Daily Archives: November 29, 2020

When it comes to making news about protests and action for liberal causes, schools in New England seem to dominate the news. Weve seen violence and protests surrounding visits from Charles Murray and Ryszard Legutko at Middlebury College. Brown University spent hundreds of millions of dollars in response to student protests related to questions of diversity and inclusion. Yale has seen numerous protests and student arrests and students there attacked and harassed a faculty couple who headed a residential college in 2015 claiming that they felt unsafe because of an email message about Halloween costumes.

While protests in other parts of the country do make news, such as the recent troubles relating to the police at Northwestern, it appears that students in New England are far more likely to engage in such actions.

Thanks to new data behind the 2020 College Free Speech Rankings from RealClearEducation, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), and survey firm College Pulse representing the largest study of student attitudes toward speech to date we know that students enrolled in the higher education institutions in New England are appreciably more liberal and open to shutting down speech and expression than the overwhelming majority of college students.

With almost 20,000 students in FIRE survey sample, it is possible to break the national sample down into regional groups and the data makes it abundantly clear that those enrolled in New England are notably different.

The General Social Survey shows that political ideology in the United States has been remarkably consistent since the 1970s and that liberals are not dominant. In the most recent sample, the survey found that 28% of Americans identify as liberal, 31% as conservative, and the balance of 37% are in the middle as moderates. In contrast, 50% of college students are liberal, 26% are conservative and the minority 23% are moderates. College students demonstrate a significant liberal lean.

But this lean is not uniform. In New England, the data reveal that college students live in a huge bubble where there are 5 liberals for every 1 conservative. 71% of New England college students identify as liberal and just 15% conservative and 14% moderate. This is by far the most lopsided region in the nation.

The most similar regions to New England, ideologically, are the West Coast and Mid-Atlantic regions. 59% of students in both regions identify as liberal with just a fifth of their students holding conservative views, meaning there are three liberal undergraduates for every conservative student in those regions. This breakdown is far off the national average.

Looking at other regions in the United States, liberal student dominance disappears. Take the Mountain region 8 states that are mixed ideologically with rural areas and big and growing cities such as Denver and Phoenix and the ideological balance is far less extreme. Here about a quarter of students are moderate and in the middle with a little more than a third identifying as conservative and 41% stating that they are liberal. In fact, if one excludes the three extreme liberal regions, the remaining 6 divisions are far more diverse with 46% of students being liberal, a quarter moderate, and about a third (30%) conservative.

The differences between some schools are striking. At the University of Arizona in Tempe there are 1.5 liberals for every conservative. But Brown in Rhode Island has 12 liberal students for every conservative.

Ideological imbalance is problematic in and of itself if you value viewpoint diversity in the classroom, but it is also the case that students in New England are far more likely to believe that actions to shut down speech are acceptable.

When asked whether it is ever appropriate to shout down or try to prevent someone from speaking on campus, 61% of students found that this was acceptable, nationally. But in New England 70% of students thought preventing a speaker was talking was justified in at least some circumstances. This is in stark comparison to regions like East South Central, home to the Universities of Tennessee and Alabama, where just half of the students found such behavior acceptable.

Similarly, when asked about the acceptability of blocking other students from entering a campus event, almost half (48%) of New England students thought this tactic would be an acceptable way to protest a campus speaker. About 30% of students in the East South Central, the Mountain, West North Central, and West South Central a nearly 20-point difference felt that blocking an entrance was acceptable.

Put somewhat differently, 51% of Yale students would approve of tactics which would prevent students from hearing an opinion on their campus, but just 35% at the Universities of Missouri which itself made national attention when a faculty member and students tried to forcibly block the press from covering a demonstration would be willing to block others from attending an event.

New England schools are collectively an outlier in terms of both student liberalism and their willingness to shut down speech. And the perception that protests against speakers are more common in New England is born out in the data. This lopsided liberal trend matches earlier work, which revealed a similar imbalance, where liberal professors outnumber conservative professors 28 to 1 for New England colleges and universities. And while finding a conservative professor in New England is exceedingly rare and far out of step with the national ratio of 6 to 1, many regions in the country are not as homogenous.

Ideological imbalance among students is a problem, especially in New England. It is crucial that students of all ideological backgrounds encounter a multitude of ideas in college.

But its important to note that the student imbalance in New England is far less one-sided than the faculty imbalance there. And faculty imbalance may be a far more pressing problem if one values viewpoint diversity. Its more readily fixable too, if schools would only prioritize the hiring of a more ideologically diverse faculty and work to ensure that all faculty strive to present a multitude of views and intellectual traditions in their classrooms.

Samuel J. Abrams is professor of politics at Sarah Lawrence College and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. This article is part of a series of opinion essays on the topic of free speech on campus, coinciding with the launch of the 2020 College Free Speech Rankings. It was first published on Real Clear Education.

More here:

Are students liberal? Yes but not everywhere - MassLive.com

In his bid against President Donald Trump, President-elect Joe Biden had argued for a liberal internationalist foreign policy to once more place America at the head of the table. In contrast to Trumps America First conduct, Biden wants the US to re-assume its leadership of global governance issues, embrace advocacy of democratic values and human rights, and sustain its network of security partnerships. Towards such a restorationist agenda to rescue US foreign policy, Biden recently announced nominations to key foreign policy and national security posts, with most being veterans of the Barack Obama administration. However, Bidens decision to nominate former colleagues (and some close confidants) also reflects careful deliberation.

Not just Obama 3.0

Bidens cabinet is a departure from the experience of the Trump cabinet. The latter often oversaw intense factional conflicts, with an odd combination of supposed adults in the room (like Jim Mattis, H R McMaster), neoconservatives (like John Bolton), political acolytes (like Mike Pompeo, Nikki Haley), and ideologues as advisers (like Steve Bannon, Stephen Miller). Bidens team is less of an odd mix of rivals, and more like a reunion of former colleagues. However, each pick also reflects Bidens foreign policy priorities.

Read:Democracy, economy key to India-US ties

As US ambassador to the UN, Biden has tapped career-diplomat Linda Thomas-Greenfield, who will be the second African American woman to represent the US at the global high-table. In contrast to the Trump years, which saw US withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council and UNESCO, Bidens prioritisation of the organisation is reflected in his plan to reinstate the US ambassador to the UN to cabinet rank. Moreover, at a time when China has sought to expand its influence at the UN (particularly among African member-states), Thomas-Greenfields experience as Obamas Assistant Secretary of State for Africa would be central to Americas counter efforts. Similarly, in once again rallying the world after Trump withdrew from the Paris climate agreement, the decision to tap former Secretary of State John Kerry (who helped negotiate the agreement under Obama) as Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Change is significant.

In addition, on Bidens agenda to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal and possibly even coax an expansion of the deals scope with follow-on negotiations, Biden has picked Jake Sullivan as his National Security Adviser. During the Obama years, apart from serving as National Security Adviser to then-Vice President Biden, Sullivan was a key player in the secret negotiations that led to the deal with Iran. Furthermore, Sullivans nomination also reflects Bidens intent to convey continuity in US policy towards Asia. As the Deputy Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Sullivan notably worked on Clintons flagship Pivot to Asia policy which, in hindsight, was a critical precursor to the Indo-Pacific strategy.

The clear-eyed internationalist

The most significant nomination was that of Antony Blinken for US Secretary of State. With some in Democratic national security circles also viewing him as Bidens alter ego, Blinken most recently served as National Security Adviser (2009-13) to Vice President Biden, Deputy National Security Adviser (2013-15) to Obama, and Deputy Secretary of State (2015-17).

With this extensive experience, Blinkens nomination as Bidens top diplomat chiefly pertains to rekindling US ties with its prime allies across the Atlantic. After four years of Trump deriding Europe as Americas foe and claiming that the European allies had ripped off Washington on collective security, they will now have a Secretary of State to deal with who is a fluent French speaker and who considers them as partners of first resort, not last resort.

Moreover, at a time when there is dwindling appetite for US internationalism across the political spectrum, picking Blinken offers a centrist proposition. He is known to be uncompromising in his support for American advocacy of democratic values and human rights, albeit in recognition of the limits of US power. In the Obama administrations deliberations on supporting the democratic uprising in Egypt, Blinken was part of a majority of officials who called on Obama to be on the right side of history, while his boss (Biden) was part of a minority who counselled caution against abandoning the pro-US Hosni Mubarak regime. However, on Afghanistan, Blinken and Biden together convinced Obama to adopt a limited counterterrorism-focused strategy, over a military-led counterinsurgency mission.

Known for his prudent understanding of the limits of American power, Blinken was notably also one of the prominent Obama administration officials who expressed doubt on the proposition of arming Ukrainians against Russia. In the past, such a worldview has also often informed Blinkens position against overstating the centrality of America in other nations strategic considerations. For instance, in pushing back against Republican insinuations on Russian aggression against Ukraine being a result of Obamas inaction in Syria, Blinken notably said in an interview: This is not about what we do or we say in the first instance, its about Russia and its perceived interests.

Pragmatism on India

Blinkens nomination will also bear on Bidens continuity on US-India ties, since he has had first-hand experience of the cultivation of Americas ties with India. In the early years of Washingtons courtship of New Delhi, Blinken served as staff director on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when as its chairman then-Senator Biden oversaw the passage of the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement.

Moreover, Blinkens prudent nature has been apparent in the context of US-India ties as well. For instance, during the campaign, Blinken often touted two key developments of the Obama-Biden years for US-India ties. They were, the designation of India as a Major Defence Partner and the announcement of the US-India Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). Since then, Trump has only further built on these Obama-era developments by classifying India under the Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 category and finalising the Industrial Security Annex for the actualisation of DTTI. Given Trumps continuity, Blinken hence seemed to limit criticism of Trumps record on India to the futility of photo-ops and a transactional approach to trade issues.

However, there would be one critical avenue where Blinkens approach to India would surely depart from the Trump precedent. Given his record as a supporter of US advocacy of democratic values, Blinken would certainly raise American apprehensions over some of Indias domestic policies. Blinken has already alluded to there being real concerns over India cracking down on freedom of movement and freedom of speech in Kashmir, [and] some of the laws on citizenship. However, he has pragmatically called for working on those differences, even as the two nations continue to build greater cooperation and strengthen the relationship.

Blinkens rhetoric on China suggests a recalibration of US-China ties along ideological lines. Case in-point, in construing the US-China rivalry as a contest of two distinct governance and development models, Blinken has identified Trumps apparent signals of impunity on Beijings human rights record as a major reason behind Washington suffering a strategic deficit. Certainly, one way to look at this criticism is to also consider it as a course-correction of the Obama years folly of over-prioritising cooperation with China, at the cost of ignoring its transgressions at times. However, regardless of the motivation to assume a firm stance this time, in Blinkens plan to now have America remerge in a position of strength from which to engage China, he has invoked Trumps Indo-Pacific strategy and notably called on India to be a key partner in that effort.

Hence, with greater attention to the China challenge, Bidens team of Obama-era liberal internationalists could adopt a degree of pragmatism on American apprehensions over Indias domestic policies.

(The writer is a Research Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Mumbai)

More:

Return of the liberal internationalists - Deccan Herald

"Rahm Emanuel covered up the murder of a Black teenager, Laquan McDonald, while he was Mayor of Chicago," tweeted New York Rep.-elect Mondaire Jones. "That he's being considered for a cabinet position is completely outrageous and, honestly, very hurtful."

But that didn't help matters.

"What is so hard to understand about this? Rahm Emanuel helped cover up the murder of Laquan McDonald. Covering up a murder is disqualifying for public leadership. This is not about the 'visibility' of a post. It is shameful and concerning that he is even being considered....It is also a truly embarrassing indictment of what's considered 'center' politics in the US that objecting to the appointment of an official who helped cover up the murder of a Black child is deemed the 'progressive, far left' position."

While the McDonald shooting has become the flashpoint for liberal ire directed toward Emanuel, the ill will directed at the former mayor long predates that incident.

"I told him many times (about) the political cost of doing this," Emanuel said. "And thank God for the country, he didn't listen to me."

"So much of the legend of Rahm Emanuel's brilliant career makes little sense. The bigger question, perhaps, is what this says about a political party and the political press that bought the legend in the first place."

"The left didn't just get here -- it has been around for decades. In fact, it was progressives who controlled the Democratic Party's agenda for the quarter-century before Clinton's victory in 1992. That's one of the reasons we lost every presidential election held between 1968 and 1988 except the post-Watergate win by Jimmy Carter. History has proved there aren't enough voters on the far left, on their own, to elect and reelect a president or maintain a majority in Congress."

Putting Emanuel into a prominent role in his administration would be something different by Biden, however. It would be regarded by liberals as an open provocation -- whether or not Biden meant it that way. And it's not clear if the President-elect is willing to go that far down the road of antagonizing liberals before he is even the president.

Link:

The Democrat liberals love to hate - CNN