Daily Archives: January 23, 2021

The start to 2021 has not been any good indicator that this year will be anything more than an even more terrible sequel to 2020. Both sides of the aisle are fighting back, and actions are ever more favored than words. Large media corporations silence anyone who disagrees with them, and many politicians say one thing to earn votes and then do the opposite once they are in office. It does in fact feel as though we have lost our outlet to express ourselves in a meaningful and constructive way. We see provocative news stories of impending doom and violent outbursts. We are inundated with despair and shock at what is happening to our country, regardless of what our political beliefs happen to be.

The Founding Fathers issued the First Amendment not only as a law to be upheld by our government but also as a standard to guide every American throughout their lives. Speak out, and allow others to speak. Hold true to your beliefs, and permit others to hold theirs. This right is our first, and in my honest opinion, our strongest defense against tyranny and injustice.

Thankfully, it has not been and truly never can be stolen away from the masses. Though you may not be a Shakespeare or Seuss, you still possess the ability to write out your thoughts effectively and persuasively. Speak out online, in newspapers and in public. Engage with your state and local politicians: your senators, representatives, governor, mayor whoever is willing to listen. Let them know what you want from them and the actions you believe they should take. It is politicians duty to listen to their constituents, and it is our civic duty to speak when we perceive any form of injustice.

Tanner Engles is a junior majoring in computer science.

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Letter to the editor: Put the First Amendment first - Daily Mississippian

When Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence, he included in it a list of the colonists grievances with the British government. Notably absent were any complaints that the British government infringed upon the freedom of speech.

In those days, public speech was as acerbic as it is today. If words were aimed at Parliament, all words were lawful. If they were aimed directly and personally at the king as Jeffersons were in the Declaration they constituted treason.

Needless to say, Jefferson and the 55 others who signed the Declaration would all have been hanged for treasonous speech had the British prevailed.

Of course, the colonists won the war, and, six years afterward, the 13 states ratified the Constitution. Two years after ratification, the Constitution was amended by adding the Bill of Rights. The first ratified amendment prohibited Congress from doing what the colonists never seriously complained about the British government doing infringing upon the freedom of speech.

James Madison, who drafted the Bill of Rights, insisted upon referring to speech as the freedom of speech to emphasize that it preexisted the government. If you could have asked Madison where he believed the freedom of speech came from, hed have said it was one of the inalienable rights Jefferson wrote about in the Declaration.

Stated differently, each of the signatories of the Declaration and ratifiers of the Bill of Rights manifested in writing their unambiguous belief that the freedom of speech is a natural right personal to every human. It does not come from the government. It comes from within and cannot be taken away by legislation or executive command.

Yet, a mere seven years later, during the presidency of John Adams, Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts, which punished speech critical of the government.

So, how could the same generation in some cases the same human beings that prohibited congressional infringement upon speech have enacted a statute that punished speech?

To some of the framers the Federalists who wanted a big government as we have today infringing upon the freedom of speech meant silencing it before it was uttered. Today, this is called prior restraint, and the Supreme Court has essentially outlawed it.

To the antifederalists or Democratic-Republicans, as they called themselves the First Amendment prohibited Congress from interfering with or punishing any speech.

Adams Department of Justice indicted, prosecuted and convicted antifederalists for their public speech critical of the government.

When Jefferson won the presidency and the antifederalists won control of Congress, the Federalists repealed the speech suppression parts of the Alien and Sedition Acts on the eve of their departure from congressional control, lest it be used against them.

During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln locked up hundreds of journalists in the North who were critical of his war efforts. During World War I, President Woodrow Wilson whom my alma mater, Princeton University, is trying to erase from its memory arrested folks for reading the Declaration of Independence aloud and singing German beer hall songs.

Lincoln argued that preserving the Union was more important than preserving the First Amendment, and Wilson argued that the First Amendment only restrained Congress, not the president. Both arguments have since been rejected by the courts.

In the 1950s, the feds successfully prosecuted Cold War dissenters on the theory that their speech was dangerous and might have a tendency to violence. Some of the victims of this torturous rationale died in prison.

The governments respect for speech has waxed and waned. It is at its lowest ebb during wartime. Of course, dissent during wartime which challenges the governments use of force to kill is often the most important speech.

The speech we love needs no protection. The speech we hate does. The government has no authority to evaluate speech. As the framers understood, all people have a natural right to think as we wish and to say and publish whatever we think. Even hateful, hurtful and harmful speech is protected speech.

Yet, in perilous times, such as the present, we have seen efforts to use the courts to block the publication of unflattering books. We have seen state governors use the police to protect gatherings of protesters with whose message they agreed and to disburse critical protesters. We have seen mobs silence speakers while the police did nothing.

And in perilous times, such as the present, we have seen Big Tech companies silencing their opponents. I hate when they do that, but they have every right to do so. They own the bulletin board. Twitter and Facebook can ban any speech they want because they are not the government. And the First Amendment only restrains the government. In the constitutional sense, free speech means only one thing free from government interference.

Punishing speech is the most dangerous business because there will be no end. The remedy for hateful or threatening speech is not silence or punishments; it is more speech speech that challenges the speaker.

Why do government officials want to silence their opponents? They fear an undermining of their power. The dissenters might make more appealing arguments than they do. St. Augustine taught that nearly all in government want to tell others how to live.

How about we all say whatever we want and the government leaves us alone?

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Napolitano: Does the First Amendment restrain Big Tech? - Daily Herald

The Ohio Supreme Court just granted review inM.R. v. Niesen, on the question whether "when a lower court imposes a prior restraint on expression, immediate appellate review is required." (The underlying case involves a Cincinnati policeman who sued for libel over a post that accused him "of possibly being associated with white supremacy or of being racist after spotting a video and picture of him allegedly flashing the 'ok' sign at a City Council meeting held to address concerns by those in the Black Lives Matter Movement." The judge responded by issuing apreliminary injunction ordering the defendants not to "publiciz[e], through social media or other channels, Plaintiff's personal identifying information," which apparently includes the policeman's name.)

I think the answer is yes, given the National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokiecase. With the indispensable help of our excellent pro bono counsel Jeffrey M. Nye (Stagnaro, Saba & Patterson), the UCLA First Amendment Clinic had filed an amicus brief supporting that position and arguing that the court should hear the case, on behalf of Profs. Jonathan Entin, David F. Forte, Andrew Geronimo, Raymond Ku, Stephen Lazarus, Kevin Francis O'Neill, Margaret Christine Tarkington, Aaron H. Caplan; the National Writers Union, the Society of Professional Journalists, the NewsGuild-CWA, Euclid Media Group; and me. Here's the heart of our argument (which I expect we'll also resubmit as a merits-stage brief to the court, now that it has agreed to consider the merits):

{The plaintiff, a police officer, sued the defendants, Ohio citizens who criticized his on-duty conduct providing security at a City Council meeting at Cincinnati City Hall. The complaint raised a defamation claim and other similar tort claims. Less than two days after filing the complaint, after a hearing at which the defendant-appellants were present and at which the plaintiff presented no testimony, the court issued an order that "enjoined" the appellants "from publicizing, through social media or other channels, Plaintiff's personal identifying information." The order did not define "personal identifying information," but the only statute that defines the phrase, R.C. 2913.49(A), defines it to include a person's "name."}

Within 48 hours of filing his complaint, [plaintiff] sought and received a sweeping prior restraint: an order forbidding two Ohio citizens from publishing information about a public official arising out the performance of his official duties. That order, like all prior restraints, is presumptively unconstitutional. But when those citizens, Julie Niesen and Terhas White, appealed that order to the First District, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, concluding that there was no final order.

That dismissal was wrong, and there are at least four reasons why this case presents substantial constitutional questions and issues of public or great general interest.

[A.] The order is a prior restraint of the appellants' free-speech rights.

"The term 'prior restraint' is used to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur." Bey v. Rasawehr, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3301, 25(some quotation marks omitted). "Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctionsi.e., court orders that actually forbid speech activitiesare classic examples of prior restraints." Id.(quotation marks omitted). "It is inescapable that a regulation of speech 'about' a specific person . . . is a regulation of the content of that speech and must therefore be analyzed as a content-based regulation." Bey at 33.

"[B]efore a court may enjoin the future publication of allegedly defamatory statements based on their content, there must first be a judicial determination that the subject statements were in fact defamatory." Bey at 44(citing O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 246, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975)). Likewise, a court may enjoin speech that falls within some other exception only after "there has been" a "judicial determination that future postings" by the plaintiffs will fit within that exception (in Bey, this was the "speech integral to criminal conduct" exception). Id. at 45, 47.

The court below forbade Ms. Niesen and Ms. White from mentioning the name of a public official (police officer "M.R.") in any forum or medium, and it thus is a content-based order. This was a decision made by one judge, without the opportunity for a full trial or even comprehensive briefing, less than 48 hours after the complaint was filed, and it thus was not made after judicial determination that the statements were in fact defamatory. Nor is the order limited to forbidding libelous speech, speech that constitutes true threats, or speech that falls into any other First Amendment exception, such as the exception for intentional incitement of imminent and likely criminal conduct, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). It thus does not satisfy the requirement of falling outside the protection of the First Amendment.

The order prohibits speech that is fully protected by the First Amendment and by Art. I, 11 of the Ohio Constitution. It has no expiration date. The order is a prior restraint of the appellants' speech. And "Prior restraints on First Amendment expression are presumptively unconstitutional." Bey at 60. Cases seeking review of presumptively unconstitutional orders restraining speech are the epitome of cases raising substantial constitutional questions.

[B.] The prior restraint impinges upon the public's rights.

The First Amendment protects not only the rights of speakers, but also the rights of listeners. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 609 (1976)(Brennan, J., concurring) ("[I]t is the hypothesis of the First Amendment that injury is inflicted on our society when we stifle the immediacy of speech.") (emphasis added); McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2015) (anti-libel injunction has "the potential to harm nonparties to the litigation because enjoining speech harms listeners as well as speakers.").

Prior restraints always interfere with the public's constitutional right to listen, but this particular prior restraint also interferes with the public's constitutional right to accessincluding to listen to accounts ofcourt proceedings. That right is well-established. See In re T.R. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 16 n.9 (adult civil and criminal proceedings are "presumptively open to the public"); State ex rel. The Repository v. Unger (1986), 28 Ohio St. 3d 418, 421 (both pre-trial and trial proceedings are open to the public); Sup.R. 45(A) (case documents are open to the public). This order interferes with that constitutional right because it prohibits the defendants from discussing the plaintiff by name when talking about this litigation.

The public also has a right (and indeed, a duty) to supervise and scrutinize public officials regarding the performance of their official duties. That is true generally, but this Court has said that it is particularly true when the public official is a police officer and when the conduct being discussed is his participation in court proceedings. See Soke v. Plain Dealer (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 395, 397.

The order in this case thus represents a constitutional quadruple-whammy: by allowing the public official here to surreptitiously use the Ohio courts to immunize himself from such public scrutiny, the order has interfered with the appellants' speech rights generally; interfered with the public's right to listen to speech on matters of public interest; interfered with the public's right and duty to supervise the proceedings of the state court system that dispenses justice in their name; and interfered with the public's right and obligation to supervise public officials' performance of their official duties. The First Amendment does not permit this type of speech restriction.

[C.] The dismissal order elevates state civil procedure rules over the First Amendment and form over substance.

Because of all the foregoing constitutional problems, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that prior restraints must be subject to immediate appellate review. National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). But the Court of Appeals refused to follow this precedent, explaining its decision to disregard the U.S. Supreme Court's command by saying that it viewed the order as just a "temporary restraining order," and not a preliminary injunction.

That refusal raises yet another substantial constitutional issue. Constitutional rights, including the First Amendment precedents requiring immediate appellate review of prior restraints, apply regardless of state-law distinctions between TROs and preliminary injunctions. Holding otherwise would permit state law (or, more precisely, state court rules) to dictate the applicability of federal constitutional law. That would wrongly elevate state-law form over federal substance, turning the Supremacy Clause on its head. See U.S. Const., art. IV, cl. 2 (federal Constitution and laws "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding"). Federal law controls over state procedure; not the other way around.

Moreover, the First District's reliance on the supposed status of the prior restraint as a TRO was an inaccurate elevation of form over substance. This Court recently (and unanimously) recognized that TROs can be "classic examples of prior restraints." Bey v. Rasawehr, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3301, 25. The immediate appealability of the order therefore does not depend at all on whether the order was a TRO, a preliminary injunction, or anything else.

{And, though it does not matter to the constitutional issue, the appellate court's conclusion that the order was a TRO and not a preliminary injunction is likely incorrect. The order is properly seen as a preliminary injunction because it was not granted ex parte, cf. Civ.R. 65(A) ("A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice... ."), and, as the Court of Appeals observed at 10, the duration of the order "extended . . . past the expiration of the period set forth in Civ.R. 65 for a temporary restraining order." See id. (limiting TRO to 14 days plus one like extension for good cause; the order here was journalized in July and apparently was intended by the common pleas court to remain in effect at least until September 1).}

[D.] The dismissal order created a split between appellate districts.

Even if the First District's dismissal order had no constitutional implications, it would warrant review and correction by this Court because it created a district split. The First District below held that the First Amendment offers no right to immediate appellate review of an ostensible temporary restraining order. M.R. v. Niesen, 1st Dist. No. C-200302 at 1 (Sept. 9, 2020).

But the Second District has held that "Because the right of free speech must be protected against the chilling effect resulting from even its temporary infringement, the United States Supreme Court held in [Nat'l Socialist Party] that: 'If a State seeks to impose a restraint of this kind, it must provide strict procedural safeguards, including immediate appellate review. . . .'" Int'l Diamond Exch. Jewelers, Inc. v. U.S. Diamond & Gold Jewelers, Inc., 70 Ohio App. 3d 667, 671, 591 N.E.2d 881, 884 (2d Dist. 1991) (citations and some internal markup omitted; emphasis in original). And "Given that an immediate appellate forum for review of an order that imposes a prior restraint upon the exercise of free speech is necessitated by the federal Constitution," an appellant need not "wait until the case has been concluded in the trial court before he may challenge the order." Id. See also Connor Group v. Raney, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26653, 2016-Ohio-2959, at 1 ("Although the issuance of a preliminary injunction by a trial court generally is not viewed as a final appealable order, . . . a preliminary injunction that constitutes a prior restraint on speech requires immediate appellate review.").

The Eleventh District agrees: "[W]here an injunction seeks to 'impose a restraint [on First Amendment rights],' there must be strict procedural safeguards, including immediate appellate review." Puruczky v. Corsi, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2017-G-0110, 2018-Ohio-1335, 15 (paraphrasing Nat'l Socialist Party; some internal markup omitted). "Since Corsi alleges that the injunction substantially impacts his rights and constitutes a prior restraint on his speech, we will proceed to a review of the merits of his appeal." Id.

Unlike the First District's decision below, the holdings of those districts offer no loophole for temporary restraining orders, and those courts exercised their jurisdiction and reviewed (and reversed) the prior restraints. And both Puruczky and Connor Group were libel cases, like this one.

And the Second and Eleventh Districts' approach is correct: As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, even temporary restraints on speech can create a chilling effect on the exercise of free speech. See Int'l Diamond, 70 Ohio App. 3d at 671. This Court should also exercise its discretion to review this case and resolve this split of authority on this important constitutional issue that affects fundamental rights. Unless and until it does, the rights of defendants to speak and of the public to listen and supervise their courts and their public officials, will depend on which of the State's appellate districts they reside in.

Proposition of Law no. 1: An order that imposes a prior restraint on speech must be subject to immediate appellate review.

"[I]mmediate appellate review" of prior restraints is constitutionally required. National Socialist Party, 432 U.S. at 44. See also Puruczky; Connor Group; Int'l Diamond, supra.

This principle is fully applicable here. Puruczky and Connor Group involved injunctions entered in response to libel lawsuits, just as this case does. National Socialist Party famously involved Nazis marching in Skokie, Illinois. Nat'l Socialist Party, 432 U.S. at 4344; see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1199 (7th Cir. 1978). If Nazis who want to march in a neighborhood populated with thousands of Holocaust survivors are entitled to immediate appellate review of an injunction against their speech, then citizens criticizing a police officer must be entitled to the same.

This constitutional requirement flows naturally from courts' recognition of the dangers of prior restraints. "A prior restraint...has an immediate and irreversible sanction" that is unlike any other remedy a court may impose, including "a judgment in a defamation case" or even "[a] criminal penalty," because all other sanctions are "subject to the whole panoply of protections afforded by deferring the impact of the judgment until all avenues of appellate review have been exhausted. Only after judgment has become final, correct or otherwise, does the law's sanction become fully operative" for other remedies. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).

That "panoply of protections" does not exist for a prior restraint, which is why "prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." Id.Prior restraints "fall on speech with a brutality and finality all their own." Id. at 609(Brennan, J., concurring in reversal of prior restraint).

More broadly, every day that a prior restraint remains in place is a First Amendment violation, and "[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). "'Where . . . a direct prior restraint is imposed upon the reporting of news by the media, each passing day may constitute a separate and cognizable infringement of the First Amendment.'" CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994)(Blackmun, J., in chambers) (citation omitted); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006)(endorsing this principle as requiring "expeditious[]" decisionmaking as to restraints on First Amendment rights, there the right of access to court records); Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 27273 (4th Cir. 2014)(same); Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994)(same), superseded on other grounds, as stated in Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1068 n.4 (7th Cir. 2009). And of course this principle applies beyond the mainstream media, and covers social media users as well.

{Art. I, 11 of the Ohio Constitution "guarantees to '[e]very citizen' the right to publish freely his or her sentiments on all subjects, regardless of that citizen's association or nonassociation with the press." Wampler v. Higgins, 93 Ohio St. 3d 111, 121 (2001). "We have consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers." Citizens United v. United States, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010)(internal quotation marks omitted). "The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. . . . The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion." Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938); see also Chevaldina v. R.K./FL Mgmt., Inc., 133 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)("Angry social media postings are now common....But analytically, and legally, these rants are essentially the electronic successors of the pre-blog, solo complainant holding a poster on a public sidewalk," and are just as fully protected by the First Amendment).}

The injury inflicted by prior restraints is thus not remediable by vacatur or reversal of a prior restraint at a distant future date after final judgment, especially where (as here) the prior restraint relates to a public official and his conduct in official and court proceedings. The parties and the public have a right to speak contemporaneously, not merely retrospectively, both about public officials and about court proceedings. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941)("[P]ublic interest is much more likely to be kindled by a controversial event of the day than by a generalization, however penetrating, of the historian or scientist."); Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 272 (4th Cir. 2014)(acknowledging the harms of "delayed disclosure" with respect to court proceedings). Immediate appellate review is thus critical to make sure that the injunction does not cause such a loss of First Amendment freedoms.

The logic of these cases turns on the commands imposed by the First Amendmentcommands that override any contrary state procedural distinctions that would limit immediate appellate review. And of course both this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have recognized that "Temporary restraining orders," no less than "permanent injunctions," "are classic examples of prior restraints" that are fully subject to First Amendment constraints. Bey v. Rasawehr, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3301, 25; Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).

Yet the First District took a sharply different approach; it concluded that neither the U.S. Supreme Court's Skokie decision nor the Second and Eleventh Districts' decisions applied here, simply because this case involved a temporary restraining order. M.R., 1st Dist. No. C-200302 at 9. The First District did not acknowledge this Court's or the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of temporary restraining orders as prior restraints, nor did it explain why the First Amendment rule of immediate appellate review of prior restraints would be limited by the TRO/preliminary injunction distinction.

This Court's review is necessary to set forth a uniform rule on when immediate appellate review of prior restraints is necessary.

Conclusion

Prior restraints on speech are rarely constitutional; and to make sure that unconstitutional prior restraints suppress speech for as short a time as possible, both the U.S. Supreme Court and Ohio courts have required that such restraints be subject to immediate appellate review. The injunction in this case is a prior restraint, and thus subject to immediate appellate review; indeed, it is a content-based prior restraint, and one that is not limited to libelous speech or to speech that falls within a First Amendment exception. This Court should step in to correct the serious First Amendment violation in this case, and resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on whether the normal First Amendment rules apply to temporary restraining orders.

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Do Critics of Police Have the First Amendment Procedural Protections That Nazis Get? - Reason

Nancy Costello, director of the First Amendment Law Clinic and supervisor of the McLellan Free Speech Online Library in the Michigan State University College of Law, discusses the First Amendment and freedom of speech. The First Amendment Law Clinic is the only program in the country solely dedicated to the protection of student speech and press rights.

In simple terms, what is the First Amendment and what does it do?

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights and protects freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press and the right to petition. The First Amendment is one of the most important amendments for the protection of democracy.

Nancy Costello, director of the First Amendment Law Clinic and supervisor of the McLellan Free Speech Online Library in the Michigan State University College of Law.

When was it created?

The First Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights. To protect individual rights, the framers of the U.S. Constitution added 10 amendments to the document in 1791, four years after the Constitution was ratified.

What does the First Amendment say about freedom of speech?

Generally speaking, it means that the government may not jail, fine or impose civil liability on people or organizations based on what they say or write, except in limited circumstances.

President Donald Trump recently was suspended from a number of social media platforms. Is this a violation of his First Amendment rights?

Facebook, Twitter, Instagram or any similar social media platform can censor any persons speech because they are private companies. Censorship is when an entity punishes individuals for their speech or prevents the speech from being expressed. Free speech is the ability to express ones thoughts and opinions without fear of being punished by the government.

The First Amendment protects against the government from censoring speech. None of these social media platforms are part of the government, so President Trump cannot claim his First Amendment rights have been violated.

President Trump was impeached a second time for incitement of insurrection. What is incitement speech?

Incitement speech is not protected by the First Amendment. Incitement speech is when someone encourages lawless action, and that lawless action is imminent and likely. It could be argued that Trump incited the mob violence on Jan. 6 in his summoning and assembling of supporters at the White House rally, his repeated claims that he won the election and his exhorting the crowd to go to the Capitol. Among other things, the president told the crowd, If you dont fight like hell, youre not going to have a country anymore. Not long after Trumps speech, members of the crowd converged on the U.S. Capitol, broke through doors and windows, invaded the Senate and House chambers and private offices, and had violent clashes with police resulting in deaths.

What types of speech are not protected under the First Amendment?Types of speech that arent protected include:

Does the First Amendment only protect U.S. citizens?

Theres no citizenship requirement for First Amendment protection. If you are a resident of the United States, you have freedom of speech, religion, press, assembly and petition.

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Ask the expert: The First Amendment and free speech - MSUToday

I write not wanting to ruffle feathers or strain friendships. Yet, I am reminded that we remain silent because silence is easier. There may come a time I need friends to speak out on my behalf and they might not because I've set a poor example.

I am troubled by the messages that I've received over the last few days by people who are enraged because their freedom of speech rights are being denied. I interpret this to mean their Twitter accounts have been closed.

First, I'd like to point out your freedom of speech has not been denied, or I wouldn't be hearing from you. You are coming through on another forum maybe not the one you typically use, but I'm guessing you'll have a new platform shortly. Remember that Facebook and Twitter are private companies, and they do have the right to require that their users follow certain rules. Remember all of those pages you didn't read when you signed on to be a user? You simply checked, "I agree." Well, that's what you agreed to.

Second, the Supreme Court has ruled that there are a few exceptions to the First Amendment. They include obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, true threats and speech integral to already criminal conduct. There's a reason you can't stand up in a crowded theater and yell "Fire!" It's incitement and causes danger to others as they attempt to flee.

One example: In November, Sidney Powell, then-lawyer for President Trump, accused Dominion Voting Systems of promoting widespread voter fraud through voting machines she claimed were manufactured in Venezuela for the explicit purpose of throwing elections. All of those claims were proven false, but, nonetheless, they were picked up by social media and spread across the internet like mice in a grain bin. The president repeated Powell's claims, and his ardent followers took his words to heart, becoming more and more convinced that their candidate had been robbed of his election. He, as well as other congressmen and women, jumped on the groundswell of this example of misinformation despite state and federal judges (many Republican) throwing the claims out of court.

Employees of Dominion Voting Systems began receiving death threats. Imagine that. You do your job, someone falsely claims you cheated, and without any facts to these claims, your business plummets, and your 300 workers and their families fear for their lives. To top it off, the president of the United States continues to feed this misinformation to his loyal supporters to the point they become outraged.

So, back to the original question: Has this speech included "obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, true threats and speech integral to already criminal conduct?" If you, by chance, "shared" information on a "private" company's platform, whether you knew or didn't know that it was false, and it led to defamation and inciting others to violence, then yes - your account was blocked. That is a lesson to us all to be careful about casually hitting the "share" button.

Dominion Voting Systems is suing Sidney Powell for $1.3 billion (with a B), and the CEO claims that's just for starters. More suits are being filed. Are Facebook and Twitter concerned because they allowed their platform to be used to spread the lies that resulted in defamation, fraud, incitement, threats and criminal conduct? You bet.

Like millions of others, I am distressed and sickened that our country is being divided over the issue of honesty a quality I'm sure both sides agree with in principle. I understand completely why others can listen to the same speaker as I do and walk away with a different opinion as to the best approach for making our country a strong, productive and moral society for our children to inherit. In doing so, however, we have to start by agreeing with what is true and what is being propagated for personal and political gain. If someone is milking millions off a falsehood, then they're going to buy the cow? We've got too many cash cows in our midst, and they're doing severe damage to the land we love. It's time to trim the herd.

BRENDA BEVAN REMMES

Mayesville

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Letter: To everyone, including friends and family members, who feel First Amendment rights are being denied - Sumter Item

The Supreme Court should leave in place a lower court's ruling that former President Trump violated the First Amendment by blocking critics on Twitter, a free speech advocacy group argues.

The public interest in preventing impermissible viewpoint discrimination in government-operated social media accounts weighs heavily in favor of keeping the Second Circuits judgmentin place, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University argues in papers filed Thursday.

The papers come in response to arguments filed by the Department of Justice on thelast full day of Trump's presidency.

The government lawyers urged theSupreme Court to find both that the battle over the Twitter blocks is moot -- given that Trump is once again a private citizen -- and that a lower court ruling against him should be vacated.

The legal battle dates to 2017, when the Knight Institute sued Trump on behalf of seven critics who were blocked by him on Twitter.

Knight said the blocks violated users' free-speechrights, arguing that Trump's Twitter account was a public forum -- comparable to city streets, parks and other places where the government can't censor people based on their opinions.

U.S.District Court Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald in New York sided with the Knight Institute and ruled that Trump acted unconstitutionally by blocking social media users based on their viewpoints.

The Justice Department appealed to the 2nd Circuit, arguing that Trump acts in a personal capacity, not an official one, when he blocks people on Twitter. The First Amendmentprohibits the government -- but not private individuals -- from censoring criticism.

In 2019, the appellate court rejected the White House's position, ruling that evidence of the account'sofficial nature was overwhelming.

The Justice Department then sought review by the Supreme Court. In its most recent papers, the Justice Department argued that the 2nd Circuitruling was deeply problematic.

Allowing the decision below to stand would be harmful, no longer to President Trump, but to the Presidency itself and to other governmentalofficials, the Justice Department wrote.

The Knight Institute counters that the appellate court's ruling should be preserved because it provides a sensible framework that is ofvalue to the legal community and the public.

The organization added that the 2nd Circuit's decision rests on a unique set of facts and doesn't pre-ordain the result of any futurelawsuit involving other public officials and other accounts that may be used in different ways.

The Supreme Court has had the case on its conference calendar since November, but hasn'tyet said whether it will review the ruling.

A decision could come as early as Monday.

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Knight Institute Urges Supreme Court To Preserve Ruling That Trump Violated First Amendment 01/25/2021 - MediaPost Communications

Thursday, Jan. 21, 2021

While much of former President Trumps language was not traditionally presidential, it has been largely protected thanks to the First Amendment.

But since the U.S. Capitol riot, Trump has been banned from many major social media sites and some right-wing apps were muzzled.

While critics suggest this is a slippery slope toward total censorship of conservative thought, supporters of the restrictions argue Trumps incitement of the riot was deadly and allowing him to stoke further violence is dangerous.

As social media, press freedoms and a deeply divided America collide, we revisit the question: what does the First Amendment actually protect?

We sit down with national experts to analyze what freedom of speech means as Big Tech remains more powerful than ever and a new administration takes office.

GUESTS

RonNell Andersen-Jones, professor of law at the University of Utah and affiliated fellow at Yale Law Schools Information Society Project

Jillian York, director for International Freedom of Expression at Electronic Frontier Foundation

Katie Fallow, senior staff attorney at Knight First Amendment Institute

Read more here:
Do Social Media Companies Have Too Much Power Over The First Amendment? - WFAE

This article is part of the Free Speech Project, a collaboration between Future Tense and the Tech, Law, & Security Program at American University Washington College of Law that examines the ways technology is influencing how we think about speech.

TRUMP INCITES MOB read the banner headline on the Jan. 7 New York Times the morning after a seditious crowd stormed the Capitol to try to block certification of the 2020 election results. Aside from certain loyalists, it seems that most agree that under the colloquial understanding of incite, Trump incited the insurrection. Even some insurrectionists pointed the finger at him, like the one who said, We were invited by the president of the United States, as they lay siege to the Capitol.

When the Senate tries Trump on the single charge in his second impeachmentINCITEMENT OF INSURRECTIONit will doubtless consider whether his incendiary Jan. 6 diatribe is protected expression under the First Amendment, as his defenders claim. The question will also be central in a criminal prosecution if the D.C. attorney generals current investigation leads to an indictment. So, did Trumps words satisfy a legal definition of incitement, whether in a criminal court or his Senate trial?

To answer that question, we have to start with Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969). In an opinion joined by all of the justices, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader under a state statute that criminalized advocacy of crime violence, or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of effecting political change and barred assembly with any group that promoted such doctrines. The court held that the law criminalized too much speech because it failed to distinguish between mere advocacy at the heart of political speech and incitement to imminent lawless action, which the First Amendment does not protect.

The Brandenburg ruling proclaimed that freedom of speech protects advocacy of the use of force or of illegal acts except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action. That test continues to govern incitement law.

Brandenburg involved an appeal from a criminal conviction by a Ku Klux Klan leader, Clarence Brandenburg, who had advised the hooded crowd at a Klan gathering that if the federal government continue[d] to suppress the Caucasian race, its possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken. A wooden cross was burned during the rally, and a video revealed weapons. No acts followed. Brandenburgs exhortation lacked imminence. The possibility of illegal forms of revenge was remote; the threat of vengeance was conditional, only to occur if something out of the crowds control happened. Brandenburg did not call for any immediate action.

Trumps speech on Jan. 6 was very different from Brandenburgs. At noonwith Congress scheduled to meet in joint session at 1 p.m.Trump exhorted the crowd: And after this, were going to walk down and Ill be there with you. Were going to walk down to the Capitol. The crowd applauded. Later, wrapping up, he reiterated, So we are going to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue and we are going to the Capitol. Trumps words more than satisfy the imminence requirement.

Whether he directed illegal acts presents a trickier question. Trump did not specifically instruct people to storm the Capitol, disrupt the certification of Bidens election, destroy or steal government property, kill law enforcement officers, or terrorize the officials in the building, including his own vice president. Its important to note, however, that incitement can be implicit as well as explicit.

Trump did nothing to stem the violence while he watched it unfold live on television. He never seriously exhorted the crowd to cease anddesist.

Fact-finders sitting in judgment will decide whether Trumps language was implicitly directed at inciting or producing imminent lawlessness. But public actions from that day suggest it was. He stirred people up with baseless claims, rejected by dozens of courts since Election Day, that he had won the election in a landslide. He insisted, We wont have a country if we dont fight like hell, adding that we will not let them silence your voices. Were not going to let that happen. He questioned the steadfastness of Vice President Mike Pence (Im not hearing good stories), whom the insurgents later threatened to hang. Meanwhile, the audience chanted, Fight for Trump, suggesting they got the message.

That context matters. After Trump spoke, many of those who listened to him in person attacked the Capitol. Trumps own behavior that afternoon also proves significant. He did nothing to stem the violence while he watched it unfold live on television. He never seriously exhorted the crowd to cease and desist. When he finally spoke, he undercut his scripted law-and-order message by reiterating that a sacred landslide victory had been viciously stripped away from great patriots. He urged them to Go home with love. Trump reportedly called freshman Sen. Tommy Tuberville of Alabama, seeking his help in delaying certification of the Electoral College count. All of this demonstrates that Trump intended the result he got: insurrection. It also points to dereliction of duty to protect the government and the Constitution.

Senators or jurors might also justifiably look backward to Trumps Dec. 19 tweet inviting supporters to gather in Washington on Jan. 6Big protest Be there, will be wildand possibly further back to all of Trumps efforts to delegitimize the 2020 election. None of those earlier tweets and statements count as incitement because any threat they contained was remote, but they provide context for how Trumps listeners understood his Jan. 6 speech. Trump, in turn, presumably knew that people from all over the country planned to bring weapons and disrupt the Capitol because they shared their plans on public social media sites. Those preparations increased the likelihood that Trumps speech would spark lawlessness, though Trump may argue that the insurrection had independent momentum.

Legal observers debate whether courts should look to the average listener or to specific listeners, like the self-selected group that attended Trumps rally, to determine the likelihood that the crowd will take action. But Trumps words amount to incitement under either standard. Lets start with the subjective. We know how a significant portion of those at Trumps rally understood his language, not only from their actions but from their subsequent words. For example, after she was arrested, Jenna Ryan, who flew from Texas to Washington for the Jan. 6 events, justified her conduct by saying: I was following my president. I thought I was following what we were called to do.

The widespread impression that Trumps speech incited the ensuing riot appears to satisfy an objective standard as well. Many who watched Trumps speech from afar feared it would trigger violence, though we lacked the imagination to envision the horror that followed. An audience did not have to be specially primed to hear Trumps speech as a call to action and as permission to, in the words of one reporter, take more extreme measures.

Trumps defenders point to a single sentence of his speech to counter the incitement charge. A master at crafting deniability, Trump put on the record: I know that everyone here will soon be marching over to the Capitol building to peacefully and patriotically make your voices heard (emphasis added). He then pivoted to his pervasive imagery of warfare: Our country has been under siege for a long time.

This same maneuver had enabled Trump to escape liability in a civil suit brought by peaceful protesters who had been roughed up at one of his campaign rallies in 2016. Trump convinced an appellate court that his single admonition, Dont hurt em, insulated his five exhortations to get em out of here from any plausible reading as advocating violence.

But if a single sentence in an inflammatory speech could inoculate incitement from liability, every sentient speaker would add the requisite phrase while inciting to their hearts content. Here, the extent of inflammatory rhetoric compared with a passing nod at peaceful behavior indicates Trumps language was directed to incite and was likely to incite. Still, that will be question for senators or jurors to decide.

In the end, the intricacies of incitement doctrine in criminal law may not matter in the Senate. Different rules apply.

Senate rules are conspicuously silent regarding the standard of proof in impeachment trials. When Chief Justice John Roberts presided over Trumps first impeachment trial, he submitted the case to the senators for a vote without specifying any standard, or indeed giving any guidance at all.

Absent guidance, a senator might justifiably conclude a preponderance of the evidence established that Trump incited insurrection, while in criminal proceedings the prosecution would have to show that it had proved each part of the Brandenburg test beyond a reasonable doubt. A conviction in the Senate would not broaden the constitutional definition of incitement. Under the criminal standard, Trumps implicit direction to the crowd on Jan. 6 might fall short of the stringent Brandenburg requirement that the speech be directed to producing imminent lawless action.

That distinction alone could lead to a conviction in the Senate, followed by a decision not to pursue charges or an acquittal in federal court. Neither of those outcomes should be seen as undermining the legitimacy of a Senate conviction.

In a moment of crisis, it may prove tempting to disregard the fundamental premise that free speech is essential to democratic self-governance. The First Amendment recognizes that speakers hope their words will lead to action and not prove impotentbut it never protects violence. Brandenburg allows dissidents of every stripe to organize, motivate, and act. It must continue to protect movements from Black Lives Matter and environmental causes to the Proud Boys, until they cross the line from zealous advocacy to unprotected incitement.

Future Tense is a partnership of Slate, New America, and Arizona State University that examines emerging technologies, public policy, and society.

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What the First Amendment Really Says About Whether Trump Incited the Capitol Riot - Slate

Q: I thought the attack on the Capitol Jan. 6 by supporters of President Donald Trump was horrible, but Im really worried about the way social media like Twitter and Facebook are denying people like the president their free-speech rights. How can the tech companies get away with violating the Constitution like this? Am I missing something?

A: The tech companies have not violated the Constitution. By removing users from their platforms, social media companies do not deny people the right to freedom of expression under the First Amendment.

The First Amendment to the Constitution protects speech from government censorship, not the actions of private businesses. The Amendment, part of the Bill of Rights, states in part: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble.

Actions by private businesses to restrict speech do not violate the Constitution. An employer, for instance, can fire a worker who disagrees with its policies, or who espouses views even outside of work that are inconsistent with the employers image, policies or stated values. Businesses and individuals can choose not to associate with views with which they disagree and, in fact, the right not to speak, also is indirectly protected by the First Amendment.

The government cannot control what newspapers publish. And states cannot require workers to pay union dues that support political views with which they disagree.

Even where government action is involved, the right to speak ones mind is not unfettered. The government can place reasonable restrictions on the time, place or manner of speech as long as the restrictions are not related to the content of the speech. Use of loudspeakers at night in a residential neighborhood can be prohibited, for example, as could a gathering that blocks traffic, or a protest that prevents people from accessing medical facilities.

Speech that incites imminent unlawful action can be prohibited, as can obscenity, child pornography, defamation and libel and threats, which have been defined as a statement which ... a reasonable person would foresee would be interpreted ... as a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm. Planned Parenthood v American Coalition of Life Activists(9th Circuit, 2002).

Trump is not the only one accusing social media giants of violating the First Amendment by kicking some right-wing and pro-Trump voices off their platforms. The presidents son, Donald Jr., claimed on Twitter, ironically that Free speech no longer exists in America. Sen. Josh Hawley, who was the first senator to object to the certification of Joe Bidens victory and who went through with his objection after the riot, claimed his rights were trampled when Simon & Schuster decided not to publish his book on big tech.

Trump, Donald Jr., and Hawley especially Hawley, an Ivy League-educated lawyer should, and do, know better. Twitter and Facebook do not violate their users free speech rights by suspending the accounts of people who violate the companies' terms of service, and a publisher is not required to publish a book by an author it may hold in contempt.

But the inaccurate description of the First Amendment disseminated by both Trump Jr. and Hawley is a misinterpretation shared by a majority of Americans. A 2019 survey by the Freedom Forum, a nonprofit dedicated to raising awareness of First Amendment, found that 65 percentof respondents believed wrongly that banning users on social media because of the content of their posts was a First Amendment violation.

Social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter enjoy protections not provided newspapers or other publishers. Thanks to a 1996 law, social media platforms unlike publishers can place some restrictions on the content disseminated without becoming civilly liable for the content. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act allows social media to place good faith restrictions on material the provider considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.

Perhaps ironically, the purpose of the law was to protect a medium that offers a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.

Both Facebook and Twitter, include adherence to standards as a condition for use of the free services. Facebook, for example, prohibits expression that threatens people or has the potential to intimidate exclude or silence. Twitternot only bans hateful conduct, but also explicitly prohibits the use of misleading information about COVID-19, violent threats and the glorification of violence.

Both companies contain exceptions to their policies for speech that is viewed as being in the public interest, although Twitter may flag some tweets. Twitter notes it is likely to remove a tweet if it includes a declarative call to action that could harm a specific or individual group, or shares information or engages in behavior that could directly interfere with an individuals exercise of their fundamental rights.

Trumps calls to overturn the results of the 2020 election which would have disenfranchised the roughly 81 million people who voted for Biden in favor of roughly 74 million who voted for Trump was determined to be a violation of Twitter and Facebook policies. While Facebook allowed the president to continue to make unsupported claims about the legality of the November election as being in the public interest, Twitter increasingly flagged the claims as inaccurate.

After Trumps Jan. 6 rally, which preceded the insurrection and assault on the Capitol building, both platforms decided to suspend Trumps accounts. Twitter statedthat the context around his tweets, and the way they were being received and interpreted on and off Twitter, demonstrated a risk of further incitement of violence.

While neither social media giant violated the free speech rights of Trump nor Hawley, there is increasing concern about the power of social mediato control the information Americans access, by suspending certain accounts as in the case of the president or by amplifying extreme opinions, or by limiting our exposure to information that appeals to and reinforces our existing views.

In the case of Trump, few individuals, if any, enjoy a wider platform from which to exercise the right to freedom of expression. The office of the President of the United States is arguably the largest platform in the world dwarfing even social media giants.

Even without Twitter, Trump has no difficulty presenting his views to the nation: Few news organizations will skip a press conference called by the president of the United States, and coverage of such events is customarily disseminated throughout the globe.

Trump, however, is not alone in calling for greater control over social media. Both Trump and Biden, for different reasons, have called for a repeal of Section 230, which legally protects social media companies from liability from content posted by users.

Attorney Daniel A. Gwinns Troy practice focuses on employment law, civil rights litigation, probate, and trusts and estates. Contact him with your legal questions at daniel@gwinnlegal.com or visit the website at gwinnlegal.com. Ask the Lawyer is informational only and should not be considered legal advice.

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Ask the Lawyer: There is no First Amendment right to social media use - The Oakland Press

In this morning'sPrice v. Barrdecision, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly (D.D.C.) held:

[1.] Filming, including for purposes of making a film that would be commercially distributed, is protected by the First Amendment.

[2.] The permit requirements are content-based, because

[The requirements] do not apply generically to all commercial activity in national parks. To the contrary, the permitting regime applies to filming, a form of expressive speech, and specifically to a type of filming, "commercial filming." 54 U.S.C. 100905(a). Section 100905's implementing regulations make this content-based distinction even more apparent, defining "commercial filming" as the "recording of a moving image by a person, business, or other entity for a market audience with the intent of generating income." The application of 100905's permitting regime, therefore, necessarily turns on an assessment of whether the content of a film was meant to appeal to a market audience and generate income.

Consider, for example, the enforcement of 100905 against Mr. Price and his film Crawford Road. To determine whether Crawford Road ran afoul of 100905's permitting regime, NPS officials needed to review the film and determine ex post whether the content Mr. Price included therein was geared towards a "market audience" or evinced some "intent of generating income." 43 C.F.R. 5.12. If, however, Mr. Price's film was "non-commercial" or happened to feature only news worthy "information about current events or of current interest to the public," the permitting requirement would not apply, see id. at 5.4(a).

[3.] The requirements must therefore satisfy strict scrutiny, which they can't do. The "governmental interest in revenue collection" isn't compelling enough; and the regulations aren't narrowly tailored to the interest in "[p]rotecting national park land and the resources it contains":

First, 100905 and its implementing regulations are overinclusive. On their face, 100905 and its implementing regulations flatly require a paid permit for all "commercial filming." This regime, therefore, requires "individuals and small groups to obtain permits before engaging in expressive activities," just the same as it does for large groups with heavy and potentially disruptive filming equipment. Defendants offer no explanation for how the broad sweep of this permitting regime is sufficiently tailored to the government's goal of protecting federal land.

Relatedly, 100905's permitting regime also excludes non-commercial filming without any consideration for the damage that activity might also cause to national parks. For example, a "non-commercial" filming production carried out by a non-profit organization or a news crew would escape the reach of 100905's permitting regime, even if those groups used heavy filming equipment that damaged federal land.

I'm not sure that a distinction between commercial filming and noncommercial filming, turning just on whether the result is to be commercially distributed, iscontent-based. But I agree that the news-gathering exemption, for "information that is about current events or that would be of current interest to the public," makes the rules content-based, see Regan v. Time, Inc. (1984). And I agree that the rules can't pass the strict scrutiny required for such content-based restrictions.

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Permit Requirements for Filming in National Parks Violate First Amendment - Reason