Daily Archives: January 19, 2021

Donald Trumps departure from office on Wednesday, after his historic second impeachment, will be welcomed by many who decry the rise of global populism. Yet Trump is a symptom, not a cause, of populism whose rise may continue into the 2020s fuelled by the aftermath of the coronavirus crisis.

As of 2020, some 2 billion of the worlds population was governed by populist leaders, including the more than 300 million US populace, according to academic research from the Global Populism Database a comprehensive tracker of populist discourse. That data, from an international network of academics, analysed speeches through textual analysis of key leaders in 40 countries during the last two decades.

What the research found is that leaders from across different continents won power through common campaign tactics, including attacking multinational organisations, so-called fake media, and immigrants. And this electoral success is itself a microcosm of a wider upending of the tectonic plates of the global political landscape.

The research found that, some 20 years ago, only a handful of states with populations over 20 million including Italy, Argentina and Venezuela had leaders classified as populists through their speeches. This was an era that saw the controversial billionaire businessman Silvio Berlusconi as a right-of-centre maverick prime minister in Rome, presaging the rise of Trump; and Hugo Chvez as Venezuelan president.

This-then relatively small populist club expanded significantly during the aftermath of the 2007-08 international financial crisis. But it was not until the last half a dozen years that there has been the biggest rise in populism.

To be sure, there are still some limits on the rise of populism with a significant number of countries including Canada, France and Germany never having a governmental leader in the post-war era that has used populist rhetoric. However, even in these states, the share of the vote going to populist political parties has tripled since 1998.

The research highlights that this latest wave of populism is just one of several over the last several hundred years. Populism has been a recurrent phenomenon in the United States, for instance. Andrew Jackson, who served as US president from 1829 to 1837, won the moniker King Mob and some have drawn comparisons between him and Trump.

However, this latest wave of populism has cast a bigger footprint than perhaps ever before. The Global Populism Database indicates some 2 billion people are therefore today governed by a somewhat/ moderately populist, populist or very populist leader, an increase from 120 million at the turn of the millennium, with the research calling out leaders like Indias Narendra Modi as belonging in the populist camp.

Another key finding is how shades of populism differ across the world. In South America, populism leans towards socialism, albeit with Jair Bolsonaro as a key outlier, whereas current populists in Europe tend to be right of centre.

Looking to the future, one key question is whether this populist phenomenon will tail off in coming years. While that is possible, there is a plausible case that populism will grow. It should be remembered here that, while Trump lost in November, he won more votes than in 2016, and would most likely have been re-elected had the pandemic not struck.

Populism will likely remain at historically high levels for the foreseeable future for two reasons.

First, the coronavirus crisis has triggered a deeper, wider global recession than after the financial crisis of just over a decade ago. While the world is still in the midst of the corona crisis, it is already clear it will be the deepest recession since the World War II, with the largest fraction of economies experiencing declines in per capita output since at least 1870 according to the World Bank.

Yet, it is not just the absolute decline in economic output, but also rising economic inequality that is key. While some affluent cohorts have seen their wealth increase since the pandemic began, including through a booming stock market in many countries, poorer people have often seen their incomes stagnate or worse.

There is also an inter-generational impact too with young people disproportionately likely to lose their jobs. This puts countries at risk of long-term damage to earnings potential and job prospects, fuelling political discontent.

Second, there are some factors completely unrelated to the current economic slump that may also drive greater populism. This includes the disruptive and mobilising role of social media.

There remains debate about how instrumental social media has been in fomenting political populism in recent years. However, whether one sees this new technology as an essential component that translated discontent into concrete support for populism, or accentuated what was already inevitable, indisputably it has played an enabling role that may only grow.

Taken together, Trumps toppling is a setback for global populism, but it cannot be assumed that this political phenomenon has now peaked. The coronavirus crisis has increased the prospect of further political and economic instability in the 2020s which social media may help mobilise.

Views expressed above are the author's own.

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Is the populist tide ebbing? Despite Donald Trumps impending departure, growing global populism is still po - The Times of India Blog

Donald Trumps incitement of a mob attack on the US Capitol was a watershed moment for free speech and the internet. Bans against both the US president and his prominent supporters have spread across social media as well as email and e-commerce services. Parler, a social network popular with neo-Nazis, was ditched from mobile phone app stores and then forced offline entirely. These events suggest that the most momentous year of modern democracy was not 1989 when the Berlin wall fell but 1991, when web servers first became publicly available.

There are two related issues at stake here: the chilling power afforded to huge US corporations to limit free speech; and the vast sums they make from algorithmically privileging and amplifying deliberate disinformation. The doctrines, regulations and laws that govern the web were constructed to foster growth in an immature sector. But the industry has grown into a monster one which threatens democracy by commercialising the swift spread of controversy and lies for political advantage.

What is required is a complete rethink of the ideological biases that have created conditions for tech giants to have such authority and which has laid their users open to manipulation for profit. Social media companies currently do not have legal liability for the consequences of the activities that their platforms enable. Big tech can no longer go unpunished. Companies have had to make judgments about what their customers can expect to see when they visit their sites. It is only right that they are held accountable for the terms and conditions that embed consumer safeguards. It would be a good start if measures within the UK online harms bill, that go some way to protecting users from being exposed to violent extremism and hate, were to be enacted.

In a society people also desire, and need, the ability to express themselves to become fully functioning individuals. Freedom of expression is important in a democracy, where voters need to weigh up competing arguments and appreciate for themselves different ideas. John Milton optimistically wrote in Areopagitica: Let Truth and Falsehood grapple; whoever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter? But 17th-century England did not know 21st-century Silicon Valley. Today, speech takes place online much more so than in public streets. Politics is so polarised that Mr Trump and his Republican allies claimed without any factual basis that electoral fraud was rampant.

Facebook and Twitter can limit, control and censor speech as much as or more than the government. Until now, such firms exempted politicians from their own hate speech policies, arguing that what they said was worthy of public debate. This rests in part on the US supreme court. Legal academic Miguel Schor argued that the bench stood Orwell on his head in 2012 by concluding false statements of fact enjoyed the same protection as core political speech. He said judges feared creating an Orwellian ministry of truth, but said they miscalculated because the US does have an official ministry of truth in the form of the presidents bully pulpit which Trump used to normalise lying.

Silicon Valley bosses did not silence Mr Trump in a fit of conscience, but because they think they can stave off anti-trust actions by a Democrat-controlled Congress. Elizabeth Warren threatened to break up big tech and blasted Facebook for spreading Trumps lies and disinformation. Her plan to turn social media into platform utilities offers a way to advantage social values such as truth telling over the bottom line.

Impunity for corporations, technology and politicians has grown so much that it is incompatible with a functioning democracy. Populists the world over have distorted speech to maintain power by dividing the electorate into separate camps, each convinced that the other is the victim of their opponents ideology. To achieve this, demagogues did not need an authoritarian state. As Mr Trump has demonstrated, an unregulated marketplace of ideas, where companies thrive by debasing politics, was enough.

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The Guardian view of Trump's populism: weaponised and silenced by social media - The Guardian

One must concede that the institutional strengths of the American democratic system have for now got the better of an attempted right-wing coup. Or, if you like, Coup Klux Klan as theTimes ofIndia put the matter imaginatively.

Those institutional strengths, in passing, may not include how Americas law-enforcement personnel often treat black American citizens much like how our own police treat some of our marginalised communities. Although it also remains a fact that a George Floyd occurrence could cause a veritable revolution to happen that India, by and large, is still a stranger to.

Yet, banana republics of the world may be for now excused if they say physician, heal thyself.

Historians fielded by media channels like CNN have of course pointed out how the insurrection of January 6 issues from a long history of racial divide, ever since male black Americans were accorded the right to vote in 1873. Just to recall, eleven Southern states had refused to accept Abraham Lincoln as president and seceded from the Union, leading to the civil war.

Indeed, in 1878, the elections in North Carolina were actually overturned by force by the Klan and other white supremacists, and the whole Reconstruction era was characterised by dour supremacist strategists to deny franchise to black Americans through diverse ploys (including abominable episodes of lynchings), of voter suppression.

In that context, Vladimir Putin may be excused for having remarked on a flawed American electoral system, and sundry commentators too for having pointed fingers at how the American state has often supported insurrections of the January 6 kind, recent examples being Venezuela and Bolivia. Not to forget the infamous support given to the mafia-style right-wing revolt led in 1991 by a thug-like Boris Yeltsin in Russia.

Protesters wave American and Confederate flags before they stormed the US Capitol Building in Washington, US January 6, 2021. Photo: Reuters/Shannon Stapleton/File Photo

Trumpism retains a vast constituency

It should not be forgotten that some 75 million Americans voted for Donald Trump. He may in the bitter and violent end have been duly ousted, but Trumpism continues to retain a vast constituency.

Even as Trumpism (if you like, a new contemporary term for what Europe experienced a century ago) afflicts at least half a dozen modern states worldwide today.

So, how do we understand Trumpism of our time?

First, in economic terms, I am with those analysts who see the rise of Trumpism as, foremost, an underling push-back worldwide against the economic thesis of globalisation.

If the globalising slogan of 1848 workers of the world unite; you have nothing to lose but your chains had sought to reorient the productive forces and material yield of the world to meet the just requirements and deserts of the labouring who were the producers of wealth, the second call to globalisation that was unleashed with the Washington Consensus of 1990 could have been interpreted to read exploiters of the world unite; you have nothing to lose but your profits.

The unprecedented flow of moneys across national boundaries (hot money) that followed that consensus among the endowed (monopolised by the G-7 coterie) had the direct consequence of relegating the real economies of the world to subsidiary status. The fall-out the reform came to be an unconscionable centralisation of wealth in fewer and fewer hands, chiefly through the quick money turn-overs in stock markets, to the exclusion of such long-term investments as lift the living standards of the vast masses. (Not that Trumpist populism was to carry any bonanzas for those on whose behalf the existing economic elite were to be challenged.)

Also Read: The Trump Coup DEtat and Insurrection Was Long in the Making, And Will Continue

The new global economic elite came to ground its clout in a corresponding cultural supremacy that was perceived to cause a top-down schism between a new global Ivy League and a new colonised hoi polloi. This new clout of international finance capital began to be read back into a new politics of identities on either side of the phenomenon.

This was clearly not a phenomenon that a global working class, shattered by a rampant digital technology, could combat anymore with success through classic forms of resistance.

Failing any global mobilisation from the Left, a familiar old and parochial nationalism of the deprived underdog stepped in from the Right to combat the global reform that was seen to cannibalise the conservative Right itself.

Those who understood this also understood that the dominant systemic arrangements of the world, including among states that were designated democracies, had come to be closed archives of power that catered almost exclusively to the marauding needs of global capital.

Trumpism thus came to be a sort of revolt from below, but one that could no longer be organised on accepted principles of constitutionalism.

Donald Trump. Photo: Reuters/Rick Wilking

The task required a new paradigm of leadership and a new paradigm of mass organisation.

The new leader of this epistemic shift had to designate for himself a justification and a status that drew upon sources of legitimation that would conflict with what democratic rule books prescribed.

That, in turn, required a reorientation of identities, both on behalf of those who came to lead the push-back and those who were to be made to follow the lead.

A new paradigm

Elections now were to be won by first creating an extra-constitutional paradigm of selective citizen entitlement grounded in an appeal to the victimhood of identities, be it of race, religion, region, or linguistic orientation.

Appeal came to be made to new cultural majorities to the effect that elite minorities had them in thrall, and that endowed enemies were everywhere who dictated the rights and wrongs of citizenship and of values that must inform legitimate power-structures.

In America, for example, Evangelist white Christians, suburban white housewives, non-collegiate white males who belonged to a depressed blue working class came to be organised in a new political contract as populations who had been ripped off by a politics of multi-racialism that appeased the black American and the immigrant outsider.

This new indigenism, of course, shut its ears to such historical facts as, for example, that only the native American Indians could justly claim the status of originary inhabitants of the land, and that American capitalism was largely a yield first of black slave labour before any other forces of production could come into play.

Not surprisingly, the new leader in Washington understood that he had to recast himself as Washingtons enemy. And, in order to overcome the systemic verities of Washington, he had to recast himself as a new Loius XIV and declare, in effect, Lest cest moi (I am the state).

The construction of a new cultist leadership enjoined that the state be subsumed into the person of the leader.

And the new cultist leader had a new political agenda to forge and propagate:

The truth of all things was now to be seen as identical with the pronouncements of the leader; entrenched channels of information, most of all the liberal media, was to be reconstructed as purveyor of fake news; liberal elites were to be rubbished as enemies of the extra-parliamentary majority which actually constituted the nation; those who manned the institutions of the pseudo and complicit democratic state were to understand that their legitimation could come only from their loyalty to the cult-leader; new loyalists were to be put in places of authority; a code of dog-whistles was to be assiduously framed one to which the new majority would respond on the instant, requiring neither deliberation nor justification, nor systemic sanction; bands of vigilantes (who could call themselves Proud Boys) were to be cultivated who could be trusted to use voluntary muscle as and when required to quell the voices of opposition; sections of the population were to be declared interlopers without locus in the republic. Laws and pardons were to apply selectively to different segments of the populace, some to be hounded eternally, others never to be touched (ring a bell?).

Also Read: Inside Donald Trump and Barrs Last-Minute Killing Spree

Trumps refusal to accept the results of the American Presidential election of 2020 was thus propagated not as a repudiation of the democratic process but of an elite conspiracy to rob the real people of their ownership of the nation. The slogan that Trump gave as the culminating dog-whistle let us take back our country was thus not to be seen as a seditious calling, but an invocation to a return to a lost authenticity of possession, one notified by the Confederate flags that were in evidence at the site of the violent insurrection on Capitol Hill. That an Indian tricolor was also carried by some insurrectionists, of course, carries food for thought for Indian citizens who may be as anxious about the new turn of events here as there. One is left to imagine that such a display may, after all, have issued from the slogan Ab ki baar Trump sarkar.

A screengrab from the viral video. Photo: Twitter@aletweetsnews

The siege of that symbol of the American republic was thus the final putsch by a violent rogue right-wing against a pusillanimous progenitor constitutional right-wing,as much as against a democratic elite which was perceived to have usurped America from those who had the first right to it a sort of a renewed burning of the Reichstag.

One need not here belabour the quite obvious parallels of this package and agenda in other states of the world today, but no close watcher may have any difficulty in deciphering the contents and the modus operandi.

Post the assault on the Capitol, Narendra Modi has cryptically remarked that unlawful protests cannot subvert democracy, but one does not quite know whether, for example, the assault on the Babri mosque in 1992 would in his view qualify as an unlawful protest, or what his view might be of the uninhibited vigilante assaults that have interminably accompanied his tenure in the highest office, that as in the case of the Capitol event took the life of a law-enforcement officer in the state of Uttar Pradesh.

What seems certain is that lawful farmers protests of the kind now in evidence may be all too necessary to shore up a democratic order whose moral and procedural verities have come to be massively degraded.

As stated at the outset, the mechanics of the constitutional right-wing stood fast in the end. Trumps more institutional and legal attempts at overturning the peoples verdict were rebuffed in court after court by judges, some of whom he had appointed in the belief that they would stand him in good stead in his hour of need. Nor did Americas reputed media outlets, barring of course their own godi media (captive media) like the Fox News channel outlets, succumb, or electoral officials, including officials of his own Republican Party give in to his shamelessly proferred instructions to falsify the count. Also to note, that despite consequences to their own electoral prospects in the coming years, unflinchingly critical, even damning voices have come to be raised by scions of Trumps own party against his incitement to violence and insurrection.

It is sadly not at all certain that in the other parts of the world where Trumpism reigns, such a concerted push-back from the systemic branches of the state may be forthcoming, were matters to come to a parallel pass.

Also Read: The Past, Present and Future of Indias Capitol Hill Moment

Trumps exit from office nonetheless gives little hope that this will spell the end of Trumpism. Our analysis suggests that its ideological roots and resentments are far too deep, and no business-as-usual politics from the centre-right, however more decently democratic, may be sufficient guarantee against its return. This is true as much of Trumpism in other countries as of Trumpism in the now not-so United States of America.

If the distorted assumptions of what used to be the tenets of liberal democracy are to be salvaged from their innate vulnerability to right-wing lurches first of a constitutional/democratic sort, and then of the Trumpian variety, the answer can come only from an open-eyed critique of those fancy assumptions from a reasoned politics of the centre-left, and mass movements whose genius, as of the current farmers movement in India, sentiently rejects the enticements, and fake proclamations of right-wing false prophets.

But so great now is the usurpation of the tools and assets of the so-called democratic world in the hands of the right-wing that battling it from the Left is far more arduous a task than a David-Goliath paradigm.

The push-back against Trumpism everywhere must come from a new, all-encompassing covenant of civic citizenship which can successfully expose the false constructions of a presumed real nationalism and, through relentless analysis, propagation, and mass mobilisation show it up for what it is a new fascism of our time.

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Trump Is Gone but Trumpism Is Rampant: The Globalisation of Populism - The Wire

What can we make of Clive Palmer?

This week, he announced his United Australia Party (UAP) would not contest the upcoming West Australian state election on March 13.

After a dismal showing in the October 2019 Queensland poll, where does this leave his political prospects?

Given Palmers love of publicity stunts and populist policies, one might be tempted to see him as a miniature, Antipodean Donald Trump but that would be misleading.

Trump was able to garner massive support in segments of the American population, whereas Palmers UAP only managed 3.43% of first preference votes in the lower house at the 2019 federal election.

American-style populism does not resonate with large numbers of Australians. Australian political traditions are quite different to those of America especially in terms of welfare and health provision. Those who seek to take the populist route find it a hard road.

In the 2019 election One Nation and United Australia combined only managed to win 7.76% of the Senate vote.

Given the small base on which the likes of Palmer and One Nations Pauline Hanson have to work, one wonders what they now hope to achieve.

The current situation with COVID-19 might provide a clue as to why they have failed to spark a populist surge in Australia.

Palmers major contribution to the COVID world was his unsuccessful High Court challenge to force Western Australia to open its borders.

The last 12 months has demonstrated the significance of quarantine culture in Australia, a term first coined by cultural historian John Williams in the 1990s.

The natural instinct of Australians is to close borders against outside threats, be they national or state. The only partial exception to this rule at the moment is New South Wales the one part of Australia that had a vigorous free trade (or internationalist) political culture in the 19th century.

Read more: WA border challenge: why states, not courts, need to make the hard calls during health emergencies

In late 19th century and early 20th century Australia, writers such as WG Spence and magazines like The Bulletin talked about a desire to protect Australia against a harsh outside world and, if possible, limit the operation of international finance. The ideal was an Australia not dependent on the rest of the world.

In this regard, it is also worth recalling that one of the arguments often given for restricting Chinese immigration at the time was they were seen as carrying diseases into Australia.

Read more: What Clive Palmer must now ask himself: would China's 'bastards' buy a mine from him?

This was a form of populism but one quite different to the American version. It sought to protect Australia and Australians from the outside world, not to assert their right to liberty.

The COVID pandemic seems to have reignited this desire to protect Australians from an outside threat. The most remarkable aspect of this development has been the way in which this desire for protection has devolved to the state level.

Moves to close borders and institute quite draconian measures to halt the spread of the virus have been generally popular. Australians, it would seem, are more interested in being protected than they are in asserting their rights to do as they please.

This makes life quite difficult for someone such as Palmer, who has pushed for freedoms and border openings.

No wonder he has decided not to contest the WA state election. He is not in tune with the popular mood, which has strongly backed Labor Premier Mark McGowans hard border approach. It is not the time for libertarian populism.

It is difficult to know how long this protectionist attitude will last. One suspects the current situation with China has also fed into it. The mood is one of a threatening world.

From here, two comments are worth making.

The first is political. Prime Minister Scott Morrison will need to cultivate this threatening mood if he is to succeed at the next federal election, which could be held as early as August. He will need to convince Australians he is the leader who will protect them most effectively. This means going slowly, slowly on things such as opening the international border.

The second is economic. Even in the 1890s, the Australian economy depended on international trade through the sale of wool. The idea Australia could operate independently of other countries was a fantasy.

The same is true today. The borders will need to re-open and students and tourists let in.

Morrison will have to perform a juggling act. He must appear to be providing protection even as he appreciates protection can only go so far.

In the meantime, the prospects look grim for populists such as Palmer and Hanson.

The prime minister and his coalition have the opportunity to steal many of their supporters. The pandemic shows that to be successful in Australian politics, leaders needs to pose as the protector of the people, not promise more freedom and more openness.

I suspect Morrison understands this very well.

Read more: 2021 is the year Australia's international student crisis really bites

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Is it curtains for Clive? What COVID means for populism in Australia - The Conversation AU

Alongside the COVID-19 virus, which has infected over 23 million in the United States and, regrettably, killed almost 400,000, there is another virus that is now infecting at least twice as many than COVID-19 in America. That virus is properly termed populism, defined as resentment among ordinary people that democratic institutions (legislature, executive, judiciary, the media, big business, academia, etc) and their leaders only serve the elite few and disregard the masses of the people.

The populist virus is no more American than COVID-19 was Chinese. Obviously, the virus infects and is spread by populist leaders like Donald Trump. But we should remember that the three most populous democracies in the world of 2020-2021, other than the United States, are led by populists, namely, Narendra Modi of India, Joko Wikodi of Indonesia, and Jair Bolsonare of Brazil. Regrettably, to one extent or another, leaders in other democratic states demonstrate tendencies in the populist direction.

The most dangerous, and often fatal, variant of the virus is insurrectionary activity against democratic institutions and constitutional rule such as played out before the very eyes of 100s of millions of people in Washington on January 6. Similar activity is being planned in the 50 mainland states in America. In the United States, this virus and its insurrectionary variant is obviously reflected in and fuelled by white supremacists angry at the browning of America and supported by white racists distressed by the apparent erosion of white privilege. However, not only white racists are vulnerable to this virus in the United States or elsewhere. Clearly, this is not the driving force in India, Indonesia, and Brazil. Nor does this virus infect only uneducated or white malcontents.

President Trump, for example, in the 2020 elections, increased his voter support over 2016 among black males and other minority groups. Indeed, the January 6 insurrection against the United States constitution, the Congress, and the election rulings of the Supreme Court, as well as other authorities was and is supported by a most diverse group. Among them, war veterans who have given patriotic service to the United States such as Ashli Babbit, who served for 14 years in the US Air Force and who her husband described as very opinionated but caring, sweet, thoughtful. She was shot and killed by a police officer while breaking into the Senate offices. As well, the insurrection was fomented and supported by blacks like the social media personality Alli Alexander. Most interestingly, it was provided with leadership by outstanding Princeton and Harvard graduates like Ted Cruz. Senator Cruz, along with seven other Republican senators and 139 Republican Congressional representatives, voted on the night of January 6 to overturn the election results even after having to flee for their lives and being escorted back to the chamber by heavily armed security personnel following the attack on the Congress by the insurrectionary mob.

The truth is that democracy is in crisis, not only in the United States, but in counties around the world. A 2020 Cambridge University study found the highest level of democratic dissatisfaction and the lowest expression of satisfaction with democracy since 1995 in countries worldwide. The average satisfaction level was 42.5 per cent. In the Western Hemisphere, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of 2017 found similarly low levels of satisfaction with democracy. Among 18 countries, Jamaica was among the lowest, at 32.2 per cent. Only the people of Colombia, Panama, and Peru recorded lower levels of satisfaction.

The crisis reflects itself in declining percentages of electorates who turn out to vote in all regions of the world. Jamaicas turnout of 37.8 per cent in 2020 was the lowest in the region with the exception of Haiti. Low electoral support in elections for governments and oppositions is one manifestation of distrust in a wide range of democratic institutions (political parties, police, elections). Most worrisome, the other side of that coin, is growing numbers who have the crazy idea that only military authoritarian and undemocratic solutions can deal with crime and corruption. This sentiment, according to the 2017 LAPOP study, is now held by a majority of the Jamaican people.

Why is there this growing dissatisfaction and turn to authoritarianism among people across the world? The highly respected Edelman Trust Barometer of 2020, examining the major market economies, including the United States, puts it, and I agree, this way: Distrust is being driven by a growing sense of inequity and unfairness in the system. The perception is that institutions increasingly serve the interest of the few over everyone. Government, more than any institution, is seen as least fair, 57 per cent of the general population say government serves the interests of only the few ... .

This is an increase over the Global Corruption Barometer findings. At that time, surveys of 114,000 people in 107 countries in 2014 found that 54 per cent believed that government is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves. Only in the Scandinavian countries did a majority feel otherwise. This perception is borne out by the reality revealed in the 2020 Commitment to Reduce Inequality study of taxation policy, social protection, and labour rights in over 150 countries. This study disclosed that these policies fuelled inequity revealed dramatically in the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

As with the pandemic, there are protocols that can mitigate the conditions that give rise to the populist virus.

First, regular sanitisation. This requires systemic review and reform of the rules and behaviour of all democratic institutions to discern and rectify outcomes that produce inequity and unfairness. This regular cleansing must apply to governmental bodies and (Parliament, Cabinet, judiciary) and functionaries as well as to economic and social policy, the application of codes of conduct, media coverage, and unethical business behaviour.

Second, public-awareness building and assertiveness must be strengthened to detect, expose, and resist words and deeds, particularly of political leaders, hostile to constitutional democratic principles of transparency and accountability.

Third, donation distancing. Big contributors who fund political parties and leaders must be especially alert to the early signs of authoritarianism even as they might well be short-run beneficiaries of corruption and cronyism from politicians and high public officials. In the long run, a major contributor to the populist virus and its insurrectionary variant in the US was continued support before the 11th-hour withdrawal of financial support from Trumpists by big manufacturers and financial institutions such as Goldman Sachs, Citi Group, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan Chase & Co.

Fourth, those on the front line of resistance to authoritarianism are the judges, independent institutions such as parliamentary commissions (Integrity Commission, Electoral Commission, public defenders, Auditor Generals Department, etc), permanent secretaries, law-enforcement officials, media owners and managers. They have to be constantly nourished on an integrity diet composed primarily of regular training and sensitisation in the components of ethical conduct. Front-line officials resisting wrong and doing the right thing are among the first line of defence against the populist virus.

- Professor Trevor Munroe CD, DPhil (Oxford), is principal director, National Integrity Action. Send feedback to info.niajamaica.org or columns@gleanerjm.com.

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Trevor Munroe | Developing a vaccine against the populist virus and its insurrectionary variant - Jamaica Gleaner

Turning the crowd into "the people"

Populism is a complex and contested political concept. It is nevertheless identifiable by certain characteristics. First, of course, it often involves some form of demagoguery, a rhetorical device that Donald Trump masters perfectly, as rhetoric professor Jennifer Mercieca has shown. "You're stronger, you're smarter. You've got more going than anybody," he told his audience on January 6. He also praised the crowd's pride and supposed patriotism, calling out "a deep and enduring love for America in our hearts [...] an overwhelming pride in this great country." But flattery in itself does not define populism.

As political scientist Jan-Werner Mller has demonstrated, what characterizes populism is above all a very restrictive and exclusive definition of "the people." In his inaugural speech, President Trump contrasted the "forgotten people" with a corrupt elite. When he addressed his supporters on January 6, he said: "You are the real people" which he defined as "the people that built this nation", and contrary to "the people that tore down our nation". Trump's "American people" are also the people who "do not believe the corrupt fake news anymore".

As used by Trump, "the people" is both a rhetorical construction and an embodied metaphor found in phrasing like "the incredible patriots here today" and "the magnitude of the crowd" stretching "all the way to the monument in Washington." For the President, size is a sign of moral virtue: "As this enormous crowd shows," he says, "we have truth and justice on our side."

As many observers have noted, Trump is obsessed with crowd size. One of the very first lies from his spokesperson regarded the size of the 2016 inauguration crowd, how it was bigger than Obama's in 2009, despite clear evidence to the contrary. This was the first of thousands of "alternative facts" that came to define Trump's presidency.

Another characteristic of Trump's "people" is their victim status. They are the victims of a corrupt system and the "fake news media". He also makes a link between "the country that has had enough" and a we who will "not take it any longer" because "that's what this is all about." Trump's people identify with him through this victimisation. Hence the use of the subject pronoun we. "It's incredible what we have to go through" he laments, building a cognitive bias that favors adherence to his numerous falsehoods.

Victimisation is an essential element of the populist discourse. It emphasises the innocence and the purity of the people (and their leader). It makes any future action, even illegal, morally justifiable. "When you catch someone in the act of fraud," said the President, "you're allowed to follow very different rules." In other words, it gives a blank check for illegal actions that will happen next.

This rhetoric of victimisation is also illustrated by the construction of the figure of an enemy who is no longer a foreign outsider but fellow Americans, as I have analysed thoroughly elsewhere.

In Trump's "Save America" speech, this enemy is primarily the news media. They "suppress speech," and even "thought". They are the "enemy of the people" and "the biggest problem we have in this country". The expression "enemy of the people" is not new: it has its origins in the Roman Republic and was used during the French Revolution. But there is a certain irony in Trump using a term made particularly popular by the Soviet Union while comparing the suppression by the media to "what happens in a communist country."

This view of the "enemy press" echoes that of Richard Nixon, as outlined in a recent article by RonNell Andersen Jones and Lisa Grow Sun. But Trump is much more vehement in his public attacks. And the enemies he mentioned are not limited to the press: he also attacked the "big tech" who "rigged the election," the Democrats and the "radical left" that will "destroy our country," the Republicans such as Mitch McConnell, Bill Barr, and Liz Cheney who refused to back his false claims, or the Supreme Court that "hurts our country".

The populist discourse also requires the construction of a permanent crisis. The enumeration of numerous enemies leads to an implacable logic: "Our country has been under siege". This type of war lexicon is all the more effective that the emotional charge is reinforced with the evocation of children:

"They also want to indoctrinate your children at school by teaching them things that aren't so. They want to indoctrinate your children. It's all part of the comprehensive assault on our democracy."

This threat of "indoctrination of children'' validates the policy in favor of private schools put in place by the Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos. It may also echo QAnon's conspiracy theories that portray Donald Trump as the hero of a struggle against the "deep state" and a supposed cabal of Democratic politicians and celebrities baselessly accused of abusing children. But, more generally, what is at stake is the very existence of the nation: "If you don't fight like hell," the President warned, "you won't have a country anymore". So now, said the President, "the American people [are] finally standing up and saying, "No".

By standing up and fighting, Trump's "people" can become heroic. It is common for US Presidents to rely on the trope of the hero, a figure whose strength is always kept in check by virtue. Donald Trump presents a very different narrative where heroism is exclusively defined by unchecked strength, to the point that strength is a virtue in and of itself, as I developed previously in my research. "You have to show strength, and you have to be strong," he repeated, and members of Congress who promised to oppose the certification of votes became "warriors".

The claim that "We will not be intimidated into accepting the hoaxes and the lies" is also a way to refuse to be weak. After repeating the term "weak Republicans" several times, Trump clearly showed he enjoyed this expression, insisting he was going to use the term from then on.

This binary view of strength vs weakness echoes a very conservative and gendered narrative that appeals to Donald Trump's base, especially evangelicals: Trump's hypermasculinity is contrasted to the Democrats' enlightened masculinity, portrayed as weak and feminine. An extreme incarnation of this hypermasculinity can be found in the neo-fascist organisation Proud Boys present among his supporters.

At the end of his speech, when Trump encouraged his supporters to take action by going to Capitol Hill, he asked the crowd to "give our Republicans - the weak ones, because the strong ones don't need any of our help [...] - the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country".

As the speech reached its crescendo, Trump emphasised his supporters' strong emotional bond with him, and his with them. "We're going to walk down, and I'll be there with you", he promised, as if they would be protected by a Christ-like presence that did not even have to materialise - and it didn't. Instead, as what was now a mob moved toward the Capitol, Trump was driven back to the White House, where he watched the assault unfold on live television.

The tragic events of January 6 and their aftermath are now well known. Five people died, including police officer Brian Sicknick, who was beaten to death by the pro-Trump mob. Despite the violent attack, Congress was able to reconvene and formally recognize the victory of President-elect Joe Biden and Vice-President-elect Kamala Harris. But the risk was grave and the wounds deep.

All of this was made possible by Donald Trump's ability and willingness to heighten and take advantage of his supporters' sense of exclusion (economic, social or otherwise), fear of cultural and identity dispossession, and distrust toward US institutions. Trump's populist narrative and coded language gave them a feeling of empowerment and encouraged them to imagine that a violent attack on Congress would be a patriotic, heroic act.

This is partly why, despite what happened on Capitol Hill, his approval rating remains at 40 percent. If his popularity among his voters may have slightly declined, it is still close to 80 percent, and about one in five Republicans (22 percent according to Reuters-Ipsos, or nearly 15 million Americans) claims to support the rioters' actions. Most importantly, a large majority of them continue to believe what the President has been saying for months: that the election was "rigged", and that Joe Biden is therefore illegitimately President-elect.

With the beginning of another impeachment procedure against Donald Trump and the threat of further attacks by his supporters on American institutions and elected officials in Washington and across the nation, and a pandemic, the next few days, weeks, and even months could prove crucial for American democracy.

Jrme Viala-Gaudefroy is an assistant lecturer at CY Cergy Paris Universit.

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Opinion: How Donald Trump's populist narrative led directly to the assault on the US Capitol - Newshub

Democracy was in a coma even before the election of Donald Trump, and power will once again be for the people and for the people only under new political structures, explains political scientist Hlne Landemore, professor at the University of Yale.

She defends assemblies of non-politicians chosen by lot, such as the one that decided on changes to the Icelandic Constitution and the one that formulates environmental policy in France.

We must also change the private sphere, said Landemore, 45, who launched the Work Manifesto last year, along with eight other researchers. Instead of spreading the idea that managers should be at the forefront of politics, she says, the key is to bring politics to business. Businesses are too important to be in the hands of business people, he says.

The professor, who defines herself as a radical democrat, believes it is time to change the way decisions are made: There has been almost a coup dtat in the United States. How far will we have to- get us off before trying something more drastic?

For her, the invasion of the United States Congress failed only because the American president did not stimulate his supporters to the extreme, and the message that will be left to other populist leaders around the world will be that he There is no need to be afraid to explicitly encourage violence. .

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Is Trumps defeat any relief for anyone who has seen American democracy in jeopardy? I do not believe. Even though Trump is arrested, there is a new form of populism, with new followers and people like [o senador republicano] Ted Cruz ready to follow this path, perhaps in a more dangerous way, however planned.

Why would this be a new populism? In the United States, there was no such thing for decades. But, in fact, there is nothing new about demagogues using populist troops. Some of my colleagues, like [o professor de filosofia de Yale] Jason Stanley, called it fascism from the start, under criticism from those who saw Trump as a mere clown wanting to increase his visibility.

Is it too much to see fascism in Trump? I dont think he had a fascist project at the start. But he thirsts for blood, hes a tyrant [assediador, quem vive a intimidar os que considera vulnerveis]. Without meeting any resistance, especially among the republicans, fascism grew in him. He realized that it would give him more power. Why would he stop? His bossy, chauvinistic, and sexist personality thrived in a Republican environment he thought he could control, but he was not.

How and when do you realize the line has been crossed? With stalkers, its never too early to react. We let Trump continue because we were complacent. High alert should have gone up in election debates with Hillary Clinton already, when he said he would not accept defeat in the election. He made it clear that he had no intention of following the rules.

Trump is admired by other leaders, like Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. What message do you get from the invasion of Congress and its reaction? Do they discourage coup attempts? No. What leaders like Bolsonaro will learn is that Trump was not bold enough. As an opportunist, he made a calculation to keep open the possibility of returning in 2024. He incited the coup, but it was not until the end.

The lesson for Bolsonaro is that there is no need to be afraid of explicitly encouraging violence. If Bolsonaro decides the only strategy is to be bold and burn all bridges, as Machiavelli might recommend pick one goal and go with everything Brazil will be in trouble, because it is very easy to reclaim power. See how few police officers were on Capitol Hill. How people came together to invade you. The speed with which people were ready to support the coup, which narrowly failed.

Doesnt the failure of the coup show that the institutions worked? I am very pessimistic. For me, the rebels didnt go to extremes because Trump didnt explicitly order it. But, if he had reached the limit, what would have happened? Its counterfactual, hard to imagine, but disturbing. And what can happen in countries where desperation or tolerance for violence is greatest?

Some politicians speak in dialogue with the other party to heal the polarization. Is it viable in this environment of hate towards the other on both sides of the table? This will not happen through classic political structures. Party leaders set gasoline on fire because polarization benefits them.

I would start with a sort of citizens assembly with the power to enforce its decisions, for example on immigration policies or on how to get out of the Covid-19 crisis.

I just dont see how to overcome 40 years of polarization, which almost perfectly accompanies rising inequalities. Reducing inequalities is a prerequisite, because it generates a lot of resentment and it inflames populism.

What do the figures from the US Congress tell us? That it is controlled by the richest 10% for the richest 10%, especially for the 1%. The ideology of the ruling class was to pretend that it remains democracy, when it is a plutocracy, an elitocracy disguised as democracy.

People start to think, if its democracy, Im not interested; I prefer an authoritarian leader who fights corruption and reduces the chasm .

What is mrs. said is that democracy was already in a coma? Its a step beyond warnings that she might die from the poison inside, as she contends. [o professor de Harvard Steven] Levitsky? Levitsky and [Daniel] Ziblatt [autores de Como as Democracias Morrem] have a minimal definition of what democracy is. It comes down to the rule of law and constitutional rules. It is not about the power exercised by the people for the people. They like it to be exercised in the name of the majority and benefit the people.

Perhaps the acceptable obstacle has gone too far. Deregulation and deindustrialisation have been too rapid and brutal. Democracy, in addition to not being for the people, has ceased to be for the people. And the left was an accomplice. They have also become a party for the 10 percent Caviar Democrats. The workers preferred Trump, who speaks at least their language.

Like Mrs. is it politically situated? As a social democrat. Perhaps it is hardly more correct to speak of a radical proceduralist, or a radical democrat, because I no longer focus on public policies and I think that elections are not enough; we have to change the way we decide.

The people we empower will never dare to exceed certain limits. There is no good that comes from a Congress in which 82% of the membership is the richest 10%. I defend citizens assemblies with decision-making power, whose decisions are implemented by the government. Its not a perfect solution, but its worth a try.

We are at a time when there was almost a coup dtat in the United States. How far will we have to go down before we try something more drastic?

Mrs. he is part of a group which has just launched a manifesto for the democratization of work. Is this another more radical attempt? One of the strongest phrases in [senador republicano] Mitt Romney, when he ran against Barack Obama in the 2012 election, said, Im a manager, a businessman. Thats why I have to take control of the government . Trump also used this argument: I know how to run a business, I will know how to run the country. Neoliberalism has produced businessmen who think they are better able to govern than politicians.

You have to turn around. Companies are too important to be in the hands of businessmen, especially with the impact they have on the public sphere. We need companies to be guided by people who understand the democratic conditions of political life, who oblige companies to assume their responsibilities.

Instead of putting managers in politics, we need to put politicians in business. Democratize the economy. Political democracy is impossible if there are no democratic enterprises in which workers have power, or democratic families in which their members have power.

The criticism will be that you have to be profitable, economically viable. Yes, but society can create the conditions. Laws, regulations, financial mechanisms can support. Our next step will be to work with companies willing to try new forms of governance. There are executives who understand that democracy will only be secure if the corporate world also changes.

You describe yourself as a group of researchers. Does gender make a difference? It wasnt intentional, but its a really collaborative group, not ego driven. Some of us have a certain visibility, but from the beginning it was a collective project. Gender matters, at the end of the day, because women end up, by necessity, being more collaborative.

But would a male member be rejected? I think were going to keep the group of nine women because its working well, but weve already worked with men. We didnt come to theorize about that, but basically we didnt want to become hostage to the traditional actors in this field, who are men, and have a man who represents the group. We want no one to represent us. We just want to be a group.

Hlne Landemore, 45,

she has been professor of political science at Yale University since 2009. Franco-American, holds a masters degree in political science from Sciences-Po (Paris) and in philosophy from the Sorbonne-Paris 1, and a doctorate in political science from Harvard University. Research democratic theory, the philosophy of economics, and democracy in the workplace, among other topics.

She is the author of Open Democracy (Princeton University Press 2020, without translation in Brazil), in which she defends new forms of democratic representation based on a drawing, and co-founder of the Democratizing Work movement.

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Companies are too big to be in the hands of businessmen, says researcher 1/18/2021 Worldwide - KSU | The Sentinel Newspaper