Daily Archives: March 23, 2017

What’s Left? – London Review of Books (subscription)

Posted: March 23, 2017 at 2:36 pm

For Eric Hobsbawm, the Russian Revolution which occurred, as it happens, in the year of his birth was the central event of the 20th century. Its practical impact on the world was far more profound and global than that of the French Revolution a century earlier: for a mere thirty to forty years after Lenins arrival at the Finland Station in Petrograd, one third of humanity found itself living under regimes directly derived from the [revolution] and Lenins organisational model, the Communist Party. Before 1991, this was a fairly standard view, even among historians who, unlike Hobsbawm, were neither Marxists nor Communists. But finishing his book in the early 1990s, Hobsbawm added a caveat: the century whose history he was writing was the short 20th century, running from 1914 to 1991, and the world the Russian Revolution had shaped was the world that went to pieces at the end of the 1980s a lost world, in short, that was now being replaced by a post-20th-century world whose outlines could not yet be discerned. What the place of the Russian Revolution would be in the new era was unclear to Hobsbawm twenty years ago, and largely remains so to historians today. That one third of humanity living under Soviet-inspired systems before 1989-91 has dramatically dwindled. As of 2017, the centenary of the revolution, the number of Communist states in the world is down to a handful, with Chinas status ambiguous and only North Korea still clinging to the old verities.

Nothing fails like failure, and for historians approaching the revolutions centenary the disappearance of the Soviet Union casts a pall. In the rash of new books on the revolution, few make strong claims for its persisting significance and most have an apologetic air. Representing the new consensus, Tony Brenton calls it probably one of historys great dead ends, like the Inca Empire. On top of that, the revolution, stripped of the old Marxist grandeur of historical necessity, turns out to look more or less like an accident. Workers remember when people used to argue passionately about whether it was a workers revolution? have been pushed off stage by women and non-Russians from the imperial borderlands. Socialism is so much of a mirage that it seems kinder not to mention it. If there is a lesson to be drawn from the Russian Revolution, it is the depressing one that revolutions usually make things worse, all the more so in Russia, where it led to Stalinism.

This is the kind of consensus that brings out the contrarian in me, even when I am to a large extent part of it. My own The Russian Revolution, first published in 1982 with a revised edition coming out this year, was always cool about workers revolution and historical necessity, and made a point of being above the political battle (mind you, I wrote the original version during the Cold War, when there was still a political battle to be above). So its not in my nature to come out as a revolutionary enthusiast. But shouldnt someone do it?

That person, as it turns out, is China Miville, best known as a science fiction man of leftist sympathies whose fiction is self-described as weird. Miville is not a historian, though he has done his homework, and his October is not at all weird, but elegantly constructed and unexpectedly moving. What he sets out to do, and admirably succeeds in doing, is to write an exciting story of 1917 for those who are sympathetically inclined to revolution in general and to the Bolsheviks revolution in particular. To be sure, Miville, like everyone else, concedes that it all ended in tears because, given the failure of revolution elsewhere and the prematurity of Russias revolution, the historical outcome was Stalinism: a police state of paranoia, cruelty, murder and kitsch. But that hasnt made him give up on revolutions, even if his hopes are expressed in extremely qualified form. The worlds first socialist revolution deserves celebration, he writes, because things changed once, and they might do so again (hows that for a really minimal claim?). Libertys dim light shone briefly, even if what might have been a sunrise [turned out to be] a sunset. But it could have been otherwise with the Russian Revolution, and if its sentences are still unfinished, it is up to us to finish them.

Mark Steinberg is the only one of the professional historians writing on the revolution to confess to any lingering emotional attachment to it. Of course, revolutionary idealism and daring leaps into the unknown tend to result in hard landings, but, Steinberg writes, I admit to finding this rather sad. Hence my admiration for those who try to leap anyway. But even Steinberg whose study of the lived experience of 1917, based largely on the contemporary popular press and first-person reports, is one of the freshest of the recent books has largely abandoned his earlier interest in workers in favour of other social spaces: women, peasants, the empire and the politics of the street.

To understand the current scholarly consensus on the Russian Revolution, we need to look back at some of the old controversies, notably the one about inevitability. For Steinberg, this isnt a problem, as his contemporary worms-eye view ensures that the story is full of surprises. But other writers are almost excessively eager to tell us that outcomes were never set in stone and things might always have gone differently. There was nothing preordained about the collapse of the tsarist autocracy nor even of the Provisional Government, Stephen Smith writes, in his sober, well-researched and comprehensive history. Sean McMeekin seconds this, affirming that the events of 1917 were filled with might-have-beens and missed chances while at the same time tipping his hat to show who the intellectual enemy is: these events were far from an eschatological class struggle borne along irresistibly by the Marxist dialectic. In other words, the Marxists, Western and Soviet, were all wrong.

Historically Inevitable?, an edited collection, addresses the question of necessity directly by offering a series of what if? studies of key moments of the revolution. In his introduction Tony Brenton asks: Could things have gone differently? Were there moments when a single decision taken another way, a random accident, a shot going straight instead of crooked could have altered the whole course of Russian, and so European, and world, history? But Dominic Lieven is surely speaking for the majority of the volumes contributors when he writes that nothing is more fatal than a belief that historys course was inevitable. To be sure, those contributors see contingency as playing a greater part in the February and October revolutions than in the post-October path towards terror and dictatorship. Orlando Figes, author of a widely read study of the revolution, The Peoples Tragedy (1996), devotes a lively essay to showing that, had a disguised Lenin not been admitted without a pass to the Congress of Soviets on 24 October, history would have turned out differently.

In play here are various politically charged arguments about Soviet history. First, there is the question of the inevitability of the collapse of the old regime and the Bolshevik triumph. This is an old Soviet article of faith, hotly disputed in the past by Western and, particularly, Russian migr historians, who saw the tsarist regime on a course of modernisation and liberalisation that the First World War interrupted, plunging the country into disarray and making the previously unimaginable Bolshevik victory possible (Lieven, in one of the most sophisticated essays in the volume, characterises this interpretation of Russias situation in 1914 as very wishful thinking). In the context of past Sovietological debate on the revolution, raising the question of inevitability was interpreted not just as a Marxist claim but as a pro-Soviet one, since the implication was taken to be that the Soviet regime was legitimate. Contingency, conversely, was the anti-Marxist position in Cold War terms except, confusingly, when the contingency in question applied to the revolutions Stalinist outcome, as opposed to its onset, in which case conventional wisdom held that a totalitarian outcome was inevitable. Figes holds the same view: while contingency played a big role in 1917, from the October insurrection and the establishment of a Bolshevik dictatorship to the Red Terror and the Civil War with all its consequences for the evolution of the Soviet regime there is a line of historical inevitability.

In an attack on the whole what if? genre of history, Richard J. Evans has suggested that in practice counterfactuals have been more or less a monopoly of the Right with Marxism as target. Thats not necessarily true of the Brenton volume, despite the inclusion of right-wing political historians like Richard Pipes and the absence of any of the major American social historians of 1917 who were Pipess opponents in the bitter historiographical controversies of the 1970s. Brenton himself is a former diplomat, and the last sentence of Historically Inevitable? We surely owe it to the many, many victims [of the revolution] to ask whether we could have found another way rather endearingly suggests a diplomats propensity to try to solve problems in the real world, as opposed to the professional historians habit of analysing them.

Pipes, who served as Reagans Soviet expert on the National Security Council in the early 1980s, was the author of a 1990 volume on the revolution that took a particularly strong line on the basic illegitimacy of the Bolshevik takeover. His argument was directed not only against the Soviets but also against revisionists closer to home, notably a group of young US scholars, mainly social historians with a special interest in labour history, who from the 1970s objected to the characterisation of the October Revolution as a coup and argued that in the crucial months of 1917, from June to October, the Bolsheviks had increasing popular, notably working-class, support. The 1917 revisionists work was solidly researched, usually with information from Soviet archives which they had been able to access thanks to newly established official US and British student exchanges; and much of the field held it in high regard. But Pipes saw them as, in effect, Soviet stooges, and was so contemptuous of their work that, in defiance of scholarly convention, he refused even to acknowledge its existence in his bibliography.

The Russian working class was an object of intense interest for historians in the 1970s. This wasnt only because social history was in fashion in the profession at the time, with labour history a popular sub-field, but also because of the political implications: did the Bolshevik Party in fact have working-class support and take power, as it claimed, on behalf of the proletariat? Much of the revisionist Western work on Russian social and labour history despised by Pipes focused on workers class consciousness and whether it was revolutionary; and some but not all of its practitioners were Marxist. (In the non-Marxist wing, I annoyed other revisionists by ignoring class consciousness and writing about upward mobility.)

The authors of the centenary books all have their own histories that are relevant here. Smiths first work, Red Petrograd (1983), fitted the labour history rubric, although as a British scholar he was somewhat removed from American fights, and his work was always too careful and judicious to allow for any suggestion of political bias; he went on to write a fine and underappreciated study, Revolution and the People in Russia and China: A Comparative History (2008), in which the workers and labour movements continued to play a central role. Steinberg, a US scholar of the next generation, published his first book on working-class consciousness, Proletarian Imagination, in 2002, when social history had already taken the cultural turn, bringing a new emphasis on subjectivity with less interest in hard socio-economic data. But this was more or less a last hurrah for the working class in writing on the Russian Revolution. Pipes had rejected it outright, holding that the revolution could be explained only in political terms. Figes in his influential Peoples Tragedy focused on society rather than politics, but minimised the role of the conscious workers, emphasising instead a lumpen proletariat raging in the streets and destroying things. In their new works, Smith and Steinberg are both uncharacteristically reticent on the subject of workers, though street crime has entered their field of vision.

McMeekin, the youngest of the authors here, set out to write a new history, by which he means an anti-Marxist one. Following Pipes, but with his own twist, he includes an extensive bibliography of works cited or profitably consulted that omits all social histories except Figes. This includes Smiths and Steinbergs earlier books, as well as my own Russian Revolution (though it is cited on p.xii as an example of Marxist, Soviet-influenced work). It could be argued that McMeekin doesnt need to read the social histories since his focus in The Russian Revolution, as in his earlier work, is on the political, diplomatic, military and international economic aspects. He draws on a multinational archival source base, and the book is quite interesting in detail, particularly the economic parts. But theres a whiff of right-wing nuttiness in his idea that Marxist-style maximalist socialism is a real current threat in Western capitalist countries. He doesnt quite call the whole revolution, from Lenins sealed train in April 1917 to the Rapallo Treaty in 1922, a German conspiracy, but thats more or less what his narrative suggests.

The end points people choose for their histories of revolution reveal a lot about their assumptions of what it was really about. Rapallo is, appropriately, the end point for McMeekin. For Miville its October 1917 (revolution triumphant), for Steinberg 1921 (not so much victory in the Civil War, as you might expect, as an open end with revolutionary business unfinished), and for Smith 1928. The last is an awkward choice in terms of narrative drama, as it means that Smiths book ends with two whole chapters on the 1920s, when revolution was on hold under the New Economic Policy, a retreat from the maximalist aims of the Civil War period made necessary by economic collapse. Its true, something like NEP might have been the outcome of the Russian Revolution, but it actually wasnt, because Stalin came along. While the two chapters on NEP, like the rest of the book, are thoughtful and well-researched, as a finale its more of a whimper than a bang.

This brings us to another highly contentious issue in Soviet history: whether there was essential continuity from the Russian/Lenin Revolution to Stalin, or a basic disruption between them occurring around 1928. My Russian Revolution includes Stalins revolution from above of the early 1930s, as well as his Great Purges at the end of the decade, but that is unacceptable to many anti-Stalinist Marxists. (Not surprisingly, Mivilles annotated bibliography finds it useful though unconvincingly wedded to an inevitabilist Lenin-leads-to-Stalin perspective.) Smiths cohort of 1917 social historians generally felt much like Miville, partly because they were intent on defending the revolution from the taint of Stalinism; but in this book, as on many issues, Smith declines to take a categorical position. Stalin certainly thought of himself as a Leninist, he points out, but on the other hand Lenin, had he lived, would probably not have been so crudely violent. Stalins Great Break of 1928-31 fully merits the term revolution, since it changed the economy, social relations and cultural patterns more profoundly than the October Revolution had done and moreover demonstrated that revolutionary energies were not yet exhausted. Still, from Smiths standpoint its an epilogue, not an intrinsic part of the Russian Revolution.

Even-handedness is the hallmark of Smiths solid and authoritative book, and Im uneasily conscious of not having done justice to its many virtues. Really the only trouble with it and with many of the works being published in this centenary year is that its not clear what impelled him to write it, other than perhaps a publishers commission. He identified this problem himself in a recent symposium on the Russian Revolution. Our times are not especially friendly to the idea of revolution I suggest that while our knowledge of the Russian Revolution and the Civil War has increased significantly, in key respects our ability to understand certainly to empathise with the aspirations of 1917 has diminished. Other contributors to the symposium were similarly downbeat, the Russian historian Boris Kolonitsky noting that, while finding out the truth about the Russian Revolution had seemed enormously important to him back in Leningrad in the 1970s, interest in the topic is now falling drastically. I sometimes wonder: who cares now about the Russian Revolution? Steinberg asks sadly, while Smith writes on the first page of his Russia in Revolution that the challenge that the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 posed to global capitalism still reverberates (albeit faintly).

In purely scholarly terms, the 1917 revolution has been on the back burner for some decades now, after the excitement of the Cold War-fuelled arguments of the 1970s. The days are long gone when the late imperial era could be labelled pre-revolutionary that is, interesting only in so far as it led to the revolutionary outcome. That started to change in the 1980s and 1990s, with social and cultural historians of Russia starting to explore all the interesting things that didnt necessarily lead to revolution, from crime and popular literature to the church. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the revolution shrivelled as a historical subject, revealing behind it the First World War, whose significance for Russia (as opposed to all the other belligerents) had previously been remarkably under-researched. That same collapse, by stripping away the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union, brought questions of empire and borderlands to the fore (hence Smiths subtitle, An Empire in Crisis, and Steinbergs chapter on Overcoming Empire).

In the 1960s, it was self-evident to E.H. Carr, as well as to his opponents like Leonard Schapiro, that the Russian Revolution mattered. It mattered to Schapiro because it had imposed a new political tyranny on Russia that threatened the free world, and to Carr because it had pioneered the centralised state-planned economy that he saw as a portent of the future. Coming to the subject in the 1970s, I concluded that, along with the many betrayals of socialist revolution pointed out by Trotsky and a host of others, there were also many achievements in the realm of economic and cultural modernisation, notably state-sponsored rapid industrialisation in the 1930s. Hobsbawm made a similar point on a wider canvas when he noted that Soviet-based communism became primarily a programme for transforming backward countries into advanced ones. The modernisation point still seems right to me, but it has been tarnished by the fact that, on the economic side, it is a kind of modernisation that no longer looks modern. Who cares now about building smoke-stack industries, except in a context of polluting the environment?

Brentons confident summation has a free-market triumphalism that, like Fukuyamas End of History, may not stand the test of time, but it reflects the negative verdict of much current writing on the Russian Revolution:

It has taught us what does not work. It is hard to see Marxism making any sort of comeback. As a theory of history the revolution tested it, and it failed. The dictatorship of the proletariat did not lead to the communist utopia, but merely to more dictatorship. It also failed as a prescription for economic governance. No serious economist today is advocating total state ownership as the route to prosperity not the least of the lessons of the Russian Revolution is that for most economic purposes the market works much better than the state. The rush away from socialism since 1991 has been Gadarene.

If the Russian Revolution had any lasting achievement, he adds, it is probably China. Smith, in more cautious terms, makes a similar assessment:

The Soviet Union proved capable of generating extensive growth in industrial production and of building up a defence sector, but much less capable of competing with capitalism once the latter shifted towards more intensive forms of production and towards consumer capitalism. In this respect the record of the Chinese Communists in promoting their country to the rank of a leading economic and political world power was far more impressive than that of the regime on which it broadly modelled itself. Indeed, as the 21st century advances, it may come to seem that the Chinese Revolution was the great revolution of the 20th century.

Now thats a conclusion that Putins Russia still uncertain what it thinks of the revolution, and therefore how to celebrate it needs to ponder: the Russian Revolution brand is in danger. Perhaps by the time of the bicentenary Russia will have worked out a way to salvage it, as the risk of losing a chapter in the world history of the 20th century is surely one that no patriotic regime should ignore. For the West (assuming that the extraordinarily resilient dichotomy of Russia and the West survives into the next century), it is bound to look different as well. Historians judgments, however much we hope the opposite, reflect the present; and much of this apologetic and deprecatory downgrading of the Russian Revolution simply reflects the short term? impact of the Soviet collapse on its status. By 2117, who knows what people will think?

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What's Left? - London Review of Books (subscription)

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Turning Maphisa into an agro-processing hub – Chronicle

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Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa (left) tours Arda Antelope in Maphisa in Matabeleland South accompanied by Arda Board chairman Basil Nyabadza and other dignitaries in this file photo

Business Editor, Prosper Ndlovu IN pursuit of a new trajectory of accelerated economic growth and wealth creation, the Government formulated a strategy known as the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim-Asset: October 2013-December 2018).

In the foreword to this economic blueprint, President Mugabe noted that the strategy was crafted to achieve sustainable development and social equity anchored on indigenisation, empowerment and employment creation, which will be largely propelled through judicious exploitation of the countrys abundant human and natural resources.

One such resource is the land, which is now in control of a majority of Zimbabweans following the successful land reform programme since the turn of the millennium.

This results-based agenda, said the President, is built around four strategic clusters that are meant to enable Zimbabwe to achieve economic growth and reposition the country as one of the strongest economies in the region and Africa. The four strategic clusters are: food security and nutrition; social services and poverty eradication; infrastructure and utilities and value addition and beneficiation.

The revival of the agriculture sector as the backbone of the countrys economy is at the heart of Zim-Asset as it speaks to the food security goals as well as the value addition and beneficiation thrusts. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) play a key role in this matrix as they add impetus in fast-tracking attainment of set economic targets. One of the flagship projects is the partnership between the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) and Trek Petroleum at Antelope Estate in Maphisa, Matobo District and Ingwizi Estate in Mangwe District.

Since February 2015 when ARDA entered into a five year partnership with Trek Petroleum, Antelope and Ingwizi Estates, which were on the verge of collapse, have registered improved output, creating more job opportunities for local communities. Recent reports show that ARDA Antelope, the pioneer project under the partnership, has made dramatic recovery and progressively expanded wheat and maize hectarage under rain-fed farming and irrigation cropping.

In the 2016/17 season, ARDA Antelope has 500ha planted under maize, which would be increased to 750ha in the coming winter cropping and 1 000ha in the next rain-fed season, ARDA board chair Mr Basil Nyabadza said recently. ARDA Ingwizi is at 600ha with plans to increase to 850ha this winter and 1 000ha by year-end. This means the two estates would by the end of the year have the capacity to produce about 10 000 tonnes of the crop each, which would contribute immensely to food security in the drought prone province.

During a visit to the two estates a fortnight ago, Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa said output conditions were ripe for Maphisa growth point in particular, to be turned into an agro-processing hub in Matabeleland South.

We already have silos and driers here and the next plan is to set up a milling plant for wheat flour and mealie-meal. With time if we grow soya bean here we will then need to set up an oil expressing firm.

We need to do manufacturing and packaging here. The market should go to where the product is and not the other way round. This means shops in Bulawayo and elsewhere will come here and order products. This will create more jobs in this area and this is the vision we have, said VP Mnangagwa.

He said the Governments objective was to facilitate inclusive development where ordinary people in communities participate in project development. The Vice President said there was a synergy between improved agricultural production and infrastructure development. He said establishment of a processing factory in Maphisa would necessitate a quick road infrastructure upgrade and attract more service providers to invest in the business centre.

This means everything will be done here and people from Bulawayo will come and get produce here. With such a big business, it will also be easy to fix the road network. When this is done Zimbabwe will bid goodbye to hunger. So, this is what we want, to achieve self sufficiency using local resources, said the VP.

He said a similar model could be applied to all productive zones in the country where agro-processing inputs like cotton, soya bean, tobacco, meat and horticultural produce was in abundance.

Chief Nyangazonke from Kezi also hailed the project but urged improved relations with the local community through mutual consultation with the traditional leadership.

This is a good project for us but communities need to be clear of what their input is? What their control is, and what is their benefit? These areas need consultation with locals so that we do not become visitors in our institution or projects, he said.

We are looking forward for employment of local people there. There should be a clear percentage of, say shares, to locals. The programme should also have a synergy with local farmers on the livestock front because our wealth lies in cattle.

On beneficiation of farm produce, Chief Nyangazonke said there should be a model of ensuring that milling, packaging and other services were given to locals so as to empower the community.

The community needs to feel part of this dream and have ownership for its success. There should not be a situation where people feel as outsiders or be treated as intruders. Even the elderly should feel the project is theirs and benefit from it, he said.

The chief said the expansion of ARDA Antelope should also encompass imparting farming skills to locals as well as training services to agricultural colleges and attachees. He said sustainable farming should also consider wild animals, which are part of the wealth of the community.

Zimbabwe is looking forward to a bumper harvest this year after receiving above normal rains. The Command Agriculture scheme, a specialised maize production programme, has added impetus with more farmers embracing the Government supported scheme. Communal farmers, who also benefited from the Presidential Inputs scheme, are also expected to get positive yields despite hiccups such as shortage of fertiliser and the outbreak of pests such as the fall army worm, which affected some crops, mainly in January.

Prospects for the 2016/17 season, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development, indicate that the country would harvest an excess of two million tonnes enough to meet domestic consumption and processing industry needs.

Government has already suspended grain imports saying the country has enough food reserves with more deliveries expected at the Grain Marketing Board depots when harvesting starts next month.

Agro-processing industries such as millers, brewery and stockfeed manufacturers stand to benefit immensely from improved yields. Increased yields are set to spur agro-processing industrial output, Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries president, Mr Busisa Moyo said.

Beyond 2017, experts say Zimbabwe now needs to come up with a strategic model to enhance food production throughout the year using irrigation farming. This is crucial in view of droughts experienced in the last few years across the country and the region at large, which are testimony to the reality of climate change that had made rain-fed agriculture unreliable.

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Cadre deployment does little for the country’s future or the wine … – Daily Maverick

Posted: at 2:36 pm

Just as the ANC cannot suddenly introduce meritocratic performance as an employment criterion anywhere that supporters have been rewarded with a job, the wine industry cannot suddenly abandon its accredited training systems and its community outreach projects, whether or not they are really producing palpable benefits.

Like everything else that has been left to cadre deployment, essential infrastructure has collapsed in a welter of ineptitude and corruption. Not all these failures are equal: as the roads get worse, the number of off-road vehicles on urban roads simply increases. As power availability and distribution deteriorates, businesses which require ample supplies of electricity simply shut down or generate the own requirements. However, when, through lack of foresight and planning, the state fails to provide water for urban dwellers, theres no easy fix. If you think the current service delivery protests have the potential to turn scary, the great-granddaddy of them all lurks in the failure to deliver clean fresh water to the 15-million or so residents (12-million South African citizens and probably three-million foreigners) living in Gauteng and delivering more than a third of the countrys GDP.

Of course this is symptomatic of a greater malaise: the belief that past injustices can be used to justify present pillaging. There may be a sense of symmetry to this logic but it is both functionally indefensible (a shirt stolen from Edgars in Eastgate cannot be returned to Stuttafords in Sandton City) and not conducive to proper nation building. To feed more people, the cake must grow in size, so it's not a good idea to attack the bakers.

Harvard Professor Ricardo Hausmann made this very clear at a recent CDE briefing when he highlighted the dangers of creating an internal enemy white monopoly capital. This, he said, is based on a fundamental lie and is super-counterproductive... But it is a scapegoat and a dangerous one because it puts the accent on the firms that exist when the problem of SA is the firms that do not yet exist that need to employ the nine-million people who dont work.

Blaming someone or something else to deflect attention from ones own shortcomings is not a uniquely South African solution to political incompetence, though, as with many things, weve taken the sleights of hand of others and raised them to an art form. For Hitler the problem with the post-Great War German economy was the Jews, and the strategy of blaming them for his countrys ills turned out to be potent muti in his quest for power. Only afterwards (and the post-World War ll generation of Germans is still paying the price for this) did the lie seem obvious, but by then tens of millions of people were dead and the country lay in ruins.

The Cape wine industry has been wrestling (sort of) with the problem of transformation. However, since the wine business is intrinsically unprofitable (it's estimated that around 50% of all producers are actually losing money), it doesn't lend itself to the kind of BEE deals that worked so well with listed companies in the 1990s. With no easy way to change the complexion of the farming or production side, and plenty of pressure to look like it's doing the right thing, the industry has come up with a host of proposals all with suitably arcane BBBEEE scorecard acronyms. These include L&D (Learning and Development), LMS (Learner Management Systems), SEC (Socio-Economic Development) and ED (Enterprise Development) terminology that would make its way easily to George Orwell's Top 10 list.

There are numberless courses for cellar workers (skills enhancement) as well as a smattering of programmes for those who work in the vineyards. As one committed but pragmatic producer put it recently: You will be surprised to see how many certificates we issue annually... From fire prevention to health and safety to forklift and tractor driving to how to prune young vines, Windows95, MS Word 97, etc etc.

Rosa Kruger, one of the country's foremost viticulturists, is less concerned about scorecards and more concerned with the systemic issues affecting wineland communities. Her arguments are to-the-point, simple and blunt, and relate primarily to the importance of introducing basic training for vineyard workers, and making it compulsory for farmers to send their workers to attend two such courses every year. Empowerment starts with education. Social upliftment starts with education. I have lost too many vineyard workers to Tik, TB and violence, to not notice the absolute desperation. I think by education we can start the long and cumbersome process of upliftment. If Kruger has her way, the obligation to send vineyard workers on these courses would become mandatory for producers seeking certification under the Integrated Production of Wine (IPW) guidelines.

Here is where the Orwellian world of not-very-useful acronyms misses the intersection with the real world. Like cadre deployment (which really means giving the largely under-skilled party faithful the money which should be invested in managing existing infrastructure and building new power stations, pipes and roads before the old ones collapse), many of the options chosen by the industry are scorecard-related. They sound good, they may even make those involved feel good, but they're not doing much for the country's future.

However, they share with cadre deployment the status they enjoy simply by being entrenched. Just as the ANC cannot suddenly introduce meritocratic performance as an employment criterion anywhere that supporters have been rewarded with a job, the wine industry cannot suddenly abandon its accredited training systems and its community outreach projects, whether or not they are really producing palpable benefits. However, there is also a difference: whatever the shortcomings of the industrys formal efforts, the intention is to produce a higher skills and happiness quotient. The same obviously cannot be said about cadre deployment. DM

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Valley Hawks, Fighting Poets, others who will replace Lord Jeff? – Amherst Bulletin

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AMHERST Emily Dickinson, Robert Frost and other famed artists who lived and worked in town could represent the athletic program at Amherst College as the fighting poets.

Its also possible the next mascot for the college will be represented not by pugilistic imagery or writers, but rather by animals that inhabit the regions woods and skies, such as Wolves or Valley Hawks. Perhaps an extinct species that once roamed the Earth, like the Mammoth, whose skeleton is on display in a campus museum.

Or maybe the college will stick with the name recently applied to its athletics program: The Purple & White.

On Thursday, college officials unveiled the final five mascot choices, selected by the mascot committee, that will be the subject of a vote by students, alumni, faculty, staff and friends of the college. An online vote will run from Monday through March 31.

The process to pick a new mascot follows the removal of the controversial Lord Jeff as Amhersts unofficial mascot early in 2016.

Lord Jeff was cut from the team following a student demonstration for increased equity at the school in November 2015. Many students, faculty and alumni objected to the long-used mascot because of historical evidence that Lord Jeffery Amherst advocated employing germ warfare to wipe out American Indian tribes.

The colleges mascot committee received more than 2,000 suggestions, amounting to nearly 600 unique ideas. After soliciting the input of 441 student and alumni delegates, officials revealed the 30 semi-finalists in January.

Two of the top vote getters in that earlier round, Hamsters and Moose, failed to make the final cut.

The vote will feature an instant run off, or rank choice voting, where voters will be asked to put the finalists in order from favorite to least favorite. If one of the five wins a majority, it will be the next mascot. If none get this majority initially, then the votes will be dispersed until one achieves a majority.

The colleges website provides background information about why each mascot choice is appropriate.

The Fighting Poets doesnt signify any specific artist, even though Dickinson lived in Amherst and Frost taught at the college. Rather, it celebrates multiple poets who have taught, studied or written poetry in association with the college or town of Amherst.

Mammoths has a college connection, with the Beneski Museum of Natural History displaying the skeleton of a Proboscidea, unearthed by Professor Frederick Brewster Loomis and brought to town in 1925.

Purple & White have been the colleges colors since April 30, 1868. Its served as the unofficial nickname of sports teams for the past several months.

The Valley Hawks mascot, according to the college website, would reflect pride in the campus bird sanctuary and the colleges other connections to avian studies.

Finally, the website notes: Known for their keen senses, intelligence and power, wolves collaborate and care for one another in packs, but they can also represent individuality and independence.

Scott Merzbach can be reached at smerzbach@gazettenet.com.

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Valley Hawks, Fighting Poets, others who will replace Lord Jeff? - Amherst Bulletin

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Cameroon continues its oppression of English speakers – The … – Washington Post

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By Denis Foretia By Denis Foretia March 21

Denis Foretia is co-chair of the Denis & Lenora Foretia Foundation and a senior fellow at the Nkafu Policy Institute.

What began as occasional protests in Cameroon by Anglophone lawyers and teachers trade unions in November 2016 has now transformed into full-scale civil disobedience. Cameroons English-speaking citizens constitute 20 percent of the total population of about 24 million. The oppressive response from the government has brought the country to a state of complete political paralysis. What happens next will have serious ramifications on the future and political construct of the country.

English-speaking Cameroonians of the Southwest and Northwest regions have a unique historical experience in the country. In the referendum of 1961 the region, previously under U.N.-mandated British trusteeship, voted to reunite with the French-speaking Republique du Cameroun to form a two-state federation. In 1972, contrary to strict constitutional provisions, the countrys first president, Ahmadou Ahidjo, orchestrated a referendum that changed the governing system into a unitary state with ensuing hyper-centralization of decision-making in Yaounde, the nations capital. Twelve years later, President Paul Biya, now 84 years old and in his 35th year of power, changed the countrys name from the United Republic of Cameroon back to the Republic of Cameroon, further alienating the Anglophones who were already being seen and treated as second-class citizens.

Cameroon today suffers from entrenched poor governance across all sectors, but the Anglophone marginalization is particularly pronounced. Of the36 government ministerswho control departmental budgets, only one is an Anglophone. Despite constitutional stipulations, the use of English barely exists in government administration. French-speaking teachers who barely understand English are sent to teach in Anglophone regions. Magistrates trained in French civil law, with no knowledge of the English language, are sent to administer the law to an English-speaking population that practices British common law. Anglophone teacher trade unions as well as lawyers have vehemently opposed this government-driven francophonisation of their communities. It is not the first time they have protested,but this time the challenge is different. Today, the entire Anglophone population is irate and speaks with one voice.

The governments response to the peaceful protests and civil disobedience has been true to its Jacobin teaching of total repression: the arrest of Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium leaders who are now accused of acts of subversion punishable by death; the arbitrary arrest of more than 110 English-speaking Cameroonians; the curtailing of civil liberties, especially freedom of speech; and the allegedrape and torture of university studentsby some members of the security forces. Many Anglophones have been killed and many others have fled the country. In an act of desperation, the government has shut down the Internet to the English-speaking regions, for two months now, as a last resort in preventing the spread of civil disobedience to the French-speaking regions.

The fight against the Islamic sect Boko Haram in the three northern regions, as well as the very porous borders in the East region with the Central African Republic, have created an extremely tenuous security situation. Conflict in the Northwest and Southwest means six of the 10 regions will face security challenges. National revenues and foreign exchange havedropped significantly in recent years, driven by low oil and commodity prices worldwide. There is growing pressure from the International Monetary Fund to devalue the currency and will likely result in the implementation of austerity measures that would undoubtedly be opposed by the predominantly young population. For a country with 62 percent of its population under the age of 25, this potential demographic dividend is far from being achieved.

The politics of fear and iron-fisted rule, a government specialty, has been completely crushed by Anglophones with Francophones taking full notice. State-citizen relations have been dramatically altered in a way similar to that of East Germany just before it collapsed in 1989. It is becoming increasingly questionable whether elections scheduled for 2018 will be possible.

Cameroon faces a historic opportunity to transform itself into a pluralistic, democratic, broad-based market economy where diversity is at the core of its raison dtre. It can choose to be a country where open, frank debates are celebrated, as demonstrated in Ghana, not one where countless presidential decrees are the norm.A federalist governing system, perhaps a 10-state federation, is the surest way to resolve these crises while simultaneously enhancing national unity and well-being.Cameroonians must continue to fight for this. Will the Biya government see the writing on the wall or will it, by being incapable of changing, continue down its repressive path with the consequences that abound?

Cameroon continues its oppression of English speakers – Washington Post

Posted: at 2:35 pm

By Denis Foretia By Denis Foretia March 21

Denis Foretia is co-chair of the Denis & Lenora Foretia Foundation and a senior fellow at the Nkafu Policy Institute.

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Cameroon continues its oppression of English speakers - Washington Post

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Israeli Playwright Joshua Sobol Confronts Oppression And Corrupt Leadership With His Work – WBUR

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wbur Joshua Sobol. (Courtesy New Repertory Theatre)

His plays have made an impact, causing a riot in a Tel Aviv theater, championing the rights of Palestinians and attracting the attention of renowned British actor Brian Cox.

Israeli playwright Joshua Sobol may not cause quite as much commotion in the Boston area as he begins a two-week residency, but with titles like that of the lecture hes scheduled to deliver at no less than five Boston area venues "Theatre as a Form of Resistance to Oppression and Genocide" dont expect a celebration of contemporary political leaders.

I read only today in the newspapers about the human catastrophe in Africa, the keenly attentive Sobolsaidin a recent interview. There are some 20 million people who are risking starvation there in Africa because of these tribal wars that are going on there, and which seem to have no obvious reason except just making war for the sake of war."

This is one side of the coin, the playwright added. The other side of the coin is what happens in Europe and the United States with nations who are becoming very paranoid and fearful because of the wave of refugees, asylum seekers and so on. The two phenomena are interconnected, of course ... I think that this wave of panic is very dangerous because we dont have adequate leaders in the Western world or adequate leadership to face that problem and to solve it somehow and deal with it.

"I think that this wave of panic is very dangerous because we dont have adequate leaders in the Western world or adequate leadership to face that problem and to solve it somehow and deal with it."

Where political leadership fails, the arts often and fearlessly pick up the slack. Sobol's residency will be with Boston-based Israeli Stage, but his sojourn here also happens to coincide with a season in which the New Repertory Theatre's theme is "What's Past is Prologue." (And, in case you don't get what they're hinting at, one of its first productions this year was the cautionary tale "Good" about a decent man's slide into Nazism; another was a pointed reading of "Fiddler on the Roof.")

Sobol's visit is also planned to unfold in parallel with New Rep's month-long "New Works" festival, which includes a presentation of Greensboro Arts Alliance & Residency/Mirror Theater's fully staged production of his play, "Sinners." Staged readings of two more of Sobol's works are also on the itinerary, one of them a world premiere by Israeli Stage. (Sobol will also take time out of his lecture series to chat live with The ARTery's editor Ed Siegel at theCharles Mosesian Center in Watertown.)

The story of this remarkable cross-institutional adventure begins with Israeli Stages producing artistic director and founder, Guy Ben-Aharon, meeting Sobol in Israel in 2012, just a couple of years after the companys start in 2010.

Of the prolific Sobol author of more than 75 plays over the course of a career spanning four decades Ben-Aharon said, He embodies the act of winking, if you will. Very whimsical, very sharp, cynical, yet optimistic."

A few months after we first met, Ben-Aharon continued, Israeli Stage presented the American premiere of 'Sinners' ... as a staged reading with Nael Nacer and Maureen Keiller.

That initial meeting eventually led to an invitation to Sobol to travel to Boston for the "In Residence" program at theIsraeli Stage, which is dedicated to bringing top Israeli playwrights to the Greater Boston Area to workshop new plays, according to an Israeli Stage statement.

That goal will be fulfilled with the world premiere of"David, King," a new Sobol work, in a staged reading featuring Boston actor Jeremiah Kissel. "David, King," Sobol said, is an interpretation of the historical Jewish leader as a man reluctant to accept his place on the throne.

I took the biblical story of King David, and I tried to create a kind of narrative that is not [typically] the kind of narrative when we deal with King David, Sobol said. I represent him as a king who didnt want to be king, who was basically an artist a musician, a songwriter, a poet. And he is somehow forced to take over the throne of Judea. On every occasion that offers itself he tries to get rid of the throne. He says he doesnt seek to power.

The playwright pointed out that his interpretation has scriptural roots. I found it in the Biblical story King Saul was [a] paranoid person and he [feared] David was dreaming after the throne. King Saul tried to kill David and tussled with him On various occasions in the Biblical story, David says to him, Listen, I could kill you, but I dont want to kill you. Please understand, I dont want to become a king. Leave me alone. And so in this sense its a kind of a comedy, but its a serious comedy, saying, Maybe we should elect leaders who are not greedy for power, and who are not eager to stick to power. People who when the mission is accomplished, they are ready to step aside and give it over to others.'

He tied the theme of the new play to current events, remarking, I believe that in our situation, when we see leaders sticking to power for longer periods, power corrupts and they become corrupted. Corruption is again a danger, because corrupt leaders are always trying to justify themselves by creating a crisis and saying, Now is a time of national emergency; our existence is in danger, and so on. 'David, King' has to do with that question of what is an ideal king, or an ideal leader. In my mind, its someone who has a very clear mission, and if the people dont want to follow him on that mission he says, OK, Im not imposing it on you. Im stepping aside. Do what you want.

Sobol has never been afraid to court controversy with his work. "Ghetto," one of his first plays and still his most famous examines the Holocaust through a surreal lens. A 1985 play titled "Palestinian Girl," written when he was assistant artistic director for a theater in Haifa, challenged deep-seated Israeli notions even before the play went up.

You see, the playwright explained, in the '80s it was almost a taboo in Israel to use the word Palestinian, a taboo that Sobol clarified by noting that accepting Palestinian as a name for a genuine and distinct minority means we have to recognize the Palestinians as a people; and then once you recognize them as a people, you have to accept that they have rights as a people using the word Palestinian and putting it on the posters on the theater was already a challenge for many people, and we had problems with subscribers of the Haifa theater of the time who protested against the title of the play. They wanted [the theater] to return their subscriptions because we had the word Palestinian on the poster. In the end, the fuss was worth it: I dont say that I was the only one, but I helped also to legitimize the use of that word.

"I think that theater and the arts in general, when they make a common effort and they join forces, they can change the discourse in a society. They can change the priorities."

I think that theater and the arts in general, when they make a common effort and they join forces, they can change the discourse in a society. They can change the priorities, Sobol continued. I am not nave; I am not exaggerating in estimating the power of theater or of art to change political trends, but you can do something. I feel it is my duty. It is still my duty now.

A few years later, in 1988, Sobol created still more controversy with his play"The Jerusalem Syndrome," which so outraged theatergoers a riot broke out and Sobol ended up leaving his post at the theater. Despite the personal cost, Sobol saw the response to the play as a sign that he was on the right path.

I must say that the moment when the riots broke out in the auditorium when we played 'The Jerusalem Syndrome' in Tel Aviv for the first time, in January 1988 it was a moment when the auditorium really became a kind of arena of violence it was a moment when I felt that the theater is doing what it should do, because the play was about the danger of society indulging in zealotism, fanaticism and a warning that if we will indulge in a nationalistic fanaticism, we will maybe end up in a catastrophe and the destruction of the state of Israel, because I believe that the fanatics, they lead society to disaster, Sobol recounted. I think we are still running the danger in Israel. Now we have a government, the most extreme right wing government we had in our short history of 70 years, and it is a government that fills me with apprehension, and with fear sometimes.

But Sobol has not stopped responding to the times as he feels he must. Another play he's only recently completed is titled "Bereaved," in which two families one Israeli, the other Palestinian meet. The Israeli clan has lost a son, but its Palestinian counterpart has also sustained the loss of a child, a daughter, who was shot at a checkpoint.

"We'retrying to deal in this play with bereavement as a reason to look deep into what they are doing and to understand that [while] it is a catastrophe on a personal level for the families, we should consider it a catastrophe on the national level," Sobol said, adding that if no humane and compassionate solution is found, Israelis and Palestinians will "become two bereaved societies, [each of them] badly injured.

"Now, we are going to do the play with two couples," the playwright continued. "A couple of Israeli Jewish actors, and another couple of Palestinian actors. Also, maybe, part of it will be in Hebrew and part of it will be in Arabic. We shall see what the audience will make of it." With a laugh, Sobol confessed, "I don't know what to expect."

That sense of blended urgency and uncertainty also colored the Vermont production of Sobols play "Sinners." After Israelis Stages American premiere of the play as a staged reading in 2013, a full production by Greensboro Arts Alliance & Residency/Mirror Theater eventually followed. Mirror Theater will repeat the feat for Sobols visit, though this time the play will be staged in Boston, at TheatreLab@855, in a presentation by the New Repertory Theatre in association with the Boston University-affiliated Boston Center for American Performance.

Actress Nicole Ansari reprises her role as Layla, a married teacher charged with having an adulterous affair with a young man named Nur. When Nur betrays her, Layla faces death by stoning. Its strong stuff, and Ansari felt so strongly about the work that she ended up played a key role in getting "Sinners" to the stage in Vermont in the first place.

Ive known Joshua for 20 years, Ansari said in a recent phone conversation that included her husband, actor and director Brian Cox. I worked with him on a play called 'Alma' that he wrote especially for the international theater festival in Vienna.

Ansari went on to explain that about four years ago he sent me this play, ['Sinners'], and said to me, I think you should do this play. You are perfect for this. I read it and I was just bawling; I had to read it two times in a row because the first time I read it I just couldnt read it because my tears were all over the paper. When Cox found his wife in this state and asked what she was reading, she showed him Sobols play. Cox decided on the spot he wanted to direct it.

Fast forward to 2015, when Ansari had just finished starring in a run of "Hamlet" with Mirror Theater. The plays director, Sabra Jones also the producing director for Greensboro Arts Alliance & Residency/Mirror Theater asked Ansari what she might like to do for the following season.

I said, Well, besides "Medea" and "Hedda Gabler," I dont know,' " Ansari recounted. There is one play, but I dont think its right for Vermont. Its about a woman being stoned to death for adultery in the Middle East.

Sabra, however, loved the script.She was all over it she said, No, no, no, we can make this work. It think its perfect, Ansari said. Cox signed on as director, and the show went up.

I had always wanted to direct Nicole, and she would be the perfect vehicle [for this play] in some ways, Cox chimed in. Shes half Iranian, so its part of her culture.

Vermont audiences responded appreciatively. Despite their uncertainty about how the play would be received, Cox said, the reaction was tremendous, absolutely tremendous. People came back two or three times to see it. Then the production found fresh life, thanks to Sobols planned visit. Cox recalled that the people from Boston said, Would you bring it? Were doing this retrospective of Joshuas writing.

"...if you feel that its your destiny to share your insights, then you do it with your means. I do it with my plays."

Retrospective might not quite be the word for it, just as "Sinners" does not exactly fit into the New Repertory Theatres month-long Festival of New Works ("We're grouping it with the festival even though its not very new, but [its] new to Boston, New Rep publicist Michael Duncan Smith explained.),but a sense of occasion, and of communal enthusiasm, attends this celebration of Sobol and his career.

Sobol gave a suitably lyrical summary of his work as ourinterview wound down. There was a poet, Elsa Lasker-Schler, a German Jewish poet who compared the artist to a tree that gives its fruits. She said he cannot force anyone to eat the fruits that he offers, but he cannot help giving the fruits. I accept the metaphor, and I think this is probably the best view of the artist. If you can avoid it, then you must not offer anything. But if you feel that its your destiny to share your insights, then you do it with your means. I do it with my plays."

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" My experience from the 1990s…helped me stay ahead of my hunters" – Honorable Wirba Joseph finally breaks the … – Cameroon Concord

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Honorable Wirba Joseph has finally broken the silence following reports that he has fled Cameroon to avoid arrest. See what he wrote via his official Facebook page below...

My Dear Sisters and Brothers,

The struggle of the people of West Cameroon is on course. I wish to welcome all of you to my new official Facebook page. You can also join the #WirbaForce on Twitter (@HonWirbaJoseph) and Instagram (@WirbaJosephM). This will enable me reach out to you and participate in your determined push for our freedom.

Let me take this opportunity to thank all of you, on behalf of our people, and from the bottom of my heart, for all your prayers, support, and unquestionable commitment towards our struggle.

I will also want to inform you that after I led the persistent hard push on the colonial government, their brutal military forces came searching for me. The order for my arrest was given by the Secretary General at the presidency of Cameroon in agreement with the Minister of Interior and designated the Chief of Police, Mbarga Nguele to execute. There were two names in that arrest order: WIRBA JOSEPH, SDF MP and AYAH PAUL ABINE! The execution date was January 20th, 2017! The Cameroon government's goal was to stop me from reaching Kumba, in the South West Region where I was to lead a follow up rally after the one in Kumbo, North West Region! The manhunt for me was thus launched and I am sure their main target was to assassinate me.

My experience from the 1990s when we fought in the streets to ensure the SDF party survived the brutal onslaught of our oppressors, helped me stay ahead of my hunters. My immediate goal was to stay safe in order to continue the fight for our freedom. All you need to know for now, is that l am safe and despite the overwhelming challenges of life on the run, my spirits are very high because of my firm belief that the time to seize our freedom is now! We will remain vigilant and smart in our strategies.

My brothers and sisters, l will not sleep, rest or have any peace as long as some our children lie dead and others hospitalized from the brutal guns of our oppressors; as long as some of our brothers and sisters are in jail, on the run, in hiding, or violently forced into exile! How can l have any respite when millions of West Cameroonians at home live the daily misery of man-made poverty under violent government oppression?

For now, social media presents a convenient forum, especially to those of you in the diaspora with unlimited access. It presents an opportunity for you and I to connect, communicate, and forge a stronger and united team to resist oppression and take back our freedom.

I will continue to remain honored by your commitment, participation and prayers.

Please feel free to share any communiques that are published on my page to as many sympathizers and supporters as you can to help advance our cause for freedom.

I wish you all good health and God's abundant blessings.

Stay blessed Hon. WIRBA.

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" My experience from the 1990s...helped me stay ahead of my hunters" - Honorable Wirba Joseph finally breaks the ... - Cameroon Concord

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Iran’s War on Drugs: Holding the Line? | Middle East Institute

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Drugs and stimulants have influenced Iranian social, economic, and political life for hundreds of years. Opium, specifically, has long been used in Iran for medicinal and recreational purposes. In the 18th and early 19th century, opium was produced in Iran mainly for domestic consumption. The expansion of the Far Eastern market in the late 1800s spurred an increase in opium cultivation in Iran. As a result, opium became Irans top export while domestic consumption also rose.

Throughout the 20th century, Iran grappled, largely unsuccessfully, with the problems of opium addiction and trafficking. Government policies alternated between severe punishment and regulation. The first law to control opium use was enacted in 1911. A little over a decade later, the government issued ration coupons to addicts and imposed levies on opium exports. Contrary to expectations, however, opium use did not slacken, and opium exports actually increased. In fact, by the late 1920s, opium accounted for nearly a quarter of Irans total export revenues.

In 1928, international pressure led Irans government to claim a monopoly on opium and to pledge to reduce poppy cultivation and demand. Yet, in the subsequent 10-year period, the area under poppy cultivation expanded, as did the volume of opium exports. Similarly, the 1955 Law on Prohibition of Opium Poppy Cultivation and Taking Opium had perverse effects stimulating production in Afghanistan and Pakistan, making the smuggling of heroin and morphine from there into Iran profitable, and ultimately leading to an upsurge in the number of Iranian addicts and incarcerated smugglers.

These unwelcome developments prompted an eventual policy shift. In the late 1960s, the Shahs government permitted the resumption of opium cultivation in designated areas under state supervision while at the same time making drug smuggling a capital offense punishable by death. In addition, the government instituted a system of opium rationing for addicts 50 years of age and older as well as for patients as prescribed by physicians; and laid the groundwork for establishing a nationwide system of health clinics and rehabilitation centers for addicts. However, these latter plans went unfinished, as Iran entered a period of revolutionary turmoil.

The Iranian Revolution (1979) and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) coincided with the protracted conflict in Afghanistan precipitated by the Soviet invasion. During this same period, Afghanistan emerged as the worlds leading opium poppy producer while Iranian consumption of opiates surged in spite of the revolutionary governments imposition of harsh criminal penalties (in August 1980) for all forms of substance abuse. Throughout the 1990s, Afghan poppy production flourished; meanwhile, in Iran, heroin use increased, as did heroin use by means of injection. The ban on poppy cultivation by the Taliban in 2000 resulted in shortages in the availability of opium, which shifted the drug consumption pattern in Iran toward even greater heroin use and addiction.

Iran is a key link in a complex transnational opiates supply chain that is anchored in southwest Asia. Known as the Golden Crescent, this production and trans-shipment zone encompasses the isolated mountain valleys of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. At the core of the Golden Crescent lies Afghanistan, the source of about 92% of the worlds heroin. The 2006 Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy Survey reported an all-time record high harvest, with total cultivation up 59% and production up 49% from the previous year. According to the 2007 Afghanistan Survey, production is 34% higher than in 2006. Figure 1 shows Afghanistans share of opium poppy cultivation in recent years.

Two primary routes are used to smuggle heroin originating from Afghanistan. The Balkan Route, which runs through southeastern Europe, is the main supply line for Western Europe. The Silk Route, which runs through Central Asia, feeds heroin into Russia, the Baltic States, Poland, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and other parts of Europe. While in recent years the Silk Route has become increasingly active, the lions share of Afghan opiates continues to pass through Iran along the Balkan Route as well as southward toward the Persian Gulf. The UNODC estimates that 60% of the heroin and morphine from Afghanistan moves through Iran to the external market, principally to Europe. The Iranian passageway is attractive to drug traffickers for the simple reason that they must cross just two borders to get to the European market.

Dotting Irans eastern borders a 936-kilometer stretch shared with Afghanistan and 909-kilometer segment shared with Pakistan are numerous entry points for smuggled consignments of opiates. Three main supply lines carry these shipments from Irans eastern frontier into and across the country: Northern (Khorasan), Southern (Sistan va Baluchistan), and Hormuzgan. The Northern and Southern lines are connected to the traditional Balkan network. The Hormuzgan line flows to Bandar Abbas, whose airport and ferry links to Dubai make it an easy trans-shipment point for deliveries to Europe and the Gulf, as well as incoming chemical precursors destined for heroin labs in Afghanistan.

Figure 1

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2007, Figure 15, p. 41.

Iran and the neighbors on its eastern flank are classic weak states. As such, their respective central authorities have traditionally lacked the capacity and the legitimacy to extend their writ to peripheral areas. Yet, these very areas are critically important nodal points in the highly segmented Iranian domestic and international opiates supply chain. It is therefore not surprising that the territory of Baluchistan a predominantly Sunni-populated ethnic-Baluch region that straddles the borders of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan has been a major opiates smuggling thoroughfare.

Indeed, Zahedan, the capital of the Iranian province of Sistan va Baluchistan, is a vital staging point for opiates trafficking. The province desolate and underdeveloped is notoriously lawless. In the 1970s, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi reached an accommodation with Baluchi clan leaders whereby they would abandon drug smuggling in exchange for government cash benefits. But in the post-revolutionary period, this arrangement broke down amid a general deterioration of the relationship between Tehran and Baluchi clans.

Major Trafficking Routes

Opiates smuggling in Sistan va Baluchistan has lately coincided with an escalation of violence there. In December 2005, an insurgent group known as Jundullah (Gods Brigade) reportedly abducted nine Iranian soldiers. In another incident three months later, 22 Iranians were killed. In February 2007, 11 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were reported killed in an attack for which Jundullah claimed credit. In a clash with drug smugglers in July 2007, 11 more IRGC personnel lost their lives. It is difficult to discern from the sparse media accounts of these and other incidents in Sistan va Baluchistan to what extent drug trafficking and insurgent activities might be linked.

Ethnic and religious minorities form part of the drug trafficking picture in other peripheral regions of Iran as well. Khorasan province, for example, hosts a large number of Afghan refugees. Drug traffickers along the Northern line, usually organized in smaller groups of up to 10 people, are mainly Afghans. The Southern and Northern Routes are maintained from central Iran onwards by Azeri and Kurdish mafias.

The Afghanistan-Iran drug connection is a complex phenomenon whose burden on the state and devastating effects on society flow in both directions. As previously mentioned, soaring Afghanistan opium and heroin production is fuelling Iranian opiate abuse and boosting Irans role as a drug transit country. At the same time, opiates abuse has skyrocketed in Afghanistan, with some reports stating that many addicts are returning refugees who had developed their drug habits while residing in Iran. The Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2006 concurs with these accounts,

not[ing] with concern the problem of drug abuse among Afghan refugees in neighbouring countries, including Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan. Approximately 35 per cent of male and 25 per cent of female drug abusers in Afghanistan first abused opium as refugees outside of Afghanistan, particularly in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in refugee camps in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. The Board also notes that evidence suggests a high risk of transmission of HIV among persons who abuse drugs by injection in Afghanistan, particularly among refugees returning from the Islamic Republic of Iran who abuse drugs by injection.

Whereas Turkey has long been the principal exit point for drugs transiting Iran, the porous border with Iraq has become a new destination and passageway on Irans western flank. The weakening of border controls and the breakdown of the security infrastructure of Iraq following the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in 2003 created a fertile environment for smuggling. In the intervening years, Iraqs nascent security forces, faced with a multitude of challenges, (understandably) have not made counter-narcotics their top priority. The influx of drugs into Iraq has contributed to a rising incidence of addiction among Iraqis and has opened up an additional pathway to the European market. According to Hamid Ghodse, president of the International Narcotics Control Board, drug traffickers have entered Iraq via Iran. Sometimes disguised as pilgrims, they have set up operations in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, smuggling opiates into and through Jordan. Media in the United Kingdom, drawing on accounts provided by British troops stationed in the south, have reported drug smuggling operations routed through Basra as well.

As mentioned earlier, Iran is a major destination, not just a corridor for illicit opiates. Nor, it should be mentioned, are opiates Irans only problem drugs. Opium and heroin are smuggled from the east, while hallucinogenic and chemical-based designer drugs enter Iran from Turkey and Bandar Abbas. The influx of narcotics into Iran, opiates in particular, has had a profoundly adverse impact on public health and public security.

The actual size of Irans drug user and drug addict populations is difficult to pin down, given that reliable data is scarce, Iranian official statistics tend to be more conservative than figures presented by the UNODC, and Iranian authorities restrict what the UNODC Tehran office may share publicly. Compounding the difficulty of gaining definite estimates of prevalence and incidence of substance abuse in Iran, as Mokri points out, are [s]ocial stigmatization along with legal restrictions on substance abuse [that] prevents drug users from admitting their act, offering clear data and referring to governmental sectors.

Though estimates of drug abuse and addiction in Iran vary, the statistics most often cited are nonetheless stunning. A Rapid Situation Assessment (RSA) of 10 urban centers conducted in 1998 reported a sharp increase in the availability of heroin, in heroin dependency, and in injecting drug use. The RSA 1998 estimated the total number of drug users as 2 million, with 1.2 million addicts and 800,000 recreational users. The first large sample nationwide study (conducted in 2001 by Irans Ministry of Health in cooperation with the UNODC) estimated the number of users of opium and heroin at about 3.76 million, of whom 1.39 million were classified as cases of abuse and 1.16 million as cases of addiction or dependence. In 2003, then-President Muhammad Khatami and State Welfare Minister Muhammad Reza Rah-Chamani stated that Iran had approximately 1.2 million heroin addicts and another 800,000 recreational heroin users. In April 2006, Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Gooya, the chief of the Iranian Health Ministrys disease-management center, put the figure at 2.5 million drug addicts and another 137,000 who inject drugs occasionally. According to Muhammad Reza Jahani, deputy head of Irans anti-narcotics organization, the number of drug addicts in Iran is increasing at a rate of 8% annually.

The spike in intravenous heroin use in Iran, as in many other countries, has been accompanied by a rise in HIV/AIDS infection rates among injecting drug users (IDUs). According to the UNAIDS/WHO AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2006, high HIV infection levels in intravenous drug users are a major concern in Iran. The report states, Almost one in four [23%] injecting drug users participating in a recent study in the Iranian capital, Tehran, [was] found to be HIV-infected. The report also states that risk behavior is widespread among IDUs unprotected sex and non-sterile syringes were the main causes of infection. Another study has shown that, The recent rise of heroin injection in Iran is strongly associated with HIV risk. The statistics are particularly alarming in the Iranian prison system, where in Tehran, for example, incarceration-related exposures [have been] revealed to be the main correlates of HIV-1 infection.

But the IDU-HIV nexus extends beyond the prison population. Studies describing HIV risk in Iran, though relatively few in number, all point to injecting drug use as the main transmission mode for contracting the disease; moreover, they indicate that the number of injecting drug users appears to be climbing. Emran Razzighi et al., for example, state that, Regardless of the actual number of IDUs, worrying trends suggest that, compared to non-injecting drug use, the prevalence of injecting drug use has increased more rapidly during the past decade and will continue to rise in Iran.

Irans drug problem has also contributed to an upsurge in violent criminality and corruption. Criminal violence (e.g., kidnapping and murder) has become particularly acute in the province of Khorasan, where drug lords reportedly resort to these crimes to ensure that local residents provide logistical support for their operations. In addition, over 3,500 Iranian law enforcement and security personnel have died in clashes with heavily armed drug traffickers over the last two decades in what former Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazzi once referred to as a full-scale war along Irans eastern border.

The drug problem has placed a massive burden on Irans criminal justice system as well. Irans prison population has swelled. In the first nine months of 2006 Iranian officials made public the dubious accomplishment of 314,268 drug-related arrests. According to Ali Akbar Yesaqi, the head of Irans Prisons, Security, and Corrections Organization, a large proportion of those incarcerated are drug offenders, and many of those are either drug users or addicts. In June 2006, Mohammad Ali Zanjirei, an Iranian prison official, stated that drug-related crimes are the most common in 19 of Irans 30 provinces. According to the 2007 US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), More than 60 percent of the inmates in Iranian prisons are incarcerated for drug offenses, ranging from use to trafficking. Narcotics-related arrests in Iran during the first nine months of 2006 were running at an annual rate of almost 400,000, which is a typical level for the last several years. Twice as many drug abusers were detained as drug traffickers. Iran has executed more than 10,000 narcotics traffickers in the last two decades.

Iran has been at the forefront of efforts by the international community to combat the Afghan drug trade. In 1998, the United States removed Iran from its list of drug-producing countries. As early as 2003, the US State Department Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) declared: There is overwhelming evidence of Irans strong commitment to keep drugs moving out of Afghanistan from reaching its citizens. As Iran strives to achieve this goal, it certainly also prevents drugs from reaching markets in the West. Similarly, the 2007 INSCR strategy report states that, Irans actions support the global effort against international drug trafficking.

At the national level, the main policymaking body responsible for planning and monitoring different aspects of the counter-narcotics campaign is the Drug Control Headquarters (DCH), which was established in 1988. The DCH coordinates the drug-related activities of the police (the leading enforcement unit in terms of drug seizures), the customs officers, the IRGC contingent, and the Ministries of Intelligence, Security, Islamic Guidance and Education, and Health.

Iran has also put in place a rudimentary counter-drug institutional network at the provincial and local levels. In 1989, acting on an order by the Expediency Council, the Mohammad Rasulollah Central Headquarters and three tactical headquarters of Salman, Meqdad, and Abuzar were established in the eastern part of the country. In 1991, the IRGC Qods headquarters was established. Shortly thereafter, the Islamic Revolution Committee was merged with the Law Enforcement Force, and the Mersad Headquarters was established. Much of this machinery is geared toward strengthening the states capacity to track and curb smuggling.

Since the founding of the Islamic Republic, drug-supply reduction has been the mainstay of Tehrans approach to combating the narcotics problem. As in other countries, Irans counter-drug efforts have traditionally rested on two pillars: the criminalization of drug possession and use, and the apprehension of smugglers and the interdiction of supplies. In the first few years of the Islamic Republic, this approach was rooted in the post-revolutionary leaderships ideology and efforts to consolidate power. The hard line against narcotics users and smugglers was part of the jihad against sin.

As previously mentioned, upon taking power, the revolutionary leadership declared the use of all intoxicants to be illegal. In keeping with the anti-Western tenor of the revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini declared that the distribution of heroin was a US-inspired conspiracy. The first post-revolutionary executive director and spokesman for Irans anti-narcotics task force Mokhtar Kalantari likewise explained the upsurge in drug use and addiction in Iran as part of the Wests war on Islam. And the crackdown against drug smuggling in Sistan va Baluchistan was portrayed as part of the struggle against seditionists. To be sure, Islamic ideology is still used to legitimate and reinforce the Iranian governments counter-drug policies. But, as will be shown, both the interpretation and the application of drug-related laws in Iran have changed.

Over the years, Iran has taken a number of steps to staunch the inflow of drugs from the east. The Iranian government has deployed more firepower to the periphery in order to reinforce local and provincial law enforcement officers. Beginning in the mid-1990s, Iranian security forces stationed an estimated 30,000 men along the eastern border. In 2000, Iran also created village-level Basij units, whose activities since then have broadened from defending villages to conducting offensive counter-narcotics operations. In an attempt to seal off the joint boundary with Afghanistan, Iranian authorities have sought to enhance border security by, among other things, installing barbed wire fencing, ground fortifications, and canals.

According to Iranian officials, security forces confiscated nearly 300 tons of drugs and arrested more than 370 traffickers between March 2005 and March 2006. The International Narcotics Control Board credits Iran with a considerable increase in seizures of opiates in 2005, putting the figure at 350 tons. (See Figure 2.) In the first nine months of 2006, by Iranian officials own calculations, interdiction efforts yielded 7.261 kilograms of heroin, 6.133 kilograms of morphine and 231,778 kilograms of opium. The UNODC confirms what Iranian officials have claimed about their vigorous interdiction efforts that substantial quantities of opiates have been intercepted.

Figure 2

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2007, Figure 24 , p. 48.

But despite these achievements, international experts acknowledge that over 60% of Afghan heroin, for example, continues to be smuggled through Iran the possible explanations for which are explored later in this study.

Over the past decade, a paradigm shift in Iranian counter-drug policies has been under way, marked by greater official acceptance of, and support for, demand and harm reduction interventions. Demand reduction encompasses a variety of measures that range from advocating the non-use of drugs, to treating individuals with problematic drug use and facilitating their reintegration in the community. Harm reduction aims at preventing the transmission of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases as well as death through overdose from drug injection.

By the late 1990s, Iranian authorities had begun to recognize the gravity of the HIV threat to the country. Springing from this realization were efforts, relatively uncoordinated at first, to raise public awareness about HIV. In 2001, in an attempt to develop more comprehensive and coordinated programs to combat HIV/AIDS, they established the National AIDS Committee. The following summer, they formed a sub-committee known as the National Harm Reduction Committee, tasked with developing ways to reduce the harm related to injecting drug use and curb the spread of HIV/AIDS among IDUs. Importantly, the members of these bodies encompassed official and non-governmental organizations ranging from the Ministry of Health, the Drug Control Headquarters, the national police, Iranian television, and the prison and welfare authorities to the research and academic institutions.

In an October 12, 2004 statement before the Third Committee of the United Nations, Irans Special Advisor to the UN Ms. Paimaneh Hastaei declared:

In an attempt to strike a balance between prevention, treatment and law enforcement activities, the Islamic Republic of Iran has assumed that demand reduction is as important as supply reduction; special attention is paid to the creation of effective prevention programs targeted at youth and high-risk groups.

Support for demand and harm reduction interventions among senior Iranian officials has been building, albeit very gradually. Beginning in the early 1990s, Iranian authorities introduced treatment regimes that range from abstinence-only to detoxification. In 1994, medical intervention for drug abuse became legal and explicit. Opioid agonists were used furtively in private clinics at first, and made officially available for detoxification programs only in 2001. Subsequent attempts have been made to improve pharmacological treatment and to introduce psychotherapeutic interventions for drug dependent persons.

The rise in the HIV infection rate, especially among intravenous drug users, catalyzed the shift in official attitudes towards a more favorable view of demand and harm reduction approaches. Razzaghi et al. write that there was a convergence of drug demand-reduction and HIV-prevention approaches. The prison population was the initial primary focal point of Irans more progressive interventions, gradually migrating from there into the general population. In fact, Irans burgeoning prison population is home to a large and growing number of drug injection users. Iran is one of just 22 countries that provide harm reduction services to incarcerated drug injection users (DIUs). The government sponsors peer counseling, the dissemination of information to and hotlines for prisoners. Bleach is made available to them for disinfecting needles. Inmates receiving methadone maintenance treatment (MMT) or ARV care are referred upon release to needle exchange programs and other health services. The majority of Irans 28 provinces have an after-care center for prisoners returning to the community.

With respect to the general population, under the reformist government of former president Muhammad Khatami, Iran adopted a more relaxed attitude, regarding users as criminals who need to be healed instead of locked up. The reformists stimulated awareness of and a lively debate about the sources as well as the most effective methods to respond to the narcotics problem. In 1997, the government passed a law stipulating that a drug user who voluntarily seeks treatment will be exempted from punishment.

The ascendancy of the reformists in Iranian politics thus fostered a climate conducive to generating progressive ideas regarding drug use. The work of Iranian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the close cooperation of the Ministry of Health and other stakeholders in the government, and informed advocacy among senior policymakers converted this new thinking into concrete action. Their combined efforts spawned three types of treatment responses to drug abuse in the general population: (1) the establishment of government-supported residential therapeutic centers, (2) the founding (in 1995) of a branch of Narcotics Anonymous (NA Iran) and NA support groups, and (3) the revival of outpatient clinics.

It is generally agreed that demand and harm reduction as concepts and as components of Irans counter-narcotics efforts took root during the Reform period. Some analysts suggest that since the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to office in August 2005, there has been a return to a primarily supply-side approach. Others, however, assert that the emphasis on harm reduction has continued. Kamin Mohammadi, for example, reports that, as of mid-2007, there were 51 government facilities, 457 private outpatient centers and an additional 26 transition centers. Indeed, demand and harm reduction interventions span the Reform and post-Reform periods:

The International Narcotics Control Board Report for 2006, attesting to Tehrans efforts to implement harm reduction measures, states:

In early 2006, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced an emergency plan to provide 3,000 people abusing drugs by injection in Tehran with a three-month treatment course. The Government also implemented a nationwide plan for the rehabilitation of drug addicts from November 2005 to March 2006. The Government is also taking various measures to deal with serious problems involving drug abuse in prisons.

Support for these efforts has come from seemingly unlikely sources. In January 2005, the judicial branch of the Islamic Republic of Iran issued a decree supporting needle exchange and warning against interference with these needed and fruitful public health interventions. That same year, Justice Minister Ayatollah Mohammad Esmail Shoshtari submitted a letter to prosecutors directing them to defer to the Health Ministry in order to counter the spread of HIV/AIDS and hepatitis. Upon close examination, this was no mere coincidence. Prominent members of the NGO community deliberately targeted key religious figures and government officials, presenting them with data and analysis in efforts to enlist their support. Over the years, a critical mass of practitioners-advocates has coalesced around the need to sustain and scale up demand and harm reduction measures.

The importance of grassroots organizations in building this policy network and in conceptualizing as well as conducting demand and harm reduction programs cannot be overstated. The work of two Iranian NGOs the Aftab Society and Persepolis is indicative of the key roles and contributions of grassroots organizations, the rich diversity of programs they administer, and their symbiotic relationship with state institutions. The Aftab Society, founded in 1998, claims to be Irans largest NGO (with offices in 13 provinces) and focuses its activities on education and prevention as well as on providing support for the families of drug addicts. The organization holds workshops in minority communities and, with support from the Ministry of Labor, conducts education workshops in factories across the country. Persepolis, founded in 1999, employs a peer-driven model and a public health approach to drug use. Among other things, this organization operates the largest methadone maintenance treatment (MMT) center in Iran. This work is conducted with support from the Ministry of Health as well as from the UNODC. Thus, beyond the actual work they do in the field, these organizations and others can be credited with helping to develop awareness and build capacity.

To be sure, Iranian officials remarks are often freighted with conflicting attitudes about the drug policies of Western countries. Their statements are laced with complaints that Iran has shouldered a great burden largely without the material assistance and credit it deserves. Some have charged that Western depravity is essentially responsible for unleashing the scourge of drugs on Muslim countries. Others have decried what they perceive as the international communitys shift in orientation from counter-narcotics to counter-terrorism. And in more intemperate moments, there are a few who have threatened to allow smugglers freedom to operate unless the international community is more forthcoming with assistance.

Yet, at the same time, Iranian officials at the highest levels have endorsed working in concert with others to address the narcotics problem. In a July 2007 meeting with the EC anti-drug commission, for example, Secretary of the Expediency Council Mohsen Rezai called for a comparative study of the methods and experiences of other countries in the fight against drugs.

The current global system for drug control rests on three international conventions the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), and the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). Iran is a party to all three. In 2001, the government of Iran ratified the 1972 Protocol amending the 1961 Single Convention. Iran, which is a signatory of the Paris Pact of 2003, is a strong proponent of an integrated regional approach to counter-narcotics.

For the past six years, the US State Department INL annual strategy reports have consistently stated that the government of Iran has demonstrated sustained national political will and has taken strong measures against illicit narcotics, including cooperation with the international community in support of the global effort against international drug trafficking. Indeed, Iran has established multiple points of contact and cooperation with regional and international partners to combat drug trafficking and, more recently, to develop effective demand and harm reduction interventions.

By 2000, Iran had held counter-narcotics discussions and/or signed memoranda of understanding (MoU) with Armenia, Australia, France, Georgia, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Norway, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and Turkmenistan. The May 1999 exchange of British and Iranian ambassadors, after a 20-year hiatus, helped pave the way for Anglo-Iranian cooperation in the counter-narcotics field. During a visit to Iran in February 2001, British Cabinet Minister Mo Mowlam pledged support for Irans counter-narcotics efforts. Since that time, Britain (and France) has contributed drug enforcement liaison officers and equipment, including sniffer dogs, bulletproof vests and night-vision goggles. In October 2004, Iran and Italy signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate on counter-narcotics. The agreement provided for the mutual access to data banks and cooperation between Iranian and Italian police.

Iran has been a beneficiary of assistance from the European Union (EU) as well. In 2005, the European Commission allocated 1.2 million euros to support demand reduction initiatives in Iran. This assistance was geared mainly towards helping local NGO networks to make progress in the area of demand control for narcotics and harm reduction.

At the regional level, in May 2005 Iran entered agreement with UAE to combat drug trafficking. In June of the following year, Iran signed a MoU pledging to help train Afghan border police, and calling upon Afghan leaders and the international community to establish a security belt and to destroy all opium processing labs. In July 2007, Secretary General of the Drugs Campaign headquarters Brigadier General Esmaeel Ahmadi-Moqaddam called for expansion of Iran-Saudi Arabia joint efforts to fight drug smuggling.

As early as 1990, Iranian officials approached the United Nations for assistance. Ghodratollah Asadi of the Health Ministry participated in discussions with officials from the UNODC in November of that year. The following May, a five-member observer team from Iran met with then UNODC director Giorgio Giacomelli to discuss coordinating activities against the illicit trafficking of drugs. This was bolstered by Irans appeal for support for its counter-narcotics programs from the United Nations.

In 1999, the UNODC opened an office in Tehran. The offices work covers drug supply reduction/law enforcement, drug demand reduction, and rule of law. Since beginning its work, this office has been engaged in the implementation of the NOROUZ Program, an umbrella of four major programs that deal with various aspects of the drug problem:

The Darius (Drug Abuse Research and Intervention Unified Strategy) Project, established in 2002, was (like the other projects) jointly designed and agreed upon by The Islamic Republic of Irans Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ) and the UNODC. The Darius institute, part of the project, serves the aim of strengthening the national response to drug addiction by focusing on demand reduction. Accordingly, the Institute organizes, monitors, and evaluates research and education projects as well as provides guidance to researchers.The institute spends 60% of its budget on drug abuse prevention, 30% on treatment and rehabilitation, and 10% on harm reduction programs.

In partnership with the UNODC, Iran has explored ways to develop more effective joint efforts at the regional level to staunch drug smuggling. Iranian officials, who have long insisted that the drug issue is a regional problem, have sought the assistance of the UNODC to help formulate an integrated approach that involves all three countries of the Golden Crescent. Iranian officials have participated in meetings facilitated by the UNODC and aimed at fostering trilateral cooperation. As a result, in December 2005, senior drug law enforcement officers agreed to joint patrolling on the border and to establish direct telecommunication links so as to share intelligence of an immediate nature related to drug smuggling activities. In June 2007, senior delegates from the three countries agreed to take action to improve border management, including constructing more physical barriers, boosting law enforcement capacity, launching joint counter-narcotic operations, better communication, and increased intelligence-sharing; to focus on all aspects of the drug economy (e.g., locating and destroying drug labs); and to hold policy-level coordination meetings twice yearly and to conduct technical-level exchanges every three months.

Interdiction: how successful? As discussed earlier, Iranian efforts to intercept drug shipments entering the country from the east have borne fruit. There are several reasons as to why Iran is nonetheless awash in heroin. The first reason is the sheer volume of supplies originating in Afghanistan. The second is the smaller-scale shipments and alternative routes and forms of transport utilized by traffickers, who continue to adapt to Iranian counter-drug methods. The third reason is the pull of the market. At the receiving end of the supply chain are the new and expanding markets for heroin in the Middle East and Africa. And then there is the pattern of drug consumption in Iran itself a burgeoning market that traffickers are eager and able to serve.

Iran: how committed? There are questions about whether Iran is applying counter-narcotics tools selectively. For example, have Iranian authorities tolerated some smugglers as in the PKK base reportedly set up on Iranian territory after the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in exchange for intelligence? There have been other unconfirmed reports that Iran has diverted some of the equipment provided to assist in its anti-narcotics efforts. According to several press accounts, Iran might have provided to Hezbollah about 250 sets of night-vision goggles that Britain had supplied for counter-narcotics purposes.

Iran: how capable? Hindering the effectiveness of Irans counter-narcotics efforts are factors very familiar to Americans: bureaucratic battles over funding, deep differences of opinion about the right balance between treatment and law and order; the firepower of traffickers; drug-related corruption. A. William Samii has reported on the ongoing conflict between the Drug Control Headquarters (DHCQ) and police, with the latter complaining DHCQ officials who do not have any practical experience come up with impractical theories and undermine the drug-control campaign.

But Iran-specific factors have also hampered the effort: the ethnic mix of the country coupled with center-periphery tension, which sometimes results in non-cooperation of locals with law enforcement authorities; and the backwardness of some provinces such as Sistan va Baluchistan, where smuggling is a coping strategy for some and a tool for supporting insurgency for others.

In addition, discussing the subjects of drug abuse and addiction may no longer be taboo in Iran. However, shame and stigma still attach to this behavior.

Irans Partners: how helpful? But there are also questions about how responsive and supportive others have been to Iran. Ambassador Mohammad Mehdi Akhundzadeh, the Iranian delegate to the UNODC in Vienna, complained that international aid to Iran is insufficient and trivial, IRNA reported.

European and other external assistance is undoubtedly limited. A number of national bans on dealing with and supporting Iran have contributed to this. The United States has applauded Iranian counter-narcotics efforts, encouraged regional cooperation and has not stood in the way of UNODC assistance. Nevertheless, Washington remains reluctant to establish a bilateral dialogue on narcotics while other issues, deemed of higher priority (e.g., the status of the Iranian nuclear program and Iranian involvement in Iraq), are unresolved.

At the regional level, Iranian officials have long voiced frustration that Afghanistan and Pakistan are not doing enough to staunch the production and flow of narcotics. UNODC officials and other international experts appear to agree. Commenting on Pakistans negligence, UNODC chief Maria Costa stated: Unfortunately, contrary to Iran, which has respected all its responsibilities in the campaign against drugs, Pakistan has been very negligent.

Apart from the issues of lagging support for and cooperation with Iran on counter-narcotics is the international communitys lack of urgency in tackling the skyrocketing opium poppy cultivation and production operations in Afghanistan. The recently declared US priority on disrupting the Taliban and Al Qaedas money stream by zeroing in on the Afghan narcotics problem represents a welcome, though belated development.

There are some bright spots in this otherwise gloomy picture. Harm reduction programs have not been the norm in Middle Eastern countries, but the recent remarkable growth of such programs in Iran could serve as a model for the whole region. In fact, Iranian NGOs are already leading the way. The Middle Eastern Harm Reduction Network was launched by Iranian civil society.

There are also some looming uncertainties. The factors driving ever-larger numbers of Iranians into drug abuse and addiction are poorly understood. Clearly, the draconian policies of the past had not curbed risk behaviors far from it. What remains unclear, however, is whether the incipient network of civil society and official supporters of demand and harm reduction interventions will be able to generate the momentum needed to implement an integrated approach to the opiates epidemic and scale up programs that are necessary to contain the multifaceted threat it poses to the country.

More here:

Iran's War on Drugs: Holding the Line? | Middle East Institute

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Deadliest Place to Deal review the carnage at the heart of Duterte’s war on drugs – The Guardian

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Deadliest Place to Deal: presenter Livvy Haydock with the mother of a drug suspect killed by the police. Photograph: Daniel Bogado/BBC

As a documentary presenter, Livvy Haydock is no stranger to risk. She has made films about girl gangs and prison smuggling. She has been to war zones and worked with Ross Kemp. But throughout Deadliest Place to Deal (BBC3) she looked profoundly ill at ease, as if the Philippines was the last place she wanted to be.

It is not hard to imagine why. It has been eight months since the foul-mouthed populist Rodrigo Duterte waselected president on a platform of eliminating crime, corruption and drugs. He promised that all of that would be gone in six months, a local journalist tells Haydock. He also promised it would be bloody.

It has been. Dutertes war on drugs has killed more than 7,000 people. The vast majority of these have been extrajudicial executions, either by police or more frequently by vigilantes acting on police instructions. To call Duterte unrepentant would be to understate things. Hitler massacred three million Jews, he said in one speech. Now there are three million drug addicts. Id be happy to slaughter them all. His numbers might be off, but there is no disputing his intent.

Haydock joined Manilas night-shift press pack, who travel from one bullet-ridden body to the next, reporting on as many as 22 killings a night. A single lonely underpass Haydock visited has seen 10 bodies turn up in the past eight months. Thats more than one body a month, said Haydock, who has a habit of resorting to the baldly obvious.

She is, however, nothing if not intrepid. She talks to the families of victims, goes on raids with the police, interviews a vigilante murderer and follows the bodies to the funeral home. She sees people being forcibly drug tested in their homes and at work by door-knocking cops. Anyone who tests positive is placed on the police drugs watch list the list used to furnish vigilantes with the names of people to be eliminated. Increasingly, political opponents of Duterte and even human rights workers find themselves targeted. Its really starting to look like a witch-hunt, said Haydock.

A lot of the camera work was the sort one associates with clandestine filming shaky, murky, reliant on the hastily framed closeup but everything was out in the open. The police were happy to be filmed at work. The drug dealer and the vigilante only required a bit of face drapery. What made Haydocks time in Manila so uncomfortably surreal was the backdrop of Dutertes extreme popularity: he won the election by alandslide, and currently enjoys approval ratings of around 80%.

Later, Haydock indulged a police spokesman in a bizarrely upbeat interview. Since the crackdown began, he said, all crimes happening in the streets went down, except for murder. Here, Haydocks gift for the obvious served her well. She pointed out that murder was sort of the worst crime. Heshowed her a pie chart comparing 760,000 surrenderers to the 1,795 people killed in police operations. Thats a big number, though, she said, pointing to the killing slice.

Where do we focus? he said. On the spot on the clean piece of paper? Oron the entire paper? He rather did himself in with his own analogy there.

The programme was rounded out with an interview with Dutertes sister, the family spokesperson. Chillingly, she ate lunch through it, pausing to swallow a forkful before defending the chaos and carnage as the will of the people. Now theres a phrase for the age.

The joy of The House That 100k Built (BBC2) is watching architect Piers Taylor manage both the expectations of budget-conscious self-builders and his own exasperation with their design choices. He smiles as he looks over their plans, but you can tell his eyes are bleeding on the inside.

Kevin and Leslie have got big ideas for a retirement dream house on the Isle of Sheppey, and only 50k to build it with now they have bought the plot of land. Their plan had a curved sloping roof and a staircase to match. Pierss sidekick Kieran Long said theyd fallen into the classic self-builders trap of giving showy design priority over a great place to live in. Piers was privately more blunt: I have to put my cards on the table, and say I just hate the roof.

Piers tried to convince Kev and Leslie that their roof was a stupid waste of money, but he only managed to talk them out of the staircase. At their next meeting he got rid of their two-storey wall of window. By the end of the show, their dream house was still only foundation-high. Mark my words: that crazy wavy roof has no chance.

Deadliest Place to Deal review the carnage at the heart of Duterte's war on drugs - The Guardian

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Iran’s War on Drugs: Holding the Line? | Middle East Institute

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