Daily Archives: December 27, 2021

Nearly six months in, "The View" has yet to settle on a permanent replacement for Meghan McCain. And now, the longtime co-hosts are upping the pressure to pick a successor. | Todd Anderson/Disney Resorts via Getty Images

Before taking off for the holidays, the four long-standing hosts of The View had a message for executive producer BRIAN TETA: Were tired of the rotating cast of Republican guest hosts.

When MEGHAN MCCAIN departed in August, Teta initially told the Wrap that he was taking a little time to find a replacement. Since then, ABC has tried out a variety of conservative fill-ins, including S.E. CUPP, ALYSSA FARAH, MORGAN ORTAGUS, CONDOLEEZZA RICE, CARLY FIORINA, and GRETCHEN CARLSON.

Nearly six months in, the show has yet to settle on a permanent replacement. And now, the longtime co-hosts JOY BEHAR, WHOOPI GOLDBERG and SUNNY HOSTIN are upping the pressure to pick a successor, and voicing their displeasure at having to introduce new guest hosts week after week in a seemingly endless process that they find disruptive to the flow of the show.

Right now, we still do need a really conservative voice, Hostin told New York Magazine in November. And we need someone thats not duplicative of anyone else on the panel.

According to a spokesperson for The View, the program will continue to audition potential hosts in the new year, bringing some women back for a second turn. Farah will return in January, and the show will bring in other big names, like BARI WEISS and LISA LING neither of whom exactly fit the conservative label while the network continues to conduct focus groups on the audiences reaction.

Sources close to the show said that the search has stalled as executives struggle to find a conservative cast-member who checks all the right boxes. They will not consider a Republican who is a denier of the 2020 election results, embraced the January 6 riots, or is seen as flirting too heavily with fringe conspiracy theories or the MAGA wing of the GOP. But at the same time, the host must have credibility with mainstream Republicans, many of whom still support DONALD TRUMP.

The problem is that they bring people on under the mantle that this woman is a conservative, when theyre Never Trump, so they dont represent the country, said one of the rotating guest hosts.

At the same time, the anti-Trump conservative cant be seen as too chummy with the other co-hosts, as the networks market-research shows that the audience wants to see the women spar. Sources said that this has hurt the chances of ANA NAVARRO, a regular fill-in on the conservative chair who worked as a surrogate for JOE BIDEN in 2020: She is perceived by the producers as too friendly with the other hosts and not a traditional Republican.

They are really looking for a unicorn, said a former show staffer. They want someone who is going to fight but not too hard, because they dont want it to be ugly and bickering.

It doesnt help that theres a perception that whoever sits in the conservative host slot is on borrowed time, with prominent Republican former co-hosts like NICOLLE WALLACE, ELIZABETH HASSELBECK, ABBY HUNTSMAN and McCain leaving the show with claims of being bullied by their co-hosts and ABC executives on-set and off, while veterans like Goldberg and Behar have thrived.

Sources said that the show was eager to recruit young libertarian KAT TIMPF, but she turned them down because of the shows reputation for treating conservatives poorly and her contract with Fox. Timpf declined to comment to Playbook. Others have said that the show has a responsibility to fill the conservative chair with a strong Republican co-host ahead of the midterms if they are going to be a credible political talk show.

Our plans are on track as we continue to look for the right person to join our panel of smart, dynamic women, said a View spokesperson. We look forward to welcoming guest co-hosts for return appearances and introducing new names into the mix in the new year.

Good Monday morning. Thanks for reading Playbook. Drop us a line: Rachael Bade, Eugene Daniels, Ryan Lizza, Tara Palmeri.

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This year, the world searched to support nurses. For the length of the pandemic, nurses around the world have been heroesand in 2021, the world searched to recognize them. when is nurses week was searched at an all-time high around the globe. Explore Google Year in Search 2021.

IN MEMORIAM Our illustrious colleagues at POLITICO Magazine have put together a package of obituaries and remembrances of the political players, agitators, chroniclers and pioneers who died this year and why they mattered. Among those profiled: COLIN POWELL, BOB DOLE, BOB MOSES, RICHARD TRUMKA, bell hooks, RUTH ANN MINNER, DONALD RUMSFELD, SHELDON ADELSON, RUSH LIMBAUGH, LEE HART, VERNON JORDAN, G. GORDON LIDDY, ROSE OCHI and CARL LEVIN.

Clockwise from top left: Vernon Jordan, Sheldon Adelson, Ruth Ann Minner, and Walter Mondale. | Todd Heisler/The New York Times/Redux Pictures; Ethan Miller/Getty Images; Dee Marvin/AP Photo; Stephen Voss/Redux Pictures

Click here for all 33 profiles, written by the likes of CONDOLEEZZA RICE, Reps. TOM MALINOWSKI (D-N.J.) and JUDY CHU (D-Calif.), former Rep. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN (R-Fla.) and more.

BIDENS YEAR IN REVIEW WATCH: Biden got by with little help from his friends: A Beatles remix

During the first year of the Biden presidency, the nation just seemed to want to double down on divisiveness. Biden thought his first year was going to be like a happy Beatles song. The country needed help. It was time to get back and come together over him. We could get by with a little help from our friends! Please enjoy a very Beatles parody of Bidens hard days night and year, 2021.

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As the year comes to a close, see the people, stories, and events the world was searching for. Watch Google Year in Search 2021.

BIDENS MONDAY:

10:05 a.m.: The president will receive the Presidents Daily Brief.

11:30 a.m.: Biden will join the White House Covid-19 response teams regular call with the National Governors Association to discuss the pandemic.

12:15 p.m.: Biden will depart the White House en route to Rehoboth Beach, Del., where he is scheduled to arrive at 1:15 p.m.

2:30 p.m.: The president will virtually receive his weekly economic briefing.

THE HOUSE and THE SENATE are out.

PHOTOS OF THE YEAR

Supporters of President Donald Trump climb the west wall of the the U.S. Capitol in Washington as they try to storm the building on Jan. 6. | Jose Luis Magana/AP Photo

Police with guns drawn face off against rioters trying to break into the House Chamber at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6. | J. Scott Applewhite/AP Photo

A rioter hangs from the balcony in the Senate Chamber on Jan. 6. | Win McNamee/Getty Images

THE PANDEMIC

THE OMI-CHRONICLES

Coronavirus cases are being reported at record levels across the world surpassing even last winters devastating peak in some places, write WaPos Bryan Pietsch and Annabelle Timsit. The UK, Italy, Ireland and France are among those nations that broke their previous records over the weekend. Here in the U.S., health officials warn that the country could soon see more than 1 million new cases per day, far beyond last winters peak of 248,000.

Sunday travel plans got totally derailed. As of Sunday evening, more than 1,300 flights with at least one stop in the United States, and over two times as many around the world, had been canceled, NYTs Marc Tracy writes.

Health experts are urging city and state officials to do more to ensure that the most vulnerable particularly nursing home residents get boosters quickly, NYTs Sharon Otterman and Joseph Goldstein write. New York, like much of the country, was slow to push boosters before the new variant arrived a few weeks ago, and has largely left administering third doses to the long-term care facilities themselves, some of which are struggling with the task.

Business leaders are asking Congress for another dip into the national piggy bank. The question Congress will face when it returns in January is whether the latest Covid-19 wave justifies a new rescue beyond the $1 trillion of emergency small business assistance lawmakers have approved since March 2020. Most of the programs have been tapped out or are winding down, Zachary Warmbrodt writes.

Meanwhile, Bidens plan to use USAID to help vaccinate the world in 2022 is running out of money, Erin Banco reports. Over the past year, the agency has largely relied on more than $1.6 billion allocated through the American Rescue Plan to help facilitate the shipment and administration of Covid-19 vaccine doses internationally. The agency has either used that money or already earmarked it for several months into the new year to help countries prepare to receive and distribute the doses, the officials said.

THE WHITE HOUSE

BEHIND-THE-SCENES BACKBITING Daniel Lippman has the scoop on an explosive whisper campaign that tried to sink STEVEN BONDYs appointment as U.S. ambassador to Bahrain. This is one such story youve not read before. It features a decorated diplomat with an unblemished record, about to claim a career-defining prize: an ambassadorial posting to a key Middle East ally. It involves serious accusations and counter-accusations of racism, none of which were made publicly. Hidden not far beneath the surface are personal histories and policy disagreements in this case between appointees of former President Donald Trump and the Deep State bureaucracy that havent been put to bed with the advent of a new administration. To tell the tale properly, we need to go back three years and start in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates.

THE ECONOMY

HOLIDAY SHOPPING UP BIG Despite many worries that the new surge coupled with headache-inducing supply chain woes would stunt holiday sales this year, data says that doesnt seem to be the case. American consumers spent at a brisk pace over the shopping season, as an early rush to stores amid worries about supply and delivery problems muted the effects of a Covid-19 surge that disrupted some businesses and crimped spending before Christmas, WSJs Suzanne Kapner and Paul Ziobro report.

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Google Year in Search 2021: "how to help haiti was a breakout search worldwide.

POLICY CORNER

THE NEW RULES OF MONOPOLY A new breed of antitrust activists say its time to rewrite the rules that have long protected competition in the American economy, reports Leah Nylen. And unlike many of the hottest issues embroiling Washington, the antitrust debate doesnt break down along neat partisan or ideological lines. Supporters of sweeping change include progressive Democrats like Massachusetts Sen. ELIZABETH WARREN and Federal Trade Commission Chair LINA KHAN, as well as conservative Republicans like Missouri Sen. JOSH HAWLEY and Colorado Rep. KEN BUCK, all of them facing resistance within their own parties.

ALL POLITICS

MAGA MOVES Trumps staunchest allies in Congress are aiming to grow their ranks in the midterms by primarying establishment Republicans. The goal, organizers of the effort say, is to supersize the MAGA group in the House from its current loose membership of about a half-dozen and give it the heft that, combined with its close alliance with Trump, would put it in a position to wield significant influence should Republicans win the House majority, WaPos Colby Itkowitz writes. A number that jumped out at us: In 2020, Trump won 45 [House] districts by more than 15 percentage points. Under new maps already finalized in more than a dozen states, he would have won 78 districts by that margin.

THE NEW GOP WINSOME SEARS road to becoming Virginias lieutenant governor and the first Black woman elected to statewide office in the commonwealth was unlikely. Now, she wants to change the conversation among Black Republican voters. This is the question that Ms. Sears embodies: whether she is a singular figure who won a surprise victory or the vanguard of a major political realignment, dissolving longtime realities of race and partisan identification, NYTs Campbell Robertson writes in Richmond, Va. Democrats say there is little evidence for the latter, and that Ms. Sears won with typical Republican voters in an especially Republican year. But Ms. Sears insists that many Black and immigrant voters naturally side with Republicans on a variety of issues and that some are starting to realize that. The only way to change things is to win elections, she said. And who better to help make that change but me? I look like the strategy.

AMERICA AND THE WORLD

FIRST IN PLAYBOOK PBS In Their Own Words series will debut a new episode on former German Chancellor ANGELA MERKEL on Tuesday, Dec. 28. The special will feature interviews with HILLARY CLINTON, GEORGE W. BUSH and others to explore how Merkel overcame fierce opposition, a vicious press and rampant sexism to lead Germany and Europe with a steady focus on peace and freedom. In an exclusive clip shared with Playbook, Clinton and Bush talk about Merkels dealings with world leaders like Russian President VLADIMIR PUTIN. Bush even tells a story about when he introduced his dog, Barney, to Putin. The 2:49 clip

ON THE GROUND In Ukraine, the military is training civilians as a precaution if Russia takes the extraordinary step to attack the country, drawing on a lesson from the United States wars in Iraq and Afghanistan of the past two decades, when guerrillas provided enduring resistance in the face of vastly superior American firepower, NYTs Andrew Kramer writes in Kyiv.

JUDICIARY SQUARE

LAW OF THE LAND Federal prosecutors are increasingly using racketeering statutes to go after a broader array of criminal activity, applying them in ways that deviate from the laws original goal of dismantling organized crime, WSJs Deanna Paul reports.

Alexander Vindman portrayed himself on Sunday nights season finale of Curb Your Enthusiasm. While on book tour in the episode, Vindman overhears Larry David on the phone asking a Santa Monica city councilwoman for a favor while dangling a large donation in front of her.

IN MEMORIAM via APs Jake Bleiberg: Sarah Weddington, a Texas lawyer who as a 26-year-old successfully argued the landmark abortion rights case Roe v. Wade before the U.S. Supreme Court, died Sunday. She was 76.

via NYTs Vimal Patel and Azi Paybarah: Richard Marcinko, the hard-charging founding commander of Navy SEAL Team 6, the storied and feared unit within an elite commando force that later carried out the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, died Saturday at his home in Fauquier County, Va. He was 81.

TRANSITION Jon Selib will be managing director and global external affairs leader at Clayton, Dubilier & Rice. He previously was SVP of global policy and public affairs at Pfizer, and is a Max Baucus alum.

WELCOME TO THE WORLD Michael Ly, director of public policy at the American Kidney Fund, and Katie Leesman, an associate at Ballard Spahr, welcomed Vinh Michael Ly last Monday. Pic

HAPPY BIRTHDAY: Rep. Jeff Fortenberry (R-Neb.) Laura Lott of the American Alliance of Museums Shhrazade Semsar Emily Murphy Julie Benkoske NBCs Savannah Guthrie Mercedes Schlapp Kurt Volker Andi Lipstein Fristedt Gray Televisions Jacqueline Policastro Osaremen Okolo Jessica McCreight Brown Marc Smrikarov of Chatham Strategies James Burnham Andi Pringle Emily Hytha Googles Jeff Murray Kamau Marshall Tierney Sneed Joe Harris Josh Litten BCW Globals Karen Hughes POLITICO Europes Tim Ball and Nick Vinocur Arthur Kent Benji Backer of the American Conservation Coalition Hemanshu Nigam Mike Thomas Barclay Palmer Joseph Collins Andrew Chesley Catherine Marx former Reps. Abby Finkenauer (D-Iowa) and Joe Walsh (R-Ill.) (6-0) James King

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POLITICO Playbook: 'The View' struggles to find a Republican - Politico

2021 was the year that Americas democracy came under attack from within.

Donald Trumps effort to overturn the election results, an endeavor that culminated in the 6 January assault on the Capitol, ultimately failed. But the lies the former president spread about fraud and the integrity of the 2020 results have stuck around in a dangerous way. False claims about the election have moved to the center of the Republican party.

Republican lawmakers have seized on the fears created by those baseless claims and weaponized them into new laws that make it harder to vote. Between January and October, 19 states enacted 33 laws to restrict voting access, according to the Brennan Center for Justice.

But Republicans havent stopped there. There is now a concerted effort to take more partisan control of election administration. Trump is supporting election deniers in their efforts to take control of key offices that control the rules of elections and counting of ballots. That effort has elevated fears that Trump is laying the groundwork for another coup in 2024, when supporters in those roles could help overturn the election results.

All these actions are taking place against the backdrop of the once-per-decade redistricting process, which Republicans dominate in many states. Republicans are taking full advantage of that power, drawing districts that will entrench their control of state legislatures and win congressional seats for the next decade.

Joe Biden has described this attack as the most significant test of our democracy since the civil war. But Democrats in the US Senate have been unable to pass two bills with significant voting rights protections. Whether Biden and Senate Democrats can find a way to get those bills through Congress looms as a major test of his presidency.

Here are the ways that voting rights emerged as the most important story in American politics in 2021:

When state legislatures convened at the start of 2021, many moved quickly to enact new laws making it harder to cast a ballot. Many of these new measures targeted voting by mail, which a record number of Americans used in 2020.

One of the most high profile battles was in Georgia, a state Trump targeted with baseless claims of fraud after a surprising loss to Biden there. Republicans enacted a law that requires voters to provide additional identification information on both absentee ballot request forms and the ballot itself. They also restricted the availability of absentee ballot drop boxes, a popular method of returning ballots in 2020. The law also criminalized providing food and water to people standing in line within 150ft of a polling place.

In Florida, Republicans enacted a new law that also restricts the availability of ballot drop boxes, imposes new rules around third-party registration groups, and requires voters to more frequently request absentee ballots.

The fight over new voting restrictions exploded in July, when Democrats in the Texas legislature fled the state for several weeks, denying Republicans the quorum they needed to pass new voting restrictions. Republicans eventually succeeded in passing a law that banned 24-hour voting, established regular citizenship checks for voter rolls, made it harder to assist voters, and empowered partisan poll watchers.

A staggering number of Americans continue to deny the results of the 2020 election. A September CNN poll found 36% of Americans do not believe Biden was the legitimate winner of the election.

Trump has fed that disbelief by continuing to make claims of irregularities that have already been debunked. Republicans in several states continue to call for the decertification of elections, something that is legally impossible.

Republicans in some places have gone even further, authorizing unusual post-election inquiries into election results.

The most high-profile of those reviews was in Arizona, where Republicans hired a firm with no election experience, called Cyber Ninjas, to examine all 2.1m votes cast in Maricopa county, the most populous in the state. That monthslong effort, which included a hand count of every single ballot, was widely criticized by election experts, who noted that the firm had shoddy methodology and its leader had embraced conspiracy theories about the election. Ultimately, the Cyber Ninjas effort affirmed Bidens win in Maricopa county.

Republicans elsewhere have embraced similar reviews. In Wisconsin, Republicans in the legislature have hired a former Republican supreme court justice to examine the election, but that effort has been marked by sloppiness and accusations of partisan bias.

This is a grift, to be clear, Matt Masterson, a former top official at the Department of Homeland Security, who works on election administration, said in December.

These efforts have been coupled with an even more alarming effort in Republican legislatures to empower lawmakers to alter election results. Lawmakers in seven states, including Michigan, Arizona, Missouri and Nevada, introduced 10 bills this year that would empower them to override or change election results, according to the Brennan Center for Justice. Some of the bills would allow partisan lawmakers to outright reject election results, while others would allow for post-election meddling in the vote count.

Over the last year, theres been a surge in election administrators who have left their positions because of threats and harassment. Experts are deeply concerned about that exodus and say that it could make room for more inexperienced, partisan workers to take over the running of elections. Ben Ginsberg, a longtime Republican election lawyer, said earlier this month the effort was an attempt to take election administration from the pros and give it to the pols.

Trump has endorsed several candidates who have embraced the myth of a stolen election to be the secretary of state, the chief election official, in many states. So far, hes made endorsements in GOP primaries in Michigan, Arizona, Georgia and Nevada all swing states that could play a determinative role in 2024.

At the start of each decade, state lawmakers across the US draw new congressional and state legislative districts. In 2020, Republicans dominated the down-ballot races that determine who gets to control the redistricting process. And this year, theyve used their power remarkably powerfully.

In Texas, where 95% of the states population growth was from non-white people, Republicans drew maps blunting the political power of minorities. They drew no new majority-minority districts, instead giving Republicans an advantage at winning the states two new congressional seats. Republicans have also moved to shore up their advantage in politically competitive states like North Carolina, Ohio and Georgia. Democrats are gerrymandering the states where they have power, like Illinois and Maryland, but control the redistricting process in far fewer places than Republicans do.

These rigged districts will insulate Republicans from threats to their political power for the next decade.

One of the biggest frustrations of the first year of Bidens presidency has been that Democrats have not been able to pass two crucial pieces of voting rights legislation through Congress. One bill would set a minimum of access across the country, guaranteeing things like 15 days of early voting, as well as prohibiting partisan gerrymandering. The second bill would re-establish a critical piece of the 1965 Voting Rights Act requiring states where there is repeated evidence of voting discrimination to get voting changes approved by the federal government before they go into effect.

There is growing frustration that Biden has not pushed hard enough to get rid of the filibuster, which Republicans have relied on to stall those bills. Democrats have pledged to find a way around the filibuster next year.

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Democracy under attack: how Republicans led the effort to make it harder to vote - The Guardian

RICHMOND, Va. On a December afternoon, Winsome Sears, Virginias lieutenant governor-elect, stood at the podium in the State Senate chamber where she will soon preside. It was empty but for a few clerks and staffers who were walking her through a practice session, making pretend motions and points of order. Ms. Sears followed along as the clerks explained arcane Senate protocols, though she occasionally raised matters that werent in the script.

What if theyre making a ruckus? Ms. Sears asked her tutors.

Then, a clerk said, pointing to the giant wooden gavel at Ms. Searss right hand, you bang that. Ms. Sears smiled.

That she was standing here at all was an improbability built upon unlikelihoods. Her campaign was a long shot, late in starting, skimpily funded and repeatedly overhauled. The political trajectory that preceded it was hardly more auspicious: She appeared on the scene 20 years ago, winning a legislative seat in an upset, but after one term and a quixotic bid for Congress, disappeared from electoral politics. She briefly surfaced in 2018, announcing a write-in protest against Virginias Republican nominee for U.S. Senate, but this earned her little beyond a few curious mentions in the press.

Yet just three years later she is the lieutenant governor-elect, having bested two veteran lawmakers for the Republican nomination and become the first Black woman elected to statewide office in Virginia history. She will take office on Jan. 15, along with Governor-elect Glenn Youngkin.

The focus on Ms. Searss triumph, in news profiles and in the post-election crowing of conservative pundits, has been on the rare combination of her biography and politics: a Black woman, an immigrant and an emphatically conservative, Trump-boosting Republican.

The message is important, Ms. Sears, 57, said over a lunch of Jamaican oxtail with her transition team at a restaurant near the State Capitol. But the messenger is equally important.

This is the question that Ms. Sears embodies: whether she is a singular figure who won a surprise victory or the vanguard of a major political realignment, dissolving longtime realities of race and partisan identification. Democrats say there is little evidence for the latter, and that Ms. Sears won with typical Republican voters in an especially Republican year. But Ms. Sears insists that many Black and immigrant voters naturally side with Republicans on a variety of issues and that some are starting to realize that.

The only way to change things is to win elections, she said. And who better to help make that change but me? I look like the strategy.

Ms. Sears dates her own partisan epiphany to her early 20s. She already had plenty of life experience by that point: moving at the age of 6 from Jamaica to the Bronx to be with her father, who had come seeking work; joining the Marines as a lost teenager and learning to be a diesel mechanic; becoming a single mother at 21. When she listened to the 1988 presidential campaign, hearing the debates over abortion and welfare, she realized, to her surprise, that she was a Republican.

More than a dozen years passed before Ms. Sears, then a married mother of three who had run a homeless shelter and gone to graduate school, began her political career. At the urging of local Republicans, she ran in 2001 for the House of Delegates in a majority Black district in Norfolk. The seat had been held by Billy Robinson Jr., a Democrat, for 20 years; his father had held it before him. Weeks before the election, Mr. Robinson spent a night in jail on a contempt of court charge. Ms. Sears won in the surprise of the election season.

In the Legislature, she adjusted to the political architecture and her unusual place in it: joining, then leaving, the legislative Black caucus; voting dependably as a Republican but calling earlier than many colleagues for the resignation of the Republican House speaker when news broke of his sexual harassment settlement.

She did not run for re-election, instead launching an underdog campaign against Democratic U.S. Representative Bobby Scott. Mr. Scott returned to Congress, where he remains, and the House of Delegates seat returned to Democratic hands for good. Ms. Sears was done with politics, she said.

Her family moved to the small city of Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley, where Ms. Sears and her husband ran a plumbing and electrical repair shop. She held a few posts on the state board of education and on a committee at the Department of Veterans Affairs and wrote a book, Stop Being a Christian Wimp! Much of her focus was on caring for a daughter struggling with mental illness. In 2012, the daughter, DeJon Williams, was killed in a car accident along with her two young children.

While Ms. Sears was absent from politics, Barack Obama won the presidency, Trayvon Martin was killed, the Black Lives Matter movement rose up, Donald Trump was elected and neo-Nazis marched on Charlottesville, Va. Ms. Searss political example, as a Black woman Republican representing a majority Black district in Virginia, went unrepeated.

Republicans, she said, rarely even tried to sever the old ties between Black voters and the Democratic Party. This is partly why she decided to run this year.

I just took a look at the field, and said, My God, were gonna lose again, she said. Nobody was going to reach out to the various communities that needed to be heard from: women, immigrants, you know, Latinos, Asians, Blacks, etc.

She stood to the right of much of the field and was arguably the furthest right of the three Republicans nominated for statewide office. She favors strict limits on abortion, calling Democratic abortion policies wicked; she is an advocate of vouchers to help students pay for private school tuition and of tighter restrictions on voting; and she insists that gun control laws do not deter crime gun ownership does. A photo that went viral last spring, showing her holding an AR-15 while wearing a blazer-and-dress outfit suitable for a Chamber of Commerce luncheon, propelled her as much as anything to the Republican nomination.

Ms. Sears derides the left as too concerned with race but often explains her politics as rooted in Black history, stressing Marcus Garveys rhetoric on self-reliance as a Jamaican immigrant in Jim Crow America, emphasizing that Harriet Tubman carried a gun and referring to the infamous Tuskegee experiments in explaining her opposition to Covid-19 vaccine mandates. If the Democrats are always going to talk about race, then lets talk about it, she said.

She rejects the notion that the problems Republicans have attracting Black voters might run deeper than mere neglect. She was angered when Republicans nominated Corey Stewart, who had a history of associating with Neo-Confederates, for the 2018 U.S. Senate race in Virginia. But she said this didnt give her qualms about the party. She remains a champion of Mr. Trump, who openly endorsed Mr. Stewart; indeed, she was the national chairwoman of a group called Black Americans to Re-elect the President.

Jennifer McClellan, a Democratic state senator from Richmond, agreed that Democrats could not assume that Black people would show up for them at the polls, saying that Black voters, like any voters, choose candidates based on who they believe is going to help solve their problems. But, she continued, little that Ms. Sears has said suggests she would be that person in office.

The vast majority of Black voters disagree with her on abortion, on school choice, on guns, Ms. McClellan said. Those arent necessarily the issues driving Black voters anyway. Its the economy, its health care, its broader access to education.

The evidence that this years elections scrambled the fundamentals of race and partisanship is mixed at most. If anything, some Republicans worried that Ms. Searss hard-right politics might jeopardize the campaign strategy of appealing to more moderate voters. This risk was largely mitigated, said John Fredericks, a conservative radio host, by the fact that Ms. Searss general election campaign, which he called a train wreck from start to finish, never raised enough money to really broadcast her politics.

In any case, the attention was overwhelmingly directed to the top of the ticket.

The election this year was all about the gubernatorial candidates, said Stephen Farnsworth, a political scientist at the University of Mary Washington. There were few big surprises in the exit polls, several political experts said, and Ms. Sears won her race by a margin that would have been expected of just about any Republican this year.

But there were some warning signs for Democrats, outlined in a postelection survey by the Democratic Governors Association. While Black Virginians overwhelmingly voted for Terry McAuliffe, the Democratic nominee for governor, the analysis found a drop in Democratic support among Black men, compared with the 2020 presidential election. There was notable erosion in Democratic support among Asian and Latino voters as well.

We dont need to be tied or beholden to one particular party, said Wes Bellamy, a Black political activist and a former vice mayor of Charlottesville. He will be watching Ms. Sears closely, he said.

Lieutenant governors in Virginia are fairly limited in their responsibilities, but they have a public profile and they almost always run for governor. If Ms. Sears advocates for policies that improve the day-to-day lives of Black people and, more crucially, if she can persuade her Republican colleagues to go along, Mr. Bellamy said, I think shes gold.

Read more here:

Winsome Sears Wants Black Voters to Rethink the G.O.P. - The New York Times

Nearly a decade ago, former Sen. Rick Santorum ran a surprisingly competitive presidential campaign, before ultimately coming up short against former Gov. Mitt Romney. As the 2016 cycle approached, the Pennsylvania Republican saw himself as a national frontrunner since he was the next in line, which in GOP politics, often has real meaning.

Republican Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas is apparently thinking along the same lines. Politico reported:

Sen. Ted Cruz on Wednesday argued he is particularly well-positioned to win the 2024 Republican presidential nomination, citing his second-place finish behind then-candidate Donald Trump in the party's 2016 primary. The remarks from Cruz (R-Texas) came in an interview with The Truth Gazette, a conservative news service operated by 15-year-old Brilyn Hollyhand.

"You know, I ran in 2016," the senator said. "It was the most fun I've ever had in my life. We had a very crowded field. We had 17 candidates in the race a very strong field. And I ended up placing second.... There's a reason historically that the runner-up is almost always the next nominee."

Asked whether he'd consider another White House bid, Cruz replied, "Absolutely. In a heartbeat."

So, is he right? Is the most recent runner-up "almost always" the party's next presidential nominee? In Democratic politics, no. In fact, in recent decades, it's only happened once (Hillary Clinton came in second in 2008, before winning the nomination in 2016).

But in Republican politics, it's a very different story. Ronald Reagan won the GOP nomination in 1980 after finishing second in 1976; George H.W. Bush won the nomination in 1988 after finishing second in 1980; Bob Dole won the nomination in 1996 after finishing second in 1988; John McCain won the nomination in 2008 after finishing second in 2000; and Mitt Romney won the nomination in 2012 after finishing second in 2008. As patterns go, that's quite a few data points.

So, does Cruz have a point? If Donald Trump doesn't run, should the Texas senator be seen as the likely 2024 nominee?

He probably shouldn't start writing his acceptance speech just yet.

The pattern is interesting, but there are exceptions. For example, Pat Buchanan came in second in 1996, but he was crushed by George W. Bush in 2000 and ended up running on the Reform Party's ticket. Santorum came in second in 2012, but when he tried again four years later, the former senator finished in 11th place in Iowa and promptly quit.

The runner-up is "almost always the next nominee"? Not exactly. The next-in-line thesis works, except when it doesn't.

I won't pretend to know what the GOP's 2024 field will look like, or who the top contenders will be. But I think it's safe to say historical patterns like these should be seen more as fun trivia than reliable predictors of future events.

Steve Benen is a producer for "The Rachel Maddow Show," the editor of MaddowBlog and an MSNBC political contributor. He's also the bestselling author of "The Impostors: How Republicans Quit Governing and Seized American Politics."

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Ted Cruz and the Republican Party's next-in-line problem - MSNBC

This article isreprintedfromCatalyst: A Journal of Theory and Strategy, a publication from the Jacobin Foundation. Right now, you cansubscribe to the print editionofCatalystfor just $20.

Has the GOP become a working-class party? On its face, the question is absurd. Whatever the modern Republican Party is, its historical analogues are not the parties of the working class. The party has virtually nothing in common with the SPD (Social Democratic Party) of prewar Germany, the SAP (Swedish Social Democratic Party) of the Meidner Plan, or Lulas PT (Workers Party). Even the decrepit Socialist International, which once counted among its member parties Hosni Mubaraks National Democratic Party, would surely balk at extending admission to the Republican Party.

Yet many Republicans themselves are convinced that their party has indeed made a turn to the working class. The night of the 2020 election, Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri tweeted, We are a working-class party now. Thats the future. A few months later, Representative Jim Banks, chair of the influential Republican Study Committee, wrote a memo to House minority leader Kevin McCarthy making this case in more detail. Banks argued that the two parties were undergoing coalitional transformations, with the GOP becoming a party of the working class, and the Democratic Party becoming a party of professionals and the rich. The result was a historic opportunity for the Republicans to redefine themselves, and, in so doing, secure the permanent Republican majority the party has been chasing for the past two decades.

Liberals have also expressed worry over this prospect. Since at least the 1990s, liberal writers have sounded the alarm about the defections of white workers from the Democratic coalition. At different moments, liberal analysts have pointed to different causes for their alleged abandonment by the white working class. In the 1990s, Thomas and Mary Edsall identified the backlash to the partys embrace of civil rights. In the early 2000s, Thomas Frank highlighted Christianity and cultural conservatism. More recently, Thomas Piketty has argued that the Democrats are but one example of a broader phenomenon across the advanced capitalist world, in which educational polarization replaces class polarization, with the highly educated voting liberal and the less educated voting for various forms of conservatism. It is not only the hopeful right who sees the working class turning the wrong shade of red.

These arguments were, of course, given a healthy fillip by Donald Trumps election in 2016. And indeed, researchers have found real evidence that the white working class was quite important to Trumps victory. Mike Davis, writing in these pages, drew attention to the role of plant closings in key counties in pushing white workers toward Trump. Other researchers have found that white workers comprised a crucial portion of the bloc of 2012 Barack Obama supporters or nonvoters who went for Trump in 2016. Trump, in his own vulgar way, endorsed Pikettys argument about educational polarization, proclaiming, I love the poorly educated.

Yet for all the noise about the GOPs transformation into a working-class party, the claim has remarkably little basis in fact. Examination of survey data reveals that the working class has undergone a slight shift toward the Republican Party, but it is nothing resembling the kind of coalitional transformation claimed by party boosters. Similarly, there is no evidence that workers are today a more important constituency in the Republican Party than in the past. The GOP, simply put, is not transforming into a working-class party.

Theres no question, however, that it has become a different kind of party than American politics are accustomed to. Though complaints about political polarization in the United States are ubiquitous, it is by now widely accepted among political scientists that the main cause of polarization has been a move to the right by Republicans. In comparative perspective as well, the Republican Party stands out. Analysis of its 2016 platform by the Manifesto Project places the GOP closer to the far-right Alternative fr Deutschland than Angela Merkels CDU (Christian Democratic Union), and to the right even of Marine Le Pens Rassemblement National.

Moreover, the GOP has embraced politics that often run directly counter to the preferences of American capital. The government shutdowns it forced while in opposition in 199596 and 2013, and while holding the presidency in 201819, brought demand shocks and economic uncertainty with them, in the service of political goals (budget cuts, stopping Obamacare implementation, and a border wall with Mexico) that could hardly be said to be set in Fortune 500 boardrooms. Tensions between the party and the corporate power elite reached new levels in the aftermath of the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot, when the bulk of congressional Republicans still refused to disavow Trumps claims of election fraud. In response, a number of companies and the US Chamber of Commerce, vowed to withhold campaign contributions from Republicans who voted against certifying the election results. Although the boycott of election conspiracy pushers soon fell apart, it underscored the growing distance between the Republican Party and the business lobby.

This transformation in the party was not driven by a change in its voting base. Instead, it stems from the interaction of two transformations in American politics and society: the weakening of the parties since the 1970s, and the political disorganization of corporate America since the 1980s.

American parties have been institutionally weak by international standards since at least the early twentieth century. As ideologically undefined catchall parties, they existed more as confederations of local political machines than genuine national institutions. However, beginning in the 1970s, changes in party rules, congressional rules, and campaign finance law all combined to hollow out the parties even further. The result is that American political parties barely exist except as networks of funders, campaign services vendors, and candidates. Decisions such as candidate selection are instead outsourced to the primary system. This same system only magnifies the power of money in deciding party politics, since the parties possess few institutional resources for resisting it.

Weak parties themselves are insufficient to explain Republican radicalization, however. If the weakening of party institutions were the only dynamic, we might expect to see an ever-tightening link between Republican politics and the preferences of American business. Instead, we see growing autonomy and conflict. American business, it seems, is no longer as capable of setting the partys agenda as it once was. This incapacity stems from the increasingly disorganized character of American business politics. While in the 1970s business mounted a spectacular mobilization against the New Deal order, by the early 1980s, with Ronald Reagan in the White House, businesss enemies in the state and the unions had been defeated, and business unity began to unravel. At the same time, the reorganization of corporate America via mergers, acquisitions, and consolidation inclined corporate managers away from long-term, policy-oriented political activism and instead toward narrow defenses of the rents and privileges of their respective economic sectors. This kind of activism has often proven compatible with the Republican Partys long march to the right, as the party has been only too happy to oblige corporate Americas preferences for anti-labor, anti-regulatory judicial appointments and tax breaks. The structure of political action by the American ruling class, in other words, has evolved away from the kind of coordinated, long-term action that would be necessary to successfully discipline the Republican Party.

Together, weak parties and elite disorganization have cleared the way for right-wing political entrepreneurs to push the party further and further to the right. A kind of dialectic has ensued since the 1980s, in which party insurgents come to power, fail in their goals, and are replaced by a more establishment power bloc, whose failures then open the door for a new group of insurgents.

These structural transformations, and not a turn to the working-class, are what have remade the Republican Party. This article will begin by examining the evolution of the Republican Partys support base and demonstrating that claims of the partys new working-class base are very much exaggerated. It will then develop the alternative explanation, centered in the weakening of the parties and the changing nature of corporate political action. Finally, it will offer a narrative of GOP history since the 1980s, illustrating how these forces have produced a party of a new type on the American scene.

Though the cultural image of working-class Republicanism is ubiquitous, more rigorous investigation of the partys class composition is considerably rarer. Analyzing such a composition is a fraught endeavor. There are many methodological choices to be made, and these choices can have dramatic impacts on the resultant findings. This section will present one such analysis. In the interest of readability, the methodological choices will be described briefly. The reasons for such choices, and the reasons alternative approaches were decided against, are available in an online methodological appendix.

In what follows, I analyze data from the General Social Survey (GSS), which has been asking consistent questions of a representative sample of Americans for almost fifty years. To measure survey respondents class positions, I employ an occupational definition of class. Essentially, nonprofessional occupations, from laborers to white-collar workers doing semi-routine tasks, are classified as working class. Additionally, I include teachers and nurses in this group, as their incorporation in a category alongside doctors and lawyers has grown increasingly implausible. To measure partisanship, I use the GSS party identification variable, which simply asks respondents which party they identify with.

With the preferred measures of class and partisan political behavior defined, there only remains to be specified conceptualizations of partisan change. Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza, in an earlier study of class and partisanship, provide a useful schema. Drawing on a venerable tradition in American political science, they distinguish between critical realignment, secular realignment, and electoral shifts. Critical realignment, a term first proposed by V. O. Key in the 1950s to understand the coming of the New Deal, describes when a voting bloc, such as workers, decisively shifts partisanship during a single election.

For Key and many subsequent scholars, the 1932 election is the paradigmatic example of such a realignment. Key also suggested that groups sometimes undergo secular realignment, when a clear partisanship shift occurs over the course of several elections. The move of Southern whites away from the Democrats and toward a solidly Republican partisan identity after the civil rights movement is a good example of such a transition. Finally, an electoral shift is when existing partisan attachments of a group intensify or weaken, without decisively shifting. For example, women have been more Democratic than Republican for a long time, and this attachment has grown stronger since the 1990s.

With these concepts in hand, some hypotheses can be formulated corresponding to the various claims made about changes in the Republican Party. First, it may be the case that there has been either a critical or a secular realignment among workers from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. Second, it may be the case that the Republican coalition has become increasingly working class in composition. Both these hypotheses, as it turns out, are false.

Figure 1 looks at partisan identification among working-class respondents in the GSS. While there has been an electoral shift away from the Democratic Party, and Republicans have gained, there has been no decisive realignment. Indeed, among workers, the rise in independent identification has been steeper than the rise in Republican identification. These results are not sensitive to the inclusion of teachers and nurses among workers; estimates excluding them from the working class show the same trends.

Even looking at occupational subcategories of the working class, the story does not conform to a working-class GOP. Figure 2 looks at partisan identification among the lowest three categories of manual workers: agricultural and primary production workers, semiskilled workers not in agriculture, and skilled manual workers. Workers in these occupations are significantly less likely to possess a college degree (in 2018, about 6 percent of workers in these occupations had a college degree or higher, while about 20 percent of the broader working class did) and, as such, these would be the occupational categories most likely to shift toward the GOP as educational polarization progresses.

Among all three groups, there has been a precipitous decline in identification with the Democratic Party. At the same time, however, the independent category has been the main beneficiary of this decline. The rise in Republican identification has been much more modest and has been greatest among skilled manual workers.

Figure 3 examines the political identification of white and nonwhite workers, broadly defined. As has been found in much previous work, there has been a strong swing away from the Democrats and toward the Republicans among white workers. Interestingly, the bulk of this swing happened between 1970 and 1990, with little change since then. While white workers were once decisively Democratic, for the last three decades, there has been no clear preference among them. While nonwhite workers have also seen a dealignment from the Democratic Party, the result has been increased independent identification, with little gain for the Republicans.

Among working-class Americans as a whole, there has been no realignment, either critical or secular. While Democrats once claimed an overwhelming majority of American workers, their advantage has eroded considerably. Only a portion of that has led to increased Republican identification, however, and among workers as a whole, over the last decade, Democratic identifiers have outnumbered Republican identifiers by 15 to 20 percentage points. Among manual workers, the Republican gain has been greater (particularly among skilled workers) but still falls short of a clear majority. Even among white workers, there has been clear class dealignment, but nothing resembling the emergence of a stable Republican majority. (Indeed, one of the most striking facts about the racial trends is the overall similarity among white and nonwhite workers in disaffiliating with the Democratic Party. Among white workers, Democratic identification dropped by an average of 0.46 percentage points per year. Among nonwhite workers, it dropped by about 0.41 percentage points per year.) Of course, its possible that these shifts are incomplete and, within a few years, a secular realignment will be visible. But in the aggregate, and even among white workers, the trends suggest that Republican gains have actually been stagnant for some time. The overall story is one of class dealignment rather than realignment.

The other possibility is that, instead of workers becoming decisively Republican, the Republican coalition has become more working class, perhaps caused by the well-documented exodus of professionals and the highly educated from the party. Figure 4 charts the class composition of Republican identifiers. Far from becoming more working class, the Republican coalition has become less working class over time. Again, the overall trend is class dealignment. Where the Democratic Party was once far more class-polarized than the Republican Party, both parties have become less working class over time, such that the degree of class polarization in both parties is approaching equal. Independents, meanwhile, remain highly class-polarized, with little change over the past half-century.

However the Republican Party has changed since the 1980s, the driving force has plainly not been the rise of working-class Republicanism. The Democrats, it is true, have experienced near-catastrophic levels of working-class exit. But the Republicans have not, in the main, reaped the gains of this. Partisan polarization within the working class has diminished, with the result being that no party commands a clear majority of working-class support. Similarly, within the Republican Party, the share of the party made up of workers has actually diminished over the last few decades. The arguments of Republicans like Hawley and Banks appear to be more advertising than analysis. Explanations of the partys extraordinary move to the right must look beyond class voting patterns for their mechanism.

From the perspective of many other capitalist democracies, American political parties dont really exist. They have no membership lists, their platforms are largely built after their candidates are nominated, and, perhaps most important, the parties themselves have very little control over the nomination process. Thus, it is not unheard of for a Holocaust denier, for example, to win a Republican primary in a deep-blue district in which the party invests no resources, or for a member of the LaRouche cult to win a Democratic nomination in a deep-red district. Though in such cases the party will often denounce the candidate, it has no power to prevent them from running on its ballot line.

The weakness of American parties, which intensified after the 1970s, has had two results. First, the hollowing out of the parties removed one of the few counterweights to the power of money in American politics. Now, the power of money to decide matters of party direction, and thus ultimately of policy, is even more unmediated. Second, and related, the role of parties themselves changed, from institutions that determined key questions of party life, from platform to nomination, to candidate-service organizations whose main role is fundraising and providing access to vendors of campaign services.

From the countrys beginning, American political parties have been weak by design. Inheritors of the political thought of Georgian England, the authors of the Constitution were at best ambivalent about organized political opposition to the current government, seeing in such activity the seeds of civil war. To Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike, parties were, in Richard Hofstadters words, sores on the body politic. Alexander Hamilton, who, like all of the Constitutional generation, used the terms faction and party interchangeably, argued that one of the chief virtues of the Constitution would be its role in suppressing parties. We are attempting by this Constitution, he told the New York state ratification convention, to abolish factions.

The Constitution designed by these men contemplated no role for parties. (The word party is only used in the Constitution in the sense of a party to a conflict.) Indeed, the cumbersome separation of powers system they designed was expressly intended to check parties. The presidency was envisaged not as a partisan office but as one whose inhabitant would have to stand above party. As parties did inevitably develop in the political conflicts that followed ratification, they grew as private organizations in constitutional interstices, without clear relation to the state itself.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, American parties became quite powerful entities, though they existed primarily on the local level. On the national level, the parties were unwieldy coalitions of regional power elites. Nonetheless, they were strong enough that, by the late nineteenth century, the parties themselves had become plausible scapegoats for any number of societal ailments.

In the thinking of Progressive reformers, parties were either the organs responsible for activating the baser instincts of the poorer citizens or the vehicles by which such citizens plundered their more industrious counterparts. Reformers accordingly bombarded them with a whole suite of new policies. Civil service reform targeted the parties by trying to deny them the ability to reward their patrons with government employment. One of its supporters went so far as to claim that the Merit System . . . will help to abolish partisanship. Numerous municipalities attempted to remove city government from the remit of political competition entirely through the city manager system or, barring that, by making local elections nonpartisan.

The reform with the biggest impact on American politics in the long term, however, was the direct primary. Its most important advocate was Progressive standard-bearer Robert LaFollette, who, as governor of Wisconsin in 1903, signed the nations first law forcing parties to conduct nominations for state-elected positions via primary elections. For LaFollette and his cothinkers, the entire point of direct primaries was to disempower the parties as institutions and empower voters as individuals. The direct primarys effects on parties were well described by V. O. Key more than half a century ago:

The adoption of the direct primary opened the road for disruptive forces that gradually fractionalized the party organization. By permitting more effective direct appeals by individual politicians to the party membership, the primary system freed forces driving toward the disintegration of party organizations and facilitated the construction of factions and cliques attached to the ambitions of individual leaders.

Direct primaries spread rapidly. Already by 1917, thirty-two of the forty-eight states required them for nomination to state offices.

Combined with the regionalization and elite orientation of the apparatuses, the primary only further fractured the party system. As a result, American parties exist more as semi-public agencies for the organization of elections than as private bodies (agencies of civil society) advocating particular programmes. State parties are compelled to hold primaries for elections they hope to contest. Courts in some states even went so far as to forbid state parties from endorsing a candidate within a primary, an unthinkable situation in comparable countries. The national party, meanwhile, can exert no real power over state parties in matters of program, candidate selection, or anything else beyond criteria for sending delegates to the national convention. Even on the national level, American parties existence is institutionally fractured. The national committees of the party exist mainly to oversee the presidential nomination process. The congressional parties each exist independently, with no institutional link to the national committees. Most staff are employed either by individual members of Congress or by the congressional caucuses, which are funded out of congressional operating expenses. In the United States, there does not exist an actual organizational analogue to the UK Labour Party or the Christian Democratic Union of Germany.

Until the 1960s, then, American parties were pointillist entities, appearing unitary only from a distance. From the late 60s onward, two changes took place. First, the parties sorted along an ideological axis, with the Republicans becoming the party of conservatives and the Democrats the party of liberals. Second, legislative and party reforms weakened the parties even further, combining with escalating campaign costs to define a new and even more unmediated role for money in determining questions of party leadership and direction.

These processes originated with the Democratic Party, and the struggle between its liberal and conservative wings. It had been clear since 1937, when Southern Democrats first turned against the New Deal, that the prominence of the undemocratic South in the party was a blockage to the ambitions of many elements (most notably African Americans and union members) within the Democratic coalition. Since the Southern Democrats never lost to Republicans, their average tenure in the House and Senate was longer than their Northern counterparts. And since committee assignments and leadership were distributed on the basis of seniority, Southern Democrats held outsize power in Congress, which they used to block liberal legislation.

Many in the party hoped that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would be sufficient to displace the power of the old Dixiecrats. It was not. While Strom Thurmond famously left the Democrats for the party of Barry Goldwater in 1964, his was not the modal trajectory for his species of politician. James Eastland remained a Democratic senator until 1978, while Herman Talmadge served until 1981. In the House, John Conyers tried and failed in 1971 to strip the Mississippi Democrats of seniority, given that they remained members of a segregated Mississippi Democratic Party that was not recognized by the national committee.

Over the next few years, Democrats instead altered the rules by which committee leadership in Congress was distributed, weakening the role of seniority. Now, committee leadership assignment was in the hands of caucus leadership, creating more centralized congressional parties.

As John R. Wright has pointed out, liberal disaffection with Dixiecrat seniority was not the only force driving reform. The Democratic Party also confronted a money problem, and the congressional reforms it passed were one part of its solution to this problem. Since the Dixiecrats, even in the early 1970s, were still able to win largely noncompetitive elections, their campaign costs were considerably lower than other Democrats. And since these other Democrats were locked out of powerful positions by Dixiecrat seniority, there was a powerful incentive to either remove or dilute that seniority, in order to give other Democrats the congressional power that would bring donations along with it. As such, in addition to dethroning seniority as the sole criterion for committee leadership, congressional reforms in the early 1970s distributed power more widely among congressmembers, forming additional subcommittees and generally increasing the power of noncommittee members over legislation coming out of a given committee.

The impetus to increase the partys fundraising prowess was particularly pressing in the 1970s. Beginning in the mid-1960s, campaign costs had risen vertiginously. Driven by the increasing importance of broadcast (radio and television) advertising in political races, costs climbed ever skyward. From 1964 to 1968, total political spending jumped from $200 million to $300 million, a 50 percent climb in four years. In 1972, it reached $425 million, having more than doubled since 1964. Broadcast costs drove this increase. From 1966 to 1970, nonpresidential radio and television spending rose from $27.2 million to $50.3 million.

This explosion in campaign costs was bad news for Democrats. After the losing 1968 campaign, the Democratic Party was more than $6 million in debt. Since the mid-60s, Republicans had tapped into the small political donor market far more effectively than Democrats, using Richard Vigueries direct mail techniques to solicit money from hundreds of thousands of donors. At the same time, political action committees (PACs), pioneered by the CIO, were growing in importance.

This pressure combined with the long-standing liberal Democratic demand for congressional reform to create a powerful impetus for campaign finance reform. In 1972, the Democratic Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), and in 1974, it passed a series of amendments to the act that created a new legal environment for campaign spending.

FECA and its amendments brought a number of changes. First, they created a new legitimacy for PACs, whose legal status had previously been unclear. Labor unions in particular demanded PAC legalization as a way to protect their political work. Second, they introduced strict new disclosure requirements on campaign financing. Third, they instituted spending limits for presidential and congressional campaigns, as well as contribution limits for individuals. Fourth, they established a matching funds system, by which presidential candidates could receive public funding in return for keeping spending below a certain limit. In 1974, the Supreme Court ruled inBuckley v. Valeothat the spending limits were an unconstitutional infringement on freedom of speech, but it affirmed most of the laws other provisions. Finally, in 1979, a further set of amendments created the category of soft money, funds spent by state and local parties on voter mobilization instead of a specific candidate.

The consequences of FECA, modified by the Supreme Court, were immense. The most immediate consequence was an explosion in PACs and their donations. In 1968, there were eighty-nine PACs. In 1982, there were 3,371. In 1968, PAC contributions to congressional candidates totaled $3.1 million. In 1982, the total was $83.1 million. Though labor had demanded PAC legalization, business was the real beneficiary.

Candidates soon began fundraising with the goal of redistributing money to their colleagues, thereby winning their support for key committee and caucus leadership positions. As with so much else in this story, Democrats led the way. In 1977, when Tip ONeill assumed his position as Speaker of the House, the race to serve under him as majority leader was conducted, for the first time, on the basis of who could redistribute most to their colleagues. Jim Wright of Texas won, setting himself up to become speaker after ONeills retirement a decade later. Two years after, Henry Waxman of California, a two-term representative, ascended to the chair of the Health and Environment Subcommittee of the Commerce Committee (on which he ranked fourth in seniority) by redistributing money to his colleagues. He founded a new PAC, the Friends of Henry Waxman, and directed $24,000 to his colleagues on the committee, who rewarded him with their votes. Seniority was, at long last, dead.

Others soon followed Waxmans example. In 1988, there were forty-five such leadership PACs, which existed to redistribute money among congressmembers. One new congressmember who proved a keen student of Waxmans approach was the representative from suburban Atlanta, Newt Gingrich. By 1998, freshmen congressmembers were launching leadership PACs before they had even been sworn into office.

In addition to initiating this orgiastic atmosphere of fundraising and redistribution, FECA cemented the weakness of American parties in another sense. By creating a campaign finance infrastructure that is completely candidate-focused, it reinforced the background role for parties as institutions. Candidates create campaign committees, and these organizations are the primary vehicles through which elections are contested. Parties hope to exercise influence on the margins.

In other words, parties didnt simply become weaker. The role they played in American politics changed. At the state level, parties are now decisively subordinate to candidates, whose nomination is not controlled by party organizations and who dont even rely on parties for fundraising or campaigning. Instead, state parties exist mainly to provide linkage with the increasingly well-funded national organizations. As one scholar, Gerald C. Wright, summed up the new role of state parties, they are no longer performing all or even most of the roles of recruitment, nomination, electoral support, and party discipline of elected officials. The activities of the formal state party organizations are more supplemental than controlling. At the national level, the story is much the same. Parties now exist primarily as networks of funders, external organizations, and campaign service vendors. Their role is to act as intermediaries between the candidates and the private market of campaign services, as political scientist John J. Coleman puts it.

The American party organizations, always weak, have become background players in American politics. They are, in the words of two prominent scholars, hollow parties, neither organizationally robust beyond their roles raising money nor meaningfully felt as a real tangible presence in the lives of voters or in the work of engaged activists. Without any real institutional powers of their own, they exist mainly as conduits through which political money can flow from source to destination.

As a consequence, the enfeebled Republican Party can exert little counterpressure against extreme candidates who run for nomination on its ballot line, particularly if they are well financed. Sometimes, as in the case of a Holocaust denier running in a deep-blue district, the only result is half a news cycle of bad press. In other contexts, however, it has cost the party wins. In 2010, Christine ODonnell, a Tea Party activist only marginally tethered to reality, beat the former Republican governor of Delaware in a Senate primary and proceeded to lose the general election by more than 15 points. In 2012, Tea Party Senate candidates in Indiana and Missouri handily won primaries against more establishment candidates and went on to lose winnable general elections, making a Republican seizure of the Senate that year all but impossible. Though these candidacies were opposed by many in the party leadership, the leaders now possessed few organizational resources with which to derail them.

Party enfeeblement is clearly not sufficient to explain the Republican Partys increasing distance from corporate political preferences. If money now rules the parties in a more unmediated fashion than ever before, one would expect the historically preferred party of American capital to be an even more servile supplicant to corporate boardrooms. Instead, the opposite has occurred. The partys steady march to the right has resulted in new levels of estrangement from capital. American capital has failed to discipline the Republican Party.

The roots of this failure lie in the transformation of US corporate political action. Compared to most other advanced capitalist countries, business is strikingly disorganized in the United States. In the 1970s, American business forged a new degree of political unity, as the economic turbulence of that decade provided both the means and the motivation to finally strike a decisive blow against the New Deal order. However, this unity quickly decayed in the absence of a powerful external foe. At the same time, changes in the structure of American corporate organization further disorganized corporate political life.

The result of these transformations has been the political fragmentation of the corporate elite. Corporate political action is now oriented less toward classwide concerns and more toward sectional and particularistic causes. Corporate managers are interested in protecting the short-term interests of their firm. They want legislation that will hurt them to be defeated, they want judges who will rule against labor and regulations to be appointed, and they want corporate prerogatives like executive pay to be untouched.

In the defense of these sorts of sectional interests, the radicalized GOP is an able partner. It also wants social welfare legislation defeated, plutocratic privileges defended, and a judicial bench stocked with reactionary jurists. However, the partys rightward peregrination has also produced quite a few negative externalities for capital, from needless uncertainty around the national debt to a devotion to minority rule that is threatening the legitimacy of a political system that has worked remarkably well for the corporate rich since the nineteenth century. The reorganization of corporate political action has left them with few resources for reducing these externalities.

American capital is unique among other advanced capitalist countries for its disorganized character. There is no national organization that is the primary representative of American employers. The roots of this go back, ironically, to the weakness of the American labor movement. Scholars of business organization noticed long ago that the organization of capital into business associations follows the organization of labor. Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal summed up the dynamic of organization in capitalist society as follows:

In all capitalist countries, the historical sequence is this: the first step is the liquidation of the means of production of small commodity producers and the merging of these into capitalist industrial firms; the second step is the defensive association of workers; and the third step is associational efforts that are now made on the part of capitalist firms who, in addition to their continued merging of capital, enter into formal organizations in order to promote some of their collective interests.

The United States has never had a dominant national business organization. The American labor movement, weak and sectional in the half-century following the decline of the Knights of Labor, never forced American business to organize. The absence of a strong socialist party similarly removed the threat of a hostile party coming into government. As a result, the first major organizations of American business, the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, were organized externally, the first by William McKinleys 1896 presidential campaign, to promote its effort to rally all of American capital behind it, and the second by the William Howard Taft administration, as an effort to overcome the fragmentation of American business, which was making it harder for the administration to hear what capital wanted. In the United States, business has felt precious little pressure to organize itself.

The consequences of the resultant disorganization are considerable. As Cathie Jo Martin has argued, it is much harder for U.S. employers to think about their collective long-term interests than their counterparts elsewhere. As multiple organizations compete to represent business interests, business organizations have to themselves be concerned with their market share. They find it easier to voice short-term objections than to endorse positive policy change.

The economic crisis of the 1970s triggered a medium-term reversal of this tendency. In the late 1960s, as corporate profits began sagging, the efforts of American businesses to recoup them through intensified exploitation sparked a rank-and-file-led upsurge among American workers. At the same time, the American economy, more integrated than ever into the global economy, was falling behind its international competitors. Finally, beginning in the late 1960s, a new wave of regulatory bodies was created, including the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), whose new impositions on business could not have been, from the perspective of corporate managers, more poorly timed.

In response, American business began to organize itself with a new urgency. Two groups reacting to the economic advances of 1960s liberalism the Labor Law Study Committee and the Construction Users Anti-Inflation Roundtable had begun talks of a merger in the hopes of presenting a united business front capable of fighting not just on policies of particularistic interest to certain firms but on a classwide basis for business as a whole. In 1972, they merged to form the Business Roundtable, and the next year, the Roundtable absorbed the March Group, an informal association of big-business CEOs who began meeting in 1972 to coordinate political action.

The Roundtable was a new kind of organization for American business. Eligibility was limited to CEOs of the very largest American corporations. The Roundtable would not endorse candidates, nor would it hire lobbyists. Instead, it concentrated on building business unity and deploying it through the personal interventions of its CEOs with elected officials.

At the same time, the Chamber of Commerce was evolving. It created the position of a full-time president to run the group. In 1975, it hired Richard Lesher, who won the job primarily through his strident advocacy of free market economics. Lesher brought new life to the formerly sluggish Chamber, embarking on a dedicated recruitment campaign. In 1976, the organization had fewer than fifty thousand members. By 1980, it was closing in on a quarter of a million.

The result of this surge of business organization was a newly invigorated political voice for American business. As Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson put it, Corporate leaders became advocates not just for the narrow interests of their firms but also for the shared interests of business as a whole. Though pluralist political theorists had spent much of the 1960s assuring their readers that American business had far too many cross-cutting divisions to achieve the kind of unity that would allow them to dominate politics, the 1970s unfolded as one long counterargument. Initially focused on defeating liberal legislation, such as labor law reform and consumer protection bills, American business had, by the time of Ronald Reagans election in 1980, moved to take the offensive, pushing for the rollback of long-existing elements of the New Deal order.

The very success of the business mobilization undermined its durability. By the 1980s, labor institutions were in shambles, and both parties had accepted a neoliberal policy agenda. Profits were on an upward trajectory again, and labor no longer posed a threat. In the absence of a unifying external enemy, capitalist class unity broke down. On the most basic level, organizations like the Chamber of Commerce had trouble selling membership while a friend of business like Reagan was in the White House. By the mid-1980s, Chamber membership was once again falling, dipping below two hundred thousand in 1985. One senior official explained, For the last six and a half years, youve had a President in the White House who said hed veto anything antibusiness. So why should business people bother to join? With the various threats of the 1970s receding in the rearview mirror, the divisions and disorganization that characterized American business associations for most of the twentieth century once again began to assert themselves.

Capitals victory wasnt the only cause of its disorganization. Changes in the political economy during the 1980s also worked to further fragment the American corporate elite. While many could be identified, from the shareholder revolution and the consequent decline in managerial tenure to the consolidation of interests via mergers and acquisitions, the changing place of banks in American corporate life stands out in importance.

One of the most-studied facets of American corporate life is the network formed by managers and board members of one corporation who sit on the boards of another. Since this network took shape in the late nineteenth century, banks have occupied a central place within it. Bank boards, in particular, have generally been larger than other boards and have been places CEOs and board members from other companies are gathered together. In this way, banks acted as an institutional site for the construction of classwide rationality.

Since the 1980s, however, the role of banks in the intercorporate network has changed as their role in the economy more broadly shifted. The rise of the commercial paper market, in which firms issued bonds of their own to raise capital rather than taking a loan, squeezed banks on the lending end. Consumers also increasingly had new options for savings, creating a second squeeze on the depositor end. The solution was for banks to turn to providing financial services for clients, rather than lending, to generate income. Even before the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act tore down the New Dealera prohibition on commercial banks partaking in investment banking, banks had begun to move into new activities like securities underwriting. One study of a leading bank in the late 1990s found that only about a quarter of their deals involved lending as a primary component. The goal of lending, now, was mainly to secure business in other financial services divisions.

As banks became less important as lenders, they also became less central in the intercorporate network. The average bank board size dropped by about a fifth in the 1980s. The number of directors connected to other firms dropped. Where banks were once reliably the most interlocked firms in the network, by the mid-1990s, only a minority of the most interlocked firms were commercial banks.At the same time, the corporate network as a whole became significantly less centralized. In the 1980s, Michael Useem described the inner circle of the corporate elite, comprised of those figures who sat on two or more corporate boards. This inner circle disappeared over the next few decades. In 2000, seven directors each sat on six or more boards, and forty-four sat on five. In 2010, not a single director sat on six or more boards, and only eleven sat on five or more. American corporations were becoming more isolated.

These processes were corrosive to the kind of classwide rationality American business had forged in the crucible of the 1970s. Without a common enemy, fractures among business opened back up. At the same time, the nations political economy was on a track, partially as a result of victories won by business mobilization, that further undermined businesss ability to forge a long-term, classwide perspective on politics and policy. The histories of the countrys two major business organizations, the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce, both illustrate how business political action changed as a result.

The Business Roundtable had started experiencing severe internal divisions after the 1981 Reagan tax cuts blew a huge hole in the federal budget. Facing the 1982 and 1986 tax bills, the organization was divided and unable to exert significant pressure to preserve the tax provisions most favorable to business. As one Reagan administration official said of the business lobby at the time, They were brought down by the narrowness of their vision. Precisely because they defined themselves as representatives of single special interests, they failed to notice their collective power. Some issues, however, could still motivate decisive action. One such issue proved to be new Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) regulations that would have forced companies to treat stock options for executives as real costs to the business, rather than essentially free perks. The Roundtable moved swiftly into action to block the changes, inviting the FASBs research director to a private meeting with the chair of the groups accounting principles task force. The head of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) later said he had to devote about a third of his time to this issue alone, and was constantly being threatened and cajoled by legions of businesspeople. The Roundtable had found an issue on which there was unanimity, but it was one that only confirmed how narrow and provincial corporate political action was becoming.

Over the course of the 1990s, the Roundtable went into organizational decline. To be sure, there were some key victories, as when it organized vigorously for the World Trade Organization and other free trade agreements. But observers in Washington noted that its influence was not what it once was. In 1997,Fortune magazine ran a story on its decline entitled The Fallen Giant, which noted the groups troubles achieving consensus. Around the same time, the groups president wrote a memo urging a tripling of its dues to finance more aggressive campaigning. But the move backfired, costing the group nearly a third of its membership.

In the decades that followed, the Roundtable continued to press for business-friendly policies like tax cuts and social security privatization. But the issue that spurred large-scale mobilization was, once again, a narrow question of corporate governance. This time, it was a provision in the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill that would have made it easier for shareholders to elect different directors to a corporations board. In response, the Roundtable flew into action. President and CEO John J. Castellani declared, This is our highest priority. Literally all of our members have called about this. This mobilization wasnt enough, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, to kill the provision. It passed as part of Dodd-Frank. However, the Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce sued and succeeded in getting the rule removed. Researchers later estimated that the Roundtables success in protecting managerial autonomy against shareholder oversight wiped $70 billion off the value of public corporations. Once again, the Roundtables political activity focused on the narrowest and most provincial aspects of policy.

The Chamber of Commerces evolution has been even more bizarre than the Business Roundtables. The Chamber also faced significant internal dissension over Reagans deficits, and its consensus-seeking internal procedures prevented it from putting forward any plan for dealing with them. The political scientist Mark Smith provides a description of the Chambers decision-making during this period:

The organization probably could not survive without incorporating its members into decision-making. By involving its diverse membership in deliberations that set its positions, the Chamber can help avoid taking stands opposed by part of its constituency. The participation of members helps to ensure that the Chamber takes action only when there is a consensus within business. Even when decisions must be reached without large-scale consultation of the Chambers constituency, the policy committees, board of directors, and staff use available information and precedents to find the common ground supported throughout the business community.

This kind of procedure put the Chamber at a disadvantage in the increasingly fractious world of American business.

The Chamber had continued its decline from the mid-1980s until new management was brought in during Bill Clintons second term. Lesher retired and was replaced by Thomas Donohue, who pioneered a new model for the Chambers work. Rather than attempting to forge a consensus among a diverse group of companies, the Chamber would offer its resources to the highest bidder. Since the Chamber is a trade association, donations to it are not required to be disclosed. As such, it could act as a kind of shield for companies wishing to push unpopular causes that might damage their brands. Their donations to the Chamber would be secret, and the Chambers lobbyists and attorneys would be the ones to get their hands dirty. Donohue was explicit about the purpose of this business model, boasting I want to give them all the deniability they need.

This new business model was first piloted with the tobacco industry, who, as Thomas Ferguson has noted, lurks behind the scenes of many of the most important political fights of the 1990s. Facing significant pressure from Bill Clintons Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the industry needed a new strategy for fighting back, and it found the Chamber in the fight over a new cigarette tax being discussed in Congress. The Chamber offered its services to derail the bill, and Philip Morris poured over $200,000 into the Chamber in 1998 alone. As the Chamber pumped out ads opposing the bill and supplied a constant stream of lobbyists to oppose it on Capitol Hill, other tobacco companies took note of its good work and started kicking in funds. The Senate blocked the bill, and a new model of business advocacy (one can no longer call it organization) was born.

Over the next decade and a half, the Chamber would offer its reputation-laundering services to a number of different industries. When Congress considered new auto safety regulations in the wake of the Ford and Firestone recall in 2000, GM, Toyota, Ford, and Chrysler pumped over half a million dollars into lobbying to remove criminal penalties for auto executives from the legislation. Eleven pharmaceutical companies contributed over a million dollars each for a campaign about prescription drug pricing. The tidal wave of cash the insurance industry sent toward the Chamber in 2009 and 2010, however, dwarfed what had come before. In 2009, Americas Health Insurance Plans, a trade group, donated more than $85 million to the Chamber, which came to 42 percent of its funds that year. These funds allowed the insurance industry to play a double game, pledging support for reform efforts in public, all the while funding the Chambers scorched-earth campaign against a public option or any meaningful regulations on the industry. Throughout all this, Donohue continued to insist to journalists that donations to the Chamber were unrelated to its decisions to get involved in different political causes. The group was selling plausible deniability so rapidly, it seemed, it had forgotten to save any for itself.

In the three decades that followed Reagans administration, American businesss form of political action changed drastically. The united fight to tear down the remnants of New Deal liberalism was over, and business had won. Its victory, however, undermined the very conditions that had made such unity possible. Now exercising an unquestioned dominance over American politics, business found itself rent by the kinds of divisions that had seemed insignificant in the 1970s. They became, once more, as Karl Marx described, a band of warring brothers.

In this new environment, the leading organizations of American capital could no longer operate in the same way. They stopped trying to forge a classwide perspective and ceased seeking consensus. Instead, they attached themselves to the most narrow and sectional concerns of business, whether that meant shielding the tobacco industry from liability or doing everything possible to preserve managerial autonomy.

For these sorts of endeavors, a Republican Party moving ever further to the right was a profitable partner. The Republican right could be counted on to fight against any real penalties for business malfeasance, to back the most brutal slashing of the tax code, and to support judges who would maintain a ceaseless hostility toward labor unions and regulations. What Richard Lachmann describes as the autarkic orientation of American capital fit perfectly with the party becoming more and more conservative.

With the party institutionally enfeebled and corporate America more focused than ever on the narrowest, most sectional forms of political action, the way was cleared for Republican political entrepreneurs seeking to pull the party right. Even in the heyday of moderate Republicanism, during the Dwight Eisenhower administration, there was a strong constituency in the party trying to pull it further to the right. Through a combination of canny organizing, luck, and convention-rigging, these forces managed to win the party nomination for Barry Goldwater in 1964. Goldwater, of course, proceeded to a crushing defeat at Lyndon B. Johnsons hands, an outcome many thought had sealed the fate of the party. Reagans eventual victory in 1980 proved that rumors of their demise were greatly exaggerated.

Yet, once ensconced in the White House, Reagan was an inconsistent force for party conservatism. His victory in the primaries had depended on winning support from some of the partys biggest corporate funders, who had little interest in movement conservatisms various social issue obsessions. George H. W. Bushs presence on the ticket was testimony to the continuing power of this wing of the party. As noted above, after his tax cuts sent the federal deficit skyrocketing, Reagan enacted the largest peacetime tax increase in American history, greatly dispiriting his free market fundamentalist backers. But most important of all, Reagan was not much of a party builder. While he campaigned hard for GOP congressional candidates in 1982, 1984, and 1986, his 1984 campaign in particular undercut the partys efforts. His campaign was, after all, almost entirely image-based and carefully avoided ideological or partisan appeals. In 1986, the White House even ordered the Republican National Convention to avoid a partisan campaign. Moves like these did little to pull the party to the right in the way Reagans original backers had hoped he would.

That task would fall to a former history professor from suburban Atlanta: Newt Gingrich. A former Rockefeller Republican, Gingrich came to Congress in 1978 and quickly realized two things: that the old party establishments were weaker than they looked, and that his route to power meant following the money. Most accounts of Gingrichs rise in the House focus on his battles with Democratic speaker Jim Wright, whom Gingrich successfully brought down over ethics violations in 1989. Catching Wright was certainly important, but what happened behind the scenes, when the cameras werent rolling, is what allowed Gingrich to do it.

From early in his career, Gingrich was a conservative institution builder. In 1983, he founded the Conservative Opportunity Society, a strategy group for conservative congressmembers. In 1986, he took over GOPAC, a fundraising body set up by Delaware governor Pete du Pont to help maintain a healthy stable of state and local Republican candidates who could move up to higher office. Gingrich had first encountered GOPAC in 1985. He later described its impression on him, saying, There was a high dollar fun fundraiser in 1985 and I walked in and saw the amount of wealthy friends that Du Pont had. I saw so much potential that this organization and this wealth could provide.

Gingrich turned GOPAC into a force in Republican politics. He continued Du Ponts work of training candidates, sending out ideologically rigorous audio tapes candidates could listen to in their long car rides crisscrossing their districts. Over the next nine years, GOPAC would raise over $15 million, much of it from conservative business owners, to train and fund future GOP congressmembers. By the time Gingrich ascended to the office of Speaker in 1995, he estimated that 75 percent of GOP freshmen had received his largesse. As Henry Waxman had discovered a few years earlier in the Democratic Party, in the postreform Republican Party, power followed money.

Gingrichs greatest triumph, of course, came in 1994, when, under his leadership, Republicans took back the House for the first time since the Eisenhower administration. Though many observers (and, of course, Gingrich himself) attributed the victory to Gingrichs leadership and agenda, which he called the Contract with America, the evidence for his popularity is thin. In fact, 71 percent of voters reported they had never heard of the Contract, and 68 percent said they were not familiar with Gingrich (of those who were, more had an unfavorable opinion than a favorable one). Instead, as Thomas Ferguson has argued, Gingrich rode a wave of business money to victory. The Clinton administration, despite Goldman Sachs alum Robert Rubins leadership on economic policy, had managed to alienate large sections of capital. The Brady Bill stirred up the gun industry, proposed energy taxes agitated oil, and the administrations intimations about regulating hedge firms even pushed Wall Street away. Most consequentially of all, the attempt to regulate the tobacco industry through the FDA prompted a Jesse Helms protg to appoint Ken Starr (himself a lawyer for a tobacco company) to the position of special prosecutor investigating, at first, the Whitewater scandal. These companies directed a massive amount of money into the Republican Party and its candidates, which Gingrich expertly doled out to the races where it would be most impactful.

Gingrich received a unanimous Republican vote to become speaker. His time on top, however, was not to last. Mistaking the campaign funds that brought him to power for a popular mandate for conservatism, he immediately launched a budget battle with the Clinton administration, demanding cuts to Medicaid, Medicare, and education spending. Gingrich refused to give Clinton a bill he would sign, prompting two government shutdowns that sent Gingrichs poll numbers through the floor.

Gingrichs defeat on the budget dealt a blow to the partys radicals. Their momentum, seemingly unstoppable a few months earlier, had been broken. The more moderate wing of the party, grouped around figures linked to the Bush administration, was ready to seize the advantage. They coalesced quickly around Bob Dole as their choice to challenge Clinton in 1996. Dole had long-standing links to the party establishment, including running as Gerald Fords vice presidential candidate in 1976. Among the partys right wing, however, Dole was viewed as Senator Straddle. To placate them, Dole selected supply-side guru Jack Kemp as his running mate and tacked right throughout the campaign.

Doles backers in the party by this point viewed Gingrich and his horde as a problem to be managed. Allies of Bush, in particular, still smarted at the memory of Pat Buchanans 1992 RNC speech calling for aKulturkampfagainst homosexuality and feminism, which many viewed as mortally wounding Bushs reelection chances. They intended to take no chances in 1996, and GOP figures from Reagan administration veterans to current governors spread the word that theatrics from the partys insurgent conservatives would not be tolerated at the convention.

Doles subsequent defeat did little to improve the party establishments position vis--vis the insurgents. Moreover, Doles decision to resign from the Senate during the campaign meant that Trent Lott, who had been a key Gingrich ally in the House, would become Senate majority leader. In the House, a chastened Gingrich moved to a more collaborative position with the Clinton administration, working quietly behind the scenes on a plan to implement cuts to Social Security and Medicare. However, the Republican Revolution was beginning to devour its own. The freshmen representatives Gingrich had brought in had already begun to turn on him for insufficient conservatism. One Clinton administration official remarked that the freshmen had become Newts Frankenstein monster.

Gingrichs freshmen were joined by Tom DeLay, a former exterminator from Texas. DeLay had won the position of majority whip after the 1994 election, and he had won it by running against Gingrichs preferred candidate. DeLay managed this upset by redistributing money throughout the House on a scale grander than even Gingrich had imagined. A lobbyist for the brewing industry made the game plan explicit: Wed rustle up checks for the guy and make sure Tom got the credit. After winning the whip position, DeLay only intensified his fundraising efforts. He hired an experienced tobacco lobbyist to run his leadership PAC, and the tobacco industry responded by contributing generously.

It was DeLay, not Gingrich, who led the Republican charge to impeach Bill Clinton. Ironically, Gingrich himself paid the price for that gambits failure, resigning shortly after the GOP lost seats in the 1998 elections. The new speaker of the House would be Dennis Hastert, whom DeLay had elevated as deputy whip in 1995. (In fact, DeLay, Dick Armey, and John Boehner had actively been plotting to remove Gingrich and replace him with one of their own.)

As the party headed into the 2000 election, then, a sort of stalemate existed between its establishment and the insurgents. The establishment had lost two presidential elections in a row, but the insurgents had led the party into two debacles the government shutdowns and the impeachment. Moreover, the insurgents had few candidates who could credibly run in 2000.

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For Republicans, There Will Be No Return to Normal - Jacobin magazine

So much of the discussion of Trumps failed coup attempt against democracy is about learning its many details. It is like putting together all the pieces in a huge jigsaw puzzle. Understanding is very important but I think less attention has been paid to what the coup attempt means for the future.

On TV, I saw the historian Timothy Snyder explain that a failed coup is practice for a successful coup. The coup plotters and the Republican Party have been studying why the coup in 2020 failed. They are taking steps now to ensure the next coup in 2024 will be successful.

The Democrats appear asleep at the switch. They are not recognizing or responding to the magnitude of the anti-democratic threat. In their desire to normalize and be bipartisan, they want to believe both sides play by the Marquess of Queensberry rules.

The autocratic threat has multiple dimensions and tracks. I would mention the role of state legislatures, intimidation of poll watchers and state election officials through threats and physical pressure, replacing state election officials or stripping them of their powers and destroying faith in democracy. All these dimensions are in play.

Although Trump lost the popular vote by a wide margin of over seven million votes, the currency Republicans are more concerned about is electors. In 2020, Trump needed 38 electors to reverse Bidens victory in the Electoral College. Much of the Trump teams efforts between November 2020 and January 2021 was directed at inducing Republican legislatures in states that Biden won to switch and appoint Trump electors. The vote in the Electoral College was 306-232 in Bidens favor.

Under our constitution, states appoint electors. States have always respected and deferred to the will of the voters. Electors have reflected the majority vote. What the Republican partisans are engineering is a plan to fire the voters and replace them with Trump acolytes in key state legislatures they control. That way even if the Republicans lose the popular vote, a state legislature can appoint electors they desire.

The theoretical underpinning to justify the legal argument is the independent state legislature doctrine, a favorite construct of far-right lawyers and jurists. The U.S. Constitution gives state legislatures the sole authority to set all election rules. What if state legislatures believe they can throw out electors and de-certify election results?

In his article in the Atlantic, Trumps Next Coup Has Already Begun, Barton Gellman looks at strategies state legislatures are already pursuing to politicize, criminalizeand interfere in election administration. In a broad way, this is about putting in places of power and decision-making proponents of the Big Lie of election fraud so that next time ballots will not decide elections.

Gellman cites examples from Georgia, Michigan and Arizona. In Georgia, Brad Raffensperger, the Secretary of State, found no fraud and was censured by the Republican Party and is being primaried by Jody Hice, a U.S. Congress member, promoted by Trump. The Georgia legislature stripped Raffensperger of power as chief election officer. Raffensperger famously would not find 11,780 votes for Trump.

Trump also pushed former Senator David Perdue to primary the Georgia sitting governor, Brian Kemp. Trump had urged Kemp to use nonexistent emergency powers to overturn Bidens Georgia win. Kemp refused and Trump found him insufficiently loyal.

In Michigan, the Republican Party removed Aaron Van Langevelde, a Republican, from the board of state canvassers because he rejected false and unproven claims of widespread voter fraud. Van Langeveldes crime was that he voted to certify Bidens win.

In Arizona, Trump endorsed Kari Lake for governor over the current Republican Governor, Doug Ducey, because Ducey also certified Bidens win. Without evidence and after multiple recounts, Lake, a former TV anchor, called the 2020 election shady, shoddy, and corrupt.She earned the Trump nod by saying she would not have certified Bidens win. The Arizona legislature is currently debating a bill to strip the Democratic Secretary of State, Katie Hobbs, of her ability to defend election lawsuits.

Death threats and harassment from Trump supporters have terrified U.S. election workers. There are many examples. One Republican city commissioner on the Philadelphia Board of Elections, Al Schmidt, received this threat:

Tell the truth or your three kids will be fatally shot,along with the names of his children, his address and a photo of his home.

Schmidt received other messages: Cops cant help you,Heads on spikes and perhaps cuts and bullets will soon arrive at (his address). Schmidt had defended the vote-counting process in the face of unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud in Philadelphia by Trump.

Rick Barron, the director of voting and elections in Fulton County, Georgia has been subject to a barrage of threats including a voicemail,you will be served lead.

Claire Woodall-Vogg, the executive director of Milwaukees election commission has received email threats saying she deserved to go before a firing squad and she was called treasonous. Woodhall-Vogg left the state for ten days and put in extra security at her home.

According to an April 2021 survey by the Brennan Center, nearly one in three election officials feel unsafe in their job. Many non-partisan election officials are choosing to leave the profession, creating openings for the inexperienced. These code red level threats are a new 2020 phenomenon attributable to pro-Trump fanatics.

Law enforcement has largely failed to respond to the threats. A Reuters investigation in September found 102 threats of violence or death against election officials in key battleground states. Reuters could only document four instances in which someone was charged.

In August, John Keller, a senior attorney in the Department of Justices Public Integrity Section told a meeting of secretaries of state, The response has been inadequate.

Instead of responding to the threats, Republican legislators have created new laws that impose tough penalties for election officials who violate rules. In Iowa and Texas, election officials who commit technical infractions can suffer big financial penalties.

One of the worst harassment episodes was Trumps baseless attacks on two Georgia election workers, Ruby Freeman and her daughter Wandrea Moss. Trump and Rudy Giuliani falsely and repeatedly accused them of pulling false ballots from suitcases hidden under tables at a ballot-counting center. Trump slanderously called Freeman a professional vote scammer and a hustler.

The two African-American women received hundreds of death threats and racist taunts. Harassing strangers showed up at Freemans house. Even though local and state officials definitively disproved the fraud allegations, Freeman had to go into hiding.

Trump-aligned social media demonized the two women. The most recent bizarre revelation was about how Kanye Wests publicist pressed Freeman to confess to Trumps voter fraud allegations. Freeman was told she would go to jail if she did not confess.

Make no mistake,2020 saw a deliberate effort to overturn a fair and free election. The Republican Party has degenerated into believing, without evidence, that Biden cheated. Even worse, in key battleground states, they have put into important positions proponents of the Big Lie while purging non-believers in the fantasy. They have gotten zealous buy-in from tens of millions. The coup almost succeeded in installing Trump as a dictator.

The Trump forces are destroying public faith in democracy. In their world, if fraud won, then democracy is already dead and it doesnt matter what you do to win.

Gellman says the next coup will rely on subversion, not violence. If state legislatures can override voters, a far-right Supreme Court can put the seal of legality on that.

I wish I saw the Democrats as up to the challenge but they are failing. To say their response has been muted is generous. President Biden has not used his bully pulpit to fight aggressively and consistently for voting rights and the Democratic Party remains divided, without clarity of focus or message. They passively watch the fascists advance. Maybe there will be a voting rights bill but who knows.

At the same time, Attorney General Merrick Garland and the Department of Justice have shown little inclination to go after big fish in the criminal coup. That is a failure of leadership that will come back to bite all people who support democracy.

Gellman says there is a serious risk that American democracy as we know it will come to an end in 2024. We need an immediate and urgent response.

(Jonathan P. Baird lives in Wilmot.)

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Jonathan P. Baird: The Republican and Democratic response to the 2020 election raises concern for 2024 - Concord Monitor

Michael Gableman, the former Wisconsin state Supreme Court justice leading the Wisconsin legislatures Trumpified investigation into the 2020 election, is calling on the lone elected Republican who criticized him to resign.

State Sen. Kathy Bernier (R), a member of the chambersRepublican leadershipand chair of the Senates elections committee, said last month that Gablemans investigation was headed nowhere, and suggested it was a threat to democracy.

My advice would be to have Mr. Gableman wrap up sooner rather than later, because the longer we keep this up, the more harm were going to do for Republicans, she said, speaking on a panel alongside elections experts including prominent Republican lawyer Ben Ginsberg, who has also been a critic of Trump-inspired efforts to endlessly revisit the last election.

Bernier also described this constant drumbeat of all the massive voter fraud as a charade.

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But it was another comment that attracted Gablemans attention: Berniers said that she would carry a concealed weapons permit with her when she went to see Gableman speak publicly because his investigation keeps jazzing up the people who think they know what theyre talking about,and they dont.

Gableman responded to Bernier last week while speaking at a Republican event in her home county.

If youre an elected official and youre so afraid of your constituents that you think you have to bring a firearm to see them, you should take a long hard look at what youve been doing, he said, speaking to the Chippewa County Republican Party.

And then, frankly, resign, he added.

Video of the event was first flagged by the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel.

He is the last person on Earth who should call for anyones resignation,Bernier shot back in comments to the newspaper.

Gableman has made a practice of appearing at Republican events while conducting his investigation, including one at which he endorsed a Republican candidate for governor, Rebecca Kleefisch. He has aligned himself with election truthers, using statefundsto visit the Arizona audit as well as MyPillow CEO Mike Lindells Cyber Symposium. His investigation has apparently ramped up in recent weeks, with threats to jail the mayors of large Democratic cities.

In fair warning,I am about to start spending more money, Gableman said at the Republican event last week.

Bernier, herself a former clerk, was not always a critic of efforts to investigate the 2020 election. When the state legislature hired two former police officers to look into it, she celebrated.

This is great! she wrote on Twitter. If there is nothing to see here, that is fine, but if there is, then we should specifically address the issues.

Asked this month about the apparent shift in perspective by TPMs Matt Shuham, she replied that due diligence had been done and it was time to move on.

The evidence has been pretty clear, and is pretty clear, that there is not organized voter fraud, she said. We have enough evidence now to provide that we can have a lot of confidence in our election.

We need to move on for the greater good, she added.

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Wisconsin GOP's Election Investigator Calls On Republican Who Criticized Him To Resign - TPM

Washington, D.C., is now the epicenter of the pandemic.

As of Dec. 23, it had 158 COVID-19 cases per 100,000 residents, a 541% growth in cases over the last two weeks. This was much more than Alabama, Mississippi or South Carolina, all of which had cases in the 20s or below per 100,000.

Is this because D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser cares less about controlling the virus than the governors of those three Southern states? No, if anything shes been overly zealous. Its just that the omicron surge has hit at a time when the winter season means that places like D.C. and especially the Northeast are particularly susceptible.

Other jurisdictions that have seen big increases include Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey and Illinois.

The omicron wave should finally put paid to the perfervid fantasy, a staple of center-left thinking, that the coronavirus is somehow primarily a red state phenomenon, fueled by Republican recklessness and heartlessness.

Its been obvious for a long time that theres an enormous seasonal element to COVID-19 and that the virus itself has the most influence on the patterns of its spread and severity. The South got slammed last summer by the hard-hitting delta surge and now omicron which, hopefully, will be milder is roaring through blue states.

Of course, this context doesnt make for a useful political narrative, so the media and the left have ignored it in a hunt for cartoon villains. Last August, New York Times columnist Paul Krugman slammed Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis for his states surge and unfavorably compared it to low numbers in New York. Of course, at other junctures of the pandemic he easily could have done the opposite.

Krugman said that DeSantis has effectively acted as an ally of the coronavirus, a charge widely lodged against him and other GOP governors supposedly responsible for running a death cult.

DeSantis has never been anti-vaccine, but has opposed vaccine mandates, vaccine passports and masking in schools. Even if one stipulates for the sake of argument that DeSantis has been wrong about all of these policies, it is ridiculous to suggest Florida would have been spared the ravages of the delta variant if he had come down differently. A New York Times analysis of vaccine mandates concluded that they have not provided the significant boost to state and local vaccination rates that some experts had hoped for.

As it happens, positions that once were characterized as the height of Republican irresponsibility opposition to lockdowns and closing schools are now such a matter of consensus that even President Joe Biden takes them for granted.

Biden more than anyone should realize that the facile belief that Donald Trump or other Republicans had it within their power to shut down the pandemic at any point was partisan opportunism and tripe.

By the unreasonable standards he and others created over the last 18 months, he stands exposed as a miserable failure. On Jan. 20, 2021, when Biden was inaugurated, there had been roughly 25 million cases of the coronavirus in the United States; now there have been 50 million. On January 20, 2021, roughly 415,000 Americans had died; now, more than 800,000 have.

The truth is, even though DeSantis and Bowser have different philosophies and a different willingness to let individuals make their own risk calculations in dealing with the virus, neither wants their residents to get infected or die, and neither is responsible for a highly transmissible variant of virus hitting their jurisdiction at a time of maximum seasonal vulnerability.

Back in August, when everyone was saying he had blood on his hands, DeSantis noted that the virus was here to stay, and vaccines and treatments not ham-fisted restrictions were the best weapons against it. The virus is now hitting a different part of the country hardest, but this view remains the correct one.

(Rich Lowry is editor of National Review.)

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