Daily Archives: March 18, 2022

Editors Note: Elliot Kaufman, letters editor of the Wall Street Journal, Alexandra DeSanctis, a staff writer for National Review, and Saurabh Sharma, the president of American Moment, joined City Journal associate editor Theodore Kupfer for a conversation on the future of the American Right. The following transcript has been edited for clarity and economy.

Teddy Kupfer: I want to start off by thinking a bit about the title of this event, which is Whos Right? The question is an allusion to the tendencies that occupy the right side of the political spectrum: social conservatives and libertarians, neo-conservatives and populists, RINOs and reactionaries. But more controversially, the question could be construed to imply that some of these tendencies may be more authentically conservative than others, or that certain views should take priority in a conservative coalition.

These divisions certainly exist, and we will discuss them as the panel proceeds. But I wonder if they might conceal an underlying unity. Take the issues of rising crime, deteriorating public order, public-health overreach, and the long march of progressivism through the institutions. Its reasonable to assume that you three are all concerned by these trends. My first question is: Do you think that these areas of agreement can form the basis for conservative politics in the year 2022?

Alexandra DeSanctis: I think that they can. I tend to think that the areas where conservatives agree are a lot more important than where we disagree, when it comes to whom we elect, at least. What they do once theyre in office is not necessarily as simple. But I would point to the campaign of Glenn Youngkin, in particular, as evidence that the things we agree on are more important, because what the Left is doing right now troubles conservatives a lot more than what we ought to do in response.

The Left is going particularly crazy. Theyre pushing for things that are deeply unpopular, as Youngkin and the success of his campaign showed. Even though conservatives might disagree a bit about what we should do in response, if were in charge we know that pushing back against the Left is more important than quibbling over where we might disagree. I suppose the problems weve had with Donald Trump might dispute that a little bit. But for the most part, responding to the Left is the most important thing. And we can do that without fighting over where we disagree.

Saurabh Sharma: I think that if you take the question that you posed very narrowlyIn 2022, what should the Right be running on? Ending the disorder in our cities, the racialization of public education, and the general overreach of the Leftthat is perfectly fine. But in any other time horizon, it is wholly insufficient. If all the Right can muster in the United States is the idea that after the Left wins decades of victories, well marshal the tiniest response to slow them down a little bit, thats not a governing agenda. Eventually, permanent political victories or something that looks close to permanent political victories are very possible on the left of center. I look for more than just a reactive agenda that can be held by the Rightone that has something to offer to the American people beyond were not those crazy people over there.

Elliot Kaufman: I think theres no reason why there couldnt be unity, especially now, as Saurabh mentioned. Conservatives are not in power. Opposition usually has a unifying effect in that way. We can agree on what were against. On what were for, we can agree up to a point. On a variety of issues, unity could be possible. But in many ways, its a choice.

If there are micro-movements on the right that would like to spend all their time bashing other people on the right, well, then theres probably not going to be unity. In many ways, its that simple. If were going to have an environment on the right in which anyone who has a traditional, post-1945 foreign policy is going to be called a war-monger, or, worse, a war criminalif were going to have a kind of Right where everyone who believes in traditional, small-government conservatism is accused of not caring for the poorthen there probably wont be unity. That kind of rhetoricthats liberalism circa 2005. So, if were going to have 2005 liberalism on the right, even when we are in opposition leading up to a winnable midterm election, no, I dont think unity is in the cards.

Teddy Kupfer: Lets ground this discussion in some specific public-policy demands. I often hear it said that social conservatives have been the junior partner in the conservative consensus. The foreign-policy hawks got their muscular posture in Europe, the free-marketeers got their tax reductions and privatization, and what did social conservatives get but a string of defeats? Republicans almost stand idly by as abortion rights are entrenched in American life, same-sex marriage is legalized, and raising a family on a single income becomes basically impossible, depending on where you live.

I wonder if you think this criticism is true, and if it is true, to what extent social conservatives should jettison, or at least be suspicious of, the institutions that presided over this junior partnership.

Alexandra DeSanctis: I think its fair to call it a junior partnership. Something that I appreciate about the conservative perspective is that cultural problems are not, first and foremost, something that the government solves. Families, individuals, communities, civil society: those are the first bulwark against cultural problems. The federal government does not need to come in and solve every social issue that we might have. Thats why I would say that, if theres a junior partnership, it exists at the federal level.

For example, a few years back, we had Republicans in control of the Senate, the House, and the presidency. Theyve been promising for something like ten years to defund Planned Parenthood. Did they defund Planned Parenthood when they were in charge? No, but they passed a tax cut. Im perfectly happy for them to do that, but Republicans tend to run at the national level on defund Planned Parenthood or other social-conservative promises, and then they get in office and forget about it. I dont think that means that the conservative movement or the Republican Party as a whole doesnt care about social issues. Its just at the national level that its a problem.

Things like education and defunding the police are social issues. All these things that have been hot-button issuesidentity politics, abortionthe Republican Partys starting to notice, Hey, wait a minute, as the other side goes crazy like I said before, we can push back against that in a way that resonates with the average American, even if they might not be as conservative as us. So I see that shifting quite a bit in a way where social conservatives actually have a leadership role to take.

Elliot Kaufman: Part of the reason the position of social conservatism has deteriorated somewhat on the American Right is that it has deteriorated somewhat in America. There are fewer social conservatives in America than there were a few years ago. And you could say that at almost any point in the past several decades.

When I see the renewed aggressiveness from social conservatism, it seems to me that its not a sign of a new strength, but a reflection of a new weakness: realizing that things arent getting better and our position is getting worse, and therefore we must be all the more aggressive in what we do, in what we say, or else whats going to happen to us? And the problem with that strategy is that it pushes social conservatives even further into their corner. When they start talking not about winning over Americans, but when theyve given up on that and say, Were going to get power and then coerce Americans into doing what we couldnt convince them to do, I see that as a trap for social conservatives, whose causes I very much share.

I also think social conservatives underestimate how much they need other kinds of conservatives. When you think about religious liberty, and whos doing work in the courts; when you think about school choice, which should be crucial for religious conservatives: libertarians and economic conservatives are actually doing a lot of the work in those areas. Without that alliance, the position of social conservatives will collapse. A coercive, go-it-alone strategy will only make matters worse.

Saurabh Sharma: I think the last example that Elliot gave is a perfect reason to believe that social conservatives have been the junior partner in this coalitionand that they should be the senior partner. Take the example of school choice. For the better part of three or four decades, the conservative movement has worn its yellow scarves one week, every year. Its gone and stood in front of state capitals and the national capital and proclaimed school-choice week.

We all say that were for school choice, but if you look at most of the institutional forces that have been pushing school choice, the traditional arguments they made were culturally secular arguments about efficiency, about making sure that people can go to better schools on the basis of grades or on the basis of the conditions of the schools that they were in. And largely, that movement stagnated.

Why has educational choiceand, really, education policy in generalseen such a resurgence to prominence in American life today? Because the focus went from secular arguments about efficiency to a culturally and socially conservative argument about what can legitimately be called anti-white racism in American schools: the institutionalization in public education of some of the most horrific racial essentialism that weve seen in American history. That is an example of social conservatives having much more influence when theyre in the drivers seat than a more fiscally conservative, a more libertarian, a more culturally agnostic vision of conservatism would have.

More broadly, why have social conservatives been relegated to junior partners in the conservative movement? It doesnt really make any sense, because on a constituent basis, social conservatives have much less representation vis--vis the people in charge in Washington than do primarily fiscal libertarians or foreign-policy hawks. Its not even close, and I think its important to ask why that is and why we should continue to let it be the case when some of the most acute recent examples of conservative victories involve cultural issues that a GOP of yesteryear would not have touched with a ten-foot pole.

Elliot Kaufman: I dont see how you can talk about the resurgence of school choice without ever mentioning the pandemicwhat teachers unions did, or when parents actually heard what their kids were being taught. And all conservatives are opposed to critical race theory. Its not just a social conservative argument, it is a unifying argumentalong with what was dismissed as a concern about efficiency. Thats a weird way of phrasing teaching your kids well.

Teddy Kupfer: Another thing I hear when I have conversations like these is that the right-wing economic agenda is out of touch with the challenges the United States faces today. As China rises, we hear about the need for maximal free trade and the problems with proposals to build industrial capacity. As drug overdoses skyrocket and labor-force participation remains anemic, we hear about the need for occupational-licensing reform. And as progressivesin control of major institutions stamp out dissident views, we hear about how tech companies are very innovative and creating lots of value for their shareholders. Is there something to the critique that what the nation needs is more state action, both to build up the country in the face of its external challenges and to repair its internal degeneration?

Elliot Kaufman: Lets start with China. Absolutely, the U.S. state needs to be there. It needs to be active. And when I hear about who thinks we shouldnt confront China and should instead shrink from it, its often elements of these new micro-movements that want to use the state seemingly everywhere else. So that confuses me. The Quincy Institute, lets say, can come together to agree that we should let China off the hook. I dont agree with that.

Teddy Kupfer: Before you go further, lets drill down on China. I recently heard a summary of the populist agenda as encompassing hawkery on trade, immigration, border security, and Chinabut also requiring restraint in foreign policy. This presentsan obvious tensionthat has bubbled over in recent days. Three prominent realignment figures called recently on the U.S. to show China mutual respect for a civilizational equal and warned against descending into mindless hawkery. How should we resolve this tension? Do we show China the respect that it is due? Do we try to check the Chinese economic advance but without standing to military attention?

Saurabh Sharma: My primary concern about the Chinese is the systematic de-industrialization of the United States that has occurred over the last 30 to 40 years, that has largely accrued to their benefit. China and the elites who enabled its rise are a generational threat to American prosperity.

Chinas rise was the choice of domestic policymakers in the United States who allowed our industrial capacity to flow to Southeast and East Asia over the last 40 years. That was a choice that was made. It wasnt the perfidious red dragon encircling the globe choking off our trade lines. And China, as a rational state actor, took advantage of that in order to create an industrial base in their country.

So who should be blamed? I dont want to have some sort of national animosity toward China because they did what was rational on the global stage and saw a free lunch. I want to hold the policymakers in the United States that made those choices accountable. And then I want to implement policies that would start to rebalance that trading alignment.

The last part that I want to draw scrutiny to is American prosperity, maybe in contrast to American liberty. I am not worried about a million-man swim across the Pacific Ocean by Chinese gunboats looking to invade Los Angeles. What I worry about is the fact that we have basically no native capacity for industrial production, for medicine production, for technology production, or anything else. And so, in a world where political, economic, and state capital is limited, we must focus on the most acute crises. I care a lot more about the fact that we cant make a silicon chip or a medicinal drug or steel in this country at the rate that we need in order to have some level of national autonomy than I care about putting more aircraft carriers in the South China Sea. Thats how I reconcile it. We need to dwindle and draw down our foreign-policy commitments across the globe.

Elliot Kaufman: I take issue with the idea that the decline in U.S. manufacturing was a choice. Those who have looked at this have found that U.S. manufacturing jobs have declined at the same rate as in most other Western nations, regardless of the degree of interventionist economic policy. There are secular issues at play. For instance, labor advantages: labor is much cheaper over there than it is here. The idea that the U.S. was going to keep the same number of industrial jobs if policymakers just cared more about certain people doesnt stand up to scrutiny. Id also point out that U.S. manufacturing has not gone away; output has increased. Whats gone away are many manufacturing jobs. Why? Because of wage advantages. So, U.S. manufacturing has moved up on the value chain where capital plays more of a role, and U.S. productivity is higher.

On foreign policy, what we are talking about is not Chinese gunboats coming for us, but first for Taiwan. And if that happens, then our Pacific strategy is shot. The rest of the countries in the region will have no choice but to rally to the Chinese side. And then were facing a real juggernaut, including on economic terms, with the resources that China will be able to summon.

Even if you are only worried about China as a sort of economic threat, rather than a threat to American liberties, I think we have strong reasons to increase U.S. military spending, which is at 3 percent of GDP now, down from the Cold War peak of 7 percent. It could be 4 percent, it could be 5 percent, and it would be worth it.

Alexandra DeSanctis: I think thats very well said. Its not mutually exclusive to build up U.S. manufacturing, and also to acknowledge that China is our No. 1 enemy that wants to destroy us. They didnt just step into this vacuum that policymakers createdthey intentionally exploited our weaknesses because they hate us, they want to destroy us, theyre a human-rights abuser. And so while we can focus on whatever problems we might have at home, its important to keep that in mind as well.

Teddy Kupfer: Theres a certain moral authority that comes when members of a political elite can claim that their views are not just the provenance of Washington, but are authentically held by the common man, the median American. Ive seen graphs by Lee Drutman passed around where there are lots of dots in the top-left corner, suggesting nobodys actually a libertarian. I hear talk about the Middle American Radicals, who dont actually oppose receiving federal health-care benefits.

But these are not the only analyses of American public opinion. Folks like David Hackett Fisher, Matthew Walther, andothers have identified a folk-libertarianism that runs deep in the American fabric: from the Scottish borderers who came to the backcountry in the 1800s, to the Barstool Conservatives who today like legal gambling and watch porn but are against cancel culture and for free speech. And the most popular directionally anti-left figure in the country is a DMT-evangelist-bodybuilder-libertarian-comedian. Libertarians catch a lot of flak in Washington, but isnt there a folk-libertarianism woven into the American fabric? Doesnt that mean something as both a political and policy matter?

Elliot Kaufman: Absolutely. It has to. Anyone who doesnt think that theres an impulse in this country to say to the government, hands off, is not paying attention. Any conservative movement that would surrender hold of that impulse is doomed.

This goes back to something that you asked me before. Okay, new challenges, right? Shouldnt this be the time to drop our default suspicion of government action, of state action? I think this would be the worst moment to do that. We are in the midst of unprecedented restrictions on Americans liberty, the pandemic restrictions. People have been forced out of their livelihoods, forced out of society; kids have been forced out of schools.

We have seen an unbelievable overreach by the state ignoring peoples rights. There was a crisis, so people will say, I guess you have to do something. But people are waking up right now. I think we are seeing this folk-libertarianism reassert itself in a strong way.

Alexandra DeSanctis: I dont consider myself a libertarian, so Im happy to criticize things about the libertarian point of view. But I think libertarians have a natural and important home on the right, and civil libertarianism is essential to conservatism. Its essential to being an American. Its deeply politically unpopular to suggest that theres no room for individual rights or we need the state to do everything for us. Thats a Democratic tendency, right? So, as much as I agree that there are places where libertarians go too far in the individual-rights direction, certainly on social issues, in my view, that is not a reason to say that they dont belong on the right. All conservatives should have a vision of the human person that necessitates respect for individual liberties.

Saurabh Sharma: I love folk-libertarians. Theyre great. Heres the thing, though. Lets take the context of the pandemic. Folk-libertarianism implemented in public policy will get you a lifting of municipal mask and vaccine mandates. But when people still have to wear masks, and show vaccine cards in airports or in businesses, those same folk-libertarians are very happy when Ron DeSantis bans private institutions from implementing mask mandates, or vaccine mandates. Folk-libertarian Republican voters have no problem when you tell them that we should regulate Facebook, Google, and any other institution they believe is censoring conservatives into the dirt. That does not trigger their libertarian priors, because they see it as an infringement on the spiritual principle of liberty when the largest technology conglomerates in the country conspire to ensure that right-wing political speech is subordinate. There is a clear distinction between folk-libertarians and the kinds of people who populate this town, whose goal is to enshrine Section 230, or implement capital-gains-tax cuts, or open our borders for some faux-libertarian reason; between folk-libertarians, with the things that they want to preserve in the American way of life, and the libertarian priorities of policymakers in this town. Theyre almost two entirely separate universes.

Teddy Kupfer: Ideological movements have long been prone to infighting, and American conservatism in 2022 is no different. Populists have complained that legacy institutions are more interested in policing the boundaries of conservatism than in defending the principles that they allegedly exist to conserve.

But is this tendency to gatekeeping limited to these legacy institutions? Shortly after Election Day in 2020, the editors of another think-tank-aligned magazine published an article not only calling on Republicans to fight the result but also calling out their weak sisters on the right. Do you worry that various right-wing factions are sometimes more interested in sharpening their elbows and defending themselves against internecine enemies than in trying to expand their coalition?

Alexandra DeSanctis: I worry about that a lot. At the political level, that kind of thing makes a lot more sense, especially in the primary context. There are important distinctions, when were talking about voting, to be made between particular political platforms on the right. But since Ive gotten into conservative journalism, when Donald Trump was marching toward victory over Hillary Clinton in 2016, Ive seen an absurd level of fighting among conservatives at a time when unity would much better serve us. And the things were fighting about are not actually that important. The distinctions between one conservative flavor or another are not so vital compared with what were dealing with on the left. A lot of it comes from an oversaturation with social media, people looking for attention and trying to elbow to the rightperhaps to be the true conservativeand getting people to pay attention to you.

I think that sort of thing is really damaging. If someone said to me, I think abortion is wonderful, but Im for tax cuts, Id say, Okay, thats fine. Thats a conservative policy. I dont really want the conservative movement as a whole to be pro-abortion, I dont love that about you, but youre welcome to consider yourself a conservative. There are ways in which we can say what our main mission ought to be without ostracizing people who agree with us on one issue but not another. But a lot of it comes down to personality, to people trying to suck the air out of the room for their own personal attention.

Saurabh Sharma: No one opposes The Conservative Case for Writing Essays at Each Other Until We All Die more than I do. Im a big believer in convincing young people to get involved in substantive policy questions and to delete their Twitter account. We do so in our programming at American Moment. However, I will say the ability to call for unity is a luxury of power. You get to call for unity when you are the dominant faction on the right, or in any ecosystem thats being described. Its the same thing with an appeal to true conservatism. Part of the reason why I dont really hyphenate my conservatism is because I think that the ability to determine what is true conservatism is a luxury of power. Why not fake it til we make it? Im willing to call the whole set of policies that I believe in true conservatism, and well see if I end up being correct.

Theres how the Right approaches politics and how the Left approaches politics. The distinction is ultimately to the Rights detriment. The Left believes in a kind of tactical ecumenism. They will never punch to their left, and often they kind of wink and nod and say, whatever youre doing thats crazy on the left is fine. Kamala Harris encouraged people to donate to bail funds for rioters in Kenosha, Wisconsin, or wherever that particular riot was. Can you imagine the equivalent of it from a right-of-center vice president? It just wouldnt happen. Or it would be met with enormous scorn: editorial pages would heap scorn on any vice president, or president, or any other major official who did so.

You can have fulsome, aggressive disagreement within your own faction while also recognizing that the goal is to move in a particular direction. And if we want a fusion consensus to be the centerthe mainstream of policy and American lifeguess what? There necessarily has to be a bunch of stuff to the right, and a bunch of stuff that some will probably disagree with, because the cultural forces that exist are deeply encouraging to leftward trends and very discouraging to rightward trends.

My problem with the idea that we cant be fighting is, it results in the status quo: where anything to the right of a certain incumbent mainstream consensus in the conservative movement is Hitler, and anything slightly to the center-left of that is good-faith disagreement that must be contended with, and the people responsible for that slice must be welcomed into the conservative movement with open arms.

Elliot Kaufman: You said that one advantage that the Left has is that it doesnt punch left. Thats not an advantage that I want on the Right. There are racists to my right. I dont want them on the team. I think that including them on the team will end up hurting us more than anything because the media, and the Left will say, Thats all of them. And I think we make their job easy when we refuse to punch right. Im proud to punch right when were dealing with truly bad people.

By the way, people in some of these conservative micro-movements criticize other conservatives and punch right all the time. From my point of view, American Moment? All it does is punch right. But thats your prerogative.

Saurabh Sharma: You are welcome to scroll through the Twitter feed of American Moment. I think youd be surprised. We exercise pretty serious institutional discipline. Whats on my Twitter feed, I dont feel the need to put opinions are my own, but its entirely separate. I dont really care about that particular criticism.

What I will say, however, is that the Left told Mitt Romney he was going to put black people back in chains. It doesnt matter how genteel or how kind you are, how tightly you police the borders of your own faction. You can nominate the most demure, august leaders for any political movement. The Left will apply the same smear to everyone from Bari Weiss to David Duke. To them, they are all racists, or suspected white supremacists. The question is, how do you operate in political life recognizing that that label is going to be used to tarnish most of your political faction?

Elliot Kaufman: The Left will call us racist no matter what, but it matters to me whether theyre right or theyre wrong. And itll matter to other Americans, too.

Teddy Kupfer: It may be a mark of our youth that we have managed to go through a discussion of conservative politics without saying the name Ronald Reagan. But if you will indulge me, close your eyes and think about the 1970s.

Conservatives are either out of power or struggling to do anything while they are in power. There are many factions. National Review expresses a hardline anti-welfarist politics and a hardline anti-Communist politics. Traditionalists prefer communitarianism to capitalism and look fondly to the Southern Agrarians. Neoconservatives in the cities seek to both counter radicalism and advance pragmatic reforms to the welfare state. And a New Right takes a populist line, gaining appeal in the Midwest and on the West Coast, criticizing its competitors for not fighting hard enough.

All these factions clashed at times. Then they were eventually unified under one leader who managed to incorporate elements of each tendency and help all feel represented. So how do todays conflicts rate in the history of the American conservative movement? And can you imagine a figureyou dont have to say a namewho could reach this synthesis among all the various conservative factions once Trump leaves the scene?

Saurabh Sharma: One of my favorite Bible verses is Ecclesiastes 1:9: There is nothing new under the sun. I believe the same is true about internecine right-wing warfare. This is part of the reason why you will never hear me use the term New Right. One, because thats exactly what the National Review crowd called themselves when they were the insurgents fighting against an incumbent entrenched bureaucracy on the right that saw them as ridiculous radicals. And two, because I also believe there is nothing new about the ideas that there should be sanity in our immigration policy, our foreign policy, our trade policy, and that we should take cultural battles seriously. Those ideas have been championed by patriotic, decent people for the last half-century.

Internecine battles on the right are very common. Perhaps there is a roadmap we can look to in the past on how these things can be reconciled. This is where the whole three-legged stool thing gets very interesting. It is a perversion of the idea of what the coalitional right was toward the end of the twentieth century: that the conservative operator in a place like D.C. is someone who is simultaneously a foreign-policy hawk, a cultural conservative in private matters, and a social conservative in the few government areas of abortion and religious liberty, and also an economic libertarian. That political consensus was the process by which different parts of a faction came to compromises that were embodied in particular politicians and rank-ordered in legislative agendas. They were never meant to be embodied in all people all the time.

That is the roadmap for what a consensus would look like todayrecognizing that there are legitimate primary threats that each of these factions sees and finding ways to negotiate, in accordance with how theyre represented in the electorate, a new conservative consensus that takes seriously the challenges of today, much like Ronald Reagan did as president.

Who could do it? You took Trump off the table, but I will say, tonally, it looks a lot closer to Donald Trump than it does anyone else in the Republican party. At this point, things are dire. When Ronald Reagan was elected, conservatives enjoyed a silent majority in the broader populace. They enjoyed some level of cultural power such that people were able to get movies occasionally suppressed for lewdness or anti-American sentiment. They definitely had the power of corporate America behind them. And they were able to win elections.

What is it that the Rights looking at today? Total loss on the cultural level, an unclear consensus in the mass of the American people, because most people acclimatize themselves to whatever the prevailing consensus is. Most people are going to lean left because thats where it seems like most of the power is. The Right has lost corporate America, and the Fortune 500 list is full of some of the largest donors to civilizational enemies of the Right and of the country that youll ever find. Occasionally, were able to win elections, but when we do, we dont do much to address these power imbalances.

I do not blame people when they look at someone like Trump, who actually fights the disempowerment that the Right feels by sticking it to cultural forces, by telling the biggest CEOs that they can go screw themselves, and certainly by talking to the permanent ruling consensus in D.C. with utter contempt. Tonally, it is an approach of combativeness on policy. But it is a consensus that recognizes the premier threats that face us today.

Alexandra DeSanctis: Ive been reading recently about the 1980 primary campaign among Republicans, and it was as nasty as anything Ive seen going on lately. It was heartening to see that this has been happening forever. But the situation that were facing as a country is new. Were in a very different place than we were then, particularly in terms of where the Left has gone since then, what theyre standing for now, especially in cultural terms. And the world has changed: globalization, digitization, social media.

We need a different type of candidate. And I think Saurabh was right, too, that there was something about Trump that was appealing. As much as I didnt like him, there were certain things that he did that other politicians hadnt done, and where he was successful. But there was something about Reagan that people loved, and Reagan managed to unify the Right very successfully. He won 49 states, by the way. Can you imagine a Republican doing that now? It would take a really outstanding personsomeone of good character. And by that, I dont mean someone who is polite all the time. I mean a good, decent person who Americans respect, regardless of which side of the aisle theyre on. That really matters, and we shouldnt give up on that, even though the other side, and the world, I guess, has gotten quite nasty.

Elliot Kaufman: Its not hard to understand why people talk a lot about Ronald Reagan. He was incredibly successful.

I saw an ad recently from Blake Masters, whos running for Senate in Arizona. Im not a big fan of his, but he started it off by saying, Why is it so difficult to support a family on a single income? And that may be a New Right framing, but its a good onea good question, certainly. Well, three important things have gotten more expensive in America. And he named them. You could, too: housing, health care, and education.

Whats been happening in each area? We cant build homes, so of course the price is going to rise. We cant build homes because of all these regulations: he focused on environmental regulations, because thats a more popular issue, but as we know, there are many other regulationszoning, for example. Government regulation is stopping that market from operating. On health care, Masters said that you cant find health-care prices. Without prices, market mechanisms dont work. And finally, education. Masters said that universities are expanding bureaucracies to raise costs, and they can get away with it because of government subsidies and student loans. Once again, the government is doing it.

I thought about the message: a New Right diagnosis of the problem with small-government solutions. That could be a powerful message. I told this to my friend, Sam Goldman, and he said: Thats what Reaganism was. Reaganism was a merger of populism and conservatism in a way that didnt make it seem extreme, which Barry Goldwaters conservatism sometimes did, but in a way that made it seem like the most common-sense thing in the world.

Think about those problems of the 1970s: inflation, stagflation, crime, welfare, national dishonor. Stagflation we dont have today, but four out five? Not bad. When I hear people saying that Reaganism has gone stale, I think they dont understand what Reaganism was, and they dont understand our present moment, either.

Read the rest here:
What Is the Future of American Conservatism? - City Journal

Top Democratic operatives see expanding defections by Hispanic voters to the GOP, worsening Democrats' outlook for November's midterms.

Why it matters: Democrats had hoped this might be a phenomenon specific to the Trump era. But new polling shows it accelerating, worrying party strategists about the top of the ticket in 2024.

A Wall Street Journal poll last week found that by 9 points, Hispanic voters said they'd back a Republican candidate for Congress over a Democrat.

What's happening: Democrats saw evidence of this shift in 2020 in House races in south Florida, Texas and southern New Mexico.

Our thought bubble: Latinos, especially Mexican Americans, still lean Democratic. But Democrats have been losing ground among these voters in recent elections because the party hasn't been paying enough attention to them.

New Mexico Democratic political consultant Sisto Abeyta said he's been ringing the alarm bells for months that Democrats in his state were losing Hispanic men: "And everyone has been ignoring me."

Democratic strategist Chuck Rocha, based in D.C., told Axios his party keeps hiring political consultants for U.S. House races who know little to nothing about Latino voters:

See the original post:
Democrats to lose more ground among Hispanic voters, operatives warn - Axios

One can imagine a just war between a state representing individuals who want to be free and left alone and, on the other side, a tyrannical state aggressor intent on subjecting and looting the libertarian country. If the libertarians win, liberty would increase in the world. But reality is never so simple and war instead typically reinforces, on all sides, the power of the state and the idea that the individual must submit to the collective. War does not bring out the best in all people (contrary to what state propaganda suggests, including the parading women soldiers in Moscow shown on the featured image of this post).

An interesting Wall Street Journal story about the successful resistance of a small Ukrainian town illustrates how war arouses primitive instincts (Yaroslav Trofimov, A Ukrainian Town Deals Russia One of the Wars Most Decisive Routs, March 16), although I admit it is not the most tragic illustration in the history of warfare:

Russian soldiers took over villagers homes in Rakove and created a sniper position on a roof. They looked for sacks to fill with soil for fortifications, burned hay to create a smoke screen and demanded food.

A local woman who agreed to cook for the Russians is now under investigation, said Mr. Dombrovsky. A traitorshe did it for money, he said. I dont think the village will forgive her and let her live here.

In the practice of war if not generally in tribal morality, a traitor is anybody who takes another side than his tribes. But note the other element in the story: she did it for money! I suspect that Mr. Dombrovsky would not have been happier if she had done it for free, perhaps for the cause, and with a big smile. At any rate, money is apparently an aggravating factor (even if paid in deeply depreciated rubles), which corresponds to the reigning orthodoxy among our own academic philosophers.

A moral case can be made that coerced cooperation with the violent aggressors of ones neighbor is acceptable, but not cooperation for the purpose of obtaining personal benefits. But then, isnt avoiding harm a personal benefit? Does it matter that Mr. Dombrovsky, who is a special forces commander, is presumably paid himself? What if the woman had cooked for free and was only paid a tip afterwards ?

We dont know enough about this case to make any serious ethical analysis, but I would bet that Mr. Dombovskys comment reflected a generalized suspicion toward individualist behavior on free markets. If that is true, we are not dealing with the pure war case of a group of libertarians defending themselves against aggressors, but with two more or less authoritarian camps. Not surprisingly, dealing with actual cases is more complicated than with stylized models.

All that seems to confirm the classical-liberal or libertarian idea that an individual usually acts in his own personal interest and that only a minimal ethicsJames Buchanan would say an ethics of reciprocityshould be recognized as a necessary constraint on personal behavior in a free society. (See my review of Buchanan Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative in the forthcoming Spring issue of Regulation.)

Female Russian soldiers of the Military University of the Russian Defense Ministry march along the Red Square during the Victory Day military parade to mark the 72nd anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War, the Eastern Front of World War II, in Moscow, Russia, 9 May 2017.

Continued here:
The Traitor Was Paid to Cook for the Russians - Econlib

By Tom Baxter

Last week, as 2,189 candidates were qualifying to run for office this year, there was an ominous reminder that going forward, election results in Georgia may never be as cut and dried as they used to be.

By a majority of 73 percent, voters in Camden County rejected plans to build a commercial spaceport in which the county has already invested more than $10 million. The turnout was 17 percent, which is low but not out of line with a lot of local special elections. Local residents succeeded in getting a vote on the question after a petition drive in which they gathered some 3,500 signatures. The county commission is challenging their right to hold the referendum in a court suit.

Heres the ominous part: Instead of accepting the landslide vote as the end of the line for this long-debated project, the county commission filed an emergency motion to block certification of the results until its lawsuit is settled.

Its not such a surprise the county would do this. Both sides are heavily dug in on this issue, enough to exhaust every possible legal remedy. The Georgia Supreme Court quickly denied the motion, while allowing the lawsuit challenging the referendum to proceed.

Still, the refusal to accept even this clear a demonstration of the voters will makes you wonder whats going to happen in upcoming elections when the outcomes are much closer, and local election boards in many parts of the state arent as nonpartisan as they were before the 2020 election. There is a growing tendency not to accept the results of elections, even when the margin is 3-to-1.

This doesnt seem to have dissuaded people from running for office, however. Of the candidates who qualified last week, 996 are Republicans, 597 are Democrats, five are independents and four are Libertarians. The remaining 587 candidates are running in non-partisan races.

These totals might lead you to think that Republicans are either more numerous or more fractious than they really are. Every small rural county controlled by Republicans has roughly as many local offices as a large urban Democratic county, so there are a lot more Republicans in these local races, unchallenged by Democrats.

And while former President Donald Trumps beef with Gov. Brian Kemp has generated challenge races down to the level of insurance commissioner, overall Republicans dont seem more likely to do battle with each other in primaries than do Democrats. For instance, there are four candidates running for lieutenant governor as Republicans, and nine running as Democrats.

Its noteworthy that this is the highest office for which a Libertarian is also running. The presence of Libertarian candidates on the ballot caused runoffs for the U.S. Senate in 1992, 2008 and 2020, but that wont happen this year.

The races for state legislative seats probably give us the best indication of the balance between the parties and their relative fractiousness. Overall, 257 Republicans are running for the House or Senate, compared to 241 Democrats. In 42 races, Republicans dont have Democratic challengers; in 28 races, Democrats dont have Republican opposition. House District 28 in northeast Georgia has the most Republicans vying for office six, with one Democratic candidate. House District 90 in DeKalb County has the most Democrats five, with one Republican.

For all their partisan differences, the Democratic and Republican legislative candidates are very similar in many respects. The average age of the Republican candidates is 53. For Democrats, its 51.

The Democrats have 22 candidates who list themselves as attorneys or lawyers and 18 retirees; the Republicans have 21 retirees and 21 attorneys. Its hard to sort out candidates who are business people because they have different ways of identifying themselves. Republicans have the edge in this category, but not by as much as youd think. Interestingly, the five candidates who list themselves as entrepreneurs are all Democrats, while the two candidates who list themselves as CEOs are Republicans.

Four Republicans and three Democrats list themselves as retired military. The only chef candidate is a Democrat; the only chiropractor, a Republican. All in all, the candidates are a pretty wide reflection of what Georgians do for a living. Of course, the winning candidates may be a different story.

Thanks to Maggie Lee for her able data crunching.

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When 3-to-1 is challenged, what about the close races? - SaportaReport

Why are Conservatives increasingly interested in cryptocurrencies?

It might seem like an odd fit at first blush. Conservatism, after all, is something of a backward-looking persuasion. It starts from a premise that traditional ideas and institutions should, as a general rule, be protected and sustained. Theyve come through a process of trial and error over the course of history and therefore deserve our deference and respect.

This call for epistemological humility can sometimes manifest itself in an aversion to novelty and even progress. Michael Oakeshott famously described it as:

to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss.

The point here is that the conservative instinct tells us that most new ideas are false or wrong precisely because they havent been subjected to the rigours of practical wisdom. Conservatism, in this sense, is the political expression of the famous line from Will and Ariel Durant: Out of every hundred new ideas ninety-nine or more will probably be inferior to the traditional response which they propose to replace.

That might seem like an odd philosophical basis from which to embrace something as far-out as digital money. Yet there are limits to mere abstractions about conservative ideas and the conservative persuasion. Samuel Huntington tells us that conservatism must be understood in a specific situational context. Its a contingent perspective that reflects particularistic circumstances. A Saudi Arabian conservative is different from a European conservative whos different from a North American conservative. What they seek to conserve necessarily reflects their unique culture and intellectual inheritances.

North American conservatism has long distinguished itself by its unique combination of a deference to tradition and a commitment to change. In his famous essay, Why I am not a conservative, Friedrich Hayek attributed this mix of posterity and progress to the fact that what North American conservatives are essentially seeking to conserve is a classical liberal tradition. That is to say, the North American conservative is, at some fundamental level, a liberal. His or her conservatism is dedicated to the preservation of the continents liberal ideas, institutions, and values.

Its worth emphasizing this point: North American conservatism is somewhat oxymoronically committed to preserving a cultural and political liberalism which itself is fertile soil for growth, dynamism, and innovation. Its a conservative tradition committed to a set of ideas, institutions, and values that are inherently pro-progress.

David Brooks spoke to this unique amalgam of ideas and intuitions in a 2018 podcast episode with Tyler Cowen. When asked about his own conservative worldview, he answered the following:

Well, Im anAmericanconservative. My two heroes are Edmund BurkeandEdmund Burkes core conservative ethosis epistemological modesty, the belief that the world is really complicated, and therefore the change should be constant but incremental My other hero is Alexander Hamilton His conservatism was very different. Its about dynamism, energy, transformational change. And so a European self-conservatism doesnt work here. You have to have that dynamic, recreated, self-transformational element.

This applies to Canada too. As Ben Woodfinden and I outline in a forthcoming essay on Sir John A. Macdonalds own conservatism, the countrys first prime minister personified this unique mix of backward- and forward-looking ideas. He was at once a dispositional conservative as represented in his personal preferences and tastes and something of a futurist with an ambitious vision of the frontier that was manifested in his nation-building agenda. As we write:

For his part, Macdonald saw entrepreneurial freedom, limited but energetic federal power, and national greatness as inextricably linked. These instincts for national development were actually quite Hamiltonian. Like the father of the American commercial revolution, Macdonald came to represent a business liberalism which was suffused with a Toryism concerned with a virtuous and ordered liberty.

I share this abridged story of the North American conservative tradition because its important to understand the compatibility of conservative ideas and technological progress in general and conservatism and cryptocurrencies in particular. The conservative persuasion in North America should be generally viewed as sympatico with frontier-like ideas, inventions, and technologies.

These conceptual points bring us back to the more practical question at hand: why are conservatives increasingly pro-crypto?

The first point is to establish that they are indeed showing growing interest in digital currencies. There are various examples, including, for instance, MP Michelle Rempel-Garners recently-tabled legislation that would have the government consult on a framework to encourage the growth of crypto assets in Canada.

Some have dismissed these developments as merely related to the recent trucker protests in Ottawa. But this critique fails to reckon with the broader movement of conservative intellectuals and politicians that has come to support bitcoin and other forms of crypto-currencies in recent years.

The highest-profile proponents arent themselves politicians. The two biggest are probably Elon Musk and Peter Thiel who are investors and entrepreneurs with significant influence on society and culture in general and the world of libertarianism in particular.

Theyve both come to be associated with the growing cultural and political movement around crypto-currencies through a combination of their personal investments, public commentaries, and large online followings. The former has frequently talked about how he owns crypto-currencies, including Dogecoin, which he has been instrumental in popularizing. The latter has described bitcoin as the one asset that I most strongly believe in.

The appeal of crypto-currencies to Musk and Thiel isnt merely about the financial upside. Theres also an ideological dimension. Digital moneys decentralized nature conjures up possibilities of new, more libertarian economic and political arrangements. Thiel has even argued that if we want to think about contemporary technologies in ideological terms, artificial intelligence can be thought of as communist and crypto-currencies are libertarian.

Its no surprise that in the face of sustained pandemic restrictions, libertarian ideas seem to be resonating more and more these days. In this context, Musk and Thiel have emerged as major figures among a cohort of millennial or Generation Z followers who are drawn to their contrarian rebuke of the stuffy conformity of modern life. Ross Douthat has thus described the rise of folk libertarianismor what others have called Barstool conservatismas one of the key socio-political developments of the pandemic age.

This movement is less steeped in the tomes of libertarian thought and instead more reflective of contemporary cultural and political trends, including the rise of cancel culture, identity politics, and perceptions of government bossiness. Its followers are more Dave Portnoy than Ludwig von Mises.

As a cultural and political movement, its highly active online, a bit coarse and politically incorrect, and mostly engaged in politics from the periphery using GIFs and memes rather than direct action. It reflects a series of intuitions about individual responsibility, personal expression, a commitment to technology and progress, and an aversion to so-called wokeism. Recently, The Hub contributor Ben Woodfinden summed up this worldview and its followers as crypto bros. Hes not wrong.

The key point here though is that there are cultural and intellectual factors behind North American conservativess growing interest in new and novel monetary innovations. Its broadly consistent with continental conservatisms interest in frontier ideas and technologies as well as the growing appetite for non-mainstream, decentralized models of economic and political organization in the face of perceived top-down conformity. But it also possibly holds out the potential to bring new and different votersparticularly members of Canadas sizeable non-voter constituencyinto the Conservative fold. Crypto has therefore become an ideological and political rallying cry for North American conservatives.

Its not to say that there are serious issues with crypto-currencies. The recent volatility raises legitimate questions about whether this is a sustainable market development or merely a hyper-online fad. One gets the sense that the true story is somewhere in the middle.

But as Matt Spoke recently argued in an essay for The Hub, there may be a case for a country like Canada to make a huge bet that the future of crypto is more sustainable than it is faddish. Theres reason to believe that the presumptive, next Conservative leader, Pierre Poilievre, broadly agrees with this perspective.

To the extent that he does, it shouldnt be viewed as inherently incompatible with the conservative tradition. North American conservatism has since its origins reflected an intellectual and political persuasion with both a backward- and forward-looking impulse. A careful yet curious view on crypto-currencies is well-rooted in this long-standing tradition.

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Sean Speer: Why conservatives are so keen on cryptocurrencies - The Hub

ASHEVILLE - Upcoming primary electionsin Buncombe County will feature crowded and consequentialprimaries for Congress, district attorney, sheriff, City Council and Asheville City Schools Board of Education.

Trump ally Rep. Madison Cawthorn is facing an eight-way Republican May 17 primary.Democratic District Attorney Todd Williams hastwo challengers in a primary that will serve as the de facto general election because no Republicans are running.

The mayor's primary, meanwhile, has five candidates, including incumbent Esther Manheimer. Eleven council candidates are competing for three spots on the seven-member body. Both Asheville races are nonpartisan.

More: Details on mayoral and City Council candidates

The school boardis holding its first election since a historic move by the council and state legislators to switch from an appointed board.

Contested congressional and General Assembly maps caused the primaries to be pushed back into May. That means the chance to register to vote ends April 22.

Voting: NC Supreme Court strikes down redistricting maps, directs lawmakers to redraw

But voters who miss that deadline can still register if they vote the same day during one-stop early voting April 28 - May 14.

Election Services Director Corinne Duncan said it is important for votersto know how this election will be different withchanged dates and new school board elections.

But some aspects, even confusing ones, remain the same. Those include rules about how unaffiliated voters can choose whether to vote in Democratic or Republican primaries.

"It is always good to remind voters that people who are registered as unaffiliated are still able to cast a ballot as North Carolina holds semi-open primaries," Duncan said.

Now: Absentee ballots can be requested by registered voters for the 2022 statewide primaries.

April 22:Civilian voter registration deadline for the 2022 statewide primaries.

April 28:One-stop, in-person early voting period begins for the 2022 statewide primaries.

May 14:One-stop, in-person early voting period ends at 3 p.m. for the 2022 statewide primaries.

May 17:Election Day for the 2022 statewide primariesand civilian absentee ballot return deadline.

Details on statewide and local races are below:

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(Nonpartisan)

(Nonpartisan - three seats)

(Nonpartisan - four seats)

Joel Burgess has lived in WNC for more than 20 years, covering politics, government and other news. He's written award-winning stories on topics ranging from gerrymandering to police use of force. Got a tip? Contact Burgess atjburgess@citizentimes.com, 828-713-1095 or on Twitter@AVLreporter. Please help support this type of journalism with asubscriptionto the Citizen Times.

Excerpt from:
Voting in Asheville, Buncombe, WNC starts April 28; who's on the ballot? A complete list - Citizen Times

Back in February, we had a pretty good idea what was going on. Video and satellite imagery had shown the steady increase and massing of Russian troops, tanks, and military supplies around Ukraines borders. Vladimir Putin had started wars before and here he was again, on the precipice of something truly horrific.

What bothered me was the extent to which several high-profile populist conservatives were seeming to reflexively side with the cruel Russian autocrat. I watched as Tucker Carlson and J.D. Vance defended Putin, or adopted the Kremlins critique of Ukraine. The country was a pure client state of the United States State Department said Carlson. Spare me the performative affection for the Ukraine said Vance on Steve Bannons War Room podcast.

These interventions, made as Russia began an invasion that looks set to result in the deaths of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, look high risk and low reward. These commentators are undermining the credibility they have accrued for taking bold stances on the security and identity issues their base really cares about. Namely: wokeness, the border, crime and defending national heritage.

This is a real shame for populist conservatism in the United States. During the height of progressive moral panics such as the Covington Boys, George Floyd protests or Rittenhouse trial, Tuckers show was an oasis of sanity. It was, too, on exposing campus craziness and anti-white rhetoric in institutions, or the scale of illegal immigration. He defended the legitimacy of Americans who wanted to regulate the pace of ethno-cultural change and protect social cohesion, taking immense flak from the great and the good. Others, such as Glenn Greenwald, highlighted the blind spots and biases of progressive organisations and tech firms. Most American politicians and legacy media outlets failed to cover these issues objectively.

And yet, when it comes to a suite of other problems, the incisive logic of the sceptics and their marshalling of evidence yielded to sweeping neo-Marxist conspiracy theories about a manipulative power elite. This became evident during the pandemic, a tricky new challenge in which experts and politicians had to optimise between death rates and freedom. While governments and public health bodies may have got the balance wrong, and overreached with mask mandates, such a complex issue does not lend itself to maximalist claims.

Instead, the difficulties of policymaking during the pandemic demanded building a patient case with data and arguing for the dial to be turned a bit towards greater personal autonomy. Indeed, the politics of anti-lockdown libertarianism has not paid off for those, such as Nigel Farage, who have attempted to campaign on it. It was never a populist position.

Another tricky issue which is largely tangential to populist voters concerns is foreign policy, where, even with Putin issuing marching orders to unprepared conscripts, populist elites continued to carry water for this killer. Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Eric Zemmour, and Viktor Orbn all, at various moments, spoke warmly of him. While it is legitimate to make a realist case as John Mearsheimer has done for tempering Ukrainian demands and accommodating reasonable Russian security concerns, the inability of some to reject the moral equivalence of Ukraine and Russia was glaring.

What lies behind this bizarre empathy toward Putins thuggish regime?

First, there is an important disconnect between Right-wing populist elites and their audience. Populist elites compete with mainstream intellectual elites, yearning for an overarching meta-theory to rival progressive liberalism or libertarianism. Many also desire a modicum of politically-correct respectability and thus try to pretend they are motivated by a desire to speak for the downtrodden. This typically results in a neo-Marxist mlange focused on globalist power elites and their manipulation of the masses. All of which pushes populist intellectuals toward grand theories of global economic and political order that bear little relationship to what national populist voters and audiences actually care about.

Steve Bannon talks endlessly about the perils of free trade, Davos and the working class, despite the fact the data shows very clearly that cultural attitudes and views on immigration, not material deprivation, are what predict support for Trump. Likewise, Brexit elites such as Boris Johnson or Douglas Carswell, with their libertarian dreams of a sovereign free-trading Britain, are strangely disconnected from actual Brexit voters, who were like Trump voters mainly motivated by a desire for less immigration and slower cultural change. The more Brexit voters glimpse the real Johnson, who cares nothing for these things, the less connected they feel to him.

Populist elites have developed a fixation on global elites and institutions as self-interested scheming actors, and have become obsessed with mobilising opposition to the globalist juggernaut. Rather than viewing the problem as a western cultural-Left worldview which repudiates national tradition and elevates a cult of victimhood, we are treated to conspiratorial musings about the Great Reset and elites in Davos, Geneva or Brussels. My limited experience, having given talks at some of these institutions, is that the more international the organisation, the less woke it is. Yes, western high culture permeates global institutions, but these are nodes rather than the epicentre of the problem.

Once convinced of their neo-Marxist grand theory, some populist elites, fired by hostility to the rules-based liberal world order, feel compelled to develop an anti-western foreign policy. Enemy of my enemy is my friend logic carries them toward Putins Russia and quasi-illiberal democracies such as Hungary. An isolationism which originally sprang from the valid concern after protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that American nationhood not be defined by missionary democracy promotion has mutated into support for autocracy.

The perception that Russia is a masculine, white, Christian country unafraid to stand up for its traditions forms part of its appeal to conservative populist thinkers. Putin aint woke, Steve Bannon said last month. Hes anti-woke. The Russian Presidents 2019 interview with the Financial Times, when he declared that liberalism has become obsolete clearly impressed many Western conservative populists. Against Drag Queen Story Hour and self-flagellation about the sins of the past could be set Putins macho, Christian, nationalist Russia. Clearly, some populist elites took the bait.

Yet any honest appraisal of Putins Russia would reveal that its religiosity is weak, immigration substantial, and the Eurasianism of Putin and Alexandr Dugin would readily trade cultural homogeneity for more territory. Moreover, as the Russianist Edwin Bacon observes: Eurasianists embracing Orthodoxy identify themselves as having far more in common with what they would call other traditional faiths notably Islam, and principally Shia Islam than with other Christian churches. Putins Russia is a ramshackle, corrupt, aggressive despotism. It is not really hot stuff as Donald Trump put it once. It is not a post-woke paradise.

Populist elites also appear to like Russia because it has spurned liberalism, failing to appreciate that wokeness, whose sacralisation of minorities is used to restrict liberty, is best resisted by liberal arguments. They confuse procedural liberalism, which has been vital for the Wests success, with Left-modernist values such as celebrating diversity and change, which developed much later and are not central to liberalism.

As a rational populist and liberal nationalist, I maintain that the values of the median voter should be reflected in policy, but that those tasked with carrying out such policies should be guided by science, analytic logic, and expertise. The problem with many Western elites is not their technical skills, but their post-national woke values, which spring from religious rather than rational wellsprings. While populist commentators correctly skewer the progressive pieties of the elite media and political class, the anti-globalist conspiracy theorising of many needs an urgent reality check. Populist pundits and politicians should resist the urge to stake out contrarian positions on every news item, tacking instead to the centre ground on side issues to avoid losing support for core issues.

Hopefully the Ukraine crisiscan serve as a wake-up call, drawingthemback towardthe cultural problemstheir baseactually caresabout.

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Populists are losing this war - UnHerd