their northern and southern operations, and reinforce their ground forces in the east, it is also possible that they might also be able to surround and destroy Ukraine's military forces defending this part of the country.

This would be a major loss for the Ukrainian military, and significant victory for the Russians. To achieve this, the Russians will need to improve their battlefield leadership, combined arms tactics, rear area security, logistics, communications security and a range of other basic military skills. But the Russians have showed the capacity to adapt in some areas of their campaign; we should not discount this possibility.

Therefore, in the coming weeks, look to the eastern theatre of this war. We may see a significant Russian offensive in this region. Not only might this be the military victory Putin has been seeking, but it would provide bargaining power to achieve a political settlement favourable to Russian in any ceasefire negotiations.

It is a region that is no stranger to war. In the second half of 1943, a massive Soviet Army swept across the eastern parts of Ukraine from their starting points in Western Russia. Part of this campaign was a battle in the Donbas region that saw 1million Soviet soldiers battling 400,000 Germans. Over five weeks, the Soviets lost nearly a quarter of their men killed and wounded.

The Nazis made the Russians pay for every kilometre gained.

The numbers of troops involved in any Russian offensive in the Donbas in the coming weeks will not be as large. Butwe can be assured that it will be an enormously bloody campaign.

As they have elsewhere in this war, the Ukrainians will ensure that any advance by the Russians is paid for in the blood of the young and inexperienced Russian reinforcements that will surely make up a large part of this assault.

Mick Ryan is a strategist and recently retired Australian Army major general. He served in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, and as a strategist on the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. His first book, War Transformed, is about 21st-century warfare.

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Russia's military is under pressure in Ukraine and refocusing on the east is likely to be a bloody campaign - ABC News