Daily Archives: January 21, 2021

Parasites: what causes some species to evolve to exploit others – The Conversation UK

Posted: January 21, 2021 at 3:09 pm

If you saw the first episode of David Attenboroughs new BBC series Perfect Planet, you will have seen the astounding bloodsucking behaviour of the vampire finches. These small birds exist only on two remote islands in the Galapagos and have evolved to drink the blood of much larger seabirds.

You will also have seen the curious behaviour of the booby, the seabird that the finch was gulping blood from it didnt seem bothered, and it didnt try to get rid of the finch. So how might this bloodsucking and relative lack of resistance have evolved?

It likely began with a process called mutualism, where both individuals gain from a relationship. Cleaner fish such as the cleaner wrasse, for example, set up a cleaning station, typically in coral reefs. Larger fish, octopus or turtles visit the cleaning station to get the smaller fish to remove any dead skin, infected tissue or external parasites.

The relationship between a cleaner wrasse and their client is beneficial to the client as it gets cleaned, helping it to stay healthy. But the cleaner wrasse also benefits as they can eat the parasites and wont themselves be eaten by the client a winning situation all round.

Nevertheless, the evolutionary relationship can turn sour. What if the cleaner wrasse wasnt so careful, and accidentally bit the client? Suddenly, the cleaner benefits from a meal of nutritious flesh. This individual will have acquired more nutrients than usual, giving it an advantage (no matter how small) over all other cleaner wrasse.

The advantage allows it to survive long enough to reproduce and pass on its genes to the next generation. If this clumsy cleaning is heritable, rather than the more careful behaviour, the offspring will also possess the clumsy gene that results in flesh-eating. Over time, all individuals of the species will eat flesh, as it is more beneficial than leaving it the process of evolution via natural selection.

Perhaps something like this happened with the bluestriped fangblenny, a mimic that looks identical to juvenile bluestreak cleaner wrasse. The larger client fish assumes that the blenny provides a cleaning service, so waits patiently to be cleaned, allowing the blenny to avoid predation. But the blenny doesnt ever clean the client instead it bites a chunk out of the larger fish.

The blenny has even evolved an opioid-based venom that numbs the pain of the client long enough for it to escape. As you can see, this is hardly a mutualistic relationship the blenny is the clear winner at the cleaning station as it has gained a nutritious meal, while the client now has an injury as well as its parasites.

There are many parasitic species in the natural world, from animals such as cuckoos that deceive other species into raising their young, to bee orchids that deceive insects into pollinating them. However, what we might be seeing is the result of a longstanding co-evolutionary arms race, where species evolve in response to another.

In the broad example of terrestrial predators and prey, imagine a scenario thousands of years ago where all species ran at the same speed there would be no advantage to either predators or prey. Yet, if the prey gradually evolved hooves, their feet would create less friction with the ground, enabling the prey to run faster than the predators.

The predators would be losing the battle until they evolved a response perhaps having non-retractable claws to maximise traction, as the cheetah does, allowing them to be in the lead in the evolutionary race. These co-evolutionary relationships can continue, and can even change tack, so instead of evolving to achieve an even faster speed, the prey could evolve to jump like springbok antelopes to confuse the predators with evasive manoeuvres.

In fact, the Red Queen hypothesis states that species need to evolve constantly, not to win, but merely to stay alive. The hypothesis comes from Lewis Carrolls Through the Looking Glass, where the Red Queen explains looking-glass land to Alice:

Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!

Interestingly, oxpecker birds found in African savannahs feed in a similar way to the vampire finches. They remove parasites from large mammals such as giraffe or rhino, but they also feed on ear wax and blood, preventing wounds from healing by pecking at scabs. This seems like a standard parasitic relationship, where the oxpeckers have the advantage.

But, like the vampire finches, the oxpeckers arent actively removed by the mammals. In fact, they provide an additional benefit they act as lookouts for predators. If the oxpeckers see a predator approaching, they warn their mammal host who can respond accordingly.

The relationship between the vampire finch and booby may well have been a mutualistic relationship that has evolved into a parasitic one. Is this the start of an evolutionary battle between the two species? Or perhaps, like the oxpecker, there is more to this relationship that we have yet to discover.

Visit link:

Parasites: what causes some species to evolve to exploit others - The Conversation UK

Posted in Evolution | Comments Off on Parasites: what causes some species to evolve to exploit others – The Conversation UK

How supercomputers found their industry mojo – the evolution of high performance computing – Diginomica

Posted: at 3:09 pm

Are supercomputers computers? No, not really. The essence of supercomputers is that they are not computers at all.They are scientific instruments of discovery- or strategic business facilities - they justhappen to be made from computer technology. Lots of it.

Formally the domain of scientific research and defense, supercomputers are finding relevance in commercial operations.

Here are some examples: seismic processing in the oil industry is an application where High Performance Computing (HPC) prevails since most of the computation is of an explicit nature and done on structured grids. Similarly, both electro-magnetics applications using methods of moments algorithms, and signal processing applications account for the use of HPC in the aerospace community - for example, making the 787 lighter.

But broader applications can be found in engineering, product design, complex supply chain optimization (actually, almost any kind of optimization), Bitcoin mining (which you could do on a PC, but has gotten very complex). World's largest glass company, AGC, runs a constant stream of simulations that rely on simulation-driven product development, For the City of Chicago: "The Array of Things Project," 5000 sensors on lampposts can't get the data to the data center for real-time modeling, so they built sensors that do computation and act as a distributed supercomputer. Expect to see many more implementations like these of "Things." Via the supercomputer atLawrence Livermore Laboratory, researchers found that trucks should wear skirts. At Trek Bicycle, bicycles are streamlined from every angle, in draft situations using time-shared HPC.

In a gradual move from supercomputers locked away doing math, the newest ones have theflexibility to handle AI, Analytics, and other general HPC workloads for Big Data, Data Science, Convergence. Innovation. Visualization, Simulation, and Modeling.

HPE announced a program recently called GreenLake, which I'll cover in a future article. I'm intrigued by their use of the term HPC. HPE, since its acquisition of Cray, Inc., in 2019, became the top dog in the highest end of supercomputing, code-named exascale. Exascale means the ability to produce one or multiples of a quintillion double-precision floating-point calculations per second (an exaFLOP). These machines, Aurora (1 exaFLOP, 2021), Frontier (1.5 exaFLOP, 2021), and El Capitan (2 exaFLOP, 2023), are being assembled now.

Keep in mind that the monsters' price tag is >$500 million, and that doesn't include the cost of the facilities to house them, the massive cooling systems, and the 30-40MW power supply (and bill). This is one reason why you can't install one just anywhere. They need a trunk line with enough power to run a small city. Expect next-generation supercomputers to drastically reduce the energy and cooling requirements over the next ten years.

An quote so often repeated that can't be attributed is: "An exaFLOP is one quintillion (1018) double-precision floating-point operations per second or 1,000 petaFLOP. To match what a one exaFLOP computer system can do in just one second, you'd have to perform one calculation every second for 31,688,765,000 years."

They were all slated to replace the two current speedsters; the IBM machines Summit (200petaFLOP, 2018) and Sierra (125 petaFLOP, 2018). So until the HPE/Cray machines come online, Summit and Sierra are still tops. Or so we thought.

Fujitsu surprised everyone in 2020 with the Fugaku machine, operating at a surprising ~475 petaFLOP to take the #1 spot. But rumors are that's just the beginning for Fugaku because they designed everything from the ground up - chips, interconnect, and even software. Then HPE/Cray announced they would bring a 500 petaFLOP computer to Finland in 2021. That will theoretically place it at #1 unless Aurora or Frontier become operational first.

The TOP500lists the fastest 500 supercomputers in the world. Five hundred. Not a typo. My alma mater, for supercomputing, Sandia National Labs, actually has the 486th slowest one (they have others), but just to make a list, it has to perform >2 petaFLOPS. Just to put that in perspective, the 486th slowest supercomputer in the world can do in one second, what you'd have to perform one calculation every second for a mere 63,377,530 years! When I worked on ASCI Red's design in 1997, we brought the first teraFLOP computer up. That would make it one million times slower than the exascale computers coming up.

It's amazing that one man invented the supercomputer. Seymour Cray formed Cray Research in 1972 and produced the Cray-1 supercomputer. It was the world's fastest supercomputer from 1976 to 1982. It measured 8 feet wide by 6 feet high and contained 60 miles of wires. It was pretty, too. By comparison, today's exascale monsters take up the space of two football fields and run a few billion times faster.

The first customer was the Los Alamos National Lab. In 1993, Cray produced its first massively parallel computing supercomputer, the T3D. Supercomputers took off when they switched to, effectively, large arrays of identical servers spurred on by multi-core chips.

So, in a way, all computers are supercomputers now.

Sadly, Cray died in an automobile accident in 1996, and the company was sold to Silicon Graphics, which later merged with Tera Computer Company in 2000. That same year, Tera re-named itself Cray, Inc. In a brilliant move (in my opinion, though not the analysts at the time), HPE acquired Cay, Inc. HPE incorporated Cray technology to release the HPE Cray EX Shasta supercomputer built for the exascale era workloads, a smooth merger of technologies. It can support converged workloads, eliminates the distinction between supercomputers and clusters, combining HPC and AI workloads.

Central to its design is the Slingshot interconnect backbone. The U.S.'s first three exascale supercomputers are all Shasta systems. At the moment, the HPE/Cray is on track to provide three (or more) of the four fastest supercomputers in the world (Actually, Frontier was a Cray project before HPE acquired Cray, but they have blended their technology smoothly). Next time, I'll detail GreenLake and how HPE is offering HPC capabilities to all organizations' sizes.

One question is: do they process data differently than a commercial MPP arrangement?

The one enduring constant is that using an HPC machine requires the programmer to think very differently about how their problem should be attacked. Today's supercomputers are, at a certain level, the same as MPP clusters that commercial databases like Oracle, Teradata, Vertica, IBM, etc., consist of. Both employ an MPP "shared nothing" setup, where each server is independent except for a networking system. Each server is composed of its own processors, memory, and, sometimes, storage, as well as a copy of the operating system. Where they differ is that the supercomputers in production today are dramatically larger. IBM's Sierra: combines commercial CPUs and Nvidia GPU's in 4,320 nodes, with total cores pf 190,080 and 256Gb/CPU memory + 64GB memory per GPU. Commercial database installations are a fraction of its size.

Commercial MPP can't process 2.56 quadrillion double-precision floating-point calculations per second on a Dell chassis with at most 3000 cores. But the real difference is in what they do. An MPP database may handle hundreds or thousands of queries per minute and do optimization, load balancing, and workload management. The queries posed are themselves simple compared to modeling climate change. A supercomputer cannot handle that kind of concurrency when each program may involve billions of calculations.

Currently, programming supercomputers is mostly done in Fortran, C, or C++. As opposed to operational, transactional, and analytical programs, these "codes," as they call them, simple in comparison, but the configuration is the tricky part.

Except for "air-gapped" installations, where the entire arrangement is disconnected from the outside world, most supercomputers are "shared" but not at all like cloud sharing. Hundreds of users around the world may use a supercomputer, but they're not interactive. Programs are run as jobs and are submitted to a queue as part of a specific grant funded by research organizations. Grants are in the order of thousands or millions of CPU hours. They are not open to the public. You are charged per CPU hour, times the queue cost (determined by queue specs and priority). If you have an 11 CPU program running 1 hour, you consume eleven service units multiplied by the queue cost).

Cloud providers support many architectures, so it is conceivable that cloud providers can provide HPC and actual supercomputer time. Advantages of the cloud are pay-by-the-sip, distributed, and multi-tenant. I'll be looking for clarification from HPE for the next article. For now, as I understand it, petascale and exascale supercomputing is not part of GreenLake at the moment and the program is broader than just HPC.

See the rest here:

How supercomputers found their industry mojo - the evolution of high performance computing - Diginomica

Posted in Evolution | Comments Off on How supercomputers found their industry mojo – the evolution of high performance computing – Diginomica

The Logo Evolution of Heineken Over Time [Infographic] – VinePair

Posted: at 3:08 pm

Heineken, the proudly Netherlands-based international beer brand, has been brewed for over 150 years. But despite the brands longstanding popularity it is continuously cited as one of the most popular beers in the world Heineken has made sure to keep things fresh in the brewhouse and on the bottle, often changing its logo to keep up with the times.

Like many legacy beer brands, Heinekens logo has gone through a few different phases. The brand kept its signature oval-shaped design for over 100 years starting in 1884, until it simplified to its more minimalistic, modern typography-only look in 1991. Green has been the primary color of all of Heinekens logos except for a brief stint in the 1930s through 1950s, when the brand introduced a red and white logo.

In addition, all of Heinekens logos before 1991 include the brands hometown of Rotterdam, Holland though many fans still mistakenly believe that the brand is based in Germany.

See Heinekens logo evolution over time in VinePairs infographic below.

Visit link:

The Logo Evolution of Heineken Over Time [Infographic] - VinePair

Posted in Evolution | Comments Off on The Logo Evolution of Heineken Over Time [Infographic] – VinePair

Wind Creates Evolutionary Changes In Flying Insects, Depriving Them Of Their Wings – Forbes

Posted: at 3:08 pm

A winter tree battered by the the winds.

About 95% of insect species worldwide can fly. The question of what environmental pressures determine whether or not an insect species evolves to have wings has long fascinated scientists. The first scientist known to be intrigued was the twenty-two-year-old Charles Darwin when, in January of 1831, he visited the Portuguese-held island of Madeira off the coast of Morocco.

View from Madeira's third highest volcanic peak.

The island of Madeira is part of a volcanic archipelago. On its dramatically rocky shoreline, northeast trade winds bring in huge ocean swells. Temperatures at sea level in Madeira average in the 50s and 60s (F) in the winter, and are only a little warmer in the summer. In the windswept mountains it can snow. Because of its microclimates and isolation, Madeira is home to a wide array of endemic species like the Madeiran long-toed pigeon with its six-note cooing and the endangered Zinos Petrel, a seabird that lives exclusively at sea and only returns to the island to breed in the mountains. Madeira also has twenty-four species of endemic land mollusks, and it has lots and lots of beetles. Darwin was a beetle afficionado. On Madeira, he collected them, and noticed that they were wingless.

Steel engraving of naturalist Charles Darwin.

Twenty-five years after his trip to Madeira, Darwin mentioned the wingless beetles to his best friend Joseph Hooker, a geographical botanist and an adventurer who, like Darwin, had voyaged to Madeira in his younger years. To Hooker, Darwin hazarded a guess about how the apterous (un-winged) beetles had evolved. Roughly, what he suggested was that Madeira is a small island with strong winds. Any flying insects would probably have gotten blown out to sea, leaving the flightless ones to dominate the gene pool. Hooker responded that he thought Darwins idea to be very pretty. At the same time, he pointed out that he had found wingless beetles in the Sahara Desert, which is nowhere near water.

Joseph Dalton Hooker

And so a friendly argument began. Darwin and Hooker never resolved it, and it has persisted among scientists from 1855, the year of the two scientists discussion, to 2020. Publishing this December in the Proceedings of the Royal Society B, researchers from Australias Monash University have finally settled matters. Drawing on a comprehensive database of insect species that was compiled over the last three decades by other researchers, they have demonstrated that Darwin was right at least in identifying wind as the cause of the evolutionary change.

The data used by the Monash University team had been culled by researchers working in Antarctica but also on twenty-eight Southern Ocean Islands, which are in the expanse of ocean surrounding Antarctica and were the focus of the Monash University study. According to study co-author Rachel I. Leihy, the group of islands is impressive for its geographic and geological diversity. They are in the Southern Pacific, Southern Indian, and Southern Atlantic oceans, and in some cases they are isolated by thousands of kilometers of ocean. Some are relatively new, volcanic formations. Others are fragments of continents.

To varying degrees, they are windy. According to the U. S. National Ocean Service, during the Age of Sail (the 15th to 19th centuries) the winds in the seas surrounding Antarctica propelled tall ships across the ocean at breakneck speed. Amazed sailors named the winds after the latitude lines near the southern tip of the world, and told tales of wild rides courtesy of the roaring forties, furious fifties, and screaming sixties.

To the insect databases collected over three decades by other researchers, Leihy and collaborator Steven L. Chown added data about flight for each species. They also applied to each species every credible hypothesis since Darwins time about the evolution of flightlessness. These theories included:

Dunes formed by wind in the Sahara Desert, Ouargla. Algeria.

Wind, freezing temperatures, or low air pressure might independently increase the energy required to fly, depriving insects of the energetic resources necessary to create or sustain fecundity. Only insects that opt not to fly in difficult environments might retain the ability to reproduce well.

Habitat fragmentation might deprive insects of the motivation to fly.

The disappearance of either predators or competitors from certain environments might make flying unnecessary.

Wind might blow flying insects off the island (Darwins idea).

And a few more.

Ultimately, Leihy and Chown found that nearly half (47%) of insect species that evolved on the Southern Ocean Islands are unable to fly, though some do retain small, remnant wings. According to Leihy, 47% is an exceptionally large number, representing nearly ten times the worldwide incidence of flightlessness among insect species.

Comparing multiple variables about environment with their identification of species that are flightless, the researchers found that wind speed, habitat stability, and summer land surface temperatures correlate with 77% of the Southern Ocean Islands species that have lost the ability fly. (The complete variable list also included seasonality, island area, island age, insectivore richness, and island isolation.)

A traditional tall ship with reefed sails sailing through rough seas in the southern pacific ocean.

Ultimately, Leihy and Chown recognized wind speed as the single strongest environmental contributor to the evolution of flightlessness in insects. Indeed, they noted in their paper that the windier the island, the more flightless insect species they identified.

While Darwin appears to have been right in identifying wind as the primary driver of the evolution of flightlessness among insects, Leihy and Chowns study found that he was probably not correct in pinpointing precisely what it was about the wind that steered the evolutionary path. Darwin had suggested to Hooker that the wind tossed insects off of islands, but Leihy and Chown found that the proportion of flightless insects on an island doesnt generally scale with island size. This would mean that insect populations are not decimated and their gene pools fundamentally changed because the bugs that fly get blown out to sea.

The researchers did suggest an alternate way in which wind might drive the evolution of flightlessness. In environments that are very windy (like Madeira, the Sahara Desert, and the islands near the southern tip of the world), the energetic cost of flying may be far too high. Darwin had specified that all organisms are driven by a biological imperative to ensure the survival of their particular genome into subsequent generations. If he was right, insects are better off investing energetically in the machinery of reproduction than they are trying to fly in impossible environments.

Indeed, according to Leihy, Other researchers have looked at insect fecundity. Theyve found that species that are flightless have a higher reproductive output.

Case closed, probably. Score one point (not two) for Darwin.

Go here to see the original:

Wind Creates Evolutionary Changes In Flying Insects, Depriving Them Of Their Wings - Forbes

Posted in Evolution | Comments Off on Wind Creates Evolutionary Changes In Flying Insects, Depriving Them Of Their Wings – Forbes

‘Promising Young Woman’ and the Evolution of Rape-Revenge Films – Bloody Disgusting

Posted: at 3:08 pm

Spoiler warning: The article contains plot spoilers for Promising Young Woman.

Emerald Fennells directorial feature debut quickly shifted from one of last years most anticipated to one of the most polarizing upon release. The division stems mostly from the shocking third act and the vastly different reads on the film.Promising Young Womancan be viewed as a psychological thriller, a scathing satire, or even a dark drama with thriller elements depending on experiences or perspective. That Fennell weaponizes rom-com tropes in her social analysis further blurs the genre lines.Promising Young Womanis a rape-revenge film that doesnt even depict or use the word rape, and even its implementation of revenge could be questioned. Its another entry in a growing trend of rape-revenge films that venture outside of horror to deliver a provocative critique of modern rape culture.

Promising Young Womanopens to three colleagues blowing off steam at a bustling bar after work hours. They notice a woman sitting alone, too intoxicated to sit upright. One of the men (Adam Brody) decides to approach while his pals whoop and cheer. He asks the woman, Cassie (Carey Mulligan), if she has a means of getting home safely, then gently pushes her into allowing him to help. Once in the rideshare, however, he reroutes the driver to his place and proceeds to ply Cassie with alcohol. He coaxes her into his bed, all while she slurs protests. Cassie drops her drunk faade and catches him off guard. This opening sequence highlights Cassies unusual hobby of systematically dismantling the system one Nice Guy at a time.

Throughout the film, Cassies lingering trauma reveals itself. Once a promising young woman in med school, Cassie dropped out to take care of her life-long best friend, Nina, after a college party resulted in an assault from which she never recovered. Shunned from peers and authority figures that chose to preserve the promising young mans future, Nina eventually ended her life. Cassies lingering survivors guilt and trauma meant shes unable to move past it. Cassie lives at home with her parents, spends her days working a coffee shop, and moonlights as a sort of vigilante. Her method is entirely devoid of violence; she seems content to simply hold a mirror up to her would-be rapists.

Promising Young Woman

Cassies vengeance initially lacks a specific aim. She cant even bring herself to look up Ninas assailant. At least, not until former classmate Ryan Cooper (Bo Burnham) walks into her coffee shop one afternoon. Its a twisted meet-cute that sparks a romance between the two, offering Cassie a glimmer of hope for a normal life. But Ryan still has ties to the med school social circle, and mentioning Ninas attacker spurns an end game plot for revenge thats catalyzed when a shocking video of that fateful night in college surfaces.

Cassie arrives at the fifth, and final stage of her plan with all hope shattered, the make-or-break divisive moment in the film. For the first time, Cassie threatens to resort to violence, and it ends tragically for her. For many, Cassies demise seems to remove all hope for survivors, but it does present an interesting point in the murky and confusing waters of rape culture. Murder is cut and dry, but theres a general cultural confusion about consent, especially in instances like Ninas, with a system that protects the accused. Theres no catharsis for Cassie, and therefore none for the viewer.

Fennell purposefully induces tonal whiplash in her debut, a metaphor for the emotional and psychological cycle of a trauma survivor. Promising Young Womanshifts from comedy to drama to romance to jarring thrills, covering all spectrums of genre unified by a candy-coated pop music aesthetic. Its not fear that gives Cassie purpose but wrath and heartache. Fear isnt the response the film is trying to induce, either.

Rape-revenge films rose to prominence in the 70s thanks to easing censorship restrictions and a more mainstream cultural discussion of sexual politics. LikeI Spit on Your GraveorLast House on the Left, the exploitation films that emerged during the era were attributed to horror and followed a distinct formula. These movies featured a graphic rape, followed by an equally graphic enactment of revenge by either the victim or an agent acting on their behalf. The explicit, violent, and exploitive nature of rape-revenge films became so synonymous with horror that the attribution has been tough to shake since. Movies dont always fit tidily into textbook definitions of genre, especially not with the emerging trend in rape-revenge films. The topic of sexual assault is broad and complex, and adheres less and less to the simplified two-half structure of rape-revenge horror.

As notable film critic and scholar Alexandra Heller-Nicholas notes in the introduction of her bookRape-Revenge Films: A Critical Study, Rape-revenge films, then, are fluid and elastic. Despite its common association with the horror film in the United States during the 1970s in particular, it spans genre, times, and national borders. She chronicles cinemas surprising and complicated history with sexual violence in the rape-revenge narrative, and never has the complexity of it been more evident than the present.

Natalia Leites M.F.A.

Much likePromising Young Woman, Natalia Leites M.F.A. follows a traumatized young woman on a quest for revenge while exposing the system that makes it difficult for real justice. Noelle (Francesca Eastwood) is a grad student who eagerly accepts an invite to a party by her college crush. He isolates her there and rapes her. Later, she kills him in a fit of rage, and it sets her down a vigilante path to destroy men like her attacker.M.F.A.is far more firmly rooted in the thriller genre but presents an ambitious peek into the college setting in which these situations can thrive.

Similarly, Coralie FargeatsRevengespends little time on the inciting act. It focuses on an intense, French extremism style action-survival thriller with its leading lady outwitting and outlasting the men who want to snuff out living proof of their heinous crime. Fargeat sought to upend the male gaze and challenge preconceived notions about people similar to her heroine.

Paul VerhoevensEllepresents a morally conflicted cat-and-mouse game between Isabelle Hupperts Michle and her rapist. LikeEllescontemporaries, Michle eschews going to the police due to a bad experience and instead takes matters into her own hands most provocatively and peculiarly. While categorized as a thriller, Verhoeven employs dark humor to detail Michles journey in freeing herself through sex and violence.

Isabelle Huppert in Elle

Recently, ShuddersHuntedrepurposes the Red Riding Hood fairy tale for its rape-revenge adjacent survival thriller, and the upcomingViolation presents a nonlinear take on the rape-revenge formula to convey a raw and aching psychodrama instead. Both are much more rooted in horror yet evoke wrath or tragedy.

The act of sexual violence naturally inspires fear and revulsion, which plays a big part in the rape-revenge films classification. But its because of their increasingly complicated and contradictive approaches that make the rape-revenge films singular attribution to horror not so simple. Its less about the act itself and more about the filmmakers point. Promising Young Woman uses the characteristics of a romantic comedy or sex comedy to shame any viewer that would find humor in the situations Cassie intentionally pursues. Through her avenging angel, Fennell directs rage at those who allow sexual assault to happen just as much as the predators. If not more so. She makes the medicine easier to swallow with a bubblegum pink coating and bursts of levity.

Promising Young Woman is another entry in a growing trend of modern rape-revenge films that have departed horror in favor of weaponizing other genre tropes to support their core themes. While Fennells debut continues to inspire debate over its messaging, it succeeds in demonstrating that a rape-revenge film doesnt have to belong to horror to elicit a lingering, visceral response.

Matilda Lutz in Revenge

Excerpt from:

'Promising Young Woman' and the Evolution of Rape-Revenge Films - Bloody Disgusting

Posted in Evolution | Comments Off on ‘Promising Young Woman’ and the Evolution of Rape-Revenge Films – Bloody Disgusting

The Evolution of Roger Federer’s Backhand – Perfect Tennis

Posted: at 3:08 pm

From his tour debut in 1998 to playing at the 2020 Australian Open, Roger Federers single-handed backhand has evolved. It is a shot that has varied with his mental state and physical capabilities. It also impacted how he played the game as a whole.

Here, I explore Federer's various backhands at different stages of his career and how this altered match tactics. In turn, this may give us clues as to how Federer can best approach his game for 2021 as we look forward to the new season.

From 1998 to 2004, Federer hit an aggressive backhand with little topspin. Young and free from inhibition, he had the conviction to take the ball early, driving with a high finish above the head. He pushed against his non-dominant shoulder, spreading both arms behind him, minimally turning his chest towards the court.

The result was a flat and hard shot that was used to finish points quickly. Soon after the rally started, Federer would suddenly hit down the line for a winner or draw an error, as shown in his 2002 Hamburg title run. The conviction on the backhand side offered remarkable shot tolerance and enabled him to make half-volleys from the baseline to stay in the point.

Looking at the 2004 US Open, it is clear that Federer was transitioning to a backhand with greater topspin, rotating his chest towards the court as he hit. Keen to use the backhand more as a rally ball, Federer would wait until he could dictate with the more powerful forehand.

Often he would establish a backhand exchange, only to then move around for a penetrating inside-out forehand. The backhand was still used to actively hit winners but more so when Federer had plenty of space to play with where speed wasnt necessary. Federer would serve out-wide on the deuce side then calmly place a backhand into the open court, as used in the 2007 Australian Open semi-finals against Andy Roddick.

After the 2008 Wimbledon Final loss, Federers topspin backhand relied increasingly on his mental state. Overall, he hit the shot with less conviction, depending heavily on his shoulders' rotation and the hitting arm for power compared with his legs.

In drawn-out rallies, Federer would abandon the groundstroke and default to the backhand slice. While this had always been used for tactical variation, the backhand side now played a slightly less offensive role than before.

The groundstroke still produced winners, and there were patches like the 2014 Shanghai Masters where Federer was mentally prepared to be consistently aggressive with it. But in the main, the backhand had become a smaller force in point-construction.

After a six-month break from surgery, Federer rejoined the tour physically refreshed and mentally free without the weight of expectation. Federer worked with his coach Ivan Lubii on a flatter, hard, and early backhand in the interim. He returned to his initial technique, spreading both arms behind him, rising on his right leg loaded with power.

The neo-backhand is widely credited as having won Federer the 2017 Australian Open as he was able to keep points short, hitting winners off the return of serve and creating sharp angles early in rallies. Most importantly, Federer could neutralise Nadals forehand in the final with such a powerful and flat shot. The backhand helped gain him further titles, including that years Wimbledon and the 2018 Australian Open.

Federer has not used the backhand to attack as much in recent years, opting for a gentler topspin shot instead. In the 2019 Wimbledon final against Novak Djokovic, Federer did use the backhand confidently for winners. But in the last set, perhaps feeling tense, he increasingly went to the more defensive slice.

The neo-backhand did, however, make a brief appearance earlier at the 2019 Miami Open. Certainly, this is the most potent version of Federers backhands, and returning to such a shot would significantly boost his chances for 2021. The prolonged break after surgery last year may well afford him that opportunity.

Read more from the original source:

The Evolution of Roger Federer's Backhand - Perfect Tennis

Posted in Evolution | Comments Off on The Evolution of Roger Federer’s Backhand – Perfect Tennis

Pep Guardiola: An evolution through Barcelona, Bayern and City – The Athletic

Posted: at 3:08 pm

Pep Guardiola celebrates his 50th birthday on Monday, and fairly seismic things tend to happen on milestones like this.

When he turned 20 he established himself in the Barcelona first team, when he was 30 he left the Nou Camp, and when he was 40 he won the Champions League with his boyhood club at Wembley.

Since then he has spread his footballing message around the world, and recently revealed he is ready to stay in the dugout for longer than he had ever intended.

To work out what could possibly come next, we need to realise what has come before.

This is the story of Guardiola at 20, 30, 40 and 50, with a little guesswork on the future and what he might be doing at 60 too

That winning personality, the character to organise things, he had that since he was little, Albert Benaiges tells The Athletic.

Hes changed because hes grown as a person, as a coach, like everybody, but in certain...

Read more:

Pep Guardiola: An evolution through Barcelona, Bayern and City - The Athletic

Posted in Evolution | Comments Off on Pep Guardiola: An evolution through Barcelona, Bayern and City – The Athletic

Did Saving Lives With COVID Shutdowns Destroy Economies? The Data Is Telling. – Observer

Posted: at 3:07 pm

Another wave of COVID-19, complete with new and more contagious variant strands, has once again pushed many countries into lockdowns aimed at containing the spread of the virus and reducing the load on the healthcare system. Though necessary for public health, these measures come with great costs and consequences; as in the first great lockdown, they are stress-testing the socio-economic structure, especially small businesses in retails and services and indigent households.

This time around, however, the support for these measures is less generalized. While during the first wave, political approval rates closely mirrored governments capacity to contain the diffusion of contagion, the protraction of economic difficulties and a growing intolerance towards prevention measures, or pandemic fatigue, are now fueling a lively debate on a possible trade-off between public health and the economy.

In the UK, Boris Johnson recently suffered the biggest Commons revolt since his election as a total of fifty-five Tory Members of Parliament voted against the government decision to introduce a tougher lockdown tiered system. The Swiss Finance Minister Ueli Maurer claimed that a new lockdown would risk sacrificing the economy and public finances on the altar of health. And in the United States, general support for masking and social distancing measures are frequently undermined by politicians and leaders who rail against them, leading to protests and further viral spread. Unemployment continues to surge.

An alleged trade-off

But does such a trade-off really exist? Have countries with lower death rates experienced also larger economic downturns?

To answer these questions, we can look at how the health and economic impact of COVID-19 compare in different countries. Figure 1 below plots Real Gross Domestic Product (percentage change) projection for 25 advanced economies, as given by the latest IMF growth projections, against their respective excess mortality rates.

In epidemiology, excess mortality refers to the number of deaths during a crisis above and beyond what we would have expected to see under normal conditions (i.e. above the annual average of those who die of old age or from normal pathologies). It is a more comprehensive measure of the total impact of the pandemic than the confirmed COVID-19 death count alone. In addition to confirmed deaths, in fact, excess mortality captures COVID-19 deaths that were not correctly diagnosed as well as deaths from other causes that are attributable to the overall crisis conditions (e.g. the lower availability of medical-health personnel for diseases other than COVID-19).

Winners and losers

The data show how the trade-off hypothesis is simply not borne out by the facts. Indeed, the figures suggest quite the opposite: countries that have managed to protect their populations health in the pandemic, such as Austria, Denmark, or Norway, have generally managed to protect their economies too. And the reverse is also true: UK and Italy, the countries that have experienced the largest increases in mortality, were also the ones likely to suffer the most severe downturns by the end of the year.

Figure 1 also uncovers an interesting regularity. All the Southern European economies are placed below the regression line, the one that minimizes the distance, on the vertical axis, from all points of the diagram. This means that countries on the Mediterranean shores pay a relatively higher economic price for containing mortality (i.e. any given level of excess mortality is associated with a more severe economic downturn as compared to countries above the line).

Several reasons can help explain this phenomenon. One has to do with the economic structure: in Southern European countries, economies more dependent on service sector jobs may have been more harshly impacted by repeated lockdowns. This is true especially for travel and tourism that accounts for 10 to 20 percent of the GDP in Southern Europe (while to just 5 to 10 percent in Northern Europe).

Specific cultural traits can partly explain why similar containment measures might have dissimilar effects. In more individual-minded countries, where public interventions by government are rarer and far less tolerated, for example, it is reasonable to expect that the population will be more reluctant to comply with measures that entail serious limitations on personal freedoms.

Finally, to tackle the consequences of the pandemic, all countries have adopted exceptional fiscal measures. These generally rely on debt issuance to finance health expenses and programs to support workers and firms (e.g. temporary unemployment benefits and bank loan guarantees). The magnitude of these programs, however, differs notably across countries, with less financially stable economies enjoying significantly less room for relief.

The size of the economic rescue package goes a long way also explaining the comparative stability in the United States. Despite an excess mortality rate among the highest in the world, the country managed to contain the economic costs associated with the recession (it is in fact located above the regression line Figure 1). The massive $2 trillion stimulus package deployed right after the outbreak to ease the economic impact of the pandemic along with the almost unlimited quantitative easing granted by the Federal Reserve to avoid a collapse of asset prices in domestic currency, limited the economic fallouts of the dramatic public health failure.

Piergiuseppe Fortunato is an economist at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) where he leads projects on global value chains and economic integration. Neha Deopa is a final year PhD candidate at The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.

Excerpt from:

Did Saving Lives With COVID Shutdowns Destroy Economies? The Data Is Telling. - Observer

Posted in Socio-economic Collapse | Comments Off on Did Saving Lives With COVID Shutdowns Destroy Economies? The Data Is Telling. – Observer

The key trends to watch this year on nonstate armed actors – Brookings Institution

Posted: at 3:07 pm

As the international system experiences a multifaceted rearrangement of power distribution and modes of governance, challenges emanating from state actors like China and Russia are not the only issues to watch. Nonstate armed actors militants, militias, and criminal groups are acquiring increasing power at the expense of the state. This dynamic precedes the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, but has been exacerbated by it: More people around the world depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods, and criminal and militant actors are empowered while governments are weakened. Unable to effectively confront nonstate armed actors, many governments will feel tempted or required to accommodate them, or attempt to coopt them. Governance by nonstate actors will deepen and expand.

As my Brookings colleagues and I address in more depth in a new series, these are key issues for the incoming Biden administration to watch.

The pandemic is weakening the governing capacity of governments in multifaceted ways, amplifying deep-seated trends in progress for the past two decades. It wiped out 20 years of poverty reduction efforts, with as many as 150 million people pushed into extreme poverty. These numbers may significantly underestimate the calamity, as COVID-19 persists longer and more intensely than many thought, and vaccine distribution is proving more difficult than hoped, even in economically and institutionally-advanced countries.

Around the world, those affected by the illness, lockdowns, and economic collapse are forced to drastically limit their access to healthcare, food, schooling. Many have to liquidate their means of human capital development. In one study conducted in Kenya, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), over 75% of women reported at least a partial loss of household income and food insecurity, with 62% of the surveyed households in the Kinhasa province of DRC reporting a total loss of income! Latin America has likewise seen devastating economic effects, with GDP losses already at some 10%. Economies in Africa have been hit equally hard, as have many economies in Asia, and particularly the conditions of the vulnerable.

This severely constrains budgets for public expenditures, including public safety budgets. A rise in crime and conflict, along with governments inability to sufficiently offset the economic devastation and destruction of peoples livelihoods, profoundly weakens the legitimacy of governments and political systems. Political instability and social strife, including violent protests and extremist mobilization, are likely to increase in many parts of the world, even as the extent of government weakness will vary.

So are authoritarian power grabs not necessarily through outright coup detats, but under the guise of anti-crime measures. See, for instance, the Philippines, or the incremental weakening of accountability mechanisms and institutional capacity and delay of elections in Malaysia and Ethiopia. Authoritarian governments, for example in Hungary, have used the pandemic as an excuse to expand executive authority and squash opposition.

Concurrently, criminal and militant groups, as well as other nonstate armed actors, have become relatively stronger. More people now depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods, and on criminal or militant groups for basic services. The political capital of nonstate armed actors, particularly those sponsoring labor-intensive illicit economies or access to jobs in legal or informal economies, has grown. Larger territorial spaces, functional domains, and populations will be governed by nonstate actors, something that will outlast the pandemic.

Assuring access to vaccines for the most marginalized populations will necessitate negotiating with nonstate armed actors, some of which may ask for political or material payoffs. But however problematic such negotiations are, laws against material support to nonstate armed actors should not hold back vaccinations and humanitarian relief for reasons of global public health, economic recovery, and basic justice. Care needs to be taken to minimize the resulting political power of nonstate armed actors that accrues through such negotiations.

Militant groups around the world including al-Shabab, the Taliban, and the Islamic State in West Africa Province, various nonstate armed actors in Colombia, and the Houthis in Yemen have sought to exploit COVID-19. So have various criminal groups mafia groups in Italy; Mexican drug trafficking organizations; gangs in Central America; and the slums of India, Kenya, or Brazil. The ways they have exploited COVID-19 varies: Some have reshaped anti-government and anti-Western propaganda, increased recruitments, intensified violence, provided socio-economic handouts and other public goods, or taken over bankrupt businesses and penetrated the legal economy. Not all nonstate armed actors are equally adroit in exploiting the pandemic, but they have used it to tighten control over local populations in a variety of ways.

The developed world has not escaped these pernicious dynamics, with new economic hardships and lockdowns boosting preexisting trends in right-wing violent mobilization. In the United States and Western Europe, right-wing armed groups the Boogaloo Bois, neo-Nazi groups, and anti-federal government groups that espouse so-called County Supremacy have exploited the pandemic to build political capital with disgruntled business owners, increased recruitment, targeted and intimidated law enforcement, and sought to both discredit and coopt political representatives. They have intensified networking and sharing of tactics with counterparts elsewhere in the world. They represent severe threats to rule of law and safety in the West, as was demonstrated in the attack on the U.S. Capitol.

The pandemics fallout will last years, as will the dependence of many in the world on illicit economies. So too will the increased power of nonstate armed actors. Even in the West, the mobilization, recruitment, and political capital of armed groups and societal polarization will not rapidly disappear.

Yet many policies that governments may be tempted to adopt including increasing repressive tools against protesters and nonstate armed actors exacerbate the problems. In some localities, governments are simply relegating or yielding control to criminal groups and other nonstate armed actors long the case in Brazil, Jamaica, Central America, Bangladesh, and India, but now more prevalent. Elsewhere, they negotiate with and coopt nonstate armed groups to extort or coopt votes, obtain funding, settle scores with political or business rivals, or take on other nonstate armed actors.

Moreover, dangerous and counterproductive natural resource extraction logging, mining, and wildlife trade and trafficking is likely to intensify, and can be illegal or legal. Wildlife poaching has exploded worldwide, including in previously well-protected areas, as incomes for rangers and local populations dry up and some people migrate from cities to rural areas. Wildlife-based Traditional Chinese Medicine continues to be, without proof, promoted as COVID-19 cures. Deforestation in Brazil and Indonesia, meanwhile, broke records in 2020. In Asia, Latin America, and Africa, economies in natural resources will be the most available source of revenues for governments, and livelihoods for many.

But their extraction, and the resulting degradation and increased trade in wildlife, may speed up the arrival of another zoonotic pandemic. China, in particular, remains a problematic actor: Its imports of beef, soy, and timber are significant sources of deforestation. The modus operandi of China, Russia, and also India in resource extraction in Africa, Asia, and Latin America has fueled corruption, and weakened rule-of-law and good governance. COVID-19 has diminished governments capacities to resist such deleterious practices and avoid debt traps. Conditioned, monitored, and sequenced debt relief for habitat and biodiversity preservation is an important countermeasure.

Some states for instance Iran, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar will seek to exploit this instability via proxy proxy actors. In the Middle East and Africa, Russia has already inserted proxy actors (such as the Wagner Group) and security advisers into various unstable or conflict-ridden countries; Russia may also seek to exacerbate instability even without cultivating a particular local political proxy, as it did during the 2019 social protests in Latin America. But with its readiness to embrace and deploy nonstate armed actors for hybrid warfare and asymmetric purposes, Russia may also cultivate criminal groups and other nonstate armed actors to undermine U.S. partners, like in Ukraine.

China, so far, has mostly made accommodations with nonstate armed actors in Myanmar and Afghanistan. In Myanmar, it has cultivated strong relations with a set of ethnic militias and sometimes even their rivals, while maintaining strong influence over the government even under Aung San Suu Kyi. Chinese actors, including state ones, participate in illicit economies in Myanmar and around the world, particularly in wildlife and timber, but sometimes also drugs. In Afghanistan, China prefers a coalition government to emerge and constrain the Taliban, but it has worked out a dtente with the group. China does not as yet have a known record of cultivating criminal groups and proxy militias for geopolitical purposes far away from its borders, but that time may come.

China is far more likely to seek to cultivate governments such as by selling them anti-crime software (like Smart and Safe Cities), which China extensively promotes in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. To governments with tight budgets and ineffective law enforcement, that face violent crime and powerful criminal groups, such technologies may seem like silver bullets. But they can serve as backdoors for China to engage in spying and industrial espionage. Governments can also exploit them for authoritarian purposes.

In a perpetual cat-and-mouse game with states, nonstate armed actors too have long embraced advanced technologies for nefarious purposes including, lately, drones for reconnaissance, smuggling, and armed warfare; semi-submersibles for long-distance maritime smuggling; closed-circuit TVs for population control; cryptocurrencies for money laundering; synthetic drugs for enrichment; and a variety of cybercrime and cyber tools to create mayhem, inflict pain, steal money, and extort. In some cases, the COVID-19 disruptions to legal trade have forced criminal groups to accelerate their expansion into these high-tech and cutting-edge domains, such as the use of drones for drug trafficking and retail, and other innovations.

The return to geopolitical competition does not negate the growing influence of nonstate armed actors. Nor should geopolitical competition obscure the focus of U.S. national security and foreign policy on nonstate armed actors. COVID-19 has significantly amplified the power and impact of such actors around the world. Geopolitics has added complicated layers to their role and power, in some ways entrenching them further.

This new power landscape also raises important questions about the tools the United States has deployed to counter nonstate armed actors. The post-9/11 reliance on direct U.S. military intervention may be over, even if the U.S. proclivity to stand up proxy militias persists.

This new shape of the power and reach of nonstate armed actors reinforces the imperative for the United States to review its response, including vis--vis rival powers. Key issues the Biden administration will need to address include:

The rest is here:

The key trends to watch this year on nonstate armed actors - Brookings Institution

Posted in Socio-economic Collapse | Comments Off on The key trends to watch this year on nonstate armed actors – Brookings Institution

Are the Visegrad Group Countries a Success Story? – Visegrad Insight

Posted: at 3:07 pm

The economies of Central and Eastern Europe have shown no signs of any development miracle or a regional category jump to high-income countries. Instead, there is the passive acceptance of low-end manufacturing, state-capture by oligarchs and regions emptying out of young people.

The author of this present piece firmly believes that the objective of economic growth should be shunned if we are to achieve the CO2 emissions goals of the Paris Treaty and reverse the environmental devastation we have caused on this planet.

The decoupling of environmental devastation from economic growth is a myth. Balkans citizens now live around the global average, Visegrad and Baltic societies above it.

We should not aim for higher GDP, in fact, Western Europe should engage in degrowth. The social problems of our region should be handled through more equitable social redistribution, not growth.

With the above caveat, let us address the question in the title on its own terms. Can we consider the region a socio-economic success story? The default go-to indicator in our growth-obsessed world would be the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The first comparison we can make is a long term historical one, using Angus Maddisons famous database.

Chart 1 GDP/capita in the Visegrad countries in comparison to Western Europe, the World Average and China (Source: The Maddison Database)

What we see on this chart is that at the end of reconstruction after the Second World War, the Visegrad region was somewhat above the world average, and at around 50 to 75 per cent of Western Europe (defined by Maddison as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom).

Western Europe is chosen as a benchmark because it has been the age-old point of comparison in Central and Eastern Europe. As we can see, China was way below the world average at this point, at less than a quarter.

Under a Soviet-style economic system, the Visegrad countries basically preserved their advantage compared to the global average. Poland collapsed by the 1980s and even proceeded to dip below the global average. Hungary and Czechoslovakia peaked in the eighties. They have both preserved their positions compared to the global average by the end of the Soviet-style economy.

Hungary also managed to preserve its position vis--vis the West, but Czechoslovakia slipped in this comparison. No country in the region has achieved convergence with the West during this period. A purchasing power parity comparison (not available from Maddison) would be favourable to the Visegrad states, but would still reveal at best their maintained positions vis--vis the West for the group as a whole.

The rise of China begins at around this time, in the eighties, with Deng Xiaopings famous reform and opening. (As well shall soon see, other Asian Tigers that China was learning from, such as Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, had by this time demonstrated even more astounding growth rates.)

The devastating consequences of economic transition are clear to see in the case of the former Eastern Bloc. Hungary dips to the world average, Poland below it.

By the time of the Visegrad Group countries accession to the European Union, they had, by and large, managed to regain their previous long term global position somewhat above the global average. This position is similar to the one after the Second World War, or the one in the eighties.

What is striking from this graph is that China was already approximating the global average by this time.

In sharp contrast to Visegrad, there was simply no transition depression to speak of in the case of China, even though in spite of official rhetoric Beijing was in fact transitioning from a fully nationalised, planned economy to a partially privatised, partially planned capitalist development state, similar to the Far Eastern Development model characteristic of its wider region. This comparison of Visegrad transition with China is striking.

A comparison with Western Europe is also revealing. At the eve of EU accession, the Visegrad Group was further away than ever from Western Europe during the entire period under discussion.

As we have seen so far, the Central Eastern European region seems to be stuck in the category just above the global average.

The Visegrad group is part of an upper-middle-income group, while the Balkans are part of a lower-middle-income group, however, their global positions hardly change. There is definitely no category jump.

This contrasts sharply with the economic history of the East Asian region after the Second World War. The so-called Asian Tiger economies were examples of exactly the kind of category leap that has been missing from Central and Eastern Europe.

Let us take a look at their achievements:

Chart 2 The Asian Tiger economies made several category jumps in short decades, sometimes from lower-income to high-income (Source: Maddison Database)

As we can see, these tiger economies have made several category jumps, and in very brief periods of time. Perhaps the most successful country has been Singapore. It started off at levels comparable to the global average, but with gigantic hindrances: it had to be created as a brand-new state from a mostly illiterate, massively conflictual multi-ethnic and multireligious mix.

Clearly, this was a far worse starting point than in the case of any of the Visegrad states. Yet Singapore made it from the middle-income category into the high income one roughly from 1970 to around 1990, that is, in about two decades. Since then, it has become significantly richer than the Western European average.

Two other examples are Taiwan and South Korea, both of which started off in the low-income category, significantly below the world average, and even further below the Visegrad economies. Yet, they achieved a category jump from low income to middle income in the sixties, and then from middle income to high income by around the nineties.

The Peoples Republic of China is the latest arrival, from extremely low income as late as the eighties, to middle income by today.

What accounts for the disparity that Visegrad has not been able to carry out a quantitative leap, whereas the Asian Tigers have achieved several? The so-called Varieties of Capitalism literature provides us with a clear answer. Visegrad has attempted to compete with a so-called Foreign Direct Investment Dependent Competition State.

What this complicated name entails is the fact that these states have competed against each other with low wages, weak trade unions and low taxes to attract as much foreign direct investment as possible, in the process essentially becoming the economic hinterland of the German economy. They are stuck in what is called the middle-income trap.

By contrast, the developmental state model of East Asia has relied on domestically owned multinationals, state-led banks and technology policy, industrial policy, massive state investments into infrastructure and human capital.

East Asia was the only region of the world that has been able to resist Western neoliberal pressure and has achieved great success by doing so.

Let us now examine the period since European Union accession. In terms of their economic weight in the world, the Visegrad Group has pretty much managed to hold on to its position:

Chart 3 The world share of GDP of the Visegrad Group has stayed stable since EU accession in 2004

In the same period, Chinas share of global GDP increased almost four times over:

Chart 4 From 2004 to 2018, Chinas share of global GDP increased almost four times over

Where does this leave the Visegrad Group globally? This time we use GDP per capita data from the World Bank. It must be clear that this series is not comparable with Maddisons previous ones.

Chart 5 GDP per capita, Visegrad economies compared to Western Europe and World Average, as well as China, 2004-2019 (Source: World Bank)

What is clear from this graph is that the Visegrad group is still holding on to its permanent position in the upper-middle-income group: just above the global average, but far below Western Europe (defined as the same group of countries that Maddison uses).

This in spite of the fact that Western Europe now entails a number of rather damaged economies, such as Italy, France and the United Kingdom. Once again, the trends are clear to see: there has been no category jump for Visegrad since EU accession in 2004.

These are, admittedly, rather crude calculations. Many refinements can be made. One could use purchasing power adjustments for local price levels. However, these are not available for the Maddison data and, in the case of the World Bank data, they open up a pandoras box of troublesome methodological issues.

One could also take into account the fact that different countries have different wages shares of gross domestic product, and those in Visegrad economies, unfortunately, tend to be significantly lower:

Chart 6 The wage share in the Visegrad countries (red) and selected Western European (blue) countries (Source: ILO)

Not only is the wage share significantly higher in Western Europe than in the Visegrad Group countries, but the social welfare state is also dramatically more generous.

In fact, in several Visegrad states welfare provisions have all but disappeared. Several leading Visegrad politicians have openly declared themselves enemies of the welfare state.

There are additional complications: how do you factor in developments such as the 27,000 kilometres of clean, cheap and superfast high-speed trains that have been built in China in the matter of about a decade? By contrast, most of Central and Eastern Europe is still cut off from the Western European high-speed train network, with the exception of some lines in Poland.

Map 1 One decade of improvement in the Chinese high-speed train network

Similar improvements have been made in the Chinese highway system, hospitals, metro systems in major urban centres, airports, etc. Public infrastructure even in Western Europe has not been able to match these.

Similar public goods abound in the East Asia region: from the famed urban infrastructure and showcase airport in Singapore, through the global trailblazer internet speed of South Korea to human capital formation and innovation in Taiwan.

The above methodological additions are important, but they do not change the overall picture significantly. The Visegrad Group countries have not achieved a category jump in the last decade and a half since EU accession, or indeed since transition three decades ago. Almost everyone acknowledges this, though some still beg for patience.

As far as ordinary people are concerned, however, politicians have been asking for patience in this part of the world for far too long. The promise of a better future has been on the horizon for long generations, and it never arrived. It did in East Asia.

The same thirty years that was available for Visegrad to make a change was enough for China to rise from one of the poorest counties in the world to a middle-income one. Three decades had been enough for Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan to rise from misery to high-income status, rivalling or even exceeding Western Europe.

Elites in Visegrad still try to claim a success story, but ordinary people have had enough. They do not see a future for themselves in this region and are increasingly voting with their feet. It has beenwidely reported that all ten of the fastest declining countries in the world are in Eastern Europe.

At least 11 countries in Eastern Europe have shrunk by more than ten per cent since the political and economic transition in 1989, including Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania. Latvia has lost 27 per cent of its population, Lithuania 23 per cent, Bulgaria and Bosnia 21 per cent. But Poland and Hungary are also amongst the major losers.

Map 2 Maps published by Eurostat show the region emptying out

Maps published by the European Commission show the entire region emptying out, except for metropolitan centres. The major gainers from this migration flood have been Germany and Austria, and before Brexit, the UK.

By contrast, it is well known that the coastal developmental regions of China are experiencing enormous migration inflow from the mainland, equivalent in scale to the entire population of the European Union. Dynamic regions can be easily recognised by peoples desire to move there, and not away.

The population of Singapore has increased sixfold since its founding. That of Taiwan tripled in the same time period, that of South Korea increase more than two and a half times.

As it was stressed at the beginning, this author believes in degrowth. However, astonishing their development miracles have been, most people in Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea are now living beyond the planetary ecological boundary.

China has managed to lift some 800 million people roughly to the level of the global average.

The situation in Central and Eastern Europe, however, is not better. Stagnation is not the same as degrowth. Degrowth is an orderly transition to no population growth and a stable state economy. There is nothing planned for the economies of Central and Eastern Europe.

These economies have come about through the passive acceptance of low-end manufacturing, primary by German firms. We are not seeing a transition here to a sustainable society, but a slow-motion collapse, where fear-mongering and hate-filled political climates hide the fact that states are captured by corrupt oligarchs, with young people slowly but surely preferring to start their lives in Western Europe.

No, the Visegrad countries have not been a success story.

The article is part of the New Europe 100 project supported by the International Visegrad Fund.

Find out more about the New Europe 100 network here. For updates, follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn.

Democratic security comes at a price. What is yours?By subscribing or donating now gain access to analysis, forecasts and scenarios by leading analysts and reporters who monitor democratic risks and develop policy debate from Central Europe on Central Europe.

Contrary to popular belief, Lorem Ipsum is not simply random text. It has roots in a piece of classical Latin literature from 45 BC, making it over 2000 years

Read the original:

Are the Visegrad Group Countries a Success Story? - Visegrad Insight

Posted in Socio-economic Collapse | Comments Off on Are the Visegrad Group Countries a Success Story? – Visegrad Insight