Daily Archives: February 23, 2020

Identity politics in the Democratic Party isnt hurting liberalism. Its saving it. – Vox.com

Posted: February 23, 2020 at 6:42 am

American liberalism is in desperate need of renewal. Its ideas too often feel stale, its nostrums unsuited to beating back the authoritarian populist tide.

Yet there is an opportunity for revival if liberals are willing to more forthrightly embrace the politics of identity.

To many liberals, such a suggestion will sound like blasphemy. Since mere days after Donald Trumps 2016 victory, an unending stream of op-eds and books have accused identity politics defined loosely as a left-wing political style that centers the interests and concerns of oppressed groups of driving the country off a moral and political cliff.

These critics accuse identity politics of being a cancer on the very idea of liberalism, pulling the mainstream American left away from a politics of equal citizenship and shared civic responsibility. It is, moreover, political suicide, a woke purism that makes it impossible to form winning political coalitions evidenced, in critics minds, by the backlash to Sen. Bernie Sanderss embrace of the popular podcast host Joe Rogan.

The idea that identity politics is at odds with liberalism has become conventional wisdom in parts of the American political and intellectual elite. Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker has condemned contemporary identity politics as an enemy of reason and Enlightenment values. New York Times columnist Bari Weiss argues that the corrupt identity politics of the left amounts to a dangerously intolerant worldview. And New York magazines Andrew Sullivan claims the woke left seems not to genuinely believe in liberalism, liberal democracy, or persuasion. This line of thinking is practically the founding credo of the school of internet thought known as the Intellectual Dark Web.

It is also deeply, profoundly wrong.

What these critics lambaste as an attack on liberalism is actually its best form: the logical extension of liberalisms core commitment to social equality and democracy, adapted to address modern sources of inequality. A liberalism that rejects identity politics is a liberalism for the powerful, one that relegates the interests of marginalized groups to second-class status.

But identity politics is not only important as a matter of liberal principle. In the face of an existential threat from right-wing populists in Europe and the United States, liberals need to harness new sources of political energy to fight back. This is not a matter of short-term politics, of whether being too woke will help or hurt Democrats in 2020, but a deeper and more fundamental question: what types of organizations and activist movements are required to make liberalism sustainable in the 21st century. And there is good reason to believe the passions stirred by identity politics can renew a liberalism gone haggard.

To say that liberalism and identity politics are at odds is to misunderstand our political situation. Identity politics isnt merely compatible with liberalism; it is, in fact, liberalisms truest face. If liberalism wishes to succeed in 21st-century America, it shouldnt reject identity politics it should embrace it.

All politics is, in a certain sense, identity politics. Every kind of political approach appeals to particular aspects of voters identities; some are just more explicit than others.

But critics of identity politics have a very particular politics in mind a mode of rhetoric and organizing that prioritizes the concerns and experiences of historically marginalized groups, emphasizing the groups particularity.

To understand why this kind of identity politics is so controversial and what its critics often get wrong about it we need to turn to the work of the late University of Chicago philosopher Iris Marion Young.

In 1990, Young published a classic book titled Justice and the Politics of Difference. At the time, political philosophy was dominated by internal debates among liberals who focused heavily on the question of wealth distribution. Young, both a philosopher and a left activist, found this narrow discourse unsatisfying.

In her view, mainstream American liberalism had assumed a particular account of what social equality means: that equal social status for all persons requires treating everyone according to the same principles, rules, and standards. Securing equality on this view means things like desegregation and passing nondiscrimination laws, efforts to end overt discrimination against marginalized groups.

This is an important start, Young argues, but not nearly enough. The push for formally equal treatment cant eliminate all sources of structural inequality; in fact, it can serve to mask and even deepen them. Judging a poor black kid and a rich white one by the same allegedly meritocratic college admissions standards, for example, will likely lead to the rich white ones admission perpetuating a punishing form of inequality that started at birth.

Young sees an antidote in a political vision she developed out of experiences in social movements, which she calls the politics of difference. Sometimes, Young argues, achieving true equality demands treating groups differently rather than the same. The specificity of each group requires a specific set of rights for each, and for some a more comprehensive system than for others, Young writes. The goal is identity consciousness rather than identity blindness: Black Lives Matter over All Lives Matter.

She did not like using the term identity politics for this approach, arguing in her 2000 book Inclusion and Democracy that it was misleadingly narrow. But two decades later, what she sketched out is what we understand identity politics to mean.

Youngs philosophical precision allows us to understand whats distinctive about contemporary identity politics. It also helps us understand why critics see it as such a threat.

Identity politics dissatisfaction with formal equal treatment is, in their view, fundamentally illiberal. Its emphasis on correcting structural discrimination can morph into a kind of authoritarianism, an obsession with the policing of speech and behaviors (especially from white, straight, cisgender men) at odds with liberalisms core commitments to individual rights, so the critics fret. They see college students disinviting conservative speakers for being problematic, or canceling celebrities who violate the rules of acceptable discourse on race or gender identity, as evidence that identity politics fundamental aim is overturning liberalism in the name of equality.

This approach is not only illiberal, the critics argue, but self-defeating. The more emphasis that is placed on the separateness of American social groups, the less space there is for a politically effective and wide-ranging liberalism.

The only way to [win power] is to have a message that appeals to as many people as possible and pulls them together, Columbia professor Mark Lilla writes in his recent book The Once and Future Liberal. Identity liberalism does just the opposite.

Many of these critics see themselves as coming from a relatively progressive and firmly liberal starting point. They tend to profess support for the ideals of racial or gender equality. What they cant abide is a political approach that emphasizes difference, shaping its policy proposals around specific oppressions rather than universal ideals.

It is a philosophical argument with political implications: a claim that the essence of identity politics is illiberal, and for that reason its continued influence on the American left augurs both moral and electoral doom.

Its hardly absurd for someone like Lilla to see tension between liberalism and identity politics. Young herself described the politics of difference as not a species of liberalism but a challenge to it.

But her stance notwithstanding, political philosophers have come to see the politics of identity as part of a vibrant liberalism. In 1998, Canadian scholar Will Kymlicka identified an emerging consensus among political philosophers on what he calls liberal multiculturalism, the idea that groups have a valid claim, not only to tolerance and non-discrimination, but also to explicit accommodation, recognition and representation within the institutions of the larger society.

If we examine liberalisms core moral commitments, Kymlickas consensus shouldnt be a surprise.

The quintessential liberal value is freedom. Liberalisms core political ambition is to create a society where citizens are free to participate as equals, cooperating on mutually agreeable terms in political life and pursuing whatever vision of private life they find meaningful and fulfilling. Freedom in this sense cannot be achieved in political systems defined by identity-based oppression. When members of some social groups face barriers to living the life they choose, purely as a result of their membership in that group, then the society they live in is failing on liberal terms.

Identity politics seeks to draw attention to and combat such sources of unfreedom. Consider the following facts about American life:

There is no law saying black people cant own houses, that women married to men must do the cooking and cleaning, or that LGBTQ teens must harm themselves. These problems have more subtle causes, including legacies of historical discrimination, deeply embedded social norms, and inadequate legislative attention to the particular circumstances of marginalized groups.

Identity politics focus on the need to go beyond anti-discrimination works to open new avenues for dealing with the insidious nature of modern group-based inequality. Once you understand that this is the actual aim of identity politics, it becomes clear that critiques of its alleged authoritarianism miss the forest for the trees.

It is of course true that one can point to illiberal behavior by activists in the name of identity politics: Think of the student group at the City University of New York that attempted to shout down a relatively mainstream conservative legal scholars lecture out of hostility to his views on immigration law. But instances of campus intolerance are actually quite uncommon, despite their omnipresence in the media, and the idea that a handful of student excesses represent the core of identity politics is a mistake.

One can say the same thing for social media outrages. Its certainly true that many practitioners of identity politics send over-the-top tweets or pen Facebook posts calling for people to be fired without good cause. Its also true that some practitioners of every kind of politics do these things. Holding up an outrageous-sounding tweet as representative of the allegedly authoritarian heart of identity politics is a basic analytical error: confusing a platform problem, the way social media highlights the most extreme versions of all ideologies, with a doctrinal defect in identity politics.

Merely because a liberal movement contains some illiberal components doesnt make it fundamentally illiberal; if it did, then slave-owning American founders and bigoted Enlightenment philosophers would have to be booted out of the liberal canon.

The key question is whether the agenda and aims of identity politics adherents advance liberal freedom compared to the status quo. On this point, its clear that the practitioners of identity politics are on the liberal side.

In recent years, we have seen champions of identity politics rack up impressive accomplishments victories like defeating prosecutors with troubling records on race at the ballot box, getting sexual assault allegations taken seriously in the workplace, and securing health care coverage for transition-related medical care.

These are hardly examples of woke Stalinism. They are instead victories of liberal reform and democratic activism, incremental changes aimed at addressing deep-rooted sources of unfreedom.

Time and again throughout American history, from abolitionism to the movement for same-sex marriage, members of marginalized groups have refused to abandon liberalisms promises. They put their lives on the line, risking death on Civil War battlefields and in the streets of Birmingham, in defense of liberal ideals. When they demanded change, they won it through the push-and-pull of democratic politics and political activism that constitute the heart of liberal praxis. In essayist Adam Serwers evocative phrasing: The American creed has no more devoted adherents than those who have been historically denied its promises.

Todays practitioners of identity politics are the proper heirs to this tradition. Former Georgia gubernatorial candidate Stacey Abrams, one of the most prominent defenders of identity politics in American public life, has devoted her post-election career to an unimpeachably liberal cause fighting restrictions on the franchise, particularly those that disproportionately affect black voters.

In a recent Foreign Affairs essay, Abrams made the case that one of the central aims of identity politics is bolstering liberalism that it is activism that will strengthen democratic rule, not threaten it. In Abramss view, the persistence of structural oppression, and in particular the Trump-era backlash to social progress, requires careful attention to identity, and in particular what marginalized groups want from their political elites.

By embracing identity and its prickly, uncomfortable contours, Abrams wrote, Americans will become more likely to grow as one.

The critics of identity politics have another complaint: that its hold on the Democratic Party can only lead to electoral perdition. Abrams, as inspirational as many find her, did lose the 2018 Georgia gubernatorial race. Maybe identity politics can be defended theoretically but in practice alienates too many people to be put in practice.

Its possible to challenge the specifics of these arguments. Abrams didnt win, but it was a very tight loss in a historically red state (in fact, 2018 was the closest Georgia gubernatorial election in the state in more than 50 years). And you can point to many examples that go in the other direction at the local, state, and national levels.

But it would be myopic to tie ourselves up in these near-term (and frankly inconclusive) tactical arguments. We have a broader crisis to worry about.

Debating the interests of the Democratic Party confines the imagination; rising illiberalism in the United States is a deeper problem than the Trump presidency. To reckon with it, we need to take a longer view, looking at the beliefs and sources of activist energy that define the contours of whats possible in American electoral politics.

Since World War II, liberalism and its core beliefs about rights and freedom have served as something like the operating system for democratic politics. But in recent years, this consensus has come under severe stress. Elite failures and global catastrophes particularly the one-two punch of the financial and refugee crises have caused Western publics to lose faith in the liberal orders guardians. Illiberal right-wing populism has emerged as a potent alternative model. The Wests fundamental commitment to liberalism is coming into question.

Liberals are in the midst of war and in it, giving up identity politics amounts to a kind of unilateral disarmament. Todays political contests, in both the United States and Europe, are increasingly defined by conflict surrounding demographic change and the erosion of traditional social hierarchies. These are the central issues in our politics, the ones that most powerfully motivate people to vote and join political organizations.

The anti-liberal side has pegged its vision almost entirely to backlash politics, to rolling back the gains made by ethnic and racial minorities, women, and the LGBTQ community. The challenge for liberals is not primarily winning over voters who find that regressive vision appealing; no modern liberal party can be as authentically bigoted as a far-right one. At the same time, liberals should not write off entire heterogeneous demographic blocs like the white working class as unpersuadable. Instead, the main task of liberal politics should be mobilizing those from all backgrounds who oppose the far-rights vision knitting together in common cause a staggeringly diverse array of people with very different experiences.

The 2017 Womens March is a concrete example of how identity politics can help in this struggle.

The march was billed, at the time, as both an expression of feminist rage and the major anti-Trump action the weekend of the inauguration. Some liberal identity skeptics fretted that these goals were antithetical; that the particularism of the events feminist rhetoric would end up dividing the anti-Trump coalition.

I think many men assume the Womens March is supposed to be women-only, which is why it was a bad name for the main anti-Trump march, New York magazines Jonathan Chait wrote. There are many grounds on which to object to Trump. Feminism is one. I think [the] goal should be to get all of them together.

Chaits concerns were clearly unfounded. The 2017 Womens March was by some estimates the largest single day of protest in US history, with somewhere in the range of 3 million to 5 million people attending the various marches nationwide. Feminism, far from being a divisive theme, served to mobilize large numbers of people to get out and demonstrate against Americas illiberal turn.

But what happened next is particularly interesting: The experience of attending Womens Marches seems to have galvanized a significant number of people overwhelmingly women to engage in sustained activism for both gender equality and the defense of liberalism more broadly.

In the years following the 2017 demonstrations, Harvard researchers Leah Gose and Theda Skocpol conducted extensive fieldwork among anti-Trump activists. They found that the march helped mobilize many new activists the bulk of whom were middle-class, educated white women in their 50s or older. Following the marches, they found, clusters of women in thousands of communities across America carried on with forming local groups to sustain anti-Trump activism.

The Womens March seems to have played a crucial role in turning these women into activists who not only opposed Trump but aimed to defend liberalisms promise of equal freedom. Activists interviewed by Gose and Skocpol frequently cited a concern for the health of American democracy as a reason for their engagement. Despite being heavily white, they also worked on issues that are of particular concern to racial minorities organizing against (for example) the white nationalist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, and child separation.

As before throughout American history, Gose and Skocpol write, womens civic activism may revitalize democratic engagement and promote a new birth of responsive government in communities across the land.

In a recent working paper, political scientist Jonathan Pinckney took a close look at the impact of the Womens March on three metrics: increase of size in Democratic-aligned activist groups, ideology of Democratic members of Congress, and the share of the Democratic vote in 2018. He found that areas with larger attendance at the 2017 marches later saw significantly increased movement activity, left-ward shifts in congressional voting scores, and a greater swing to the Democrats in the 2018 midterm elections.

The Womens March itself seems to have largely petered out, succumbing to fatigue and leadership infighting. But its true legacy will be the activist networks it helped create, ones that contributed to sustained and impactful challenges to an illiberal presidency.

This kind of thing is what, in the long run, liberalism needs: a way to make its defense fresh and exciting, mobilizing specific groups toward the collective task of defeating the far right. Doing so will require meeting people where they are, engaging them on the identity issues that matter deeply and profoundly. Knitting this latent energy into a durable and electorally viable coalition will be the work of a generation, but its hard to see how American liberalism can get off its heels without trying.

Its true, of course, that the interests of members of marginalized groups are not always aligned, and that such groups also contain a lot of internal disagreements and diversity. There are always hard questions regarding building coalitions. Should Sanders have denounced Joe Rogans endorsement? Is former South Bend, Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigiegs dubious record on race and policing disqualifying? These are important questions, and there will be more like them. They will lead to more fights among liberals and the broader left.

But political factions of all ideologies have to make tough judgment calls when it comes time to engage in electoral politics, and theres nothing about identity politics that makes it uniquely poorly suited to the task.

While the politics of difference is attuned to the specific experiences of social groups, it also contains a universalizing impulse: a sense that all structural injustices stemming from racism, sexism, class structure, or whatever are to be opposed. Theres a core commitment to solidarity, to not only listening to the members of other groups but seeing their struggle as linked to your own.

Having to be accountable to people from diverse social positions with different needs, interests, and experience helps transform discourse from self-regard to appeals to justice, Young writes in Inclusion and Democracy.

An anti-oppression framework gives people a moral language for articulating their disagreements and perspectives, for constructing a sense of unity and shared purpose out of difference. That were having these conversations at all, and are agonizing over what exactly our liberalism should look like, is all to the good because rebuilding liberalism around anti-oppression values, no matter how difficult it might seem in the moment, is its best hope for an enduring revival.

If all of this is right, and liberalism needs identity politics not just to survive but to succeed, then an obvious question looms: How can it be adapted to take issues of identity more seriously? What might the ideals and aspirations of an identity-focused liberalism be, and how might it imagine making them possible?

One good place to start is the work of CUNY philosopher Charles Mills. Millss most famous book, The Racial Contract (1997), is a fundamental critique of the Enlightenment political tradition, arguing that racist attitudes expressed by philosophical giants like Immanuel Kant are not some alien parasite on their theories, but vital to their intellectual enterprises.

Its the kind of thoroughgoing dissection you might expect from a socialist or black nationalist, someone willing to scrap liberalism altogether. Yet at the end of his most recent book, Black Rights/White Wrongs, Mills explains that his project is not aimed at supplanting liberalism but rather rescuing it by developing what he calls black radical liberalism.

Central to black radical liberalism is the idea of corrective justice: the notion that liberalism as it has been practiced historically has fallen badly short of its highest ideals of guaranteeing equal freedom, and that the task of modern liberalism ought to be rectifying the racial inequalities of its past incarnations.

Millss approach is refreshing because it moves beyond the strange conservatism in so much liberal writing today. His work is not an uncritical valorization of the Enlightenment nor a paean to dead white thinkers; it does not aim to Make Liberalism Great Again. It is instead a harshly critical account of liberalisms history that nonetheless aims to advance liberalisms core values and secure its greatest accomplishments.

The animating force of identity politics, what gives it such extraordinary power to mobilize, is deep wells of outrage at structural injustice. Millions of people see the cruelties of the Trump administration its detention of migrant children in camps, the Muslim ban, the plan to define transgender people out of existence by executive fiat, the presidents description of Charlottesville neo-Nazis as very fine people and want to do something.

Todays liberals often focus their arguments on bloodless abstractions like democratic norms and the liberal international order. I dont deny that these things are important; Ive written in their defense myself.

But people arent angry about norm erosion in the way they are about, say, state-sanctioned mistreatment of migrant kids. By making identity politics something not outside of liberalism but at the center of it, liberals can enlist the energies of identity to the defense of liberalism itself.

Doing that successfully requires a level of Millsian radicalism. While this sort of identity liberalism would not reject the accomplishments of the past, it requires admitting their insufficiency. It means accepting that liberalism is a doctrine that has failed in key ways, and that repairing its errors requires centering the interests of the groups that have been most wronged. It means appealing to the specificity of group experiences, while also emphasizing their shared interests in the twinned fights against oppression and for liberal democracy.

This approach will require compromises from some mainstream liberals, who will need to start welcoming in people and ideas they might not like. Theyll need to get over squeamishness about student activists and their pain regarding political correctness, to recognize that their vision of balancing competing political interests wont always win out. Thats not to say they cant argue for their ideas; this type of liberal can and should be entitled to make the case for more cautious political approaches. But liberals need to stop trying to play gatekeeper, to banish ideas like intersectionality to the illiberal wilds.

Because the practitioners of identity politics are not illiberal. They are, in fact, some of the best friends liberalism has today. The sooner liberals acknowledge that, the closer we will be to a liberal revival.

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Identity politics in the Democratic Party isnt hurting liberalism. Its saving it. - Vox.com

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COLUMN: Trying to look forward while looking back – Chilliwack Progress

Posted: at 6:42 am

After recent reaction to protests in support of the Wetsuweten hereditary chiefs, a reader suggested I re-run a column from June 4, 2015: in the Chilliwack Times. The message is indeed just as apt today as it was then. Edited for length:

Oh no, here we go, muttered the person blind to the colonial history of Canada now that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has issued its report on the dark past of residential schools in Canada.

Why wont those Indians just put the past behind them, get a job, and start contributing to society?

That is what he said to me.

There are certain subjects usually left alone by those who should know better.

That was the past, get over it.

These are not the opinions of some bygone era. These are attitudes held by some people here and now. Present and but a scratch below a thin layer of politeness that covers our daily discourse.

Why wont those Indians just put the past behind them, get a job, and start contributing to society?

I write it again, because this it struck me as amazing. I was chatting someone who should know better. An educated, successful member of Chilliwack society.

He used the term Indians, even. No, he wasnt talking about people from India. I asked. When talking about our local Sto:lo population he said he prefers Indian over native or aboriginal.

And dont even start him on the term First Nations.

Dont talk about Indians to this guy, he joked as others joined us in the public setting where our conversation took place. Laughs.

Apparently, Ive learned, it is political correctness run amok when people suggest an objectively inaccurate term is just weird to use.

You know where India is, right? I asked.

No comment.

OK, then, you do know the Indians in this country have endured an attempted cultural genocide, right?

Get over it, was the response.

Today many local Sto:lo folks are likely grappling with Justice Murray Sinclairs report, its 94 recommendations, something that invariably will dig up the terrible wounds of what was endured at residential schools by parents grandparents and great-grandparents.

The ignorance and hatred that led to a cultural genocide, a government-church led systematic killing the Indian in the child is done. Its gone from our churches. Its gone from our cultural institutions. Its gone from our government.

But the sentiment remains, if below the surface for some, that Indigenous people should just snub out the last remnants of that language, drop the cultural practices, forget the drumming and the hunting and the fishing and the rest of it, and just be more like us.

Why cant you be more like us?

There is, among us mostly white settlers, a belligerent sense of entitlement, but even more so a disregard for any expression of culture from those who were here before us.

Political correctness is a false label for what is simply correctness.

The guy I was talking to says the term First Nations is politically correct crap and he refuses to use it. Fine, but it also just happens to be correct. These nations of people were here first.

Its really time to get our settler heads out of the sand, acknowledge the truth that some our ancestors took part in, or at least acquiesced to, very bad treatment of Indigenous people. We do need to reconcile. This doesnt meant saying we are sorry you are upset. This means more, and individuals like the one quoted above need to learn some history. Learn how children were stolen from their parents as government policy.

Cultural genocide is the destruction of those structures and practices that allow the group to continue as a group

This is big stuff, and its been buried for too long. What we should not do is let the ignorance of the be more like us sentiment carry on.

Those today who are blind to history and what went on with the Indian School Act need to open their eyes.

READ MORE: Sto:lo protest in support of Wetsuweten shuts down busiest intersection in Chilliwack

READ MORE: Federal minister pledges to meet Wetsuweten chiefs in B.C. over natural gas pipeline

Do you have something to add to this story, or something else we should report on? Email: paul.henderson@theprogress.com

racism

Grand Chief Steven Point, former lieutenant governor of B.C. marches with protesters along Knight Road in Chilliwack on Feb. 14, 2020 on Sto:lo day of action in support of Wetsuweten hereditary chiefs. (Paul Henderson/ The Progress)

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A Glut of Arms: Curbing the Threat to Venezuela from Violent Groups – International Crisis Group

Posted: at 6:41 am

Whats new?Political turmoil, economic ruin and heightening tensions with neighbouring countries have furnished non-state armed groups, including guerrillas from Colombia, criminal syndicates, paramilitaries and pro-government vigilantes known as colectivos, with the means to expand their influence and presence across Venezuela.

Why does it matter?Armed groups filling the vacuum left by a government determined to resist domestic opposition, international pressure and mounting sanctions pose a threat of escalating violence in the absence of negotiations, while also entailing major risks of sabotage in the wake of any eventual political settlement.

What should be done?These groups threat to peace must be contained, and that imperative should feature prominently in future talks aimed at settling the crisis. Those negotiations should include Venezuelas military. Demobilising each armed group will require a tailored approach, but most should aim for deals securing acquiescence in a comprehensive political settlement.

As Venezuelas turmoil deepens with no end in sight, power is seeping out of formal state institutions and pooling in the hands of various armed irregulars. Behind this phenomenon are diverse causes. The ceaseless struggle for supremacy between President Nicols Maduros government and opposition forces has turned state organs into partisan bodies that either solicit support from armed groups or overlook them. Economic ruin brought about by government mismanagement now worsened by U.S. sanctions has pushed numerous Venezuelans into illicit livelihoods and the orbit of organised crime. Meanwhile, the countrys long, porous borders have allowed Colombian guerrillas to gain footholds deep inside the country. The armed groups are far from identical, but all are ready to use violence and territorial control to further their goals, and any might sabotage a settlement that Venezuelas competing political forces eventually agree to. Defanging them will require approaches tailored to each outfit, but the main goal should be to demobilise fighters and seek their buy-in to a deal that ends Venezuelas collective agony.

Guerrillas from Colombia, loyalist pro-government militias known as colectivos, paramilitaries and a catalogue of criminal gangs stand out as the main non-state armed groups now operating in Venezuela. Their methods, goals and affinities vary hugely. Some profess ideological motivations while others pursue naked criminal profit. Some work in alleged collusion with ruling elites, while others purportedly have ties to opposition elites. The opposition led by Juan Guaid and its international allies, now numbering close to 60 countries, accuse all but the right-wing paramilitaries of complicity with state security forces, or even with the high military command and political elites within chavismo, the movement named after the late president, Hugo Chvez. But the exact nature of the ties between these armed groups and the state, and the mutual benefits that arise from them, are not always easy to identify. Skirmishes between state and non-state actors acting in supposed coordination have exposed the high levels of mistrust that divide them.

Formal talks between the government and opposition are moribund, but if and when they restart, they should urgently address the questions of how to reduce the armed irregulars influence and how to stop them from scuttling agreements that the sparring Venezuelan sides may reach. As the types of armed groups present different problems, each will need its own remedy. Dealing with Colombian guerrillas will require intensive cooperation between Caracas and Bogot, ideally as part of efforts in the latter capital to end the insurgencies through negotiations aimed at general demobilisation. Some colectivos may be persuaded to reassume their historical role as mediators between state and society. As for criminal elements, several of them may also accept deals whereby they avoid prosecution or face reduced sentences in exchange for giving up arms. Experience in other Latin American countries shows that such tactics, while not always easy to swallow, are more likely to help the Venezuelan state reassert its writ with a minimum of additional bloodshed.

Caracas/Bogot/Brussels, 20 February 2020

President Nicols Maduros government is clinging to office in Venezuela, tightening its authoritarian grip on the countrys politics and society even as opposition to it has grown more uncompromising and received the support of a rising number of countries. It is doing so in the name of preserving the power of chavismo, the movement embracing the left-wing populist ideology propagated by Maduros predecessor Hugo Chvez, but at the cost of growing disarray in state institutions and national economic catastrophe.

The battle between the government and opposition intensified in January 2019, when the head of the National Assembly, Juan Guaid, asserted his own claim to the presidency, saying Maduros re-election the year before was invalid. As a result, for over a year Venezuela has had two leaders claiming to be legitimate president, as well as two legislatures and two Supreme Courts.[fn]On 21 July 2017, amid mass protests against the Maduro government, the opposition-controlled National Assembly swore in an alternative Supreme Court as a response to the perceived bias of the official one, which was packed with judges supportive of the government in the last days of the previously chavista-controlled National Assembly in 2015. The National Assembly declared those appointments void in 2017 and proceeded to swear in a new Supreme Court. Maduros reaction was swift; he called the new judges criminals, ordering their arrest one by one. Three judges were detained, and the rest fled abroad. Maduros government has continuously used the Supreme Court to undermine parliaments authority through various rulings. Members of the new National Constituent Assembly, all of whom are government supporters, were elected in July 2017. Pedro Pablo Pealosa, 3 magistrados detenidos y 30 en la clandestinidad: as va la cacera de Nicols Maduro contra los jueces nombrados por el Parlamento, Univision, 25 July 2018; Jennifer McCoy, Venezuelas controversial new Constituent Assembly, explained, Washington Post, 1 August 2017. See also Crisis Group Latin America Briefing N36, Power without the People: Averting Venezuelas Breakdown, 19 June 2017.Hide Footnote The governments move in early January 2020 to seize control over the National Assembly has served only to splinter the countrys institutions further.[fn]On 5 January, Maduros government and state security forces prevented Guaid and other opposition legislators from entering the National Assembly precinct and participating in the vote on the Assemblys new one-year presidency. The chavista deputies, together with some former opposition deputies, took part in a sham vote that flouted established procedures and declared Luis Parra the new National Assembly president. Parra is a former opposition deputy who has been accused of corruption in relation to government food programs. Guaid and the majority of the Assemblys deputies held a parallel vote later that same day, in which Guaid was re-elected Assembly president. The Maduro government and some of its international allies (though not all) recognise Parra as Assembly leader. At the same time, 58 countries including the U.S. and most of South America continue to recognise Guaid as both Assembly leader and Venezuelas interim president. Ana Vanessa Herrero and Julie Turkewitz, Venezuelas National Assembly opens for business: scuffles, tear gas and doused lights, The New York Times, 7 January 2020.See also Crisis Group Statement, Seizure of Parliament Plunges Venezuela into Deeper Turmoil, 7 January 2020.Hide Footnote Meanwhile, the U.S. has imposed sweeping sanctions, including on oil sales, aggravating the Venezuelan economys sharp contraction since 2013 due to falling oil prices, government mismanagement and corruption. Despite recent efforts to scrap inefficient state controls and dollarise the economy, much of the population suffers regular interruptions to electricity and water supply, while hunger is rife and the public health system is in ruins.[fn]In March 2019, the country suffered a nationwide electrical blackout lasting 50 hours, which was followed by recurrent service cuts across the country. In various parts of the country, the government now applies an electricity rationing program that cuts off the supply for many hours. Phil Gunson, The Darkest Hours: Power Outages Raise the Temperature in Venezuela, Crisis Group Commentary, 15 March 2019. Regarding the problems in the health service as well as food insecurity, see UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock: Statement on the Humanitarian Situation in Venezuela, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 6 November 2019. Regarding the recent bonfire of economic policies and their impact, see Ryan Dube, Juan Forero and Kejal Vyas, Maduro gives economy a freer hand to keep his grip on Venezuela, Wall Street Journal, 30 January 2020.Hide Footnote Certain public services still operate, including the main offices of state bureaucracy, urban transport and waste collection and police and fire emergency response, albeit with numerous problems and shortfalls.

The central state continues to oversee territorial control, law enforcement and maintenance of public order. It funds, supervises and appoints the heads of the armed forces and other security services, and takes the militarys loyalty extremely seriously.[fn]Crisis Group Latin America Briefing N39, Venezuelas Military Enigma, 16 September 2019.Hide Footnote But the ability of the government in Caracas to carry out these functions is also slipping. Security forces have failed to contain Venezuelas extremely high levels of criminal violence and have themselves been charged with numerous human rights violations.[fn]The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported in July last year that Venezuelas security apparatus is responsible for a series of political and other crimes. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, OHCHR, July 2019.Hide Footnote At the same time, the political and economic crisis has both weakened the security forces which must get by with depleted resources while grappling with desertions and internal tensions and empowered non-state armed groups, which have grown in size or scaled up their operations in the country thanks to the boom in illicit business coinciding with the formal economys collapse.[fn]An estimated 1,500 Venezuelan military officers deserted for Colombia and Brazil during and immediately after the efforts backed by Guaid and international allies on 23 February 2019 to get humanitarian aid into the country. Recent reports suggest that the military high command is alarmed at the high ongoing rate of desertion. Militares desertores en Colombia, entre el olvido y el engao, France 24, 5 June 2019. Antes la alarmante desercin, el ministro de Defensa de Venezuela orden convencer a los soldados de regresar como sea, Infobae, 20 January 2020.Hide Footnote

The result is a realignment in the countrys internal security as irregular armed outfits have partly replaced the state security apparatus in the southern states of Bolvar and Amazonas, as well as in certain other rural and urban settings, particularly along borders. Venezuelas state forces are not obsolete or irrelevant. Their support for Maduro makes them the backbone of the status quo and will make them critical in any transition.[fn]Crisis Group Briefing,Venezuelas Military Enigma, op. cit.Hide Footnote But as their operational power and territorial presence fades, they are forming unstable alliances with, or tolerating the rise of, non-state armed groups, which provide crude versions of state services and assure locals some form of livelihood.

This report examines the main non-state armed groups in Venezuela, assesses their relations with government officials and political elites, and explores how their activities and alliances could affect the outcome of Venezuelas turmoil.[fn]This report does not consider the case of Hizbollah, the Lebanese Shiite militia whose alleged presence in Venezuela has become a leading concern of the U.S., Colombia and the Venezuelan opposition, as reflected in the January ministerial conference on terrorism in Bogot. Duque denunci presencia de clulas de Hezbol en Venezuela, El Tiempo, 20 January 2020. Although evidence linking the group to Latin Americas worst-ever terrorist attack, the AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires in 1994, remains very strong, the supposed presence of Hizbollah in and around Venezuela appears to be based largely on sightings of individuals reportedly connected to the organisation. See La evidencia que se llev Pompeo de los nexos de Maduro y Hezbol, El Tiempo, 26 January 2020. Crisis Group has until now encountered no evidence that the group has an organised, armed presence in Venezuela.Hide Footnote It also points to how negotiators from both sides in future talks could seek to manage the threat posed by these groups in any eventual transition. The report builds on Crisis Groups continuous coverage of Venezuelas socio-economic and political crises over the last five years.[fn]See, in addition to previously cited publications, Crisis Group Latin America Briefings N33, Venezuela: Unnatural Disaster, 30 July 2015; N35, Venezuela: Edge of the Precipice, 24 June 2016; and N37, Venezuela: Hunger by Default, 23 November 2017; as well as Crisis Group Latin America Reports N65, Containing the Shock Waves from Venezuela, 21 March 2018; and N73, Gold and Grief in Venezuelas Violent South, 28 February 2019.Hide Footnote

Irregular armed groups have a long history in Venezuela.[fn]Guerrilla movements under the influence of Cuba operated in Venezuela throughout the 1960s, attempting to overthrow the countrys democratically elected governments. For a favourable account of the guerrillas in Venezuela, see Pedro Pablo Linrez, Lucha Armada en Venezuela, Bolivarian University of Venezuela, 2006. Venezuelas 2,200km border with Colombia is porous, enabling Colombian guerrillas to cross back and forth at least since the 1980s. Conflict between Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries also spread into Venezuela starting in the 1990s. Socorro Ramrez, Colombia y sus vecinos, Nueva Sociedad, no. 192, July-August 2004.Hide Footnote But in recent years their presence has taken on a qualitatively different character. In theory, non-state armed groups, while not direct enemies of the state like insurgencies, nevertheless seek a degree of autonomy from state institutions and formal politics. Yet in Venezuela, as in other Latin American countries, the relationship between armed groups and the public sector is far from clear-cut. Many irregular outfits have direct relations and common interests with parts of the state, which support or influence them either secretly or openly.[fn]Certain vigilante, militia and paramilitary groups, notably in Colombia, urban areas of Brazil and in the Northern Triangle of Central America, have been tied to the state. Ulrich Schneckener, Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance, in Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini (eds.), Private Actors and Security Governance (Geneva, 2006). Some scholars argue that for some governments the existence of non-state armed groups is a convenient scapegoat that serves to distract the public from other problems and entrench the social status quo. Dennis Rodgers and Robert Muggah, Gangs as Non-State Armed Groups: The Central American Case,Contemporary Security Policy,vol. 30, no. 2 (2019); pp. 301-317. Regarding definitions of non-state armed groups in Venezuela, see Colectivo, Paramilitar, Parapolicial, PROVEA.Hide Footnote For some state officials or politicians, these shadowy groups prove attractive because they can generate income via their illicit activities while also serving political ends, for example by intimidating people in order to secure votes. Growing evidence and eyewitness testimony indicate that such relations are becoming more commonplace in Venezuela, although the countrys highly polarised political landscape has given rise to mutual accusations of complicity in criminal conduct that are not always grounded in reality.[fn]Maduros government has made unsubstantiated claims that Colombian paramilitaries funded by the Venezuelan opposition have planned to assassinate him dozens of times. See, for instance, Venezuela arrests Colombians over Maduro assassination plot, BBC, 10 June 2013. Meanwhile, evidence presented to the UN by the Colombian government showing alleged Venezuelan support for Colombian guerrillas came into question when several photos were proved to have been taken outside Venezuela. Gobierno enviar a ONU versin actualizada del dossier contra Maduro, El Tiempo, 1 October 2019.Hide Footnote

The guerrillas in Venezuela today are largely transplants from neighbouring Colombia, although they do also recruit local members who in certain areas outnumber the Colombians.

The National Liberation Army (ELN) and the disbanded Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) maintained a limited presence in Venezuela well before Chvez assumed the presidency in 1999.[fn]For instance, in 1995 eight Venezuelan soldiers died after a guerrilla attack on the border with Colombia. At this time, the Colombian guerrillas had bases inside Venezuela and were involved in kidnappings and other illegal activities on Venezuelan soil. Ludmila Vinogradoff, Mueren ocho marines venezolanos en un ataque de la guerrilla colombiana, El Pas, 27 February 1995.Hide Footnote Chvez was generally tolerant of their activities, declaring as early as 1999 that his government would be neutral in relation to the armed conflict in Colombia. On occasion, he expressed active support for the guerrillas hard left political stances.[fn]Miguel Goncalves, Conditional Convenience: Venezuelan Support for FARC since Hugo Chvez, The Yale Review of International Studies, January 2014. See also The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of Raul Reyes, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011.Hide Footnote Ties between Chvez and the guerrillas deteriorated, however, during the last years of his presidency as relations with the Colombian government of former president Juan Manuel Santos improved. Venezuela played an active role in peace negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government that began in 2012. For at least its first four years, the Maduro administration continued the line espoused by Chvez, supporting the conclusion of peace negotiations and refraining from open support for the guerrillas.[fn]For an overview of the role of the Venezuelan government in the Colombian peace process, see David Smilde and Dimitris Pantoulas, The Venezuelan Crisis, Regional Dynamics and the Colombian Peace Process, Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2016.Hide Footnote

Since 2017, however, Venezuelas heightened political instability and deepening economic crisis, combined with the spread of new or expansionary armed groups in Colombia following the FARC insurgencys end, have boosted the guerrilla presence in Venezuela.[fn]On these changing conditions in Venezuela and Colombia in 2017, see Crisis Group Latin America Report N63, Colombias Armed Groups Battle for the Spoils of Peace, 19 October 2017; and Crisis Group Briefing, Power without the People: Averting Venezuelas Breakdown, op. cit.Hide Footnote Colombian guerrillas from the ELN and dissidents from the FARC who reject the peace process use Venezuela as a safe haven and a source of revenue through illicit activities. Their presence has extended far into the interior, with reports suggesting that they operate in at least thirteen of Venezuelas 24 states, although the heartlands of their activity remain the states of Bolvar and Amazonas in southern Venezuela and the regions of Apure and Tchira, adjacent to the Colombian border.[fn]On Bolvar and Amazonas, see Crisis Group Report, Gold and Grief in Venezuelas Violent South, op. cit. A recent report indicates that FARC dissidents control municipalities in Apure state and are assisting with health and school services there. Sebastiana Barrez, Elorza, el pueblo venezolano controlado por las FARC: El comandante Lucas es el amo del lugar, Infobae, 13 April 2019. See also The Guerrillas Are the Police: Social Control and Abuses by Armed Groups in Colombias Arauca Province and Venezuelas Apure State, Human Rights Watch, January 2020.Hide Footnote In addition to these groups traditional activities of drug trafficking, extortion and smuggling, they are now heavily involved in illegal mining of gold and other minerals, from which they are believed to obtain most of their revenue. According to sources close to these groups, both FARC dissidents and the ELN make more than half of their income from mining inside Venezuela and Colombia.[fn]Crisis Group Report, Gold and Grief in Venezuelas Violent South, op. cit., p. 6.Hide Footnote

The presence of these groups on Venezuelan soil, often operating with the connivance of corrupt authorities, has sparked escalating tensions between Venezuela and Colombia, replete with threats of military reprisal. Bogot insists that Caracas and the guerrillas are acting in concert, a claim that has assumed far greater urgency since a number of FARC commanders announced they were taking up arms again at the end of August 2019, from a location that senior Colombian officials claimed was in Venezuela.[fn]Crisis Group Latin America Briefing N40, Containing the Border Fallout of Colombias New Guerrilla Schism, 20 September 2019.Hide Footnote Colombian President Ivn Duque told the UN General Assembly that he had irrefutable and conclusive proof that corroborates the support of the dictatorship for criminal and narco-terrorist groups that operate in Venezuela, although some of the photographs in the file he handed over were later found to have been taken in Colombia, not Venezuela.[fn]Colombias Duque tells U.N. that dossier proves Maduro supports terrorists, Reuters, 25 September 2019. Following the declaration of the new FARC schism on 29 August and in response to perceived Venezuelan aggression, the Colombian government pushed hard for the activation on 23 September of the Rio Treaty, also known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, a mutual defence pact.Hide Footnote Venezuelan opposition leaders have used similar language, calling the guerrilla groups terrorists who work hand in glove with the Maduro government.[fn]Acuerdo en rechazo a la presencia y expansin de grupos narcoterroristas en el territorio nacional, Venezuela National Assembly, 3 September 2019.Hide Footnote But no one has presented incontrovertible proof of close ties between senior officials in Caracas and the guerrillas.

The activities of guerrilla and dissident groups across Venezuela bring them into close contact with state officials and local residents, while also triggering violent clashes with other groups coveting illicit revenues. In their mining operations, guerrilla groups subcontract other armed outfits to control the miners and the impoverished local population, sometimes through coercion, but sometimes by offering them job opportunities and staple goods.[fn]According to media reports, in some parts of the country the ELN is helping distribute government food parcels, known as CLAP. Las evidencias de la alianza del Eln con Maduro, El Tiempo, 20 May 2019.Hide Footnote To transport and export the gold, the guerrillas rely on cooperation with state security forces and trafficking networks, both of which take sizeable cuts of the revenues.[fn]Crisis Group Report, Gold and Grief in Venezuelas Violent South, op. cit.Hide Footnote Evidence also suggests, however,that the relationship between Venezuelas military and Colombian guerrillas can rapidly turn sour: Venezuelan troops reportedly killed two FARC dissidents on the border next to Zulia state in July 2019, while ELN guerrillas clashed with Venezuelan National Guard in Bolvar state in late November 2018, killing three guardsmen.[fn]On the killing of the FARC dissidents, see Caleb Zuleta, El Ejrcito de Maduro tambin mata a guerrilleros ex-FARC, Alnavo, 31 July 2019. On the clashes between the ELN and the National Guard, see Bram Ebus, A Rising Tide of Murder in Venezuelas Mineral-Rich South, Crisis Group Commentary, 12 November 2018. The ELN commander involved in those clashes was reportedly detained with numerous privileges in the Fuerte Tiuna barracks in Caracas. Sebastiana Barrez, Oficiales venezolanos toman caf y oyen vallenatos con un jefe de la ELN que mat a tres sargentos de la Guardia Nacional, Infobae, 1 September 2019. Venezuelan security forces reportedly killed another ELN commander in Zulia state early in November. Sebastiana Barrez, Muerte en una discoteca del Zulia: cmo cay un comandante del ELN por el disparo de un polica venezolano, Infobae, 6 November 2019.Hide Footnote

So-called colectivos are civil associations that in some cases function as para-police groups and that have gained prominence as Venezuelas political conflict has intensified. Both colectivos opponents and their defenders tend to attribute almost mythical dimensions to their importance, yet they have without doubt become chavismos backbone through coercive control over street protests and influence in low-income communities.[fn]One writer says the colectivos are revolutionary grassroots organizations [that] represent the backbone of the Bolivarian process and are at the forefront of the struggle for a new kind of state. George Ciccariello-Maher, Collective Panic in Venezuela, Jacobin, June 2014. Conversely, others say the colectivos have a green light to kill any person who is against Maduros regime. Pachi Valencia, Licencia para matar: Los colectivos armados en Venezuela siembran terror en el pas, La Gran poca, 25 June 2019.Hide Footnote Their relationship with central government and state institutions, however, is far from harmonious.

In Venezuela, the term colectivo has traditionally referred to a local organisation with a left-wing ideology that seeks, in theory, to serve the common good of its members and the general public. In practice, opinions as to what these groups now represent differ markedly. Supporters of chavismo emphasise their community roots and commitment to locals well-being as defining features. They argue that these bodies function as social auditors monitoring the progress of what Chvez called the Bolivarian revolution, supporting and helping execute government policies at the neighbourhood level.[fn]For a description of the colectivos, see Daniel Garca Marco, Qu son los colectivos y cmo operan para defender la revolucin bolivariana en Venezuela, BBC, 7 July 2017.Hide Footnote

From their opponents viewpoint, on the other hand, colectivos constitute shadowy paramilitary units, linked to organised crime, which follow government orders and use guns and fear to exercise social control, mainly in the poorest neighbourhoods of Caracas and other big cities.[fn]Ludmila Vinogradoff, Brazo armado Venezuela: as son y operan los colectivos chavistas, la cara ms oscura del rgimen, Clarn, 5 April 2019. Thomas Dangel, Colectivos en Venezuela: de civiles a delincuentes, PanAm Post, 17 May 2019. Ronny Rodrguez Rosas, Represin y colectivos para aplacar protestas en Caracas y el interior del pas, Efecto Cocuyo, 31 March 2019.Hide Footnote Members of the colectivos engaged in acts of political harassment under Chvez when they attacked TV stations, business organisations, diplomatic missions or figures opposed to the government.[fn]Fabiola Snchez, Detienen a Lina Ron por ataque a Globovisin, El Nuevo Herald, 4 August, 2009. Atacan misin del Vaticano en Venezuela, VOA, 4 February 2009.Hide Footnote Venezuelas extremely polarised politics have led many in the opposition camp to scorn any public expression of support for chavismo as the fruit of coercive colectivos, prompting violent reprisals against people with no links to these bodies.[fn]Crisis Group interview, social scientist, 4 April 2019.Hide Footnote

Under the Maduro government the colectivos have taken a more active role in the defence of the revolution, and during opposition demonstrations of 2014 and 2017 engaged in violent and criminal acts against protesters.[fn]Daniel Wallis, Venezuela violence puts focus on militant colectivo groups, Reuters, 13 February 2014. Patricia Torres and Nicholas Casey, Los colectivos venezolanos, las bandas de civiles armados que atacan a los manifestantes y defienden a Maduro, The New York Times, 22 April 2017.Hide Footnote Colectivos reputation as brutal para-police enforcers has been reinforced over the past year following opposition attempts led by Guaid to overthrow the Maduro government, which has responded by relying on the colectivos power to intimidate opponents and mobilise supporters.[fn]As pressure mounted on Maduro at the start of the year, colectivos staged various public events where they swore to defend the Bolivarian revolution and Maduro. Colectivos armados llaman a defender revolucin, ANSA, 7 January 2019.Hide Footnote Both on 23 February, when Maduros opponents attempted to force humanitarian aid into Venezuela from neighbouring Colombia and Brazil, and during the oppositions failed civil-military uprising on 30 April, the colectivos played a leading role in street clashes. Witnesses to the February events on the Colombian border report that the colectivos were more effective in deterring the efforts of Guaids supporters than the security forces proper.[fn]Lucia Newman, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, Al Jazeera, 9 May 2019.Hide Footnote

More recently, government supporters carrying firearms, rocks and sticks violently prevented opposition deputies from entering the National Assembly while also harassing journalists.[fn]Venezuela opposition says govt. loyalists fired at them, AFP, 15 January 2020. Colectivo chavista neg haber agredido a periodistas cerca del Palacio Federal Legislativo, El Nacional, 13 January 2020.Hide Footnote The press and the opposition called the mob colectivos, but bona fide members of these groups who were around the National Assembly at the time said they had nothing to do with the violence. Representatives of the colectivos nevertheless recognise that they carry out joint actions with state security forces to preserve peace, and many colectivo members are also part of the official Venezuelan civilian militia, an adjunct of the armed forces said by the government to be 3.3 million strong.[fn]On the reported size of the state militia, which has not been independently verified, see Maduro despliega milicias en las calles de Venezuela para garantizar la paz, EFE, 13 November 2019. Also on state militia, see Crisis Group Briefing,Venezuelas Military Enigma, op. cit.Hide Footnote

A direct relationship connects some colectivos and the government. But not all are the same, and some have stayed relatively independent of central government and remain wary of falling under top-down political control. One group of colectivos, for example, has maintained a continuous presence in Venezuelan politics since the 1970s and 1980s, years before the emergence of Chvez. Members of this group, such as the Coordinadora Simn Bolvar in the working-class 23 de Enero neighbourhood of Caracas, display clear left-wing leanings and are committed to improving community life through better public policies, cultural activities and campaigning against police repression and abuse.[fn]Juan Contreras, Nacimiento de la Coordinadora Cultural Simn Bolvar en la Parroquia 23 de Enero, Rebelin, 8 February 2008.Hide Footnote However, even these groups are increasingly aligned with Maduros government, arguing that Venezuela is under attack from imperialist forces across the region.[fn]Crisis Group interview, colectivo member, Caracas, 18 August 2018.Hide Footnote

Two other categories, which also are branded colectivos, display far less interest in grassroots mobilisation. One is made up of opportunists and criminals who use their supposed affiliation with chavismo to gain legitimacy and act with impunity. The Frente 5 de Marzo, for example, is a colectivo with professed links to security forces and the chavista political elite.[fn]Ronna Risquez, Lder del Frente 5 de Marzo: Los colectivos somos un mal necesario, Runrunes, 24 October 2014.Hide Footnote Nonetheless, its leader, together with four other colectivo members, was killed in a skirmish with the police in 2014, an event that sent shock waves through the Maduro government and led to the dismissal of General Miguel Rodrguez Torres, then the interior minister.[fn]Vanesa Moreno, Lucha de poder caus la muerte de dos integrantes del Frente 5 de Marzo, Efecto ,4 October 2014.a political class- as their members stated- and forces is better. egion. aranty the country'nt (otherwise we wiCocuyo, 15 December 2015. For a political analysis of the event, see also David Smilde and Hugo Prez Herniz, Removal of minister reveals tenuous state monopoly on violence, Venezuelablog, 27 October 2014.Hide Footnote Groups of this sort are mainly dedicated to illegal activities such as extortion, but also do some community work in the areas where they operate in order to win local support and a degree of public complicity.[fn]Colectivos se fortalecen con la anuencia del Estado, PROVEA, 2 April 2019.Hide Footnote On many occasions, these outfits are at loggerheads with the more politically oriented colectivos, although in moments of crisis they rally to defend the revolution and follow government dictates.

A last category consists of paramilitary or para-police outfits. These are directly related to the state, and are often the creations of politicians or senior government officials, which use them as private shock forces. State institutions or specific politicians fund them, and they spend their time working on behalf of their beneficiaries. Chavista strongman Diosdado Cabello, for example, had known ties with one colectivo leader, the late Lina Ron, while the links to the colectivos of the former mayor of Libertador Municipality in Caracas and current protector of the border state of Tchira, Freddy Bernal, are also overt.[fn]Ud. lo vio Lina Ron orgullosa de ser amiga de Diosdado Cabello, Globovisin video excerpt, 6 September 20o9. For an obituary of Lina Ron detailing her activities and the controversies around them, see Muere Lina Ron: el chavismo llora a la ms polmica de sus revolucionarias, BBC Mundo, 5 March 2011. Freddy Bernal confirma intervencin de colectivos en operativo contra Oscar Prez, El Impulso, 15 January 2018. Freddy Bernal se reuni con colectivos en el puente Simn Bolvar, El Nacional, 14 April 2019.Hide Footnote These colectivos do not always have a territorial base and usually coexist with the other two types at state-organised events and initiatives. One colectivo that has direct links with public officials and has allegedly participated in police operations is Tres Races, which operates in the 23 de Enero neighbourhood. Its members took part in a joint operation with the special police unit FAES against the renegade police officer scar Prez in 2018, as a result of which both Prez and the leader of Tres Races died.[fn]Lorena Melndez, Colectivo Tres Races: Ha muerto el len ms feroz del 23 de Enero, Runrunes, 18 January 2018.Hide Footnote

Central state officials have attempted to co-opt community-based colectivos in recent years with some success, turning a number of them into increasingly mercenary paramilitary outfits.[fn]Taylor Luke, Maduro turns to violent mercenary colectivos to maintain order, PRI, April 25, 2019.Hide Footnote In a series of interviews between 2013 and 2018 with prominent colectivo members in Caracas, Crisis Group noticed that the relative autonomy enjoyed by some of the colectivos had waned over the years. In 2013 the main aim of these groups was to fight for the communal state that they regarded as Chvezs main legacy, while in 2015 the members indicated that their overriding objective was to guarantee food and staples to their community in alliance with the state, and prevent any private sector speculation. In 2018, many were working as bodyguards for state officials, and instead of discussing community power spoke far more about imperialism and their hostility toward the opposition.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, different colectivo leaders in Caracas, April and May 2013, November 2015 and September 2018.Hide Footnote

As a result, all three sorts of colectivos have developed common characteristics. All are to some extent armed and opposed previous disarmament policies promoted by the government to reduce gun crime.[fn]In 2013, the National Assembly, then controlled by chavistas, passed a gun control and disarmament law. The colectivos were loath to hand over their weapons to the state, however, arguing that as the armed vigilantes behind the chavista revolution they need the guns since the opposition could destabilise the government at any time. Crisis Group interviews, two colectivo leaders, 23 de Enero, Caracas, 15 August 2013. The law eventually proved a failure, and official disarmament efforts have since been discarded. James Bargent, Disarmament Law in Venezuela Yields Near Zero Results, InSight Crime, 18 August 2014.Hide Footnote In addition, they all derive local power by exhibiting connections with the state; they usually operate under strict vertical command systems; and they all defend the revolution and are willing to resort to violence to this end. Even so, it is not unusual for fights to occur between different colectivos operating in the same area. In one of the most recent incidents, five members died in a clash between two groups in the 23 de Enero neighbourhood.[fn]Colectivos del 23 de Enero matan al hermano de Heyker Vsquez, El Pitazo, 13 January 2020.Hide Footnote

That said, colectivos are not necessarily passive recipients of government orders. Different factions within the Venezuelan government control separate colectivos, and as a result the groups interests do not always coincide. On several occasions security forces have openly clashed with the colectivos, forcing the government into hard choices as to which side to favour. In 2014, as mentioned above, former interior minister Miguel Rodrguez Torres was sacked after police and members of the 5 de Marzo colectivo fought, with five group leaders killed after the authorities accused them of criminal activities.[fn]One of those killed, Jos Odreman, offered declarations to the press before the clashes with the police in which he held Rodrguez Torres responsible for their possible fate. Maduro reemplaza a controversial ministro del Interior y le da 15 das de descanso, EFE, 24 October 2014.Hide Footnote Members of the group and other organisations demanded that Rodrguez Torres be dismissed, a request with which Maduro complied.[fn]Sale Rodrguez Torres y lo sustituye Carmen Melndez, EFE, 24 October 2014. The relation between Torres and Maduro deteriorated further, and in 2018 Torres was arrested on charges of espionage, conspiracy and instigating a military rebellion. He sits in prison to this day.Hide Footnote

Four years later, frictions between the military high command and colectivos resurfaced when Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino Lpez voiced indignation following the release of a video showing colectivo members with guns announcing their willingness to use violence in defence of the government. The state and the Venezuelan people have the armed forces constitutionally fulfilling their tasks, he stated, arguing that there was no need for armed groups to rally to the governments side.[fn]Padrino Lpez: Rechazamos grupos armados que se hacen llamar colectivos, Aporrea, 2 March 2018.Hide Footnote Spokespeople for the colectivos retaliated by accusing Padrino Lpez of failing to understand the civic-military bond at the heart of chavismo, and insisting that they had become part of the Venezuelan state and would continue defending the Bolivarian revolution.[fn]Colectivos: Padrino Lpez no aguant la presin de la derecha, Noticiero Digital, 3 March 2018.Hide Footnote

The relation between Padrino Lpez and the colectivos does not seem to have improved greatly since then, with the minister recently stating that the armed forces are obliged to combat all armed groups present in the country.[fn]Sebastiana Barrez, Padrino Lpez pretende desligarse de los colectivos chavistas y pidi a la Fuerza Armada actuar contra cualquier grupo violento, Infobae, 6 April 2019.Hide Footnote Nonetheless, Maduros explicit backing for colectivos and their central role in seeking to quash pro-Guaid protests restrains the armed forces in any action against them.[fn]Daniel Lozano, Nicols Maduro: El primer defensor de los colectivos soy yo, El Mundo, 4 April 2019.Hide Footnote

Right-wing paramilitaries, to use the Maduro governments terminology, are illegal combat units usually acting on behalf of foreign governments and in collaboration with the Venezuelan opposition. As with the guerrillas, the paramilitaries are supposedly imported from Colombia, where they were involved for years in both extreme counter-insurgent violence and organised crime, including drug trafficking. Under former president lvaro Uribe, the government began negotiating their demobilisation in 2003, concluding an agreement in 2006. But some of the paramilitaries were only loosely committed to this peace process, giving rise to a second rash of criminality.[fn]Regarding the paramilitaries in Colombia and their dismantling as a result of the 2003-2006 peace process under Uribe, see Crisis Group Latin America Report N8, Demobilising the Paramilitaries in Colombia: An Achievable Goal?, 5 August 2004; Douglas Porch and Mara Jos Rasmussen, Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 31, no. 6 (2008), pp. 520-540.Hide Footnote Their activities in Venezuela allegedly include crimes such as harassment, extortion and kidnapping of peasants and landowners, as well as intimidation of chavista loyalists and leaders.[fn]Eligio Rojas, Denuncian asesinato de seis militantes chavistas, ltimas Noticias, 28 July 2019.Hide Footnote Although core members of these outfits are Colombian, recent reports indicate that they have tried to recruit new members from among Venezuelan migrants.[fn]Helen Murphy and Luis Jaime Acosta, Exclusive: Colombian armed groups recruiting desperate Venezuelans, army says, Reuters, 20 June 2019.Hide Footnote

The Maduro government has placed great emphasis on the role played by right-wing Colombian paramilitary units in the country, saying there are five that participate in various illegal activities and are tolerated by Colombian armed forces along the border.[fn]En la frontera con Venezuela existen 5 grupos paramilitares: Bernal, Panorama, 13 August 2019.Hide Footnote The Venezuelan military report, not always truthfully, that they have suffered casualties in paramilitary attacks on their posts near the border.[fn]For example, the November 2018 attack attributed by the Venezuelan military to Colombian paramilitaries was in fact the work of the ELN. Mueren 3 militares venezolanos tras ataque de grupo irregular, Telesur, 4 November 2018.Hide Footnote They have repeatedly announced the arrest of paramilitary members allegedly seeking to destabilise Venezuela.[fn]In 2015, the Maduro government closed the border with Colombia after gunmen wounded three Venezuelan military officers. Maduro said Colombian paramilitaries were behind the attack. David Smilde, Venezuelan government blames Colombian paramilitaries for violence, contraband and protests, Venezuelablog, 24 August 2015. The Maduro government said it had captured 83 paramilitaries in 2019 alone in Tchira, a state bordering Colombia. Gobierno venezolano asesta otro golpe a la banda paramilitar La Lnea, VTV, 8 November 2019. See also Venezuela: six farmers killed by Colombian paramilitary, Telesur, 30 July 2019.Hide Footnote

The Venezuelan opposition denies any connection with right-wing paramilitary groups, but these disclaimers are in doubt after the publication of compromising photographs showing Juan Guaid with two Colombian paramilitaries. The photograph was taken as he travelled into Colombia via an illegal crossing, known as a trocha, in order to attend a humanitarian aid concert on 22 February and support efforts to get relief supplies into Venezuela the next day.[fn]Venezuelas Guaid pictured with members of Colombian gang, The Guardian, 14 September 2019.Hide Footnote Guaid claimed not to have known the paramilitaries identity, saying many people had their picture taken with him that day.[fn]Guaid niega que grupo criminal Los Rastrojos lo ayudara a cruzar la frontera con Colombia, CNN, 13 September 2019.Hide Footnote

Venezuela is one of the most dangerous countries in the world if judged by its homicide rate, one of Latin Americas highest.[fn]Venezuela for many years had one of the highest murder rates in the world, with official data putting Venezuela constantly among the five most dangerous countries. Officially, in 2016 the murder rate was 56 per 100,000 inhabitants, and in 2015, 58. Extra-official data have reported significantly higher rates, with murder rates of over 80 per 100,000 inhabitants. Since 2017, however, murder rates have decreased, with 2019 being the least violent for years. Extra-officially, in 2019 the murder rate was 60 per 100,000 inhabitants, while the Maduro government claims it stood at 20 (the government does not include murders caused by state security forces). See Mayela Armas, Venezuela murder rate dips, partly due to migration: monitoring group, Reuters, 27 December 2018. Ludmila Vinogradoff, Informe 2019: con ms de 16.000 asesinatos, Venezuela se mantiene como uno de los pases ms violentos del mundo, Clarn, 27 December 2019. Venezuela reduce 36,3% tasa de criminalidad en ocho principales delitos durante 2019, Xinhua, 29 December 2019. For a global study showing Venezuelas exposure to high levels of homicidal violence, see Global Study on Homicide, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019.Hide Footnote A range of criminal groups of varying size and structure engage in robbery, kidnapping, fraud, blackmail, contract killing or illegal trade, notably in weapons, drugs, children and women.[fn]For a comprehensive overview of criminal dynamics and activities in Venezuela, see Roberto Briceo-Len and Alberto Camardiel (eds.), Delito organizado, mercados ilegales y democracia en Venezuela (Caracas, 2015).Hide Footnote Police report that a total of over 100 Venezuelan criminal groups operate across the country, with the three most important categories of illicit organisation being the pranes (criminal bosses in Venezuelas prison system), megabandas (mega-gangs) and sindicatos (literally, the unions).[fn]The Venezuelan police in 2019 reported that 110 criminal groups operate in eighteen of the countrys 24 states. Rosibel Cristina Gonzlez, 110 bandas criminales tienen secuestrada a Venezuela, El Nacional, 7 September 2019.Hide Footnote Despite their criminal activities, in some areas these groups have replaced the state by providing rudimentary law and order.[fn]In a recent protest against police operations in a poor, densely populated suburb of Caracas, Petare, residents claimed that the police are killing us, and the gangs are protecting us. Carlos dHoy, Excesos del FAES provocan protesta en Petare, El Universal, 10 June 2019.Hide Footnote

The pranes are the heads of criminal groups usually dedicated to drug trafficking and extortion operating out of Venezuelas squalid and extremely violent prison system.[fn]In a recent incident in a western Venezuelan jail, 29 prisoners were killed and 19 police wounded in clashes. Venezuelan prison clashes leave 29 inmates dead, BBC, 25 May 2019. Prisons in Venezuela are overpopulated; estimates say the country has 46,675 prisoners while jail capacity stands at 20,776. See Claudia Smolansky, En 20 aos de chavismo ms de 7000 personas murieron en crceles venezolanas, Crnica Uno, 2 April 2019. Venezuela prisons beyond monstrous, UN warns, highlighting plight of Colombian detainees, UN News, 9 October 2018. Simon Romero, Where prisoners can do anything, except leave, The New York Times, 3 June 2011.Hide Footnote In many cases, the pranes control the prisons where they are held, and tend to feel safer behind bars.[fn]Quin era el Conejo, el homenajeado con disparos al aire en una crcel en Venezuela?, BBC Mundo, 29 January 2016.Hide Footnote Ill-advised prison policies made during the Chvez and Maduro governments, including toleration of overcrowding and informal arrangements as to who exercises control over inmates, strengthened the role of the pranes in prisons, giving them exceptional power inside these institutions.[fn]Andrs Antillano, Cuando los presos mandan: control informal dentro de la crcel venezolana, Espacio Abierto,vol. 24, no. 4 (2015). La delegacin del poder estatal: Los pranes, InSight Crime, 20 May 2018.Hide Footnote

Mega-bandas are hierarchical organisations that are a relatively new arrival to the Venezuelan underworld. They engage in drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping throughout the country, and have great sway on their own turf. Many of these groups leaders have spent time in jail, as a result of which it is not uncommon for them to work together with the prison-based pranes.[fn]Antonio Mara Delgado, Grandes bandas delictivas siembran terror en Venezuela, El Nuevo Herald, 23 July 2015.Hide Footnote

Criminal experts have detected the existence of between twelve and sixteen mega-bandas, some with over 300 members.[fn]Megabandas en Venezuela, El Nacional, 13 May 2016.Hide Footnote They are heavily armed and, as a result of the threat they pose through territorial control, the government has tried to combat them through fierce police crackdowns, most notoriously the Operation to Liberate and Protect the People between 2015 and 2017.[fn]The name given to these police operations was later changed to Humanistic Operation to Liberate the People.Hide Footnote While these massive police raids failed to reduce the gangs power, they perpetrated widespread human rights violations wherever carried out.[fn]According to a police officer questioned by researchers, prison overcrowding persuaded government officials that a crime policy based on killing suspected criminals was preferable to mass incarceration. So we started to eliminate, eliminate, eliminate. So as to clean up the population, above all the poorer classes. Vernica Zubillaga and Rebecca Hanson, Los operativos militarizados en la era post-Chvez, Nueva Sociedad, November-December 2018. See also OLP: The mask of official terror in Venezuela, Connectas.org, 6 October 2017.Hide Footnote At the same time, the government has also selectively favoured the creation of peace zones in Caracas, entailing informal non-aggressionpacts between state security forces and criminal groups in an attempt to pacify and eventually demobilise the latter. Opposition critics have vilified these zones for allegedly offering impunity to criminal groups, despite evidence of security benefits of neighbourhood ceasefires among competing criminal groups, in certain cases brokered by local women.[fn]On local peace movements in Caracas, see Vernica Zubillaga, Manuel Llorens and John Souto, Micropolitics in a Caracas Barrio: The Political Survival Strategies of Mothers in a Context of Armed Violence, Latin America Research Review, vol. 54, no. 2 (2019), pp. 429-443. For opposition criticism of peace zones, see Parlamento venezolano investigar enfrentamientos en la Cota 905, NT24, 31 July 2019.Hide Footnote

The sindicatos, meanwhile, are criminal groups operating primarily in southern Venezuela, and largely based in the Orinoco Mining Arc, a vast area in Bolvar state that is home to a government mining initiative created in 2016. Their origins lie in the construction industry, but since the economic crisis began they have focused on illegal mining and other illicit activities. They are able to deploy significant armed force, have alleged links to state officials, and compete with other non-state armed groups, notably the ELN guerrillas.[fn]Crisis Group Report, Gold and Grief in Venezuelas Violent South, op. cit.Hide Footnote The sindicatos have grown more autonomous from the state as they have become richer and better able to draw on their own support networks.[fn]Edgar Lpez, Una mafia disfrazada de sindicato est al mando del yacimiento de oro ms grande de Venezuela, Arcominerodelorinoco.com, 19 September 2017.Hide Footnote But to a greater extent than the guerrillas, their relations with locals are marked by disrespect, looting and atrocities, provoking indigenous communities to create, or consider creating, security brigades or self-defence groups.[fn]The indigenous self-defence groups have arisen in response to efforts by various groups (including the military) to control gold mines in the south of the country. Mara Antonieta Segovia, Indigenous self-defense groups rise in southern Venezuela, Armando.info, 10 October 2015.Hide Footnote The sindicatos and their conflict with other armed groups are visible in one of Venezuelas most dangerous places, the south-eastern mining town of El Callao, where civil society groups calculate a murder rate of over 600 per 100,000 inhabitants roughly a hundred times the rate in the U.S.[fn]Bladimir Martnez Ladera, Sindicatos convirtieron en un Pueblo Vaquero El Callao, Nueva Prensa, 30 May 2019. In one of the most recent crimes in El Callo, political activist Rosalba Mara Valdez was shot dead after denouncing the relations between state and non-state armed groups in the area. De varios disparos asesinaron a exconcejal Rosalba Valdez en El Callao, Tal Cual, 22 December 2019.Hide Footnote

Judicial investigations, generally carried out by U.S. prosecutors, as well as media reports, suggest that a number of senior government officials have direct, profit-sharing links to organised crime.[fn]The most notorious case suggesting links between the high echelons of chavismo and organised crime is the case of the narco-nephews. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration arrested two nephews of Cilia Flores, President Maduros wife, on drug trafficking charges in Haiti. A U.S. court found them guilty and sentenced them to eighteen years in prison. Brendan Pierson, Nephews of Venezuelas first lady sentenced to 18 years in U.S. drug case, Reuters, 14 December 2017. An InSight Crime investigation reports that 123 government officials are involved in criminal activity. 7 Reasons for Describing Venezuela as a Mafia State, InSight Crime, 16 May 2019.Hide Footnote At the same time, weak and poorly supervised state institutions, economic crisis and discretionary public policies have created a permissive environment for criminal activity to prosper by coexisting with and supplanting state institutions, without necessarily depending on full-scale collusion between the two.[fn]El Estado y el delito organizado: exceso y vaco normagtivo, in Briceo-Len and Camardiel, op. cit.; John Polga-Hecimovich, Organized Crime and the State in Venezuela under Chavismo, in Bruce Bagley, Jorge Chabat and Jonathan Rosen (eds.), The Criminalization of States: The Relationship between States and Organized Crime (London, 2018).Hide Footnote Recent reports from Venezuelas rural areas indicate that local people have been reduced to living in preindustrial conditions, providing armed groups with the opportunity to supplant an increasingly absent state. These groups have often taken charge of enforcing business contracts, punishing common crimes and even settling divorces, witnesses report.[fn]Anatoly Kurmanaev, Rural Venezuela crumbles as president shores up the capital and his power, The New York Times, 13 January 2020.Hide Footnote

Armed groups operating in Venezuela have distinct objectives, modus operandi, political loyalties and relations with the state. As political conflict has intensified, they have increasingly preyed on the states absence, fissures or weakness, providing them with the sort of power and economic stakes that they will not easily forsake and which directly threaten the countrys long-term stability. At the same time, engaging with these groups as part of a political settlement or eventual government transition raises profound moral concerns and practical challenges.

Although there is at present no formal negotiation between the government and opposition, previous rounds of talks among the countrys political forces have focused almost exclusively on political and institutional arrangements, with little or no discussion of how to deal with armed groups and criminal actors. Venezuelas competing forces may be avoiding mention of these groups due to the political cost of addressing the issue or because they do not consider it urgent. But even if these armed factions do not arouse the greatest concern, their growth in a climate of economic collapse and political deadlock, and the consequences for the countrys future security, should help motivate both sides, and their respective allies, to resume the quest for a negotiated outcome. The threat posed by these groups also underlines the importance of ensuring that the top brass is involved in any forthcoming negotiations. Military participation in future talks is essential to ensuring that no faction of the armed forces sabotages an eventual political transition, as well as to designing and later enforcing a long-term policy toward non-state armed outfits.[fn]See Crisis Group Briefing, Venezuelas Military Enigma, op. cit.Hide Footnote

The approach chosen will have to be tailored to each set of groups. Dealing with the Colombian guerrillas or rebel offshoots operating in Venezuela requires flexibility and regional cooperation. The Venezuelan state alone cannot bargain with these forces without risking entrenching them in the country and creating tensions with Colombia. Optimally, both countries governments and armed forces would embark on fresh negotiations with the ELN aimed at its permanent demobilisation, while also working to persuade FARC dissidents to lay down their arms in exchange for judicial benefits and reintegration. Venezuela showed in the talks between Colombia and the FARC that it can help end decades of insurgency if it wishes. While such cooperation now seems improbable given the parlous state of bilateral relations, the countries shared interest in reducing violence along lengthy borders could help sway both governments. For now, the two countries could build confidence by calling for an independent, multilateral border monitoring mechanism, possibly under UN auspices, so as to prevent and contain flare-ups.

As for colectivos, negotiations may also be an option. Not all the colectivos are the same, and a future political settlement aiming to pacify the country, respect the integrity of the chavista movement and prevent future political persecution could attract the support of these groups, especially if it includes provisions that emphasise their historical identity and mission as social movements auditing the effects of government policy at the local level. Such an approach might appeal to the more community-oriented and politically active colectivos. The ambitions of some colectivo leaders may also facilitate their incorporation into formal political life so long as the state and judicial system can provide guarantees that they will not be subject to criminal investigation or violent retaliation.

Dealing with purely criminal groups, including certain colectivos as well as major gangs and cartels, will require recognition of the states limited resources as well a prudent use of sticks and carrots. Whereas civilian authorities should assume the responsibility of gauging the main security threats, it will be up to Venezuelas armed forces and police to combat and weaken these groups in a range of ways. Purely coercive law enforcement and iron fist policies targeted at the largest and most violent criminal outfits will in all likelihood not achieve this goal, and could in fact do the reverse, judging by previous experience in Venezuela and Latin America.[fn]See, for example, Crisis Group Latin America Report N64, El Salvadors Politics of Perpetual Violence, 19 December 2017; Ivan Briscoe and David Keseberg, Only Connect: The Survival and Spread of Organized Crime in Latin America, PRISM, vol. 8, no. 1 (February 2019); Ulrich Schneckener, Dealing with Armed Non-State Actors in Peace-and State-Building, Types and Strategies, in Transnational Terrorism, Organized Crime and Peace-Building (London, 2010).Hide Footnote Mindful of norms against extending amnesties to perpetrators of certain serious crimes as well as possible domestic resistance to any such moves, civil and military authorities should explore the prospect of leniency for those willing to surrender their weapons, including reduced jail sentences for those who have committed serious crimes on condition that they give an honest account of their acts and do not return to crime.[fn]A model for such transitional justice albeit applied to an armed insurgency and not a purely criminal enterprise can be found in the 2016 Colombian peace accord, which allowed for reduced (non-prison) sentences for serious crimes such as murder, extrajudicial executions and kidnapping so long as the former combatants undertook to tell the truth, make reparations to victims and do not return to crime. Acuerdo final para la terminacin del conflicto & la construccin de una paz estable y duradera, 2016. See also Crisis Group Latin America Report N67, Risky Business: The Duque Governments Approach to Peace in Colombia, 21 June 2018.Hide Footnote Profit-driven actors may be receptive to offers that allow them to retain some of their resources in exchange for a peaceful life and reduced sentences.[fn]According to one peacebuilding scholar, when exploring the potential of engaging armed groups through economic issues, it is essential to consider that those benefiting from economic opportunities in times of war may not want to lose these sources of revenue and power just for the sake of peace. Achim Wennmann, Getting Armed Groups to the Table: Peace Processes, the Political Economy of Conflict and the Mediated State,Third World Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 6 (2009); Alex De Waal, No money, no peace, Foreign Policy, 2 December 2015.Hide Footnote

Armed groups have extended their reach across Venezuela as the countrys political convulsions and economic debacle have afforded them the complicity or tolerance of state officials and illicit profit-making opportunities. Colombian guerrillas and rebel offshoots have also taken advantage of these inviting conditions by crossing long, largely unmonitored borders in and out of the country. Although the two sparring sides in Venezuelas dispute focus on the fight for the commanding heights in Caracas, the spread of irregular armed units that are in effect ruling impoverished populations in urban, rural and border areas highlights the acute danger that a continuing political standoff will lead to the fragmentation of territory into numerous enclaves run by local warlords. Both sides in Venezuela and their international allies should acknowledge that such outcome is to the benefit of neither, and offers a powerful reason to return to the negotiating table.

That said, the challenges posed by these groups to the countrys stability during and after any future political agreement will be considerable. Any effort to tame the threats posed by armed groups after a settlement is reached will most likely coincide with a period in which the state is fragile, violence is rife and reconciliation embryonic. Negotiations or deals with these groups could incur a high cost to the government, give armed actors legitimacy and political prominence, and need considerable effort, time and resources at a moment when all three will be in short supply. But treating these groups as little more than the criminal debris of the central political struggle to be either ignored or relentlessly fought could result in a stretch of violence that far outlasts the countrys current turmoil.

Caracas/Bogot/Brussels, 20 February 2020

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A Glut of Arms: Curbing the Threat to Venezuela from Violent Groups - International Crisis Group

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Space and Sound: Berlin’s Abandoned Spaces – Palatinate

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By Will Entwistle

Most of us, when listening to music, are unaware of the meaning of the sounds and what they represent. Fewer of us appreciate the origins of the sounds. Knowing how and why music is made is not a prerequisite for our enjoyment. However, it helps. Contextualising music offers insight into the uniqueness of certain genres and the places that inspired them. Both the consumption and practice of music forms the narrativisation of a place. In this sense, music is more than sound; it is a translation or articulation of subcultural experiences. Where, then, can we see spaces influence on sound? Moreover, is space indispensable to musics existence?

Contextualising music offers insight into the uniqueness of certain genres and the places that inspired them

Industrial decline marked a socio-economic shift that left workers and buildings behind. Despite this, post-industrialism was, paradoxically, responsible for the industrialisation of electronic music. Technos association with warehouses embodies the impression of place on sound. For instance, industrial technos routinized thumping in 4/4 time resembled working factory machines. In this sense, the beating heart of industry was immortalised in music.

Berlins abandoned buildings exchanged socialism with sound

Berlins techno scene derived from the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Tobias Rapp claimed that 30% of buildings in East Berlin after the collapse were left empty. Techno accepted the opportunity to re-identify these abandoned socialist relics. For instance, Tresor nightclub was founded within a year of the Berlin Walls collapse and was originally the vault of a bank in a department store located in the central district of East Berlin, Mitte. Elsewhere, Planet nightclub was an abandoned warehouse. The Vaults low ceilings and untreated, fortress-like concrete walls offer listeners with security yet vulnerability.

Techno sounds reflect these structures with firm beats providing listeners with rhythmic certainty alongside distorted and unpredictable synths counteracting the rigid bassline the DJ prescribes. Yet, space is also capable of enhancing sounds. Tresors 1-meter-thick concrete walls, encasing the Vault, help improve the depth of the bass while retaining the clarity of accompanying sounds. In this sense, space furthers our interaction with sounds both atmospherically and acoustically.

Abandoned spaces gave techno an identity beyond sound. Uniquely, the socialism previously attached to these spaces made techno both a form of liberation and rebellion. Felix Denk and Sven von Thlen, in their book, interviewed DJ Robert Hood on Berlins influence on techno. Hood says that the dark and murkyclubs, like Tresor, changed techno because the brutal socialist structures transformed techno from fantasy-based electronic sounds to a reality-basedsounds. Techno industrialised making beats faster and heavier while retaining the freedom of unpredictable synthesisers. Importantly, Hoods emphasis on technos reality demonstrates that space defined the musics change. Comparably, DJs performing in these Cold-War era structures soon after 1990 personified freedom from, but also and rebellion against the GDRs restriction on the arts. Berlins abandoned buildings exchanged socialism with sound.

Image: MichaelBrossmann via Wikimedia and Creative Commons

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Space and Sound: Berlin's Abandoned Spaces - Palatinate

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Crestwood defies odds to celebrate 50 years as the first ‘perfect’ Radburn neighbourhood in the world – ABC News

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Updated February 23, 2020 11:11:20

A "catastrophe", "total disaster", a "crazy, ludicrous living hell" that's how politicians described some of Australia's most radically designed neighbourhoods.

The design of the nation's capital itself was based in part on the US town of Radburn, New Jersey, where back-to-front homes have front doors opening on public parks rather than the street.

In addition, fences are non-existent and circular streets twist around the neighbourhood, never intersecting with a winding network of footpaths.

The Radburn concept was visionary when it was used in Canberra and dozens of other neighbourhoods across the country in the 1960s and 70s.

But things didn't quite work as planned, and many areas were transformed into crime-infested slums.

Many of those neighbourhoods were later bulldozed and rebuilt, but one shining example of a Radburn success story remains in the unpretentious southern Perth suburb of Thornlie and its residents are proud to have bucked the trend.

Original Radburn architect Clarence Stein reportedly described the community of Crestwood, 18 kilometres south-east of Perth's CBD, as the "first perfect Radburn scheme in the world".

"The people, the residents, the atmosphere there's no threats, you're safe no matter what, I was happy here all the time," said Rita Bernadette Fisher, one of the community's first homeowners.

The residents of Crestwood who this month celebrated 50 years as a village said their strong community spirit spared them from the crime and privacy issues typical of shared living.

"I will come home from work and there will be either two, three or four of our neighbours they'll end up on someone's driveway and they're having a good old yack," said resident of 38 years Maria van der Linden.

"When we go on holiday, they'll look after our garden. We do that for each other, that's really nice."

"We just loved the layout of the place," added Ms van der Linden's husband, Emile.

"The kids can get to school without crossing any roads, you just go [through] underpasses all the way to school.

"After work you'd go and play with your kids out in the park it's just a marvellous place to bring kids up in."

A 1978 resident survey found 60 per cent of homeowners were attracted to Crestwood by its aesthetics and 88 per cent were happier having moved there.

Most agreed there was more social interaction in Crestwood than standard suburban estates and said coming home at the end of the day was like entering a separate world.

There were also some negatives to the shared spaces.

Some remarked living in Crestwood was "a bit like having to dress for dinner and always be watching your manners", while several people commented on the implied social pretence in the area and the "existence of petty squabbles amongst residents".

Dan McDonald and his family moved from rural Queensland to a home in Crestwood late last year.

"Something that has been surprising or not expected, and we really enjoy it, is that everyone knows each other," he said.

"Because we both came from rural backgrounds, well that's a given for me that people talk to each other and that neighbours work together.

"But in the city, that's unheard of or it seems strange, it seems unusual.

"It seems so far that people here have mastered the art of living together, helping each other out without being too close."

There was also an unexpected, deeper benefit Mr McDonald and his family discovered.

"I felt lost in the city I felt very detached and lonely even though I was surrounded by people," he said.

"It doesn't seem to be like that here obviously it's not a beer over the back of a ute, but people will stop and have a chat over the back fence, look at the dog, have a yarn about the garden.

"Our oldest has some learning difficulties and she has very bad anxiety. The surroundings almost fixed that.

"She's a different child."

As for living back to front: "No one can figure out how to get in our house and we really like that!"

The innovative Radburn design underpinning Crestwood was enthusiastically received by the governments of the day, which saw it as a progressive solution to public housing issues.

WA suburbs with high concentrations of state housing, such as Withers, Bentley, Karawara and South Hedland, were constructed using the Radburn blueprint, but this triggered huge social problems including burglaries, drug use and assaults.

Some of those suburbs were completely bulldozed and rebuilt in a more conventional style, while others are still pressing ahead with a so-called "de-Radburnisation" effort.

Planning Institute of Australia WA committee member Vicki Lummer said Karawara was an excellent case study in the flaws of the concept.

"There was a high percentage of state housing properties which then set the tone for the socio-economic mix in that area and I think from the start that was the problem for Karawara," she said.

"As time went by all the design provisions were slowly eroded, so people weren't doing low fences, and then the crime rates started to escalate because [the parks] then became unsafe areas to walk through."

Peter Ciemitis, principal at urban planning specialists RobertsDay, said passive surveillance proved effective in reducing crime rates.

"With the inclusion of the high fences that people were starting to put in at Karawara, it actually made it a golden opportunity for crime because the worst crimes happen behind a high fence."

The neighbourhood watch mentality is something Crestwood does well.

"When we moved in here hardly anyone had a back fence, but times change and gradually fences went up, but to me it just spoils the whole concept of it," resident of 44 years Wendy Curtis said.

"We like to keep our fence open. I don't care if everyone looks in at us, I like looking out at everyone else."

Liz Griggs grew up in Crestwood and moved back as an adult with her own children.

"It wasn't until I got older that I really appreciated what I had as a child," she said.

"There was children everywhere we would have games and there would be 30, 40, 50 kids all participating from different parks, different age groups.

"The beauty of here is you look through your fence and out into the parks. It defeats the purpose, I think, having the big fence.

"I understand from a security point of view that that's how some people feel, but then you may as well live anywhere."

Crestwood was intended to be five times bigger than it is, with the addition of high-density apartment buildings and larger community facilities.

But the collapse of land values in the late 1970s and a drop in demand for lots meant that never eventuated and the surrounding land was developed in a more conventional style.

Crestwood Homeowners Association secretary Kathrina Oakland said she wondered if expansion would have seen Crestwood implode.

"It would have just got out of hand," she said.

"Whereas there's only 295 of us and we all live here because we want to live here."

Crestwood was initially marketed towards higher income earners, with royalty-themed brochures bragging about blocks chosen by doctors, chemists, dentists, school principals and "a host of other discerning people".

It was also the first suburb in Perth to have underground power.

Mr Ciemitis suggested that niche appeal was why Crestwood never took off as a concept elsewhere.

"It's not for everybody. They always seem to work as little gems, but it's hard to just shift the whole marketplace into accepting that as a new living model," he said.

Some urban planners still believe the Radburn concept has its best days ahead.

"I think we have to learn from the successful parts of the Radburn design," Ms Lummer said.

"All of the factors of climate change and people wanting to be more sustainable and having more green space, more tree cover all of those things are coming together."

Julian Bolleter, co-director of the Australian Urban Design Research Centre, said he believed Radburn neighbourhoods would come back in style in Australia.

"We need to be able to design suburbs that can funnel biodiversity," he said.

"Radburn planning is very good in that front because you have uninterrupted spines of open space.

"I think our suburbs will have to get denser and they are getting denser, so we do need public open space and I think Radburn is a model that still remains valid in the right context."

Mr Ciemitis said inner city suburbs that incorporated Radburn principles, such as the Perth suburb of Menora, would prove valuable in the future.

"It might have in 50 years' time a completely different life. That might be its golden year when it really works well," he said.

"Just to get rid of these ideas sometimes is not the right approach we might have the bones of something really quite spectacular."

Topics:urban-development-and-planning,lifestyle,house-and-home,housing,community-and-society,regional-development,population-and-demographics,housing-industry,family,states-and-territories,perth-6000,withers-6230,south-hedland-6722,minto-2566,canberra-2600,karawara-6152,thornlie-6108,wa

First posted February 23, 2020 06:59:30

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Thrust on durable rural housing – The Financial Express BD

Posted: at 6:41 am

Shahiduzzaman Khan | Published: February 22, 2020 22:08:06

Unplanned housing is a major problem facing Bangladesh's rural people. A few government-initiated rural housing projects, namely cluster and ideal village projects are implemented, but those are very small in number compared to the needs of the vast majority of people. These cluster villages have failed to meet expectations of the concerned people.

Authorities have very recently begun to lay thrust on developing liveable towns and villages for next generations. They think development of a standard and planned habitat would ensure people in both rural and urban areas to get their own house.

On many occasions, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has said the housing projects -- under both public and private sectors -- should be equipped with all civic facilities and services, and they should be developed under a master plan.

The Prime Minister has emphasised that lakes, water bodies and open spaces should be kept reserved for a development plan while a planned low-cost housing system should be developed for the poor living in slums scattered across cities.

The government has reportedly approved a law that would make official clearance mandatory for building houses in rural areas as well as use of land across the country. The proposed law, many say, would bring discipline in land management and prevent misuse of land.

The new law is expected to facilitate framing up of strategic plans for forest land, hilly areas and coastal belt. If the law is executed, nobody will be able to develop land at his or her whim. The country will have a national land use policy where there will be pragmatic policies for both urban and rural areas.

Bangladesh is one of the most land-scarce countries in the world. Though the National Land Utilisation Policy has focused on family-based land ceiling for rural housing and rural model house building, there is virtually no land-use plan for the rural areas that comprises about 85 per cent of the total land area.

Existing facilities in respect of physical infrastructure, housing, water supply, sanitation, etc., are inadequate in rural areas. A study suggests that housing shortage in the country would stand at around 3.1 million units, out of which 2.15 million units would be in rural areas.

Even though space availability for horizontal expansion is limited, people are forced to go for it considering high cost associated with vertical expansion. On the contrary, people in urban areas usually expand their house vertically since vertical expansion is more cost-effective in view of high price and scarcity of land in urban centres.

Indeed, a high growth rate of population has created enormous pressure on land. When the number of family members increases, people need to expand their houses. Since space is not adequately available, villagers expand their houses horizontally, encroaching on the farmland. Thus, cultivable land is gradually shrinking and numerous socio-economic problems are being created.

For the past several years, the Grameen Bank and a few non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are providing loans for rural house building that has opened a new area in the field of rural housing. Nevertheless, such organisations cater to the needs of a limited number of rural people.

The government has recently started implementing a compact township project involving a fund of Tk 4.24 billion for rural people of seven divisions. It is a new concept of compact housing that includes residential facilities alongside agriculture and forestation.

In fact, the idea was derived from the concept of cluster villages, which was supposed to provide urban facilities to villagers and save agriculture land. Analysts say such projects need to be implemented in participatory process -- in consultation with local people. Presumably, the poor and low-income group will definitely welcome such initiative, while the richer section might oppose it.

Each of the model villages is set to save about 13.05 acres of land needed for traditional housing. Besides, 16.26 acres of agricultural land will be saved, as the families will be provided with civic facilities through a single approach road.

It is found that many poorly-built rural houses collapse every year. However, the government, international agencies and private bodies can work in unison to address such problems.

Meanwhile, land use patterns are radically changing and adversely impacting the country's agricultural land, forest, water bodies and wildlife habitat. Needless to say, making new homes on cultivable land is limiting the use of land for farm production.

Furthermore, corruption remains a major problem that hampers streamlining of the country's land management. A World Bank survey reveals that most crimes and corruption in Bangladesh take place in land-related services. There are almost 3.5 million land-related cases pending.

Now, with the passage of new law for getting approval of rural housing, analysts believe, the country's housing and land administration system is set to be stronger and transparent. The government expects that discipline would be restored in land management and that misuse of land would be prevented.

In the national housing policy, due emphasis has been given on 'low cost housing', which means housing at affordable cost for all sections of the population. Apart from its thrust on housing at lower cost as compared to prevailing cost levels, a prime objective of the policy is to reduce cost and make housing an eco-friendly one.

As natural calamities like flood and cyclone are common in Bangladesh, low cost housing should also be made durable and must have good living conditions for the dwellers.

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As Andrey Zhdanov became the informal ruler of Finland – The Global Domains News

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History 23/02/20 As Andrey Zhdanov became the informal ruler of Finland

not everywhere, where the Soviet Union wanted to establish political influence, he began to alter the socio-economic and political system in his own image and likeness. Stalin, then Malenkov and Khrushchev obviously wanted to ensure that between the Pro-Soviet countries of peoples democracy and a hostile West, there was the buffer of the bourgeois-democratic state, friendly to the USSR. One of the best incarnations of this of course was after the Second world war, Finland. She had a close foreign-policy dependence on the USSR, almost the same as the countries of the organization of the Warsaw contract (OVD). Thanks to this submission in the foreign policy of Finland managed to preserve the sanctity of their way of life.

Stalin, who sought in 1939-1941 the accession of Finland to the USSR as well as he did with three other Baltic States, to the end of the war changed his plans. Priorities were the final defeat of Nazi Germany and building relationships with the great Western powers, which did not like the annexation of Finland. Also, importantly, Stalin would have feared the decay of moral spirit of the Soviet people under the influence of new citizens, accustomed to the freedom and private property. Here still it was necessary to reforge for socialism Balts, Moldovans and Western Ukrainians and Western Belarusians. Even if you include the Soviet Union almost four million Finns, it is not known who reforged would in the end.

for its part, the elite of Finland knew that the time when it was possible to hope for a military revenge against the Soviet Union, with the defeat of Germany is gone forever. How did they understand and what Stalin if he wanted to, not too difficult to occupy the whole of Finland. They are now it was necessary to ensure that maximum loyalty to the Soviet Union to keep what we have.

Therefore, no matter how difficult were the conditions exhibited by the Soviet Union in the negotiations on a truce in September 1944, Finland was forced to sign them. When the head of the Finnish delegation at the negotiations held in Moscow, Prime Minister A. Hackzell, got acquainted with the Soviet terms, he was stricken by a stroke. Conditions dictate Finlands domestic politics were the issue of the Soviet Union, its citizens (as of 21.06.1941) Karelians, Estonians and Izhora had found refuge in Finland; the dissolution of the nationalist organizations and the legalization of the Communist party; the trial of war criminals. To comply with Finlands truce (basically surrender) was established the allied control Commission, headed by Politburo member of the CPSU(b) A. A. Zhdanov.

Zhdanov in the sense of its powers and activities it is possible to liken the Royal the Governor-General of Finland N. And. Bobrikovo, eliminate the autonomy of Finland in 1898-1904 gg. 22 September 1944, Zhdanov arrived in Helsinki and from there three years, according to the instructions of Stalin, actually rules Finland (participation of British representatives in the Commission was nominal). At the request of Zhdanov, was banned organizations that the Soviet Union was considered fascist. On Control Commission, consisting of the Soviet NKVD, enjoyed the right of extraterritoriality, and had the opportunity for unlimited travel in Finland and control over the activities of state institutions. At the direction of Zhdanov, in March 1945, after the election, which victory was given to left parties, Prime Minister of Finland was approved by J. Paasikivi (Hellsten), whom Stalin considered ours after he signed the Treaty of Moscow 1940, ended the Winter war.

In November 1945 in Helsinki began the trial of the Finnish military and political leaders, Finland has drawn aggressive the war against the Soviet Union. In February 1946 he was sentenced. Former President R. ryti received 10 years in prison, the remaining seven defendants (two former Prime Minister, two Ministers of foreign Affairs, Ministers of Finance and education and the Ambassador in Berlin) from two to six years. In all these activities contributed to Zhdanov, the President of Finland K. Mannerheim. His authority helped the Soviet Union without conflict to establish control over the policy of Finland. In turn, Mannerheim avoided prosecution, but, resigning from the post of President in March 1946, just in case went to Switzerland.

February 10, 1947 the victorious powers signed the Paris peace Treaty with Finland, and in September of the same year, ceased operations of the allied control Commission in Helsinki. In 1947-1949, he was gradually released and pardoned former leaders of Finland. Stalin was outraged by this gesture obviously believed the loyalty of the Finns quite wealthy. April 6, 1948 in Moscow was signed a Treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the USSR and Finland, which operated until 1992. Mostly it was the commitment of Finland to cooperate with the USSR in the case of aggression by Germany or allied state. Considering that in 1955 the FRG became a member of NATO, the Treaty was a form of military Alliance of the USSR with capitalist countries outside the ATS.

the Line PaasikiviKekkonen (the presidents of Finland in 1946-1956 and 1956-1981) was from a disguised form of vassal relationships, something reminiscent of the situation of the Grand Duchy of Finland within the Russian Empire. Leaders of the USSR and Finland (e.g. Kekkonen and predsovmina the USSR A. N. Kosygin) had a close personal relationship. Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee had a virtual veto on the appointment of the Finnish Ministers. Finnish anti-Soviet policies during this period it was impossible to occupy high positions.

For their loyalty to the Paasikivi received in 1954the order of Lenin. Even more rich collection of Soviet awards gathered Kekkonen: the order of Lenin, order of Friendship of peoples and the international Lenin prize For strengthening peace among peoples. This is especially interesting in comparison with the facts of the biography of Kekkonen before 1945: in 1918, fought as a volunteer in the Finnish white guard; in the 20-30-ies he was a member of the far-right academic Karelian society, preaching the capture of Soviet Karelia; in 1940, the only one of the parliamentarians voted for the continuation of the war with the Soviet Union.

the Dependence of Finnish economy on the Soviet market led to the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Finnish economy experienced a severe crisis. How to write modern Finnish historians R. McCauley and J. Kokkonen, EU membership was a good thing for the economy, but still there are those who lost in this game the distance between the haves and have-nots has increased.

Source: Russian Seven

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Will the rivalry between Ghani and Abdullah undermine the Afghan peace process? The | News – Up News Info

Posted: at 6:41 am

Hours after the current president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, was declared on Tuesday Winner of the presidential elections of September 28, runner-up Abdullah Abdullah contested the delayed results, highlighting the power struggle between the two leaders.

After a count and a total delay of almost five months, Abdullah, who served as executive director of Afghanistan for the past five years, once again questioned the impartiality of the country's electoral process, in a repeat of the 2014 elections It was marred by irregularities.

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On Tuesday, Abdullah announced that he would establish a parallel government and one day later, in his capacity as executive director, he prohibited election officials from traveling outside the country.

Their movements are ahead of possible intra-Afghan talks between the government and the Taliban armed group aimed at achieving long-term peace.

The talks are based on the successful signing of a peace agreement between the Taliban and the US government. UU., Outlining the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and the Taliban's promise not to allow Afghan territory to be used as a launching pad for attacks outside the country.

On Saturday, the West-backed Kabul government, the United States and the Taliban announced the start of a one-week "violence reduction,quot; (RIV) that would culminate in the signing of the peace agreement on February 29.

Hours after the RIV pact took hold, reports emerged that Abdullah replaced the governors. from the provinces of Sar-e-Pul and Baghlan. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) expressed concern about the action and said it could jeopardize the peace process.

"Resorting to force or any other illegal means while efforts are being made to reduce violence, with the expectation that it may lead to the initiation of intra-Afghan peace negotiations, jeopardizes the hope of population peace. " The statement said.

After bitterly contesting the results of the 2014 elections, the Americans brought Abdullah and Ghani to the negotiating table and agreed to lead the government together, but the fissures within the national unity government often came to light.

His five years of association were often plagued by disagreements, disputes and disagreements, which stopped the government on several occasions.

But the recent dispute between the two most important leaders in the country could not have come at a more delicate time for Afghanistan.

The president of the United States, Donald Trump, initiated talks with the Taliban in 2018 as part of his campaign promise to take American troops home. The two sides are about to reach an agreement, which can see the end of almost 19 years of war.

The Taliban have been fighting NATO and Afghan government forces since 2001 when the group was overthrown in a US-led invasion.

If the agreement between the United States and the Taliban is signed, the Taliban and Afghan leaders would sit down to discuss the country's political future. The Taliban made the agreement with the United States their condition to agree to speak with the Kabul government, which for years called the "puppet,quot; of the United States.

A broad political consensus is critical when Kabul comes face to face with the Taliban as part of the intra-Afghan peace talks. However, the rivalry between Ghani and Abdullah could turn into violence that would weaken the hand of the Afghan government in the negotiations.

"This has created fragmentation in the Kabul government. This will certainly lead to a weaker position in Kabul when they sit face to face with the Taliban in the intra-Afghan dialogue," said Habib Wardak, a security analyst based in Kabul. Jazeera

"But even before reaching the point of sitting with the Taliban, it will be a challenge to form an all-inclusive team and build trust among political elites, most of whom reject the outcome of the presidential elections."

In addition to fighting to maintain consensus, the Afghan government also faces growing socio-economic problems, such as unemployment, deteriorating security conditions and the collapse of the economy.

Mariam Solaimankhail, a member of the Afghan parliament, said the election results should indicate a clear mandate to the government "to participate in any discussion of national importance."

"The results of the elections were necessary for the continuation of the democratic process. No discussion with any group should alter the constitution, democracy and general achievements of the last two decades," he said.

The counting of votes in the September 2019 elections has been involved in controversy from the beginning, with repeated delays in the results attributed to technical issues, accusations of fraud and protests by candidates.

The Talibans announcement at the time that it was boycotting the elections and its threats of violent unrest combined with a general distrust of politicians and corruption to prevent many Afghans from voting.

The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) announced preliminary results in December, saying that Ghani had won re-election by a narrow margin in a vote that had a total participation of more than 1.8 million. Abdullah dismissed the results as fraudulent.

On Tuesday, the IEC announced the final results after a recount, saying that Ghani had won with 50.64 percent of the votes, surpassing Abdullah, which obtained 39.52 percent.

Abdullahs camp was swift in its rejection, casting a shadow over the future of the democratic process in the war-torn country.

"They sided with Ghani. They worked directly for them. They surrendered to their power, status, influence and money," he told Al Jazeera Faraidoon Khwazoon, spokesman for Abdullah's campaign team.

"Therefore, not only we, but also the commission of electoral complaints, monitoring organizations and other teams did not participate in the process of audit and vote counting and this process lost its legitimacy and credibility. That is why the result and the result does not have legitimacy too. "

In addressing Abdullah's announcement to form a parallel government, which could create a constitutional crisis, Khwazoon said: "Our government will carry out its oath ceremony We have already formed groups and will also announce our high-level appointments."

Saif Khalid Sadat, a senior member of the Ghani electoral team, rejected the accusations of the Abdullah camp, saying the election results had been announced by the IEC, as it was within its legal authority, and "should be implemented by all the media,quot;.

"The elections were held successfully on the basis of all electoral laws and procedures. Ghani gives high priority to peace talks with the Taliban and I think it would be better for an elected government to negotiate with the Taliban," he told Al Jazeera

Some analysts have accused Abdullah of pursuing narrow political interests.

"Abdullah's complaints are not political and are based only on his narrow personal interest and on the interests of many warlords who are part of his political coalition," a political analyst from Kabul told Al Jazeera Harun Mir.

"President Ghani has campaigned for the preservation of the republic and the democratic constitutional political process. However, Abdullah Abdullah and his coalition partners hope that through a new provisional government, they can preserve their seats and political influence."

Sadat, Ghani's aide, reiterated the importance of all Afghan political forces joining under the umbrella of the "government of Afghanistan,quot; when doors open for intra-Afghan talks in the near future.

"All parties should reach a common goal that could end this war forever."

With reports from Mohsin Khan Mohmand in Kabul

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