Daily Archives: January 9, 2022

The term federalism, according to Encyclopedia Britannica, refers to an arrangement among various levels of government for the implementation of policies through negotiations and coordination while still maintaining central integrity. Individual liberty being the central axis, its primary focus is on negotiations and coordination to make the law and policymaking process more participatory and representative.

In heterogeneous societies where socio-cultural diversity exists, federalism provides an opportunity for local political expression and protects it by promoting localised decision-making. It is a system of government that clearly divides authority between the federal and provincial governments while focusing on integrating the federating units into a single entity.

Administrative federalism in practice translates the aspirations of a federal polity into policy outcomes. It can be termed as the defining characteristic of a federation which relates to the executive autonomy of a province and includes devolution of all kinds of administrative and policymaking authority to the provincial governments, where the latter is responsible for the enactment of laws and its implementation using its resources.

That being said, a major part of these resources is the human resource or the civil service of a province which is primarily responsible for executing these policies and decisions. In Pakistan, the 18th Amendment gave practical form to federalism and outlined the clear distribution of power between different levels of government. This momentous constitutional development realises the need for implementing practices of administrative federalism.

In the context of legislative and fiscal federalism, the then political forces may have ceded some space to the federation because the matters were complex enough to threaten the unity of the federation and were mostly related to the entire country. However, regarding administrative federalism, no constitutional accommodation was made as it neither threatened the existence of the federation nor related to the affairs of more than one province.

The federal government, on the premise of lack of capacity, still shows reluctance in devolving the actual executive authority, and members of the federal civil service continue to manage important assignments in the provinces such as the chief secretary, administrative secretaries, inspector general of police, etc, where, counterintuitively, they are not answerable to the provincial governments. It is significant because anyone who is acquainted with the affairs of a provincial government knows how important the role of a chief secretary (CS) is as its chief administrative official, supervising an entire developmental and financial landscape.

Likewise, the role of administrative secretaries is equally important in their respective departments. Hence, the appointment of the CS by the federal government gives it considerable leverage over the affairs of the provinces, and the only justification that remains for federal civil servants to serve in the provinces, after the 18th Amendment, is to support the provincial governments in its transition-leading-to-self-governance phase. Also, it might not have been possible initially to provincialise all federal civil services, and the federal government might not have been willing to disturb the tenuous balance to avoid any constitutional and/or administrative crisis while it supposedly built the capacity of the provinces.

The spirit of provincial autonomy is barely addressed in the context of administrative positions. However, the said grounds for keeping the above ad-hoc arrangement in place are eroding fast and even resorting to legal and quasi-legal instruments such as the CSP agreement between the federal and provincial governments of 1954 and the apportionment formula of 1993 may not avert the impending governance crisis.

The provincial governments should have strengthened and expanded its civil service to include not only the district management cadre (provincial management service) but also education, health, excise and taxation, planning and development, food, police, prisons, prosecution, revenue/secretariat, communication and works, irrigation, agriculture, public health, municipal, local government and rural development and other services as its occupational groups/cadres to have enhanced its ability to take over the responsibility from the federal government, thus avoiding the present structural vacuum between the two levels of government.

Subsequently, these steps could have been complemented with building the capacity of provincial institutions such as the provincial public service commissions, mid-career training institutions, etc, thereby creating a realistic administrative structure for accepting executive federalism at the provincial level and improving the standards of public service significantly.

Also, after the 18th Amendment, neither the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) nor the federal government has any constitutional rationale to hold recruitment to the services which are now provincial subjects or post and transfer any officer from/to the province. If the federal government requires the human resource for running the day-to-day business of the federal capital or other departments, it may carry out a small-scale recruitment process or even request the provinces to fill the vacant senior positions. However, constantly ignoring the tenets of administrative federalism is indicative of the lack of intent on part of the federal government to protect the executive integrity of the provinces.

Conversely, there exists an anomaly where federal civil servants are both recruited and promoted by the FPSC on seats belonging to the provincial governments as a result of which the career progression of the provincial civil servants is slow. The Sindh government recently called this phenomenon an egregious anomaly and the tussle between the two governments serves as an example of a province asserting its constitutional authority. Such incidents are only the tip of the iceberg and could become frequent if this ad-hoc regime continues to run the administration of the provincial governments.

It makes one wonder: how and when will the provincial governments be considered worthy enough by the federal government to be empowered to run its affairs? To what extent has the federal government supported the provinces in this prolonged transition phase since 2010 (if not 1973)? Why is this ad-hoc regime becoming a rule in itself and a hurdle in the way of implementing administrative federalism? Why is the executive integrity of the provinces up for grabs and encroached upon as and when deemed necessary? These are some important markers that will shape the future of inter-governmental relations in Pakistan.

The writer is a public policy practitioner hailing from erstwhile Fata. He tweets @syedabdullah100

Originally posted here:

Administrative federalism - The News International

Section 1135 emergency waivers were designed as tools for policy-makers to rapidly increase health system capacity during a disaster. Granting regulatory, administrative, or payment-model flexibilities during the covid-19 pandemic, states may be better equipped for an influx of hospitalizations. One month passed before every state adopted a covid-19 waiver and no research investigated why states adopted waivers sooner than others. This study utilizes a Parametric (Gamma) Time-to-Event design to construct a Contextual, Institutional, Political, External, and a combined Integrated model to identify determinants of speedy waiver request. States with Section 1135 precedent in previous disasters submitted requests to CMS more quickly than states without prior experience. In the Integrated Model, four indicators were significantly associated with a shorter time to request: history of a previous waiver (0.7248, p <0.01), state health expenditures (0.9994, p <0.001), a democratic governor (0.6794, p <0.05), and a new 1135 Waiver request in the region (0.8424, p <0.001). Within the U.S. federalist system, states with greater institutional experience and fiscal capacity appeared to act most quickly to expand health system flexibility during the peak of the pandemics uncertainty. Such state variation in ability to respond rapidly to an emergency may confound attempts for equity in this pandemic and beyond.

On January 31, 2020, HHS Secretary Azar declared covid-19 a national public health emergency, which was followed by President Trumps March 13th proclamation declaring the covid-19 outbreak a national emergency (Proclamation No. 9994). In tandem, these two executive actions permitted Secretary Azar to invoke the Section 1135 Waiver Authority, immediately granting medical providers across the country blanket regulatory flexibilities (42 U.S.C. 1320b5). That day, Florida became the first state to initiate additional regulatory flexibilities through an 1135 waiver request (CMS 2020). By April 16, all fifty-one states had submitted a request for specific flexibilities (Medicaid 2020).

While the HHS Secretary can permit blanket waivers over the affected regions, once the Section 1135 Waiver authority has been invoked, states in the designated emergency area can begin initiating state-specific flexibility and capacity requests (CMS 2017). In recent decades, especially with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) which further empowered state waiver institutions (2010), governors and agency directors have been largely responsible for requesting waivers (Thompson, 2013). Though state legislatures have codified statutes which either expedite or hinder a governors ability to act unilaterally, most state legislatures passively allow the executive branch sole authority to request 1135 waivers, leaving governors and agency directors to exercise authority (Hinton, 2019; NCSL 2017).

Emergencies pose an immediate threat to health so it can be safely assumed that, all else equal, a more rapidly requested waiver will be more effective. For the covid-19 emergency, thirty-four days separate the first and last waiver request (CMS 2020). But what caused some states to request a waiver sooner than others? Was this variation a function of covid-19 outcomes? Or, were other state-specific factors contributing to the timing of a request? Previous studies suggest that financial capacity and politics significantly influence the utilization of current waivers (Nattinger, 2016; Nattinger & Kaskie, 2017). Yet, no study has systematically investigated the determinents of emergency waiver adoption.

While likely uncorrelated with the states covid-19 situation, this analysis hypothesizes that Section 1135 waiver precedent from previous emergencies is a major determinant of the timing of a covid-19 waiver request. Along with previous 1135 Waiver experience, this analysis tests if the timing of covid-19 waiver requests are associated with contextual (supply and demand), institutional, political, or external factors. For example, were states with higher proportion of people susceptible to covid-19 hospitalizations more likely quickly demand an increase in hospital capacity? Or, were 1135 Waiver decisions driven by state supply of hospitals? Additionally, after controlling for contextual factors how do state agency, legislative, and executive capacity influence 1135 Waiver time to adoption? And what role, if any, does state ideology play in the realm of emergency waiver negotiations?

Covid-19 has reminded policy-makers that national disasters do not impact states uniformly. Given that 1135 Waivers were designed to provide states flexibility to meet their contextually specific needs, ideally emergency waiver activity during covid-19 will be determined by each states need during the first month of the pandemic. If, however, factors unrelated to need are driving 1135 Waiver timing, then without further action existing disparities could be intensified as a result of underlying differences between the states.

This study utilizes a Time-to-Event analytical design to identify significant determinants influencing the adoption of a states 1135 Waiver request. These study designs have traditionally been used by public health researchers to model survival (Lee & Go, 1997). More generally, any event which is a function of the length of time from onset can be incorporated into a Time-to-Event analysis (Schober & Vetter, 2018). In primary model, the event of interest is a state requesting a Section 1135 Waiver, while the time between disaster proclamation and state request date is the dependent random variable. The primary independent (binary) variable is whether a state has previously requested Section 1135 Medicaid flexibilities during previous emergencies.

Time-to-event policy analyses can be modelled with a multitude of approaches, each allowing for different levels of interpretability and complexity. To enhance the robustness of this study, three different approaches are used: Kaplan-Meier, Cox Proportional Hazard, and Parametric (Gamma).

The Kaplan-Meier analysis, considered the most general, is a non-parametric model which evaluates the time to survival between two distinct groups (Dudley 2016). As a non-parametric model, the Kaplan-Meier estimate will not be sensitive to the underlying distribution of a states time to request. This Kaplan-Meier model compares the timing to a covid-19 waiver request between states with and without 1135 waiver precedent from previous emergencies. However, this Kaplan Meier estimate cannot control for any other covariates influencing a states timing to request (Rich 2010).

To include additional variables which could potentially identify factors influencing a states timing to request, two other approaches are used: A Cox Proportional Hazard Function and Parametric Model. A Cox Proportional Hazards analysis estimates the associated risk of requesting a waiver at any given time (conditional on not having already requested a waiver). Conversely, the parametric model estimates the effect of each variable on the length of time to waiver request. Along with interpretability, this parametric model holds other benefits over the Kaplan-Meier and Cox methods. Typically, parametric models may not be favored as they require additional assumptions related to the selected distribution (Abadi 2012; Siannis 2005). However, a Generalized Gamma incorporates multiple distributions and provides greatest flexibility under minimal assumptions (Cox 2007; Cox & Matheson, 2014; Matheson 2017). Another benefit to the parametric model is the inclusion of robust standard errors, which can account for potential heteroskedasticity in the model (Yau, 2001; Gutierrez, 2002). Following a framework developed by previous time-to-event studies, the Gamma analysis fit a Contextual, Institutional, Political, External, and a combined Integrated model (Berry, 1990; Nelson, 2007; Eaton, 2013). As a sensitivity analysis, Cox model estimates will be reported, along with a test of the assumption that risks do not differentially vary over time for each model.

The data for each states Section 1135 Waiver request date were obtained from CMS correspondence with state Medicaid Directors. Previous 1135 Waiver activity were obtained by a systematic process 1) identifying previous public health emergencies for all states (DHHS, 2020), 2) identifying which public health emergencies led to an invocation of Section 1135 Waiver authority (DHHS 2020), 3) reviewing archival correspondence (CMS 2020; PHE 2019; ASTHO 2010) and federal government reports (81 FR 63859).

Following guidance from previous policy determinants research (Imhof & Kaskie, 2008; Nattinger, 2016; Nattinger & Kaskie, 2017), this studys conceptual framework motivates the inclusion of state indicators related to the supply and demand of covid-19 care (contextual factors); administrative, executive, and legislative capacity to respond to a pandemic (institutional factors); and state ideology (political factors). Additionally, this study includes state and regional indicators to conceptualize external factors which may have influenced when and how a state requested a Section 1135 Waiver. State demand for covid-19 response was operationalized as the percentage of the population over age 65, percentage of the population with multiple co-morbidities, and the percentage of the population covered by Medicaid insurance (Jordan 2020). Given the intensity of treatment necessary to care for covid-19 patients, state supply factors include hospitals per capita and Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds per capita (Hancock, 2020; Waldman 2020). State Medicaid agency capacity was operationalized using recent state expenditure data (Medicaid, hospitals, and total healthcare spending) and if the state had a current Section 1115 Medicaid Waiver (Jordan 2020; (Hinton 2019). Legislative and Executive Capacity were operationalized with salary and staff expenditure data, while the Executive model also included Line Item Veto and additional public health emergency authority (Jordan 2020; Perkins 2019). State ideology included the current Governors political affiliation, the percentage of Democrats in the current state senate, and the estimated percentage of citizens with liberal views (Jordan 2020; NCSL 2019; NGA 2020). Finally, along with the covid-19 cases and deaths at the time of the requested waiver, the external model also included a binary variable indicating if a new 1135 Waivers was requested in the region. Regions were determined by state networks (Olsen 2019).

States with Section 1135 precedent in previous disasters submitted requests to CMS more quickly than states without prior experience, however these differences were only marginally significant (Figure 1). Figure 1 shows that states with at least one previous 1135 Waiver experience requested a covid-19 waiver more quickly (p = 0.1023). Additionally, states with two or more prior 1135 experiences requested a covid-19 waiver more quickly than states with one or fewer previous 1135 waiver experiences (Figure 2, p = 0.0500). In this unadjusted model (Table 1), the Cox Proportional Hazard for states with 1135 precedent indicated a higher likelihood of requesting a covid-19 waiver at any given time (Hazard Ratio 1.5605), however this effect was not significantly different than states without precedent. For the parametric model, however, the time-to-waiver request was (marginally) significantly less for states with previous 1135 Waiver experience (Time Ratio = 0.7522).

As expected, the Full Integrated Model had the best fit (p < 0.0001). Within this integrated model, four indicators were significantly associated with a shorter time to request: history of a previous waiver (0.7248, p <0.01), state health expenditures (0.9994, p <0.001), a democratic governor (0.6794, p <0.05), and a new 1135 Waiver request in the region (0.8424, p <0.001). The only variable with a statistically significant association with longer time-to-request were covid-19 cases (1.0230, p<-.001). Table 2 reports the full estimates from each models effect on time-to-waiver request, as well as the Cox Proportional Hazards results as a sensitivity analysis.

The critical nature of this ongoing disaster warrants persistent attention from policy-makers at all levels of government. While only a segment of the total covid-19 response, Section 1135 Waivers provide a unique opportunity for states to redirect healthcare resources and expand health system capacity. Yet, this research shows that states have taken different approaches even within the Section 1135 Waiver authority. In summary, institutional (1135 Waiver experience and state agency capacity) and external (a new 1135 Waiver in the region) factors are associated with the timing of a state response. These pre-existing differences between states potentially determining the timing of 1135 policy becomes problematic. However, this new evidence should promote continual innovation by state and local policy-makers. As states continue requesting second and third 1135 Waivers for covid-19 (CMS 2020), the public should expect more timely requests.

The covid-19 pandemic has motivated examinations on American Federalism during a public health emergency. These findings continue that discussion.

The framers of the U.S. Constitution, while never explicitly using the term emergency, understood the risks and benefits of instituting centralized authority during times of national emergencies (Hamilton, 1787). Fearing the risk of unchecked presidential authority as a precursor to tyranny, emergency powers were not allocated to the executive branch (Hamilton and Madison 1788). Rather, Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war, call upon an army in times of war, and maintain an army during times of peace (critical to any legal analysis of modern emergencies was the foresight to extend these powers to situations seemingly unpredictable in 1788, including disasters during times of peace (Madison 1788)). Yet, despite the risks of concentrated emergency power within the Executive branch, the framers of the Constitution understood the value of such power when responding to an emergency in a timely, effective manner; resulting in largely undefined and broadly interpreted executive authority during emergencies (Fisch, 1990). As presidents began to exert their influence through emergency proclamations and executive orders, the federal Judiciary responded with oversight powers to mitigate presidential overreach (i.e.: Ex parte Merryman 1861; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 1952).

During the twentieth century, the constitutionally prescribed distribution of emergency powers shifted. Nearing the end of World War II, congress passed the Public Health Services Act (42 U.S.C. ch. 6A 201); of which section 319 grants the Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary authority to declare a national public health emergency (42 U.S.C. 247d). Two subsequent statutes continued the shift of emergency power from Congress to the President: The National Emergency Act of 1976 (50 U.S.C. 1601-51) and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. 5121-5207). Both acts explicitly delegate authority to declare a national emergency to the President. Finally, when both a public health and national emergency are declared, the HHS Secretary can invoke Section 1135 Waiver Authority and grant regulatory flexibilities to providers and hospitals in the designated emergency areas (42 U.S.C. 1320b5). However, while precedent is limited, just as in the wartime cases against executive overreach, the Judiciary maintains authority to ensure both the President and Secretary act within their delegated emergency powers (PHN v. U.S. 2015).

Contemporary analysis suggests two general approaches to understanding federalism. The first explores the changing power within each branch and level of government; the second explores the propensity for cooperation (Rigby & Haselswerdt, 2013; Weil, 2013) or competition (Shannon & Kee, 1989; Volden, 2005; Weil, 2009) between jurisdictions. The results of this study provide insight for both approaches. Unlike other Medicaid Waivers, which are largely driven by state executives and agency directors (Weissert & Scheller, 2008; Weissert & Weissert, 2017), Section 1135 Waivers place more authority within the federal executive branch. Even after 1135 invocation, which requires two federal actions, the HHS Secretary immediately provides a set of blanket flexibilities for all states, minimizing any subsequent request. State power is also reduced from the bottom-up, as local or municipal governments and health systems have the ability to bypass state authority to request their own waiver. This reduced authority, however, doesnt apply generally to the covid-19 pandemic which has shown massive expansion of state executives role (Cook 2020). Most interesting, however, is the apparent diffusion between states. By adopting concurrent waivers with other states in each region, the 1135 Waiver diffusion fits other cooperative activity necessary for states to pool resources, signaling that Section 1135 Waiver experience and expertise may be a valuable resource to neighboring states.

This is the first study to identify significant determinants of Section 1135 Waivers. If quality is defined by quicker requests, then the quality of emergency waivers during the covid-19 pandemic are largely determined by institutional and external factors. Meanwhile, supply and demand to do not appear to be driving the timing of emergency waiver decisions. These findings should motivate further research investigating the impact of late adoption effects on covid-19 outcomes, but more importantly, inform immediate policy decisions as state policy-makers continue to navigate the ongoing pandemic

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Click here to access the appendix.

42 U.S. Code 247d. (1944) Public health emergencies.

42 U.S.C. 1320b5 Sec. 1135.

42 U.S.C. 5121-5207 (1988) Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.

50 U.S.C. 1601-51. (1976) The National Emergency Act.

81 FR 63859. (2016). Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Emergency Preparedness Requirements for Medicare and Medicaid Participating Providers and Suppliers.

Abadi, A., Amanpour, F., Bajdik, C., & Yavari, P. (2012). Breast Cancer Survival Analysis: Applying the Generalized Gamma Distribution under Different Conditions of the Proportional Hazards and Accelerated Failure Time Assumptions. International Journal of Preventive Medicine, 3(9), 644651.

Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) (2010). ASSESSING POLICY BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE IN THE H1N1 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC. Report to CDC.

Azar, A. (2020) Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists (COVID-19) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/2019-nCoV.aspx

Berry, F. S., & Berry, W. D. (1990). State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis. The American Political Science Review, 84(2), 395415. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/1963526

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) (2017). 1135 Waivers. https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification/SurveyCertEmergPrep/1135-Waivers

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) (2020). CMS Approves First State Request for 1135 Medicaid Waiver in Florida. https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-approves-first-state-request-1135-medicaid-waiver-florida

Cook, Nancy & Diamond, Dan. (2020). A Darwinian approach to federalism: States confront new reality under Trump. Politico.

Cox, C., Chu, H., Schneider, M. F., & Muoz, A. (2007). Parametric survival analysis and taxonomy of hazard functions for the generalized gamma distribution. Statistics in Medicine, 26(23), 43524374. https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.2836

Cox, C., & Matheson, M. (2014). A Comparison of the Generalized Gamma and Exponentiated Weibull Distributions. Statistics in Medicine, 33(21), 37723780. https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.6159

Dudley, W. N., Wickham, R., & Coombs, N. (2016). An Introduction to Survival Statistics: Kaplan-Meier Analysis. Journal of the Advanced Practitioner in Oncology, 7(1), 91100.

Eaton, L. J. (2013). Policy Adoption by State Governments: An Event History Analysis of Factors Influencing States to Enact Inpatient Health Care Transparency Laws. http://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/islandora/object/fsu%3A183706/

Ex parte Merryman (1861), 17 F. Cas. 144, 1861 U.S. App. LEXIS 380, 9 Am. Law Reg. 524, 1 Taney 246, 24 Law Rep. 78, 3 W.L. Monthly 461

Exec. Order No. 13648, 78 Fed. Reg. 129 (July 5, 2013).

Gutierrez, R. G. (2002). Parametric Frailty and Shared Frailty Survival Models. The Stata Journal, 2(1), 2244. https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X0200200102

Hamilton, A. (1787). The Federalist No. 23. Yale Law School. Lilian Goldman Law Library (2008).

Hamilton, A., Madison, J. (1788). The Federalist No. 51. Yale Law School. Lilian Goldman Law Library (2008).

Hancock, F. S., Elizabeth Lucas, Jordan Rau, Liz Szabo, Jay. (2020, March 20). Millions Of Older Americans Live In Counties With No ICU Beds As Pandemic Intensifies. Kaiser Health News. https://khn.org/news/as-coronavirus-spreads-widely-millions-of-older-americans-live-in-counties-with-no-icu-beds/

Hinton, E., Antonisse, L., Feb 12, C. H. P., & 2019. (2019, February 12). Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: The Current Landscape of Approved and Pending Waivers. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/section-1115-medicaid-demonstration-waivers-the-current-landscape-of-approved-and-pending-waivers/

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Federalism and the Value of Institutional Experience During a National Disaster: Identifying Determinants of Rapid Emergency Medicaid Waiver Adoption...

Michael R. Ford| Milwaukee Journal Sentinel

Local control is a foundational governing concept in Wisconsin. Our system of dual federalism, in which the state is responsible for issues of statewide concern and local government is responsible for issues of local concern, is designed to place decision-making authority at the level of government closest to the people impacted by those decisions.

In theory, empowering local government increases the legitimacy and effectiveness of government, while ensuring residents can hold local officials accountable for their performance.

Butas a new report from the Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy Research demonstrates, local control is a contested concept weaponized for political purposes as opposed to a tool for good government in Wisconsin.

We surveyed 288 local government leaders to better understand the state of local control in Wisconsin. Tellingly, in response to an open-ended question on the meaning of local control, local officials told us, It sounds great but is not realistic because politicians use it to persuade constituents that they are voting the right way, that Legislators are more than willing to say they are for local control but it really means nothing to them, and that Local control is a moving target based on the hot regulatory items of the day.

The general pessimism around local control is not surprising given the steady erosion of local authority over key policy areas.

A 2018 memo from the Legislative Fiscal Bureau, for example, identified more than 100 state legislative changes between 2011 and 2018 that limited local government autonomy in areas such as land use and zoning, local revenue options, transportationand K-12 education. Our survey results indicate that self-identified conservatives are most likely to perceive an imbalance between state and local authority, but overall dissatisfaction with the state-local balance of power transcended ideology. In addition, there is widespread belief among local officials that their colleagues at the state level do not share their definition of local control.

Why does the ambiguity around local control matter? Simply, disagreement on the meaning of local control hampers effectiveness. Without agreement, there can be no coordination. When state and local government officials disagree on where their authority stops and starts it becomes more difficult to meet the needs of Wisconsinites.

Consider the government response to COVID-19. Our survey results revealed largescale confusion about who was responsible for responding to different aspects of the pandemic. As one respondent put it, Everyone is doing something different. There is no uniformity like there is in neighboring states. The issue was not about local vs. state authority, but rather the lack of understanding of where decision-making authority resided. The result was confusion, wasted energyand the politicization of basic policy responses to the pandemic.

RELATED: Top GOP lawmakers now want to leave virus plan in the hands of local officials

So what can be done to restore meaning to local control in Wisconsin?

Foremost, local officials need to coalesce around a common definition of local control. City managers and mayors need to understand their authority in order to provide services, and elected officials must understand local powers to provide direction to city staff. That can be accomplished through each municipalitys strategic planning process, and communicated to the public via the annual local budget.

As our survey shows, the specific definition of local control is less important than the ability for those involved in governing to agree on a common definition. There will still be disagreement over where authority over specific policy areas should lie, but local government officials will, at the very least, eliminate ambiguity that hampers government performance.

The troubled state of local control in Wisconsin is just one example of the politicization of our democracys most basic foundational elements. Federalism has proved to be a powerful tool for enabling good government despite our ideological divisions. But, when weaponized for political purposes, it loses itsmeaning and erodes trust in our government. While there will always be tension between state and local authority, local governments can work to eliminate role ambiguity and ultimately restore meaning to local control in Wisconsin.

Michael Ford is the director of the Whitburn Center for Governance and Policy Research at the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh. He also serves as an associate professor of Public Administration, and an elected member of the Oshkosh Common Council.

Our subscribers make this reporting possible. Please consider supporting local journalism by subscribing to the Journal Sentinel at jsonline.com/deal.

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'Local control' of government is a hallowed idea in Wisconsin. Here's what we can do to give it real meaning again. - Milwaukee Journal Sentinel

The Constitution must be defended except when it must be jettisoned.

Weve heard much upon the anniversary of Jan. 6 about how Donald Trump wanted to distort the Constitution to get Vice President Mike Pence to try to throw the election to him a year ago.

And this was, indeed, a cockamamie, counter-constitutional scheme. Neither the framers of the Constitution nor the drafters of the 12th Amendment, the provision in question that day, intended to invest unilateral power in one person to decide presidential elections.

Indeed, besides Pence, who refused to buckle to Trumps pressure, the biggest hero of the post-election period was the constitutional system itself. Once again, it proved a durable vehicle of representative government and a frustration to anyone hoping to seize and wield illegitimate power.

Its distribution of power via federalism to the 50 states, its separation of powers at the federal level and its provision for an independent judiciary made it impossible for Trump allies to press one button and reverse the outcome of the election.

So, its bizarre for the Democrats and the left to profess to consider a possible repeat by Trump in 2024 an ongoing national emergency, and yet establish more precedent for a president of the United States acting unilaterally beyond his constitutional powers (via Bidens eviction moratorium and OSHA-imposed vaccine mandate); push to nationalize the countrys voting rules; play with the idea of destroying the legitimacy of the Supreme Court through court-packing; and generally undermine and tear at the fabric of the Constitution as a racist relic unworthy of the 21st century.

If Trump 3.0 is an existential threat, they should want to make it absolutely clear that all presidents have to strictly abide by the Constitution in all circumstances. They should seek to maintain a highly decentralized election system. They should work to buttress the standing of the Supreme Court. And they should hold up the Constitution as a time-tested bulwark of our liberties.

Instead, weve seen the opposite because doing these things makes it harder to pursue the progressive project.

On the center-left, it is considered an outrage that the Founders didnt foresee that a left-wing Democratic Party would have trouble competing in many rural states and therefore be at a disadvantage in the Senate and the Electoral College.

The past few years should have given progressives a new appreciation of federalism, though it allowed, for instance, deep-blue California to keep governing itself largely according to its own lights even when Trump was president.

That the Constitution makes it hard to get things done in Washington, another charge in the indictment against it, also serves an important function. It forces parties to win big majorities if they want to forge transformational changes, or to mobilize public opinion behind its agenda.

Otherwise, the gravitational force of the system is toward consensus. We see this in the debate over the sweeping Democratic voting bills.

Democrats are entertaining ideas whether blowing up the filibuster, packing the Supreme Court, adding new states for partisan advantage that violate the kind of norms they always cited in opposing Trump.

The New York Times recently ran an editorial arguing that every day is Jan. 6. That is clearly absurd. But the Constitution is indeed always under threat, and it falls on its friends to defend it from all challengers.

Rich Lowry is editor of the National Review.

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Lowry: The left supports the Constitution until it doesnt - Boston Herald

The state of political discourse in America is a disaster. The federal polity continues on a downward spiral that has persisted for decades. Official Washington is broken. It is a place where backbiting has supplanted statesmanship, finger-pointing has replaced statecraft and name-calling has superseded diplomacy. Many have despaired of the ship of states ability to right itself. Is bipartisanship dead? Is compromise a quaint relic of a distant past? Is it possible for true leadership to transcend the socio-political chasms separating a polarized and suspicious electorate? Where can America look to find hope?

To the West the governors of the West.

Defying the stereotype of American politicians as ineffective, feckless and self-interested, Western governors are among the most collegial, respectful and pragmatic leaders currently populating this countrys political landscape. No group of elected officials more effectively collaborates to produce substantive and significant bipartisan public policy.

Having recently managed a meeting of Western governors in Coronado and California, my hopefulness for the future has been replenished. Such an assembly is inspiring, if not altogether cathartic. It is a place where political baggage is checked at the door, red and blue uniforms are tucked away, and a clutch of smart and savvy problem-solvers turn their attention to some of the most urgent challenges facing the region and nation.

With their attention so engaged, governors of western states proceed to do something that is, sadly, remarkable for its rarity. They work together, across party lines and ideological divisions, to develop common-sense policies, strategies and solutions. At their recent meeting, the governors worked to address the crisis of missing and murdered indigenous people, computer chip challenges in a high-tech economy and emergency preparedness. They negotiated detailed policy resolutions on energy, air quality, cybersecurity and workforce development.

And they did it all without throwing sharp elbows, calling each other names or consulting polls. Working on issues that matter, that affect real people in the real world, they apprehend no advantage in demonizing other governors who may be of a different party but who face the same challenges, threats and opportunities as they do.

Western governors share a number of attributes that account for their relative bipartisanship and effectiveness. For one thing, they are the chief executive officers of their states they are senior managers who need to make things work. Effective leaders of large organizations (like states) tend to be more pragmatic than ideological. In addressing complex and multidimensional problems, practicality beats political rigidity every time.

For another thing, these governors are not running against each other. Regardless of party affiliation, they have all traversed similar paths and find themselves facing similar challenges whether those involve the distribution of personal protective equipment, response to catastrophic wildfires or containment of invasive species threatening western landscapes. It is evident that governors have much to gain by working with and collaborating with one another. They learn from each others experiences. They alert each other to issues and threats that may be just around the bend. They unabashedly appropriate innovations from each other and they share the unusual bonhomie that comes with being members of a very small club. While the advantages of cooperation are apparent, the benefits of sniping at each other to score political points are much less so.

Other elected officials across the country would do well to emulate the example of Western governors. But even if that is too much to expect, governors will still contribute to the rescue of our country to the extent the portfolio of state and federal power is rebalanced to better reflect the intent of the founders.

The genius of American democracy is predicated not only upon the separation between branches of government (the executive, legislature and judiciary) but also upon the division of power between the national government and states, also known as federalism. Under the American version of federalism, the powers of the federal government are narrow, enumerated and defined. The powers of the states, on the other hand, are vast and indefinite and encompass all powers of governance not specifically bestowed to the federal government by the U.S. Constitution.

Over time, the balance of power has shifted dramatically toward the federal government and away from the states. This reality is reflected in the vast size, scope, cost and complexity (not to mention ungovernability) of the federal behemoth. Restoring a greater measure of authority to the states would place more decisions in the hands of governors, leaders who are closer to the people and have intimate knowledge of their states environments, economies and cultures. Also, an authentic partnership between the states and federal government would result in more effective and durable policy, resulting in a stronger and more resilient nation.

Throughout the past couple of years, governors in western states have been at the point of the spear of COVID-19 response, working to protect their people and their economies. They have been called upon to make incredibly difficult decisions life and death decisions and they have borne that burden with sobriety and grace.

At the same time, their other weighty responsibilities did not magically disappear. They have still had natural disasters to manage, students to educate and budgets to balance. And through it all, they have kept their heads high and have somehow managed to maintain their optimism, energy, enthusiasm and humor.

I am confident that Western governors will emerge from their collective emergency experience stronger, more united, and more energized than ever. And I better be right about that, because governors are the last adults standing on the American political stage.

Jim Ogsbury is executive director of the Western Governors Association. He previously served as legislative director for the League of Arizona Cities and Towns and as the clerk and staff director for the U.S. House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development.

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Governors are the last adults standing in American politics | TheHill - The Hill

Now is the time to remove our politicians penchant for insincerity from the resource control controversy. Because this is the time to begin again; time to review the 1999 Constitution in order that Nigeria may survive.

Unknown to many, possibly owing to ignorance, carelessness or perversity, the 1999 Constitution is a unitary document rather than a federal constitution. In fact, the people didnt realise the enormity of atrocity committed against federalism until the advent of the Buhari nepotism.

Even then with other regions such as South West, South East and North Central where rivers are rampant, offshore resources are placed under the Federal Government without qualms. It is noteworthy that this matter was laid to rest in 2002 with the landmark Supreme Court case between the Federal Attorney General and the Attorney General of Abia State and 35 others.The court reaffirmed federal control over the resources of the states offshore and the adjacent continental shelf on Nigerias coast. That the Supreme Court reaffirmed the anti-federalism of the 1999 Constitution never prompted the federalists to amend the Constitution. As long as graft in dollars is rolling into bank accounts of our governors and legislators, federalism can go to blazes. That federalism has not been reinstated as Nigerias accepted form of government is proof of insincerity by our politicians. And when you practice insincerity as a habit; it gradually becomes ingrained in you. You no longer recognise you are being insincere to yourself as you are doing to others. Which is why our political office holders are not ashamed of not delivering their promises to the people.

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Time to remove insincerity from resource control Opinion - Guardian