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The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), also called the North Atlantic Alliance, the Atlantic Alliance or the Western Alliance, is an international organisation for collective security established in 1949, in support of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, DC, on 4 April 1949. Its headquarters are located in Brussels, Belgium. Its other official name is the French equivalent, lOrganisation du Trait de lAtlantique Nord (OTAN) (English and French being the two official languages of the organisation).

Background

The Treaty of Brussels, signed on 17 March 1948 by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and the United Kingdom, is considered the precursor to the NATO agreement. This treaty established a military alliance, later to become the Western European Union. However, American participation was thought necessary in order to counter the military power of the Soviet Union, and therefore talks for a new military alliance began almost immediately. These talks resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in Washington, DC on 4 April 1949. It included the five Treaty of Brussels states, United States, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. Three years later, on 18 February 1952, Greece and Turkey also joined. Because of geography, Australia and New Zealand missed out on membership. In place of this, the ANZUS agreement was made by the United States with these nations. The incorporation of West Germany into the organisation on 9 May 1955 was described as a decisive turning point in the history of our continent by Halvard Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway at the time. [5] Indeed, one of its immediate results was the creation of the Warsaw Pact, signed on 14 May 1955 by the Soviet Union and its satellite states as a formal response to this event, firmly establishing the two opposing sides of the Cold War.

Dtente

During most of the duration of the Cold War, NATO maintained a holding pattern with no actual military engagement as an organisation. On 1 July 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty opened for signature: NATO argued that its nuclear weapons sharing arrangements did not breach the treaty as US forces controlled the weapons until a decision was made to go to war, at which point the treaty would no longer be controlling. Few states knew of the NATO nuclear sharing arrangements at that time, and they were not challenged. On 30 May 1978, NATO countries officially defined two complementary aims of the Alliance, to maintain security and pursue dtente. This was supposed to mean matching defences at the level rendered necessary by the Warsaw Pacts offensive capabilities without spurring a further arms race. However, on 12 December 1979, in light of a build-up of Warsaw Pact nuclear capabilities in Europe, ministers approved the deployment of US Cruise and Pershing II theatre nuclear weapons in Europe. The new warheads were also meant to strengthen the western negotiating position in regard to nuclear disarmament. This policy was called the Dual Track policy. Similarly, in 198384, responding to the stationing of Warsaw Pact SS-20 medium-range missiles in Europe, NATO deployed modern Pershing II missiles able to reach Moscow within minutes. This action led to peace movement protests throughout Western Europe. The membership of the organisation in this time period likewise remained largely static, with NATO only gaining one new member in 30 May 1982, when newly democratic Spain joined the alliance, following a referendum. Greece also in 1974 withdrew its forces from NATOs military command structure, as a result of Greco-Turkish tensions following the 1974 Cyprus dispute; Greek forces were however readmitted in 1980. In November 1983, a NATO manoeuvre code-named Able Archer 83, which simulated a NATO nuclear release, caused panic in the Kremlin. Soviet leadership, led by ailing General Secretary Yuri Andropov became concerned that US President Ronald Reagan may have been intending to launch a genuine first strike. In response, Soviet nuclear forces were readied and air units in Eastern Germany and Poland were placed on alert. Though at the time written off by US intelligence as a propaganda effort, many historians now believe Soviet fear of a NATO first strike was genuine.

The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, removed the de facto main adversary of NATO. This caused a strategic reevaluation of NATOs purpose, nature and tasks. In practice, this ended up entailing a gradual (and still ongoing) expansion of NATO to Eastern Europe, as well as the extension of its activities to areas not formerly concerning it. The first post-Cold War expansion of NATO came with the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990, when former East Germany became part of the Federal Republic of Germany and the alliance. This had been agreed in the Two Plus Four Treaty earlier in the year. To secure Soviet approval of a united Germany remaining in NATO, it was agreed that foreign troops and nuclear weapons would not be stationed in the east, and also that NATO would never expand further east. On 28 February 1994, NATO also took its first military action, shooting down four Bosnian Serb aircraft violating a UN no-fly zone over central Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO airstrikes the following year helped bring the war in Bosnia to an end, resulting in the Dayton Agreement. Between 1994 and 1997, wider forums for regional cooperation between NATO and its neighbours were set up, like the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. On 8 July 1997, three former communist countries, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, were invited to join NATO, which finally happened in 1999. On 24 March 1999, NATO saw its first broad-scale military engagement in the Kosovo War, where it waged an 11-week bombing campaign against what was then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The conflict ended on 11 June 1999, when Yugoslavian leader Slobodan Miloevi agreed to NATOs demands by accepting UN resolution 1244. NATO then helped establish the KFOR, a NATO-led force under a United Nations mandate that operates the military mission in Kosovo. Debate concerning NATOs role and the concerns of the wider international community continued throughout its expanded military activities: The United States opposed efforts to require the UN Security Council to approve NATO military strikes, such as the ongoing action against Yugoslavia, while France and other NATO countries claimed the alliance needed UN approval. American officials said that this would undermine the authority of the alliance, and they noted that Russia and China would have exercised their Security Council vetoes to block the strike on Yugoslavia. In April 1999, at the Washington summit, a German proposal that NATO adopt a no-first-use nuclear strategy was rejected.

After the September 11th attacks

The expansion of the activities and geographical reach of NATO grew even further as an outcome of the September 11th attacks. These caused as a response the provisional invocation (on September 12) of the collective security of NATOs charter Article 5 which states that any attack on a member state will be considered an attack against the entire group of members. The invocation was confirmed on 4 October 2001 when NATO determined that the attacks were indeed eligible under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. The eight official actions taken by NATO in response to the attacks included the first two examples of military action taken in response to an invocation of Article 5: Operation Eagle Assist and Operation Active Endeavour. Despite this early show of solidarity, NATO faced a crisis little more than a year later, when on 10 February 2003, France and Belgium vetoed the procedure of silent approval concerning the timing of protective measures for Turkey in case of a possible war with Iraq. Germany did not use its right to break the procedure but said it supported the veto. On the issue of Afghanistan on the other hand, the alliance showed greater unity: On 16 April 2003 NATO agreed to take command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The decision came at the request of Germany and the Netherlands, the two nations leading ISAF at the time of the agreement, and all 19 NATO ambassadors approved it unanimously. The handover of control to NATO took place on 11 August, and marked the first time in NATOs history that it took charge of a mission outside the north Atlantic area. Canada had originally been slated to take over ISAF by itself on that date.

Political Structure

Like any alliance, NATO is ultimately governed by its 26 member states. However, the North Atlantic Treaty, and other agreements, outline how decisions are to be made within NATO. Each of the 26 members sends a delegation or mission to NATOs headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The senior permanent member of each delegation is known as the Permanent Representative and is generally a senior civil servant or an experienced ambassador (and holding that diplomatic rank). Together the Permanent Members form the North Atlantic Council (NAC), a body which meets together at least once a week and has effective political authority and powers of decision in NATO. From time to time the Council also meets at higher levels involving Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers or Heads of Government and it is at these meetings that major decisions regarding NATOs policies are generally taken. However, it is worth noting that the Council has the same authority and powers of decision-making, and its decisions have the same status and validity, at whatever level it meets. The meetings of the North Atlantic Council are chaired by the Secretary-General of NATO and, when decisions have to be made, the action is agreed upon on the basis of unanimity and common accord. There is no voting or decision by majority. Each nation represented at the Council table or on any of its subordinate committees retains complete sovereignty and responsibility for its own decisions. The second pivotal member of each countrys delegation is the Military Representative, a senior officer from each countrys armed forces. Together the Military Representatives from the Military Committee, a body responsible for recommending to NATOs political authorities those measures considered necessary for the common defence of the NATO area. Its principal role is to provide direction and advice on military policy and strategy. It provides guidance on military matters to the NATO Strategic Commanders, whose representatives attend its meetings, and is responsible for the overall conduct of the military affairs of the Alliance under the authority of the Council. Like the council, from time to time the Military Committee also meets at a higher level, namely at the level of Chiefs of defence, the most senior military officer in each nations armed forces. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is made up of legislators from the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance as well as 13 associate members.

Military structure

NATOs military operations are directed by two Strategic Commanders, both senior U.S. officers assisted by a staff drawn from across NATO. The Strategic Commanders are responsible to the Military Committee for the overall direction and conduct of all Alliance military matters within their areas of command. Before 2003 the Strategic Commanders were the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) but the current arrangement is to separate command responsibility between Allied Command Transformation (ACT), responsible for transformation and training of NATO forces, and Allied Command Operations, responsible for NATO operations worldwide. The commander of Allied Command Operations retained the title Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and is based in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) located at Casteau, north of the Belgian city of Mons. This is about 80 km (50 miles) south of NATOs political headquarters in Brussels.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - UPSC Exam Preparation

Why did Russia deploy roughly 100,000 troops to the Ukrainian border earlier this year? The move alarmed Western policymakers from the Baltics to the Beltway about the possibility of an all-out invasion. While Moscow ultimately redeployed some of those troops and the crisis deescalated, the buildup highlights Ukraines vulnerability and the Wests powerlessness to Russian hard power in the region.

Russias foreign ministry spokesperson gave a very specific reason for the countrys moves at the beginning of the military buildup she warned that Ukraines bid for NATO membership could entail irreversible consequences for the Ukrainian statehood. President Vladimir Putin in his subsequent address to the nation cautioned the West against crossing Russias red lines. In short, Russia was flexing its military muscles in no small part to prevent Ukraines attempt to draw closer to NATO membership. Preventing Ukraine along with Georgia from joining NATO is one of Russias key geopolitical objectives, and it is certainly one that it is willing to use military force to achieve.

The election of President Joe Biden and the prospect of a NATO summit in the summer (now scheduled for June 14 in Brussels) seem to have triggered new hopes about NATO enlargement in both Ukraine and Georgia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in a interview earlier in the year that if he had a chance to ask Biden a question, it would be, Mr. President, why are we [Ukraine] still not in NATO? In the midst of the Russian military buildup, Zelensky urged that Ukraine be invited to participate in the Membership Action Plan, which is NATOs fast-track roadmap for enlargement, as a real signal to Russia and the only way to end the war in Donbas. The Ukrainian government reiterated its case that a roadmap for quick membership is a necessary step to confront aggression and autocracy in Europe. Insofar as Georgia is concerned, it remains a longstanding and highly ambitious NATO contributor, in the words of President Salome Zurabishvili earlier in the year, and has shown its dedication to reaching the ultimate objective of integration. Antony Blinken, then in the process of confirmation as secretary of state, said that NATOs door remains open to Georgia if it meets the requirements.

In responding to Russias intimidation, Western countries voiced strong support for Ukraine, while the NATO secretary general declared that only NATO would decide on enlargement. However, the unfortunate truth is that NATO will not offer membership to Ukraine and Georgia any time soon. The reluctance of the alliance to do so is based on sound geopolitical reasoning and a sober evaluation of the two countries limited progress on much-needed reforms. NATO should not officially close its open door to new members, but Ukraine and Georgia remaining outside the alliance is ultimately the best policy for NATO given the circumstances.

The Geopolitical Dimension

The debate on NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia dates back 13 years, when the alliance was split in half on this very issue. At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, NATO agreed that the two countries will become members, without granting membership plans or specifying when and the circumstances under which this would happen. Prior to the Bucharest decision, Putin had warned the alliance and dismissed the claim that enlargements were not against Russia because national security is not based on promises. Russias aggression against Georgia later that year, in August 2008, and subsequently in Ukraine since 2014 has pushed enlargement into the deep unknown. Today, it is necessary to approach the question as honestly as possible to avoid future missteps and renewed escalation.

While NATO deplores Russias bullying behavior against its neighbors, none of the allies are willing to risk a military confrontation with Russia over Ukraine or Georgia. It became clear during Russias short war in Georgia in August 2008 that not even the United States at the height of its post-Cold War power was willing to risk a war with Russia. When Russia attacked the Donbas and annexed Crimea in 2014, NATO was even less willing to intervene on behalf of Ukraine and more worried about Russian intentions again existing allies. Granting the Membership Action Plan expresses an intention to enlarge the alliance in the near future: If NATO wishes to take this step with Ukraine and Georgia, it should go without saying that the alliance must be serious about the defense of the aspiring new members against the military threat from Russia. As NATO membership in itself will not deter Russia, the question is whether allies will be willing and able to invest in the immense effort required to make collective defense credible.

In reaction to Russias aggression in Ukraine, NATO put in place rotating multinational battlegroups in the Baltic states designed as a trip wire to assure those allies about the collective defense guarantees. Moreover, the alliance tripled the size of its NATO response force, including by the creation of a spearhead forceto react at very short notice. A much larger U.S. deterrence initiative involves prepositioned equipment in Poland and large-scale military exercises at an annual cost of between $4.5 and $6.5 billion as a cornerstone of the broader NATO effort to deter Russian aggression in Europe. Nevertheless, Russia continues to have military superiority in the region as demonstrated, inter alia, by wargames conducted by the RAND Corporation that concluded Russia would able to overrun the Baltic states within just a few days unless NATO deployed more substantial forces until reinforcements could arrive.

If Ukraine and Georgia were to join NATO, the alliance would have to ready itself for an adequate assurance of its new members and an unprecedented conventional deterrence of Russia. Defending a country the size of Ukraine or as remote as Georgia puts in doubt NATOs ability to deploy the substantial in-theater and backup forces and equipment this would require. It also puts in doubt Americas willingness to greatly enhance its existing deterrence initiative and not least carry the financial burden. NATO has a hard enough time showing a credible defense its current members in Eastern Europe. Extending a security commitment to Ukraine and Georgia would extend NATO requirements beyond any degree of realism. Moreover, combat troops are neither trained nor structured to assist with the gray zone operations below the threshold of collective defense that Russia may be tempted to test again in eastern Ukraine, similar to the situation in 2014. In sum, the fact that NATO seems unable to make its security commitments credible in Ukraine and Georgia would expose enlargement as a gigantic bluff that would kill NATOs credibility as a defense alliance in any theater.

The Domestic Dimension

The case for Ukraine or Georgia to join NATO is further undercut by the reality that neither country is in control of all of its territory. Russia has annexed Crimea and supports separatist republics in the Donbas in Ukraine, and it has de facto annexed Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Russia is the main perpetrator, but it is nonetheless a power-political reality that cannot be ignored. The key question is: Would NATO be ready to exempt the breakaway regions from its collective defense clause or would Ukraine and Georgia be willing to give them up de jure, if this is the price for entering the alliance? Neither option seems plausible. Moreover, while a steady and overwhelming majority of Georgians support NATO membership, a significant portion of the Ukrainian people concentrated in the countrys southern and eastern parts closer to Russia are against joining the alliance.

Finally, neither Ukraine nor Georgia can demonstrate an impressive reform record that would make them obvious NATO candidates today. Ukrainian civil society argues that a Membership Action Plan could give the country the necessary momentum to kickstart security sector reform. However, Ukraine has missed so many European Union, International Monetary Fund, and U.S. reform encouragements since 2014 that it is doubtful that a membership plan this time around would be a big game changer (and besides, the Membership Action Plan instrument, Annual National Programs, is already in place). Vested interests remain a strong impediment to increased democratic control over the armed forces and to curbing the extensive powers of the security service of Ukraine. Georgia, despite a long history of defense reform since 2003, continues to suffer from politicization, the lack of transparency, and imperfect democratic control. The recent jailing of Georgias opposition leader shows the deficiency of its political system and the rule of law. Although domestic politics are ultimately of secondary concern (NATO in the past tolerated autocracies like Portugal and Turkey), it makes the case for alliance enlargement even less credible.

The Diplomatic Message

Ukraine and Georgia under continued Russian pressure are naturally inclined to draw closer to NATO. However, for good reasons, the alliance remains unwilling to risk a military escalation with Russia over the two countries. Nevertheless, the status quo is preferable to extending Membership Action Plans, which likely would lead Russia to escalate the hostilities in eastern Ukraine and perhaps its pressure against Georgia to prevent this from happening. NATOs open door policy applies to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo (should the alliance recognize it) as well as to Sweden and Finland, even though they are unlikely to join the alliance for domestic political reasons. In Eastern Europe, conversely, the open door would apply only if the geopolitical circumstances there change fundamentally. Specifically, Russia would have to abandon its idea of a privileged sphere of interests that it needs to enforce militarily and such change seems unlikely to happen in the current generation of Russian elites.

Ukraine and Georgia may again call for Membership Action Plans approaching the NATO summit on June 14. While they may realize this is unrealistic, they do so as part of a lobbying game to make NATO offer them additional support. Be that as it may, it puts NATO in an uncomfortable position because Russia constitutes a de facto veto on its post-Cold War mission to unite Europe under one security umbrella. At the same time, NATO has nothing to gain, and may in fact invite further Russian aggression, if it were to officially rescind its Bucharest declaration that Ukraine and Georgia will become members. Instead, NATOs private message to the two countries should be an appeal not to publicly push for a plan for membership since that would force NATO to publicly state the brutal reasons why the alliance will not follow through on offering them membership any time soon.

NATO (and the European Union) members should continue to support Georgia and Ukraine politically, financially, and, to a limited extent, militarily. However, they must also leverage the implementation of defense, rule of law, and economic reform that the countries have formally committed to but which remain long overdue. NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia remains a distant aspiration. In the meantime, Ukraine and Georgia, with NATOs help, need to focus on improving the resilience of their defense forces.

Henrik Larsen, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. He served as political adviser for the European Union in Ukraine from 2014 to 2019. He is the author of NATOs Democratic Retrenchment: Hegemony after the Return of History (2019). He tweets at @HenrikLindbo.

Image: U.S. Army (Photo by Sgt. Anthony Jones)

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Why NATO Should Not Offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans - War on the Rocks

In Catholicism, one commits a sin of omission when failing to do that which is required. The sin of omission hanging over the June 14 summit with NATO Heads of State and Government is a potential failure by allies to recognize the existential threat posed by the global march of autocracy, which is quickening its step by the day. The alliance stands at a critical juncture. As we confront a new global competition of values and systems of governance, our leaders must rededicate the alliance to the democratic foundations of the Washington Treaty and anchor our commitment to democracy within NATO by establishing a Center for Democratic Resilience within NATO headquarters.

The United States can lead the effort and do so with great humility. We know that democracy, while resilient, is also fragile. The armed insurrection at the United States Capitol on Jan. 6 opened the eyes of America and the world to this fact. Democracy prevailed that day, and we must ensure it will do so tomorrow.

President BidenJoe BidenHouse Judiciary Democrats call on DOJ to reverse decision on Trump defense Democratic super PAC targets Youngkin over voting rights Harris dubs first foreign trip a success amid criticism over border MORE is a committed transatlanticist. I know because I worked for him as a staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His commitment to the alliance has never wavered. He is also a president helping our country emerge from a period of substantial political turmoil and direct attacks on our democratic institutions. His response is a bold pro-democracy agenda both here at home and abroad. His mission at NATO should be no different and no less bold.

After World War II, 10 European nations, the United States and Canada came together to save Europe from looming communist aggression and domination. NATOs founding fathers had the foresight to define this alliance not by what it stands against, but what it stands for: a commitment to shared democratic values. Ever since, Europe and North America, through NATO, have sought to safeguard an international rules-based order based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This order has come under fire.

Competition between great powers has returned. Russia, China and others are modernizing their militaries in ways that undermine strategic stability. But we face no mere contest of military might. We are in the middle of a contest of values. Autocrats in Moscow, Beijing and elsewhere are promoting alternative models of governance and targeting the principles and institutions at the heart of our democratic societies.

We must strengthen democracy at home. Democracy unites us. It makes us stronger, and it makes us safer. Citizens, legislatures, governments and international institutions must constantly work to protect it, expand it, and strengthen the ability of our democracies to resist and counter attempts to undermine it both from within and without.

NATO must play its part too. Its commitment to shared democratic values distinguishes NATO from other alliances. Without it, NATO would be just another military bloc.

This understanding has always been at the heart of the NATO Parliamentary Assemblys raison dtre. Institutionally separate from NATO, we bring together legislators from across the Atlantic Alliance determined to protect our citizens and defend our democratic way of life. Defending democracy must be acknowledged as a key pillar of NATOs core mission.

That is why, as NATO leaders prepare to meet in Brussels, we call on them to consider the establishment of a Center for Democratic Resilience within NATO. NATO has a well-oiled machinery to deter adversaries, defend its citizens, manage crises and cooperate with our partners. But it lacks a body which is fully focused on defending democracy. This must change.

Such a center, located within NATO headquarters, would be a resource and clearinghouse for democratic best practices. Operationally, it would provide consulting to those who seek guidance and practical assistance in establishing or enhancing democratic architecture like an independent judiciary, election security, or parliamentary oversight functions. It could monitor and identify challenges to democracy, human rights and the rule of law among member states in addition to facilitating democracy and governance assistance to member and aspirant states when requested.

We were encouraged the independent group of experts supporting the NATO 2030 reflection process also saw the need for a center on democratic resilience when they recommended such urgent action to the NATO secretary general last November.

We must demonstrate our commitment to shared democratic values, in both words and in deeds. This would send a strong signal to our citizens as well as those who want to do us harm: the alliance is equally committed to defending our democratic values as it is to collective security. The importance of shared democratic values can no longer be just a mantra that our leaders trot out regularly in summit communiqus.

Come June 14, we hope our leaders heed the call and make operational the foundational commitment enshrined in the 1949 Washington Treaty: safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

Gerald E. Connolly represents the 11 District of Virginia. He is president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

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